There's many an interesting avenue packed up in that post. Thanks. I'm currently absorbing it.

:up:

Apple trees existed prior to apple pies. Insert p1. Hence, apple trees cannot be existentially dependent upon apple pies.

Apple pies are existentially dependent upon having the elements combined by some capable agent. However, not all complex entities are.

Well we plainly have different notions of what that consists of, but never mind, I hope someone else has a contribution to make. — Wayfarer

:brow:

I get the feeling that you're somehow offended? Not sure why or how, but not the aim here. I'm just more interested in a notion of mind that is amenable to evolutionary progression such that it can bridge the gap between language less animals and ourselves. So, the elements we're speaking of are already complex entities themselves...

Let's see what happens when we 'plug in' something a bit more interesting/compelling..
— creativesoul

What was the more interesting/compelling application you had in mind? — Leontiskos

I think that philosophy proper has gotten human thought and belief wrong. Hence, there are no conceptions/notions thereof that are amenable to evolutionary progression.

It is. :brow:

Is the order that emerges from the chaos of the very early universe causal or consequential? — Wayfarer

Hey Jeep! Nice summary. Causal.

I'm not really all that interested in speculating on the origin of the universe. As you may know, I do have a strong methodological naturalist bent, if for no other reason than minimizing the potential of forming and/or holding false belief. My main interest has always been thought and belief, belief systems, worldviews, etc. Current and historical political events show the importance thereof.

A second question is, exactly what do the purported simple elements comprise? — Wayfarer

Again, I find that sort of reduction uninteresting. I'm more concerned with current important events and practices in the macro world with a particular interest on how individual and collective thought and belief systems play a role.

So I'm afraid the 'sheer simplicity' of your outine might only be because it's simplistic. It's a very appealing intuitive image, that of simple elements giving rise to more complex phenomena through the evolutionary process, and arguably one of the reigning metaphors suggested by evolution. But there are a great many philosophical and scientific conundrums thrown up by it. — Wayfarer

Hopefully you'll let me know if I cross any boundaries and venture off into those conundrums. I doubt I will, but I suppose I unknowingly could.

Your OP is very interesting, and I am surprised that it didn't get attention back then. I hope this thread gets more replies, because it deserves it. Although I am not an expert on logic, I am interested in your premises and conclusions. But it is obvious that I would probably not have the answers or debate you are looking for. Yet, I would make an attempt to keep up with the path or sense of your thread. — javi2541997

Thanks for the kind words. I'm not necessarily looking for any particular answers. I'm more interested in the scope of rightful application, the consequences of application, any possible valid negation/objection; any weaknesses or limits, etc.

Apple pies consist - in part at least - of apples. Apple pies are existentially dependent upon apples. Apples are existentially dependent upon apple trees. When A is existentially dependent upon B and B is existentially dependent upon C, then A is existentially dependent upon C. Apple pies are existentially dependent upon apple trees. Apple pies cannot exist prior to apples or apple trees.
— creativesoul

I agree that B - or apples - is existentially dependent upon C - apple trees - but A - apple pies - is not existentially dependent upon C, because its existence depends on other factors.

p1 I have the apples but not the rest of the ingredients. So, apple pies are existentially dependent upon the latter - or other factors... — javi2541997

I agree that apple pies are existentially dependent upon more than just apples, hence, the "- in part at least -" bit. There is more to a complex entity than just one singled out element, and the emergence of complex entities includes all of the elementary constituents comprising the entity. That is the hallmark of necessary elemental constituents; if we remove any particular one, what's left is not enough. No single one is both necessary and sufficient.

p2 I have all the ingredients, but I do not cook the apple pie. It depends existentially upon me, not B or C. — javi2541997

There are uncooked apple pies.

 

p3 Apple trees and apples are produced to make juice - for example - so it is not necessarily that their purpose for existing is the apple pie. — javi2541997

Never said otherwise.

Three years later... another attempt to generate interest...

Whereas in time ignorant can become knowing, — unenlightened

Indeed.

It gets very interesting when one who has been ignorant of their own false belief becomes aware of exactly what they once believed.

Farmers mistaking sheets for sheeps. People believing that broken clocks are working ones. Etc.

Either some belief is not equivalent to propositional attitude or no one ever looks at a broken clock and presupposes that it's not broken. That's exactly what happens when one of us believes that a broken clock is working. S will not agree to "that broken clock is working" at the time they trust it. The farmer certainly would not assent to the claim that that sheet is a sheep, but they most certainly take that sheet to be a sheep. They believe that a sheet is a sheep. They will not state it at the time. That's due to our inability to knowingly believe a falsehood.

Nice thread!

Anyone saying that Trump voters just hate minorities are ill-informed. — ButyDude

Well... not all, but definitely, demonstrably, provably...

Some... many... but not all.

It’s not surprising that you’d blame Trump for someone else’s crime, but that’s only because it’s obvious your sense of justice has been perverted a long time ago. — NOS4A2

How do you square that sentiment with Trump's history of punishing others without honoring their right to redress?

