I group people according to their ideologies... — NOS4A2

What do you call people who believe that black people are somehow inferior to white people simply because they are black?

My definition is “ In it’s purest form, racism is the belief that the species may be divided into separate biological taxonomies called “race”.
— NOS4A2

It would follow that one who had no knowledge of biological taxonomy could not be racist. It would follow that all who used such divisions are/were racist. — creativesoul

I think that’s close. But I think in order to be racist one must apply biological taxonomy in his thinking. — NOS4A2

So, all people fighting against the unfair treatment of people based upon their race are racist?

My definition is “ In it’s purest form, racism is the belief that the species may be divided into separate biological taxonomies called “race”. — NOS4A2

It would follow that one who had no knowledge of biological taxonomy could not be racist. It would follow that all who used such divisions are/were racist.

Don't be such a dumb fuck! There is a long history of what racism is, of how the word is used, of what it refers to, of what it picks out to the exclusion of all else....

It does not pick out belief in race.

Appeal to the dictionary? For what. Belief in race is not racism. It's necessary for racism, but not sufficient.

We’re talking about race. At no point do I deny or ignore the legacy of racism. — NOS4A2

Good. Assuming you - like other reasonable considerate people - want to work on correcting racism, you must realize that it cannot be corrected by denying race.

I never said the belief in race equates to devaluing one because of her race. — NOS4A2

Right!

You said belief in race is racism. It's not!

Racism is devaluing someone based upon race. Belief in race is not racism.

So, after reading through those studies, in addition to relevant links therein as well as other resources regarding the same studies, it seems that studies clearly show some sort of sensitivity regarding inequitable distribution during social circumstances. I'm still not convinced that that equals and/or counts to having a sense of fairness/justice.

However, it most certainly could be the origens thereof!

Thanks for the discourse. If you'd like to talk about something in particular, I'm down. If not, my appreciation in spades!

:smile:

Consciousness - on my view - is the ability to draw correlations between different things. It begins simply and accrues in it's complexity according to the content of the correlations.

"Ability to draw correlations between different things", is that not the same thing as intelligence?

In any case, it's only functional description, not ontological, unless you are suggesting these "relations" somehow exist as actual, causal phenomena, and it just so happens they have this property to be conscious. — Zelebg

All intelligence is existentially dependent upon thought and belief, for it all consists thereof.

The ontological description begins when we start looking into the content of the correlations.

What's the difference between behavioural discontent as a result of the cognitive dissonance that takes place when expectations are dashed by what happens and having behavioural discontent as a result of thinking, believing, and/or 'feeling' like what happened is unfair/unjust, or ought be somehow corrected?
— creativesoul

Nothing. The expectation that rewards be distributed equally is what a belief in fairness is. — Isaac

So... All behavioural discontent due to unmet expectations counts as thinking, believing like what has happened is unfair/unjust and/or ought be somehow corrected?

Surely not.

What have you offered here that warrants our conclusion that the candidate has the expectation that rewards are distributed evenly as opposed to the expectation of them (continuing)to be distributed consistently?

Show me an animal not under duress who receives all of the resources and voluntarily distributes them equally, and we'll have an animal that either likes the results of doing that or an animal who has shown a sense of fairness.

Our difference seems to be regarding what counts as warrant for concluding that the animal has a sense of fairness.

I suppose you don't mean each disposition and emotion has its own sense, like that of touch and smell, but is there anything actually contradicting that notion?

And how about consciousness itself is actually a sense like taste or hearing, sixth sense as they say in Buddhism. Is there anything we know that can prevent this for actually being true? — Zelebg

Isaac and I understand one another regarding a sense of fairness. No, it's not like physiological sensory perception, although it is existentially dependent upon such.

Consciousness - on my view - is the ability to draw correlations between different things. It begins simply and accrues in it's complexity according to the content of the correlations(and the capabilities of the candidate).

Franz dWaal has placed a large bowl of grapes within reach during the reward experiments, and has given grapes/cucumbers in different combinations in prior exchanges. Together these satisfy me that simple expectation frustration is not the explanation (otherwise prior priming of expectation would have made a difference), nor is it simple greed (otherwise the larger available reward would have made a difference). It does seem to be related to a social peer getting a better reward, so if there's expectation involved, it's an expectation of equal distribution of rewards. I'm happy to call that a belief in fairness. — Isaac

Could you explain the patterns of reward in these experiments? The above is too vague to know what the experiments entailed.

