I'm simply saying that if one makes true statements about the source of their own moral convictions then s/he cannot be sensibly said to be morally dumbfounded...

:smile:

We went over this before, if I could get away with prefixing every word with " the ", I would. — Merkwurdichliebe

I didn't understand then, and I still do not understand such thinking...

Then may I invoke the gravely overlooked guillotine of Nietzsche, that the only correspondence between what happened, is accidental or conditioned, there is no necessary causal or logical relation between what we experience, and what that experience means. — Merkwurdichliebe

Unsure how this applies to a framework that says nothing of the sort. Looks like a conflation between truth and meaning. I've not talked in terms of truth as "a relation between experience and what that experience means"... nor would I

This is a fundamental assumption for what we are discussing here... — Merkwurdichliebe

Oh, but it's not just an assumption. It is a premiss that I've argued for may times over in past. Common sense actually. We can stay on course. Call it an assumption here, but just realize that it is well grounded by the same method used for arriving at a universal criterion for what all things called "moral" have in common.

Would you like to see a simple argument that allows us to venture between statements of thought/belief and non-linguistic thought/belief?

There's a bridge that still needs building it seems?

We cannot call the true, or what is, without tossing this discussion out with the bathwater, and beginning with epistemology. — Merkwurdichliebe

On my view we cannot draw an equivalence between what's true and what is without equating truth with what's happened. Doing so renders us incapable of accounting for what sorts of things are true and what makes them so.

I agree though. Perhaps it's best to not invoke any specific notion of "truth" as of yet. We're using one already, but it is not the one that draws an equivalence between truth and reality(or what's happened - on my view).

That said, I thought we had already effectively situated the presupposition of correspondence to what's happened and the attribution of meaning within thought/belief formation itself.

All thought/belief presupposes it's own truth somewhere along the line. All thought/belief is meaningful to the thinking/believing creature.

That is the rough general - very common sense - criterion and/or outline for what pre-linguistic and/or non-linguistic thought/belief must be able to satisfy. We arrive at that criterion(although this arrival has not yet been argued for) by virtue of looking towards statements of thought/belief as a means for assessing the common denominators of them all, regardless of the particulars.

Fear and Loathing?
— creativesoul

You had to bring it up. A book that constantly reminds us of the highest morality - qua. the tragic hero. — Merkwurdichliebe

I cannot remember. I do remember some very odd language use.

I think it would be wise, in the context of this discussion, to honor the great guillotine of Mister Hume, and leave out the notion of "true" thought/belief. Otherwise, we are going to end up in a different universe, a new thread. I think rational thought/belief is fair enough here. — Merkwurdichliebe

Not sure how Hume's guillotine is applicable. When talking about moral dumbfounding, we're talking about what we've named some particular state of mind. When we're offering answers to what grounds our moral convictions those answers can most certainly be true, and must be if one is not morally dumbfounded. Seems that Hume's guillotine is irrelevant at this time.

I'm suddenly reminded of Russell's Why I am not a Christian.
— creativesoul

I don't think he read much Kierkegaard — Merkwurdichliebe

Maybe not. Probably not. Fear and Loathing?

I'm suddenly reminded of Russell's Why I am not a Christian.

...moral dumbfounding occurs at an advanced stage of morality, well beyond the primitive stage of prelinguistic thought/belief.
— Merkwurdichliebe

Indeed. Cognitive dissonance requires a pre-existing worldview. Moral dumbfounding is a kind of cognitive dissonance.
— creativesoul

So intuitive, non-linguistic, subconscious, whichever you want to call it then? — praxis

Those are not different names for the same referent on my view. Unnecessarily multiplying entities is against my religion.

:wink:

Of what use are those notions in this context?

Plato has his own notion of the unknown. Unfortunately he claimed to know too much about it.

:halo:

I'm under the impression that "one was morally dumbfounded when and if they could not answer certain questions regarding why they believe something or other(strongly), and/or how they've come to such hold such conviction in moral belief", I would have to add: only when the question posed is done so rationally (by a relatively normal person), and is meant to elicit a rational answer. For the one who is morally dumbfounded, his reasons are perfectly rational and completely justify his position.(bolding mine) — Merkwurdichliebe

Rational?

