Got a tie?

If I go to pawn shot to sell gold medals to buy fake passport, General Mszvelescvi did not necessarily go to pawn shop to sell gold medals to buy fake passport. — Bartricks

Nonsensical meaningless use of the term "necessary". If I go somewhere, I am necessarily there.



Freudian slip?

:lol:

You're picking an individual out to the exclusion of all others... sometimes. You did not do that in the original argument.

Have no idea what the chicken reference is doing here.

There are two arguments on the table already.

If you're answering honestly... I'm sorry, but evidently you do not see where you've went wrong. Your last reply is irrelevant.

The OP invokes a particular dichotomy. The objective/subjective distinction is incapable of accounting for that which is existentially dependent upon and consists in/of both, and thus is neither.

Truth. Meaning. Thought. Belief. World-views. Understanding. Etc.

I have answered lots of your questions, and I still think they are not in good faith.

Anyway, be so good as to answer some of mine.

Do you think this argument is valid?

1. If Bartricks Potter is Superman, then if Superman went to the grocery, necessarily Bartricks Potter went to the grocery
2. If Superman went to the grocery, Bartricks Potter did not necessarily go to the grocery.
3. Therefore, Bartricks Potter is not Superman.

If you do, then just swap 'Bartricks Potter' for 'moral values' and 'Superman' for 'my values' and you've got my argument — Bartricks

Not the same argument. The original was false(not necessarily true). The new one is always true. The old lacks proper quantification. The new does not.

All your valuings count as valuings. Not all people count as superman.

Not the same argument.

He’s more spicy than astringent. In fact, if memory serves, S is short for sriracha, a chili sauce that thinks it can burn but ends up being merely mildly amusing. — praxis

:razz:

Spot on.

Spot on.

the novel existed in it's entirety prior to the first report of it. Melville reported upon something that existed in it's entirety while writing the novel as well. Prior to the report, Ahab and the Pequod was a collection of Melville's own thoughts, beliefs, and ideas.
— creativesoul

Wait, what? Did Ahab and the Pequod exist before Melville existed? — fishfry

Not on my view. Melville's thought, belief, and ideas cannot exist prior to Melville.

Of course it's an interesting fact that Moby Dick is based on a true story. The whaling ship Essex was attacked and sunk by a whale. But of course all fiction is based on or inspired by some aspect of reality. That doesn't mean the characters of the novel existed before the author conceived of them.

Agreed.

Is there a point in time, in your opinion, in which Ahab did not exist? Or perhaps you mean to regard him as an archetype? The charismatic fanatic luring others to their doom? That's an eternal theme in human affairs.

There is a time before Ahab. Prior to Melville's thought, belief, and ideas.

But I'm not sure how to take your remark literally. The sun has always been a flaming ball of ga; but Ahab has not always been the captain of the Pequod. That's the thesis I am putting forth.

He's been the captain ever since Melville made him so.

Perhaps we can refine your idea to: Truths about actual things were always true long before we discovered them. But truths about fictional things become true... — fishfry

I don't call true statements or true propositions "truths".

So prior to our first cognition... we need definitions, self-awareness, and a rational methodology.

Does that sound right to you?

Seems quite evidently wrong to me.

Yes, definitions are sufficient to value, for to be defined is to be conceived, which is always the primary ground for some immediate and subsequent mediate cognizant ability... — Mww

And being defined/conceived...

What does that take?

Not good signs...

Suit yourself.

I said the truth condition of the judgement that Helen values X, is a valuing attitude of Helen's. That's true. Obviously true. — Bartricks

No, you didn't say that at all. Regardless, you're repeating the same mistake. This new claim is not true either. It's false on it's face for the same underlying reason the other was. Only a specific valuing attitude of Helen counts as either the truth conditions or the truthmaker of "Helen values X".

Try this...

Helen's valuing Y counts as a valuing attitude of Helen's. Helen's valuing Y does not count as a truth condition or a truth maker of "Helen values X". It does satisfy the criterion you've set forth for both. So...

The criterion you're using(the standard/definition/conception/idea/notion) for what counts as a truthmaker and/or a truth condition for "Helen values X" is wrong. They're both satisfied by that which is neither.

It's that quantification thing...

:wink:

A sure sign of knowing that one is wrong, but needing to save one's own ass anyway, by any means, is to misdirect.

There's a valid objection waiting for it's due attention. I'll wait alongside it.

I said the truth condition of the judgement that Helen values X — Bartricks

No you didn't.

...not a clue what you're talking about. — Bartricks

The irony.

The truth-maker of a judgement such as "Helen values X" is a valuing attitude in Helen. — Bartricks

Close but no...

Not all Helen's valuing attitudes are valuing X.

So...

Not all valuing attitudes are ones that value X. Some valuing attitudes value Y. Y is not X. Helen valuing Y does not make "Helen values X" true. Helen's valuing Y counts as a valuing attitude in Helen. It does not count as a truth-maker of "Helen values X".

What makes all statements true is correspondence to what's happened and/or is happening. Helen must have a valuing attitude, but not just any one. In order for her attitude to make "Helen values X" true, it must be one in which she values X. She has remarkably many more, none of which make "Helen values X" true.

According to our definitions, which is immediately sufficient for any valuings... — Mww

• What about the value placed upon that which exists in it's entirety prior to all human language?
  
• What about the value placed upon that which exists in it's entirety prior to our awareness of it?
  
• What about the value placed upon that which does not consist of language?
  
• What about the value placed upon that which is not existentially dependent upon language?

If we suppose that our definitions are immediately sufficient, we are saying that they are enough to value all these things mentioned above.

The traditional use of "necessary" is incapable of doing so and remaining coherent.

