• the Moon
• perception of the Moon
• linguistic practices of Moon discussion

They're not the same, so shouldn't we keep them as such? — jorndoe

They all seem to be entangled in some way, which would be the basis of subjectivity and why each one of us view and label things in our own way but at the same time are able to reach consensus on some matters.

It's impossible to discuss the moon without discussing both our perception and the linguistic dynamics of our perceptions and representation of the moon. There may be an object preceding those things, but it's impossible for us to access that except through our perception and language, which are greatly linked. — Thanatos Sand

Let me try to misquote you for the occasion:

It's impossible to discuss jorndoe without discussing both Thanatos Sand's perception and the linguistic dynamics of Thanatos Sand's perceptions and representation of jorndoe. There may be a jorndoe preceding those things, but it's impossible for Thanatos Sand to access that except through Thanatos Sand's perception and language, which are greatly linked.

If anything significant differentiates fictions/fantasies/hallucinations/dreams (which do exist) and perception, then it must be the perceived (the Moon, jorndoe).
Hopefully you wouldn't (rudely) suggest that I'm not self-aware because you cannot experience my self-awareness? :)

I cannot discuss you without utilizing my perceptions of you. We both use the name jorndoe because we agreed to it.

If course, you can mediate or be aware of about yourself without me, but that is not a discussion.

It's impossible to discuss the moon without discussing both our perception and the linguistic dynamics of our perceptions and representation of the moon. There may be an object preceding those things, but it's impossible for us to access that except through our perception and language, which are greatly linked.
— Thanatos Sand

Let me try to misquote you for the occasion:

It's impossible to discuss jorndoe without discussing both Thanatos Sand's perception and the linguistic dynamics of Thanatos Sand's perceptions and representation of jorndoe. There may be a jorndoe preceding those things, but it's impossible for Thanatos Sand to access that except through Thanatos Sand's perception and language, which are greatly linked.

If anything significant differentiates fictions/fantasies/hallucinations/dreams (which do exist) and perception, then it must be the perceived (the Moon, jorndoe).
Hopefully you wouldn't (rudely) suggest that I'm not self-aware because you cannot experience my self-awareness? :)

You didn't just misquote me, you completely misrepresented what I said. And I never suggested what you said I did. Instead of "misquoting" and strawmanning me, try to address my actual post. That works much better for discussion.

I cannot discuss you without utilizing my perceptions of you. — Rich

Right. What other than perception would you suggest?

Can you explain what it is you think Wittgenstein thinks is only names? — Banno

I think everything with an ostensive definition. Are there things without ostensive definitions? Yes, but nominalism applies to them also in terms of reducing their abstractness. I'd imagine that would be something Witty would agree with.

Edit: Although, I have read some more about the mystic Wittgenstein. He seemed to assume that there are facts and things that have a property of abstractness that cannot be found in the world. Namely, ethics, aesthetics, and the similar; but, this seems to talk about epiphenomena and not phenomena per se. Emergent properties of a system are thus mystical, at least that's my take from reading Wittgenstein.

Although, I have read some more about the mystic Wittgenstein. He seemed to assume that there are facts and things that have a property of abstractness that cannot be found in the world. Namely, ethics, aesthetics, and the similar; but, this seems to talk about epiphenomena and not phenomena per se. — Question

It's because they're all discursive. They may arise from and deal with material realities, but the discourses have no immediate correspondents in material realities, only in discourses themselves. It's why Wittgenstein's Language Games work so well with analyzing and evaluating ethical and aesthetic discourses. It's also why Lyotard relied on them to argue why they're being forced to congeal into Meta-narratives is artificial.

It seems odd to suppose that ostensive definitions lead to nominalism.


"That thing over there is nothing but a name..."

Is the OP asking only for exegesis on the early Witti? Because his treatment of ostension became quite different, and pivotal, as he grew up.

