For although the faculty of willing is incomparably greater in God than it is in me, both by virtue of the knowledge and power that are joined to it and that render it more resolute and efficacious and by virtue of its object inasmuch as the divine will stretches over a greater number of things, nevertheless, when viewed in itself formally and precisely, God’s faculty of willing does not appear to be any greater. This is owing to the fact that willing is merely a matter of being able to do or not do the same thing, that is, of being able to affirm or deny, to pursue or to shun; or better still, the will consists solely in the fact that when something is proposed to us by our intellect either to affirm or deny, to pursue or to shun, we are moved in such a way that we sense that we are determined to it by no external force. — ibid. Fourth Meditation page 38

That's my issue with it, he says this is what the will consists of.

But why should this be the total extent of the will? We have this capacity in dramatically larger proportion than other animals, if it can be said they have will at all. Maybe they have minimal will. A dog can be "taught" not to eat a treat until the owner says so. Maybe this is minimal will, maybe not.

But it's not inconceivable to me that another even more intelligent species could have dramatically stronger capacity of will compared to us. What it would look like, I cannot exactly say, but, I don't think it can be ruled out.

Just because we can't conceive of a greater capacity for willing, does it mean that it cannot exist, at least in principle.

There is, however, another side to this. We get some sense of this when we look again at his provisional morality:

In the Discourse on Method Descartes presents his "provisional morality".

"My third maxim was to try always to master myself rather than fortune, and to change my desires rather than the order of the world."

It is provisional because his method will allow man to master fortune. Man will no longer have to accept things the way they are. Descartes method of reason is, as he says in the Meditations, the Archimedean point from which he can move the world. — Fooloso4

The desire to master fortune comes from the will, but to accomplish it requires the intellect. It is by the use of reason that he can move the world, but it is by the will that he seeks to do so. The will is without limits in that there is nothing but the will itself that limits what we want. It is provisionally necessary to change our desires because we cannot accomplish all that we desire.

But it is Descartes' ambition to master fortune. Knowledge and will work together not simply to understand the world as it is but to transform it into what it could be. Knowledge provides the ground and the will the ambition and determination to build. — Fooloso4

Apologies for my lack of clarity. These comments suggest to me that he seeking to master his fortune, that is, control his own desires - which is what he has control over after all, we cannot will to change the world, we can will to change ourselves, in order to try and have an effect on the world, however small this change may be.

These sound to me to be strongly inclined to moral considerations, I master my will in order to change my desires so as to make them adequate for the task at hand. This is what I ought to do.

This is all well and good and true. But it seems to me as if, even taking all of this into account, and granting the will the scope Descartes gives it, still falls short of his original statement, or at least, the statement under contention, that the will is wider than the intellect.

I just see much more aspects to the intellect than I do to the will, there are more elements to it that "merely" doing this or doing that, or not doing anything. I say no more than this, it's my only doubt, pardon the pun.

That's an interesting inversion. I once thought, though am not longer certain, that it was hard to justify math, that is, not so much the results of elementary problems, 2+2=4 and so on, but the very foundations, what enables me to justify the postulation of "1" or any number?

But it's given in our minds/brain somehow.

As for the will, if the goal is right or correct moral judgments, that limits of focuses the intellect on morality. But there is a lot more to consider than morality, in mental life in general.

Very cool! I'd heard that the quite long film version of Satantango was actually very well made and well received, but I've yet to see it.

I didn't know Werckmeister Harmonies existed, nor that it was an adaptation of the novel. I'd think that Melancholy of Resistance would make a better movie than Satantango, so I might check it out. Thanks for the heads up.

Part of what makes this interesting is that the force that math has to constrain us (because it is true, independent of who is doing it) is not the same as the shame, confusion, or unintelligibility that may persuade us to take a certain action, but does not have the same force upon us, on our will. — Antony Nickles

Sure, outside of his thought experiments, to deny basic mathematical outcomes is hard to imagine. Maybe a crazy person would say that 2+2=5, but to believe it, is hard to grasp, for me at least.

On the other hand, most of the time, mathematical results are of little to no significance.

That actions you have been doing all along can suddenly have distinctions and rationale that you had not considered, but that, when you do, causes you to acknowledge the truth of it; part awe in its being there already, and part uncanny that it is not always apparent. — Antony Nickles

That's a good description.

I believe he says God is more certain than math.

But, you tell me when you are done with the section.

