Yes, but how do you delineate between the two? — Posty McPostface

Well, on my view that's not always easy because there is always an emotional element somewhere within thought/belief. Emotion is not always part of the immediate correlation. It is often 'buried' somewhere within one of the things being correlated to one another.

I just offered a simple account which 'separated' the two...

the idealist's claim (original post) that the existence of the external world cannot be proved is irrefutable. — philosophy

No it's not. The idealist's claim is thought/belief based. Thought/belief requires an external world. The idealist employs a misconception of thought/belief by virtue if conflating rather complex thought/belief with one element therein...

Perception...

That notion(the idealist notion of "perception") is the only problem.

I think that there is some conflation going on. One doesn't feel like a spouse is being unfaithful. One thinks/believe it. The feeling would be despair, confusion, sadness, etc. Those are the result of thinking/believing.

If it is the case that the spouse is not being unfaithful, then the problem is that the other has drawn conclusions based upon the behaviour(s) of the one who is mistakenly thought/believed to be unfaithful.

The same behaviours can arise from different causes. It does not follow from the fact that one does not want to have sexual intercourse with another that the only reason for that is infidelity... although that could be the case.

What is “pre-lingual” thought? This is quite easy to understand for me at least. It is basically our “imagination.” I don’t need words to think about visual imagery, nor about a piano concerto. — I like sushi

Yeah...

I would certainly question the basis/ground of the above. First of all, our imagination is effected/affected by language. Secondly, a piano concerto is itself existentially dependent upon language. Thirdly, language does not require words.

I would ask you to put forth a minimalist criterion for what counts as thought, such that each and every example thereof satisfies this criterion, and every example that satisfies the criterion counts as being a case of thought.

The deaf people mentioned above don’t share a common symbolic form of representing what they wish to convey. What they do is pantomime what happened to them that day; they’re able to act out and convey some story, to joke, to laugh, to comprehend what each other is conveying with some basic gestures and use of facial expressions - this is due to empathy and mirror neurons. — I like sushi

A sign/symbol does not require written language. Pantomiming, gesturing, and facial expressions are what becomes sign/symbol, the events they are reporting upon(including their own emotions at the time) are what becomes signified/symbolized by virtue of the other drawing the correlations between the behaviours and the events being recounted. Sure, empathy and mirror neurons play a role in the capacity. They are not adequate for shared meaning.

If we’re going to talk of “thought without language or words” then we’re defining “language” in a preset manner. To make any reasonable ground in this area it is unwise to hold a view of “language” that conflicts with many other academic views of “language” - as mentioned above MANY linguistics would not say grammar or words are necessarily “language.” What is going on is much more than mere symbolic representation. We have a huge array of conveying these differences with adjectives, nouns, subjects, abstractions, etc.,.

We also know from various brain lesions that very particular parts of perceptions and language (worded/written) use become jumbled and are even eradicated. There are alos set developmental stages of human perception and languge acquisition. — I like sushi

What gives you the idea that anything in the above applies to what I've been arguing?

Creativesoul and Macrosoft -

It is interesting listening to your exchange. The main point of interest for me being what either of you mean by “language.” It isn’t clear to me where either of you are sketching (have sketched) out a starting point from which to continue. — I like sushi

Thanks. Your bit in the PI reading thread is appreciated. I'm hesitant on joining in just yet. I've yet to look for and find my copy of the PI(Anscombe's).

I don't want to speak for macro. I do believe that we share an understanding - a minimalist criterion - for what counts as language:Shared meaning, whereas all meaning is attributed
by virtue of something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant/symbolized, and a creature capable of drawing correlations between these(different things). Shared meaning is a plurality of creatures drawing the same(or similar enough) correlations.

There a few things we know about language and a few ways the term “language” is used. From evidence it does appear that language is not learnt but rather an innate capacity. — I like sushi

Seems to me that language is learned, and all users have an innate capacity that facilitates language use. The nuance is that one need not think about the fact that they're learning language, in order to do so.

Calling language "an innate capacity" is to conflate language itself(what it is) with part of what language is existentially dependent upon(with part of what it requires... at a bare minimum).

