Reincarnation is metaphysically-implied. There's an uncontroversial metaphysics that implies reincarnation. — Michael Ossipoff
Presumably the idea is that there is a sound argument with metaphysical premises (i.e. premises which concern existence) which are acceptable to all and that has as for its conclusion that reincarnation happens. — jkg20
So, Michael Ossipoff, over to you to lay out the premises one by one so we can subject them to scrutiny.
What is your definition of metaphysics, please? — tim wood
What is the uncontroversial metaphysics in question?
What do you understand by the term "implication"?
And please lay out briefly that implication.
For example, if you mean that there are belief systems (e.g., Jainism) that "buy" reincarnation, and that such systems are "uncontroversial" (whatever that means)...
, then you're arguably correct, but the proposition is not especially interesting because it doesn't say much of interest. Is that what you're saying?
I think you're confusing the truth of the implication with the truth of the consequent. What you mean is, from the stronger, the weaker. The trouble is that absent existential import - i.e., when dealing with sets with no members - neither implication nor sub-alternation hold. And certainly the idea of "suggesting" is loose enough to be without any value at all.I mean implication with a somewhat weaker meaning, in which the truth of one thing suggests another thing. — Michael Ossipoff
There's a difference between is and if; you're ignoring that difference. And of course your metaphysics of is got lost at the first turn.Instead of one world of “Is”, infinitely-many worlds of “If “.
In addition to abstract if-then facts, there are systems of inter-referring abstract if-then facts. There are complex systems of them. …infinitely-many of those as well.
Among that infinity of complex systems of inter-referring if-then facts, there’s inevitably one that’s about events and relations that are those of your experience.
There’s no reason to believe that your experience is other than that. — Michael Ossipoff
The suggestion of reincarnation isn’t really so fantastic. It’s no more fantastic than the various alternative suggestions. In fact, the fact that you’re in a life (even if an explanation can be suggested) is, itself, something remarkable, fantastic and surprising. — Michael Ossipoff
There are abstract if-then facts.
If all Slithytoves are brillig, and all Jaberwockeys are Slithytoves, then all Jaberwockeys are brillig.
That’s true even if none of the Slithytoves are brillig.
That’s true even if none of the Jaberwockeys are Slithytoves.
That’s true even if there are no Slithytoves, and no Jaberwockeys.
When I say that there are abstract if-then facts, I mean only that they “are”, in the sense that they can be stated. I imply or clam nothing about the matter of whether or not they’re “real” or “existent”, whatever that would mean.
Of course, by definition, a fact is true.
Among that infinity of complex systems of inter-referring if-then facts, there’s inevitably one that’s about events and relations that are those of your experience.
There’s no reason to believe that your experience is other than that.
Ok, you define metaphysics as talk about what is.
I mean implication with a somewhat weaker meaning, in which the truth of one thing suggests another thing.
I think you're confusing the truth of the implication with the truth of the consequent.
What you mean is, from the stronger, the weaker.
The trouble is that absent existential import - i.e., when dealing with sets with no members - neither implication nor sub-alternation hold.
And certainly the idea of "suggesting" is loose enough to be without any value at all.
Instead of one world of “Is”, infinitely-many worlds of “If “.
In addition to abstract if-then facts, there are systems of inter-referring abstract if-then facts. There are complex systems of them. …infinitely-many of those as well.
Among that infinity of complex systems of inter-referring if-then facts, there’s inevitably one that’s about events and relations that are those of your experience.
There’s no reason to believe that your experience is other than that.
There's a difference between is and if; you're ignoring that difference.
And of course your metaphysics of is got lost at the first turn.
The suggestion of reincarnation isn’t really so fantastic. It’s no more fantastic than the various alternative suggestions. In fact, the fact that you’re in a life (even if an explanation can be suggested) is, itself, something remarkable, fantastic and surprising.
Correct, they're all fantastic. but fantastic in different senses, that you confuse.
So, Michael Ossipoff, over to you to lay out the premises one by one so we can subject them to scrutiny. — jkg20
Not done yet.Will do.
Michael Ossipoff — Michael Ossipoff
I fear you are confusing facts with propositions:
There are abstract if-then facts.
If all Slithytoves are brillig, and all Jaberwockeys are Slithytoves, then all Jaberwockeys are brillig.
That’s true even if none of the Slithytoves are brillig.
That’s true even if none of the Jaberwockeys are Slithytoves.
That’s true even if there are no Slithytoves, and no Jaberwockeys.
When I say that there are abstract if-then facts, I mean only that they “are”, in the sense that they can be stated. I imply or clam nothing about the matter of whether or not they’re “real” or “existent”, whatever that would mean.
…]
However, facts are usually regarded as those things that make individual propositions true.
Insofar as conditional propositions are true, though, we do not introduce "if-then" facts to make them true
, since the truth or falsity of conditional propositions is entirely accounted for by the truth or falsity of the antecedent and consequent.
