Your valuing of things counts as being valued. If being valued is equivalent to being morally valuable, as the premiss clearly sets out, then your valuing of things results in those things being morally valuable. If what you said is true, then all things valued would be morally valuable.

They are not.

Therefore, either one of your premisses is false or you've an invalid argument.

I can follow a valid argument just fine. I can also spot a false premiss. Your first premiss(in the OP) is false. Plain and simple. Something being valued is not equivalent to something being morally valuable.

You're also all over the place here. You've just contradicted yourself, yet again.

Do you see it?

...my valuings of things - do not constitute moral values... — Bartricks

1. For something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued. — Bartricks

I've no interest in continuing with you . We're way too far apart, and you do not seem to be capable of accurately reporting upon what I have claimed. So... continued misunderstanding/misinterpretation/misattribution of meaning is guaranteed.

For someone who fancies themselves as understanding Kant, it's quite odd to me than you seem to have so much trouble with the simple task of accurately reporting upon what another says.

Point:
There are no false statements in a sound syllogism. It is impossible to falsify a true statement.
— creativesoul

Counterpoint:
Except when the statement was never true in the first place, re: in the case of the time-evolved knowledge that conditions the premises. — Mww

That's not an exception. It was never a sound syllogism in the first place. The point was that one candidate is verifiable and the other is not. I'm choosing the former, and you're choosing the latter...

Falsification of valid syllogisms is possible merely by not holding with the conditions in the premises, yes. — Mww

Yes? Not what I said. Falsification of all valid syllogisms happens the very same way... we check to see if what's said corresponds to what's happened and/or is happening.

I'm moving our discussion into the thread with our other one. They're much the same and less external distraction there...

All thought/belief consists entirely of mental correlations drawn between different things.
— creativesoul

Ok, but.....what things? — Mww

Depends upon the candidate under consideration. It's an exhaustive outline not a specific example. That happens when you work from universal criterion. You end up with an outline.

Bells and being fed... touching fire and feeling pain...

With a non linguistic creature all of those things are directly perceptible.
— creativesoul

So “what things”... — Mww

Bells and being fed... touching fire and feeling pain...

Does that mean non-linguistic creatures can’t remember things?

I wouldn't say that much. Remembering is drawing correlations...

What we're reporting upon(the thought/belief of a language-less creature) is not existentially dependent upon language. Our report most certainly is.
— creativesoul

Any report of ours is existentially dependent on language. That does not grant us authority to report on the thought/belief of language-less creatures... — Mww

Agreed.

On your view, what constitutes sufficient/adequate ground for us to acquire knowledge regarding the thought/belief content of language-less creatures?

Imagine a language-less creature that has just touched fire for the first time. (...) All that is needed is a creature capable of drawing correlations between their own behaviour(the touching) and the pain that immediately ensued.
— creativesoul

For the language-less creature, it is sufficient to say his correlations are given from instinct. — Mww

It's usually not a good sign when someone asks another to elaborate upon another's thought/belief system(worldview) and then immediately refuses to accept the terms. Prior to enabling themselves to follow a line of thought that results from several key notions therein, such a person makes it literally impossible for themselves to follow along.

To answer the question...

I reject the proposition/statement:"Language-less creatures draw correlations that are given from instinct" on the following grounds...

1.Being given presupposes a giver. Unnecessarily multiplying entities is unacceptable on my view.

2. Correlations are not given to the non linguistic thinking/believing creature. To quite the contrary correlations between different things are drawn by the creature - often for the very first time. We can watch that happen. We can set the stage. We are not giving them the correlations. They draw them themselves. We cannot literally watch it happen because we cannot physically and/or literally get into the mind of another. That's of no relevant/germane/applicable negative consequence for we need not be able to.

Sometimes we can know beyond any and all reasonable doubt that another creature has drawn correlations between different things. We can often know exactly what things. Pavlov's dog drew a correlation between the bell and being fed. His involuntary tell was excessive salivation.

The earlier fire example...

Is it not an error of equivocation, to suggest that just because a language-less creature, e.g., preserves his well-being instinctively, he is drawing correlations? — Mww

What difference does that make? It would not be an error I've made. I've certainly made no such suggestion. In fact, you're the one invoking "instinct" here and then using it as an alternative explanation and suggesting an equivocation fallacy?

