You are assuming that the probabilities of the six possibilities you identify are all equal.

What is your justification for that assumption?

If you need to give your eyes a rest, the Partially Examined Life has a discussion of Fromm on Love here. That link is Part 1 (Part 2 is here). The linked page of Part 1 contains links to their discussions on Buber's 'Ich und du' and Plato's Symposium.

The evidence to which I was referring was evidence of AGW, not that it is a bad thing. If you can't see why it would be a bad thing, I suggest you ask somebody in Bangladesh or South Sudan.

Climate change skepticism is unwarranted. — Benkei

It's not skepticism. To be skeptical is to withhold belief when there is little or no evidence to support that belief, and is the approach of all good scientists (and, one might argue, all good philosophers).

What the climate change deniers are doing is almost the opposite of skepticism. They are refusing to accept the mountain of evidence that is before them. Sometimes they even start saying nonsense like 'where's the proof?', showing that they don't even understand the difference between science and algebra.

David Hume would be turning in his grave at the attempt of the FUD-merchants to appropriate the honourable term 'skeptic' (except that, being an acute student of human nature, he'd be more likely to just observe that it is no surprise that greed, extremist ideology and self-delusion led to a failure to act on an unfolding catastrophe). Let's not do their work for them by yielding the term skeptic.

Just because you alter your gaze from thorn to flower doesn't get rid of the thorns of a rose bush — TheMadFool

That's because one can still get pricked by a thorn despite the averted gaze, which is in turn because the thorns are not just an artefact of the visual perspective. I am suggesting that the paradox you think you see is an artefact of your object-based perspective, and hence - unlike a thorn - is powerless to harm or annoy somebody that uses a different perspective.

Kindly explain what exactly you mean by ''process''. — TheMadFool

A process is a subset of the four-dimensional spacetime manifold The ones we are interested in usually have additional criteria such as path-connectedness.

Isn't that a cop out? — TheMadFool

I don't understand what you mean by this question. Can you explain it?

In addition, if I understood you correctly, as per process metaphysics it is valid to say both ships A and B are referents of the sign ''the ship of Theseus". If this is the case what is the criteria/conditions that need to be followed/met for the conclusion that both ships A and B are "the ship of Theseus"? Can you clarify. Thanks — TheMadFool

I explained in the post to which you were referring that the criterion is that both instances be part of the process that we understand to be the ship of Theseus. If you are instead asking why that is my criterion, it is simply that - according to my empirical observations - that is the way people generally use language.

If you find this confusing, just think of the instance of yourself at noon yesterday, and the instance of yourself at noon today. They are two different locations on the same worldline/process, which is called <insert your name here>, so it is generally accepted practice to refer to either or both instances as <insert your name here>. Do you agree with that? If not, why not? If you do, then just replace the process that is your body by the process that is the ship of Theseus.

If I were to follow your line of reasoning then I'd have to say both ships A and B are referents of "the ship of Theseus? Do you accept this conclusion? If you do then you need two different sets of criteria. One leading to the conclusion that the ship of Theseus is A and another leading to the conclusion the ship of Theseus is B. Wouldn't this be fallacious - specifically the fallacy of equivocation - because we're defining the term ''the ship of Theseus'' in two different ways? — TheMadFool

As I said above, you need to think about this in the context of a process-based metaphysics. Your question is rooted in an object-based metaphysics, which is incompatible with it.

In the process view, the ship forms a process - similar to what physicists call a worldline. When we say that something is the ship of Theseus, we mean that it is a particular location on that worldline. Both 'ship A' and 'ship B' are locations on the same worldline, so it is valid in both cases to say that it is the ship of Theseus. They are not the same location, but that doesn't matter. What matters is that they are part of the same process. That's why I said that a process metaphysics prevents the sort of paradoxes that can arise in trying to analyse this within an object-based metaphysics.

You seem to be saying that the ratio of old planks to new planks is relevant (

not missing say more than 1% of its components...
). But this relevance is tied to the notion of speed (time) of construction/destruction which you agreed is irrelevant. — The Mad Fool

No, it is not tied to that. The requirement is that only one plank be replaced at a time. Those replacements could happen at the rate of one per nanosecond, or one per century. The speed is irrelevant. Just think about playing a video of that process in fast or slow motion. No matter what speed you play it at, it will never look the same as one in which the ship is exploded by a bomb and rebuilt from scratch.

When I say that 'time is not the important element', I mean the time it takes for the change process to be completed. We can't disregard the time dimension competely, because that would make it impossible to even refer to 'the ship afterwards' and 'the ship before'

It depends on what you mean by the change being done 'instantaneously'. Since such a thing is impossible, it is hard to imagine what you have in mind.

Consider instead a process involving millions of very skilled tiny workers who, working together, could replace every plank or other component so quickly that the entire replacement takes place within a millisecond. Then I think we can argue that the final product is the same ship, as long as only one plank at a time was replaced (say taking a picosecond per plank).

On the other hand if the ship were exploded by a bomb and another built in its place, with all new materials, I would say the new one is not the same ship, regardless of whether it took a millisecond or a year to build.

So maybe I'm agreeing with you that time is not the important element. It seems to me that what is important is that only one component at a time is replaced - so that the ship is not missing say more than 1% of its components at any instant.

My thinking on this is guided by a process metaphysics, a la Whitehead, which I find a very satisfying and paradox-free way of looking at things.

Yes, brackets solve the problem. They are more precise than commas, which is the usual tool. The downside of brackets is that people don't like them, complaining that they break up the flow. That's true, but if the flow leads you to the wrong place (conclusion), it needs breaking up. I often play around with different formulations of a sentence, to see if I can find an elegant way of writing it unambiguously, without having to resort to brackets.

A solution that is useful in formal communication is bullet points. They are a way of bracketing without using brackets. They are copiously used in good legal drafting. They also allow for multi-level nesting without losing the reader, which is what tends to happen with brackets.

I don't think 'do what thou wilt' comes anywhere near capturing the notion that harm is what matters. One example will suffice - unwanted pregnancy is a harm that frequently comes from applying 'do what thou wilt' to sex. The dictum implies thinking only of oneself, and only for what one immediately wants, with no regard for future consequences for the self or others.

my concern is that by force third parties are trying to shutdown the private platforms of others — VagabondSpectre

I would judge that on a case by case basis, according to how private the platform was, and the means of attempting the shutdown. If it is a private house, and the shutdown was effected by forming a barrier to entering the house and wrestling with, or striking, those that attempted to do so, I would consider that to be unacceptable. On the other hand if it were a lecture theatre and the protesters were massing around it shouting abuse or alternatively, forming a non-violent barrier in the Gandhi fashion, I would consider that acceptable.

there are more than a few recent examples of protest groups, some labeling themselves as antifa, using violence, force, and assault to disrupt and shut down the speaking events of some controversial speakers and groups. — VagabondSpectre

I would consider those examples unacceptable behaviour. They are also very bad tactics, because they whittle away public sympathy for the cause.

We should bear in mind though, that almost every social movement, however worthy, has suffered from people doing bad things in its name. That's the inevitable result of the facts that (1) there is an enormous range of variation in human behaviour and (2) most social movements are not centrally controlled.

Just remember the terrible trouble Gandhi had in trying to prevent his followers from becoming violent. In the end, he failed in that endeavour, because he was up against human nature. But that didn't make his cause - the liberation of India from colonial rule - any less worthy, nor does it detract from his many achievements (including the liberation of India).

It is a matter of great regret that some hotheads get violent when protesting against fascism, and that some rabble-rousers may even seek to orchestrate a violent confrontation, but the only implication that has for the fight against fascism in general is that it makes it more difficult by leaching away public support. I cringe and mourn every time I hear of violence at a rally in support of a cause I favour.

However, I find there is a problem when we start comparing it with other innate but unaccepted characteristics, such as pedophilia or psychopathy.

If we can say, that they have certain urges but can control it, then why not homosexuals? — NukeyFox

I don't think we do say that.

What we say about paedophiles and homicidal maniacs (not psychopaths, because psychopathy is about the absence of a constraint, not the presence of an urge) is that, because expression of those urges causes harm, people who are inflicted with those urges will be incarcerated if they are unable to suppress it. This is purely a matter of harm minimisation.

Expression of homosexual urges towards consenting adults does not of itself cause harm, any more than does the expression of heterosexual urges towards consenting adults. So we do not require those urges to be suppressed.

There is no inconsistency. Unless one's morality is based on some notion of taboo, it all revolves around the question of harm.

I agree that this is a worthwhile topic. I do wonder whether the example given is a good one though. The suggestion is that it advocates the curtailment of free speech, and violence against fascists. I don't see that in the quotes from Mark Bray. He describes three tactics:

1. pressure the venue owner to try and cancel [a fascist] event
2. Physically confronting [fascists]
3. pressuring ... employers [of fascists] to get [the fascists] fired

Of these, only item 2 could be seen as having anything to do with violence. But whether it actually does depends on the context. A non-violent demonstration, chanting slogans, is a physical confrontation, as is facing up to somebody and saying that you abhor their policies. If there is evidence of the 'antifa' movement systematically advocating violence against fascists, it needs to be brought out and discussed. I am not aware of such evidence. Rather, it is the fascists that advocate violence, as we saw in the Trump rallies where he encouraged attendees to beat up their detractors.

For free speech, only 3 is possibly relevant. Item 1 does not affect free speech because it is about removing a platform that somebody is using to broadcast toxic views. Free speech is about having no punishments for expressing views, not about providing a platform from which such views can be expressed.

Item 3 is potentially a worry, as it does imply a punishment on the employee for having expressed views. If that sort of thing is happening, I would be concerned about it. But again, context is critical. There was a case in Australia of a feminist commentator who influenced an employer to fire someone that made a vicious, public, violence-encouraging, sexist attack on her. But the key link is that the attack was made using a facebook account that publicly described the employee as an employee of that employer. Hence the employer was unwillingly associated with the attack and - IMHO - was reasonable to fire the person for bringing the employer into disrepute. The situation would have been utterly different if the employee's facebook account had made no clear connection with the employer. Indeed, the way the feminist exerted the influence was to ask the employer - 'Did you know that this person posted these comments [providing link], on an account in which he describes himself as your employee?'

Some concrete examples would very much help to determine whether there is actually any problem, or any inconsistency, in the movement against fascism.

I came up with an argument against extreme spiritualism, and would like your thought on the strength of it. Extreme spiritualism: the belief that the physical world does not exist, that all that exists is spiritual, and that the physical world is therefore all imagined. — Samuel Lacrampe

If we regard the physical world as the 'cause' of our phenomenal experiences, then the existence of the physical world - thus defined - is an assumption, based abductively (and hence partly subjectively) on our experiences. Immanuel Kant believed in a such a physical world, but argued that its constituents were imperceptible and unknowable - and also, one would imagine, unimaginable. He called them 'noumena'. He went to great lengths in his second version of the Critique of Pure Reason to argue that this did not make him an Idealist (which seems to correspond to what you are calling a 'Spiritualist'), although he would agree to being a 'Transcendental Idealist', a term he made up to describe his position.

I agree with Kant that he was not an Idealist (in the sense typically applied to George Berkeley, although Berkeley called himself an Immaterialist). He believed in the existence of a physical world. He just also believed that it was unknowable.

Even the question "how to live" is extremely complicated. We're all different, with distinct aspirations, so the answer of that question for you will be different from the answer of that question for me. Remember Plato's Republic, justice is claimed to be each person doing one's own thing, without interfering with the others. For me, to answer that question "how to live" requires an understanding of what it means "to live". For some though, perhaps you, as long as they're told the "how" part, they feel the question is answered. — Metaphysician Undercover

I certainly agree that different philosophies will suit different people, from which it follows that - perhaps unless internally inconsistent (and maybe not even then?!) - philosophies are not wrong or right.

The fundamental philosophical question, to which I referred above, is often expressed as 'How shall I live?', and I used that form above. But I think it is more accurate to use the more banal-sounding form 'What shall I do?' That 'do' includes not only bodily actions, but also speech acts, thoughts and spiritual practices. Expressed in that way, the verb 'to live' is not part of the question, and one does not need to dissect it in order to answer the question.

Nevertheless, it does seem to be the case that at least some of the most influential philosophies of life do come bundled with a metaphysics of what 'life' - or 'existence' means. I am thinking of Buddhism's metaphysical concepts of Maya and Sunyata, or Heidegger's inquiries into being. I note however that neither of those seem to draw significantly in a positive way from pre-existing philosophies. Rather they reject the prevalent philosophies of their day.

I wonder, did that rejection shape them? Would the proponents have come up with the same philosophy if they had not been spurred on by ideas they wanted to refute? It's a little like the question of whether Kant would have written CPR if he hadn't been goaded into it by wanting to try to refute Hume (his attempts to refute Hume - unsuccessful IMHO - are the least interesting part of CPR, and yet there is so much value in the work in other parts, that may never have been written if he had not been spurred into action by Hume).

Kant was not a philosopher of life. It's hard to get more academic and non-applied than Kant. Even his moral works are hopelessly inapplicable to real life. But I'm interested in this question of whether the value of some philosophies may be in goading others to attempt refutations, which may contain helpful elements.

To be a good philosopher requires one to read much philosophy. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well that brings us to one of the key fault-lines in consideration of philosophy - between those who believe that a necessary criterion for being a good philosopher is to be knowledgeable about most major philosophical streams, and those who believe instead that necessary criteria are having wisdom about how to live, and being able to communicate that wisdom effectively.

It's academic vs moral philosophy (or life philosophy), Kripke vs Comte Sponville. I am of the latter group of partisans - my favourite philosophers being people like the Dalai Lama, Mohandas Gandhi and the Buddha, with the only academic philosophers that really interest me being the ones that had useful and inspiring things to say about ethics. But I think there is as much hope of attaining agreement between the two sides as there is of obtaining agreement between Idealists and Materialists.

By your own criterion, I must assume that you believe this for emotional/aesthetic reasons, and thus it carries no probative force. — Arkady

Not at all. It is, as I've said, an observation - a casual opinion, no more emotionally charged than my observation-based opinion that all live animals with hearts also have kidneys. I would happily (nay, eagerly!) adjust either opinion based on new data.

Perhaps such a datum is available in relation to your statement that you consider panpsychism irrational, despite not seeing any obvious inconsistencies in it. Can you help me expand my horizons by explaining on what basis you consider it less rational than some alternative philosophy of consciousness?

But, by your own criterion, your philosophy of philosophy has no greater claim to truth than any other — Arkady

It was meant to be an observation of human nature rather than a philosophy, but I can see how it might have come across that way. Perhaps I should put it slightly more carefully as follows:

It seems to me that people choose philosophies, wittingly or unwittingly, mostly on aesthetic/emotional grounds.

I am certainly open to observations about other criteria people use to choose between philosophies. One thing I feel fairly confident about is that they do not do it on the grounds of which philosophy is most 'rational', because a philosophy is only irrational if it makes contradicting claims, and that sort of thing is likely to be noticed. Further, for any two philosophies that are not irrational in that sense, I can't see any way of supporting a claim that one is 'more rational' than the other.

Well Agustino, Darth did say they were just personal criticisms he had of Scholasticism. Emotional reasons are perfectly valid from that standpoint. He did not, at least on my reading of his text, adduce them as arguments that Scholasticism is mistaken.

For most philosophies it is not possible to prove them correct or incorrect. If it were there would be far fewer philosophies around - maybe only one. Choosing between them is done mostly on an aesthetic basis - ie emotionally-based.

I am interested in people that like Scholasticism, and why they like it. Personally I do not like it, for reasons not dissimilar to Darth's. But neither do I like card games and I am very interested in why some other people like them so much (and conversely, in order not to appear condescending to Bridge enthusiasts, many may wonder why I like patterns so much, and arranging things into them).

Bitter Crank - you are a true gem!

So, you mean, all of the huge debates about the philosophical implications of the uncertainty principle have been misconstrued? — Wayfarer

I would say those debates are about ontology and ontology is not about reality.

Well, the HUP has been experimentally confirmed — SophistiCat

We need to be careful here. I think it's safer to say that experimental evidence is consistent with what we would expect if the HUP holds. Maybe I'm getting too Popperian about this, but I wouldn't call that confirmation.

However, the 'reality' to which I refer, because I think that's what the OP had in mind, is the 'reality' of chairs and tables, dogs and cats - ie that which can be perceived without the aid of scientific instruments. I would class a reading from an instrument, of the kind that occurs in tests of the HUP, as part of the whole scientific edifice that the OP is considering. If we think of 'theory' as being on one side of the fence and 'reality' on the other, then it seems to me that a reading from the instrument is on the same side of the fence as the HUP - and distinct from 'reality'.

Certainly QM does affect reality - as the fact that we are using computers attests. But that is about macro impacts of QM. I'll go out on a limb and guess that any measurements that are fine enough to test the HUP will not be about macro impacts.

I haven't expressed this very well but it's late and I'm tired so sorry that's the best I have right now.

isn't it more likely that animal minds don't exist than that we won the lottery against all odds? — jdh

The probability that I won that lottery is 1, as it is for any lottery winner. Your 'we' is a human, and a human has - unless severely mentally impaired - almost certainly won the braininess lottery. But that's as surprising as the fact that Myrtle Krebspark of Lake Wobegon, Minnesota won the lottery, given that Myrtle Krebspark won the lottery.

I'm sorry; but, your whole post is an appeal to authority — Question

Appeals to authority are reasonable and sensible in the hard sciences, unlike in branches of metaphysics, particularly when the participants in the discussion in which the appeal is made have no significant expertise themselves. There is such a thing as an authority on thermodynamics and energy production. There is, I suggest, no such thing as an authority on most philosophical disciplines - logic excepted. What would an authority on ontology look like?

To what extent is Heisenberg's uncertainty principle anything more than simply the limitation of our capacity to model reality? — Agustino

I wouldn't put it that way, because the inaccuracy predicted by the HUP is much smaller than our ability to perceive. So HUP does not impinge on our reality.

I think Christ's response is one in light of Thomas having already met and seen Jesus. And there's also emphasis on Jesus' appearance changing from before to after resurrection. — Heister Eggcart

How do you get that reading out of the text? Here's the text in full:

24 But Thomas, one of the twelve, called Didymus, was not with them when Jesus came.
25 The other disciples therefore said unto him, We have seen the Lord. But he said unto them, Except I shall see in his hands the print of the nails, and put my finger into the print of the nails, and thrust my hand into his side, I will not believe.
26 And after eight days again his disciples were within, and Thomas with them: [then] came Jesus, the doors being shut, and stood in the midst, and said, Peace [be] unto you.
27 Then saith he to Thomas, Reach hither thy finger, and behold my hands; and reach hither thy hand, and thrust [it] into my side: and be not faithless, but believing.
28 And Thomas answered and said unto him, My Lord and my God.
29 Jesus saith unto him, Thomas, because thou hast seen me, thou hast believed: blessed [are] they that have not seen, and [yet] have believed. — Authorised (English) Version of the Bible, John 20:24-29

I can't see any mention of a changed appearance in there. The passage appears very straightforward. Thomas does not believe his friends' claims that they have seen Jesus (and note that it uses the word Jesus, not Christ). Then he meets him, and thereafter believes his friends' claims. Lastly we have verse 29 which the author(s) attribute to Jesus (again - Jesus, not Christ), which has no corroborative evidence in any other text and is most naturally explained as the author trying to influence readers to believe him (the author).

I suggest that if Christness and altered appearance are emphasised, that is done by later writers trying to retro-fit their preferred theology to a text that does not support it.

The ass should do what a person would do - if you can't decide, flip a coin and go with what that says.

There's nothing to be gained by rehashing the argument here. None of us are experts on the issues involved, whereas there is a great deal of expertise over at PF. In the light of that, the only reasonable thing for me to do is accept their opinion - not that my acceptance has any impact on public policy or commercial investment decisions one way or the other.

One key difference between physics and philosophy is that much greater certainty is possible in physics because of its empirical nature. Unlike in metaphysics, theories can be falsified. If somebody continually posts arguing for a falsified theory, one can have a high level of certainty that it is a waste of everybody else's time, clutters up the boards to no good effect, and wastes forum resources. So if somebody persists in doing that sort of thing despite warnings they are banned.

The world is full of people with ideas for perpetual motion machines, cheap abundant energy, and purported falsifications of excruciatingly tested mathematical and physical theorems. Policy is to close such threads down and, if the poster persists, to ban them. If they didn't, the real valuable insights would just get lost in a sea of wannabe pretention. I like it that way. It's so much easier to learn, discuss and teach when the air isn't cluttered with nonsense.

I didn't read enough of your thread to see how far you went in your insistence that geothermal energy was an easy, viable source, but you were certainly treading on dangerous territory as soon as you started to reject the detailed, factual reasons you were given for why it would not work.

Have no fear though Question. That sort of a moderating approach would not work in a philosophy forum, where everything is up for grabs and proofs are restricted to a very small subset called logic. And I like it that way here too.

It's horses for courses.

But in relation to the story with Thomas, the difference between Jesus and Christ is pretty huge. — Heister Eggcart

Well let's accept for the sake of furthering the discussion, that Jesus being also the Messiah is tremendously significant and that Jesus saw it as essential that Thomas understand that.

You said

So, in my estimation, Jesus the Christ was not mocking Thomas, or giving disdain, but clarifying ...... Henceforth, Thomas is thus an Apostle of Christ, not merely Jesus. — Heister Eggcart

Let's look at that clarification - as attributed to Jesus by the author(s) of John:

"You believe because you have seen me. Blessed are those who believe without seeing me"

How does that clarify anything about Jesus's Messianicity? It doesn't even mention it.

Here's what a clarification would look like:

I'm very glad Thomas that you've now had this opportunity to learn that I have risen from the dead. Now there's one more thing that it's very important for you to know. That is that I am the Messiah [add various phrases about also being God and/or Son of God, according to one's preferred theology]. I would like you to go out and tell others about this. — risen Jesus Christ

Even the most contorted exegesis cannot turn the phrase in the text into something that means that. We must bear in mind that we are talking about someone that has divine powers, not some inarticulate savage, and hence they would be able to express themselves in the clearest fashion possible, so that no possible doubt could remain as to what they meant.

Jesus does not "complain", Christ does — Heister Eggcart

Are they not the same person? My understanding is that 'Christ' is a name essentially meaning 'Messiah' that was applied to the historical Jesus some time after his death, and it is used mostly to refer to Jesus in relation to his post-resurrection activities. Use of the term also emphasises the belief of the speaker in the divinity, or at least the Messianicity, of Jesus. But they must be the same person because if post-resurrection Jesus is not Christ then Jesus was not resurrected - he was replaced. Hence either they both complain or neither does.

Perhaps you can explain it to me then, because I can't see an answer in there.

How do you interpret that in the context of Paul's experience on the road to Damascus — andrewk

Sorry, my first mistake of the day (and it's only 815am). That should be 'Saul's experience....'. He didn't change his name to Paul until after the experience.

Fascinating article Wayfarer. I feel my inner Gnostic rising up.

It says that Blessed are those who believe without seeing me. — Agustino

How do you interpret that in the context of Paul's experience on the road to Damascus, or indeed any other non-corporeal experience? I would call that 'seeing' Jesus because I think the 'see' in the John passage means 'perceive' and is not strictly limited to the visual sense.

If we include that and other non-visual spiritual encounters as 'seeing' then to believe without seeing simply means being gullible, and believing whichever proselyte, from whichever religion, just knocked on our door, doesn't it?

He's trying to distinguish between himself as Jesus and himself as Christ. — Heister Eggcart

Why do you think that? To me the story has always been very simple and has nothing to do with personal identity. It is simply that Thomas does not believe that Jesus's life has continued beyond the crucifixion, until he meets the risen Jesus, and Jesus complains about that.

First note that
A: this statement is false
B: this statement is neither true nor false

For A the truth-value is indeterminate and we end up concluding B. — TheMadFool

How do you reach that conclusion? It doesn't look reachable to me.

IIRC we can conclude C: 'Statement A is neither true nor false', but that's very different from B. C refers to A, which B does not, and C is not self-referential.

If I can't distinguish the difference between A and B, then it can be inferred that A and B are the equivalent. — TheMadFool

It can't be inferred, but it can be stipulated, ie: defined to the case. You are free to adopt that definition of 'equivalent' if you wish. Is it a useful definition though? Where does it get you that you couldn't get to otherwise?