If monism and evolution are true, emergence must be true.
— creativesoul

Consciousness, in my view, is just part of the same coin as anything else. Maybe the best description would be that both mind and matter are part of the same thing, but an emergent property that functions as a fluid abstract system rather than a set object could be viewed as an abstract while a defined set object that emerge would be called an object. — Christoffer

Greetings Christoffer! Your contributions to this thread have been interesting. They've captured my attention.

It seems to me that not only are mind and matter "part of the same thing", but that they are part of a plurality of things, all of which 'emerge' as more complex entities.

And yes, consciousness must be taken into account in a fluid spatiotemporal manner. The problem currently - it seems to me - is the apparent inability for the sciences to draw the evolutionary bridge between language less creatures' and language users'. There are also inherent issues with the origins of meaning, which is required for all cases of consciousness. The experience must be meaningful to the creature, at the time.

This subjective quality is what is not observable or measurable in terms of objective properties of chemical substances. And that is by design... — Wayfarer

If the 'subjective quality' of experience(or experience if you prefer) emerges, then a lack of experience within or regarding the more basic elemental constituents is exactly what would be required and expected, not by design so much, but rather by necessity(existential dependency and elemental constituency).

Apple pies are not found - cannot be found - by looking at apple trees.

That's not a flaw. It is a feature.

Emergence, as it seems, has some general attributes that can be found all over our reality and it may be part of how reality itself functions. — Christoffer

If monism and evolution are true, emergence must happen.

It seems to me that supervenience is all about existential dependency
— creativesoul

I don't think it's about dependency. — frank

Emergence is.

What aspect(s) are you still trying to understand?
— wonderer1

The whole thing. — frank

It seems to me that supervenience is all about existential dependency. As someone mentioned earlier, the difference between emergentists and non-emergentists may prove helpful.

You're presupposing that... somehow... in some way are... you are privy to Michael's beliefs moreso than Michael.

While - in certain situations it is possible to know what another believes moreso than the other, I do not think Michael is the sort of person that does not know what they believe in this context. Nothing they've written must lead to wherever you've arrived. Entailment fails to be a dependable tool here.

Kindness and empathy and charity would make the world a better place even if kindness and empathy and charity aren't moral. — Michael

If by "moral" you mean according to some particular behavioural code, then I agree.

Codes can be mistaken.

Okay.

What about the rest of what I said?

I don't care if I ought or ought not promote happiness or if I ought or ought not cause suffering. I'm going to promote happiness and not cause suffering either way. — Michael

I can acknowledge that the world would be a different, better place if everyone acted with kindness and empathy and charity, but whether or not kindness and empathy and charity are moral makes no difference. — Michael

Whether or not kindness and empathy and charity make the world a better place does matter though.

I'm curious if I have the general gist of what you've been arguing in this thread.


Seems to me like you're explaining in general terms what makes the world a better place in a manner that allows/permits us to dispose of the term/notion/conception of "moral". That is to say that this, this, and this makes the world a better place, but I do not care if those things are called moral or not, I'll do them because I believe that the world will be a better place if I do, but I'm unwilling to insist that others should do the same.

It seems you're not okay with insisting that others have some obligation to share your beliefs about what makes the world a better place.

If that's close... I agree. They have to get there own their own. One cannot be forced to care about others.

Seems naturalist to me.

Why be moral?


:smile:


That's like asking...

Why be kind?

Why do what's best for most everyone concerned/included?

Why glorify doing good for goodness' sake?

Why ought we make concerted effort to think about how our behaviour effects/affects the world, and subsequently tailor it to help bring forth goodness while causing the least harm?

Why do what one believes is most helpful and least harmful?

Why be virtuous?

Why be admirable?

Why do our best to affect/effect positive change in the world?


So, why be moral?

Hopefully because we care about everyone who/that is affected/effected by our behaviour.

Sometimes there are choices other than just faith or authority There have been times when neither faith nor authority had things right.

That presupposes a subject capable of complex metacognition.

You haven’t answered either:

What makes the statement true; or
Where your confidence comes from.

Neither of your answers are in any way adequate. — AmadeusD

Well, if I've not answered then what are you possibly referring to when writing "Neither of your answers are in any way adequate"???

:brow:

First question...

Correspondence is an emergent relation between what is thought and/or believed about what is going on and what is going on. When what is thought about what's going on is 'equivalent' enough, or close enough to what is going on, then truth emerges. That is how meaningful true belief become real/actual/manifest/formed. That's what it takes. That's how correspondence 'between' belief about reality and reality(hence, meaningful true belief) emerges onto the world stage.

If it is the case that we ought not kick puppies, then "we ought not kick puppies" is true.

Are you questioning whether or not it is the case that we ought not kick puppies? — creativesoul

That was early on. Perhaps you missed it?

The second question has not been asked. Those meaningful marks have not been presented to me in that order prior to now. Earlier you asked where my confidence came from when I said that if it is the case that kicking puppies is forbidden then it is also the case that we ought not kick puppies and vice versa. You queried regarding my confidence in making those claims. I answered as clearly, concisely, and completely as possible in the fewest meaningful marks possible to do so.

I stand by that answer. I know what they both mean. They mean the exact same thing.