Nice decision... Biden campaign has a user account on Trump's platform.

Watch Trump take away the free speech of others...

Very effective move. Just show Trump contradicting himself all the time. One looooong track.

... in reality the algorithms of every online media platform have kept myself and even yourself from experiencing legitimate arguments against our beliefs. — ButyDude

Short life... this 'reality' referenced above. Sometimes to some people. Never every time concerning all people. Reality includes all people during all applicable timeframes.

Gross overgeneralization.

Echo chambers exist. Not all are powered by algorithmic forces. Pick any applicable time period... some people during the timeframe will not be challenging their own thought/belief about the world due to constant reaffirmation. Algorithmic echo chambers feed the confirmation bias of those who personally and totally identify with their worldview. To some people, any questioning of anything they say or do is taken as an assault, attack, or some other affront. This is witnessed by how any and all attempts to be helpful are met with hostility. Cognitive dissonance is more jarring the first time it happens. When reality doesn't match expectations, the ground is fertile for such circumstances to happen. How we accept our mistakes matters most, on my view anyway.

Private small social groups/communities sometimes produce the same results. Most importantly, the algorithms under consideration have not been in the world long enough to have affectively influenced everyone in the manner described in the above quote. That's one strike against.

There are plenty who seek legitimate arguments against their worldview/belief system. I'm one.

No one has been affected by every algorithm. No one is following an algorithm's path all the time. No one is always being influenced by algorithmic forces. Of all the people who've been influenced by the platforms in question, some became aware. Some of those knew the importance of the matter. Some deliberately minimize usage. I do as a proactive corrective measure taken.

Echo chambers are a problem... I grant that much without pause.

Self inspection takes others. None of us can see the flaws in our own worldview. If the only people we allow ourselves to be influenced, effected, and/or affected by are those with whom we already largely agree with, we're already in an echo chamber. If we never seriously consider another's worldview simply because it contradicts our own; if we never sit and seriously consider another explanation of the same set of events, we'll never become aware of any of the possible mistaken belief we hold regarding the world and/or ourselves

The clock is broken and sometimes we believe that it is not broken. — Banno

The term "it" refers to the broken clock. Sometimes we believe that a broken clock is not broken.

That rendering best matches what I'm claiming, but again, never would we ever assent to "a broken clock is not broken".

De dicto/ de re. — Banno

From the SEP...

Propositional attitude verbs are opacity inducing. That is, they seem to create linguistic environments that do not permit substitution of co-designating singular terms salva veritate. This is the basis of Frege’s puzzle. Modals like ‘it is necessary that’ and ‘it is possible that’ are also opacity inducing. Opacity inducing expressions give rise to a de re/de dicto distinction. The de re/de dicto distinction has meant different things to different people.

You're not helping.

Where does disquotation fit here? Why are you now talking about theories of truth? — Banno

The SEP article on propositional attitude reports places the practice under scrutiny as well, although Kripke and Frege take different issue than I. Disquotation plays a role in the practice you're employing.

Suit yourself.

Ignoring the negation does not make it go away.

You're running the conversation. — Banno

That's never true with your threads!

:cool:

False belief cannot be true
S's belief is false
"That clock is working" can be true
"That clock is working" cannot be S's belief — creativesoul

The above negates your rendering.

I'm not offering an example of beliefs that are not propositional. Language less belief does that. This example shows the inherent inadequacy regarding disquotation and belief as propositional attitude.

You're having a lend.

Maybe a different tack...

False belief cannot be true
S's belief is false
"That clock is working" can be true
"That clock is working" cannot be S's belief

:brow:

:confused:

No. I'm wondering why you keep changing the example.

P1. Sometimes we believe that a broken clock is working.

The propositional content here is "a broken clock is working"; the bit after "that".

This is not an example of a belief that does not have a propositional content. It is an example of a belief that we can have even though we would not agree to the propositional content at the time. This belief, when put into propositional terms, is not something that we would assent to at the time.

That seems to me to cause a problem for the current belief attribution practices...

Disquotation:If an agent A sincerely, reflectively, and competently accepts a sentence s (under circumstances properly related to a context c), then A believes, at the time of c, what s expresses in c.

True, but p2 sets out a propositional attitude. Does it not?

If one believes that there is a tree in the yard, and we adhere to the conventional propositional attitude reporting practices, then we say S has an attitude/disposition towards the proposition "there is a tree in the yard" such that they believe it to be true.

We cannot do this with this example.

How is it invalid?

p1 Sometimes we believe that a broken clock is working
p2 We never believe that "a broken clock is working" is true
C Not all belief is equivalent to propositional attitude

This discussion is about conventional belief ascription practices, particularly regarding propositional attitude reports.

I'm claiming that we sometimes believe that a broken clock is working, but never do we ever believe that "a broken clock is working" is true.

