More Hume pertaining to the OP...

But here it may be proper to remark, that though our conclusions from experience carry us beyond our memory and senses, and assure us of matters of fact, which happened in the most distant places and most remote ages; yet some fact must always be present to the senses or memory, from which we may first proceed in drawing these conclusions. A man, who should find in a desert country the remains of pompous buildings, would conclude, that the country had, in ancient times, been cultivated by civilized inhabitants; but did nothing of this nature occur to him, he could never form such an inference. We learn the events of former ages from history; but then we must peruse the volumes, in which this instruction is contained, and thence carry up our inferences from one testimony to another, till we arrive at the eye-witnesses and spectators of these distant events. In a word, if we proceed not upon some fact, present to the memory or senses, our reasonings would be merely hypothetical; and however the particular links might be connected with each other, the whole chain of inferences would have nothing to support it, nor could we ever, by its means, arrive at the knowledge of any real existence. If I ask, why you believe any particular matter of fact, which you relate, you must tell me some reason; and this reason will be some other fact, connected with it. But as you cannot proceed after this manner, in infinitum, you must at last terminate in some fact, which is present to your memory or senses; or must allow that your belief is entirely without foundation.

Hume's own words below. Granted, they are not the admission I was looking for, but they are spot on regarding the OP, and a difference between your report/dependency of/on Hume and Hume. I found that curious...

 

It seems evident, that men are carried, by a natural instinct or prepossession, to repose faith in their senses; and that, without any reasoning, or even almost before the use of reason, we always suppose an external universe, which depends not on our perception, but would exist, though we and every sensible creature were absent or annihilated. Even the animal creation are governed by a like opinion, and preserve this belief of external objects, in all their thoughts, designs, and actions.

E 12.24, SBN 161-2

There is, indeed, a more mitigated scepticism or academical philosophy, which may be both durable and useful, and which may, in part, be the result of this Pyrrhonism, or excessive scepticism, when its undistinguished doubts are, in some measure, corrected by common sense and reflection.

Hume's writing can be deceptive in Treatise, and it can be tricky to pinpoint what he was actually trying to say. — Corvus

Nah. He said it plainly. He said he had no idea and you say otherwise about him...

I'll take his word over yours.

...it is about how our mind and belief works... — Corvus

That's an 'interesting' thing to say, given the fact that Hume himself clearly admitted having no clue about belief...

...and he was right. He didn't.

You are correct in that you have no immediate reason a posteriori to believe in the existence of the world in the absence of perception. It is still the case you have mediate reason to believe a priori, in the existence of the world, iff you’ve a set of cognitions from antecedent perceptions. And it is impossible that you do not insofar as you’re alive and functioning, so…..

The logical and epistemic arguments for a priori justifications has been done, and is in the public record. They serve as explanation for not having to re-learn your alphabet after waking up each morning, given that you already know it. — Mww

Yup. Folk use meaningful language not created by themselves to arrive at philosophical 'positions' that quite simply cannot take account of that much.

it would... ...involve you in a performative contradiction when you go on to council us unperceived beings... — Fooloso4

You're saying that to someone who I strongly suspect may not understand what a performative contradiction is. Indeed, that poster is being grilled by a few different people here for the absurdity of claiming to not believe in anything anytime unless that something is being perceived at the time. That sort of radical skepticism leads to a reductio in more ways than one could count quickly.

If I were as cruel as I once was, I would've grilled him(I suspect) myself, but this thread topic interests me too much and I just don't find that sort of 'discussion' appealing.

Think of when you've watched another sleep. People sleep. We watch. We're part of the world. The world exists while they sleep. If you agree, but still doubt your own experience, then you're working from double standards. Special pleading for your case.
— creativesoul
It wasn't about other people sleeping. It was about the question, do I believe the world exists, when I am asleep? The point is not about the existence of the world. It is about the logical ground for believing in something when not perceiving. There is a clear difference. — Corvus

You seem to have missed the point.

When we sleep, we are not perceiving the world.

Now apply the example I offered. It is of a case where someone we're watching is sleeping, and the world still exists even though they are not perceiving the world. The same holds true of the world and you while you sleep.

