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Pop I agree with everything you said , but it doesn’t sound like Cartesian trigger-puppets would accept that empirical facts are dependent on and a product of subjective organization — Joshs

I intuitively agree with that statement. Let's see, a fact is that which has been proven to be the case with evidence. That which is empirical is a type of information which is gained on the basis of experience or observation. So, empirical facts are that which has been proven to be the case with evidence derived from experience or observation. The question is, then, whether or not facts, which have been proven with evidence that we can experience or observe, are indeed dependent on and a product of subjective organization?

Subjective organization would be the organization of our subjective states. To organize something is a process of arranging things systematically, such as thoughts or statements in a logical order. What is subjective pertains to the observing subject rather than the the object being observed. Subjective states include thoughts, ideas, feelings and beliefs which have the property of being perceived rather than having the property of being an objective feature of the world. So, subjective organization would be something like a cognitive process of arranging thoughts and ideas systematically and logically in order to gain a more holistic understanding of how sensory data that you already possess can be refined into novel information that is meaningful and useful.

I would agree that we can organize specific data a priory and then draw general conclusions from it such as with an inductive inference, that goes takes specific piece of data and generalizes it into a novel idea or inference. I also understand that such information is reliant on a posteriori data that is gathered through sensory experience which can be used in a top-down process in order to see whether or not a general idea or an uncertain assumption can be logically deduced to a more specific idea or a certain conclusion—or in other words, a fact.

If this is what was the point in question was, then yes, I accept that the statement is accurate. Is there a contradiction entailed somewhere by my affirming of those propositions?

So you relativize ethical good and bad, right and wrong, not to individual tastes, attitudes, moods, and general dispositions, but to a multitude of "selves" within the composite historical ethical agency. — Constance

That's pretty close. You see, I'm considering multiple things here. First, it seems as if morality is subjective insofar as it has subjective variability between individual subjects, just like there is aesthetic variability between individual subjects. What I mean by subjective variability is the range of possible values for any measurable or immeasurable characteristic, physical or psychological, both interchanges between multiple subjects and exchanges between an individual subject and the continuous fluctuations between their environment.

Second, it seems that in order for moral statements to be truth-apt they must be describing the psychological states of the individual subject who is expressing a belief or performing an act that is being described in the moral statement. For example, if a man named Andrew makes the statement, "Stealing is wrong," what that translates into is, "Andrew has a preference against stealing" or "Andrew has a negative attitude when it comes to stealing". Now, some psychological states are more cognitive and some are more emotive (e.g., a rational belief vs a irrational feeling) and this I have to hash out further.

As of right now, I'm running under the assumption that both moral and other evaluative statements can be considered propositions if and only if they are describing the psychological states of the individual subject they are indexed to. So, the statement from the previous example would be a description of Andrews psychological states and attitudes toward the act of stealing. Thus, it is a true statement that corresponds with the psychological fact that Andrew disapproves of stealing. As you can see, this is a translation of a descriptive declarative sentence structure that is describing the way reality is in an objective way, into a descriptive declarative sentence structure that is describing the way reality is perceived and evaluated in a subjective way. It is nonetheless a factual statement about the psychological states of the individual subject the statement is indexed to.

Alas, it seems that we must relativize morality down to the individual and translate moral statements under a proper interpretation of subjective metaethical semantics. However, a problem arises within the logic thus far, namely the imprecision of the term used to describe the individual subject. Here, we use the term 'subject' in two different contexts. So from now on the term 'philosophical subject' will be used when describing the individual subject who is a thinking and feeling entity with a conscious mind; and the term 'grammatical subject' will be used when describing the noun phrase of a proposition, being the element about which the statement is predicated.

Third, the imprecision lies in our failure to consider what I would call the mereological identity of the philosophical subject who is represented as the truth-bearing grammatical subject of the proposition. In other words, within the grammatical structure of the clause in the statement, "Andrew disapproves of stealing," the term 'Andrew' is the noun functioning as the grammatical subject to which the clause is predicated upon (the noun which the sentence is about) and the verb phrase 'Disapproves of stealing,' is the grammatical predicate of the clause in the statement that tells us what the subject is doing in the sentence. The problem is whether or not the grammatical subject of the statement accurately represents the philosophical subject that is indexed to grammatical predicate.

Since both the subject and the predicate of the statement contain contextual variables, the statement may be true or false depending on whether or not the values of these variables represent the full context and the actual state of affairs of the surrounding environment at the instant the statement was made. The grammatical subject may or may not be representative of the psychological subject to which the moral statement purports to describe the psychological states of. This would be a form of ambiguity and a potential for equivocation regarding the definition of the indexical term which functions as the grammatical subject and represents the philosophical subject. This is because the philosophical subject does not maintain fixed physiological or psychological states between phenomenological frames of reference which means that the identity of the philosophical subject must necessarily change between phenomenological frames of reference over the philosophical subjects composite history.

This has to do with what I called the philosophical subjects mereological identity. Mereological identity is the view that the identity of an object depends on the identity of the objects compositional parts. And, furthermore, that the sameness of an objects compositional parts is a necessary condition of the identity of the object as a whole. So, when it comes to an individual philosophical subject, not only does the grammatical subject rely on precise indexical content that may vary from context to context, but it must also capture the philosophical subjects indexical characteristics, which is its mereological identity with regards to the whole of its physiological and psychological parts. And, the philosophical subjects physiological and psychological mereology undergoes constant compositional fluctuations as an open physical and psychological system which renders novel phenomenological states.

That is, fluctuations occur both as a material system in which energy and mass is exchanged between the physical environment, and as an immaterial system in which perceptions, thoughts, memories, emotions, desires, etc, are exchanged between a philosophical subject and their subjective experiential environment, as well as, the social interchange between their intersubjective experiential environment.

This ultimately comes down to navigating around violations of the law of identity and the law of excluded middle. Allow me to explain in a bit.

When it comes to human behavior, there are a lot of factors which play a role in influencing how we behave. Some of these factors are abstract structures which may be psychological, sociological, cultural or even societal. Examples of such structures would include: assertiveness, your gender, your race, your sexual orientation, your language and your ethnicity, government entities, laws and institutions, etc. All of these things are constantly changing and thus constantly changing the way they influence your behavior. All of these things are also related, if not contingent upon the physical material of the environment which is all interconnected through causality and emerges from the same mereological simples of the quantum realm.

Consider the metaphysical thought experiment concerning the compositional identity of the ship of Theseus. Just as changing out the rotted planks of wood gives the ship a fundamentally new mereological identity, so too does the mereological identity of our body change with its physical composition constantly being exchanged with the physical composition of its environment. This would also be the case with our constantly changing psychological states.

