Is being called "wrong" the same as being so?

No!

The respect of X is the moral aspect.

If you said X is believed to be moral and believed to be not moral, there would not be an issue.

You are one. You are saying that X is moral, and X is not moral at the same time.

I may not be able to pull the wool over anyone's eyes. I'm certainly not trying to. I'll grant everything you've said here.

One cannot say of something that it is and that is is not in the same respect and at the same time.

You are the 'one'.

The something is a behaviour in question. Let the behaviour be called X. The respect is the moral respect.

One cannot say that X is moral and X is not moral at the same time.

What are you doing?

Is that your disposition?
— creativesoul

No. — Terrapin Station

Really now. So you don't believe what you write?

There are numerous variations of moral relativism, and moral subjectivism... If what I wrote doesn't apply to you, then either ignore it or expand upon my notion of subjectivism/relativism by setting out the difference between the general notion and your particular special one.

Yes. Just like other true statements, a moral statement is true if it corresponds to fact/states of affairs/what has happened.
— creativesoul

And any evidence at all of the moral properties we're corresponding to? — Terrapin Station

Who said anything about 'moral properties'?

If they're simply expressions of dispositions, feelings, etc., it's not an issue of matching something else, or "getting it correct." — Terrapin Station

Is that your disposition?

That which is existentially dependent upon human thought and belief is subjective. Everything that has ever been spoken, written, and/or otherwise uttered is subjective. All claims are subjective. If being subjective is ground for rejection...

Well...

Surely you get the point. Being subjective is something that all claims share. Therefore, the term itself cannot further discriminate between differing contradictory claims.

It's useless for moral discourse.

Special pleading will surely ensue!

Morality(belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour) differs according to cultural, familial, historical, and other particulars.

It does not follow from that that X can be both moral and immoral. It does not follow from that that "X is moral" can be both true and false, according to the particular morality in question.

It follows that X is believed to be moral. Believing X is moral is insufficient for X being moral.

It follows that "X is moral" can be called "true". Being called "true"(aside from being called "true" as a result of being the result of valid inference) is indicative of believing "X", and/or believing that "X" is true(assuming sincerity in speech). Being called "true" is insufficient for truth. Believing that "X" is true is insufficient for "X"'s being true.

Moral Relativism conflates being called "true" with being so. Moral relativism conflates truth and belief.

Next up... subjectivism...

The difference is whether our utterances are "matching" some state of affairs or not. If they're simply expressions of dispositions, feelings, etc., it's not an issue of matching something else, or "getting it correct." — Terrapin Station

Here we go.

Yes. Just like other true statements, a moral statement is true if it corresponds to fact/states of affairs/what has happened.

Now...

What part/role does meaning play?

For those who claim that some statements can be true, but not moral ones...

What's the difference?

What makes the one truth-apt, but not the other?

They wouldn't be talking about the statement itself, unless they didn't know how to speak properly. — S

This coming from one who is talking about the statement...

:snicker:

’m not a child psychologist and I sure as hell don’t remember the formation of my first worldview. Doesn’t matter though; I know moral philosophy is adequate explanation for differential moral agency. — Mww

We need not remember something to know it.

Explaining the differences in moral belief requires knowing what belief is. I'm not sure any conventional philosophy has that right.

In our case, the world would not be a better place
— creativesoul

....is correct from the point of view of whomsoever should hold congruent judgement. This does nothing to explain or justify the morality of those in opposition to it, whose categorical imperative obviously differs and from which they necessarily judge themselves as not wrong. — Mww

This notion of being correct from a point of view...

Is agreement equivalent to truth?

No.

This does nothing to explain or justify the morality of those in opposition to it, whose categorical imperative obviously differs from which they necessarily judge themselves as not wrong — Mww

That can be explained by virtue of looking at how all of us form our first worldview(replete with moral belief).

Language acquisition.

Morality is distinct from other kinds of thought/blief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour because it involves how humans treat each other and other sentient beings.

Compare/contrast with using an appetizer fork to eat dinner.

It doesn’t miss the point; it is the point. Mine anyway.

To say that the same behavior is both moral/immoral, and have instances wherein such behavior I’d objectified, is the perfect reason for even having moral philosophy in the first place. — Mww

To say that the same behaviour is both moral/immoral is incoherent, and as such it is not acceptable.

I'm not sure what you're trying to say about being "objectified".

The objective/subjective dichotomy has no use here.

Morality(having a 'sense' of what's morally right/wrong) is best understood as a human condition. We are interdependent social creatures by our very nature. As such we come to learn that there are some behaviours from others that we do not like. This is true of everyone, regardless of subjective particulars.

