The example presents a mundane notion of an existence, and illustrates that the outline doesn't parse it. — HuggetZukker

This is quite the specious claim, my friend.

Pots and kettles.

Prior to the heart transplant, Dennis is/was not existentially dependent upon it. After the heart transplant, Dennis is/was. What's missing?

Where does your example effectively parse out these distinctions?

I no longer understand your objection. I've conceded that Dennis exists prior to and after the transplant. Nothing you have presented follows what I've put forth. It's quite simple.

That which exists prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent upon it.

You've provided Dennis, who had a heart transplant during his lifetime. Are you claiming that Dennis prior to the heart transplant is/was existentially dependent upon the heart transplant?

I don't see how you can possibly think that hinge-propositions aren't beliefs. — Sam26

I don't think that there are such things as "hinge propositions" or hinge beliefs, at least not in the sense that all other thought and belief are grounded upon them. Some thought and belief are grounded upon actual events. Witt couldn't arrive at that because he worked from beliefs as propositions(having propositional content). He did not draw and maintain the meaningful distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief, and did not do so as a result of holding to conventional notions such as JTB.

I have argued that true belief exists prior to language.

What I've argued here shows why it is the case that we ought not place too much unwavering importance upon the act of justification. If we do we will inevitably lose sight of the fact that it is just plain not necessary in order to form and/or hold justified true belief.

Not all justified true belief is existentially dependent upon language. Any and all positions that hold otherwise are just plain wrong. They work from utterly inadequate notions of thought and belief, notably that all belief is propositional in content. All reports of thought and belief are propositional in content. A report of thought and belief is not equivalent to thought and belief.

Witt follows that mistake. Hence, he did not ever look for hinge beliefs. He was himself, bewitched by language use.

Do not get me wrong Sam. I am not at all denying Witt's brilliance and/or the novelty of his thinking. There are entire schools of thought as a result of it. He clearly added to our understanding of how many different things can go into the attribution of meaning.

He was not without fault though, and he clearly expressed his hope that someday someone or other would pick up where he left off, to put it mildly.

Witt follows convention in several ways. He also never draws and maintains a distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief. That follows one of the most consequential conventional mistakes ever made in philosophy 'proper'... academic philosophy. Witt follows suit.

First, OC is not meant to support the notion of JTB. That's not to say there aren't examples of JTB in his notes. I don't know of any interpretation of Wittgenstein that thinks his writings are conventional in this sense, do you? Most interpretations think that Wittgenstein's writings are unconventional, and for the most part original.

Second, one could argue that Moore's propositions are examples of what many would consider propositional knowledge. Yet Wittgenstein is going against this notion, demonstrating that these propositions aren't propositions in the ordinary sense, which is why he calls them hinge-propositions. Hinge-proposition aren't epistemological at all, they are arational beliefs. Again, not just my interpretation, but the interpretation of many others who have studied OC.

I don't see how you can possibly think that hinge-propositions aren't beliefs. Wittgenstein starts out by critiquing Moore's propositions, which by definition are beliefs. My ideas of hinge-propositions go beyond what Wittgenstein said, in that I talk about prelinguistic beliefs. Wittgenstein stays within the bounds of language for the most part. There are many hinge-propositions that are linguistic, starting with Moore's propositions (I know this is a hand), are you saying this is not a belief? Wittgenstein's arguing that they are a special kind of belief, beliefs that fall outside the conventional understanding.

Two passages that I believe show the idea that hinge-propositions are beliefs, is the examples given in OC 284 and 285, but that they are beliefs there is no doubt. There are too many examples to list. Wittgenstein never denies that they are beliefs, he denies that they are pieces of knowledge, and knowledge goes beyond mere belief, in that they are beliefs that are justified in some way, according to particular language-games.

It's true that hinge-propositions solve the problem of infinite regress, but that's not the thrust of OC. His main goal is to come to grips with the nature of these kinds of beliefs, and this he never finished. My theory is that they are prelinguistic, and when language comes into the picture they become foundational beliefs that everyone swallows as part of reality.

By the way all propositions are beliefs. Thus a hinge-propositions could very well be called a hinge-belief. In fact, that may be a better way of talking about them. — Sam26

So...