Thanks for the extra context. I remain unconvinced though. I could imagine situation in which my capacity for willing could be greater, it could for instance, be transparent to me how it is that I choose to do something or not do something. Even something as simple as raising my arm, is shrouded in mystery to me, I have no clue how I actually do it, even though I can, I don't know how I can.

Alternatively, my will could have the power to move objects beyond my body - surely God has such powers. And so on.

The ability of man to do whatever he wills to do is limited only by the limits of our knowledge. It is in this sense that the will is more extensive than the intellect. Descartes' will is for man to do whatever he wills to do, and this is accomplished by the increase his increase in knowledge. — Fooloso4

In the end, it seems to me that knowledge provides better information on which to make a better informed decision. A man could do whatever he wills, but If I compare that to an idea - say reading a novel or thinking about the weather, it seems to me to be far more intricate and complex than the will.

Unless, of course, I am misreading or misunderstanding some aspect of the will, as Descartes conceives it.

Oh sorry man, I briefly saw this and forgot to reply, just came to my mind all of a sudden.

“Well, then, where do my mistakes come from? Their source is the fact that my will has a wider scope than my intellect has, so that I am free to form beliefs on topics that I don’t understand… That is the source of my error and sin.”

So Descartes’ will and judgment is falible, indirect. We must not assume we have immediate access to the truth by some internal calculation or connection to something outside us; it takes time to get clear about what makes this situation or practice distinct from others. — Antony Nickles

Yes, he says this quite astonishing quote about the will being wider than the intellect, briefly mentioned when talking to @Fooloso4.

I tried to understand that, even attempting to look at that statement as if I lived back then, but I can't make sense of it. I mean, it just seems obvious to me that intellect is far broader than will in scope. Of course, we use the will all the time (arguably), but it's scope is somewhat reduced to do this or do that or don't do, more or less.

I believe you have said you tend to follow the late-Wittgenstein tradition, so maybe the impact will be different, but I really do find the whole "remembering" and "from within me" to be quite accurate in my experience and surprising. We need not follow its religious aspects, but it's a powerful thought.

So he retreats to mathematics as his example, and the properties it has are repeatable, predictable, thus proveable and so contain the certainty he needs to extrapolate that, if he understands something, it’s properties must be true as well, which is his justification that the property of existence must be true about God. — Antony Nickles

Back in his time everything was still mixed, philosophy and science and math, not to the level of the Greeks, but, still, no huge distinctions arose. And thus he probably mistook one our capacities - the capacity to do math, with something almost entirely different, our capacity to recognize objects and things in the world.

And while I think there are strong reasons to take them to be innate, they are of a different nature. And certainty in one, is not translatable to certainty on another.

That's true.

I don't know of many substance dualists today, maybe some theological-leaning philosophers might be substance dualists, but there aren't many.

It seems to me as if most people try to aim for a monist account. Within this, you find a significant amount of property dualists.

If we are having trouble with one "substance", matter of the physical, it's difficult to argue that we need to add another substance, but, as you point out, view vary.

If you need any more clarifications or have doubts, don't be afraid to ask, this much I should be able to explain. :cool:

Well, one should keep in mind that he "privileges science" (which is a fair assessment, in my opinion), in respect to trying to understand the nature of the (external, mind-independent) world. If someone wants to find out things about the world, you should follow what science says about it.

Nevertheless, there is far more to life than what science says about it, in our human experience. When it comes to issues about understanding human psychology and thinking, he frequently says that a work of great literature is quite a deal more insightful than most modern psychology.

By him saying we don't know what the physical is, he usually (not necessarily always) says this to anticipate "non-physical" talk, as if saying "the mind is non-physical" means something substantive. He sometimes says that by now, use of the word "physical" implies that we have a theoretical understanding of a problem, when we don't understand something some tend to say that consciousness is "non-physical", signaling theoretical ignorance as well.

But aside from this terminological choice, until someone can say what the physical is (does it exclude the mind? Why?, etc.) there is in fact, no physical, non-physical distinction.

When he says, we don't know what matter is, it's literally that, we don't know what it is, we don't know what a particle is, we know some of the properties of particles, but not what it is, yet. But he takes it that the brain is "modified matter", and that experience is the fact of existence of which we are most confident about.

Do you believe that if the nature of physical matter is beyond our understating then idealism gets a boost as an alternative ontology? — Tom Storm

Until we can define materialism, we aren't debating substance, is what I guess he would say. All this is explained in the article I shared.