We cannot change the tree on the road with our words alone. It does not follow from that that we cannot change the world with our words. Strictly speaking we do always change the world with our language, if for no other reason than we've added more examples of language use to it.
— creativesoul
X cannot do Y. That doesn't mean X cannot do Y? Is this not a contradiction?

You're mistaken here. "change the tree on the road with our words alone" is not equivalent to "change the world with our words". In other words, you've assigned the same variable "Y" to two different things and then treated them as the same thing. They're not.

See that word "alone"?

Words do not cut down trees. Words can instruct another to cut down trees... using language to do so.

What is the point trying to create a well with just Austin's linguistic analysis on Ayer?...

<snip>

...Wouldn't the water in the well go stale soon with the prejudice and narrow mindedness rejecting all the relating issues, analysis and criticisms? — Corvus

The well is Austin's criticism of Ayer's position. The conversation is based upon that. In the conversation, relevant replies dip from exactly that well. Germane points and subsequent conversation are not creating the well. They're using it; drawing it up from the depths... examining its contents.

Valid objection/criticism of Austin's critique of Ayer's position is perfectly fine. If the criticism is broad, and it somehow applies locally to this particular thread topic, then that connection ought be set out in as clear and concise language as possible.

There is no logical ground for me to believe the world exists during my sleep, because I no longer perceive the world until waking up to consciousness. Therefore perception is prior to language. — Corvus

The last claim above does not follow from the bit that precedes it.

Think of when you've watched another sleep. People sleep. We watch. We're part of the world. The world exists while they sleep. If you agree, but still doubt your own experience, then you're working from double standards. Special pleading for your case.

Do we always change the world? With language?
Can you change the tree on the road with your words? — Corvus

We cannot change the tree on the road with our words alone. It does not follow from that that we cannot change the world with our words. Strictly speaking we do always change the world with our language, if for no other reason than we've added more examples of language use to it.

The point is that we do sometimes use language to do exactly what you said, but... and this is the important part...

We do other stuff with it too.

Thanks, but the bit you replied to ought not be further expounded or explicated. It's far too tangent.

...the point was that whether it is 'direct' or 'indirect' is a matter of looking at it from different perspectives, using different definitions of 'direct' and 'indirect'.

Understanding what one possibly means, what they're talking about, or what they're picking out to the exclusion of all else when they utter "direct perception" or "indirect perception" is just a matter of looking at definitions and/or the way their using the words. With that much I'll readily agree.

But...

Whether "it" is direct or not is to question whether all perception is direct or not.

If it began happening long before we began thinking about it, then we're attempting to take account of something that existed in its entirety prior to our noticing it. If our notion of perception cannot admit this or dovetail with it, then it is wrong.

If all perception includes our thinking about it, then it would follow that only creatures capable of thinking about their own perception are capable of perceptions. We use language to acquire knowledge of that which preceded it. Such metacognitive endeavors emerge via language use replete with naming and descriptive practices. We have ancestors that were once in the cat's stage...

Cats perceive mice despite having no idea what the term "mice" is. No notion of "perception" necessary for that to happen either. Our acquiring knowledge of that much is another matter altogether.

Not all notions of perception are on equal footing.

Sorry for the interruption folks. :yikes:

During the time before language, all sorts of different creatures were perceiving all sorts of stuff. None of it was existentially dependent upon language. Not all of it was large enough to be seen with the naked eye. Optical advances grew our knowledge. If using a man-made optical device counts as indirectly perceiving what's on the other side of the glass, then directly perceiving the same things amounts to looking at the same scene after removing the tool.

Not all perception uses tools. If it is the case that all perception is indirect, and it is also the case that not all perception uses tools(Ayer knew this too!) then Ayer's notion of "perception" remains undisturbed by the comparison to optical tools such as telescopes/microscopes. That counts as indirect as well.

He means something different. He's drawing correlations between something other than optical tools.

I find that criticism toothless.

I think it worth mentioning here that early, basic, and/or rudimentary point of view invariant(universally applicable) perception was taking place long before we ever began noticing.

Hard to talk about something if there is nothing in the mind of the speaker. Before we began using terms like "perception", in order to pick stuff out of the world to the exclusion of all else, there was something to be named. Anything else is a complete fabrication of the mind.