How about true?

Moral dumbfounding can perfectly explain why Socrates drinks the hemlock. — Merkwurdichliebe

Can it?

I was under the impression that one was morally dumbfounded when and if they could not answer certain questions regarding why they believe something or other(strongly), and/or how they've come to such hold such conviction in moral belief.

Was that the case with Plato's own personal superhero?

Projection?

:yum:

...moral dumbfounding occurs at an advanced stage of morality, well beyond the primitive stage of prelinguistic thought/belief. — Merkwurdichliebe

Indeed. Cognitive dissonance requires a pre-existing worldview. Moral dumbfounding is a kind of cognitive dissonance.

I'm actually beginning to wonder why that seems to be something so troublesome to agree on for some here.
— creativesoul

I think that I may have figured it out, and in the process identified a basic flaw in the project of attempting to develop a universal criterion for what counts as a moral thing, which is essentially that we may be blind to morals frameworks (and their particular sets of values) that differ from our own. — praxis

Indeed. It does not follow that their morals are different in kind. They are still morals. They are different in terms of approval/disapproval. They are different in all sorts of ways. However, they are all about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour.

Maybe later? After we conclude the origen thread?

Resting a minute while hoping that the others will catch up.

I agree. But in the absence of any other criterion, this become the only ground to stand on. — Merkwurdichliebe

You've stated this concern on several occasions. If we arrive at the absence of any other criterion, then we've missed and/or completely overlooked everything that existed in it's entirety prior to our account of it.

...modern day reductionism/analytics, which is not only guilty of perpetuating the nonexisting problem, but of compounding it, mutilating it beyond recognition, and into a greater delusion that, again, thinks something might actually be resolved. — Merkwurdichliebe

That's a subject matter worthy of it's own thread.

Logical possibility alone does not warrant assent/belief.

Not sure if my overall outlook regarding all philosophy is quite as fatalistic and/or fait accompli.

I have a hard time understanding how the same person can do both; acknowledge the inherent problems in philosophy and suggest their continued use.

The point is that no purported T1 can be altogether without change — Janus

One could argue from a freeze-frame sort of line of thought. A picture in time. However, one cannot argue from that and arrive at no thing is identical through time for the argument itself requires significant passage of time and the speaker will not be able to remain coherent and successfully identify a thing/entity s/he is picking out to the exclusion of all others unless s/he calls the ever-changing thing by the same name despite the fact that everything is in flux.

A at t1 is A. A at t2 is A.

The alternative is untenable.

The distinction is between considering behaviour towards another and considering one's own thought, belief, and/or behaviour in a specific context that is not considering behaviour towards another.
— creativesoul

I think the point you are missing here is that in moral thought we are considering what kind of person we want to be, and that makes no sense in the absence of the other. — Janus

I'm not missing that at all. I've even argued for the existential dependency that all morals have upon an other.

Rather, I'm arguing about the content of what counts as moral thought - in kind. Moral thought does not have to be about, and/or in the context of considering behaviour towards another. Some is. Not all.

I'm actually beginning to wonder why that seems to be something so troublesome to agree on for some here.

Do you agree with that?

Hey Sam! I'm good. How are you?

I do not think of you in such terms. No worries. Someone needs to take me to task. That's the point of putting it out there.

Do you place much value in the rules of logical entailment?

Are you aware that you've been talking in prescriptive terms whereas I'm talking in descriptive.

Two very different methodologies...

I’m just trying to understand your distinction between behavior towards others and behavior not towards others, as it relates to morals.

If you don’t want to cooperate that’s fine. It’s entirely your choice. — praxis

But I'm neither drawing that distinction nor talking about it. The distinction is between considering behaviour towards another and considering one's own thought, belief, and/or behaviour in a specific context that is not considering behaviour towards another. The latter is what The Fox and the Grapes is about. It's not about the former.

The distinction is being drawn as part of the comparison/contrast between two different criterions for what counts as a moral thing. The first criterion is my own. All moral things are about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. The other criterion came from another participant. It claims that all moral things are about considering behaviour towards others.