I think that in order for moral statements to be truth apt, the truth aptness must be dependent upon the psychological states (which is represented by the grammatical predicate) of individual philosophical subject (which is represented by the grammatical subject) that the statement is indexed to. Furthermore, it is necessary for moral statements to be indexed as the grammatical predicates next to the grammatical subject which represents the specific mereological identity of the individual philosophical subject relative to the sum of its mereological parts and in context with the overall state of affairs surrounding it within its environment at a particular point in history.

We can think of the environment as a mereological whole or otherwise as a complex system within a larger more complex system, within a (perhaps infinite) number of subsequent systems that are not isolated and thus are undergoing physical exchange which emerges into chemical exchange and emerges into biological, psychological, and sociological interchange between various ecological systems and living intelligent systems of individual philosophical subjects who  identify themselves with the present phenomenological frame of reference within a stream of conscious experiences.

Seeing that each individual philosophical subject seems to be undergoing these constant changes that fundamentally alters their identity, it would be violating the law of identity to not consider the totality of composite material and mental parts that define the identity of an agent. Therefore, it is necessary to specify all the contextual specificities which means relativizing to such degrees of precision in order to make the moral statement in question retain meaning and be capable of being true or false. Also, it would be a violation to the law of excluded middle if a moral statement could be both true and false when indexed next to the same generic grammatical subject without specifying any differential properties or compositions to the philisophical subjects mereological identify.

I'm considering both the law of identity and the law of excluded middle here. You have heard my arguments pertaining to the physical and phenomenological composition of an individual philosophical subjects mereological identity and from there you can hopefully appreciate why I have considered all the contextual factors that go into indexicals of a moral statement. Now, consider the law of excluded middle: this law of thought states that for every proposition, either this proposition or its negation is true. Just as with the problem of navigation around the law of identity by conceding the fact that the individual philosophical subject who in a moral statement is represented by the grammatical subject (what or who the sentence is about) relates to the action or attitude towards an act, which is represented by the grammatical predicate (what the subject is or is doing) of the moral statement, it is necessary to include the specific values of all the relative contextual variables that make up the mereological sum when considering the truth value of propositions within an argument.

To get a better idea, consider the following hypothetical: an 8-year-old girl named Misty believes in Santa Claus, thus the proposition, "Misty believes in Santa Claus," is true. In one years time, the now 9-year-old girl named Misty no longer believes in Santa Claus. Does this mean that the proposition, "Misty believes in Santa Claus," is now false, thus its negation is true? Or, does this mean that both the proposition and its negation are true?

I think neither option is the case because I think that these are two different propositions about the attitudes of two different individuals. The 9-year-old Misty who doesn't believe in Santa Claus is not the same individual as she was when she was an 8-year-old girl who did believe in Santa Claus.

This is the case with regards to our physical compositions as well. If we define a person as the individual with all of the properties and mereology of composite parts who stands before us, then that person would no longer meet the compositional criteria that once defined them. I assume you realize that we are quantum systems and are thus undergoing a constant state of energy and material exchange with the quantum systems which make up our environment. Just because we are unable to distinguish between such micro-level changes does not mean that they don't occur and subsequently alter the material composition which defined us a fraction of a second before.

How does one ever make a determination as to what an ethical agency is when the concept is so fleeting and disjointed? It seems you pin the metaethical question, what is the nature of ethical goodness and badness? on unpinnable actualities. — Constance

I'm not sure that it is possible to do so on this logic. I am afraid that such is not a requisite capability and that the truth may be that we cannot.

All you bring out is there, but then once this is exhausted, there is the pain, that is, pain simplicter. This is the metaethical "real" that is the material foundation for ethical attitudes and judgment. This is irreducible. (Not that the language used to talk about it is irreducible, but the injunction not to apply a flame to a living finger is. Wittgenstein would have agreed. He would just refuse to talk about it.) — Constance

Pain? So morality is reducible to a hedonistic unit representing negative utility? But, pain is also subjective. Some people associate the same stimuli that others report as pain, but as pleasure. Think of the masochist. Pain seems to be just as arbitrary and mind-dependent as any other psychological state.

What is the relationship between subjectivity and empirical notions like the physical , neurophysiological facts and adeterministic universe? — Joshs

Subjectivity is probably best understood as a psychological context about the way things are and also as the opposite of objectivity, which is the way things are independent from individual subjectivity. We can identify subjectivity if we consider the way things in the world are that have to do with our perceptions, feelings, or attitudes towards them. We can additionally identify subjectivity if we consider such things that are dependent upon our mental states to exist, such as a belief, a taste, or a perspective.

A few examples of things that exist objectively would be: an actual Christmas tree, an actual grizzly bear, and the actual moon. On the converse, a few contrasting examples of things that exist subjectively would be: the symbolic meaning of Christianity associated with a Christmas tree; the emotional state of fear associated with a close encounter with a grizzly bear; and our belief that there are little green men living on the moon.

Empirical notions is an interesting term. I suppose it could mean a vague idea or concept about the information we derive from sensory experience. Alternatively, it could mean to think about empirical evidence, or empirical-based theories.

In regards to your first example: 'the physical' is quite a broad term that can be modeled into empirical theories, but not necessarily. Whenever physics, for example, engages in non-empirical theorizing such as mathematical, or a priory, it can be modeled in a completely abstract way.

Consider the differences between classical 'Newtonian' physics and modern 'quantum' physics. While it is clear that classical physics corresponds exactly to the empirical state of the world since it mainly deals with phenomena at the macroscopic scale and phenomena at the macroscopic scale can largely be studied with only the basic human senses; whereas when it comes to quantum physics, on the other hand, phenomena behaves in ways of which seem to be fundamentally incompatible with the laws of classical physics.

This is due to the fact that modern physics largely deals with phenomena at the sub-microscopic level. At this level, the laws and observable regularities of classical physics become blurred or even broken. The laws and rules that govern classical physics seem to either be completely inapplicable or only approximately applicable with the laws and rules that govern modern physics.

Your second example regarding neurophysiological facts are indeed empirical facts since it is a study branching from both physiology and neuroscience to focus on the functioning of the nervous system. Thus, neurophysiological facts have to do with the structure and function of the nervous system such as how neurons receive and transmit information from a stimulus. However, the phenomenological content which emerges from the nervous system as a result of many cognitive processes occurring among the many regions of the brain, remain mired in subjectivity. There, the brain begins a process of refining the raw stimulus sense-data into useful information. Subjectivity may only be epistemically accessible to the individual subjective agent, thus it remains locked away and it most unfortunately is largely ignored within these sciences. There are the neural correlates, I suppose.