Of course, by definition, a fact is true.
, the usual definition (philosophically speaking anyway) is that a fact is what makes true propositions true.
,Don't get me wrong, there are all kinds of philosophical issues with what I have been saying
…However, you seem right from the beginning of your proposal to be conflating notions that need to be distinguished, …
If all Slithytoves are brillig, and all Jaberwockeys are Slithytoves, then all Jaberwockeys are brillig.
I have to agree with @MetaphysicsNow
Let's take a look at this claim for instance:
Among that infinity of complex systems of inter-referring if-then facts, there’s inevitably one that’s about events and relations that are those of your experience.
.
There’s no reason to believe that your experience is other than that.
That being so, the complex systems of inter-referring if-then facts you talk about here are just "bundles" of propositions…
…with logical connections between each other. My experience is certainly other than that because my experience is not a proposition at all
There are true propositions about my experience, and there are also true conditional propositions in which propositions concerning my experience feature as antecedents and as consequents.
My experience, whatever else it is, is something that is capable of making such propositions true.
“If all Slithytoves are brillig, and all Jaberwockeys are Slithytoves, then all Jaberwockeys are brillig.”
…is a conditional proposition
You suggest that, in addition to the facts, there’s something else (concrete, fundamentally, independently and objectively existent material things and stuff) that the facts are about..
For you, I recommend more careful thinking and less incoherent babbling.For you, I recommend less assertion and more reading.
“If all Slithytoves are brillig, and all Jaberwockeys are Slithytoves, then all Jaberwockeys are brillig.”
…is a conditional proposition
I'd replied:
…and it’s a fact.
It’s a true conditional proposition.
It is not a fact, and it does not even express a fact. — MetaphysicsNow
What makes logically valid arguments interesting, from a philosophical perspective, is when they purport to be sound, which means when they are presented along with the assertion that all their premises are true.
You have yet to present us with a logically valid argument for the existence of reincarnation, when you do, we can address the matter of its soundness.
We aren't speaking the same language. There' s nothing to say to your comment above, other than to refer you to SEP, so that you can find out what the terminology consensus is, and what "fact" means, in that consensus.
MO does not understand and/or accept the logical distinction between validity and soundness. — Janus
I've been around and around this very not-so-merry-go-round with MO before.
MO is apparently emotionally invested in his incoherent pet theory
, and will just keep repeating the same uninformed assertions
I've been repeatedly emphasizing that, regarding the abstract if-then facts that I've been referring to, there' s no reason to believe that any of them are "sound", in the logic sense There's no reason to believe that any of their premises are true.
...assertion and appeal to the "authority" of Michael Faraday — MetaphysicsNow
You might like Wittgenstein's Tractatus - there you really do have a philosopher who believes that the world is the totality of facts not of things. Funny thing about the Tractatus, though, is that Wittgenstein doesn't give an argument for that claim, he just asserts it. — MetaphysicsNow
The central issue here is not about facts, the issue is about the difference between vacuously true propositions - i.e. tautologies that are made true by virtue of their logical form alone — MetaphysicsNow
the tautology expresses nothing, .
Your incorrectly calling actualities "if-then facts", when "if-thens" are actually propositions... — Janus
, shows your conflation of soundness and validity.
I know...I'm wasting my breath...and I should know better...
I've been repeatedly emphasizing that, regarding the abstract if-then facts that I've been referring to, there' s no reason to believe that any of them are "sound", in the logic sense There's no reason to believe that any of their premises are true.
Take the last sentence, to what does the possessive pronoun "their" refer? Your if-then facts. Facts do not have premises, arguments have premises.
Your writing is peppered with these kinds of errors
If an "if-then" proposition, an implication-proposition, might not be true, then it can't be called a fact. It's only a proposition. — Michael Ossipoff
So then a fact can be defined as a true proposition, and so a true if-then proposition can reasonably be called an if-then fact.
A fact has also been defined as a state of affairs, or a state of affairs that obtains. — Michael Ossipoff
A common tactic here consists of taking advantage of philosophy's definitional disagreements, to frivolously and maybe dishonestly take issue with the usage in a post that you can't otherwise find disagreement with. — Michael Ossipoff
I used the Slithytove example because I wanted to use, as an example, a particularly simple fact. The simplicity, the obviousness that you object to, was my reason for choosing it. I wanted simplicity for that example.
But disregard it if you want to. I've described other if-then facts, including, for example, the fact that IF the additive associative axiom is true, THEN 2 + 2 = 4. — Michael Ossipoff
And here you display your equally superficial knowledge of number theory - I guess you pick that up from a cursory reading of websites as well as your philosophy. In most systems of number theory, the associative property of addition is not an axiom, it is a theorem that can be proven from the axioms of the theory.the fact that IF the additive associative axiom is true, THEN 2 + 2 = 4.
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