Witt has examples of conventional JTB in his writing(follows convention).
He denies that Moore's propositions are propositions in the conventional(JTB) sense(follows convention).
He denies that Moore's propositions are knowledge.
He always stays within the bounds of language(follows conventional JTB).
He denies the justifiability/dubitability of Moore's propositions(original as far as I know).
He claims that knowledge must be dubitable(original as far as I know).
He claims that all doubt is belief based(original as far as I know).
He never calls hinge propositions "hinge beliefs".
He never actually claims to have found a hinge proposition.
He does not call Moore's propositions "hinge propositions".
His notion of hinge proposition includes their being outside of the conventional understanding of JTB.
The conventional notion of JTB has belief as propositional in content(he seeks hinge propositions).
The conventional notion of JTB requires being justified in believing some proposition(he denies Moore's justification).
Everything he bangs on about uses JTB as the standard for what counts as knowledge.
A hinge proposition, if set out sensibly, would dissolve the problem of justificatory regress.
Justificatory regress is/was an issue for JTB.


He made himself famous as a result of dissolving historical philosophical 'problems' by virtue of showing how they were a result of language use negatively affecting one's subsequent thought/belief. It looks to me like his aim was to show that justificatory regress was just another example of the bewitchment of language by virtue of showing how some belief are beyond and/or are outside the scope of applicability with regard to justification. The consequence is clear. They cannot be knowledge(JTB).

Thus...

He denied that they were.

What more is necessary to warrant believing that Witt worked from the conventional notion of JTB?

In your opinion, what thing(s) did Dennis 1967-2018 existentially depend on? You don't have to mention Adam and Eve and all that, just the most immediate non-trivial necessity or necessities. — HuggetZukker

The question itself is conflating distinctly different time periods, according to your own example. Conflating different time periods loses the distinction between Dennis prior to the heart transplant and Dennis after. The outline is all about applying common sense to known temporal order(s) and arriving at knowledge of existential dependency(and vice-versa).

Aren't we looking for a counterexample which negates the outline?

I understand where you're coming from, but I do not think that all ethical rules are on equal ground. Some aren't hard to follow. The right ones, implemented properly, wouldn't be.

In my opinion, the old sculpture and the new sculpture are sub-existences of a whole time sculpture. To say that the whole time sculpture seizes to exist due to one change seems absurd. — HuggetZukker

I agree that to say the sculpture ceases to exist would be absurd. I think that it can be the same sculpture and the sculpture prior to the box cannot be existentially dependent upon the box.

By the way, I'd argue against Heraclitus, and have. It might be interesting to flesh out the differences. I suspect that you'll take me to task on that. It's my burden.

With your approach, it seems impossible to conceive of the existence of Dennis 1967 - 2018.

In year 1967, Dennis was born.

In year 2010, Dennis' heart failed, but luckily he survived thanks to receiving a heart transplant. Thus concluded the existence of Dennis born in 1967 as began the existence of Dennis who got a heart transplant in 2010.

In year 2018, Dennis who got a heart transplant in 2010 swallowed nine lithium batteries on purpose to die and succeeded. On his tombstone it said,

Here lies Dennis who got a heart transplant
2010 - 2018
RIP — HuggetZukker

:blush:

That's quite clever. I laughed out loud! Thanks. It doesn't follow from the premiss in question, nor does it pose a problem for it.



Dennis prior to the heart transplant cannot be existentially dependent upon the heart transplant.

That is what follows from the claim...

That which exists prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent upon it.

This is not proven...

"Belief and thought about existence is dependent on language." — Blue Lux

What would count as proof to you?

:worry:

I think it may serve us well to take a moment and review all that we've agreed upon. I'm fairly confident that our disagreements aren't as important, particularly regarding the matter at hand - pre linguistic belief and all that that entails. I'm certain that it interests us both to a significant 'degree'...

