Now then, do you disagree with one or both of my premises?

I think the point is that nobody can really tell what your premises are. I suppose one of them must be
"There are if-then facts".

Yes. And, because some didn't like the term "if-then" facts, I invited Janus to substitute some other term for an instance of one proposition implying another.

Then i suggested substituting "implication" for "if-then fact".

Or, if you think that an implication is a proposition then substitute "true implication".

We've been all over that topic, and I've amply answered that terminology-objection.
— jkg20

But when you give examples of what these if-then facts are supposed to be, you just give tautologies

As a particularly simple example of an implication, I gave the Slilthytoves syllogism.

As an additional example of an implication, I mentioned that the additive associative axiom and the multiplicative-identity axiom imply 2 + 2 = 4.

(...because the multiplicative identity is used in my definitions of counting-numbers).

But, in my statements of my metaphysical proposal, I spoke of various implications and propositions about implications.

As an example of how any fact about our physical world implies, corresponds to, and can be said as, an implication, including ordinary facts in our experience, I gave the example:

There being a traffic-roundabout at the intersection of 34th & Vine.

A fact that if you go to the intersection of 34th & Vine, you'll encounter, there, a traffic roundabout.

Also, I mentioned that a set of hypothetical physical quantity-values, and a hypothetical relation among them (called a "physical law") together comprise the antecedent of an implication...except that one of those hypothetical physical quantity-values can be taken as the consequent of that implication.

(It goes without saying that a proposed physical law starts out as a theory or hypothesis, and isn't called a law until it has been found to apply with sufficient consistency.)

I mentioned that a proved mathematical theorem is an implication whose antecedent includes (at least) 1 or more mathematical axioms.

So I've mentioned a number of kinds of implications, some of which relate to my metaphysical proposal.

(Here I've been using "implication" as a substitute for "if-then fact". I consider an implication, an implying of one proposition by another, to be a fact. ...in contrast to a proposition about an implication. But if you don't think an implication is necessarily a fact, then substitute "true implication".)

, and then refuse to engage in a discussion about the distinction between logical truth and substantive truth that risks being conflated when identifying tautologies as a kind of fact.

I'm speaking honestly when I say that I have no idea what you're talking about.

I've thoroughly discussed and answered the objections to my use of "if-then fact", and I've obligingly substituted another term, "implication". ...and, if that isn't suitable to you, then I invite you or anyone to choose a term for referring to an instance of one proposition implying another, and substitute it for "implication", the term that I use in this post.

By "substantive truth", do you mean an alleged objective, fundamental, concrete "existence" for our physical world and its things and its stuff?

I've admitted that I can't prove that Materialism's objectively fundamentally, concretely existent physical world, and is concretely and objectively existent stuff and things don't superficially exist, as an unverifiable and unfalsifiable brute-fact, alongside of, and duplicating the events and relations of, the hypothetical complex system of inter-referring abstract implications about hypotheticals, that I've been referring to.

Michael Ossipoff

I didn't notice the apostrophe.

I've heard of Peano arithmetic, but that wasn't my topic.

In answer to your question, the system of axioms that I'm using is the one that is usually used, stated and cited. ...the one in which, for one thing, associativity is an axiom, not a theorem.

Michael Ossipoff

First, definition of some counting-numbers:

Let "1" mean the multiplicative identity.

Let "2" mean 1 + 1
Let "3" mean 2 + 1
Let "4" mean 3 + 1

By those definitions, 2+ 2 means (1+1) + (1+1).

The additive associative axiom says:

a + (b + c) = (a + b) + c.

Applying that axiom:

(1+1) + (1+1) = ((1+1) +1) + 1

Because, by definition, 1 + 1 = 2:

((1+1) + 1) + 1 = (2+1) + 1

So (1+1) + (1+1) = (2+1) + 1

Because, by definition, 2 + 1 = 3:

(2+1) + 1 = 3 + 1

So (1+1) + (1+1) = 3 + 1

Because, by definition 3 + 1 = 4:

(1+1) + (1+1) = 4

Because, by definition, 1 + 1 = 2:

2 + 2 = 4 QED

(As I said before, the use of the multiplicative identity implies acceptance of the multiplicative identity axiom.)

Michael Ossipoff

"2" is defined as "1' " — jkg20

???

It's far from clear what you're saying in that post, but:

I've complied with Janus's request that I post, as an argument for my metaphysics, premise(s), conclusion, and as statement regarding how the former imply the latter. I did that

And, before that, I posted, in this thread, a complete statement of my metaphysical proposal and its uncontroversial justification.

It's easy for you to say "You haven't done that."

...but can you or can't you specify an incorrect premise, an incorrect statement, or an unsupported conclusion in my metaphysical proposal, or my argument for it?

As for reincarnation, let's get clear about this: I don't claim to have proof of it, or a logically-sound argument for it. I've merely told how my metaphysics implies it (but not in the strong sense that "imply" has in logic).

Nor is reincarnation part of my metaphysics, though it's implied by it.

Michael Ossipoff

Consider this question: In all the time that you have been posting on forums have you found even one person who agrees with your 'argument'? — Janus

Though I answered that, I'd like to also say this:

One thing that I haven't found in reply, is a specific substantive and valid disagreement with what i said in my metaphysical proposal, or the specification of an incorrect statement or un-supported conclusion in that proposal.

You asked me for an argument for my metaphysical proposal, lising premise, conclusion, and a statement of how one implies the other..

I've posted those.

Now then, do you disagree with one or both of my premises?

(For "if-then fact", we can substitute "implication" (or true implication, if you prefer) or any other term that you like, for an instance of one proposition implying another..)

...or do you find an incorrect statement or unsupported conclusion in my discussion of why my conclusion is implied by my premises?

Michael Ossipoff

I didn't mean that you were only making fool of yourself via your gross mis-spelling, and your run-on sentence.

I was referring also to your mis-statements in that post, regarding associativity only appearing to be an axiom in one system, and your silly statement that all of the arithmetical axioms are needed in order to prove that 2+2=4.

...and that's just in one post,.

Michael Ossipoff

Eh? This sounds like you're using the word "metaphysics" in a New Age sense, rather than a philosophical sense — gurugeorge

Can you be more specific about what I said that suggests that?

You mean reincarnation?

From as soon as I began participating in the discussion of reincarnation here, I've been clarifiying that reincarnation isn't part of my metaphysics. I've merely said that reincarnation is implied by my metaphysics. And I've also been clarifying that, when saying that, I don't mean "imply" in its logic sense, but only in its weaker ordinary sense...of strongly or convincingly suggesting.

Michael Ossipoff

Really? You are reduced to counting spelling mistakes? — jkg20

...then shall I count run-on sentences too?

Look, the gross mis-spelling, and the run-on sentence in that post are just common sloppinesses that typically, and in MetaphysicsNow's case, accompany other instances of sloppiness, such as MetaphysicsNow's mis-statement that associativity only appears to be an axiom in some systems, and that to prove that 2 + 2 = 4, all of the axioms for the counting numbers are needed. .

...and that's just in one post.

And no, at least in Merriam Webster, "Wheen" isn't listed as meaning "Wean" in any language. Merriam-Webster lists it with an adjective meaning and a noun meaning.

Wean is derived from an Old English word, "Wenian", to accustom or wean.

I've been away a while and just skim read through the various posts. Aren't we still waiting for your explicit statement of premises, one by one, giving us a valid argument that takes us from those premises to the conclusion that reincarnation happens?

No. Janus asked me to state, in regards to my argument for my metaphysics, a premise, conclusion, and to tell how the premise implies the conclusion.

His question was about the metaphysics ("your system"), and wasn't about the matter of reincarnation.