Do you agree with what I'm claiming... as set out directly above?

That S believes the clock is broken was specified, by you. — Banno

That's not true.

You emphasized that a certain proposition had "to stay within the scope of S's belief". I'm asking how you determine what must be included or not within the scope of S's belief. Rules? Intuition? What S would assent to at the time?

"The clock is not broken" has to stay within the scope of S's belief. And it seems to me that you miss this. — Banno

How do you determine what would be included or not within the scope of S's belief at any given time?

Okay. No problem. I'm just attempting to understand the position you're defending.

How do you determine what would be included or not within the scope of S's belief at any given time?

There's an ambiguity about that, between the clock being broken and S believing it is broken. S's belief is about a clock, yes. But it's not, for S, a belief about a broken clock. As in, It's not true that "S believes that (the broken clock is not broken)"; but that, to get the scope right, "Of the clock, S believes (the clock is not broken) AND the clock is broken.

"The clock is not broken" has to stay within the scope of S's belief. And it seems to me that you miss this. — Banno

Okay.

Am I correct in saying that - according to the position you're working from and/or defending - the scope of S's belief is determined by what S would say at the time?

:blush:

Ah my friend...

I've misunderstood you. My apologies for doubting your integrity. Stellar reply. Thank you for that. I'm still processing, but I think I understand a bit better now. I'll do my best to fill in the blanks that I've left. I've always been bad for mistakenly assuming everyone else is already on the same page as I am. I've become aware of the fact that I've actually not addressed your replies as they deserve to be addressed.

Again... stellar reply. Admirable. :point:

Well... that tells me that we must misunderstand one another.

:worry:

Perhaps it best to find places of agreement.

S's belief is about a broken clock. Do you agree?

I've laid out several, and they've yet to have been given careful consideration. You've been drowning strawmen in the poison well instead. I've no idea what your intent is. I still like to believe that you're arguing in good faith, and I ought make my words as impeccable as I can.. That's worth saying. So, here goes...

The position you're arguing for/from arrives at either self-contradiction or incoherence. Neither is acceptable. You're all over the place. Earlier you claimed that the clock in S's belief was both... broken and not. Clocks cannot be both at the same time. We're talking about S's belief at time t1. The clock that S looked at is the clock in S's belief, and it was broken. There is no grey area here. None.

But, you want to invent a completely different clock - whole cloth. As if just because S does not believe the clock is broken, as if just because S does not know that the clock is broken, as if just because S does not know they were trusting what a broken clock said, as if just because S believed that that particular broken clock was working at that particular time....

Somehow - magically - there's now two clocks instead of one(according to you). The new one is not broken, because S believes it's working...

:yikes:

So much for the distinction between truth and belief. I was surprised to see that from you, but Janus, not so much.

Propositional attitude, psychological state usually expressed by a verb that may take a subordinate clause beginning with “that” as its complement. Verbs such as “believe,” “hope,” “fear,” “desire,” “intend,” and “know” all express propositional attitudes. — Janus

The above applies to speaking. According to the accounting practice under examination, S would not say "I believe that that broken clock is working", and thus would not - could not - believe that either. I'm claiming that S believed that a broken clock was working, but would not say so... until after they came to realize that the clock they looked at was broken.

So, if we're to give preference to S, what argument or reasoning would support giving preference to what S would say at time t1 instead of what they would say at time t2, after realizing that they had believed a broken clock was working?

S holds that, "The clock is functioning," not that, "The broken clock is functioning." "Broken" does not enter into their intentional act. They do not hold a belief regarding a broken clock; they hold a belief regarding a (working) clock. They just happen to be mistaken.

But I am probably not honing in on the exact difference that Banno and creativesoul are meting out. — Leontiskos

Well, the above reflects a large part of it. The differences are many but most all of them seem to be logical consequences of our respective positions regarding belief.

A question may help...

What does S's belief - at time t1 - consist of?

You all three seem to hold that S's belief - at time t1 - does not consist of a broken clock. Although Banno agrees with me that S's attitude at time t1 is towards a broken clock. You're now claiming that S does not hold a belief regarding a broken clock. Banno said much the same thing earlier. This seems to be a huge problem from my vantage point.

The particular clock that S looked at at time t1 was broken. That is true regardless of S's belief. Here, I think we all agree. On my view, if their belief was about the particular clock they looked at, and the particular clock they looked at was a broken one, then their belief was about a particular broken clock, and it does not matter if S realizes that it was broken or not.

Cool. Now we're getting somewhere useful. I'm afraid it will be much later in the evening before I can take the time needed to further explain other consequences/implications, but now we can at least begin to see the importance of timestamping S's belief.

According to all three of you, and I take that as current conventional practice, at time t1, S's belief was not about a broken clock. The clock in S's belief was not broken. I ask all of you to now imagine a later time, after S became aware that at time t1 the clock was broken.

Here, at time t2, S would readily admit that at time t1, they believed that a broken clock was working.