Is the OP asking only for exegesis on the early Witti? Because his treatment of ostension became quite different, and pivotal, as he grew up. — Banno

Yes, that is of interest to me. If you care to elaborate I would appreciate that.

Sam26 would be a better guide.

Seems like we could discuss ...

• the Moon
• perception of the Moon
• linguistic practices of Moon discussion

They're not the same, so shouldn't we keep them as such? — jorndoe

Harry Potter and "Harry Potter" are not the same. A painting of an angel isn't a painting of paint. There's clearly a semantic or intentional difference between these things. But we can't then infer an ontological difference. That would be a non sequitur.

Within the narrative of the story, Harry Potter is a wizard. Within the "narrative" of the painting, the angel is a winged man. But from an outside analysis of the story and the painting, Harry Potter is a fictional character and the angel is a mixture of paint.

Idealists and other anti-realists take this approach to everyday life. Within the "narrative" of our ordinary experiences and descriptions, the things we see are separate entities, distinct from sense-data and language, but from an outside analysis of these things, they're not.

Arguments like yours against this are akin to saying that the angel isn't just a mixture of paint because there's a difference between a painting of an angel and a painting of paint. It conflates the in-narrative account of the painting with the outside analysis.

Realism, by its very account, can't argue itself to be the case simply by pushing semantics.

Sure. Think I said something similar to:

Realism, by its very account, can't argue itself to be the case simply by pushing semantics. — Michael

But what's to argue? If you do not understand that "the cat is on the mat" is about the relation between the cat and the mat, you haven't understood quite a bit. In restricting themselves only to "cat" and "mat" the antirealist is in danger of missing the rather vital bit; it's about cats and mats.

The rubber is not on the road; the gears are spinning but the clutch is on; idealists see the rabbit, but not the duck.

If you do not understand that "the cat is on the mat" is about the relation between the cat and the mat, you haven't understood quite a bit. In restricting themselves only to "cat" and "mat" the antirealist is in danger of missing the rather vital bit; it's about cats and mats. — Banno

What the statement is about isn't what matters. The Harry Potter story is about going to a school for wizards, and the painting is about an angel visiting Joseph. But we're not concerned with intentionality; we're concerned with ontology. Is the angel in the painting more than just a mixture of paint? Is the wizard in the story more than just a fictional character? Is the cat that I see more than just a collection of sense-data? Is the Standard Model more than just an instrumental tool?

Is the angel in the painting more than just a mixture of paint? Is the wizard in the story more than just a fictional character? Is the cat that I see more than just a collection of sense-data? Is the Standard Model more than just an instrumental tool? — Michael

Is the rabbit more than just a rabbit?

It depends on what one is doing.

I'd said:

Then explain why there is the metaphysically-primary, fundamentally existent material reality that you (or at least some people) believe in. — Michael Ossipoff

What would an explanation look like in this case? More words.

Translation: "I can't explain why there is the metaphysically-promary, fundamentally-existent material reality that I believe in."

Yes, explanations typically use words.

So yes, Physicalism has a brute-fact. ...is based on and dependent on a brute-fact.

Skepticism makes no assumptions and doesn't posit a brute-fact.

I could throw spit balls at you until you agree that there are indeed spitballs.

Would that help?

It would certainly support your claim about as well as you're supporting it now.

Michael Ossipoff

Banno's "spitball" analogy suggests that he's confused about the difference between verification and explanation.

Michael Ossipoff

I didn't name-call. I said you posted blather, which isn't calling you a name. And you are the one who wasn't specific at all. So, you're just being hypocritical. And you're particularly hypocritical here where you become the only one name-calling here, calling me two names.:

"Thanatos" 's wasn't discussing philosophy. His conduct in this instance is just that of the ordinary usual internet-abuser and flamewarrior, sadly ubiquitous on the Internet.

