Is the OP asking only for exegesis on the early Witti? Because his treatment of ostension became quite different, and pivotal, as he grew up. — Banno

Yes, that is of interest to me. If you care to elaborate I would appreciate that.

Can you explain what it is you think Wittgenstein thinks is only names? — Banno

I think everything with an ostensive definition. Are there things without ostensive definitions? Yes, but nominalism applies to them also in terms of reducing their abstractness. I'd imagine that would be something Witty would agree with.

Edit: Although, I have read some more about the mystic Wittgenstein. He seemed to assume that there are facts and things that have a property of abstractness that cannot be found in the world. Namely, ethics, aesthetics, and the similar; but, this seems to talk about epiphenomena and not phenomena per se. Emergent properties of a system are thus mystical, at least that's my take from reading Wittgenstein.

To understand the Tractatus is to transcend the text, to see the whole picture. — Banno

I strongly doubt that even the early Wittgenstein thought there was one whole entire picture of the universe or reality. Again, each and every picture is subject dependent.

A quote in support of what I have mentioned in my previous two posts could be;

If a lion could speak, we could not understand him. (PI, p.223)

I would call this sort of subject based nominalism as a sort of psychological nominalism which Wittgenstein greatly elaborates in the Investigations. E.g family resemblances, language games, the beetle in a box, meaning as use.

Would that we could avoid "...isms"; it's not clear what sort of nominalism Q. meant.

I don't think that Q's conclusion follows. As I mentioned before, Wittgenstein is setting out that the primary metaphysical consideration is not things, but predications to things. Now predicates include relations between things. It's not obvious that this is a rejection of holism.

Indeed it is arguable that the conclusion of the Tractatus is holistic. — Banno

What makes you say that the conclusion in the Tractatus is holistic?

The nominalism in the Tractatus seems to be with the subject who observes the world, not objects themselves per se, which I incorrectly stated in the OP...

A la, the picture theory and the resulting picture one perceives is entirely dependant on the observer's relation to the object's of interest.

But the claim is that the fact that the tree fell is a fact that depends on there being a witness. So the antecedent in your statement ("if a tree falls in a forest and nobody is there to witness it") can never obtain. That this antecedent entails the consequent is irrelevant. — Michael

Ok, I understand. Thanks for clarifying.

The question is "can a tree fall in a forest without witnesses?", not "if a tree falls in a forest without witnesses, does it fall?" The latter is just a logical matter, not a factual matter. — Michael

I tend to think that there can be no facts without deduction of some sort. This is independent of proper names and direct referants/rigid designators.

So, if you ask me, any observer-independent claim is a form of deduction based on facts about the world, in this case, the tree falling.

The question is whether or not the antecedent can obtain ("a tree falls in a forest and nobody is there to witness it"), not whether or not the antecedent entails the consequent. — Michael

Can you expand on that? I don't think I entirely see your position.

Actually, I did in my first post, and you just confirmed I was right by showing that another English phrase ("it has fallen") could represent the action, meaning "it fell" doesn't succeed in fully representing it. And there are thousands more such phrases in English that could partially represent the action but fail to fully represent it as my first post and your last posts have just shown. — Thanatos Sand

Well, if your purpose here is to prove that you're 'right', then you're in the wrong forum.

You have no ground to say that 'it fell' doesn't succeed in fully representing the fact that the tree has fallen. Besides, what does it even mean to say that something has been 'fully represented'? As if there were some measure or standard one could apply to the fact that it fell. No true Scotsman fallacy?

I mean, even if we assume that every object is a sort of noumena, then again nothing can be really said that would fully encapsulate the properties and characteristics of an object in discussion.

Then you should be silent as you've shown a clear incapability of discussing the matter. And if you think observation fully elucidates representation, you should remain silent on those matters, too. — Thanatos Sand

Yeah, but you haven't demonstrated that the representation of a tree falling by, 'it fell' or 'it has fallen', as incomplete. If it is, then you can always say more about the manner in which it fell.

the physical reality that the phrase "it falls" does not fully capture the physical dynamics of the tree falling. — Thanatos Sand

The last line of the Tractatus is: “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.”

If the issue is with representing the fact that the tree fell linguistically, then its representation will be fully elucidated by the observation that it fell.

No, that's not semantics; it's linguistic reality. I'm sorry you can't get that. — Thanatos Sand

Then,

It's also physical reality since "it falls" doesn't come close to even representing the action that occurs. — Thanatos Sand

How is something a linguistic reality and then becomes a physical reality? If we assume that linguistic reality accurately depicts physical reality (for which there are no grounds to even doubt that fact), then there's nothing more that can be said about the tree falling.

The tree physically moves in that way "it falls" aims to represent, but the action itself is not fully represented by the phrase "it falls;" "it falls" only fully represents the symbols of the English language working to point to other symbols in the English language to best represent the action of the tree. — Thanatos Sand

Semantics. It falls just means that it falls. What else can be said?

Drop the double standards, please.

So, in my opinion, and in cohort with the pragmatists, it seems that facts are the physical laws and mathematical truths that govern the world at play.

Again, if a tree falls in a forest and nobody is there to witness it, it still falls.