Apologies for the length.

My pleasure.

Sure! :up:

I'm surprised at the way (it appears to me) that Chomsky seems to hold up intuition as the standard for what qualifies as understanding. Human intuitions generally arise as matters of pattern recognition based on things we observe all the time. However, observing hydrogen and oxygen atoms either in isolation or when combined into a water molecule is not something we do all the time. We simply don't have the sensory capabilities to make such observations unaided, let alone under all the conditions that would be needed in order for us to develop accurate intuitions about such things.

If we were able to resolve individual atoms and observe them under a wide enough variety of conditions, we would observe that hydrogen and oxygen themselves form liquids and even solids under the right conditions of temperature and pressure. For example a phase diagram for hydrogen — wonderer1

He doesn't hold intuition to be the standard for a scientific account of a phenomenon of nature at all. In fact, the whole essay I shared is trying to show how Newton proved that the world was inherently unintuitive, contrary to what Newton, and all the great scientists and philosophers of his time, and before (throughout human history), thought to be the case.

What happened was that the goal of science shifted with Newton, science was now tasked with giving intelligible theories of the world, not with understanding the world. Descartes, Newton, Leibniz and all others looked for the latter, but the former prevailed, again, to Newton's own astonishment.

Now we take this utterly for granted. But it wasn't so until quite recently. That's the point, we are no longer bothered that we don't understand gravity intuitively, but are perfectly content with the theory and sometimes have trouble comprehending what this issue of understanding could even mean. Wasn't always this way.

From a scientific perspective (that doesn't put human intuition on a pedestal) there are more sophisticated ways of understanding the details of what it is going on in the case of H2O, and no need for the notion of "the potential for liquidity". — wonderer1

I'm sure there are such ways. I don't doubt that. Of course, human intuition has enormous flaws, I don't recall arguing otherwise.

And I'd also add that science, is also a human creation, it comes from us. When some aspects of the external world happen to coincide with some of our scientific capacities (including mathematics, generalizations, abduction, hypothesis creation, projections, retrodictions, etc.) we construct a science of that phenomena.

It's not as if science exists in some objective world out there. Not that you are saying this, but, it should be mentioned.

It is certainly true that liquid's property of taking the shape of the vessel it is in is radically different to the molecule's property of having a rigid structure and not taking the shape of the vessel it is in, but isn't this what we would intuitively expect. — RussellA

Then I believe we agree in this instance, but are calling the phenomena by different terms, "weak" vs. "strong" emergence. So on the topic of liquidity, it's a terminological issue, which doesn't matter much if we agree on the fundamentals, as it seems we do here.

If panpsychism is true, when particles collide, consciousness would not emerge from the collision, as consciousness was already present in the particles before colliding.

If panprotopsychism is true, when particles collide, consciousness could emerge from the collision, as a proto-consciousness was present in the particles before colliding.

IE, there are some theories whereby consciousness doesn't emerge, as it is already fundamental and ubiquitous. — RussellA

Correct. That's a big "if". I don't find the reasons given, either in Strawson's or Goff's account (or anyone else, that I've seen) to be particularly persuasive.

Additionally, there's no test we can put forth to determine if it's correct or not.

Proto-consciousness? That's fine, I suppose, but I'd add the caveat that whatever matter ends up being, it is also almost a "proto-everything", including proto-sensations, proto-liquid, proto-heart, etc.

I mean, I mostly agree with your summary. And it's been a problem for hundreds of years, if not more, and probably shows a natural limit in our cognitive capacities.

As for the weak or strong emergence, I think the stress in Chomsky's quote should be focused on "Can there be what he calls radical emergence, entirely new properties somehow developing without any elements of them in earlier structures. I think that happens all the time."

I take him to mean that "strong emergence" happens all the time. I don't see any intuitive (I'm not speaking of a theoretical account) reasoning that would get a rational human being to expect or not be surprised that liquid can emerge from what looks to me to be completely liquid-less particle, in isolation.

Of course, we are then forced to say, that the particle is not liquid-less, it has the potential for liquidity in certain configurations. But I don't see how the end result of liquidity, is evident from the constituent parts.

A lot of people seem to think that consciousness of free will should be strongly emergent, but there's absolutely no reason to think that this is the case. For all we currently know, consciousness is weakly emergent, as any other collective phenomenon in large systems. — RussellA

If by "strong emergence" she means that particles in the LHC should show signs of consciousness when they collide, then of course it's not "strongly emergent" in that case.