We also know that people without a “language” (in the everyday “wordy” sense of the term) can and do communicate. Examples of feral children show what appears to be a lack of a “language instinct” at first glance, but with a further investigation we learn that this is more to do with familiarity with humans in a social capacity than exposure to some “language” - evidence coming from deaf people with no language coming to aquire language very late on in life. — I like sushi

I would put this a bit differently, although I agree...

If we know that creatures without conventional "wordy" language can and do communicate, then it only follows that conventional "wordy" language is not necessary for communication.

Communication is existentially dependent upon shared meaning(as previously explained). On my view, that is language. So, rather than conclude that communication does not require language, it seems to me that neither communication nor language requires words.

The problem we’re always going to have here is delineating what we mean by one sense of “language” and another. For example it is acceptable for linguists to call bee dances “language” yet we know perfectly well we’re not talking about a complex grammatical structure or anything like this “language” I am writing in now. — I like sushi

The importance of one's conceptual framework comes to the fore...

If there is nothing in common between dancing bees and talking people, if bee dances are not anything like this language that we're writing in now, then calling bee dances "language" adds nothing more than unnecessary confusion(incoherency). There is no justification for calling bee dances "language" if bee dances have nothing at all in common with the language we're using.

That would be an incoherent position to hold, and/or argue for. The evidence for that is equivocating the term "language", which is inherent self-contradiction. That kind of inconsistency of terminological use adds nothing to our understanding of that which existed in it's entirety prior to our naming it.

The bee dance is sign/symbol, the location of pollen is signified/symbolized, and the bees learn to interpret the meaning of the dance from the other bees that already knew what it meant. The meaning of that rudimentary language transcends the individual bee. So, it is the case that bee dances have something in common with the language we're using. More importantly, it is the case that bee dances share the same set of elemental constituents that all other language shares.

Knowledge of that set of elemental constituents is the strongest justificatory ground possible for claiming that this or that constitutes being a case of language(or not). What counts as language and it's use is not something that we determine by virtue of how we use it. Rather, language is something that exists in it's entirety prior to our taking an account of it. These are things that we can get wrong.

There is also the fact that spoken language is constantly shifting. We cannot insist upon what people say and what terms and phraseology falls in and out of fashion (although some speakers do try and keep a baseline standard in order to keep a more precise universal communciation an approachable idea eve if we understand that we’ll never truly arrive at a moment of complete understanding. — I like sushi

While we cannot insist upon what people say and what terms and phraseology falls in and out of fashion, we can use language as a means to acquire knowledge of that which exists in it's entirety prior to our knowledge(account). Some language and some thought/belief are just such things. We can use our knowledge of that which exists in it's entirety as a standard of measure by which to analyze and/or consider other language uses...

I'm suggesting something like a pre-human 'bottom' of our mind/language. Some things are just so automatic that we live rather than see them. With difficultly we can get a vague sense of them, by looking at certain problems in attempts at explicit accounts.

Children do not learn that books exist, that armchairs exist, etc.,etc.---they learn to fetch books, sit in armchairs, etc.,etc.

Does a child believe that milk exists?

Are we to say that the knowledge that there are physical things comes very late or very early? — macrosoft

This is good. The 'bottom' of our mind/belief. Witt's questions are apt for showing that belief about existence is not primary/foundational.

My drakes and hens have physiological sensory perception. They have innate fear and hunger. They have the sense of familiarity.

They have drawn correlations between their own hunger and our behaviour, between their own hunger and the food bin... the treat bin...

They have attributed meaning. Correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content. The have no ability to doubt whether or not they are really hearing... really seeing... really smelling... really fearful... really hungry...

This is the water you say we see through...

There is a limit to what can be explicitly said about pre and/or non-lingual thought/belief. That limit is determined by the pre-lingual creatures' capability to drawn correlations. The content of such correlations is determined by what the creature is capable of perceiving. If thought/belief begins simply and grows in it's complexity, then the capability is - in part - innate. We need not 'turn on' our physiological sensory perception. We need not 'turn on' instinctual fear and hunger. We need not 'turn on' the drive to reproduce. We need not 'turn on' a sense of familiarity that comes with repeatedly drawing correlations between some thing and other things.