Glad that you brought up modalities. Not that it explains what a fact is, but rather enhances its ontological footprint.

That seems to me like you didn't write what you wanted to write there. If you believe that if nobody is around to hear a tree fall, it still falls regardless of our observation, then it wouldn't be the case that you have a hard time seeing facts as observer-independent. So I'm not sure what you're saying there. — Terrapin Station

Yeah, but we've already presupposed that the tree falls. Get the paradox?

This makes absolutely no logical sense to me. Why couldn't one believe that universal, mutually dependent and holistic facts exist? I have no idea what you're thinking there implicationally. — Terrapin Station

The rationale is that there are elementary facts of which nothing can be said about in isolation. This is a hard form of nominalism. Now, here's the issue. We are presupposing that elementary facts exist in isolation, which can only be talked about in relation to other things.The elementary fact or logical atomic fact or object exists as a sort of noumena if you see where I'm getting at.

Yes, but the limits of my language are the limits of my world. Thus, solipsism?

So one might say that the proposition that grass is green is made true by the fact that grass is green. But then what is the difference between the fact that grass is green and the green grass? Are they the same thing? If so, and if the latter is a thing, then facts are things. Are they different? If so, can we deduce the observer-independence of the fact from the observer-independence of the thing (assuming, for the sake of argument, that green grass is observer-independent)? To answer the latter we must first determine how the fact that grass is green differs from the green grass. — Michael

This seems to be a matter of where does one derive meaning from? Is it the fact or the subject-object relation that we're really talking about here, following that we have talked about our subjective vision of the world and the object itself. It's sounding awfully Kantian at this point.

The world does not consist of individuals - cats , mats, and so on; but of cats on mats.

Facts, unlike individuals, have predicate content. — Banno

Yes, but Wittgenstein specifically uses the term 'logical atomic facts' or 'simples'. These seem to point towards a nominalism of some sort. But, then how can one talk about individual facts without bearing their properties and characteristics in mind? Not sure if the crux of the matter is clear?

What part don't you understand?

There is a scene in the movie Dr. Strange Love where he talks about how any country (I believe he is referring to one of the more powerful industrialized nations) can build a doomsday weapon ; which in the movie was supposedly a massive nuclear weapon filled with radioactive Cobalt which "supposedly" could render much of the earth unlivable for tens to hundreds of years.

Little did people know that this "doomsday weapon" in the movie was based an ACTUAL weapon being consider by the USSR at the time. It was never built because the primer at the time thought it was too crazy which is kind of funny since he was know for taking off his shoe and beating his desk with it to get attention while at the UN. — dclements

The doomsday weapon was proposed as a sort of reductio ad absurdum by Herman Kahn. Strategists never took the idea seriously.

Are you kidding? The nuclear weapons, instead of being amassed by just a few super powers, are now in many different hands. The great fear of annihilation which we had in the sixties and seventies has just been replaced by complacency, because it hasn't happened. — Metaphysician Undercover

This seems to be a common sentiment. I don't think any nation is amassing nuclear weapons and actively pointing them at other nations as per the cold war. Correct me if I'm wrong; but, nuclear deterrence is widely considered as a detrimental policy nowadays. If anything it seems to be a shortcut to bankrupting a nation.

I am, and thank you and others once again. Ill be sure to add you guys to my Paypal monthly billing account once I'm on disability.

Its just a matter of taste then. But since you run and own the place its your call. Having ads run the place just makes the place self sufficient and not reliant on the donation of the few esteemed members.

Ok, was just a passing thought from an impoverished pseudo philosopher who appreciates this forum.

Could we put up a small ad from Amazon? I really think its a matter of being pragmatic and have no issues with seeing one quality ad from now and then.

Anyone?

I think the issue isn't about brute facts as opposed to criteria we use to evaluate whether a fact is brute or not.

Mine is a neo-fascist emblem used in the Captain America comics books series.

Hail Hydra!

Ridged designators aren't a-modal?

Distinct from what object? The assigned value is what can be said about red that is distinct from the red sports car? Or is it what can be said about red that is distinct from every red item? — Banno

Yes, the second. I believe that what can be said about red is dependant on the red observed, it's intuitively obvious once you imagine the multitude of factors presenting 'red' to you, However, proper names are distinct in that the one's I have in mind entail direct referents and one's with family resemblance a.la Wittgenstein.

Being an observer you are modal independent.

Is it? That's not how, for example, Searle used the term. — Banno

How did he use the term?

Further, what is the assigned value of a property, as distinct from the property? — Banno

The assigned value of a property is everything that can be said about it, this is distinct from the object itself, e.g a black hole or a star.

Or are you saying that a brute fact is a property and an individual of which that property is true? — Banno

Whatever can be said about the object and compared with itself.

But if that is the case, how does a brute fact differ from a fact per se? — Banno

The truth value of brute facts are not subject to modalities and are not contingent unlike facts per se.

Is think were still assuming every physical law is computable?

A brute fact is the assigned value of a property and the property itself.

Yes, the function or property is real in its own state space.

Its usually called state space or formerly logical space. That by which I mean to say the ontology of any system is represented by its state space.

Would it be wrong to call a brute fact just a 'state of affairs'?

That's heavily dependant on the modality of the situation. Isn't it?