If she means that the new properties (consciousness, will, in this case) should be expected from the constituent parts, then I don't think that's true, and would call consciousness and will "strongly emergent".

This again, doesn't mean that we should expect that planets has free will when it moves in its orbit, or something like that, but weak emergence suggests to me a certain kind of obviousness which I don't see. But I may very well have wrong intuitions, that's certainly possible.

Thanks. The lectures are quite interesting to watch (I've probably seen a dozen or so) but I often find at the end of them I haven't been left with anything much. — Tom Storm

Exactly, same thing happened to me. Granted, some are more interesting than others, but one is often left with the feeling that although much was said, sometimes amusingly, there wasn't much content.

I view it in terms of intelligibility. You are correct that we have a theory as to how liquids emerge from molecules, but we have no intuitions about it. We don’t (yet) have a theory about consciousness, nor do we have an intuition of how matter could give rise to experience (this goes as far back as Locke indcidently). We may get a theory of consciousness, we may not, if we do get a theory then we would say the same thing about consciousness as we do about liquids. We can’t yet say this about consciousness, but the issue of radical emergence is one of intelligibility- we have a theory of liquids, but no intuition- we don’t know how particles could have the property of liquidity in them, that only arise in specific configurations, not in isolation. So if you want to call the liquid case “weak emergence” that’s fine, but I think it’s misleading.

Actually you can, you can email him any time, and he would answer. I've met him personally and have asked him about the topic, it was part of my thesis.

But, if you have doubts, see the following.

See starting min. 59:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kzRkho1s5FA

I suppose that what matters here is not so much which feeling is worse - they are both bad, but instead - how long one of these feelings last.

It's fine to be sad for a while, or bored for a while, but not for too, too long, otherwise it becomes a very serious issue.

unlike the emergence of liquids from molecules, where the properties of the liquid can in some reasonable sense be regarded as inhering in the molecules. — RussellA

I think it is meant as somewhat ironic, because as he says later on in the same page:

"It should be noted that the molecule-liquid example, commonly used, is not a very telling one. We also cannot conceive of a liquid turning into two gases by electrolysis, and there is no intuitive sense in which the properties of water, bases, and acids inhere in Hydrogen or Oxygen or other atoms." (my bold)

As the quote in your quoting of him in p.171, says, "even if we are certain it does." We can't doubt that experience comes from the brain.

As for the quote in page 178, the point is stress that it might not only be neurons that are the cause of consciousness, there is a whole lot of other activity going on in the brain. These other parts of the brain likely play an important role on consciousness, but we've still to figure it out.

He references Randy Gallistel, who he thinks is persuasive on this topic.

Where does Chomsky say that "consciousness is emergent" ?

There is a difference between weak emergence, as liquid from molecules, and strong emergence, as minds from brains. — RussellA

He doesn't make a difference between strong and weak emergence.

He doesn't say it explicitly, but I think it's quite clear:

https://web.ics.purdue.edu/~drkelly/ChomskyMysteriesNatureHidden2009.pdf

Top of page 192.

Interesting and cryptic.

There is much merit to the idea of what we ought to do and not expecting others to follow. The moral situation is simply overwhelmingly complex, in so far as we blame the world but are also part of it.

I believe that we have, to varying degrees, levels of hypocrisy in us.

Nice quote from Oasis, I also get a feeling that part of this post is reflected in another song by them, "D'ya Know What I Mean?"

:cheer:

He's entertaining and provides some interesting observations on certain curious or strange phenomenon. Contrary to others here, although I have read his Less Than Nothing and one of his essay collection books (forgetting the name now), I find his lectures to be better. In fact, I notice little distinction between long lectures and reading his stuff.

He has drawbacks: his scholarship is quite bad; he is prone to exaggeration and even makes things up(!) and he has a tendency to want to complicate or extend a certain type of "Hegelian logic" way beyond specific instances in which such a counter-intuitive way of thinking may be of use or of interest.

Roger Scruton was not a fan of Zizek, nor is Pinker, though most of us can say Pinker has his own issues.

On the other hand, Varoufakis and Cornel West think well of him, and these are serious people.

So, it's a mixed bag, for me he is not as bad as Mikie puts it, but he does have serious flaws, beyond the usual "we are all humans" complaint.