Your final example, a deterministic universe is a philosophical view that every event in the universe was determined by a preexisting chain of causal events. In other words, that there has been a cause and effect relationship between all the events that have ever occurred, are occurring, or will occur yet in the universe.

Determinism is more directly supported by virtue of a probabilistic confirmation rather than in the sense of empirical proof such as from experience and experimentation. Determinism is an interesting prospect for a relationship between what is subjective (human free will) and what is empirical (physical sciences). However, all in all, the determinism entailed by a deterministic universe seems to be more a notion of cause/effect rather than an empirical notion.

Are empirical facts the product of intersubjectivity? — Joshs

I'm not sure if I understand the question. Intersubjectivity can be having a shared empirical definition of an object. When asked to imagine a tree, the empirical definition of the tree would correspond with an actual tree. The word 'tree' provides a shared meaning by virtue of linguistic construct that people can use as they interact with each other as a common resource for interpreting the meanings of social and cultural elements. This kind of forms a segue into your next question, however.

they social constructs, and if so, is s scientific truth adjudicated the same way as subjective moral truth? — Joshs

I think that social constructs naturally develop within any social group. They may take the form of physical, empirical and otherwise objective material objects but the elements of a social construct are not represented as an objective feature of reality, but rather they are represented instead by their attached meanings. These meanings are not inherent to the physical material symbolizing such meaning, as such things are only meaningful because the individuals within the social group have adopted such meanings. For example, the notion of an event such as Christmas, or the connotations placed on such terms as democracy.

I don't understand the last question pertaining to scientific truth and subjective moral truth. Science is empirical, objective, a posteriori and subscribes to the correspondence theory of truth, whereas individual moral subjectivism is more theoretical or rational, and, of course, subjective, a priori, and seems to subscribe to the coherence theory of truth (alternatively, a pragmatic theory of truth may be subscribed to).

Does science progress through falsification or change the way the arts and politics do? — Joshs

I think such accounts described by Thomas Kuhn within his, "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" are some of the best, certainly most influential, descriptions of the history and especially the development of science. Such accounts held by Kuhn was that science maintains periods of stable growth wherein the prevailing theories and models produce accurate predictions and moves the knowledge of science forward. These stable periods sometimes enter into a state of crisis as the prevailing theories and models become less accurate or are threatened by competing models which may become further punctuated by a revisionary into scientific revolutions.

Also, Kuhn's "Incommensurability thesis," seems to lean in the direction of scientific progression analogous to that of art or politics, perhaps. At least insofar as theories and models from differing periods throughout history (e.g., Aristotelian, Galilean and Newtonian) each seem to equally lack the quality of being similar and comparable to other theories and models.

The totality of physical and phenomenological variables as they were arranged and sequenced in a specific order, having a specific causal relationship between the physical universe and the subject of experience, both with regards to the subjects entire series of past experiences and the trajectory of their experience into the future. Everything that happened before an event and the deterministic flow of the universe into everything that will ever happen subsequent to an event.

Something along those lines. The idea is that everything is at all times in a state of fluctuation and thus nothing, no one, and no idea or feeling can ever be the same as it was a fraction of a second ago. It is a way of answering questions pertaining to individual subjective morality with regard to a subjects proclivity to change evaluative positions or moral views—and at times erratically, irrationally, and/or sporadically.

It's no specialized term. It's more a function of my linguistic incompetence in describing such abstract concepts.

This what I was going for in P1.

All humans have an equal basic moral status. They possess the same fundamental rights, and the comparable interests of each person should count the same in calculations that determine social policy. Neither supposed racial differences, nor skin color, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, intelligence, nor any other differences among humans negate their fundamental equal worth and dignity. — Rank Amateur

Did you cite the author John Kekes whos essay "A Reasonable Alternative to Egalitarianism" was published in "Debates in Political Philosophy"? You quoted him word for word here.

All humans have an equal basic moral status. They possess the same fundamental rights, and the comparable interests of each person should count the same in calculations that determine social policy....

All moral subjectivists refuse to reckon with that lighted match. — Constance

I don't understand this objection. What exactly do you mean by "refuse to reckon with"? I consider stimulus events such as objects or events that elicit a sensory response when a detectable change to the energy in the surrounding environment is registered by the senses. A stimulus triggers our nervous system whenever sufficient changes in the environmental energy is detected. These changes in the environmental energy act as information inputs insofar as they affect the level of voltage across the cell membrane of the neuron. This is called a change in the membrane potential of a neuron.

The membrane potential of a neuron is the difference in electrical charge between the inside and the outside of a neuron. This difference in electrical charge is due to the unequal distribution of ions between the inside and outside of the membrane. Ions are atoms that have lost or gained electrons and as a result either have a negative or positive charge.

A few of the ions that play an important role in the membrane potential of a neuron are positively charged sodium ions and negatively charged chloride ions which are more prevalent on the outside of the cellular membrane when the neuron is at rest. Also while at rest, there are positively charged potassium ions and many other negatively charged ions prevalent on the inside of the cellular membrane. At rest, the inside of the cellular membrane is mostly negative with the outside of the membrane mostly positive.

The inside membrane potential is regulated by a protein mechanism, which disproportionately influences which ions travel through ion channels. It uses energy to pump positively charged sodium ions out of the cell and pump negatively charged potassium ions into the cell. For every two sodium ions pumped out of the cell, three potassium ions are pumped into the cell which is how the inside of the cellular membrane maintains its overall negative charge.

An action potential is a momentary reversal of membrane potential which is the basis for electrical signaling in neurons. A stimulus event causes an influx of positive ions to enter the inside of the cell and once a threshold is passed, a sudden, fast, transitory and propagating change of the resting membrane occurs in the form of a nervous impulse. These impulses carry information in the form of a sensation to which we attach meanings to. These meanings are in constant fluctuation as well and can even develop enough differences over time to change the overall patterns of our perceptions.

The thing is, the energy of a stimulus event can be measured and reproduced so to enable us to test how a subject will respond to the same stimulus energy. And, what all the data points to is that while a physical stimulus event can be measured in such trials with a constant variable of energy, the subjects neuropsychological response and subsequent sensory perceptions and associated attitudes, on the other hand, will vary. It then seems likely that no source will produce the same response from us and that our experiences at the most fundamental level are arbitrary. If a stimulus event is held objectively constant, whatever information stored in such energy becomes distorted as it processes within the receiving subject. It seems as if the lighted match transmits a regularity of data which is uniquely processed into meaningful information through it's integration in the contexts of a complex system of dynamic neuropsychological structures tethering the mereology of individual conscious experiences that we identify as ourselves.