None of this is existentially dependent upon language aside from the report/account itself. What I'm accounting for is not existentially dependent upon my account.

I wonder if you are pointing at thought independent of language/words? — macrosoft

My pointing is not independent of words. What I'm pointing at is. Thought/belief that consists of correlations drawn between different things, none of which are language.

I'll share some thoughts on Feuerbach's philosophical religion. 'God' is all of us, greater than any one of us individually. Some are wiser and brighter than others, but even these are wiser and brighter because they are plugged into others, because they are open to difference, assimilating it and shattering one narrower self-conception after another. This world, in which we have bodies, is already the world for us. It could always use some work (giving something real to do), but a healthy body in healthy relationships with necessities met is already almost in paradise--if the mind is right. With philosophy (Feuerbach's vision), even death can be made sense of. As narrow individuals, we are already dead to the degree that we are not lit up where we should be. The threat of bodily death (ego death) encourages us to push beyond our petty self-attachments and grasp something like Feuerbach's philosophy in the first place.

The narrow world is widened. We think of the billions that come and go, the billions living equally meaningful lives, some of them always more meaningful, wiser and bright. Others get this or that righter than we do as we get something else righter than they do. Thanks to language and matter (the stuff with a kind of memory that resists being engraved), we inherit the work of others. Our work is passed on to 'reincarnated' versions of ourselves. For Feuerbach something like reincarnation seems metaphorically true. If we find the best part of ourselves in others, including those not yet born, then we don't exactly die. We feel and not only think ourselves the flame and not the melting candle. — macrosoft

This points to some important considerations...

The fact that meaning transcends individual people via language use.
The fact that thought/belief begins simply and grows in it's complexity.
The fact that thought/belief is self-contained, and it takes an other to show us a mistake in ours.
The fact that there is no sense of self-worth without others.

It does seem to presuppose something like mind/body dualism. I cannot accept that.

Looks like the OP is chock full of reference/ground that is highly questionable.

When perception is said to be informed by language... the result is a conflation of complex thought/belief and but one element therein. Perception is necessary but insufficient for thinking about a computer as a computer.

Is thinking musically meaningless?

All attribution of meaning consists of something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant/symbolized, and a creature capable of drawing correlations between different things.

All meaning consists of correlation. Thinking musically is meaningful. Therefore...

Where there is no correlation there can be no thinking musically.

One example of the attribution of meaning to the contrary will suffice.

Got one?

Can one think musically without language?

I would argue that one cannot. All language consists of correlations.

:gasp:

What's going on in your mind when you think musically?

Hmmm... after a re-read, it seems I missed a bit of opportunity. You'll have that when hyper focusing upon making an argument, point, or setting out a position...

:wink:

There's much more to be discussed.

Been great. See ya next time!

Cheers!!!

I've issues with phenomenological jargon.

Meaning emerges within thought/belief formation. Shared meaning is the birth of language.

Shared...

...Are we not currently adding meaning to this space? Perhaps your vision depends on something I find problematic. I was trying to find my way around that mountain. — macrosoft

Sure... we're adding meaning to this space, if by "this space" you mean the space shared between us.

For me the shared world is the 'life world,' the world as it is for us in our ordinary lives. This world includes sense perception but also the perception of relations between sense objects and between other relations. Our being-in-it is pre-theoretical. When people call it 'mind' or 'matter' or a (?), they still refer to this that they are in, merely slapping a name on it, connecting it to various relations that exists within it. — macrosoft

Of course... our world is chock full of thinking about complex thought/belief replete with correlational content including language.

Not everything has something essential that makes it what it is aside from our calling it whatever we call it.

Pre-lingual thought/belief must as well, otherwise there would be no such thing as thinking about one's own thought/belief.
— creativesoul

For me this could be explained by a self-enriching space of meanings. — macrosoft

As if a space of meanings is the sort of thing that we say can enrich itself?

I say that that's not even close

Pre-lingual thought/belief must as well, otherwise there would be no such thing as thinking about one's own thought/belief.