Witt worked from the conventional notion that all thought and belief is propositional in content. It is my strong opinion that that served to stifle his genius on this matter of belief.
— creativesoul

This just isn't true. In fact, there is much in Wittgenstein's thinking that is just unconventional. Hinge-propositions are not propositions in the conventional sense. In a sense they're not propositions at all. — Sam26

We just disagree here Sam. Do you have any evidence from posthumous works that support the idea that Witt did not follow the conventional notion of JTB? It is my understanding that hinge propositions were meant to dissolve the issue of justificatory regress. It is also my understanding that Witt never found what he was looking for(a single hinge proposition). He called them "hinge propositions"... not hinge beliefs.

I disagree. There is no criterion of belief — Blue Lux

Present an argument or a valid objection to my own. Not interested in anything else, especially gratuitous assertions.

In my opinion, the old sculpture and the new sculpture are sub-existences of a whole time sculpture. To say that the whole time sculpture seizes to exist due to one change seems absurd. — HuggetZukker

I did not say that, nor does it follow from what I've written.

The claim in question is this...

That which exists prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent upon it.

The sculpture - prior to - the box cannot be existentially dependent upon the box. The sculpture - after the box - is not prior to the box.

Do you agree thus far?

:confused:

Surely you see the point here? I do recognize the difficulty you're presenting, so you know, and I appreciate it more than it may seem. You're showing me that there's a bit more sharpening to be done, so to speak.

Not Booker. Too inexperienced, and doesn't seem to have a moral compass beyond civil rights he's interested in.

Nice!

Thanks for the follow up Sam Sam...

Being honest is remarkably important in more ways than many have imagined. Morality is best understood as a human condition. We are interdependent social creatures, and despite the fact that many folk today couldn't care less about others in their community, we could have never gotten where we are today if everyone were like that all along.

My condolences csal...

Why ask?

You already know what you ought do.

There's a lot of stuff that philosophers do and and a lot of stuff that can be done with philosophy.

But one of the big appeals - one of the temptations you see thinker after thinker succumbing to - is the possibility of pronouncing the Truth. Of being the one who pronounces.

Truth, capital T, gets eviscerated by the postmoderns, but the gesture and drive lives on nontheless in their works. Derrida is emblematic here. More truth-shaking than anyone AND ALSO the most pronouncy person who ever lived.


Capital T truth is pronounced synoptically. Anything else that might be said will, inevitably, fall within the ambit of the truth pronounced - and so can be given its proper place.

Nietzsche already more or less said that but kept doing it anyway.

So what's going on here? What is happening? Why can't we stop? — csalisbury

Because truth is presupposed in all thought, belief, and the statements which follow. The presupposition of truth is an elemental constituent of all thought and belief itself. It's necessary in order to even have thought and belief, and philosophy hasn't ever quite gotten thought and belief right to begin with.

That's why.

Take the example of a modern art sculpture made out of trash. The sculpture is a tower, and near its base is a supportive rotten box of wood that is threatening to collapse.

The sculpture collapses if the box collapses. However, with the help of hydraulic equipment, the tower can be saved by being temporarily suspended as its rotten box gets replaced by a metal box that was fabricated later than the tower was built. Wouldn't you say that the metal box did not exist until it had been fabricated, so it did not exist before the sculpture? — HuggetZukker

Yes. The sculpture existed prior to the metal box.

Would the sculpture have seized to exist if the rotten box had collapsed?

The sculpture would've changed.

Someone might think of it still existing but in a collapsed form, but the artist might reject it and say that it stopped existing.

That's the artists' prerogative.

If we say it would have seized to exist, after its fix up, is it the same sculpture? What if the artist insists that it is?

This gets into the ambiguity of what counts as being the same over time/change. I'm reminded of Heraclitus' river. The artist can say whatever s/he wants. It's not the same sculpture. It has different structural integrity, different components, etc.

However, if any person, such as the artist, is taken to be the arbiter of the sculpture's existence then the person's opinion of its existence is its only direct existential dependency, and any other factors are just a temporary indirect dependencies.

Come now, let's not lose all sensibility.

All thought and belief about existence is existentially dependent upon language.

Existence is not.

The sculpture as it was prior to the box is not the same as it was after the box. It consists of different things.

The sculpture with the box did not exist prior to the box. The sculpture with the box is existentially dependent upon the box. The sculpture prior to the box is not. They are not the same sculpture.

Probably olfactory as well for many animals. Reading a little bit on how dog's experience the world of smell was rather mind blowing. — Marchesk

Most certainly...