Just to be clear then, your view is that premise 2 in this argument

1. If what makes a moral statement "Xing is right" true is my having attitude Y towards X, then if I have attitude Y towards the act of raping Jane, then the statement "Raping Jane is right" will necessarily be true if I say it.
2. If I have attitude Y towards the act of raping Jane, then the statement "raping Jane is right" will not necessarily be true if I say it
3. Therefore, what makes a moral statement "Xing is right" true is not my having attitude Y towards X.
— Bartricks

Is false.

You think that if you approve of raping Jane, then necessarily it is morally right for you to do so.

That's absurd. You stand refuted. — Bartricks

Just to be clear, you are the referent subject within the argument, not I. And, I think that if we consider the meanings which moral terms express under the interpretation of individual ethical subjectivism, then a subject's approval of an act is by definition what makes the act morally right. This would be analytically true and self-evident in the same way that being an unmarried man is by definition what makes the man a bachelor. I accept the reductio entailed by the view so long as the view remains otherwise consistent and with no competing views to consider. But, to be precise, the reductio entailed by the view would be that, "If we consider the meanings which moral terms express under the interpretation of individual ethical subjectivism, then a subject's approval of an act is by definition what makes the act morally right," which is a considerably less difficult bullet to bite because it is not a statement about what is moral to any other subject other than the one in which the statement is indexed to.

It is self-evident to reason that if A is bigger than B, and B is bigger than C, then A is bigger than C.

It is self-evident to reason that arguments of this kind:

1. If P, then Q
2. P
3. Therefore Q

are valid - that is, their conclusions are true if their premises are.

And it is self-evident to reason that if you approve of raping Jane, it does not follow of necessity that it is actually morally right for you to do so.

Now, you can double-down if you want and insist that it is in fact right, but that's no different in terms of rational credibility than just insisting that the above argument form is invalid because you have a theory that says it is. — Bartricks

I never challenged the validity of your argument, but rather it's soundness. Modus ponens is indeed a valid deductive argument form. It is also tautological in nature which can be said to soften it's persuasive force, but nonetheless reinforced my initial belief that was lost once I realized that the metaethical semantics proposed by individual ethical subjectivism which produced the analytic truth of the arguments I've presented for you were also tautologous as well. That I think would be a better objection to the argument.

It is only self-evident to reason using arguments in the form of modus ponens ("if P then Q")—first, only if it already sound (if the conditional statement is accepted), and then if and only if the antecedent (P) holds by virtue of being true by definition when inferring to the consequent (Q), such as, "If P, then Q" whereby the terms of antecedent have been defined in such a way that they are analytically equivalent to the terms of the consequent (e.g., if the term 'morally right' has been semantically equalized to the term 'approved of by the subject'); or if the antecedents negation can not be demonstrated to produce a contradiction when inferring to the consequent (e.g., "If there is sunlight outside, then it is daytime; there is sunlight out; therefore, it is daytime," and the negation, "If there is no sunlight out, then it is daytime, there is no sunlight out; therefore, it is daytime".) Perhaps I can formalize a better example.

Modus ponens structure:

If P, then Q
2. P
3. Therefore Q

If the antecedent holds, then the consequent may be inferred:

1. If there exists something, then the statement 'nothing exists' is false. (P = "There exists something" and Q = "The statement 'nothing exists' is false").

2. There exists something.

3. Therefore, the statement 'nothing exists' is false.

Demonstrating the antecedent's negation forms a contradiction:

1. If there does not exist something, then the statement 'nothing exists' is false. (P = "There does not exist something" and Q = "The statement 'nothing exists' is false").

2. There does not exist something.

3. Therefore, the statement 'nothing exists' is false.

The second argument forms a contradiction because if there does not exist something then the statement 'nothing exists' would be true, not false. To say otherwise is to say that it both is and is not the case that something must exist for the statement 'nothing exists' to be false.

And it is self-evident to reason that if you approve of raping Jane, it does not follow of necessity that it is actually morally right for you to do so. — Bartricks

No, it isn't under a proper interpretation of the metaethical semantics of individual ethical subjectivism. You are committing an equivocation fallacy otherwise. A self-evident truth can never be derived from an equivocation fallacy. And, modus ponens does not necessarily mean that the inference is a self-evident truth. That is absurd. Consider the following:

1. If Earth orbits the sun, then Jupiter orbits the earth.

2. Earth orbits the sun.

3. Therefore, Jupiter orbits the earth.

This is a modus ponens syllogism and thus a valid argument structure. However, the consequent is false, therefore the argument is unsound. Definitely not a self-evident truth.

As I see it, your "index" of references constitutes an endless search of grounding, any proposition that can be conceived being duly contextually contingent upon other conditions, and those still deferring to others. — Constance

I'm not sure if I understand what you mean. When I consider indexicals, I am considering the meaning of ethical language as described by a specific metaethical view (metaethical subjectivism in this case; a contingency for the truth-aptness of moral statements upon the attitude of the individual subject indexed to the statement), since such views seem to describe their meanings in a way that is both novel, thus necessarily requiring an alternative semantics, and in a way that maintains a reflection to its context. Since the view is a metaethical thesis that goes beyond the foundational metaphysical, epistemological, semantic, and psychological understandings of morality with regards to how we think, speak, and practice morality, it is important that while we suppose new theories about what morality is, or what of it can be known, or the role it plays in human behavior, etc, that we also consider how this could potentially change the foundational meanings that moral terms express.

In doing this, I have simply considered how the metaethical semantics of individual ethical subjectivism may effect the reference of certain linguistic expressions in such a way that must shift from a context that is definite, regular, or consistent over time and doesn't consider the continuing development of a subjects subjective identify, over to a context of contextual dynamics considering all interrelated conditions such as: historical subjectivity, social influences on behavior—conditioning as well as processes of compliance, identification, and internalization that factor in changing attitudes, the specific configuration of physical environmental influences and the corresponding internal neuropsychological responses, etc. All of which must be relativized to a specific attitude of a specific subject within a specific spatiotemporal configuration who has a specific history of conscious and subconscious experiences, and so on. We are never the same person because we are constantly changing both physically and psychologically, therefore our attitudes and likewise our morality if we consider an individual subjective view is never fixed and undergoing constant fluctuations at all times that may from moment to moment influence measurable changes in our moral outlook. I have simply come to the conclusion that our attitudes are reflections of our moral outlook but only relative to a moment in time or within a specific frame of reference unique to a sequence of experiences throughout the totality of our experiences since the emergence of our consciousness.

I suspect that in order to understand the framework in which individual ethical subjectivism makes sense, it is necessary to realize that linguistic expressions are but signals that semantically refer to a unique frame of reference to an experienced event in the absolute context in which it was experienced as it occurred.