With all universal criterions, it only take one actual example to the contrary to falsify them. The Fox and the Grapes falsifies the criterion is question. Not all morals are about and/or consider behaviour towards another.

I could not have been more cooperative.

One of the intractable problems I see with trust when it comes to professional therapists is that they charge you for their services, and just as you would not expect a prostitute to love you or know you, why should you expect that the therapist really knows you or cares about you? How can you trust someone if you do not feel that they genuinely know you and care about you? — Janus

Good questions to ask oneself of everyone and anyone who we chose to come into contact with. Great question to ask a paid professional. All professionals, I would think, would need to answer in the affirmative.

It does not follow from the fact that profit is gained that it is the sole motive. Some people love to help others.

What had been traditionally the therapeutic effect of talking about one's issues with trusted friends has been appropriated, and turned into a paid service, it has been monetized and turned into a kind of prostitution. Therapy is also very expensive and not affordable to those on low incomes.

If being paid for one's services makes one a prostitute, then capitalism has made prostitutes of us all.

I think that that's a misleading way to frame the discourse.

It always takes an other. That's all I'm saying my friend. Always. In isolation there is no possibility of recognizing one's own mistakes in thought/belief, and/or unhealthy habits of mind, whatever they may amount to.
— creativesoul

If you just mean that it is only through interactions and specifically talking with others that one's traumas mys be dealt with, then I would say that may be right. If you are suggesting that it must be through some expert other, then I would consider that a baseless assertion. — Janus

I meant that it always take's another worldview to take on another way to look at the same things. Another worldview always takes another person. That person need not be an expert on the mental ongoings of humans. A healthier worldview can be acquired accidentally through purely coincidental interactions(being in the same place at the same time with another whose view invokes less stress, resonates well, is true, and/or is based upon trustworthy foundations). Loosely speaking here, of course...

Also, more generally, the absurd notion that there is no shared meaning, if accepted, would render all discourse futile, because interlocutors could never be doing anything other than talking past one another. A lamentably useless position to hold! — Janus

I would concur. Good point on the matter of dilation as well.

That's not what the story is about.

...you’re also saying that it’s not about considering behaviour towards others. You must see that that’s where we disagree, or I don’t follow your meaning — praxis

Who and/or what determines the moral of the story?

The community of language users who first imagined the fox in a human situation and recorded the story along with it's moral. The moral is a life lesson. A lesson that is meant to guide one's future behaviour should they find themselves in the fox's situation. The moral is don't be like the fox. Don't adapt an attitude that what is not currently within one's reach is not worth having.

That does not consider behaviour towards others.

You agree that there is at least one moral to the story. That's all I'm saying here.
— creativesoul

Not exactly... — praxis

You said that there were two. There are two(on your interpretation).

I'm not ignoring the explanations and/or entailments that you've just offered. It's just not time for that yet. I hope you'll be around for that too.

After we sort out the origen, we can compare/contrast different moral thought/belief in a comparative value assessment in terms of what's the best way to think, believe, and/or act in some situation or other...

Right now, we are still laying the groundwork.

I'd like to resolve this, but it's fine if you'd like to move on.

I've identified two morals in the fable... — praxis

Good. You agree that there is at least one moral to the story. That's all I'm saying here. That moral, while being existentially dependent upon others as a result of it's existential dependency upon language, is not about considering behaviour towards others. It's just not. I'm not making it up. I'm simply offering an accurate account of it. So...

Not all morals consider behaviour towards others.

Exactly. Glad someone else was also paying attention.

Incoherence anyone?
— creativesoul

We can be both referring to A (or P or whatever) at time T1. — Terrapin Station

Ever heard of time dilation?

Meaning is the act (or event) of making mental associations. — Terrapin Station

Ah. You're learning... almost. Thinking/believing is the act. Meaning is the result.

...what we're talking about can be identical. — Terrapin Station

Incoherence anyone?

I don’t think this line of thought is important to the project of determining the source of morals. I’ve found it interesting though. — praxis

Well, we differ here and we agree. I've found this conversation to be quite interesting. It's nice having you around as well. Dissenting opinions are welcome.

Cheers. If I could buy you a drink... we'd all be buzzed!

:wink: