Sorry about the delay, but I wanted to be more specific this time.
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I’d said:
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I call myself a Theist because, in a meaningful sense, in comparison to Atheists, I have a lot more in common with some Theists who talk about God, even if some (but not all) of them use “exist” differently from how I do.
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You replied:
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So what do you have in common then?
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The feeling that’s behind the allegory.
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(…a feeling felt by some, but not all Theists)
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But of course I don’t deny that there are plenty of Theists, of the door-to-door aggressive, abusive, arrogant variety, whose only feeling is their feeling of dogmatic superiority. We’re all familiar with them, and have encountered their rudeness. I have nothing in common with them.
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Call it “cherry-picking”, but it’s
some, but not all, Theists that I have something in common with.
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Many or most, but not all, Atheists are Materialists, and believe that science covers, describes, and applies to, all of Reality. In contrast, I claim that the workings of the physical world isn’t all of what’s discussable, describable and arguable, much less all of Reality. Metaphysics is about what else is discussable and arguable, regarding what is.
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I know I’ve already said this, but I don’t think that physics and metaphysics cover all of Reality, because not all of Reality is explainable, describable, discussable, definable, arguable or provable.
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As I mean that word, Theism is a type of felt conclusion, attitude, feeling, impression or belief about that non-describable aspect of Reality. But, regarding what isn’t arguable or provable, “belief “ can be a misleading word.
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It isn’t possible to be clearer about what I mean without more detail. Somewhere in this posting, I’ll be more specific. I’ve looked for that Hegel thread that I spoke of, but haven’t re-found it yet, so I don’t know exactly how much I said there, and so I might repeat some of it here.
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…but whilst it has given me a clearer understanding of your beliefs, it has not explained why you think they're closer to biblical-literalists than atheists.
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Not
all Biblical-Literalists. It depends on their attitude. But, regarding some of them, their anthropomorphic allegorical beliefs don’t seem so important, compared to their feeling about indescribable Reality.
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It seems a bizarre, and incredibly arbitrary use of the word 'theist' to say that the common feature is that you all use the word 'God' to define the non-material force/entity/experience of widely differing properties.
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It isn’t the use of the word “God” that gives them something in common with me. The aggressive Theists that I mentioned above use that word too, as do many scientists and science-writers discussing things in physics (as you mentioned).
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It’s just that what’s said by some Theists, even allegory-believing ones, about their impressions, sounds familiar, rings true.
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Scientists could just as easily have decided that the Higgs-Boson was what they call 'God' (in fact I think it was even called the god particle for a while), making all scientists theists as well.
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Sure, now I agree that we should call them that when they say that. Should the word “Theist” be interpreted broadly enough to include the scientists and science-writers who want to apply the word “God” to something in physics? Why not? If the rude, abusive and arrogant door-to-door Biblical-Literalist promoters are called Theists, when why not the science-writers too? I’d be agreeable to that.
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…though neither are what I really consider Theists.
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Definitions are a MF.
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I'm unaware of any other proper noun where normal use is for the speaker to simply apply it to whatever they wish to fall into that definition, rather than have it define some collection of things already found in human discourse.
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A widely used and misused word. To me, the valid use of the word God, is its use by what might be called Philosophical (or non-allegorical/non-anthropmorphic)Theists (…though the word “God” is much used by Atheist philosophers too.). …even though I don’t usually use that word, because it seems to still have some anthropomorphic implication.
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We don't decide whatever we think falls into the category 'tree' and get to talk with others expecting that definition to mean something to them. 'God' is already a word that defines certain propositions, it's quite a wide definition, and certainly takes in some non-material aspects, as well as the very anthropomorphic version, but that doesn't mean we can just apply the word to any metaphysical proposition and expect to be understood.
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Of course, which is why I don’t use that word, except when replying to, referring to, or quoting people who use it.
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You said
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"No, you’re talking about physics. Of course it’s widely-agreed that there’s a lot of unknown physics. That doesn’t make you a Theist. Physics has nothing to do with Theism, by anyone’s definition.".
So how come you're able to apply the word 'god' to whatever metaphysical (or meta-metaphysical, if you like) position you see fit
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I don’t. Though I call myself a Theist, I don’t usually use the word God.
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…though I realize that “Theist” is derived from a word for God. I feel that there’s validly something behind what some people mean when they refer to God.
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It’s true that I’m using “Theist” in a way different from how it’s usually meant. But I’m using it for what I feel is what’s valid behind what’s usually called “Theism”. To me, Theism isn’t the dogmas and allegories.
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I and others like me don’t promote or proselytize, and so the only “Theism” that is well-known is that of the preachy allegory-promoters. …and so they get to define the words.
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, but say with absolute certainty that I can't apply it to unknown forces in physics?
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I shouldn’t say that.
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Well, it would have a different meaning, but sure, why not? It already has overbroad meaning. As I mentioned, I wouldn’t object to scientists and science-writers being called “Theists”, when they use the word “God” to refer to something in physics—as they sometimes do. Maybe then they’d be more careful about their language. The word “Theist” is already used so broadly as to lose its meaning, so why not broaden it further, in co-operation with people whose language calls for it?
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So yes, the usage and definitions of “Theist” are mutually contradictory and not very useful, no doubt about it. I use “Theist” to refer to someone who expresses certain impressions or feelings about Reality beyond physics and metaphysics. But that’s just my usage.
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What aspect of the definition of 'god' are you invoking to make such claims?
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I don’t usually use that word, and I don’t have an exact definition, but, to me, a valid meaning for God would refer to the subject of a certain kind of impression or feeling that some people express about Reality beyond physics and metaphysics. …an impression of gratitude for the Good-ness of what-is. … an impression of Good as the basis of what-is.
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(As regards the latter, someone here quoted a well-known Greek philosopher, maybe Aristotle or Plato, as expressing that. I’ve heard that from a modern philosopher too, but I don’t remember his name.)
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…though, as I said, I don’t usually use the word God, because I feel that it has some anthropomorphic implication.
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This whole thread is about dishonest philosophy and I find this kind of language game to be an example of this. As you said, quite rightly, it's all too easy for disagreements to arise simply out of poor definition of terms - 'god', 'belief', 'theist', but the way to avoid that is not only to define your terms first, it is to make some attempt to stick to previously agreed definitions, to not deliberately stray too far from the fuzzy boundaries that previous language use has defined for a word.
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I don’t intend any dishonesty. Admittedly I use “Theist” with a definition of my own, but only because I feel that it better expresses Theism’s valid element. It’s as if people were calling walnut-shells “walnut”, and dictionaries had begun to define “walnut” as walnut-shells, and all the discussion about walnuts were about the merits of eating walnut-shells.
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There are times when we disagree with the dictionary and standard usage.
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Anyway, “God” and “Theism” are already used super-broadly.
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Well, when I describe my Theism, I try to avoid controversial or contradictorily-used terms.
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(…other than the word “Theism” itself—It’s just that sometimes it’s necessary to choose between named categories, so you try to choose the closest one.)
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As I was saying, I don’t know how much I said at the “Hegel’s religious writings” thread, and so I might repeat some of it here.
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I’ve posted about my metaphysics in many thread-discussions, where metaphysical questions came up. Let me paste here my reply to someone’s objection to my metaphysics, in which I spoke of (my impression about) its meta-metaphysical implications.
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I’m not saying that metaphysics is necessarily the only thing that leads to the good conclusion. And maybe the conclusion that I describe is already known to you.
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Anyway, this pasted post is from the currently-active “What is Nothing?” thread:
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Here’s the post with the objections and reply:
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I’d said:
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that end [the sleep at the end of lives] is arguably the more normal and natural state of affairs for us, in comparison to our temporary life in the world of time and events.
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You replied:
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But how can it be more "natural" for us when we are not, or are no longer? I mean, death is when we cease being the entities that we are. We cease being an entity altogether. We are no longer.
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No, I haven’t been talking about that time. The time when you’ve completely shut-down won’t be experienced by you. For you, there’s no such time. The time when you’re gone will be experienced only by your survivors.
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You’ll never experience a time without experience.
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I was referring to the sleep at the end of lives (or at the end of this life if you don’t believe in reincarnation).
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What makes the sleep at the end of lives more natural and normal, is the fact that it’s your final outcome, your final state of affairs, and is timeless.
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You continued:
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And "Natural" surely only applies to living entities that are. Entities that are not, are no longer part of the natural world. Therefore death cannot be "more natural" for us since in death we are not entities.
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See above.
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Moreover, sleep is only ever something we do, or something that happens to us, when we are.
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…and I was talking about sleep, when we still are.
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Of course, it’s a time when we’re approaching Nothing. But we won’t know that, because, as I said, by then we won’t know that there ever were, or could be, such things as worldly life, body, identity, time or events. The impending gradual end will be quite meaningless and irrelevant, because we won’t know or care about it.
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So I think it is misleading to use it as a metaphor for death. It could lead to unclarity.
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I hope that, above in this post, I’ve clarified what I meant.
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I’d said:
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But can you show that a person’s world and its events aren’t hypothetical?
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You replied:
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Sorry I think you have the burden of proof here, not me.
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I think not. I’ve told why.
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If, as I’ve discussed, our experience is consistent with a hypothetical system of if-thens, and if you could interpret it either way, then which interpretation requires the assumption of a brute-fact?
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Here’s what I said about that:
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“Among the infinitely-many complex systems of inter-referring abstract if-then facts about hypotheticals, there inevitably must be one whose events and relations are those of your experience.
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“There’s no reason to believe that your experience is other than that.
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“You’re in a life because you’re the hypothetical protagonist of one of the infinitely-many hypothetical life-experience possibility-stories. …complex systems of inter-referring inevitable abstract facts about hypotheticals.
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“I can’t prove that the concretely, objectively, fundamentally existent physical world of Materialism doesn’t superfluously exist, as an unverifiable, unfalsifiable brute-fact, alongside of, and duplicating the events and relations of, that system of inter-referring if-thens referred to above.”
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It’s customarily agreed that brute-facts, unnecessary assumptions, and unverifiable unfalsifiable propositions are suspect."
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You said:
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The reason is that it is highly implausible that we experience life hypothetically and/or factually. Myself, and the people within my shared culture, experience the world in terms of familiarity and significance.
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Of course. I didn’t mean to denigrate or deny suchness, presence, direct experience, etc.
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You find out about the logical, factual matters when you check for them. …and, when you do, you’ll find that your experience is self-consistent. But I’m not implying that you spend all your time with logic, facts, etc.
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I often emphasize that metaphysics is to experience and Reality, as a book on how a car-engine works is to actually taking a ride in the countryside.
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Logic, and statements, descriptions or evaluations about facts, aren’t, and don’t describe, experience and Reality.
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Logic, physics and metaphysics don’t cover, describe, or govern Reality.
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But, though it isn’t all of Reality, and isn’t all of your experience, metaphysics is my topic here.
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The fact that metaphysics isn’t everything doesn’t mean that we can’t or shouldn’t talk about it. I find it of interest.
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Metaphysics is the limit of what can be discussed and described.
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You said:
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When I'm running for the train, for example, I do not think of a hypothetical or a fact. To do so I would first need to abstract from and reflect on the situation. There is never an experience like this. Instead I am completely caught up in the situation and this is grounded in my familiarity with catching trains. I know how to catch trains and know how to catch a train that I'm running late for. I am fully involved. I am the situation. In a sense there is no I, there is only the situation, when I am so fully involved.
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Of course. No argument there. See above.
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I’d said:
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Any fact about this physical world implies and corresponds to an if-then fact:
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“There’s a traffic roundabout at 34th & Vine.”
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If you go to 34th & Vine,
then you’ll encounter a traffic roundabout.”
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You reply:
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Again, this is not how we experience our world. Why? because the way you have expressed this, the roundabout is meaningless and abstracted from everyday experience. It has no significance. For example, someone who is lost and following directions does not go to 34th & Vine to encounter a roundabout, they go there only in order to get onto the road they need to get on to. It is significant to them for that reason. Or, someone who is familiar with the roundabout probably more readily experiences the frustrations of driving in traffic with idiots, or thinking about the discussion they had that morning with their partner, than their surroundings (including the roundabout) as such. Perhaps they are so utterly familiar with the roundabout and their drive to work that they don't even consciously notice it. This happens all the time for me in the flow of life. Notice that in this latter example the person went to 34th & Vine but didn't encounter a roundabout. At least not in a consciously aware factual manner (present-at-hand in Heidegger speak), which is what I take you to mean here by "encounter".
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I have no disagreement with that. Sometimes you don’t experience the facts unless you’re looking for them. But, when you do, you’ll find facts that aren’t inconsistent with the other facts of your experience. That’s why your life is a possibility-story instead of an
impossibility-story.
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Philosophy, the topic of these forums, is about matters that are verbal, discussable, describable.
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But I emphatically agree that Reality isn’t about logic, metaphysics or physics.
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But explanations of the logical underpinnings and background of our lives are still of interest. …without any implication that they’re the complete explanation or background for Reality.
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Whether or not any of us like it, we still deal with facts, states of affairs, situations. Their verbal explanation and logical factual background can be of interest. As humans, we deal with logical factual matters whether we like it or not. It’s only a matter of
how we deal with it.
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We can worry unnecessarily or excessively, when we take the facts too literally, believing in the “concrete” fundamental objective existence of the physical world. Obviously we must deal with the physical world, and take care of ourselves in that world, but we also tend to worry too much, unproductively, unnecessarily.
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By the way, this protagonist that we are, of a life-experience possibility-story, is an animal, a purposely-responsive device designed by the events of natural-selection. Things can happen to us, and we all know that eventually something
will happen to each of us. But we aren’t here for things to happen to. We’re merely designed to respond to our surroundings optimally for the goals set by natural-selection. So, if we’re doing our best, then that’s all that matters. So a Chinese writer once pointed out that anything is nullified if we do what we can to deal with it.
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Subjectively, we do what we want, like or prefer. But, our choices and decisions aren’t really ours, or our problem, because (as one would expect for a purposefully-responsive device) those choices are determined for us by our wants, likes and preferences (inborn and acquired), and our surroundings,
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I suggest that what I said in the two above paragraphs is relevant when events, choices or decisions erroneously seem a problem.
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I’ve said this before, but let me say it again.
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By the metaphysics that I propose, what is discussable and describable is insubstantial and ethereal. Of course we do our best, and, whether we admit it or not, we enjoy our lives. But this temporary life is insubstantial, so of course we just enjoy it while it lasts, while doing our best. Hence the Hindu emphasis on life as primarily “Lila”, play.
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I suggest that this metaphysics implies an openness, looseness, and lightness. …in contrast to Materialism’s grim “objective” accounting.
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So no, I don’t mean to say that you always live in logic, facts, verbal description, etc. But, when you visit them, they aren’t as bad as you’ve been taught. In fact they’re pretty good.
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Metaphysics is a verbal discussion about what logically, factually is. What factually is, is pretty good.
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[end of pasted reply from other thread]
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So it’s the impression, of me, and some others, that what-is, is pretty good, and inspires gratitude.
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An impression that the whole overall metaphysical what-is, is very good—Is that different from an impression that Good is the character or basis of what-is?
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These are impressions, or the same impression. But if your subjective impression is that something is good, then isn’t there a real sense in which it
is good, as far as you’re concerned? So the distinction between impression and belief isn’t really so distinct.
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…because none of this has anything to do with convincing anyone else.
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And, if there’s an impression is that Good is the basis of what-is, then isn’t that really just another way of saying an impression that there’s good intent behind what-is?
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Michael Ossipoff