No, don't be silly. It is self-evident. If Tim approves of raping Sarah, that does not entail that it is morally right for Tim to rape Sarah, does it? — Bartricks

According to individual ethical subjectivism, to say that a subject approves of an act IS to say that it is moral, but it is only moral relative to the subject if and only if it the subject indeed approves of the act.

It is not self-evident. A self-evident proposition would be something like, "Conscious experiences are happening," or, "A whole is greater than, or equal to, any of its parts," since to say otherwise produces a contradiction by virtue of how we define the terms of such propositions. A well-known analytical proposition would be, "A bachelor is an unmarried man," since a bachelor is by definition an unmarried man, or, a well-known metaphysical proposition such as, "There is something rather than nothing," since the proposition is a fundamental assumption that we necessarily must presuppose in order to even engage in metaphysical discourse or thought.

The proposition, "Rape is immoral," cannot be demonstrated to produce a contradiction nor is it a fundamental presupposition necessary for discussion or thinking about morality. You can only either beg the question by using a circular argument (e.g., rape is immoral because rape is bad), or appeal to a series of unjustified premises to support it ad infinitum by accepting an infinite regress argument (the truth of proposition P is holds only by P², which holds only by P³, which holds only by P⁴, and so on, ad infinitum), or just not be willing to discuss the rationality of the proposition at all by maintaining dogmatism—or relying on faith.

I'm happy to concede this point, if and only if you can demonstrate the truth of your claim by evidence or sound argument.

Moral norms and values obviously transcend our own, both individually and collectively — Bartricks

What is the argument for that?

if morality appeared to be collectively subjective, then sociology would solve moral problems — Bartricks

I'm not sure what you mean by 'collectively subjective' and since I'm not holding the position that morality is intersubjective, or to come from anything other than the interior of individual consciousness, then this is either a misrepresentation or a term you must necessarily define to make this statement clear. Disambiguation notwithstanding, it is not clear that sociology would solve moral problems if they were subjective.

individual ethical subjectivism and collective ethical subjectivism are demonstrably false. Nobody defends them. They're only mentioned for the purposes of rejection. If you want to get good at metaethics the first thing you need to do is understand why those views are false, not continue foolishly trying to defend them. — Bartricks

If individual ethical subjectivism is demonstrably false, then it's falsity must be capable of being demonstrated, shown or proven. You have done none of the above and it is certainly not clear that it is false. Premises such as, "Nobody defends it," are merely appeals to the people (i.e., argumentum ad populum), which is fallacious reasoning that I will not accept because it does not logically imply the conclusion. If such views are false, I very much wish to understand why and you have not yet demonstrated that this is indeed the case. I am not so much defending them as I am demanding an accurate representation of them be refuted by virtue of countervailing proof—be that evidence or sound argument. Could you please present which two statements (under a proper interpretation of individual ethical subjectivism) form a contradiction? Or, which terms form an equivocation? You claim that individual ethical subjectivism is demonstrably false, thus conceivably proven false, so then you hold the burden of proof which can only be satisfied by substantiating the truth of a negation to any of the propositions it holds.

This is where I would say Tim's approval (not sure why his approval must be universal rather than particular here) of rape is an expression of individual relativism (meaning it is right insofar as it is approved by Tim) but seeing that society does not operate on such a premise —be it true or false—but rather on a culturally relativistic premise with deontological installations such as social contracts, human rights, and other such normalized standards for conduct that stigmatize and denormalize such individualized moral standards.
— Cartesian trigger-puppets

I do not understand what you mean. — Bartricks

Which premise is false in this argument:

1. If what makes a moral statement "Xing is right" true is my having attitude Y towards X, then if I have attitude Y towards the act of raping Jane, then the statement "Raping Jane is right" will necessarily be true if I say it.
2. If I have attitude Y towards the act of raping Jane, then the statement "raping Jane is right" will not necessarily be true if I say it
3. Therefore, what makes a moral statement "Xing is right" true is not my having attitude Y towards X.
— Bartricks

It depends on which metaethical semantics we interpret these statements under. That is the point of metaethics is it not?
— Cartesian trigger-puppets

Waffle. That first sentence - "It depends on which metaethical semantics we interpret these statements under" - is nonsense. I said stop trying to be clever.

It is a deductively valid argument, yes? So you need to deny a premise. Like I say, don't try and be fancy. Stop using words like 'semantics' and 'metaethics'. Plain English.

Now, premise 1 is true by definition - it just describes a kind of individual subjectivism. So you can't deny 1 .

It has to be 2 then.

Yet 2 is self-evidently true.

There's a reason why philosophers don't defend individual subjectivism. That argument being one of them. — Bartricks

Im not trying to be clever. Semantics has to do with how words convey information to us as we draw meaning from them and how meanings can change based on their contextual relations to other words, or within different syntactic structures. Metaethics makes an effort to understand the meanings of moral terms used in ethical discourse: whether they convey information, whether they capable of being true or false, and if so what would make them true. Ethics uses a special kind of discourse wherein declarative statements seem objective and cognitive intuitively but upon further investigation it becomes less and less apparent that this is the case. Ethical language can be descriptive, emotive, evaluative, directive, critical, etc, and the meaning we draw from ethical statements can be interpreted differently based upon a number of theories about what it is that ethical statements are actually expressing.

Could we not interpret the meaning of these statements differently based upon which metaethical theories we adopt as a frame of reference? Subjective or objective, relative or absolute, cognitive or non-cognitive, etc.

Yes, the argument is deductive and logically valid, but it is not necessarily sound. Premise 2 is not axiomatic or self evident as it is a contention within metaethical discourse which we are taking part in. It is also not a strong representation of individual moral subjectivism.

1. If what makes a moral statement "Xing is right" true is my having attitude Y towards X, then if I have attitude Y towards the act of raping Jane, the statement "Raping Jane is right" will necessarily be true if I say it.

2. If I have attitude Y towards the act of raping Jane, then the statement "raping Jane is right" will not necessarily be true if I say it

3. Therefore, what makes a moral statement "Xing is right" true is not my having attitude Y towards X.

This would be a much stronger representation:

1. If having a positive attitude towards an act makes it morally right (in the context of individual subjective morality) for the person having the attitude, then it is morally right if and only if it is indeed the case that they hold such a positive attitude and that the attitude accurately conveys how they feel.

2. It is indeed the case that they hold such a positive attitude and that the attitude accurately conveys how they feel.

3. Therefore, by having a positive attitude towards an act makes it morally right (in the context of individual subjective morality) for the person having the attitude.

Notice that so long as the definition of that which is morally good is that which a person has a positive attitude towards, then premise 2 is, by definition, self-evidently true. Furthermore, so long as the definition of that which is morally good is that which a person has a positive attitude towards is maintained through the interpretation of your argument, then premise 2 forms a contradiction. Namely, that it both is and is not the case that that which is morally good is that which a person has a positive attitude towards.