Michael Ossipoff

And you're the one who was unable to name where I made mis-statements and errors and then show how. You accused me of having made a "brute-fact," and I asked you to show how and you continually failed to do so, as I pointed out to you:

Nothing you say in your "counter" to my quote above it counters or even effectively addresses what I said at all. I never made a physicalist belief; I just correctly said our facts are our reflections of the material reality of the universe; I never said they weren't part of our reality as well.

And the only big, blatant brute-fact is your statement calling my statement one, as my statements can and have been explained, and you don't explain or support yours at all. And your referring to your outside in-supported topic with the interesting name does not suffice or stand as explanation or support.

And then you again failed to support your claim, as I requested, that my statement was a "brute-fact," instead providing a tautology not backing your claim at all.

A primary, fundamentally-existent material reality is a brute-fact. Physicalism and "Naturalism" need to posit that brute-fact. That's what makes it unparsimonious...not the fact that someone assumes that Physicalism is correct.

And I made specifically clear, as you wrongly claimed I didn't, how that was wrong:

A primary, fundamentally existent material reality Is not a "brute-fact," as a brute-fact is something that cannot be explained and a primary, fundamentally existent material reality can be explained. Michael doesnt' know what "brute-fact" means.

So, the only one who has been doing philosophy in this exchange has been me, and the only one name-calling has been you. Very ironic.

I think the issue gets resolved when we make the claim that something just is the same thing as it is. Tarskian semantics also does help. The liar just is lying.

Here is a proposition in support of my assumption that the Tractatus professes a nominalist tone.

2.0.2.4 . The substance is what subsists independently of what is the case.

What is the case are state of affairs. State of affairs is constituted by the substance and properties of objects.

Then Wittgenstein proposes:

2.0.2.7 . Objects, the unalterable, and the subsistent are one and the same.

Now, this seems to smell of monism or the logical atomistic theory made by the logical positivists.

Further;

2.0.2.7.1. Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is changing and unstable.

Reinforcing the logical atomism and monism in the Tractatus.

Then confusingly he states;

2.0.6.1 . States of affairs are independent of one another.

This isn't confusing if we assume that states of affairs are observer dependent, thus the variation in their pictorial form relative to each observer, this also applies to epistemological beliefs.

Now, if we think of pictures as names of situations and states of affairs, then that would seemingly close the loop of a nominalistic interpretation of the Tractatus.

I'm sorry, the previous is untrue due to the following proposition.

3.1.4.4 . Situations can be described but not given names. (Names are like points; propositions like arrows—they have sense.)

Ok, here's the killer:

3.2.0.3 . A name means an object. The object is its meaning. (‘A’ is the same sign as ‘A’.)

So, nominalism or not? I think nominalism, yea?

Thanatos says:
.

I didn't name-call. I said you posted blather, which isn't calling you a name.

.
Instead of name-calling a post that you don’t like, pejoratively characterizing it, and thereby violating forum guidelines, it would be better to specify what you think is wrong with it. You did the former, but forgot to do the latter.
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Typical standard behavior of a flamewarrior who can’t otherwise support his claims.
.

And you are the one who wasn't specific at all.

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So you say, repeatedly, without pointing to a particular instance. I invited you to tell us specifically what error, mis-statement or vagueness you found in a post of mine. Instead, you’re still just repeating the same unsupported angry noises.
.

So, you're just being hypocritical. And you're particularly hypocritical here where you become the only one name-calling here, calling me two names.:
"Thanatos" 's wasn't discussing philosophy. His conduct in this instance is just that of the ordinary usual internet-abuser and flamewarrior, sadly ubiquitous on the Internet.”—Michael Ossipoff

.
To send in my complaint, it was necessary to tell what behaviors I was complaining about. I included that information in my post too, because, after flagging your post, I wanted there to be an explanation for that near the end of the posts in the topic.
.

And you're the one who was unable to name where I made mis-statements and errors and then show how.