Fairness would require some sort of undeniably altruistic redistributive behavior(hence the earlier suggested experiment). Seeing another receive something that one wants but did not receive themselves could result in discontent, regardless of any prior primings and/or patterns of reward. Wanting what another has does not count as a sense of fairness.

When we're claiming that some non human creature has a sense of fairness/justice, we're saying something about that creature's mental ongoings(thought and belief). Thus, it behooves us to know what all thought and belief consist of, lest we have no way to know whether or not some creature or another is capable of forming/holding those kinds of thought and belief.
— creativesoul

Yes, but this just goes over the ground we've already covered with regards to terms. There isn't something which just is what thiugh/belief consists of. There are just the phenomena we observe, how we choose to group them and what we choose to call those groups is arbitrary. I've already defined what I'm referring to by belief and thought. I've not heard (or perhaps not understood) how you're using those terms. — Isaac

You're not talking about observables. The sense of fairness consists of thought and belief, as I've been setting out heretofore. A sense of fairness is not equal to the behaviours that it may play a role in influencing.

I do think and would strongly argue that language is necessary.
— creativesoul

Yet all you've given thus far is...

they are further thought of as being unfair.
— creativesoul

This implies some sort of agreement
— creativesoul

it requires some measure of morality(what ought happen)
— creativesoul

I'd agree with all of those (with the same caveats as you). But you've not demonstrated any of them are necessarily dependant on language, so I don't see how they're relevant to your argument. — Isaac

A sense of ought/fairness/justice is to assess what has happened in light of what ought to have happened. All such assessments are comparisons between one's morality(what ought to have happened) and what happened. This requires thinking about one's own thought and belief(what ought to have happened) while also thinking about what did happen. Language use is necessary for that sort of division of thought content and subsequent comparison. Thus, language use is necessary for having a sense of ought/fairness/justice.

An agreement most certainly requires language, as it is to stipulate one's own acceptance of certain things(conditions).

Good. Now what do you think is keeping the disparities in play?

Mostly the way you frame them. If you view it through the lens of race, racial disparities necessarily arise. — NOS4A2

If you do not include race in the discussion, then racial disparities aren't able to be identified!

:brow:

Hence, one can claim color-blindness as a means to intentionally not address the problems.

Race-ism (the belief in race)... — NOS4A2

Bullshit.

Belief in race does not equate to devaluing one because of their race. The former is necessary for the latter, but not all belief in race includes devaluing one because of race. The former is not what we are referring to by "racism". Rather, it's the latter.

You're abusing language here.

To defeat racism is to value people equally regardless of their race.

So examining this external behaviour is adequate for examining the referent of the name. — Isaac

Is it though? How can examining our behaviour when describing something that exists in it's entirety prior to our naming it be adequate for examining the referent?

What measure could possibly be used to know whether or not we've gotten it wrong?

Instead a see the same old repetition where people get bogged down in arguments about dualism, reality, and naive realism. — I like sushi

Arguing in favor of direct perception does not equal arguing for naive realism. I readily acknowledge both direct and indirect perception. The former is not mediated in any way shape or form by/with language. The latter is.

...meaningful correlations drawn between different things. — creativesoul

...with pain we have something clearly subjective. — Marchesk

What good is that notion of subjective?

Simple. Take a sensation, call it 'red'. Job done. 'Red' isn't out there waiting for us to find it, we experience things and give some of them names, the names have to be related to some external behaviour otherwise naming fails (no one else knows what we're talking about). So examining this external behaviour is adequate for examining the referent of the name. — Isaac

Reminds me of Quine, Witt, and Kripke all rolled into one - aside perhaps from the use of "sensation".

No.

I know that there can be no hallucination, dream, and/or illusion of red if there is no red. I do not work from the dichotomies underlying your account. Rather, I reject them as inadequate.

What on earth are 'red experiences'? I've certainly never had one. — Isaac

You and I are in near complete agreement on that. I was just following suit(so to speak).

Our difference seems to be regarding what counts as warrant for concluding that the animal has a sense of fairness. I've just read your latest reply to our ongoing discussion about the experiments. I think I'm recognizing the sticking point(s).

...we don’t experience an apple or a chair, we experience our intentionality constituted through intersubjective perception. — I like sushi

That's probably closer to my view, but still not on par with it. Thought and belief. That is what all experience consists of. Much of it is socially mediated. Some of it is internal. All of it consists of meaningful correlations drawn between different things.

