No, you weren't just let go, your mother supported you. So you have not had the experience you speculate upon. So who has? :chin: — Pattern-chaser

I'm not specifically talking about "me" here. I was generalizing for other people who might have experienced something similar or the same.

But you introduced the topic by asserting that experience...? — Pattern-chaser

Specifically on my end of the spectrum, then from my father, yes.

Then it isn't your experience. Whose experience is it? — Pattern-chaser

Hypothetically speaking, anyone.

That isn't mandatory. Is it your experience? — Pattern-chaser

From my father's side, yes. My mother has been supremely supportive of me.

[...] the first reference by A in a conversation between A and B is successful if B interprets it as referring to the same individual that A intended to refer to. — andrewk

This is interesting. What do you think about it @Banno.

Sounds something like the Gettier problem. Theories of ambiguity also arise from the above.

That is not retribution, as it cannot harm the culprit who is already dead. Rather it is deterrence against potential future suicide bombers. — andrewk

I don't know. I feel like it's the same thing. Just that the scope is broadened in this case.

That was something beautiful.

What kind of society do you live in? I request the hemlock now. It is the fiduciary duty to God, our nation, and the people to ensure that people don't go about stealing for food in our prosperous land.

This is unjust.

I object! It's not fair to blame me for something I had no control over. I'm just another statistic ending up in jail due to the negligence of our leaders to look after us and OUR welfare.

I'm outraged. It's wrong!

deterrence — andrewk

Isn't deterrence grouped together with retribution in law. Or at least that's how it appears in practice? I mean if you boil it down, then they appear to be indistinguishable from another...

I don't see free will as necessary for culpability. — Terrapin Station

Why not? If I claim that I had no free will, then that's that. I'm no longer culpable.

So, Mr. Wallows, I am judge Crank and I demand that you provide this court with evidence in support of your claim that deterministic factors overrode your free will. — Bitter Crank

Science says.

Did you seek assistance from the county welfare office, Mr. Wallows? — Bitter Crank

There is no welfare. It's every man for himself. So says Darwin!

In your arrest statement you stated that you had taken a college class in the summer. Did circumstances force you to register for the class and study, or did you freely choose to take the class -- in Philosophy, I believe. Poverty doesn't normally drive people into philosophy classes. — Bitter Crank

Philosophy made me cynical. I digress.

Mr. Wallows, you can't have it both ways: Either you are unable to make any decisions on your own, and thus should be deemed a permanent ward of the state, or you are merely a criminal and are responsible for what you do. Which category do you think we should put you into? — Bitter Crank

No hemlock?

So, take the following from SEP:

"On the standard semantics for quantification, the interpretation of (3*) requires that we be able to say when an individual satisfies the open sentence ‘Ralph believes that x is a spy’. This is because the standard semantics for quantification is objectual: A quantified sentence ∃xΦx is true just in case there is an object that Φx is true of. "

What do you think about this?

I still maintain that counterfactuals are strictly de dicto and cannot be de re.

Somewhat helpful in case anyone is interested:

Anyway, how do you evaluate a propositional attitude that is de re, contra a descriptive proposition like de dicto?

Why are you putting "de re" after "in his mind" and "de dicto" after "in fact"? — Terrapin Station

Sorry, I meant to imply that de re is a phenomenological report or propositional attitude dependent on subjectivity. Whereas a de dicto is descriptive, objective, and impersonal.

"Someone is a spy" in the de re sense, so that Ralph says it with his neighbor in mind, etc.

Well, it turns out that his neighbor isn't a spy. Which means that it was a counterfactual. Was it not a de re proposition? — Terrapin Station

Let's complicate matters and say that Ralph is a schizophrenic. In his mind (de re) he is right. In fact (de facto), he is wrong (de dicto). How can this be?

"The lottery" refers to an actual situation though — Terrapin Station

Yeah, again "the actual situation", can be interchangeable with "the actual world". Counterfactuals are existentially dependent on the actual world for their counter-factuality. Hence, they are purely descriptive or de dicto and not de re.

I hope you win!

It's interesting to note, that de dicto assertions don't have sense; but only reference if we are to evaluate the validity of any de dicto claim. Whereas de re assertions is almost exclusively about sense.

True or false?

The de re sense is predicating something of a particular in the real world that Ralph is familiar with--namely, Ralph's neighbor, whom he believes is a spy. He believes that his neighbor has particular properties that make him a spy. — Terrapin Station

There it is, "in the real world" to quote from you. De re just doesn't obtain without placing one's self into the actual situation, and that simply can't be done wrt. to counterfactuals because they are inherent de dicto assertions.

I had something like this in mind:
==========
I played the lottery. (Framing condition)

I didn't win the lottery. (Fact)

I won the lottery in a possible world. (Counterfactual, de dicto) (de re doesn't obtain)
==========
Thoughts?

Say that there's a false belief that A.Conan Doyle based Sherlock Holmes closely on some particular, real detective. — Terrapin Station

Is that a counterfactual?

Thanks that makes better sense.

As a separate question in regards to counterfactuals... Do you think we can only speak about counterfactuals de dicto and no de re?

Here is the wiki entry on it in regards to thought:

There are two possible interpretations of the sentence "Peter believes someone is out to get him". On one interpretation, 'someone' is unspecific and Peter suffers a general paranoia; he believes that it is true that a person is out to get him, but does not necessarily have any beliefs about who this person may be. What Peter believes is that the predicate 'is out to get Peter' is satisfied. This is the de dicto interpretation.

On the de re interpretation, 'someone' is specific, picking out some particular individual. There is some person Peter has in mind, and Peter believes that person is out to get him.

In the context of thought, the distinction helps us explain how people can hold seemingly self-contradictory beliefs.[4] Say Lois Lane believes Clark Kent is weaker than Superman. Since Clark Kent is Superman, taken de re, Lois's belief is untenable; the names 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' pick out an individual in the world, and a person (or super-person) cannot be stronger than himself. Understood de dicto, however, this may be a perfectly reasonable belief, since Lois is not aware that Clark and Superman are one and the same.

I don't think it means either of those things. — Andrew4Handel

Well, those are just examples to illustrate the de re and de dicto distinction. Maybe you have a better example in mind? I can't think up any.

I'm probably not the only one confused about this. — Terrapin Station

Sorry. I think I read in too deeply into the SEP entry.

What is the "truth/validity of epistemic content" distinction you're making, and what is it supposed to have to do with the de re/de dicto distinction? — Terrapin Station

I don't think I'll elaborate on nonsense. Sorry again.

That's defined in the article you took the bulk of your post from. — Terrapin Station

It's not clear to me. Care to take a shot at it? I'm not sure what the answer may be.

Is it that you don't entirely understand the distinction they're making? (I kind of understand it "in theory," but re the examples given, it becomes less clear to me, which is a weird dichotomy.) — Terrapin Station

Ok, I'm all ears.

Perhaps I should mention in all this that I am on disability. I never cared about money and live on what subsistence from the government provides. I feel like an outsider to society, which doesn't bother me; but is a nuisance to ones collective consciousness.

I have a job prospect lined up to move out to Nevada and work for a friend; but I can't find the motivation to do so. Since I don't care about money, that compounds the persistent apathy.

I don't really feel afraid of death and sometimes wish it would already arrive. I doubt I would ever actively hasen its arrival as I don't want to be the source of grief for someone I care about dearly (my mother).

Oh well, there's my story anyway.

Any thoughts?

What do you mean?

Yeah, there's a fine line between sanity and insanity. Most people who know they have an illness ( it can be even a common cold ) take precautions to ensure their sanity. I find in my case I used to and still do to some extent, obsess over my illness. But, after a while you learn to cope with it in various ways.

I don't know what to say about mental retardation and mental illness. It can be a little ambiguous between the two at times, depending on your me talk state.

I’ve been told that someone as logical and seemingly intelligent as me (not that I claim to be either) couldn’t possibly be mentally ill. — Noah Te Stroete

Depends. On average I'm pretty normal. Nobody is psychotic 24/7 all year round. If you think that some people are like that then you may have seen too many Batman movies with Heath Leger playing the Joker, in it.

I don’t have a cognitive disability, nor have I been diagnosed as mentally retarded. Do you find that people often confuse mental illness for cognitive disability? — Noah Te Stroete

I don't know. What's the difference between a cognitive disability and a mental illness. Both can be classified as disabilities...

If I understand the distinction correctly, the change in scope of existential quantification is dictated by which perspective we assume. Does that sound correct?

In regards to counterfactuals, which have been occupying my mind... Those are strictly de dicto propositions dependent on the actual world. Nothing can be said about them de re.

What are your thoughts about quantification across possible world's if I may also ask.

Yes, I'm really into quantified modal logic as of late, thanks to you.

What's your interpretation of the Barcan Formula? Actualist or possibilist?

Epistemically, we cannot know of any contingent necessary conditions of any other possible world apart from framing the issue wrt. to the actual world.

Yet, metaphysically you could do so.

Why the discrepancy?

@andrewk, what do you think about all this?

That takes in a lot of ground. It leaves only im-possible worlds outside the actual world. — tim wood

Well, there can exist an infinite amount of possible worlds, just originating from this one. But, I think the word "real" needs to be dropped into the discussion here. What is a "real" world? One where our set of circumstances have dictated its evolution?

Perhaps. When is a definition ever not stipulative. — tim wood

I don't know. That seems to be my main question here.

For TPF, I'd welcome a requirement that all the significant terms of an OP either have their definitions provided or stipulated. That alone would shut down a lot of so-called God posts and reduce other nonsense by about 78%. — tim wood

Here's what I said a while ago. I still think it would be good to implement:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/4310/on-stipulative-definitions

Question: Are not all worlds accessible to the actual world part of, or in or attached to, the actual world? If yes, then "possible" worlds are actually impossible worlds. If no, then the implication is denied. Yes? — tim wood

Yes, but, I don't see how a possible world can be determined as impossible? It merely states that the state of affairs of a possible world is always going to be dependent on our own. Counterfactuals can only exist wrt. to events in the actual world and cannot be quantified beyond that. This is what actualism in philosophy asserts to the best of my knowledge.