Reincarnation isn't part of my metaphysics. It's merely implied by it. And I've clarified that, when I say that, I mean "implied" in the ordinary weaker sense, not in the logic sense. I don't claim to have a "valid argument that takes us from...premises to the conclusion that reincarnation happens."

I've already told how my uncontroversial metaphysics implies reincarnation. ...in the sense of plausibly and convincingly suggesting it. Proving it? I don't say that.

I asked you for that right at the beginning of this thread and you've waffled on quite a lot it seems, but logically valid arguments seem impossible to dig out of your words.

When you asked about the metaphysics, I stated my metaphysical proposal, and my justification for it,

When Janus asked for an argument for my metaphysics, with clearly-labeled premise, conclusion, and statement of how the premise implies the conclusion, I posted that.

I've long been inviting people to specify a mis-statement or un-supported conclusion in my metaphysical proposal.

Of course that invitation still remains.

All the objections and disagreements that I've been getting are quibbles about terminology, which I've now amply answered.

Michael Ossipoff

I do need to wheen myself of making a fool of you — MetaphysicsNow

Making a fool of yourself, actually.

"Wheen" yourself of that by all means, if you can. :D

(I don't use nested quotes, because they don't seem to work. I separately quote what I was quoted saying, and the other person's reply)

I'd said:

Incorrect. Reincarnation is metaphysically-implied. There's an uncontroversial metaphysics that implies reincarnation.

I doubt there's such a thing as a noncontroversial metaphysics. Do you say you've got a hold of one? — Cabbage Farmer

Yes. See my previous posts about it in this thread.

I'd said:

If there's a reason why you're in a life (something that I've discussed here), and if that reason still obtains at the end of this life, then what does that suggest?

You replied:

What do you mean "a reason why you're in a life"?

That's best answered by saying what I don't mean: I don't mean the reason in terms of physical causation in this world. I'm talking about a reason more fundamental and original than that.

Is this reason supposed to generate the implication you've singled out?

Yes.

What do you mean by the phrase "in a life"?

Nothing other than what you surely must interpret it to mean.

One reason I'm alive is that I was born. One reason I was born is that I was conceived. Is this the sort of reason you have in mind?

Of course not.

In terms of physical causation in this physical world, you're alive because you were conceived and then born. No one denies that.

But this is a philosophy forum, not a biology forum.

First, a brief summary of my metaphysics (which I describe and justify in more detail in previous posts in this thread):

In the metaphysics that I propose, and described and justified in previous postings in this thread:

There are infinitely-many complex systems of inter-referring abstract implication-facts (instances of one hypothetical proposition implying another).

Among those infinitely many such systems, there is inevitably one whose events and relations are those of your experience.

There’s no reason to believe that your experience is other than that.

Of course I can’t prove that the Materialist’s objectively, concretely, fundamentally existent physical world, and its objectively, concretely existent stuff and things don’t superfluously exist, as an unverifiable and unfalsiable brute-fact, alongside of, and duplicating the events and relations of, the hypothetical logical system that I described above.

I emphasize that, in this metaphysics, I regard the experiencer and his/her experience as primary.

So then, why are you in a life?

You’re in a life because there’s a life-experience possibility-story, consisting of a hypothetical logical system such as I’ve described immediately above, having as its protagonist someone just like you…you, in fact.

That’s who/what you are…the hypothetical protagonist in a hypothetical life-experience possibility-story.

You’re in a life, as that protagonist.

If, at the end of this life, you still have subconscious future-orientedness, feelings of incompletion in any regard, &/or any subconscious predisposition, desire or need for life or the things &/or experiences in life, then there will still be a life-experience possibility-story about you

…one that starts with someone like you are during the sleep during death, when there’s no waking-consciousness or knowledge that you were in a life, or knowledge of whether you’re coming or going, or knowledge of the distinction between unconsciousness at the beginning of a life and at the end of a life.

Unconsciousness (absence of waking-consciousness) occurs during the sleep at death. There will come a time when you don’t remember this life, but you retain your subconscious wants, needs, predispositions, etc. …and there’s a life-experience possibility-story that starts about someone like you are at that time during death’s absence of waking-consciousness.

So, if the reason for this life remains, at the end of this life, then what does that suggest?

According to Hindu and Buddhist teachers and writings, nearly everyone has those predispositions, needs, wants, incompletions, etc., that will bring them into a next life.

There are a very, very few people who are so life-completed and lifestyle-perfected, that they won’t have those subconscious needs, wants, drives, inclinations, predispositions, feelings of incompletion, future-orientation, etc. Their placid sleep at the end of their life won’t have any resemblance to the bewilderment and subconscious striving-emotion at the beginning of a life, and hence there won’t be a life-experience possibility-story about them; they won’t be in such a story.

It’s said in Hinduism and Buddhism that every one of us, after many lives, will reach that life-completion and lifestyle-perfection described above. Don’t count on it this time. It’s probably very far off, as it is for nearly everyone.

Michael Ossipoff

Obviously an implication, an implying of one proposition by another, is a fact, and is not a proposition.

And, because an implication is a fact, then an implication-fact is obviously the kind of fact that is an implication.

...a bit redundant, but clear and un-ambiguous.

And I'd long been saying that the if-then facts to which I was referring to were implication facts.

But, even of itself, "if-then fact" was unambiguous. Obviously it would refer to a fact that if one thing is true then another thing is true.

Anyway, even if there could have been misunderstanding before, that silly quibble was cleared yesterday when I said that i was referring to an instance of one proposition implying another, and then calling it an implication (or, unnecessarily and redundantly) a true implication.

Michael Ossipoff

Maybe we could have saved all that unnecessary quibble if I'd just said "Implication" instead of "Implication Fact" or "If-Then Fact".

Or maybe it should be "True Implication".

Obviously one or both of those would work fine as a substitute for "If-Then Fact" or "Implication-Fact".

But, just out of curiosity:

Yes, an implication-proposition is false if its antecedent is true and its consequent is false.

But what about just an implication? One would expect "Implication" to have a stronger meaning than "Implication Proposition". ...that an implication-proposition isn't a genuine implication if the proposition isn't true.

I don't know what the conventional definition says, but I guess it must be one of the following three:

1. Maybe "True" and "False" aren't applicable to an implication (as opposed to an implication-proposition), because something wouldn't even be an implication if it weren't true. P either does or doesn't imply Q. It does, or there isn't that implication. So "True" and "False" don't even apply to an implication.

2. Maybe an implication (as opposed to an implication-proposition) is said to be necessarily true, because otherwise it wouldn't be an implication. This differs from #1, in that, instead of not having truth-value, it necessarily has a truth value of "True", because an Implication (as opposed to just an implication-proposition) is taken to be a true proposition.

3. Maybe "Implication" is taken to just mean "Implication Proposition", in which case of course an implication could be true or false (Of course if it's false, that's because its antecedent is true and its consequent false).

---------------------------

I guess I could say that more briefly by saying that either:

1. An Implication ( as opposed to an implication-proposition) is considered a fact.

2. Just saying "Implication" (as opposed to saying "implication-proposition") is considered to mean "true implication-proposition."

3. An implication is considered to be a proposition that could be true or false (Of course if it's false, that's because its antecedent is true and its consequent false).

--------------------------------------------

Of course I was saying "Implication-Fact" because I wanted to clarify that was referring to a fact. .
--------------------------------------------

If the official interpretation is #1 or #2, then I could substitute "Implication" for "Implication-Fact" and for "If-Then Fact".

If the official interpretation is #3, then it would be necessary to instead substitute "True Implication" for "Implication-Fact" and for "If-Then Fact".

-------------------------.

Though I've read a bit about implications and facts, I don't remember an answer to this question about those 3 possible things hat might be said or meant in the official meaning of "Implication". Of course the standard definition of "Implication" that I read was the same everywhere where I found it. I just don't remember anything in that definition about #1 vs #2 vs #3.