To avoid a semantic debate over the word seeing, we can distinguish a red perceptual experience from an internally generated one. This demonstrates that red experiences come from us and not into the eyes riding on light waves, as if the red somehow jumps onto electrons and enters the visual cortex. — Marchesk

No it doesn't. It demonstrates that red experiences require both, red things and the ability to see them as such. It also demonstrates that the internal/external and objective/subjective dichotomies are inadequate for taking proper account of experience.

because there is no it, the whole concept of 'the experience of seeing red' as opposed to just 'seeing red' is incoherent.
— Isaac

This is wrong, because we do have experiences of seeing red without seeing red. Dreams, memory, imagination and optical illusions do not count as seeing red. And as was noted earlier, the part of the brain that creates color experiences can sometimes be stimulated in blind people by other means. — Marchesk

And yet those people are seeing red.

The evidence is stronger where alternative explanations for those restorative behaviours have been ruled out by careful experiment design such as the use of ultimatum games, tokens, eliminating social hierarchies etc. instead of simple resource distribution. — Isaac

I'd like to talk about these...

Which ones do you find convincing enough to conclude that those subjects are indeed performing restorative behaviours stemming from and/or showing a sense of fairness/justice? Which experiments show conclusively that those animals are acting out of a sense of what ought be done as compared to what was?

What's the difference between behavioural discontent as a result of the cognitive dissonance that takes place when expectations are dashed by what happens and having behavioural discontent as a result of thinking, believing, and/or 'feeling' like what happened is unfair/unjust, or ought be somehow corrected?

Does all sharing count as having a sense of ought/fairness/justice?

Can one share solely as a result of liking what happens afterwards? I think so. This may be something that can be used in an experiment. What would happen if we offer all of the resources to any particular individual who is not under any duress. Well results have varied, and none of them support what you've put forth. However, perhaps the experiment was not up to snuff, so to speak...

Let's say we have two individuals that have conclusively proven to us that they are not prone to exhibiting dominant behaviour. Not only individuals, but of the same litter/brood/etc. These two would need to have a well established documented history of passive behaviour with one another. It would be best if these two had a history of grooming each other, resting together, playing together, etc. Most importantly, there must already be a habit of sharing behaviour between the two. There must already be results showing us conclusively that these two 'siblings' are prone to equally distributing the available resources between themselves. Otherwise, there is no way to show that they think and believe that they ought correct the situation when the resources are not equally distributed. So...

In addition to having the right sorts of individuals mentioned above, for the experiment, these two are to be kept in separate chambers adjoined with some readily accessible pass-through that would allow either to share resources with the other if they so chose to do so, without threat of consequence. It would be best if the shared wall is clear.

The experiment must begin by developing new daily routines; one where each could be shown as expecting something particular as a reward if they performed some simple task. They will always remain in full view of one another, and close enough to see what the other one has received for performing the same task. There need to be a well documented history of equal reward for each specific task.

Then...

We could introduce the new unexpected result of one receiving much more and/or all of the resources as opposed to both receiving equal amounts. It is here - in this very circumstance - that a sense of fairness/justice would be put on display by virtue of one of them voluntarily offering the other an equal amount of the resources.

I'm asking you for exactly what counts as a sense of fairness? What is the criterion which - when met by any and all candidates - counts as a case of that candidate having a sense of fairness? You and I meet the criterion.

What is it such that the non human primate meets it too?
— creativesoul

A sense of fairness, for me, is a belief that some restorative action should be initiated if certain resources in certain scenarios are not distributed either equally (by default) or according to some rule which has been previously established between individuals in a group.

Non-human primates can be said to have met that criteria if the[y] take restorative action (complain, show negative emotion etc) in such scenarios. The evidence is stronger where alternative explanations for those restorative behaviours have been ruled out by careful experiment design such as the use of ultimatum games, tokens, eliminating social hierarchies etc. instead of simple resource distribution. — Isaac

I'm having trouble with the equivalence being drawn between clear discontent due to false belief about what's going to happen(accompanied by and exemplified after unexpected events/results), with complaining and taking restorative action. There's no issue with discontent being characterized as showing negative emotion. However, not all discontent and negative emotion are equivalent to complaining and/or taking restorative actions.

I am not of the opinion that such alternative explanations for apparent restorative behaviour needs to be entirely ruled out before we accept the hypothesis because I think that would imply an unwarranted principle of anthropocentrism. We know we evolved from primates, we should presume, as a default, that they share all of our traits until we demonstrate one to be unique, not presume all of our traits are unique until we prove that they're not. — Isaac

I'm of the opinion that unless and until we know - as precisely as possible - what makes our trait what it is, it is impossible to know whether or not it is unique to humans or not.