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I asked if you could specify which of my statements was/were “blather”, and tell why you think so.
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You couldn’t.
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Then there was nothing more to be said.
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You accused me of having made a "brute-fact,"

I said that Physicalism has a brute-fact. You said you didn’t think so, and I pointed out that the independently-existent, objective, fundamentally-existent, metaphysically-primary physical world that you (or at least someone) believe in is a brute-fact, unless you can explain it or quote from someone who has.
.

and I asked you to show how and you continually failed to do so.

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See above. In fact, I’ll re-copy it for you again:
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…and I pointed out that the independently-existent, objective, fundamentally-existent, metaphysically-primary physical world that you (or at least someone) believe in is a brute-fact, unless you can explain it or quote from someone who has.
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I have no idea about whether or not you’re a Physicalist, or just a typical troll. It doesn’t matter. That’s why I said “…that you (or at least someone) believe in.”
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We can replace that with “…that Physicalists believe in.”
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So yes, I did tell what Physicalism’s brute-fact is.
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(I’d already stated it in numerous posts to various topics)
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I never made a physicalist belief

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I didn’t say that you were a Physicalist. I merely told about Physicalism’s brute-fact.
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My wording that I quoted above, showed that I didn’t claim to know if you were a Physicalist.
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I have no idea what you are. It’s irrelevant.
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; I just correctly said our facts are our reflections of the material reality of the universe; I never said they weren't part of our reality as well.

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Forgive me if I thought that that statement (quoted directly aboves) suggested a belief in the primacy of a “material reality”, of which facts are a reflection. :)
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And the only big, blatant brute-fact is your statement calling my statement one

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A “material reality” that is related to facts by their being a reflection of it, because it’s metaphysically prior to them, is a way of asserting Physicalism’s brute-fact.
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, as my statements can and have been explained, and you don't explain or support yours at all.

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I’m always willing to explain &/or support any particular statement that I’ve made. Directly above, I’ve explained some things that I’d said.
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Your statements are explained? Oh really. Then, specifically, which earlier statement(s) was/were the “blather” that you were referring to? (…statements made before you expressed that characterization)
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You joined a conversation in which I’d spoken of Physicalism’s brute-fact. You tried to deny that Physicalism has a brute-fact, because you were confused about the difference between an explanation and a verification.
.

And then you again failed to support your claim, as I requested, that my statement was a "brute-fact," instead providing a tautology not backing your claim at all.

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If you’re saying it’s a tautology, you’re also saying that it’s true. No, we needn’t debate whether it’s a tautology.
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I’d said:

A primary, fundamentally-existent material reality is a brute-fact.

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…because a thing posited but not explained is a brute-fact.
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So yes, it’s a brute-fact unless you (or someone) can explain it.
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Shall we wait for your explanation?
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And no, a verification isn’t an explanation.
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Thanatos quotes me:
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Physicalism and "Naturalism" need to posit that brute-fact. That's what makes it unparsimonious...not the fact that someone assumes that Physicalism is correct.

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…and says:
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And I made specifically clear, as you wrongly claimed I didn't, how that was wrong:
A primary, fundamentally existent material reality is not a "brute-fact," as a brute-fact is something that cannot be explained, and a primary, fundamentally existent material reality can be explained.

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Then I invite Thanatos’s to explain it..
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Michael Ossipoff

Michael, This is a statement of fact and not an insult. That was a long rambling rant that failed to counter any of my points and was barely coherent. It's clear my posts upset you, even though I never called you a name as you erroneously claimed I did. I suggest you relax a bit, gather your thoughts and try again.

I won't say that your post doesn't contain any information. It says that you can't explain what you said can be explained.

My post was long because I was answering a long post. You know, answering, something absent from your posts.

But enough of this.

I've answered you all that I intend to, and more than your posts deserve. I've more than fulfilled any obligation to reply to you.

Discussion concluded.

Michael Ossipoff

No, it was long because it was long. Unlike my post, it made no answers. Ending our discussion, however, is a smart idea.

Ciao.