I actually second the notion that it is important to understand Ayer’s idea of “perception” and not bring a preconceived notion to our reading... — Antony Nickles

Indeed.

In order to fully understand any position, the student must first grant some of it, at least. "The mark of an educated mind" and all that. Does Austin target Ayer's notion of "perception"? Did Ayer reply?

Nice thread. Good stuff.

I think it's more a matter of philosophers finding new and novel ways to imagine things; the "problem" only arises when the demand that there be just one "correct" way of viewing things is made.
— Janus

It is possible that more than one way of thinking about things is valid, in one way or another. But surely some sort of selection will be needed sooner or later. — Ludwig V

Hi Ludwig. Aside from this post, I'll likely not add much more. I am not attempting to disagree with anything you've said here. I just wanted to add a bit to what you wrote in response to the sentiment you're addressing above.

It does not follow from the fact that there is more than one notion of perception that all the different ones are on equal footing. It's also worth pointing out that a position, notion, or conception can be both, perfectly valid and false. Seems to me that in cases like this, we can further discriminate between the notions. As Banno and others have hinted at, the notion of perception is in dire need of being precisely put.

However, this thread is about Austin's answer to Ayer's and thus it is about that notion of perception. That would be the correct one in this situation. "Correct" in the sense that that is the one under consideration, so the others are irrelevant here.

Below is taken from another thread. It's an example of application 'in the wild'...

Speculative philosophy can be done in a dark room full of vacuum for sure
— Corvus

The basis upon which the speculation happens cannot happen in a vacuum. — creativesoul

It would be a conceptual vacuum of course. — Corvus

I'm objecting to the very notion. Speculative philosophy requires common language. One cannot acquire common language without conceptions. — creativesoul

Seems clear to me that that is precisely the wrong way around. We do not go from propositional and cognitive understanding to non-propositional and non-cognitive understanding. There is no such thing as non-cognitive understanding. There is such thing as non-propositional thought, belief, knowledge, and understanding. It's what precedes the propositional.

It follows that your emotions, thoughts, and inner world are not you.
— creativesoul
Good point. The only candidate for our permanent, enduring self is our awareness. — Art48

Awareness without emotions, thoughts, or inner world?

Supposing that we have them at all (see Davidson), do we perceive our world views or do we discover or construct them? — Banno

We adopt, discover, and construct them. They are both causes and effects/affect. We perceive their effects/affects. That's tangential to the topic though.

I'm just curious about the approach to direct/indirect perception.

A massively interesting question. Is there anything prohibitive about language being the "opening" to the world, that which makes things "unhidden" (alethea is the Greek term) to us and that defines our radical finitude, that makes the "leap" (Kierkegaard) to a non cognitive and non propositional understanding impossible? — Astrophel

...to there... from where exactly?

premise: I am not what I am aware of; those are objects of awareness. Rather, I am awareness itself.

Let’s unpack that. Of what am I aware? Of physical sensations (sight, sound, smell, touch, taste) along with emotions and thoughts. Seven types of sensations: five related to the (purported) external world, and the emotions and thoughts that constitute our inner world. — Art48

It follows that your emotions, thoughts, and inner world are not you.

If things were going well in my daily life, even though the logical thing to do would be to step to one side, out of passion, I decide not to step to one side. This would be an example of Free Will, acting illogically. — RussellA

Free Will does no acting.

One may logically decide to step out in front of a train. They may plan to do so. They desire the effect. They want certain things to happen as a result of their deliberate choice. They do so in order to make the world match their desires...

According to you this is illogical.

I see a truck approaching me at speed.

If things were going well in my daily life, the logical thing to do would be to step to one side. — RussellA

Logic does not always determine how one reacts in such circumstances. It's not like everyone has pondered what to do at the time based upon some logical calculus. There's no time to run the rules through one's mind while the train is approaching. One avoids danger successfully, nonetheless.

Logic does not determine how one reacts in such circumstances. It's not a logical thing to do.

This would be an example of Determinism, acting logically. — RussellA

Determinism is the name of a position one may take upon how the world works. Determinism is a worldview. Worldviews are not the sort of things that 'act logically'. Determinism is not the sort of thing that acts logically any more than Indeterminism, or Theism.