So, unless you can provide an argument for why the statement "raping Jane is right" will not necessarily be true if I say it (in the context of individual subjective morality), then what can be asserted without evidence can also be dismissed without evidence.

You must answer the epistemic question: "How do we know that rape is immoral?" Which will either be met with claims that it is self-evidently true whenever there is moral disagreement between individuals, cultures, societies and over history, or met with an argument which is circular, or met with an argument that requires an infinite regress of subsequent supporting arguments. None of these are acceptable justifications and are thus unfounded and can be just as easily dismissed.

When you say that subjectivism is a theory about what something is 'made of', are you saying that morality (according to subjectivism) is made of our attitudes, feelings, or other psychological states? If so, is individual moral subjectivism not a form of individual moral relativism wherein moral values are relativized to the individual subject? I understand that realism is a family of theories about what exists and im not debating that, but rather I am trying to understand how something must necessarily exist in order to be considered true.

Additionally, subjectivism is a form of anti-realism (the denial of moral realism), which traditionally holds—in the case of morality—that morality exists mind-independently, and can thus be considered a thesis that rejects the view that morality exists mind-independently. This is what I understand to be the case as described in the following:

Traditionally, to hold a realist position with respect to X is to hold that X exists in a mind-independent manner. On this view, moral anti-realism is the denial of the thesis that moral properties—or facts, objects, relations, events, etc. (whatever categories one is willing to countenance)—exist mind-independently. This could involve either (1) the denial that moral properties exist at all, or (2) the acceptance that they do exist but that existence is (in the relevant sense) mind-dependent. — Joyce, Richard,

I understand that subjectivism/objectivism and realism/ relativism are orthogonal to each other, but a subjectivist can take a relativist form as well as an absolutist form. For example, individual subjectivism would be relativized to each individual so that the moral values held by each individual are equally good and, as Richard Joyce describes below, in the context of subjectivism, moral subjectivism "...denotes the view that moral facts exist and are mind-dependent...".

5. Subjectivism
To deny both noncognitivism and the moral error theory suffices to make one a minimal moral realist. Traditionally, however, moral realism has required the denial of a further thesis: the mind-dependence of morality. There is no generally accepted label for theories that deny both noncognitivism and the moral error theory but maintain that moral facts are mind-dependent. Here I shall use a term as good as any other (though one used not infrequently in other ways): “subjectivism.” Thus, “moral subjectivism” denotes the view that moral facts exist and are mind-dependent, while “moral objectivism” holds that they exist and are mind-independent. — Joyce, Richard,

Conversely, subjectivism can take an absolutist form such as with divine command theory wherein the truth or falsity of moral value judgements rests ultimately on the subjective states of a single omnipotent being—thus mind-dependent and absolute, or non-relative.

It seems to me that there are multiple accounts for what theories under 'subjectivism' may entail. I may of course be wrong and your explanation did help open my eyes to a specific account, but now I just need to understand how your account makes ones like these obsolete, or how I am misinterpreting what is being said here.

I literally do not see how you cannot see the difference. Theories about what exist: morality exists (realism); morality does not exist (nihilism); morality is not a thing that exists or does not exist (expressivism).

Theories about what morality is made of: subjectivism (morality is made of subjective states); naturalism (morality is made of natural objects, properties and relations); non-naturalism (morality is made of non-natural objects, properties and relations). — Bartricks

I understand and this helps, but what am I getting wrong about subjectivism as a form of relativism, or as a type of anti-realism?

Are beliefs considered to be a part of an individual's subjective states? If so, can such beliefs be cognitive?
— Cartesian trigger-puppets

Yes, beliefs are subjective states. Only subjects - minds - can believe things. A belief is a state of mind - a state of a subject. Beliefs are subjective states.

I do not know what you mean by 'cognitive'. Can you ask the question again without using the word cognitive? — Bartricks

Cognitive in the sense that they convey information rather than being entirely emotive in which they only convey an emotion. For example, if I say, "Apples are delicious," I am making a statement which is phrased objectively insofar as it is declarative and truth-apt. It is cognitive because it is conveying information, but it is also emotive since when I say it, what I actually mean to say is something like, "I believe that apples are delicious," which is phrased subjectively and with emotive meaning since the truth-aptness rests upon whether or not I hold such a belief and that it is conveying how I feel.

That was an objection to individual subjectivism. (Subjectivism is the name of a family of views, that includes my own - divine command theory). So, I am a subjectivist. My objection was to 'individual' subjectivism. — Bartricks

Forgive my imprecision of language, I did mean to say individual subjective morality and not simply subjective morality.

So, let's just say - for the sake of argument - that 'wrongness' describes a certain attitude of disapproval (perhaps universal disapproval) and rightness approval (a certain universal approval, say).

Okay, well then by definition if Tim universally approves of rape, it will be right for Tim to rape.
That's clearly not true. Therefore that kind of subjectivism is false — Bartricks

This is where I would say Tim's approval (not sure why his approval must be universal rather than particular here) of rape is an expression of individual relativism (meaning it is right insofar as it is approved by Tim) but seeing that society does not operate on such a premise —be it true or false—but rather on a culturally relativistic premise with deontological installations such as social contracts, human rights, and other such normalized standards for conduct that stigmatize and denormalize such individualized moral standards.

When you say, "It is clearly not true that it is right for Tim to rape," what makes it 'clearly' not true? How do we know that rape is immoral?

Which premise is false in this argument:

1. If what makes a moral statement "Xing is right" true is my having attitude Y towards X, then if I have attitude Y towards the act of raping Jane, then the statement "Raping Jane is right" will necessarily be true if I say it.
2. If I have attitude Y towards the act of raping Jane, then the statement "raping Jane is right" will not necessarily be true if I say it
3. Therefore, what makes a moral statement "Xing is right" true is not my having attitude Y towards X. — Bartricks

It depends on which metaethical semantics we interpret these statements under. That is the point of metaethics is it not? Under the metaethical semantics of individual subjective morality, premise 2 is false because if you have attitude Y towards the act of raping Jane, then the statement "raping Jane is right" must necessarily be true if you say it because it is an analytic truth. It is a true statement derivable from a tautology by putting synonyms for synonyms.

If by having the attitude Y towards the moral statement X is what makes the moral statement X true (on individual subjective morality), then the moral statement X is true by having the attitude Y towards it. It is true by definition because having the attitude Y is analytically equivalent to the moral statement X being true. It is reduced to a tautology. If the terms 'P' (Having a positive attitude towards) and 'Q' (That which is morally right) are defined as synonymous with one another, then 'P' is logically equivalent to 'Q'. It would be the same for divine command theory:

If 'P' (is commanded by God), then 'Q' (has the status of being morally good). Because everything commanded by God, by definition, has the status of being morally good, then 'P' is analytically equivalent to 'Q'. Of course this is only the case under the metaethical semantics of divine command theory.