Ok, but you could say a thin man not being in a doorway has nothing to do with a fat man not being there. Or, if they do have something to do with each other, then I guess we can drag in other locations, characters and even Julius Caesar. I'm talking about the problem of identity-criteria for facts.

Ok, but you could say a thin man not being in a doorway has nothing to do with a fat man not being there. Or, if they do have something to do with each other, then I guess we can drag in other locations, characters and even Julius Caesar. I'm talking about the problem of identity-criteria for facts. — Cuthbert

We're talking about the same doorway and what, if anything, is there in the one case.

What is the ontology of 'facts'.

The early Wittgenstein postulated that the world is the totality of facts, not things. — Posty McPostface

And it's true. Or at least the Materialist's "things" or "stuff" would be superfluous if it exists. The proposition of objectively-existent universe, and its objectively-existent stuff and things is unverifiable, unfalsifiable, and would be a brute-fact if true.

Michael Faraday pointed that out in 1844.

What does he mean by asserting the existence of facts in logical space? Does he mean to say that the world is everything that is the case, which means that the world is what configuration objects have in the world between one another?

I don't suppose that any of us can answer for him, unless he answered that question somewhere in his writings.

But aren't the "objects" to which you refer, the the same as the "things" that Wittgenstein said aren't?

The "objects" themselves are just part of the system of facts, all deriving from abstract logical facts.

I have a hard time seeing these facts about the world as observer-independent

Observer-independence is a separate issue, without as clear an answer as is sometimes assumed.

Obviously, all we know about the physical world around us is via our own personal individual experience. For that reason, it makes sense to speak of our world as an individual life-experience possibility-story, consisting of a complex system of inter-referring inevitable abstract if-then logical facts about hypotheticals.

...an Anti-Realist view.

But, looking at it more generally and objectively, the logical facts that make up our life-experience possibility-stories aren't really different from all the other abstract logical facts. So, if ours are there, then the others are there too.



So I don't think absolute Anti-Realism can be right.

But we can speak of whatever logical facts systems we want to, and of course the one that makes the most sense is the one that's about your experience. Hence my preference for my emphasis on the individual experience point of view, when describing a metaphysics.

I agree with those who say that Reality beyond metaphysics is unknown, unknowable and indescribable. ...suggesting another reason to not say anything definite and all-encompassing about Realism vs Anti-Realism.

When we assume that facts exist, we are implicitly committing ourselves to a form of nominalism as opposed to viewing things as mutually dependent and holistic.

"Exist" isn't metaphysically-defined. But certainly there are facts, including abstract logical facts. No one would deny that. As for what you call "real" or "existent", that's entirely your individual subjective choice.

As for Nominalism, it was being espoused by a Materialist here, and it was his way of expressing his Materialism. When I looked that word up, Nominalism sounded a lot like Materialism, a re-statement of it, or nearly-so.

Speaking about there being facts doesn't imply Materialism, or anything like it.

You said:

as opposed to viewing things as mutually dependent and holistic.

Things? But the Wittgenstein quote said that there aren't things, only facts. (And I say he was right.)

When we assert the ontology of the universe as facts and not things, we seem to be saying that objects are nominalist, but, as opposed to what?

Aren't we saying that objects are only a name for a local aspect or part of the system of facts?

Are all of these facts observer dependent?

Strictly-speaking, no. ...for the reason stated above. ... but with the caveat stated with it.

Because otherwise, everything would consist of thing's and not facts if it weren't.

Not sure why that would follow, unless you think that facts have to be about (more fundamentally-existing) things.

Michael Ossipoff

Well, of course facts are things too. But, from the usage in the Wittgenstein quote, we can take things, for the purpose of this thread, to mean "things other than facts", or maybe even "material things".

I suggest that the accepted meaning for "things" is: "Whatever can be referred to". But, in this thread, a more limited meaning is intended, as described in the paragraph before this one.

Michael Ossipoff