I'm objecting to the very notion. Speculative philosophy requires common language. One cannot acquire common language without conceptions.

Speculative philosophy can be done in a dark room full of vacuum for sure — Corvus

The basis upon which the speculation happens cannot happen in a vacuum.

This raises the question as to what are thoughts? — RussellA

Correlations drawn between different things.

So much the worse when the philosopher is going to claim that the something could never be perceived directly. — Banno

The idea of rejecting the distinction between direct and indirect perception interests me, but then again, I don't use "indirect perception" in such a limited fashion. For me, whether or not something is directly perceptible or not is partly determined by what it consists of. So, it's not just about a tool using perceiver. It's also about the elemental constituency of what's being perceived.

We sometimes indirectly perceive both causes and effects. Worldviews are efficacious. They cause certain things to happen. Worldviews cannot be directly perceived, but their inevitable affect/effect on the world can.

Worldviews are - in large part at least - adopted during common language acquisition. They are in that sense, an affect/effect of societal norms.

An electron's consciousness — RogueAI

Requires consciousness be something that it is possible for an electron to have. What ground/justification is there for holding such a belief?

Poetic flowery language. While that's certainly useful, it's not usually a good way to do philosophy.

It's all about the relationship between the three terms in the OP. People use those three terms in very different ways.

Try this...

All belief is about what happened, is happening, or is expected to happen(events). Facts are events. Belief is always about events. Events are not truth apt. Beliefs are. Correspondence between events and belief is truth. Reality is all the events(what's happening) at any point in time. Reality is not truth apt. Belief is. Belief is always about fact/reality. Correspondence between fact/reality and belief is truth.

When a creature attributes the right kind of meaning to a particular set of events during either contemplation or observation, they formed and/or reformed accurate(veridical) belief. They've a good grasp upon the way things were, are, or are expected to be. They have true belief about fact/reality.

I want to see real evidence that [panpsychism's] the case before I change course
— flannel jesus

What would that evidence look like? How do we go about verifying something like panpsychism? — RogueAI

Evidence to disprove a theory that claims everything is conscious? I think that the standard for what counts as something being conscious takes center stage in such a debate.

We could start by examining obvious cases where we would agree that the candidate under consideration is conscious. Remove individual particulars and gather relevant common denominators.

On my view, it's all about meaningful thought and belief. If some thing or other is capable of thought and belief then they are conscious.

Is it possible consciousness appeared when a certain amount of information processing in brains was present? In that case, if consciousness just happens when a certain amount of information is processed, would you really say it's a "product of evolution"? — RogueAI

...in brains...

That was left out. The biological machinery evolved. That's too important to neglect. Certain brain structures (and other biological systems) evolved and as a direct result of having them, some creatures became capable of drawing correlations, associations, and/or connections between different things... and hence, simple cognition emerged.

Where does it all start? <-----that seems to be the underlying sentiment/question. Evolution of biological structures was/is and will continue to be a slow process. What sort of thing can consciousness be, such that it is capable of emerging and subsequently evolving over time given enough mutation and happenstance into the sort of extremely complex metacognitive endeavors we humans find ourselves engaged in?

I think that consciousness is a biproduct of meaningful thought and belief. Or, perhaps, is equivalent to meaningful thought and belief.

Interesting conversation. I've been looking for just such a discussion. Care if I join? More questions than anything, really... for now.

It's a popular sentiment that children don't owe their parents anything, e.g. — baker

Thanks for the reply.

That assertion/statement/proposition is stated in such a way that most would agree with it... as written.

Many people, from all sorts of completely different socioeconomic circumstances, would share the exact same propositional attitude towards what you wrote despite having completely different and otherwise contradictory belief about why it's acceptable to feel like that. The differences matter.



The attached blurb was penned by a very inconsiderate person. It reeks of overgeneralization. To refuse to help one's own parents simply because they did not successfully prepare themselves - financially - for the later years in life is to punish them for what could be financial mistakes. Some financial mistakes are honestly made.