Are there behaviours that none of us like done to us?

Of course there are.

We feel empathy for others if we observe them in situations that we know that we do not like.

Moral belief differs. How we deal with that is another matter altogether.

....is correct from the point of view of whomsoever should hold congruent judgement. This does nothing to explain or justify the morality of those in opposition to it, whose categorical imperative obviously differs from which they necessarily judge themselves as not wrong — Mww

This misses the point.

There is no true/moral from my point of view but false/immoral from yours. That would be to say that the same behaviour is both moral/immoral. This is how moral relativity/subjectivity fails...

My moral inclinations would certainly prohibit me from kicking a puppy, but if the occassion warrants, which is impossible to foresee, then cute or not.....we’d have to see. — Mww

This is a common way to think about things after one has come to understand and thus incorporate the possibility of unexpected events altering one's beliefs, and/or of becoming painfully aware of our own fallibility.

The odd thing though, is that you either can foresee an exceptional circumstance or it is impossible to foresee. I think you mean it's impossible to know whether or not unexpected unforeseen circumstances may take place that would warrant kicking the puppy. Certainly we could envision some.

Reasonable people allow for exceptions when they are warranted. Good people do not let the exception become the rule.

So...

If what counts as being moral/immoral is relative/subjective, then they could not be wrong about it. There has to be something aside from our own moral belief that determines whether it is true, or false(wrong).

X is wrong/immoral is not the same as X is believed to be wrong/immoral.

In our case, the world would not be a better place. Thus, they are mistaken(hold false moral belief), and... if we apply the imperative as a standard of measure, they approve of immoral behaviour, because the world would not be a better place.

Not sure I understand you.

If the rest of the world believes that assassinating, stealing, and torturing others is acceptable as long as it make one wealthy, are they wrong?

Well, let's fill in the variable and see!

Let X be do whatever it takes to acquire wealth.

One could steal, murder, lie, assassinate, etc. If everyone did this, the world would most certainly not be a better place...

Would it?

If everybody did X, would the world be a better place?

Say we have a group of friends, one which we all know is a jester. S/he is prone to saying all sorts of stuff just to make people laugh. Outlandish stuff, and that's part of why it's so funny. We all know that s/he does not really believe what they're saying. We all know that it's a joke. They say exactly what they mean to say, they just do not believe what the statements mean.

Imagine some scenario where our jester is a queen of the Rue Paul kind. They say, "Oh my God!", "If that girl says one more thing, I'm gonna just sew her mouth shut!"

If that was spoken sincerely, if our jester believed what they meant, then there ought be a mouth being sewn shut if it says one more thing. But this ought is not on par with voicing our approval/disapproval of the behaviour. Rather, it's a confirmation of our knowing what the statement means.

It's about understanding how language works, with particular attention being paid to sincerity/insincerity. We know our jester does not believe what they say, and as a result, we do not expect a mouth to be sewn shut. Since the speaker is insincere, there ought not be a mouth sewn shut if it says one more thing. Again, this ought is not on par with voicing our approval/disapproval of the behaviour. Rather, it's a confirmation of our knowing what the statement means.

If one promises to plant a rose garden, then there ought be a rose garden planted.

Imagine a situation where we do not know whether or not a speaker is being honest/speaking sincerely. We have much different expectations from sincerity than insincerity. This cannot be properly accounted for and thus grasped by virtue of focusing upon truth conditions alone.

Sincere speech does not match the world if it is mistaken. Insincere speech does not match the world, unless it is mistaken. We all know this, and our expectations and understanding regarding what we will find when we check differs accordingly.

When someone believes that there is a beer in the fridge and says "There is a beer in the fridge", they are speaking sincerely. The sincerity aspect is determined by the speaker's belief, not by whether or not what they say is true. If we know that they are sincere, and we go look in the fridge and discover that there is no beer, then we know that they were mistaken.

When someone does not believe that there is a beer in the fridge and says "There is a beer in the fridge", they are speaking insincerely. The sincerity aspect is determined by the speaker's belief, not by whether or not what they say is true. If we know that they are insincere(say we know that it is a joke), and we go look in the fridge and discover that there is no beer, then we know that they were not mistaken, because they did not believe that there was any beer to begin with.

If all we focus upon is what it takes for the statement to be true, we learn nothing about the sincerity aspect, for we've separated the statement from the speaker. That is an ill-advised move.


So the examples above were cases when we knew the sincerity/insincerity aspect. Sometimes we do not. When we're mulling through ways to check, we posit what should or should not be the case for sincere/insincere speech. What should or should not be discovered.

