The question then arises, how is it possible to distinguish whether concepts arise from different mechanisms, or concepts arise by degree from a simpliciter, or, divide into simpliciters from a whole, from one mechanism? — Mww
So do properties, for you, exist prior to our naming them? I think it is reasonable to say that they do, but they are not in any way separate from, or "had by" or "attached to" things, as naming can make them seem to be. — Janus
It's not clear to me what roles mood and the emotional life, or indeed physical appetites, have in your formulation. Language-less infants have already learnt 'how to behave in certain situations' and may well have laid the foundations for all sorts of other aspects of how they'll be, haven't they? Emotions, educated by life and reason and other emotions,, still guide me in much of what I do or don't do. — mcdoodle
Has anyone had that Nietzschean moment where you come down from the mountain, so to speak, and applied your philosophy to living... — NOS4A2
Mueller did not exonerate Trump of anything. The Mueller report did not either! Mueller was not looking for evidence of collusion.
Here in the United States prosecutors are supposed to prove guilt, not innocence. — NOS4A2
You say it that way.
What if I said: Things appear (where 'thing' is taken in the broadest sense as objects, processes, colours, basically anything you can think of). What is it then that "has" properties? Are not properties just among the "things" that appear (if we allow that shapes, colours, textures and so on are even separable from shaped, coloured and textured objects)? — Janus
It seems to me that that 'chopping up' of experience that we do prior to applying the label "quale" to it isn't particularly reflective of what it's like at all. What it's like to be in any experiential state is a colossal feedback and intermingling of my senses and thoughts. — fdrake
...what in this experience furnishes the distinction between the shape and the colour of the table? — fdrake
The truth is Trump was innocent despite all claims and worries to the contrary. There was no Russian collusion, no conspiracy to defraud the US, no obstruction. — NOS4A2
Creativesoul just helped me illustrate this case. — god must be atheist
"Collusion" is a red herring. Very well used. Self-perpetuated nonetheless. There is no such crime. He knew - they knew - there would never be any such charge of collusion. So, no matter what come of the investigation... it could not ever be a case of being guilty of collusion.
Read the Mueller report. Watch the testimony.
Exactly right. The media and DNC inundation of Trump/Russian collusion was based on that falsity from the get go. We don’t need the Mueller report or his testimony to realize that, but we no less heard it for nearly three years. — NOS4A2
Did you believe Trump colluded with Russia to help him win the election? — NOS4A2
More or less. There is not a clear distinction on my account of prescriptive claims that are moral versus ones that are not moral, but sometimes in writing about it I get the feeling that using the word "moral" in place of just "prescriptive" might confuse some part of the audience, so I'm not certain that for all speakers they are synonymous.
The sense I get from those who might make such a distinction is between other-directed action and self-directed action, though on my account there is no need to make that distinction for the claims to be broadly speaking "moral": I'd say one ought not, for example, literally beat oneself up (like punch oneself in the face) over one's failures, and that "ought" is prescriptive, and therefore on my account the same kind of claim as a claim that one ought not beat up overs over their failures, but I get the sense that others would say that only the latter claim about interpersonal action is "moral" and the first is... something else, I guess? I would make a distinction between self-directed and other-directed action when it comes to procedural justice, saying that someone has the right to beat themselves up but not the right to beat someone else up, but that's only a subset of moral concerns, and in the broader sense I'd say that the first is moral too. — Pfhorrest
What makes a claim moral in kind? — creativesoul
Its prescriptivity, which can be elaborated upon in terms of direction of fit. A descriptive claim is like a detective's list of the things a man he's investigating bought at the grocery store; a prescriptive claim is like the shopping list the man's wife gave him. The lists might be exactly the same, but they are for different purposes: if the things the man bought disagree with the detective's list, the detective's list is wrong, but if the things the man bought disagree with his wife's list, the things the man bought are wrong instead. — Pfhorrest
Moral claims are not descriptive, they're prescriptive... — Pfhorrest
it's Putin, not Trump, who has made progress. — Echarmion