Some people are on fixed income after being promised that if they participated in the social security program they would have enough money to live comfortably during retirement. Some of those people are not necessarily at fault for having such an unsettling debt to income ratio. The financial cost to live comfortably now is far higher than social security and healthcare are capable of providing.

If the child is more than capable of helping but refuses to do so in lieu of intentionally punishing them - for the sake of punishing them - for the rest of their life, then that is a child who knowingly and deliberately causes unnecessary harm to their own parents. Mean inconsiderate possibly very self-centered person.

I'll not pass universal judgment on every single individual's personal belief(popular sentiment) that they do not owe their parents anything.

There's also quite a range of what exactly is not owed. There are all sorts of different kinds of debt. All debt is owed. "I owe you nothing" means I am not in debt to you. Not all people who believe that they do not owe their parents anything are talking about money. The sentiment underwriting the agreement has emerged as the result of very different individual particular circumstances.

Yet bearing in mind the premises in your OP, it's clear that one couldn't be where one is today were it not for one's parents, and that some akcnowledgement of this debt is in order.
Similar for one's teachers. — baker

That's a bit too strong for my taste. If taken too broadly, parents land in the category of cause along with all other influences in our lives. It doesn't make much sense to have a sense of owing a debt to everyone who changed or influenced our lives. I do agree that that is certainly an apt thing to say about some people.
 
Not all parents teach their own children. Of those who do, not all teaching counts as something we ought aspire towards. Some people are raised by people other than their biological parents. All people live with others during their lifetime. We are most certainly interdependent social creatures, which speaks to the following...

Another popular sentiment is to think of oneself as independent, as not having needed anyone in order to succeed, and taking pride in this. Similarly as above with parents and teachers, it's clear that such is not possible, and that a million things need to come together in order for a person to succeed, a million things over which the person has no control. — baker

American rugged individualism is preached and practiced. Many do not carefully consider that different influences effect/affect each and every one of us. I, for one, consider myself very lucky. I also make concerted attempts at doing things that open up the possibilities.

Not all parents are worthy of holding in high esteem.

Let's see what happens when we 'plug in' something a bit more interesting/compelling..
— creativesoul

Gratitude to parents.
Gratitude to teachers.

Bearing in mind that it is impossible to be "one's own person" and not need anyone. — baker

Could you plug it in? I'm not sure what to do with that! :smile:

1. Temporal ordering and causation. Is the dependence relation you're interested one of logical necessity or one of (physical?) causation? Or maybe the two are two sides of the same coin? I could see the argument that our logical sense emerges from the causal, as a form of abstraction that evolution equipped us with, but you can also see arguments for logic being more essential and "at work," in causation. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Logic, on my view, is an accounting practice. Hence, it is existentially dependent upon something to take account of, as well as a practitioner.  

2. That "elemental" parts are, in ways, more fundemental that wholes. The elemental parts must exist before the wholes, no? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Necessary elemental constituents comprise the complex entity. Here it is worth noting that necessary elemental constituents are themselves entities. Most times, they exist in their entirety prior to becoming a part of the complex entity, but not always.

But might we consider that the whole sometimes seems to precede the distinction of parts. E.g., we needed the universal process, the fields in which "part(icles) subsist" before we can have the elemental parts? Or, the universal relation through which "mass" emerges must pre-exist "massive particles," as the latter are necessarily defined in terms of the former. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Here we must be careful, I think. It's easy to conflate what it takes for us to become aware of something, with what it takes for that something to exist in it's entirety prior to our knowledge of it. I'm also not well versed enough to even offer a well-informed view regarding particle physics or quantum physics.

Which makes me ask, is this for only the universal case, or the particulars as well? You can't have an individual apple pie without first having apples, but it seems possible to have war prior to fighting. Maybe this says something about the essence of war. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Maybe. It may say something about entities which have their elemental consistencies completely and totally determined/established/delineated by us. War is one such thing. If there is war without fighting, then - at that time - that war doesn't include fighting. That war, at that time, does not consist of fighting. However, I do not see that example as an interesting one. You have been touching upon the rightful application of the outline/discipline though. So, thanks for that!

:smile:

In what way is it it more "anthropomorphic," then something like the inverse square law, Maxwell's equations, etc.? — Count Timothy von Icarus

After a quick look... it seems I've perhaps made a mistake regarding Shannon's Information. For some reason or other, I had the impression that it situated meaning in circumstances where there could be none.