Correlations drawn between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or the creature itself.

Owls detect infrared.

When talking about prelinguistic beliefs actions are the only indicators of a belief. There is no other way to say that a human or animal has a belief other than by observing their behavior. — Sam26

I tentatively agree. Observation alone is utterly inadequate. We must also have some standard, some criterion, some measure of what counts as belief.

Witt worked from the conventional notion that all thought and belief is propositional in content. It is my strong opinion that that served to stifle his genius on this matter of belief.

If a prelinguistic human is using their hands to root around in the soil, then one can say with absolute certainty that the human believes that it has hands.

You see Sam, this is actually quite contentious. Following the same logic, my chickens believe that they have beaks.

This harks back to the issue I'm raising. We must first have some notion regarding what a belief actually is, and more importantly what belief is existentially dependent upon and/or what belief consists of, prior to our being able to observe and correctly attribute belief to another.

The rooting around in the soil does reflect more than one belief, that's for sure, but that doesn't count against the idea that the actions reflect the beliefs. In fact, it supports the idea.

I'm not so much arguing against the idea that thought and belief has efficacy(influence subsequent behaviours). I argue for that. Rather, I'm pointing out the inherent weakness of the idea that behaviour shows belief. Behaviour alone is inadequate justificatory ground for positing any particular belief. There are also clear actual examples that serve to falsify that claim, placing it into the "some" behaviour shows belief category... clearly not all.

My view does tell you what the belief consists of, viz., the actions of the person or animal in question. It's not at all gratuitous. We do this all the time, linguistic beliefs or not.

You're right to say that positing pre-linguistic belief is not gratuitous. I'm mistaken to say that, now that I actually think about it. My apologies. However, to say that belief consists of actions while also asserting that action shows belief renders the language use incoherent.

My take is all thought and belief consists of drawing correlations between different things, visual memory could be one of those things...

My epistemological theory Creative only requires that there be prelinguistic beliefs of a certain kind, and what gives life to these belief are our actions. The actions show the belief. — Sam26

I understand that, and it follows Witt's line of thinking. The problems, however, are immanent. First actions are not reliable indicators of belief. Second, several different beliefs could be reported as an explanation for most actions. Thirdly, several different beliefs could cause the same behaviour. Lastly, on my view, positing pre-linguistic belief without getting into what belief consists of is to gratuitously assert a pre-linguistic belief.

The interesting part of establishing what pre-linguistic belief consists of lies in the consequences that applying that bit of knowledge has. The sheer scope of rightful and appropriate application could not be any broader. It's downright daunting.

The sculpture existed prior to the metal box. That which exists prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent upon it. The sculpture is not existentially dependent upon the metal box.
— creativesoul

And yet from this quote...

Are there examples that clearly negate any of the five 'rules'?
— creativesoul

...it would appear that you were interested in having it explored whether or not P1 could be right. — HuggetZukker

And I am. I do not see how what you've provided serves as a counter-example and/or negation.

Take the example of a modern art sculpture made out of trash. The sculpture is a tower, and near its base is a supportive rotten box of wood that is threatening to collapse.

The sculpture collapses if the box collapses. However, with the help of hydraulic equipment, the tower can be saved by being temporarily suspended as its rotten box gets replaced by a metal box that was fabricated later than the tower was built. Wouldn't you say that the metal box did not exist until it had been fabricated, so it did not exist before the sculpture? — HuggetZukker

The sculpture existed prior to the metal box. That which exists prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent upon it. The sculpture is not existentially dependent upon the metal box.

↪creativesoul I guess you are considering my questions to be baseless? — Blue Lux

Which have went unanswered?

It seems to me that you're giving these beings linguistic notions, viz., the concepts of causality and the ability to draw an inference. — Sam26

Causality is not existentially dependent upon language. Drawing correlations, associations, and/or connections between different things(not language constructs) is not either. Neither of these can be rightfully called a linguistic notion. Together, they are more than adequate for attributing causality, and in this case doing so correctly.

The prelinguistic human touched the fire and felt discomfort, and as a result, formed a further belief based on these sensory experiences. I do believe there is a causal connection between the touching of the fire and the belief, but it's not because they attributed causality or even inferred this. The causal connection is independent of what they think. — Sam26

Are you claiming that the creature does not believe that touching fire caused the discomfort, or that such belief is not attributing causality?

How many things do your see? Three? But that means not counting the middle circle; Four? then it's not a trinity. One? Then whence the division?

Nothing sensible can be said about the trinity. — Banno

The diagram can have plenty said about it that is sensible. The center is the existential commonality between three distinct manifestations of that commonality.

The Trinity was the primary subject of the First Council of Nicaea, presided over by Constantine. — Ciceronianus the White

My understanding is different. I have held that the person who had the final say in what was kept and what was not was not Constantine, but some other fellow - who wasn't even Christian. Cannot remember his name off the top of my head. Too lazy to look it up.

Would you like for that to be put into argumentative form?

A language-less creature can touch fire. Touching fire causes discomfort. Some language-less creatures can touch fire, feel discomfort, and attribute causality by virtue of inferring that touching fire caused the discomfort. All attribution of causality is thought and belief. That creature thinks, believes, and otherwise infers that touching fire caused the discomfort. That creature's belief is true. That creature's belief is well-grounded. That creature's belief cannot consist of language. That creature's belief cannot consist of propositions. That creature's belief cannot be existentially dependent upon language. That creature's belief cannot be existentially dependent upon justification. Not all well-grounded true belief is existentially dependent upon language. Not all well-grounded true belief is existentially dependent upon justification. — creativesoul

That creature's thought, belief, and/or inference consists of correlations drawn between it's own behaviour(touching fire) and the discomfort that followed. None of this is existentially dependent upon language aside from this report itself.

Some well-grounded true belief exists prior to language. All well-grounded true belief is justified true belief(knowledge). Some justified true belief exists prior to language. All justification is existentially dependent upon language. Some well-grounded true belief is not existentially dependent upon justification. — creativesoul

These are the fourth and fifth posts of the thread Sam...

p1 Some well grounded belief exists prior to language
p2 Providing ground is existentially dependent upon language
C1 Some well grounded belief is not existentially dependent upon providing grounds(from p1. p2)


... and this one?

p1 Some true belief can exist prior to language
p2 That which exists prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent upon it
C1 Some true belief cannot be existentially dependent upon language(from p1, p2)
p3 All true belief is existentially dependent upon truth
C2 Truth cannot be existentially dependent upon language(from C1, p3)


This one?

p1 Justification is existentially dependent upon metacognition
p2 Metacognition is existentially dependent upon language
C1 Justification is existentially dependent upon language(from p1, p2)
p3 That which is existentially dependent upon something else cannot exist prior to it
C2 Justification cannot exist prior to language(from C1, p3)
p4 That which is pre-linguistic must exist prior to language
C3 Justification cannot be prelinguistic(from C2,p4)

How's that look now Sam?

However, there are some beliefs that don't fall into this epistemological language-game. Those are Wittgenstein's hinge-propositions or bedrock beliefs. They are grounded, but they are grounded in a way of acting, i.e., my actions show or demonstrate that I have the belief. Is this what you're saying? — Sam26

No. it is not.

This kind of grounding seems to be a bit different than what you're saying. Being well-grounded seems to imply something more, not sure, I'll keep reading your explanations.

Indeed, what I'm arguing isn't exactly along the lines of Witt's hinge propositions. However, I do strongly believe that if there are/is a set of beliefs that all others hinge upon, rest their laurels upon, and/or otherwise serve as/to ground the rest of one's belief system, then the method I'm employing here will help in acquiring knowledge of those, for they must exist prior to all the rest...

A belief does not need to be argued for in order for it to be well-grounded. — creativesoul

I agree, we express beliefs all the time that can be justified, or that are well-grounded, without putting forth the reasons or evidence for those beliefs. — Sam26

Good. I suspected that we were in agreement there. We can also further surmise something of importance from this...

Justification is not necessary in order for a belief to be well-grounded. Here, we either must draw and maintain a distinction between what counts as being justified, and what counts as being well-grounded or admit that being justified is not existentially dependent upon justification, because being well-grounded most certainly is not.

A belief does not need to be argued for in order for it to be well-grounded.