Paste the premise and then tell me how anything I've said contradicts it. — Bartricks

:brow:

You're asking me to address the coherency aspect. Validity/coherency is insufficient for truth. The premiss is not true. That's the problem being shown.

What part of that do you not understand?

...the first premise says 'if' my valuings are morally values (so not 'they are' but 'if') then if I value something necessarily it will be morally valuable.

If all your valuings are morally values, then if you value something it will be morally valuable. If some of your valuings are not morally values, then if you value something necessarily it will not always be morally valuable, for some of your valuings are not.

Not all your(or anyone's) valuings are morally values. Some is/are. Some is/are not.

:brow:

Your premiss is false. It contradicts the way things are. Need I spell it all out for you?

Er, yes. It establishes that not all value is moral value. Do you actually understand arguments at all? I mean, you've thrown the word 'quantification' in so that we'll all think you do. But it seems to me that you most certainly don't. — Bartricks

Odd reply from someone who has just been shown that his/her premiss is false on it's face.

Together they entail that moral values are not my values. — Bartricks

I reject entailment. Following the rules of entailment is the foothold of Gettier. It is to mistakenly connect claims that have nothing to do with one another. If I believe that I am going to get a job as a result of being told so, the number of coins in my pocket is utterly irrelevant. If I think to myself "I am going to get the job, oh... hey, I have ten coins in pocket... So, the man with ten coins in his pocket is going to get the job" then I am referring to myself. The man with ten coins in his pocket - in my mind - is me!

As aside. Worth a brief mention.

Does the one chicken that finds it see it justified to believe that the grain and its nutritional value exist? Yes. — god must be atheist

The chicken sees the grain. Chickens do not see in terms of justification, nor are they even capable of thinking in such terms. Seeing belief as justified is to isolate that belief and apply a standard.

A belief being justified(well-grounded) is another matter.

I see neither in the example. Chickens do not know about the nutritional value of grain. Chickens do not have such thought/belief about the grain.

the first premise... — Bartricks

...is missing some necessary quantification.

As already stated, not all value is moral value.

the first premise says 'if' my valuings are morally values (so not 'they are' but 'if') then if I value something necessarily it will be morally valuable. — Bartricks

The first premiss needs to say 'if all'...

Because if some values are not, then the first premiss is false on it's face.

Analogy - if water is made of gold then if I have some water necessarily I have some gold.

If some water is not... the premiss is false on it's face.

Question....just because:

Given herein that the principle of necessity makes explicit that for which contingency is impossible. What is it for any rational agent that it is absolutely impossible not to value, such that it must be valued necessarily? — Mww

It needs only to meet our definitions.

If I value something necessarily it is morally valuable.
If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable.

:worry:

All things exist in their entirety prior to the first report of them.

I like that much better. Seems odd. I'm willing to defend the assertion.

Any takers?
— creativesoul

Fiction...

...Ahab became captain of the Pequod when Melville decreed it. Before Melville wrote the novel, there was no Pequod and there was no Ahab. — fishfry

The novel existed in it's entirety prior to the first report of it. Melville reported upon something that existed in it's entirety while writing the novel as well. Prior to the report, Ahab and the Pequod was a collection of Melville's own thoughts, beliefs, and ideas.

The report/novel does not shed light on that.

Hmmm...

Which experience?

Are you saying that sub atomic particles have no spatiotemporal location, spin, momentum, etc. prior to our measurement?

In quantum entanglement, any measurement of a property of a particle performs an irreversible collapse on that particle and will change the original quantum state. In the case of entangled particles, such a measurement will be on the entangled system as a whole.

Apparently, such property has no definite value until you measure it. — alcontali

So, what exactly did not exist - in it's entirety - prior to the first report of it?

...what has philosophy taught you? — Wallows

All sorts of things...

The aim, for me at least, was to critique my own worldview/perspective/belief system in order to identify and isolate any and all questionable beliefs. Basically, I wanted to avoid forming, having, and/or holding false belief about anything. The reality check immediately preceding that change was 'earth shattering' so to speak. I became painfully - on a visceral level - aware that a number of different things were not the way I had thought/believed.

An important way of thinking occurred to me via reading and/or doing philosophy.

It involves what sorts of things can be true and what makes them so.

Don't see the similarity.

Events are what happened and/or is happening. What happened yesterday may or may not still be happening today.

So, I would not agree with the claim that all events exist always.

Here, for your convenience, is the argument thus far:

1. For something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued.
2. Only a subject can value something
3. Therefore, for something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued by a subject.
4. If moral values are my valuings, then if I value something necessarily it is morally valuable
5. If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable.
6. Therefore, for something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued by a subject who is not me. — Bartricks

Not all value is moral value. On that ground I reject 4. So, 5 and 4 contradict one another and/or are otherwise incompatible/mutually exclusive.

If the thread has so far focued more on 'what' identity politics is over the nature of it's effects, that's mostly because there's been confusion over the former, even though the latter is important and interesting too. — StreetlightX

I would think that a proper report covers both.

Knowing how to use the words in a coherent manner.

To further support Kant's notion of Categorical Imperative, I'd say that it's one of the best rules of thumb that I've been fortunate enough to come across. It's a way to 'measure' and/or otherwise determine whether or not some thought, belief, and/or behaviour is moral.

If everyone did 'X' what would the world look like? What would the result be? Would the world be a much better place?

The Golden Rule, which I see talked about more than I care to say, is also a good general rule of thumb. However, it suffers the fatal flaw of mistakenly presupposing that everyone likes being treated the same way...

I see it as lying/dishonesty if one isn't forthright about what one has in mind, and one instead diverts, manipulates, etc. But, I don't see lying as a categorically bad thing. In fact, I think that lying is sometimes a good thing. — Terrapin Station

I would concur.