Hegel doesn't deny time or the fact that we aren't actually starting from nothing. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Understood. It makes no sense to me for anyone to insist that we act like it's even possible to set all presuppositions aside. It's not. I do agree that Kant had inherent issues, namely untenability. Hegel seems to have the same fundamental flaw.

I'm interested in how thought and belief emerge. Amongst a number of them, I also reject the subject/object, physical/non-physical, internal/external dichotomies, particularly when it comes to taking proper account of minds(thought and belief). None of those frameworks are capable of taking proper account of that which consists of both, and is thus... neither one or the other. Thought, belief, consciousness, mind, etc... are precisely such things on my view.

I think we have to focus on what is needed to exist a priori to let apple pies exist. Because, despite apples and apple trees being key elements to their existence, we understand that they are not the only elements of an eventual apple pie. — javi2541997

Well, if our aim was to acquire knowledge of all of the necessary preconditions pertaining to the emergence of apple pies, then we would have to focus on that. I'm not seeking omniscience, nor do I require it. We can know some things are prior to others. We can know some things consist of others. Etc. Seeking and acquiring some knowledge is a useful endeavor. We need not know everything in order to know some things.

The apple pie example was meant to get familiar with the discipline set out in the OP. We can have more interesting talks, to me anyway, regarding the emergence of truth, meaning, and belief.

Not at all - just a bit exasperated at having misinterpreted the aim of the OP. — Wayfarer

Good. Sorry for the disappointment I was part of. I've always liked you Jeep. :smile: Hope you're well. You seem so. Moderator now too!

>>>>insert shaka<<<<

I had the same thought, but when I re-read the OP I realized it doesn't commit itself to this. With the exception of p5, the OP is entirely negative: it is all "cannot". "Must exist prior" is no part of the OP. — Leontiskos

Very astute! I'm impressed. Some things emerge simultaneously. Meaning, truth, and some of the simplest thought(s) seem to me to do exactly that.

Some language less creatures have belief. Belief emerges prior to language. All belief is meaningful to the believing creature. Meaning emerges prior to language. Some language less belief is true. Truth emerges prior to language.

Seems that way to me anyway.

Shannon Entropy — Count Timothy von Icarus

Reeks of anthropomorphism...

You might be interested in Hegel's two Logics, which follow a somewhat similar methodology. But Hegel has the added criteria that we must start without any presuppositions, from a "blank slate." — Count Timothy von Icarus

We work from starkly different criteria regarding what counts as a 'somewhat similar methodology'. One takes note of time. The other denounces the practice. The aim is the evolutionary progression of mind, thought, belief, worldviews, knowledge, etc. Of course it presupposes time.

There is a distinction to be drawn and maintained between our account/report and what we're taking account of and/or reporting upon. They are completely different entities. Our report includes meaningful language use. What we're reporting upon does not always. So, when it comes to insisting that "we" start with a blank slate - as reporters - that's impossible. Blank slates don't write.

However, as far as blank slates and the first thinking or believing creatures go...

It had to start somehow. Much to my own dismay, I've found that the gradual nature of evolutionary progression - when it comes to the emergence of human consciousness - refuses to offer the deep satisfaction of an ah-hah - there it is - moment in time. It's not like adding vinegar to baking soda. It would be more like watching the erosion of oceanfront tectonic plates in real time. There would not be a sudden clear distinction from this moment to the next when the candidate under consideration/observation suddenly becomes conscious in the way we describe ourselves with that word.

We've been drawing all sorts of complex meaningful correlations, connections, and/or associations between all sorts of different entities for a very long time. Many, if not most of those correlations include language use... for us anyway. Some language less creatures are capable of forming, having, and/or holding thought and belief about the world and themselves. They do it the very same way we do. The differences between thinking and believing creatures involve the content. The content is limited by the biological machinery the candidate is equipped with.


Yup.

I think it's pretty well certain that our report of the evolutionary progression of human thought and belief presupposes both, time and causality - as it must. That's what the words mean, after-all. I mean, it's impossible to set out a timeless progression of past events. That's nonsense.