But for ''II)" I have some things to say. Logic is enough to accept that consciousness is either a. 100% reducible, b. not 100% reducible, or c. fundamental. — Eugen

According to him, consciousness is emergent (he says that "radical emergence" happens all the time, which I think is true), as is liquid from molecules who appear to lack this property in isolation.

You would perhaps reply by saying that this means consciousness must be reducible to particles, because if it is emergent, the reduction follows. Not quite. Consciousness arises in brains, which are a very specific arrangement of matter, as far as we can see 99.999999% of the universe doesn't have creatures with brains.

But saying consciousness is reducible to brains doesn't make any sense, how is that a reduction? I don't see how a brain is a "lower level" phenomena of mind, it seems to me to be a higher one, in terms of, we discover brains through consciousness, otherwise, we couldn't even postulate them.

So Chomsky would invert the now classical slogan "the mental is the neurophysiological at a higher level." I believe he discusses this in New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind. Or if not, in the first essay of Power and Prospects. Don't remember which one.

Q1. So by saying consciousness isn't reducible to matter, does Chomsky leave the room open for options b and c, or he is saying that there are other options that our mind cannot comprehend?
Q2. If the latter, why would he believe that? — Eugen

It's in the provided essay. We don't know what matter is, almost nothing about it. Physicists don't even agree on what a particle is - that's a problem. What we do know about matter quite intimately, are its (conscious) mental aspects, what we see, feel, talk with others, read, etc. That's as clear as anything could be for a human being.

Newton proved we don't understand motion: we provide descriptions for in our theories, but we don't have the capacity to understand it, which he made clear in his famous "It is inconceivable..." quote.

Understanding the world vs. understanding theories of the world, are very different things. The latter is a massive lowering of standards of understanding.

And what happened with the problem of motion? We simply got used to it, in fact, we take it for granted, forgetting we don't understand it, outside our theories.

If we can't understand motion, it is unlikely we will comprehend how matter can think. We know we are thinking matter, but we don't understand how it is possible. He quotes Locke and Priestley here, and several others, worth looking at the article.

I dedicated a reading group on this topic, the attached essay is, I believe, the clearest articulation of "mysterianism", which he thinks should instead be called "common sense". I'll repost the link of the article below, and if you so choose, you can browse the thread.

https://web.ics.purdue.edu/~drkelly/ChomskyMysteriesNatureHidden2009.pdf

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12417/chomskys-mysteries-of-nature-how-deeply-hidden-reading-group/p1

I) He's said that science is not reductionist, that it instead is opportunist, you get what you can from it. He has said several times that we no longer have a clear notion of "matter", so reducing consciousness to matter doesn't make sense.

This can be found on YouTube, on many interviews on this topic, including this one:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kzRkho1s5FA

II) More so type 2, simply put: given we are natural creatures, we will have the capacity to understand some things and others not. If we had no natural limit to understanding, we would have no scope, thus we couldn't develop anything.

This is discussed with significant depth and sources in the attached article, but, it is a long-ish read.

Nah. I make it up as I go along. Seriously. Of course it is based on what is found in the text, but the connections are things I am working out as I write. — Fooloso4

You coulda fooled me. In any case they have been fantastically helpful.




In effect, it seems merely a point of emphasis on something particular (this specific clock, this specific human being) or something broad (clocks and human beings). Something seems off, just a little, maybe it's our modern way of understanding, but in contemporary (scientific) understanding, you gain knowledge of general things (human beings) by studying - in principle - one person.

In practice we need much more.

But not completely wrong. The details of his biomechanics might be wrong, but much has been gained by seeing the body as a mechanical system. — Fooloso4

As an example of human anatomy, it can be a useful heuristic.

But in terms of physics, or the way the world works, it was way off the mark. I mean, it was very intuitive and coherent, and everyone believed in it until Newton demolished it, to his surprise and lament.

Our freedom is that, when we are presented with the possibilities in a context, “we have no sense that we are pushed one way or the other by any external force.” So our will may very well be impinged, and our freedom is not about unfettered internal agency; as Descartes puts it, “I can be free without being inclined both ways.” The will is not having every option open (being “indifferent” he says), but having a will, an inclination, passion, desire, wish; Descartes focuses on acting on principle or knowledge, but the picture is that we are partial (made whole in the act Emerson says), personal, not simply intellectual, rational. — Antony Nickles

I mostly agree with this interpretation, though Descartes does mention that sometimes we are not compelled one way or another, he also mentions that (as per Chomsky's highlight of Descartes, which Descartes actually says) we are inclined to do or say such and such in a specific situation X, but we are not compelled to do so.