When a sincere speaker says "There is a beer in the fridge", unless s/he is mistaken, when we go check - there ought be a beer in fridge.

When an insincere speaker says "There is a beer in the fridge", unless s/he is mistaken, when we go check - there ought not be a beer in fridge.

I'm piddling around to see if some sense can be made of the claim that moral statements are truth-apt. Unfortunately, it seems to me at least, most moral discourse is being governed by outdated modes of thinking.

When an insincere speaker says "I promise to plant you a rose garden", unless s/he is mistaken, there ought not be a rose garden planted. If they are, there will be.

When an insincere speaker says "The cat is on the mat", unless s/he is mistaken, there ought not be a cat on the mat. If they are mistaken, there will be.

It's about both, belief and truth.

"There ought not be a rose garden planted" is true when an insincere speaker promises to plant one.

That report(that utterance of ought) corresponds to what happened.

One who knows what a statement means also knows what ought to be the case(what ought be discovered) when we check. That is... when one knows what a statement means, then one knows what must have happened; one knows what it takes in order for it to be true.

No quiet. When a sincere speaker says "The cat is on the mat", unless they're mistaken, there is a cat on the mat. If they're mistaken, there is not.

Using ought to mean is is obtuse. — Banno

I agree. Good that I'm not.

The substitution doesn't work Banno for it cannot be made without losing crucial meaning. I do not mean what is the case by using "ought". Aside from that... I do not disagree with what you've said here. It's just that it's not so simple.

When a sincere speaker says "The cat is on the mat", unless they're mistaken, there is a cat on the mat.

I didn't write that, because I wasn't talking solely about what it takes for a speaker to be mistaken(for their belief statements to be false). I was also talking about what it takes for their statement to be meaningful and sincere as well.

Being meaningful takes much more than the cat being on the mat. When an insincere speaker says "The cat is on the mat", unless they are mistaken, there is not a cat on the mat. So, at times when we think that we may just have such a situation, there ought not be a cat on the mat.

We're talking about the meaning of moral statements, as well as the truth conditions of such statements... aren't we? I'm arguing that thought, belief, and statements thereof can be true. I'm further arguing that all true statements are so by virtue of correspondence to what has happened. True moral statements are no different.

When a sincere speaker says "It's raining outside", unless they're mistaken, it ought be raining outside. If they're mistaken, it ought not be.

When a sincere speaker says "I promise to plant you a rose garden on Sunday", unless they're mistaken, there ought be a rose garden planted on Sunday. If they're mistaken, there ought not.

When a sincere speaker says "There's a beer in the fridge", unless they're mistaken, there ought be a beer in the fridge. If they're mistaken, there ought not.

When a sincere speaker says "The cat is on the mat", unless they're mistaken, there ought be a cat on the mat. If they're mistaken, there ought not.

We all know that this is true. That's how language, talking about the world and/or ourselves, works.

A sincere speaking saying "It is raining" implies that said speaker believes it is raining -- but they are talking about the rain, and not their belief. — Moliere

Indeed. Unless they're talking about the statement itself.

What has happened and what is happening are one in the same by the time you've spoken about it.

What has happened/what is happening... these are facts on my view. These sort of semantic quibbles aren't helpful. Your objection was misplaced.

As it pertains to whether or not moral claims can be true...

Thought, belief, and statements thereof are the sort of things that can be true. True statements correspond to what has happened. False statements do not. Moral statements are no different.

I wanted to clarify something with you, since you mentioned it more than just once.

"It is raining outside" does not mean the same thing as "I think/believe it is raining outside" in every case. The latter use of "I think" or "I believe" could indicate uncertainty.

However, I think that you're saying the former is about something other than thought/belief, whereas the latter is about thought/belief.

I wouldn't entirely disagree. It could be the case, but not always.

I'm keeping in mind that a sincere speaker believes what they say, and that all sincere statements are statements of belief, including "It is raining outside". I think that your approach neglects to keep that in mind.

So it's not a fact that I'm standing here right now? What's happening right now hasn't already happened. That would be absurd. So it can't be a fact under your ill-considered definition. But that's also absurd, because it is a fact. — S

Bewitched by language use much?

There's a period of time between your report and what your reporting upon(what happened). I wouldn't expect one who has not acknowledged the inherent untenability of Heraclitus' river to understand...

Horses and rivers...

When a sincere statement is made then the world ought match the meaning of the expression... and always does unless the speaker is mistaken. The same holds good for making a promise.

Facts are what has happened.