Yes, I admit that was sloppy of me. I am doubtful that the second claim is true because im not entirely sure what im committed to by saying that some moral statements are true. I have to explore a few questions more thoroughly. Questions such as: "Can some moral statements be considered true under a coherence theory of truth, or under a pragmatic theory of truth?" for example.

If I maintain the view of moral subjectivism by retracting the second claim (that some moral statements are true) but leaving all else the same, what other objections would you raise? You seemed to be more interested in showing how my philosophical language was erroneous rather than refuting the overall thesis of my theory. Perhaps it would be easier to just ask you a few questions.

On your view:

Are beliefs considered to be a part of an individual's subjective states? If so, can such beliefs be cognitive?

Can there be facts about an individual's subjective states? (Consider the following excerpt from Dwayne H. Mulder, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.)

b. Objectivism, Subjectivism and Non-Cognitivism

Philosophical theories about the nature of morality generally divide into assertions that moral truths express subjective states and assertions that moral truths express objective facts, analogous to the fact, for example, that the sun is more massive than the earth.

So-called subjectivist theories regard moral statements as declaring that certain facts hold, but the facts expressed are facts about a person’s subjective states. For example, the statement “It is wrong to ignore a person in distress if you are able to offer aid” just means something like “I find it offensive when someone ignores a person in distress….” This is a statement about the subject’s perceptions of the object, not about the object itself (that is, ignoring a person in distress).

Do you find anything wrong with this author's description here?

I remember you offering one such objection that went something like: 'If moral subjectivism is true, then my belief that raping J is good would make raping J a moral thing to do. Raping J is not a moral thing to do. Therefore moral subjectivism is false.' Forgive me if I have misrepresented your argument here.

The problem with the above argument is that it fails to acknowledge the metaethical semantics of subjectivist moral theories (such as Dwayne H. Mulder acknowledged in his article). With this in mind, the statement, "Raping J is good," simply means something like "I find it morally acceptable to rape J" which is simply a description of the authors subjective states. This description seems to be truth-apt, and at least a psychological fact, but I suppose im uncertain whether or not it is true.

That is incredibly dishonest of you. They did NOT say such things. — Bartricks

I meant that Wikipedia cited these authors. The citations are right there on the page if you don't believe me. I'm not being dishonest, perhaps I could have written that a little more clearly. Wikipedia clearly cited these authors, whether or not these citations are accurate representations of what these authors actually said is another issue.

people like you, who lack any concern to get things correct — Bartricks

If I lacked any concern to get things right, then why would I tolerate interacting with you? Your rhetoric is hardly tolerable, but there is at least a smidge of knowledge somewhere in you and it is that reason alone that I even read your comments. I am quite concerned about getting things right, even if I must endure such impudence.

No conflation of subjectivism with realism. So a) stop dishonestly pretending that what you're quoting is coming from professional philosophers. — Bartricks

I agree that the citation seems questionable at best but if you would actually read what I was saying, then you would see that I merely stated that they are used as a citation. I said 'they' cited, as in Wikipedia cited these authors. Notice that I won't assume intellectual dishonesty here with you, but that you could have done a better job of reading what I said and I probably could have been more clear. I did clearly say that the authors were cited, though.

How on earth does that contradict what I said??? — Bartricks

Realism also makes the claim that moral statements have a truth value, and that some of those truth values are true, but, in addition, realism also claims that such truth values exist objectively, as in a mind-independent property of the world.
— Cartesian trigger-puppets

No, you're conflating moral realism with objectivist moral realism. — Bartricks

I'll consider your suggestions when I'm less irritated by your demeanor. As of now, I'm starting to think that you really are just a troll. Note that I didn't bother to carefully read your arguments, a symptom of sharing dialogue with an insufferable interlocutor, so I will withhold any comments until I have the energy and patience to assess them critically.

My previous comment should be read in the context of a capitulation. I was explaining myself more than I was criticizing you.

I understand that Wikipedia is not academically peer-reviewed, but those particular statements were cited by two academic sources:

1. Richard Brandt (1959). Ethical theory; the problems of normative and critical ethics. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

2. Harrison, Jonathan (2006). Borchert, Donald M. (ed.). Encyclopedia of philosophy (2nd ed.). Detroit: Thomson Gale/Macmillan Reference USA.

The reason I referenced the SEP article was because it highlights the problems we are having. And how does this not contradict you: "To deny both noncognitivism and the moral error theory suffices to make one a minimal moral realist. Traditionally, however, moral realism has required the denial of a further thesis: the mind-dependence of morality," this implies that traditional moral realism does not merely state that some moral statements are true, but must be true independent of human thought or opinion. In other words, mind-independent or objective. This is why I was attracted to a subjective view because I find it more plausible that morality lie within our subjective states rather than as a property of the external world.

Perhaps I am making a mistake in using the term 'truth' and I did admit as much to you much earlier. I am still trying to figure out which theory of truth best fits my moral outlook and which ones I may adopt to discover a more satisfying one. If by making a statement of fact about my attitude toward a thing makes the truth of my moral judgments depend on a natural, however subjective, fact about the world, then maybe I am committing to a minimalist form of realism, or subjective naturalism, or something. Or, perhaps, I should just say that my attitude is what makes my statements express a moral goodness or other such evaluations within a subjective framework, rather than statements which are true.

You have succeeded in getting me to seriously doubt the consistency of my moral theorizing, or perhaps the meta-ethical position that best describes my views. You haven't given me any ideas for a better alternative theory, which would have been most convincing. I think my problems lie in my ignorance of the various theories of truth. I accept a correspondence theory in some contexts, coherence in others and have even considered some pragmatic theories of truth, but I find none completely satisfactory.

If I am in error here, it certainly was no aid to persistently insist upon misrepresenting me. If by saying that, "At least some moral statements are true," does indeed necessarily commit me to realism, it still is not an accurate representation of what I was saying. You could have been much more effective by using the terms that I was using. I never made the statement that I am committed to realism so why would I give credence to any point you make asserting just that? If you would have said that subjectivism is not committed to the statement that some moral propositions are true (and I'm aware that you have said that, but disproportionately so) it would have stuck with me a bit better. It was with such thought in mind, as I read more strictly academic sources that I have access to, that I began to form greater uncertainty.