We could be talking to a friend about a basketball match (for example) and we would know what topics are relevant to the conversation. But if I want to, I could perfectly well begin to talk about the political situation in Argentina, which is not relevant to the conversation, nor are we usually inclined to do such things, but we can do them, if we so decide to do so.



You have such mastery of the text that one feels intimidated in saying much, if anything.

That passage about a particular nature was perplexing, for he discusses, as you mention two uses of the word "nature", one being broader than the other. The more narrow sense refers to (as I take it now) human nature, a combination of body and mind. The other use of "nature" refers to the whole world. It sounds like an artificial distinction, as if we are somehow removed from the world.

But even "soul" stuff would have to be part of the world in some way, otherwise these distinctions don't make sense.

What's interesting to note, is that despite his famous dualism, he does mention the relation of the brain with the soul. Of course, most of us have heard about the famous "pineal gland", but the general point is that Descartes account of the mind and the body was quite naturalistic, for his time.

The frequent mockery he gets from neuroscientists or just scientists in general is very unfair and ignorant.

The example of the clock is illustrative, for he thinks that bodies, including human bodies, are similar to clocks, just more complex. On this he turned out to be quite wrong, as history would show, but his intuitions were quite sensible.

I don't have a general comment on temporality here, just commending you for your impressive contributions.

This is good advice, especially when the books are quite long.

Having said that, I'll likely wait some time before following your advice, otherwise I risk the habit of not reading novels and finishing them (now that I've started a new one).

Thanks.

In the Miso Soup - Ryu Murikami

Had to stop Perdido at about page 300 or so, I really liked the writing style and the city descriptions (this latter up to a point), but I found it became somewhat of a slog, in that he'll tell bits of the story, then spend pages on the city again and again, making it uneven.

Definitely will try it again sometime in the future, but, I wasn't really feeling it at the moment, especially towards the last 100 or so pages of my reading.

Some things don't have explanations though we seek them so, desperately wanting answers to every "why" we pose. But for every moment of fortune or misery experienced, the universe itself, does not care for our concerns or tribulations.

But there is far more to this than cosmic conspiracy- for we are part of the universe and we do care about ourselves and other beings. A very small, but nonetheless instructive example is the very fact that you encounter people here - complete strangers - having sympathy for you and offering the best advice they can give, in so far as experience has taught them so.

So a slight shift in perspective may be the first step in the re-imagination of the scope of the problem, from an uncaring universe, to caring people. Streaks of luck, ranging from the lowest misery to the highest ecstasy cannot continue indefinitely, the only true constant is change, in which case, all I can say is, I am sorry for the moment you are going through, and I hope better times will come, which cannot help but happen.

Not particularly much to say. Desmond Clarke, who has written a very thoughtful interpretation of Descartes, says that:

"Descartes is, at best confused about what substances are. Secondly. he consistently argues that we have no independent knowledge of substances apart from knowing their properties."

Sorry, I missed this reply somehow. I think it's a bit more complex than that, I mean there is no doubt that being a religious fanatic can be very problematic and even dangerous, we have plenty of examples throughout history that exemplifies this side of religion.

On the other hand, I don't agree about "synthetic" or "fake" experiences. I don't think they are this and would have trouble imagining what a "fake experience" could be. You can say, afterwards, that your judgement about an experience was mistaken, the experience itself wasn't false.

And there's a lot of variety too, you are right that some Christians go overboard when they start speaking in tongues. But there's also plenty of people who have a religious experience that don't do extreme things.

So it's a bit too broad-brush to say that all of this is fake or illusory, as I see it anyway.

This is where man’s greatest and most important perfection is to be found ... If I restrain my will so that I form opinions only on what the intellect clearly and distinctly reveals, I cannot possibly go wrong.

He has within himself the ability to become more perfect by avoiding error. Note that he allows for degrees of perfection. — Fooloso4

The will argument is somewhat strange, especially when he says that the scope of the will is larger than the scope of the intellect. Since he allows for degrees of perfection, there are aspects in which we could be more perfect.

I had in mind the following quote, near the end of the Fourth Meditation:

"And I have no cause for complaint on the grounds that the power of understanding or the natural light which God gave me is no greater that it is; for it is in the nature of a finite intellect to lack understanding of many things, and it is the nature of a created intellect to be finite."