Since we can build on the simple fact of our agreement. We can discourage puppy kicking, try to avoid the temptation provided by puppies, or introduce sanctions against puppy kickers. All the bits we need for a moral practice still follow, without a grounding in deontology or consequentialism, and with precious little metaethics. — Banno

Can we tease this out a bit further?

Would you agree with my saying that we need no 'rule giver', 'enforcer', and/or judge aside from ourselves if for no other reason than strictly because we are all we have? Since that's the case, then the mantra of "practice makes perfect" is the best approach we have. If that's all we have, then it's best for us to accept the facts and begin openly discussing which sorts of behaviours are better than others and why... without appealing to external judges and rule makers aside from ourselves.

At some point we must discuss consequences lest we have no other basis upon which to ground our belief about what and/or which behaviour is best in some set of circumstances.

Seems a brute fact to me. There is no need for an external judge, especially one of supernatural origin. Occam's razor applies. It is almost certainly the case that we humans 'make up the rules' governing our own behaviour. We are the ones who decide what is acceptable/unacceptable.

That's the natural progression of human thought. We act. We reflect upon actions. Then, we reflect upon those reflections, ad infinitum. In this way, morality and moral discourse emerges.

So, we arrive at not so much as admitting that codes of conduct are subject to influence by individual particulars, but insisting upon keeping that fact in mind and building upon it.

Interesting. Thanks for that. Collective intentionality may dovetail nicely with my own position.

Yup. I've been listening to/watching Searle lectures from time to time for a while now. Trying to keep the ontology closer to ground level. Dennett helps too!

:cool:

Searle's status functions??? Institutional facts???

People threatening to hang Mike Pence are not enemies of the US either, I suppose...

:roll:

Sedition is not a rebellion against the United States government. A rebellion against the United States is not an insurrection. Sedition is not an insurrection.



I suppose you'd agree with all that?

I'm conflating nothing. Sedition is enough.

Seditious conspiracy is insurrection and rebellion? Then why didn’t they get charged for insurrection and rebellion — NOS4A2

Does not matter. Rebelling against the transfer of power with arms nonetheless is enough.

No sedition. — NOS4A2

Rubbish. Sedition against the United States is both rebellion and insurrection. Trump and many congress members were involved, have and continue to offer aid and comfort to those already found guilty of sedition and seditious conspiracy... ahem... rebellion and insurrection against the United States.

He has not been found guilty of any such thing. — NOS4A2

By anyone who looks.

Look again. Sedition is rebellion against the United States

Trump has been found guilty of offering aid and comfort to people who are guilty of sedition. That disqualifies him from holding public office.

That's a matter of enforcement... nothing else. Some people run stop signs too, and yet the cop doesn't ticket them. It's an offense nonetheless.

Well no... sedition and seditious conspiracy is enough. We have that too!

Attempting to obstruct an official proceeding such as the peaceful transfer of power counts as an offense that disqualifies one. Offering those people aid and comfort also disqualifies one.

Evidently you're unaware of all the cases where some have plead guilty and/or been found guilty of precisely the language in the article. So, check... there are such people. Secondly, there are members in congress who have and continue to offer aid and comfort to those who've been found guilty by the facts in earlier court proceedings...

Trump had and does as well, and that ought be check mate.

The judge doesn't matter at this point.

If they were guilty, by whatever means you find acceptable, what sense would it make for them to have the sole exclusive power to enforce the article?

They wouldn’t have the power because they would be barred from being in Congress. — NOS4A2

If they were members at the time they gave aid and comfort to insurrectionists, they would.

Right. It seems to me that that article applies much much more broadly than is currently being applied. In other words, it is clear that a large number of current elected officials ought be removed from their office, and many of them are currently holding congressional positions.

Holding public office or being on the ballot does not exonerate one from the article.

Holding public office prior to offering aid and comfort to insurrectionists does not exonerate one from the article.

Just as the article prohibited confederate officials after the Civil War, it applies equally to those currently in congress who attempted to obstruct an official proceeding as well as all of those who've given aid and comfort to insurrectionists.

If the power of enforcing the article was exclusively conferred to congress, it would be completely incapable of removing any members guilty of what the article sets out. Given that the very purpose of the article is to prohibit such members, it is clear that that interpretation is wrong.

The purpose of the article is to prohibit insurrectionists and those who give aid and comfort to insurrectionists from holding public office. It makes no sense whatsoever to confer the power to execute/enforce the article to the very people who have given and continue to offer aid and comfort to insurrectionists.

The judge doesn't matter at this point.

If they were guilty, by whatever means you find acceptable, what sense would it make for them to have the sole exclusive power to enforce the article?

On the other hand, the 14th amendment does confer the power to enforce the provisions to Congress, so one can assume correctly that that power belongs with Congress and no one else. — NOS4A2

How would that work if there were members in congress who were guilty of what the article sets out?

If those guilty of what the amendment sets out won an election and were to hold public office and it were up to them to enforce it, it would defeat the very purpose of the amendment. They won't find themselves guilty.

If this congress were responsible for enforcing it as written, they would be forced to conclude that they themselves were disqualified from holding their own positions. Well, a large portion of the republican members anyway.

A congress full of insurrectionists. A congress full of folk who attempted to stop/obstruct an official proceeding. A congress of folk who continue to commit fraud against the American people.