That which exists in it's entirety prior to our awareness and/or knowledge of it's existence...
— creativesoul

I do have concerns here. Is this necessary for the rest of your view? How does it function if unperceived? I'm concerned about the 'thing-in-itself' aporia. — macrosoft

Allow me to ease the concerns...

I'm not invoking Kant.

Mt. Everest...

Existed in it's entirety prior to our awareness and/or account of it.

That which exists in it's entirety prior to our awareness and/or knowledge of it's existence...

Remember that distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief?

Good!

Do you follow me?

Language/World???

Never considered it.

I could name a few dichotomies than are inherently useless for taking proper account of that which is both... and is thus... neither.

The content of correlation is sometimes easier to ascertain than others.
— creativesoul

Ok. That makes sense. — macrosoft

That is where perception does not require being informed by language. The content of a language less creature's thought/belief must be perceptible to a non linguistic creature. The content of correlation is perception. Perception is existentially dependent upon a plurality of things and a creature capable of drawing correlations between different things.

Do not conflate our report with what we're reporting upon. The latter is pre-lingual thought/belief and as such it is not existentially dependent upon the former.

If I read you correctly, this underlined part takes into account the vagueness I'm interested in. We just ignore a certain vagueness as unimportant. If we search out some final exact meaning, we can't give it. Images are at work on the level of ordinary objects. Named images. — macrosoft

The content of correlation is sometimes easier to ascertain than others.

I tried to slip into your worldview a little, and I realized something important (to me anyway.)

Semantic holism becomes important only as sentences get either complex or appeal to abstractions. — macrosoft

So much the worse for it...

Sentences are existentially dependent upon written language. Written language:Spoken language. Spoken language:Pre-lingual thought/belief.

Pre-lingual thought/belief must be meaningful to the creature; capable of being so; and consist of correlations drawn between different things.

Do you not see the unveiling?

I'm not convinced there's a sharp line between language and non-language. For instances: a peace sign, a wink, a salute. Are these that different from 'hi' or 'uh' or 'hmmm'? — macrosoft

Shared meaning.

A plurality of creatures drawing the same(or similar enough) correlations between (the same or similar enough)different things.

That is the only line, and it's razor sharp.

All attribution of meaning is existentially dependent upon something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant/symbolized, and a creature capable of drawing a correlation between different things.



All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content(regardless of subsequent later qualifications).



All utterance of "thought" and "belief" is predication. All statements of thought/belief is predication. All predication is existentially dependent upon a plurality of creatures drawing the same(or similar enough) correlations between different things. All use of "thought" and "belief" is existentially dependent upon a creature capable of drawing correlations between different things.

Consisting of language or shared meaning is not acceptable, for pre-lingual thought/belief if there is such a thing, cannot consist of either.

Propositions?

Not on my view. Propositions are existentially dependent upon language.

The critics point regarding the emphasis upon the fact that how we use the terms is an influencing factor upon meaning applies here when we consider what method of approach could lead us to such knowledge(of pre-lingual thought/belief). We have to start at the conventional notions, all the ways we use the terms "thought" and "belief". We have to discover, determine, and/or otherwise clearly establish that they share the same set of basic elemental constituents. Then we have to consider this set of basic elemental constituents in a different light.

Can we sensibly say that non-linguistic thought/belief consist of them as well? If not, then we surely have no good reason to call both sets of thought/belief by the same name.

We're discussing whether or not it is possible to acquire knowledge of pre-lingual thought/belief. I suggested a method of approach earlier. That method begins by virtue of looking at all the different uses of the terms "thought" and "belief" in an attempt at discerning whether or not they share some set of common denominators that make them what they are.

That would be the first step.

A reminder...

The goal is to discover and/or establish pre-lingual thought/belief.

So, whatever we discover that all linguistic thought/belief consists in/of, we must be able to confidently, intelligibly, and sensibly say that those same elemental constituents make up and/or are also adequate for pre-lingual thought/belief.

That is the strongest justificatory ground for calling them all(these pre-lingual mental ongoings) by the same name... "thought" and "belief"...

Sure...

Gimme a minute or two, I'm making some Peet's decaf!

:wink:

Which one? Could you quote me? I'll gladly elucidate wherever necessary as best I can.