Continuing in this line, a bit further down, in which Descartes speaks of the will, as you have quoted, he also says:

"... but it is undoubtedly an imperfection in me to misuse my freedom and make judgements about matters which I do not fully understand. I can see, however, that God could have easily brought about it that without losing my freedom, and despite the limitations in my knowledge, I should nevertheless never make a mistake."

He proceeds to say that he could see how it might be more perfect that we live in this world than one in which we never make an error and then:

"And I have no right to complain that the role God wished me to undertake is not... the most perfect of all."

According to the argument it is not simply knowledge that God exists, but the claim that God would not deceive us that guarantees that clear and distinct ideas can't be wrong. — Fooloso4

Thanks for precision, that's correct, he does say that. But that specific part of the argument doesn't seem to me to have aged very well.

At bottom is a reliance on reason. For even his claims about God depends on reason. Further, he has established that even if God is a deceiver, his Archimedean point, his knowledge that he exists, established by reason, is fixed. — Fooloso4

Yes, I agree. The thing is I don't see reason as being "transparent", that is, I can't get to the bottom of reasons in a way that I feel no problems in "seeing", this is as simple and as foundational as any reason can get, there's just so much in every judgment and proposition that are assumed.

:100:

Yeah, just like opium, it makes them feel good, but it could shut down options that they would otherwise pursue, maybe getting into political activism or something along those lines, because why bother? We are going to a better place, etc.

The promise is that of a better life in the afterlife, with no suffering, joy, bliss and happiness. It's especially prevalent in people who are very poor - I live in the Dominican Republic, I think the only country which has a bible in the shield of the flag - and whose loved ones have died, or have committed crimes - there's murders here all the time, every day, quite dangerous, nowhere near the levels of Haiti, but that's a bad comparison, cause Haiti is the worst country in the hemisphere in terms of poverty and life expectancy, but it's not a picnic here.

As for your other answer, I do not know. And have asked myself such questions. I can only assume that the biological drive to survive is so strong, that it overrides such thoughts and actions.

Again, I don't believe in any of this, and we have lots of evidence for all the bad things religions have done, but it has plenty of value for believers.

I mean, I've seen many people hang on to life due to a belief that there will be a better life after this one.

It's not true of course, nor does it resonate with me in any way. But my experience just shows me that for some people it does work, like nature does to you, and to me, to some extent.

It actually does. The Japanese, some of the most modern-stressed people in the world, prescribe forest therapy for burnout, grief, recovery from illness. — Vera Mont

I don't think we disagree on the large picture, but we seem to differ on the scope of the solution. That's right, Japan has the highest, if not one of the highest, suicide rates in the world. And nature can provide much needed help and relief.

What I am saying, is that it may provide a complete relief for some - for some period of time anyway - maybe for most. But what I'm adding, is that even if those people get relief from nature, it is not enough to ward off suicide, or waves of meaninglessness or depression for many.

It's a fantastic help, but not a total one, for man's conditions. For nature is beautiful and also lethal.

As do the gods, whose followers cause most of this suffering. The cruelties of humans to one another compensated-for by clinging to gods made in the image of men. As for natural disaster, I find it more spiritually and rationally acceptable that bad things just happen in an unreasoning, amoral universe than that a god causes them to happen as punishment for something a distant ancestor may or may not have done. May that's just me.... — Vera Mont

I don't disagree that it is easier to handle in this way for us, which doesn't make it easy.

I've seen cases of people who live near, often in nature, for all effects and purposes, that live pretty harsh lives, they have no income, no healthcare, no way to feel meaningful in life, because they have virtually no opportunity to get out of poverty and telling them you have mountains and rivers and hills, isn't going to help much.

I very much think it's circumstance dependent.

Is that a spiritual yearning, though, or an intellectual desire to make sense of things? — Vera Mont

I kind of take existence and the world to be a kind of (secular) miracle, so in this specific case, I cannot disentangle them. Most people would consider it an intellectual desire, but for me, it goes a bit beyond that.

You don't need to tell me about it, I very much agree with that.

But just because it may satisfy me or you, doesn't mean it will work equally well with everyone, for some it doesn't cut it.

I mean, sure mountains, beaches, jungles, the night sky, are all wonderful, but if one's child dies from starvation or one's whole family was killed, then these things have more limited utility.

I still feel the inclination to some philosophical framework, it does provide me with the "religious" equivalent, and is very interesting, at least to me.

But sure, nature can be great, on occasion.

I agree.

Ok.

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