Drawing correlations between different things begins happening long before the creature becomes aware of their own mental ongoings. Correlations begin as simply as possible, and grow in complexity thereafter.

At the moment of a creature's biological conception, there is no thought/belief(correlation).

Isn’t it rather the case we think he must be making correlations because correlation is the only way humans can think anything at all? Including, what it’s like to be a language-less creature merely from his observable reactions. — Mww

Having a good grasp upon human thought/belief is the best possible starting point.

I would not dare claim to know what it's like to be a language less creature. I do not know what it's like to be an apple pie. I can clearly set out the basic elemental constituents of both language-less thought/belief and apple pie nonetheless.

Moved the following discussion into this thread...

Do you have values other than moral ones?

What part of the argument are you having trouble with?

Are moral values really dependent on human beings? It seems to me that would make them subjective. If they are objective, as many philosophers think they are, then they must be independent of human beings; in other words, some things are bad or wrong even if people are oblivious to them. — cincPhil

Being bad for an oblivious human being is not being independent of an oblivious human being.

Have the believer somehow break and/or lose the symbol, the sign, the cross, the bust, picture, representation, figure, etc. of Jesus and see how it effects/affects them.

The response and subsequent behaviour will sometimes provide enough evidence to know if it (the belief of the candidate) qualifies as idolatry.

PS

The "figure" part was added after reading the post immediately following this one.

My argument is not about where our 'sense' of right and wrong, good and bad comes from, but about what it would take for anything actually to be right or wrong, good or bad. — Bartricks

The right answer would consist of two remarkably different standards/criterion. Right and wrong are a matter of being true/false. Good and bad are a matter of what counts as acceptable/unacceptable, praiseworthy/blameworthy, glorified and celebrated/vilified and shunned, good/evil, helpful/harmful, etc.

I suspect you know this already.

On another stage, I shall assume you’re aware a sound deductive syllogism predicated solely on rational premises cannot be falsified. It’s impossible, actually, for no purely rational dictum whatsoever lends itself to verifiable negation outside itself. — Mww

First, the agreement...

A sound deductive syllogism has both true premisses and a valid conclusion and/or argumentative form. A true statement/proposition cannot be falsified simply because it's true. True statements are not false. Being falsified is being shown to be false. Only false statements are falsifiable.

There are no false statements in a sound syllogism. It is impossible to falsify a true statement. A sound deductive syllogism cannot be falsified.


Now, the disagreement...

Validity does not equal truth. A false conclusion can result from a valid inference if being valid is following the rules of correct inference and/or having valid argumentative form.

Some valid syllogisms provide verifiable/falsifiable conclusions. Verifiability/falsifiability has nothing to do with a valid syllogism being predicated solely on rational premisses. Those premisses cannot be verified. Logical possibility alone(argument by definitional fiat) is inadequate ground for belief. Some valid syllogisms predicated solely on rational premisses can most certainly be falsified.

The verification of something to the contrary, a mutually exclusive set of statements/propositions provides us with true statements about fact/reality that offer more than adequate ground to reject any and all claims to the contrary as false. That is more than adequate to falsify a valid deductive syllogism with unverifiable premisses... those consisting solely of rational premisses notwithstanding.

See my critique of the OP's first premiss...

As far as I’m concerned, a conversation doesn’t have to be eventually productive as it has to first be interesting. And what interests me about your apparent personal speculative philosophy, is that if I badger you long enough, in the form of proper Socratic dialectical procedure, you’ll get around to telling me exactly how such personal philosophy works, rather than merely laying a bunch of self-invented terminology on me, and leave me hanging like Grandma’s laundry. You can’t just inform me the rational framework of my choosing doesn’t work without giving me something to compare it to, and thus allowing me to judge for myself. — Mww

Fair enough.

There's no need for you to beat around the bush though. If you want to know how it all works, as best as I've figured it out anyway, just come straight out and ask me that. I'm always willing to show my work. The charge against Kant does not require understanding my view though, to be clear. Kant does not and cannot draw and maintain the actual distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief. He is not alone. In fact, he has all the company in the world. As far as I'm aware, there is no philosopher from any school of thought that has... even to this day.

Definition and conception are not required for rudimentary level thought/belief.....
(Ehhhh.....starting to lose me here) — creativesoul

The above needs to be understood, in order to grasp the totality of what I'm saying. That seems a good place to go from here.

All thought, belief, and statements thereof consist entirely of correlations between different things. On the rudimentary level(regarding a language less creature) those correlations are always drawn between directly perceptible things. Language is not always one of them.

Imagine a language-less creature that has just touched fire for the first time. This creature learns that fire hurts when touched despite not being able to say that. It can recognize and/or attribute causality, and does, as is demonstrated by it's subsequently avoiding fire. The creature thinks/believes that touching fire caused the pain that immediately followed.

There is no place and no need for language here. Definition and conception are both existentially dependent upon language. Learning that fire hurts when touched is not. Neither definition nor conception is required for such rudimentary level thought/belief. All that is needed is a creature capable of drawing correlations between their own behaviour(the touching) and the pain that immediately ensued.

Our understanding of all this is another mater altogether. Definition, conception, and language are all required for our knowledge/understanding regarding this matter. What we're reporting upon(the thought/belief of a language-less creature) is not existentially dependent upon language. Our report most certainly is.

It's all a matter of existential dependency. Being verifiable/falsifiable helps too. :wink:

I’m going with “understanding”. Just a guess.

I’d rather be informed of what it consists of, to tell the truth. — Mww

There we go.

Pardon me for having a habit - and a bad one at that - of mistakenly assuming that everyone else has as good a grasp upon my own linguistic framework/conceptual scheme as I do.

"Understanding" doesn't help here as best I can tell. I mean, on my view all understanding consists of thought/belief. In addition, there's a bit of common sense nuance concerning it. Understanding cannot be false, so... there's that.

In short, to directly answer the question...

All thought/belief consists entirely of mental correlations drawn between different things. With a non linguistic creature all of those things are directly perceptible.

No worries. It seemed that way to me as well. This time!

:wink:

I didn’t say anything about moral value being required for cognitive apparatus; I said incorporated into: just as the wet ingredients of a pastry are incorporated into the dry to construct a finish-able product, so too are moral values incorporated into pure practical reason, aka cognitive apparatus... — Mww

Incorporating one thing into another requires both things.

You may not have said it, but the coherency of your position depends upon it.

An earlier assertion of yours stands in direct contradiction with thought/belief existing on a rudimentary level prior to definition. Some(non-linguistic, rudimentary, basic) thought/belief exists in it's entirety prior to language. Definition and conception are not required for rudimentary level thought/belief. Thought/belief are more than sufficient for cognition, just not meta-cognition. Pure Practical Reasoning is metacognition.

Kant can't take account of this.

Do you still not see that the primary premiss is false? Some values are not moral values. "moral values" is not equivalent to "values". With that in mind...

For something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued. — Bartricks

Some values are not moral values. All values are valued. When non moral values are being valued they do not become moral values, but things are still being valued.

So...

The primary premiss is false. It contradicts the way things are. As it stands we have more than just moral values. As a result we can be valuing something and it not be morally valuable.

Being morally valuable takes more than being valued.

Are you finding our conversation productive?

Ok. I see no point in continuing here.

One can know what the appropriate thing to say is during certain situations, all the while being both foolish and irrational.

One can be witty, foolish, and irrational.

I submit it is a natural condition of being human that there exists a sub-system of intrinsic values necessarily incorporated into the cognitive apparatus — Mww

What does all that even mean?

A natural condition. All humans have it. Intrinsic values. "Intrinsic" seems redundant. Remove it.

A sub-system?

Are there values 'embedded' into our thinking by virtue of other people's language use prior to our being able to take account of them?

Sure.

We draw correlations between pre-existing situations and pre-existing language use long before we begin to talk about our own worldview. In that way, perhaps our adopted morality(moral thought/belief) is part of the subsystem of the cognitive apparatus required to reflect upon one's own thought/belief? It would not be part of the cognitive apparatus required to have some moral value.

But a rooky mistake — Bartricks

:blush:

Moral values = thought/belief;
Thought/belief = O and S things;
Moral values can be neither O nor S things of thought/belief;
Moral values /= thought/belief. — Mww

A proper report does not change the truth conditions of what it's reporting upon.

All moral value consists of both objective and subjective things. Talking about moral value being one or the other cannot possibly take proper account of the fact that it consists of both. Moral value is both. One must talk in terms of both hydrogen and oxygen in order to take proper account of water. Water is neither. The same holds good for moral value.

As a tool, the objective/subjective dichotomy cannot possibly glean anything at all about that which is both... and is thus... neither. There is no hydrogen water, there is no oxygen water, at least not in terms of elemental constituents. We can name something whatever we want.

There is no objective moral value. There is no subjective moral value. There is moral value. It consists of a particular kind of thought/belief(about acceptable/unacceptable things). All things called "moral" have that same common denominator. It's always about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour.

Moral value is a kind of thought.

All thought/belief formation requires one thing to become sign/symbol, a different thing to become significant/symbolized, and a creature capable of drawing a correlation between different things.

Moral value is about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. Having some moral value does not require being able to talk about. Weighing the differences between differing moral values does. Some moral value(thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour) is prior to language acquisition.

That leans towards/helps develop a good basis.

What I'm doing here with the odd claim is attempting to drive an existential wedge between reports of things and what's being reported upon.
— creativesoul

Why does it matter? — jamalrob

It matters to be able to take proper account of things in terms of their basic/rudimentary elemental constituency. That, in turn, enables an account of the evolutionary progression of that particular thing. The content of all reports shares a basic set of elementary constituents. They consist of the same things. Language use is one. Language is required to report upon thought/belief. If thought/belief begins simply and grows/evolves in it's complexity, then our account must satisfy this:It must be amenable to evolutionary progression.

Thought/belief(insert any mental ongoings of your choosing) is on the left, and a report(the first) thereof is on the right. What's on the right requires rather complex common language replete with names for mental ongoings. What's on the left does not always. Whatever the left is existentially dependent upon, so too is the right, but not always the other way around.

What does the thought/belief of a creature that has never spoken about it consist of?

Can't be common language. Propositions are existentially dependent upon predication. Predication... language. Can't be propositional content either.

It's what happens when the ends justify the means and/or profit is the sole motive.

Discourage such thinking by showing what can and does happen as a result, and there may be something more worthy of calling "the commons".

So...

3.

So.....tell me all about the subjectivity of moral values. In 30 words or less. — Mww

On my view, moral values consist entirely in/of thought/belief. All thought/belief consists of both objective and subjective things. So, moral values are neither.

if I am already entirely familiar with the content of my rationality by my inescapable acquaintance with it, why in the hell do I have to think about it in terms of their respective definitions, which you explicate as “thinking about one’s own thought/belief”? Only in the telling, methinks, never in the doing. — Mww

Thinking about definitions is one way to think about one's own thought/belief. It's not the only way. One can also just use language. That's just to clarify a nuance of my position to you, it's not that germane to this particular exchange. However, we've had many, and I suspect that that will continue.

To address the rest...

It's the content and/or complexity of the rationality(thought/belief) that matters here. Being acquainted with one's own rationality is a situation that requires different things, depending upon the content and/or complexity of the thought/belief(rationality) itself.

Follow me?


A different tack on the question...

What must be valued? That seems to be what your asking. What do all people value, regardless of their individual particular circumstances?

Is that an acceptable re-wording?

...a subject doesn’t recognize a particular terminology for his conscious mental machinations, isn’t sufficient reason to suppose he isn’t doing the same thing he’d be doing if he did. — Mww

That's the problem because it is not true. Consider when one is thinking about one's own thought/belief. I know you come from a Kantian framework. Kant can't account for the distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief. Not a big deal.

Did I answer your initial question to your satisfaction?

I'm all for creating a system which leads to all people being treated equally. One in which more people share in the same sorts of accumulated advantages that some men have long since been the beneficiaries thereof.

Some men.

Some men have never had such privileges afforded to them. Some men have been given the same shortest straw by the same people... some men. If our path forward does not include more opportunities for the male who has not reaped the benefits of this idea that has become a movement aimed at all men, based upon just the fact that some men do bad stuff, then these men will be essentially punished for the sins/crimes/trespasses of other people simply because they all share the same name.

"Men".

If you judge all men solely by virtue of being men, then you're assuming that they have something in common aside from just sharing the namesake. That is a mistake that many racists make as well. Making the mistake does not make you a racist. Rather, it makes you both guilty of gross overgeneralization.

Some men have not done the things you've said counted as men protecting women.

Some of these men(arguably most) are all for promoting women's rights. That doesn't mean that we have to agree with everything that every women says. That doesn't mean that we cannot add value to the movement towards women's rights.

The impending possible challenges to Roe v. Wade are startling though. Clearly planned systematic elimination of the only place all women can afford regarding their health concerns and/or feminine needs.

Shameful way to take away the ability for some women to realize the results of using their rights. It is a woman's right to decide what is done to her body. That right ought be afforded to everyone. All to whom it's afforded should be able to use it. Eliminating all the places for them to use it is to take away their ability to use their rights. The notion becomes empty. You have the right, but... we have made sure that you cannot use and/or benefit from using it.

Imagine a snarky receptionist...

Well... technically... you do have the right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy, unfortunately you'll have to travel to another state because new regulations put into place somehow made all the former places no longer qualify. Existing walls too narrow to meet our new criterion for what size halls were needed. We determined this by whatever was larger than what you currently have. No grandfather clause to speak of.

Ex post facto.

Isn't it wrong to punish someone for having a hallway that is too small for current standards even though that same hall has been well used for decades prior? Upon what reasonable ground does a governmental agency employ new standards to be met by everyone in such cases? Sorry, we know that you're one of the few places that women in this area can exercise and/or use their right to end an unwanted pregnancy, or acquire birth control but... from this date forward, in order to do that it has to be done within a building that has bigger hallways than yours.

How on earth does this not qualify for being illegal?

Someone on a state level decides to eliminate all the places for women to use the rights recently afforded to them after long hard struggles. Are you f***ing kidding me?

Not all men are they way you've described some. Not all females are like you either
— creativesoul

I didn't say they were. So what's your point? — Artemis

You made a universal claim about men. It is universal because all men qualify for the criterion you used.

Men.

Here are your words, in the specific order you presented them.

...to be defined is to be conceived, which is always the primary ground for some immediate and subsequent mediate cognizant ability... — Mww

I want you to keep the above in mind. It is the standard by which we now compare my report of what happened with yours. That's what's in question. You are claiming that what I reported as your words were not your words. You then offer your own report on what you said earlier, and it is guilty of exactly what you're charging me with.

Very odd. Look for yourself...

To be defined is always the primary ground for some subsequent cognizant ability. That's your words.
— creativesoul

No, actually, they are not. Not quite.
(To be defined).....is to be conceived, which is always the primary ground.....

Those are my words. Please recognize the temporal displacement native to the statement.
——————— — Mww

This strikes me as very very problematic.

I would caution you against assuming the majority in past centuries were female allies. I think as the culture has changed, so too have men and women. — Artemis

No caution needed. I've assumed no such thing.

Not all men are they way you've described some. Not all females are like you either(assuming you're a female).

The 'intersectional' aspect of the thread would be unnecessary if everyone were given some equal modicum of respect/value/equality/etc simply because they are human.

Call it what you like.

"In it's entirety" is the key phrase. Being amenable to evolutionary progression, that's a moving target. It's meant to focus upon basic elemental constituency... what things consist of.

Half complete novels exist in their entirety.

Not sure what it is yet...

Doesn't seem to work very well for some things... :wink:

It was the thesis that moral values are my valuings. That is, that being morally valuable involves nothing more than being valued by me.

That thesis. — Bartricks

Some things are morally valuable to others. Some of your values are not moral. Thus being morally valuable must include something more than just being valued by you.

:joke:

Same problem. Different set of statements.

Can we get appropriateness wrong?

What determines getting it right(assuming one has gotten it wrong)? A change of one's mind.

What determines getting a tree wrong?

What determines getting it right(again, assuming one has gotten it wrong)? A change of one's mind.

The difference, of course, is that getting a tree wrong is to get something wrong that existed in it's entirety prior to our first naming it.

But wait...

There was also a standard of appropriateness prior to our first naming it. Not as one that we knew about, but rather as one that operated unbeknownst to our talking about it. Unspoken. Not yet named. Not yet described. Like the first ideas of Ahab in Melville's mind(at the time), doing certain things during certain times and in certain situations was an evolving cognitive endeavor. Unlike Ahab now... it remains so. Like Ahab has always been, it has now also become metacognitive.