I guess I was saying "Implication-Fact" in order to emphasize that I meant #1 or #2

..but, if if #3 is official, then I wanted to emphasize that I was referring to true implications.

You might say I should do some searching for the answer to that question before mentioning it here.

I guess I bring it up here as a matter of curiosity, because there's been such intense and emphatic objection to the phrases that I've been using, that the subject has already come up, in a big way.

Anyway, bottom-line:

If the official meaning of Implication is consistent with #1 or #2, then I could substitute "Implication" for "Implication-Fact" and for "If-Then Fact".

But if the official meaning of "implication" is consistent with #3, then it would be necessary to instead substitute "True Implication" for "Implication-Fact" or "If-Then Fact".

Michael Ossipoff

My reply to your questions will be along this afternoon, tonight or tomorrow morning. I'll make my best effort to have enough computer-time to send it this afternoon or tonight.

My replies tend to be long, because I like them to be complete, and that can mean that they take a little longer.

Michael Ossipoff

As a precedent for my argument, I cited abstract if-then facts or implication-facts..

You might reply by standing by your previous statement that there are no if-then facts or implication-facts.

My answer to that would be: See my previous reply to you, above the part where I stated my premise, conclusion and argument. I said what I mean by "if-then facts" or "implication-facts".

So there are implication-facts, as I defined them.

But if you say that you can't understand anything that I say unless I use your own definitions (whether or not they're standard in philosophiy--and it's unlikely that they are, given what I've found at SEP.), then I'll say this:

I trust that we agree that there can be instances of one hypothetical proposition implying another hypothetical proposition. Call it what you want. Substitute that term everywhere that I said "abstract if-then-facts", "abstract implication-facts", abstract facts about hypotheticals" or "abstract implication-facts about hypotheticals".

Michael Ossipoff

I’d said:

If an "if-then" proposition, an implication-proposition, might not be true, then it can't be called a fact. It's only a proposition.

You said:

And what is it that determines whether or not any proposition is true?

Abstract propositions such as mathematical theorems can sometimes be proved. Propositions about particulars in our physical surroundings, such as physical theories, can sometimes be verified by observation.

I’d said:

So then a fact can be defined as a true proposition, and so a true if-then proposition can reasonably be called an if-then fact.

A fact has also been defined as a state of affairs, or a state of affairs that obtains.

You said:

This is where your conflation lies. 'Fact' has two senses; a semantic sense, or the sense in which a fact is considered to be a true proposition, and a substantive sense, a sense in which substantive facts make propositional facts true. Only the latter kinds of facts are equivalent to states of affairs. The former kinds of facts are propositional descriptions of states of affairs.

"Paris is the capital of France' is not a state of affairs, it is a statement. Paris being the capital of France is a state of affairs.

You seem to be be saying that a proposition is a statement. That’s widely disagreed-with. A statement is an utterance of a proposition.

This distinction is the first thing you need to get clear. There is no such thing as an "if-then fact". Propositions, not facts, are in the form of 'if-then'. Tautologies don't count as facts either. You are distorting sensible usage in sophistical ways.
.
Consider Tarski's formulation: " 'Snow is white' is true iff snow is white"

A safe bet indeed.

; 'Snow is white' is a propositional
or semantic fact if it is a substantive fact that snow is white. For every propositional or semantic fact there is a corresponding substantive fact. Which is to say that for every (propositional) truth there is an actuality.

Of course that can reasonably be said about the things that you’re speaking of, and I have no objection to it being said. But you seem to be making a way of saying things into a doctrine about how things are, and a claim that nothing else can validly be said.

There are certain denominational-promoters who come to my door to tell me how things are, and that if I don’t accept and believe their version of how things are, then I’m uneducated and refusing to be educated. Is that what I’m hearing now?

What you’re saying sounds like a Facts-Dualism, and a bit unparsimonious, an unnecessary multiplication of entities.

If the truth of one proposition implies the truth of another proposition, that’s a state-of-affairs.

In other words, it’s a fact.

It’s an implication-fact.

It’s an if-then fact.

…even if that evidently isn’t the official way of saying it.

Then we hear, “If you don’t say things the official way, you can’t expect anyone to understand what you’re saying.”

Nonsense. I’m speaking English, as you are, and trying to say thing more parsimoniously.

You said:

Paris being the capital of France is a state of affairs.

I like that. I like that way of saying it. It’s a better description of experience.

You can change all of my statements of facts into that form. The state-of-affairs form best says what I mean by facts, and is the way I mean for facts to be worded.

For example, how about:

“A implying B”, with the same meaning as “Paris being the capital of France”.

But it could also be said—and maybe it would be a better way of saying it—that an implication is one of the relations that are referred to when it’s said that a fact consists of some objects, and some properties &/or relations that that they have.

I’ll skip to your last paragraph first, and then answer your paragraph before it:

You said:

Consider this question: In all the time that you have been posting on forums have you found even one person who agrees with your 'argument'?

Yes.

Aside from that, I admit that the physicists Michael Faraday, Frank Tippler and Max Tegmark aren’t on this forum. But they’ve said things that agree with some of the main aspects of my metaphysical proposal.

You said:

…there is also the apparent lack of any cogent argument to support your "system".

Why not lay out your argument (if you have one) in a clear, concise form showing your major premise(s) and your conclusion, then you should be able to determine once and for all whether it is even a valid argument let alone a sound one.

Fair enough.

Premises:

1. We’re each, from our own point-of-view, in our experience, in a life in a physical world.

2. There are abstract facts, including abstract implication-facts. …at least in the sense that they can be stated.

Conclusion:

Premise #2 is sufficient metaphysical mechanism and explanation for premise #1.

Why the Premise Implies the Conclusion

In my statement of my metaphysical proposal, earlier in this thread, I told of how any fact about this physical world or about the physical events and relations in our experience, implies, corresponds to and can be said as an if-then fact. I told of how any fact in about this physical world is (at least part of) the “If “ antecedent of some if-then facts, and is the “then” consequent of other if-then facts.

As Michael Faraday pointed out, in 1844, there’s no observation or experiment that shows anything other than mathematical and logical structural-relation. There’s no evidence of anything other than that.

Among the infinity of complex systems of inter-referring abstract if-then facts, there inevitably is one whose events and relations are those of your experience.

There’s no reason to believe that your experience is other than that.

[That's the Premise, the Conclusion and their Implication-Relation]

Michael Ossipoff

Of course defining the counting numbers in terms of the multiplicative identity makes use of the multiplicative identity axiom, but that was too obvious to mention.

Michael Ossipoff

There is at least one often-discussed system of axioms in which associativity is a theorem instead of an axiom.

There's no one right system of axioms.

The arithmetical axiom-system in which associativity is an axiom instead of a theorem is the widely used and cited one.

The existence of other axiom-systems is quite irrelevant to what I said.

To establish an implication like the one that I stated, it typically is not necessary to use every axiom in the system.

With the natural and obvious counting-number definition that I referred to, the use of the additive associative axiom establishes 2 + 2 = 4.

Michael Ossipoff

I’d said:

I've been repeatedly emphasizing that, regarding the abstract if-then facts that I've been referring to, there' s no reason to believe that any of them are "sound", in the logic sense There's no reason to believe that any of their premises are true.

(…but I realize that “valid” and “sound” really apply only to arguments. Strictly speaking then, an implication proposition (such as the true ones that I call implication-facts) isn’t what “valid” and “sound” are applied to.

…even though of course the arguments to which those words apply make use of an implication-proposition which may or may not be true, and whose premise may or may not be true.)

MetaphysicsNow says:

Take the last sentence, to what does the possessive pronoun "their" refer? Your if-then facts. Facts do not have premises, arguments have premises.

It’s sometimes said that arguments have premise and conclusion, but that implication-propositions instead have antecedent and consequent.

But, in actual usage, we often encounter an implication-proposition’s antecedent referred to as its premise…and its consequent referred to as its conclusion. That’s sometimes found in academic articles.

If an implication-proposition is true, then it’s a true proposition. It’s also a state of affairs. Those are both definitions of a fact.

If an implication-proposition can have an antecedent, which can be called its “premise”, then the fact that an implication-proposition is a true proposition doesn’t mean that it no longer has a premise (antecedent).

Then, as a true proposition, and as a state of affairs, that implication-proposition is now an implication-fact, or an “if-then” fact. …and guess what: That true implication-proposition still has a premise (antecedent).

So yes, an implication fact, a true implication-proposition, has a premise.

Are you done quibbling? :)

Your writing is peppered with these kinds of errors

Like all of the “errors” you cite, the usage of mine that you referred to above isn’t an error. It’s a usage consistent with consensus for definitions and terms, and an instance of you mis-applying a term or definition.

As I’ve said before, academic philosophy is full of rampant disagreement about terms and definitions. But there’s some consensus, and my usages are consistent with that consensus.

I’ve been suggesting that you do some reading about that. The SEP would be a good place for you to start.

I invited people to specify any incorrect statement or unsupported conclusion in my metaphysical proposal.

What I'm getting instead are fallacious quibbles based on misuse and/or misunderstanding of accepted definitions and terms.

If that's the best "disagreement" that you can find, then I don't have time to continue arguing with you.

Let's just agree to disagree, and terminate this discussion.

Michael Ossipoff

Your incorrectly calling actualities "if-then facts", when "if-thens" are actually propositions... — Janus

If an "if-then" proposition, an implication-proposition, might not be true, then it can't be called a fact. It's only a proposition.

One of the definitions of "fact" that I've found is:

"A true bearer of truth-value". In other words, "A true proposition".

So then a fact can be defined as a true proposition, and so a true if-then proposition can reasonably be called an if-then fact.

A fact has also been defined as a state of affairs, or a state of affairs that obtains.

If A implies B, then that A implies B is a state of affairs. ...a fact. ...a fact that could reasonably be called an "if-then" fact.

Alternatively, if a fact is defined as a state of affairs, then a proposition could be defined as a putative or hypothetical state of affairs.

(I know that, in philosophy, it's often said that a state of affairs doesn't necessarily obtain, and that a fact is a state of affairs that obtains. But a supposed "state of affairs" that doesn't obtain isn't a state of affairs.)

, shows your conflation of soundness and validity.

An argument is valid if its premise implies its conclusion.

An argument is sound if it's valid and its premise is true.

By the way, in all the articles I've run across, validity and soundness are applied only to arguments. My metaphiysics refers to implication facts, for which there' s no reason to believe that their premises are true.

A proposition isn't an argument, though the arguments that "valid" and "sound" apply to are based on an implication proposition.

By the way, though it's often said that an implication has an antecedent and a consequent, those are often referred to as "premise" and "conclusion". (...though some want to say that "premise" and "conclusion" only apply to arguments).

I've been referring to "antecedent" and "consequent" as "premise" and "conclusion". There's ample precedent for that usage.

In philosophy, of course there's rampant disagreement about definitions, but my usage is consistent with the basic consensus of those definitions.

A common tactic here consists of taking advantage of philosophy's definitional disagreements, to frivolously and maybe dishonestly take issue with the usage in a post that you can't otherwise find disagreement with.

I know...I'm wasting my breath...and I should know better...

Then why don't you stop.

Michael Ossipoff

The central issue here is not about facts, the issue is about the difference between vacuously true propositions - i.e. tautologies that are made true by virtue of their logical form alone — MetaphysicsNow

No, that issue isn't central to any evaluation of my metaphysical proposal, because the abstract facts that I speak of aren't tautologies, or facts blatantly equating the same thing worded two ways.

I used the Slithytove example because I wanted to use, as an example, a particularly simple fact. The simplicity, the obviousness that you object to, was my reason for choosing it. I wanted simplicity for that example.

But disregard it if you want to. I've described other if-then facts, including, for example, the fact that IF the additive associative axiom is true, THEN 2 + 2 = 4.

...where the counting numbers are defined by repeated addition of the multiplicative identity.

I've described how hypothetical physical quantity-values and hypothetical relations among them (physical laws) are parts of if-then facts.

As I said, the Slithytove syllogism isn't part of my metaphysical proposal, so, no, there's nothing "central" about your tautology issue

Anyway, even aside from that the point of what you're saying isn't at all clear. If you're saying that a tautology like the Slithytove syllogism isn't a fact, then there's the question of on what "fact" definition you base that claim.

...or is it just your personal feeling that a tautology isn't a fact?

...if that's what you mean--and I don't know what you mean.

In the various definitions of the word "fact", I didn't find any stipulation that a tautology isn't a fact.

For example, a tautoloogy, however trivially-obvious, is a state of affairs, and its an obtaining state of affairs.

Another definition of "fact" that has been stated is "A true bearer of truth-value". A tautology, merely by being true, would then seem to qualify as a fact.

"Bearer of truth value" is often given as a definition of "Proposition". So then, from those two definitions, a fact would be a true proposition.

Or a proposition could be defined as a putative or hypothetical state of affairs.

the tautology expresses nothing, .

You mean that a statement of a tautology doesn't provide new information.

You seem to not want to call a tautology a fact because a tautology can't be false, but neither can any proved abstract proposition or theorem.

The difference that a tautology's truth is immediately-obvious, while that isn't necessarily so for theorems or propositions in general. But where does it say that a fact can't be obvious? As I said, I don't know where you get such a definition of "fact".

Anyway, as I said, I don't know what you mean--but that's ok. Don't explain it.

I mention this elsewhere too: Academic philosophy is full of rampant disagreement, and is a thoroughgoing muddle of mutually-contradictory definitions. So then, one common tactic at a philosophy forum is to say, "We can't know what you mean when you don't use the standard terminology":--when the terminology and definitions are thoroughly inconsistent and disputed.

Yes, there's some consensus though, and my use of "facts" is consistent with that consensus.

Michael Ossipoff

...assertion and appeal to the "authority" of Michael Faraday — MetaphysicsNow

I don't appeal to the authority of Michael Faraday. You seem to be suggesting that I'm appealing to Faraday's authority because he's a physicist, and anything a physicist says must be true. But many or most physicists are Materialists, so obviously I'm not saying that Faraday is right because he was a physicist.

I mentioned Faraday partly just to give him credit as the first Westerner that I've heard of, to say what he said. Also, though, I mention him because, even though not everything a physicist says is necessarily true, the fact that a physicist has made those statements shows that not all physicists are Materialists, and that Materialism isn't necessary to or implied by science. ...that science and Eliminative Ontic Structuralism aren't incompatible.

You might like Wittgenstein's Tractatus - there you really do have a philosopher who believes that the world is the totality of facts not of things. Funny thing about the Tractatus, though, is that Wittgenstein doesn't give an argument for that claim, he just asserts it. — MetaphysicsNow

I don't assert it.

I've many times admitted that I can't prove that the Materialist's objectively and fundamentally-existent world, and its objectively existent things, don't superfluously exist, as non-verifiable, non-falsifiable brute-fact, alongside of, and duplicating the events and relations of, the complex system of inter-referring abstract if-then facts that I've described.

Michael Ossipoff

MO does not understand and/or accept the logical distinction between validity and soundness. — Janus

There are many available articles defining validity vs soundness, as those terms are used in logic, and I've never disagreed with anyone here about those words' defined meanings....unless someone mis-stated those definitions. ...which is entirely possible, given what we've seen in this thread.

I've been repeatedly emphasizing that, regarding the abstract if-then facts that I've been referring to, there' s no reason to believe that any of them are "sound", in the logic sense There's no reason to believe that any of their premises are true.

.In fact, I said that just a few postings ago.

So no, I wouldn't have a motive to refuse to accept the meaning of soundness or validity.

I've been around and around this very not-so-merry-go-round with MO before.

No, not really. But it makes a good story.

MO is apparently emotionally invested in his incoherent pet theory

Oops! Janus forgot to tell where my metaphysical proposal is incoherent.

But then he also forgot to on the previous occasions when I invited him to be more specific in his rants.

, and will just keep repeating the same uninformed assertions

On the previous occasions when Janus kept repeating that statement, and ones like it, I invited him to specify an incorrect assertion of mine. He hasn't done so.

Janus demonstrates for us the common Internet tactic of making lots of attack-worded, but unsupported criticisms of a position that he wants to argue against. Like other people using that tactic Janus seem to believe that the more such sludge he spew,s and the worse his manners, the more effective he will be.

Michael Ossipoff

“If all Slithytoves are brillig, and all Jaberwockeys are Slithytoves, then all Jaberwockeys are brillig.”

…is a conditional proposition

I'd replied:
…and it’s a fact.

It’s a true conditional proposition.

It is not a fact, and it does not even express a fact. — MetaphysicsNow

We aren't speaking the same language. There' s nothing to say to your comment above, other than to refer you to SEP, so that you can find out what the terminology consensus is, and what "fact" means, in that consensus.

That's why I suggested that you do less asserting and more reading.

What makes logically valid arguments interesting, from a philosophical perspective, is when they purport to be sound, which means when they are presented along with the assertion that all their premises are true.

Referring to the complex systems of inter-referring if-then facts about hypotheticals that I refer to:

There's no reason to believe any of the premises of the if-then facts that I refer to are true.

I make no claim of soundness for that system of inter-referring abstract if-then facts.

You have yet to present us with a logically valid argument for the existence of reincarnation, when you do, we can address the matter of its soundness.

I merely mention that reincarnation is implied (in the weaker ordinary meaning of that word, not the logic meaning) by the metaphysics that I propose.

I emphasize that I make no claim of soundness for the system of inter-referring abstract if-then fact about hypotheticals to which my metaphysics refers.

There's no reason to believe or claim that any of the premises of those abstract if-then facts are true.

Michael Ossipoff







.

I have to agree with @MetaphysicsNow

Yes, much of what you say seems directly lifted from MetaphysicsNow’s post.

Therefore, as my reply to you on those matters, I refer you to my reply (above in this thread) to MetaphysicsNow.

But I’ll reply separately, below, to what you said that wasn’t quite word-for-word from MetaphysicsNow’s post.

Let's take a look at this claim for instance:

Among that infinity of complex systems of inter-referring if-then facts, there’s inevitably one that’s about events and relations that are those of your experience.
.
There’s no reason to believe that your experience is other than that.

Now the only sensible way to interpret "if-then fact" on the basis of what you have said in your introduction is that an "if-then fact" is just an unfortunately chosen name for a conditional proposition.


Incorrect. “Fact” doesn’t mean the same thing as “proposition”.

For the difference between a fact and a proposition, I refer you to my reply to MetaphysicsNow…and to the SEP.

That being so, the complex systems of inter-referring if-then facts you talk about here are just "bundles" of propositions…

Facts.

…with logical connections between each other. My experience is certainly other than that because my experience is not a proposition at all

I didn’t say that your experience is a proposition. I said that there’s no reason to believe that your experience is other than a system of inter-referring abstract if-then facts.

I’ve defined a purposefully-responsive device’s “experience” as its surroundings and events from its point-of-view, in the context of its design-purposes—whether that device is a human or a Roomba. …but I speak of and define my metaphysics in terms of the individual’s experience, with that experience as its fundamental basis.

…your experience consisting of that system of inter-referring abstract if-then facts about hypotheticals. An experience, for example, of being a human or a Roomba….a human in the case of the participants in this forum.

So it’s a subjectively-defined metaphysics. …an Eliminative Ontic Structural Subjective Idealism, to use accepted philosophical terms.

There are true propositions about my experience, and there are also true conditional propositions in which propositions concerning my experience feature as antecedents and as consequents.

There are facts like that.

My experience, whatever else it is, is something that is capable of making such propositions true.

…something referred to as facts.

You suggest that, in addition to the facts, there’s something else (concrete, fundamentally, independently and objectively existent material things and stuff) that the facts are about. Michael Faraday pointed out that there’s no reason to assume or invent such metaphysical entities or objects.

Our experience and observations, personal and scientific, are about structural, logical, and mathematical if-then relation-facts. There’s no evidence for metaphysical existence of other than that.

Michael Ossipoff

But then it seems as if saying that Jack has no "philosophical" free will isn't saying anything at all.

Because we are still going to treat him as blameworthy ("deserving" of imprisonment etc) in the same way we would if we had said he does have "philosophical" free will. Which suggests that really we think he does have such free will. — tinman917

Jack had no choice about what he is. He's despicable. It wasn't his choice to be born or raised to be despicable. But he's still despicable.

Let's say that Jack is someone who likes to harm people. He didn't choose to be born or raised to like harming people. But he still likes it, and does it because he chooses to because he likes it.

Because he likes harming people, he deserves imprisonment. Though, through no choice of his own, he was either born or raised to be someone who likes harming people, he still likes harming people, and deserves imprisonment.

Michael Ossipoff

MetaphysicsNow says:

I fear you are confusing facts with propositions:

One of us is confusing facts with propositions.

MetaphysicsNow quoted me:

There are abstract if-then facts.

If all Slithytoves are brillig, and all Jaberwockeys are Slithytoves, then all Jaberwockeys are brillig.

That’s true even if none of the Slithytoves are brillig.

That’s true even if none of the Jaberwockeys are Slithytoves.

That’s true even if there are no Slithytoves, and no Jaberwockeys.

When I say that there are abstract if-then facts, I mean only that they “are”, in the sense that they can be stated. I imply or clam nothing about the matter of whether or not they’re “real” or “existent”, whatever that would mean.

In the above quotation the following conditional:

“If all Slithytoves are brillig, and all Jaberwockeys are Slithytoves, then all Jaberwockeys are brillig.”

…is a conditional proposition
[/quote]

…and it’s a fact.

It’s a true conditional proposition. And it’s a fact. If it makes you happy, you can call it a conditional fact, or an implication fact. I call it an if-then fact, because I’m writing for a broader audience.

…]
However, facts are usually regarded as those things that make individual propositions true.

Regarding the proposition “Someone posts here under the name of MetaphysicsNow”, what fact makes that proposition true? How about: The fact that someone here posts under the name of “MetaphysicsNow”.

Facts are defined in a number of ways. We often hear a fact is defined as “a state of affairs”, or “a state of affairs that obtains”.

(The latter sounds odd to me, because, if it didn’t obtain, it wouldn’t be a state of affairs…and so the “…that obtains” part seems unnecessary. Maybe someone meant “a hypothetical or putative state of affairs that obtains”…where “a hypothetical or putative state of affairs” could define a proposition.)

Insofar as conditional propositions are true, though, we do not introduce "if-then" facts to make them true

I didn’t introduce facts to make propositions true. I spoke of facts because facts were what I wanted to refer to.

, since the truth or falsity of conditional propositions is entirely accounted for by the truth or falsity of the antecedent and consequent.

I’ll say it again:

An implication-proposition, by its truth-functional definition, is true unless its premise (or “antecedent) is true and its conclusion (or “consequent”) is false.

I’d said:

Of course, by definition, a fact is true.

This is a strange definition of a fact


I didn’t offer it as a definition of a fact. I said that it follows from the various definitions of a fact.

, the usual definition (philosophically speaking anyway) is that a fact is what makes true propositions true.

That’s often said about facts, and it’s a reasonable statement. But you’ve mistakenly latched onto it as the definition of a fact.

Don't get me wrong, there are all kinds of philosophical issues with what I have been saying

,
You think?

…However, you seem right from the beginning of your proposal to be conflating notions that need to be distinguished, …

…like facts and propositions?

Judging by what you’ve been saying in this post that I’m replying to, there are differences that you don’t understand, between facts and propositions.

There isn’t a fact that the Earth is a gas-giant and (given the arithmetical axioms) 2 + 3 = 7. There is a (false) proposition that the Earth is a gas-giant and 2 + 3 = 7.

There’s an if-then fact that, if all Slitheytoves are brillig, and all Jaberwockeys are Slitheytoves, then all Jaberwockeys are brillig.

There’s an if-then fact that, IF the additive associative axiom of the real, rational and integer numbers is true, THEN 2 + 2 = 4.

…where the counting numbers are defined, in the obvious manner, in terms of the multiplicative-identity and addition.

You might want to check out the SEP (That stands for Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), on the subjects of facts, state of affairs, and propositions.

You’ll find that there’s rampant disagreement among academic philosophers, and endless quibble over what philosopherrs mean by various words…but, in general, the what I’ve said about facts is consistent with the consensus.

For you, I recommend less assertion and more reading.

Michael Ossipoff

Jack accepted the bribe because he's a sleazy, uncaring crook. Say, just for example, that he was born that way. It isn't Jack's fault that he was born as a sleazy, uncaring crook., but he still is one, and, as such, he deserves a penitentiary sentence.

He committed the crime because he wanted to. No, he didn't will to will it. But he still willed it.

Or maybe he's that way because his parents raised him to believe that anything that he does is ok, and let him get away with everything. It wasn't his fault that he was raised that way, but he nevertheless is what he is...and what he is isn't something that I like, or someone I want to be outside of a penitentiary.

Michael Ossipoff

In Tim’s post that I’m replying to here: Not only does he not support anything that he says, but he doesn’t even specify an instance of the alleged errors that he refers to.

Tim needs to learn to do a lot better at saying what he means.

In my replies to his comments below, I made a few guesses about what Tim might mean, but in general, it isn’t possible to reply to Tim if he can’t express himself more clearly.

So why reply at all?

One reply is necessary, so that it won’t seem as if I’m evading irrefutable statements.
--------------------------
Tim says:

Ok, you define metaphysics as talk about what is.

That isn’t what I said. But don’t worry about it—It’s close enough.

I’d said:

I mean implication with a somewhat weaker meaning, in which the truth of one thing suggests another thing.

Tim says:

I think you're confusing the truth of the implication with the truth of the consequent.

Maybe, before posting what he thinks, Tim should give it more thought.

In logic, an implication, by its truth-functional definition, is standardly said to be true unless its antecedent is true and its consequent false.

When “imply” is used outside of logic, with its everyday dictionary meaning, we don’t speak of an implication’s consequent or antecedent. I’d already clarified that I wasn’t using “imply” with its logic meaning.

What you mean is, from the stronger, the weaker.

No, I meant what I said. “Imply” has a stronger meaning in logic than it does in other usage. I clarified that I wasn’t using “imply” with the strong meaning that it has in logic.

The trouble is that absent existential import - i.e., when dealing with sets with no members - neither implication nor sub-alternation hold.

Oops! Tim forgot to specify an instance in which I said or implied that implication holds when dealing with sets with no members.

In academic articles defining “implication”, I didn’t find mention of sets, but it’s standard that, in its truth-functional definition, an implication is called true unless its premise is true and its conclusion is false. …even when its premise and conclusion refer to things that don’t exist.

…but I won’t try to guess what Tim means.

And certainly the idea of "suggesting" is loose enough to be without any value at all.

In usage outside logic, “imply” doesn’t have the strong meaning that it has in logic usage.

I used the word “suggest”, because I wanted to err on the side of caution. Instead of asserting that reincarnation necessarily follows from my metaphysics, I wanted to leave conclusions about that to the reader.

I encourage Tim to not let anyone tell him what he should value.

Tim quoted me:

Instead of one world of “Is”, infinitely-many worlds of “If “.

In addition to abstract if-then facts, there are systems of inter-referring abstract if-then facts. There are complex systems of them. …infinitely-many of those as well.
Among that infinity of complex systems of inter-referring if-then facts, there’s inevitably one that’s about events and relations that are those of your experience.
There’s no reason to believe that your experience is other than that.

Tim says:

There's a difference between is and if; you're ignoring that difference.

Well, when I spoke of one instead of the other, that didn’t imply that they’re the same. :D

As usual, it can only be guessed what Tim means. Maybe he means that “Is” and “If “ aren’t the same part of speech. “If “ is a subordinate conjunction, and “Is” is a verb. Did I ignore that difference? Sure, because I was talking, instead, about a distinction between conditional and indicative meanings.

And of course your metaphysics of is got lost at the first turn.

I don’t have or propose a metaphysics of is.

As is always the case in the post that I’m replying to, Tim isn’t being very clear with us about what he means.
.
I’d said:

The suggestion of reincarnation isn’t really so fantastic. It’s no more fantastic than the various alternative suggestions. In fact, the fact that you’re in a life (even if an explanation can be suggested) is, itself, something remarkable, fantastic and surprising.

Tim says:

Correct, they're all fantastic. but fantastic in different senses, that you confuse.

…and that’s quite a trick, given that I didn’t say or imply anything about the manner, way or sense in which those various things are fantastic. :D

Tim forgot to share with us a specification of the passage in which I said or implied something incorrect about senses in which those things are fantastic.
--------------------
After this one reply, I don’t have time to reply to more sloppy and vague rant, and I’m not going to take the time to reply to subsequent posts from Tim.

So that I won’t be expected to, it’s necessary that I declare now that I won’t reply to subsequent posts from Tim. My not replying won’t mean that Tim has said something irrefutable…only that his first effort didn’t justify continuing to reply to him.

Of course if anyone feels that there’s an error, a mis-statement, or that they have a legitimate, supportable disagreement, then they’re encouraged to specify it.

Though I myself don’t have time for more of Tim’s arguments, if anyone feels that, in some subsequent post, Tim has expressed a valid argument about my metaphysical proposal, then that person should feel free to quote that argument, with a claim that it’s valid (and any clarification that’s missing in the argument itself). Then I’ll reply to that person.

Michael Ossipoff

So (sorry to repeat, but just to be clear) what is the answer to the "is it the same or different?" question in my last post. — tinman917

It's different.

You have legal free-will. You don't have philosophical free-will.

Using the Jack being bribed and Jack at gunpoint scenarios from my earlier posts as examples of (the absence of) "philosophical" and "legal" free-will respectively.

Legally:

If you're being threatened, the law wouldn't call it your will when you comply with the ultimatum that comes with the threat. If you're merely being bribed, then the law would blame you for choosing to accept the bribe.

You have legal free-will.

Philosophically

Whether you're being threatened or bribed, your compliance will depend on your predispositions, inclinations, and the circumstance. Your choice will be determined by those things. Your role in that choice is merely a judgment (typically a guess) regarding which choice would be more favorable to your likes and goals.

You don't have philosophical free-will.

As a famous philosopher once said, you can do what you will, but you can't will what you will.

Michael Ossipoff:

First I'll briefly reply to a few of Tim's questions, and then I'll describe the metaphysical proposal that I'm referring to, and how it implies reincarnation.

Time asks:

What is your definition of metaphysics, please? — tim wood

As I use the term, "metaphysics" means the discussion of what is, at the limits of what is discussable, describable, and meaningfully assertable and arguable. ...and, within that limitation, at the limits of generality.

I don't claim that metaphysics covers, discusses or describes all that is, or all of Reality. I don't claim that all of what is, all of Reality, is discussable, describable or meaningfully assertable or arguable. Here, I'm not making any assertions, claims, or even comments on that matter. Referring to the matter of what is, but isn't discussable, describable or meaningfully assertable or arguable...I'd call that "meta-metaphysics". I'm not making any claims or assertions about that (...and, by definition it wouldn't be meaningful to do so anyway.) I'm just discussing metaphysics here..

What is the uncontroversial metaphysics in question?

See below.

What do you understand by the term "implication"?

In logic, it's a proposition, P, about a relation between propositions A and B, such that P is false only if A is true and B is false.

I mean implication with a somewhat weaker meaning, in which the truth of one thing suggests another thing.

And please lay out briefly that implication.

See below. The discussion of the implication of reincarnation follows my description of my metaphysical proposal.

For example, if you mean that there are belief systems (e.g., Jainism) that "buy" reincarnation, and that such systems are "uncontroversial" (whatever that means)...

A statement is "uncontroversial" if no one can come up with a supportable reason for disagreeing with it.

I'm saying that my metaphysics is uncontroversial. I'm not saying that anything else is uncontroversial.

What I describe isn't a "belief-system".

, then you're arguably correct, but the proposition is not especially interesting because it doesn't say much of interest. Is that what you're saying?

No. See below.

Metaphysical Proposal:

Let me first summarize, and quote Faraday:

In 1844, the physicist Michael Faraday pointed out that what we observe in the physical world consists of mathematical and logical structural relational facts, and that there’s no particular reason to believe that the physical world consists of more than that.

In particular, there’s no particular reason to believe in the Materialist’s objectively-existent “stuff”.

He was right.

There are abstract if-then facts.

If all Slithytoves are brillig, and all Jaberwockeys are Slithytoves, then all Jaberwockeys are brillig.

That’s true even if none of the Slithytoves are brillig.

That’s true even if none of the Jaberwockeys are Slithytoves.

That’s true even if there are no Slithytoves, and no Jaberwockeys.

When I say that there are abstract if-then facts, I mean only that they “are”, in the sense that they can be stated. I imply or clam nothing about the matter of whether or not they’re “real” or “existent”, whatever that would mean.

Of course, by definition, a fact is true. Otherwise it would be a proposition, but not a fact.

Also, I make no claim about the truth of the premises of the abstract if-thens that I speak of, in regards to the metaphysics that I propose. There’s no particular reason to believe that any of their premises are true.

Any fact about this physical world implies, corresponds to, and can be said as, an if-then fact:

“There is a traffic roundabout at the intersection of 34th & Vine.”

“If you go to the intersection of 34th & Vine, you’ll encounter, there, a traffic roundabout.”

Additionally, any fact about this physical world is (at least part of) the “if” premise of some if-then facts, and is the “then” conclusion of other if-then facts.

For example:

A set of hypothetical physical quantity-values, and a hypothetical relation among them (called a “physical law”) together comprise the “if ” premise of an if-then fact. …except that one of those physical quantity-values can be taken as the “then” premise of that if-then fact.

A proved mathematical theorem is an if-then fact, for which at least part of the “if ” premise consists of a set of mathematical axioms.

We’re used to speaking in declarative, indicative grammar. But I suggest that we believe our grammar too much. I suggest that conditional grammar better describes what metaphysically, discussably, describably is.

Instead of one world of “Is”, infinitely-many worlds of “If “.

In addition to abstract if-then facts, there are systems of inter-referring abstract if-then facts. There are complex systems of them. …infinitely-many of those as well.

Among that infinity of complex systems of inter-referring if-then facts, there’s inevitably one that’s about events and relations that are those of your experience.

There’s no reason to believe that your experience is other than that.

I call that your “life-experience possibility-story”.

Why are you in a life? Because you’re the hypothetical protagonist of a hypothetical life-experience possibility-story. To say it differently, there’s a hypothetical life-experience possibility-story that has, as its protagonist, someone just like you—you, in fact.

Now, if you’re in a life for a reason, then what if, at the end of this life, that reason still obtains? What does that suggest? …

At the end of life, there’s eventual unconsciousness and sleep. …”unconsciousness” only in the sense of absence of waking-consciousness. Of course eventually that ever deepening unconsciousness reaches a time when you don’t know (or care) that there ever were, or could be, such things as identity, individuality, worldly-life, time, or events …or hardships, problems, lack, or incompletion.

Of course, by the timescale of an outside observer of the shutting-down of your body, you’ll soon be completely shut-down. But you don’t know or care about that, because you don’t even know that there is, was, or could be such a thing as time or events. You’ve reached timelessness. The impending complete shutdown of your body, which will be observed by your survivors, is entirely irrelevant and unknown to you.

But I suggest that it isn’t certain that you’ll reach that deep, near-end, stage of shutdown at the end of this life:

But, before you reach the place in shutdown at which you’re quite unaware of life, time, events or worldly-experience, it’s reasonable to suggest that there’s a lesser degree of unconsciousness in which you merely don’t remember or know the exact details of the life that has just ended, or exactly what’s going on, but you still retain your old subconscious attributes, predispositions and inclinations.

Lacking factual information and waking-consciousness, you don’t know if you’re coming or going, but you retain your subconscious attributes, predispositions and inclinations, including a future-orientedness, and an orientation towards worldly-life.

There’s a life-experience possibility-story about you, as you are at that particular time. You’re the protagonist of that experience-story. That life-experience story necessarily starts where you are, as do all lives, with someone who is like you are at that time. …without waking-consciousness, without any factual knowledge of what’s going on.

Without explanation, not knowing what’s going on, you’re experiencing without waking-consciousness. That situation began at the end of a life, but you don’t remember that.

As I said above, if the reason why you were in a life before continues to obtain at the end of your life, then what does that suggest?

I emphasize that reincarnation isn’t _part of_ my metaphysics. It’s just, I suggest, an implied consequence it.

You can disagree with my suggestion that it’s an implied consequence of my metaphysics, without disagreeing with the metaphysics itself.

In one paragraph above, I described a particularly deep level of unconsciousness at the end of life. I suggest that few people reach that stage, because their retained subconscious inclinations and predispositions lead them elsewhere, as described above.

According to Hinduism and Buddhism, very few people reach the end-of-lives at the end of this life, basically for the reason that I described.

The suggestion of reincarnation isn’t really so fantastic. It’s no more fantastic than the various alternative suggestions. In fact, the fact that you’re in a life (even if an explanation can be suggested) is, itself, something remarkable, fantastic and surprising.

Anyway, whether or not you agree with the reincarnation-implication, the metaphysics that I propose implies an open-ness, loose-ness and lightness in stark contrast to Materialism’s grim accounting.

…an insubstantial , ethereal nature for what is describable and discussable.

I suggest that there’s something inherently good about “what-is”.

Michael Ossipoff

Presumably the idea is that there is a sound argument with metaphysical premises (i.e. premises which concern existence) which are acceptable to all and that has as for its conclusion that reincarnation happens. — jkg20

Yes, well said. That's what I mean.

So, Michael Ossipoff, over to you to lay out the premises one by one so we can subject them to scrutiny.

Will do.

Michael Ossipoff

Any device that can do what a person or other animal can do has "Consciousness". That's how it does those things, you know. — Michael Ossipoff

If a Computer could experience for example the Color Red then I would agree. But a Computer does not Experience anything. — SteveKlinko

...and you know that....how? If you aren't a computer, then how can you speak for what a computer does or doesn't experience?

What does experience mean? I define "experience" as a purposefully-responsive device's interpretation of its surroundings and events in the context of that device's designed purposes.

By that definition, yes a computer has experience.

As I said, we tend to use "Consciousness" and "Experience" chauvinistically, applying those words only to humans or other animals. That's why I try to cater to that chauvinism by sometimes defining those words in terms of the speaker's perception of kinship with some particular other purposefully-responsive device..

A Computer can be programmed to scan pixels in an image to find the Red parts. A Computer will look for pixels with values that are within a certain range of numbers. A Computer never has a Red experience but it can find the Red parts of an image.

When you find the red part of an image, why should I believe that you have a red experience in a meaningful sense in which a computer doesn't?

The computer finds the red part of the image. You find the red part of the image. Period (full-stop).

You wouldn't report the red part of the image if you hadn't experienced it. The same can rightly be said of the computer.

So just because it can find the Red parts of an image, like a Human can, it does not mean it has a Conscious Red experience while doing this.

You call it a Conscious Experience when it's yours, or of another person, or maybe another animal. ...you or a purposeful-device sufficiently similar to you, with which you perceive some kinship.

A Computer works in a different way than a Conscious being does.

...because you define a Conscious Being as something very similar to yourself.

Science doesn't understand enough about Consciousness yet to design Machines that have Consciousness.

...if you're defining "Consciousness" as "ability to pass as human".

Current technology can't yet produce a robot that acts indistinguishably similarly to a human and does any job that a human can do.

Imitating or replacing humans is proving more difficult than expected. Life has evolved over billions of years of natural-selection. It wasn't reasonable to just expect to throw-together something to imitate or replace us in a few decades.

If such a machine is ever built, some would say that it has Consciousness and Experience (as do we), and some would say that it doesn't (and that it's a philosophical zombie merely claiming to have feelings and experiences).

Of course the former would be right.

Michael Ossipoff

I suppose the Consciousness that you're referring to needn't be unbodily. Some people are claiming that there's some mysterious way that the brain causes it. Yeah: Purposefulness. That's it. Nothing mysterious there.

What it amounts to is that you're using "Consciousness" to refer to something that I don't believe in.

You're in good company. A lot of academic philosophers do too.

But you're implying that the meaning that you give to that word is its only correct meaning.

I don't think that there's a consensus about what the word "Consciousness" means.

If someone built a perfectly human-impersonating robot, and said that it's a philosophical zombie, and if its behavior and reactions were indistinguishable from those of a human, then how would you prove that there's some un-bodily, Dualistic, "Consciousness" that it lacks? Don't you see the weakness of that position?

There'd be no reason to believe that that robot lacks anything of a human.

In actuality, robots will probably be made without the natural-selecton-built-in self-interest that humans and other animals have. No need to worry about a selfish robot take-over. They'd have more resemblence to ants than to self-interested mammals. Of course ants and bees will protect themselves, but they value, first, their service to the colony.

Michael Ossipoff

I’d said:

Any device that can do what a person or other animal can do has "Consciousness". That's how it does those things, you know.

You replied:

No, it does those things through causality causing it to do those things.

You could say that about any event, explain it by saying that it’s caused by causality. For example, that could be said about the operation of a Roomba. What the Roomba does is caused by its built-in purposeful-responsiveness. …as can also be said of any animal, or humans too. The behavior that makes you say that a person has Consciousness is the result of designed-in purposeful responsiveness. If there’s any Consciousness there, it’s the purposeful-responsiveness itself.

The (hypothetical) philosophical-zombie has that purposeful-responsiveness too. How else do you think it does what a human does?

Doing those things does not imply consciousness being involved.

Correct. It doesn’t imply the kind of Consciousness that you’re talking about. …some Spiritualist notion of a separate entity, separate and different from the body.

But animals have what you could call “Consciousness” because animals are designed to do various things, to accomplish particular goals and purposes. What you regard as a separate entity called “Consciousness” consists of the design-purpose built into animals (including humans). …their designed-in purposeful-responsiveness, to accomplish their design goals.

I’d said:

Consciousness is the property of being a purposefully-responsive device.

You replied:

Where is the consciousness in a mousetrap?

For the purpose of our animal-chauvinist usage in speech, I define “Consciousness” as purposeful-responsiveness of a device with which the speaker feels kinship.
You don’t feel kinship with a mousetrap.

Yes, it’s a vague definition, because our use of the word “Consciousness” is imprecise. Really, “purposeful-responsiveness” is a better, more uniformly-used term.

How does it rise from its physical nature?

It isn’t some separate thing that “arises”, “supervenes” or “emerges”, or whatever. It’s just the property of purposeful-responsiveness. …but you don’t call it “Consciousness” when possessed by something you don’t feel kinship with.

But would you say that insects aren’t conscious? They go about their business, as do mammals, and they experience fear. In those regards, they’re recognizably similar to us.

Michael Ossipoff

The notion of a philosophical zombie is a manifestation of the Spiritualist confusion of academic philosophers.

Any device that can do what a person or other animal can do has "Consciousness". That's how it does those things, you know.

We're purposefully-responsive devices, designed by natural-selection, to achieve certain material goals and purposes. Consciousness is the property of being a purposefully-responsive device.

But the word "Consciousness" is, of course, used very chauvinistically. We only apply that word to those purposefully-responsive devices that are sufficiently similar to us. Other humans, or maybe other mammals. ...maybe the vertebrates, or maybe include the insects...and so on.

Yeah, but when it comes down to it, you're not different in kind from a mousetrap or a refrigerator lightswitch.

Michael Ossipoff

(We are in the "after hours" for this thread now!) — tinman917

I've been away from the forum for a while.

OK so we got two meanings. I'm trying to figure out what the significance of lacking "philosophical free-will" is?

Good significance, I'd say.

It removes from us the illusory burden of "our" choices. Our only choice-making task is the relatively minor one of making a determination, usually a guess, about which choice best suits our already-had likes.

And besides, as purposefully-responsive devices, we aren't here for things to happen to. We do our best in service of our likes. That's it. We don't have the power to fully determine outcomes, so why should we worry about what we don't have power over.

I mean in terms of attitudes of blame towards the agent. Is it the same or different to the significance of lack of "legal free-will"? If different then how different?

The criminal, too, is only a purposefully-responsive device. What he did was either the result of his own predisposition, or the circumstances. But he still did it. If someone harms people, then, regardless of what caused it, it isn't desirable to allow people to be harmed, and society still has to protect itself against him. And if someone wants to and likes to harm people, that's still malice, regardless of whether it's innate or environmental in origin.

(P. S. "two different meanings"?? I'm worried there might be three. At least!

Maybe. but I'm only up to two so far.

Michael Ossipoff

You're conflating two different meanings for "free will".

In your Mary & Jack example, of course it can be said that, when coerced by threat, Jack didn't act from free will, but, when merely bribed, he did..

Philosophical free-will and legal free-will aren't the same.

Everything you do is determined by your predisposition/inclination/likes/wants and your surroundings/circumstances. Your only role in determining your choices is a judgment regarding which choice is most in keeping with your wants, likes, predispositions and inclinations, and the circumstances. Primarily and really, you're governed by those pre-determinations and circumstances. They're what really determine your choices.

You're a purposefully-responsive device.

Michael Ossipoff

I've deleted my reply, because it duplicates the same answer already given by several other people.

Someone identical, or nearly identical, to you is asking the same question in another of the "many worlds". Most of them haven't won Lotto either.

By the way, the big-win Lotto games are psychologically-inadvisable.

Michael Ossipoff