One thing I took note of here was that you're attributing a sense of ought to non human primates. Now clearly, if they do indeed have a sense of ought, it cannot be exactly like ours. However, and this is a point that needs made here:All senses of ought must have something in common such that none are existentially dependent upon language - if it is possible for a language less creature to have one. There must be common denominators - on a basic, elemental, rudimentary, language less level - which all senses of ought(all senses of fairness/justice) have in common, including our own. In other words, our account/report(model if you prefer) must be amenable to evolutionary progression. It(a rudimentary language less 'version'(for lack of a better word) must begin simply and accrue in it's complexity. More importantly...

All senses of ought/fairness/justice must follow our model. Our model must not only describe language less senses of ought/fairness/justice, but it must describe the version which is capable of developing in a language less creature's mind(thought and belief), and must also make a good amount of sense while and when doing so.

The minimalist criterion you've offered is restorative behaviours when unequal distribution of resources is experienced, or a breach of agreement where inequality was already agreed upon.

So, whatever these restorative behaviours are existentially dependent upon; whatever they themselves require in order for them to be realized, whatever they consist of cannot include language or language use if we are going to remain coherent when claiming that language less animals are performing them.

That notion of belief grants inference and disposition to act to inanimate objects.
— creativesoul

I have no problem with beliefs being attributed to non-living things, but if you do, then the notion could be limited to such states when expressed in the architecture of a brain. It makes no difference to my defence. The main point is that I don't believe they can be sensibly talked about as having 'content' in the same way a book has 'content', they are not necessarily 'about' other concepts (though they can be). — Isaac

As mentioned before, our views on thought and belief differ in crucial ways. I don't think that that has to be a problem though. We agree on much more than we disagree. That said...

The above could be thought to be an aside, but I think that it's actually the direction that our considerations must go when talking about what it's like to experience X. It seems to me that there is no correct answer to the question, regardless of the value we give to X, because so much of what we're talking about when we talk about experience is the experiencing creature's thought and belief.

When we're claiming that some non human creature has a sense of fairness/justice, we're saying something about that creature's mental ongoings(thought and belief). Thus, it behooves us to know what all thought and belief consist of, lest we have no way to know whether or not some creature or another is capable of forming/holding those kinds of thought and belief.

I was asking if that assumption was the one you're holding..
— creativesoul

Yes, I understood that, and the answer was, no, that's not the full assumption I'm holding because it does not contain the assumption that I need to convince you otherwise. To clarify, I think non-linguistic primates have a sense of fairness, I'm working on the presumption that you don't (because you stated that fairness requires a pre-existing agreement and that such agreements are impossible without language), I'm arguing in defence of my position, I've no desire to get you to change yours (at this time). Does that clear things up? — Isaac

Yes. That's quite helpful. One minor note, however, to reciprocate that clarity...

I'm suspending judgment regarding whether or not agreement is necessary. I mentioned that and argued for that as a result of the experiments involving humans that was referenced in the beginning of the abstract you've provided. The author made a point to mention both parties entering into an agreement about what was to be expected when they performed specific tasks.

I do think and would strongly argue that language is necessary. It seems to me, as stated earlier, that fairness/unfairness consists of not only unmet expectations, but further those unmet expectations aren't just unexpected, but they are further thought of as being unfair.

This implies some sort of agreement, but I'm not certain that an earlier agreement is always necessary in order for one to think that what happens unexpectedly is unfair/unjust. That further qualification of not just being unexpected, but also being unfair/unjust most certainly requires rather complex language.

Thinking that something is unfair/unjust happens when we're mistaken about what's going to happen. Being mistaken about what's going to happen doesn't always require language use. Thinking that the unexpected results are unfair/unjust most certainly does, for it requires some measure of morality(what ought happen).

our sense of fairness/justice - if it predates our language use - does not consist of anything we want it to.
— creativesoul

We don't have a sense of fairness. I have one, and you have one but there's no reason at all why they should be any more similar than is required to have the most basic conversation on the matter. — Isaac

What's the point of all this irrelevant bickering? I have one. You have one. We have one. It doesn't have to be the exact same. We have one.

Does it make any justified sense at all to say that the non human primate has one?

I'm asking you for exactly what counts as a sense of fairness? What is the criterion which - when met by any and all candidates - counts as a case of that candidate having a sense of fairness? You and I meet the criterion.

What is it such that the non human primate meets it too?

Of course the notion fairness did not predate our language use. Creatures had certain beliefs prior to language use. I've no doubt those beliefs varied. Which collection were going to come under the umbrella of 'fairness' was determined by the language community using the word, and at no point in time did they ever sit down to thrash out exactly what it, or any other word really means. — Isaac

Why do you keep going off on these tangents and arguing about stuff that I've never claimed? I'm not asking about what a word really means. I'm asking you to set out a minimum criterion for having a sense of fairness.

There is some agreement between us here. Perhaps it can be put to good use. We both agree that some language less creatures are capable of having belief. You're also claiming that what counts as a sense of fairness is determined by the community using the word. I do not disagree.

What I'm getting at is that if a sense of fairness exists within language less creatures, then it does not consist of language; it is not existentially dependent upon language. Rather, it exists in it's entirety prior to our naming it. The same holds good of thought and belief.

In other words...

We can get them wrong.

What is thought and belief then, if it is not the sort of thing that has content?
— creativesoul

I think a belief is a disposition to act a certain way, its an inference manifest in the action it sets in motion. I think all living things, and some non-living things, have beliefs.

Thoughts, for me, are any neural activity, only creatures with brains can therefore have thoughts. The two are not the same. — Isaac

That notion of belief grants inference and disposition to act to inanimate objects.

Of course thoughts and belief can be different.

I'm assuming that non linguistic animals(non human primates) are capable of having a sense of fairness/justice, and you need to convince me otherwise.

Is that about right?
— creativesoul

No - why would I need to convince you otherwise? If I thought your views might cause harm to me or others, then maybe I'd have a crack at convincing you otherwise, but outside of that scenario I can't think of a single reason why I would want to do that. — Isaac

You've misunderstood. I was asking if that assumption was the one you're holding...

In order to know that we must first know what our sense of fairness/justice consists of.
— creativesoul

Our sense of fairness/justice consists of anything we want it to consist of. It's not a term that pre-exists humans making it up. — Isaac

Well, this is certainly at the heart of the matter...

Is our sense of fairness a term?

I would think that if you sincerely believe that non human primates have some sense of fairness/justice, then it would have to be the case that that sense of fairness/justice predates humans and thus does not require terms at all.

Which means that our sense of fairness/justice - if it predates our language use - does not consist of anything we want it to.

:brow:

I'm pretty sure none of the experiments made any judgement about the "content of non- human thought/belief. I don't think thought/belief is even the sort of thing that can have content, so don't even know what evidence for such would look like. — Isaac

What is thought and belief then, if it is not the sort of thing that has content? How do you discern between thinking of trees and thinking of dots if there is no difference in the content?

This difference regarding thought and belief, and particularly what it consists of, may be the primary wedge between our viewpoints.

So, behind all these weird and irrelevant replies coming from you is the simple confession...

I'm assuming that non linguistic animals(non human primates) are capable of having a sense of fairness/justice, and you need to convince me otherwise.

Is that about right?

What's the difference between a non human primate's clear behavioural signs of discontent because they did not receive what they expected, and discontent as a result of having a sense of justice/fairness?
— creativesoul

Nothing... — Isaac

:worry:

I would definitely say that all those same experimental results could be used in show a sense of trust developing between the subject and the humans actively involved, if rewards were always hand delivered.

In order to develop a sense of justice/fairness, the candidate must perform a comparative assessment between what they expected to happen and what did happen. To do this requires naming and descriptive practices. That how one begins to become aware that they have a worldview.
— creativesoul

And you know this how? — Isaac

Decades of careful study and accounting practices largely informed by methodological naturalism, use of logical reasoning, and knowing what all thought and belief consist of. The studies you've presented here included a number of assertions from prior studies that were being challenged. I'm guessing I'm more in agreement with the previous conclusions from the previous studies and/or experimental results.

The scientific work that went into the very beginning of that abstract seems to agree with me. One of the necessary prerequisites for humans when testing for a sense of fairness/justice was agreement between parties.

The modified tests could not include the agreement because non human primates cannot make an agreement with you to do certain things and receive certain rewards. They can draw correlations between their own behaviour and receiving the same reward afterwards. They can develop expectations. Those expectations can lead to intense discontent. They can be angry and violent. They can be despondent and no responsive, etc. They cannot be said to be feelings and/or thoughts of unfairness/injustice because there is no prior agreement in the mind of the candidate from which they feel like they've been cheated.

The results of those experiments are pretty vague. They rule out a few extreme theories at either end of the spectrum, but they could reasonably support a number of quite different theories. That's why there's still no consensus on the matter. — Isaac

So, those particular experiments produced results that provide equal support for different reports/accounts of those experiments, particularly reports/accounts regarding the content of non human thought and belief.