Not that it is your duty to correct me, just that you seemed to be genuinely trying to and your approach is unnecessary antagonistic insofar as it doesn't explicitly represent the interlocutors actual words, uses small minded and defamatory language such as 'stupid,' 'insane,' and so on, merely makes—or restates—an assertion, all of which make you seem much less like you know what you are talking about and much more like the troll that some accuse you of being. It is hard to really consider what someone is saying whenever you think (or are suffering from confirmation bias) that they may be a troll.

I will have to reassess my position here and find more academic sources to do more reading with. If you have any suggestions, I would appreciate it and prioritize them first.

No, I am saying that the form of subjectivism that I have subscribed to is committed to the statement, "At least some moral statements are true," and that does not necessarily entail that I am a realist.
— Cartesian trigger-puppets

And I'm telling you that if you include that claim then you are a 'subjectivist realist' about morality. — Bartricks

So, these sources are wrong?

Ethical subjectivism or moral non-objectivism is the meta-ethical view which claims that:

1. Ethical sentences express propositions.

2. Some such propositions are true.

3.The truth or falsity of such propositions is ineliminably dependent on the (actual or hypothetical) attitudes of people.

—Wikipedia

Ethical Subjectivism holds that there are no objective moral properties and that ethical statements are in fact arbitrary because they do not express immutable truths. Instead, moral statements are made true or false by the attitudes and/or conventions of the observers, and any ethical sentence just implies an attitude, opinion, personal preference or feeling held by someone. Thus, for a statement to be considered morally right merely means that it is met with approval by the person of interest.

—Philosophybasics

To deny both noncognitivism and the moral error theory suffices to make one a minimal moral realist. Traditionally, however, moral realism has required the denial of a further thesis: the mind-dependence of morality. There is no generally accepted label for theories that deny both noncognitivism and the moral error theory but maintain that moral facts are mind-dependent; here I shall use the term “non-objectivism.” Thus, “moral non-objectivism” denotes the view that moral facts exist and are mind-dependent (in the relevant sense), while “moral objectivism” holds that they exist and are mind-independent. (Note that this nomenclature makes the two contraries rather than contradictories; the error theorist and the noncognitivist count as neither objectivists nor non-objectivists — Joyce, Richard,

—Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Two points then, that you seem incapable of understanding.

Point 1: nobody, but nobody, uses 'subjectivism' about morality to include a commitment to realism. It is 'compatible' with realism, but it does not include a commitment to it. Of course, you are free to use words however you like, but it is misleading and silly to use the term in the way you are and it just makes you seem confused (and you are, clearly).

Point 2: if you think some moral statements are truth apt and some of them are true, then you think their truth conditions obtain. And so you are therefore a moral realist. For you believe morality exists. For by your own lights, morality itself is the truth conditions of moral statements. — Bartricks

Regarding point one, I am not necessarily committing myself to moral realism. I do not think that moral statements can be immutable truths, nor do I think that they exist (at least in an empirical or objective way), but rather I think they can nonetheless be true, and that such moral statements are made true by the attitude of the subject they are indexed to. I think that 2 + 2 = 4 is a true mathematical statement. I do not necessarily think that 2 + 2 = 4 exists as a natural, or otherwise supernatural property. As I made clear many days ago, we are fundamentally arguing past one another because we are operating under different assumptions about the nature and definition of truth. You obviously hold to the correspondence theory, I to the coherence theory, and you have yet to address this point, btw.

Regarding point two, no, I am not a moral realist, though I see how one could see me as a minimalist realist. I'm not even sure if a minimalist realist even counts as a realist. I think the truth conditions obtain, yes. However, I think that the truth conditions of moral propositions obtain by virtue of its coherence with a specified set of propositions, not that the truth conditions of moral propositions obtain by virtue of corresponding with objective features of the world. Is it true that you have thoughts? Is it true that you have individual instances of subjective, conscious experience? Is it true that you hold subjective states such as beliefs and emotions? Do these things have to necessarily exist to be true?

I hope to get past this notion that I believe that morality exists. Perhaps we should disambiguate the term 'existence' as well as the term 'truth'.

Lie aptness is important, so you, technically, are the one speaking riddles. — ghostlycutter

I don't remember making the claim that, "Lie-aptness is unimportant," as you are implying here.

Instead of addressing both sides, which you should, as you have not merely implied lie aptness through truth aptness, you have consequently subserved through the truth-apt side, only, justly 'coming off wrongly'' as I put off earlier. — ghostlycutter

Let's just cut through the gibberish and state an intelligible proposition. I know that you are capable of doing so. As far as I know, 'lie-aptness' is a term unique to you—or, at least alien to me—so it does little to move the conversation forward. Could you please just isolate the propositions that I have made that form any false claims and provide an argument (reasons to believe that they are false) to support your own claim.

Basically, how can you use the term moral without directly associating morality (good and evil)? If we're to engage in discussion about anything to do with morals, surely it's wise to understand them properly. — ghostlycutter

This is, again, not an argument. I understand your claim, namely that, " used the word moral a few times incorrectly," but you offer no examples, no supporting evidence, and no line of reasoning for me to analyze and assess the logical pattern of. This is a question. And to answer it; yes, you can use the term moral without directly associating morality. For example, the interrogative statement, "What does moral mean?". We do not yet understand morals properly, let alone the meaning of moral terms. This is why we are engaging in meta-ethical discussion right now. Now, could you show me which propositions I have made that are false?

I define morality as a system of principles and values used to determine the goodness or badness of an outcome, or the rightness or wrongness of an act or behavior.

I defined good as beneficence concerning a core, and evil as stupidity(or maleficence) concerning a core. — ghostlycutter

What does 'beneficence concerning a core' mean to you?

Now that I have shown you proper interpretation of good and evil, are the standards of this discussion still the same or have they improved? — ghostlycutter

No. Your language is esoteric. This conversation has just gotten even more confusing because instead of providing much-needed elucidation and disambiguation to your previous comments, you have otherwise provided additional terms that are unintelligible to me.

You keep bringing up laws and I don't understand why. I understand that laws have a moral purpose but they are not a part of moral philosophy. Moral philosophy is usually a discussion of either metaethics, applied ethics, and normative ethics. The former being the case with the OP.

Moral statements are also lie-apt, some moral propositions are false. 'Morality' as prescribed by the OP is false, and thus the OP begets a negative response from someone who is moral. — ghostlycutter

'Lie-apt', if we really want to use such a term, would be the same as truth-apt because for a moral statement to be false in a deceitful way (concealing or misrepresenting the truth) it would necessarily have to be truth-apt in order to be 'lie-apt' in the first place. Your statement, "Morality as prescribed by the OP is false, and thus the OP begets a negative response from someone who is moral," is not an argument. It's merely an assertion and thus unworthy of consideration. Perhaps you would like to provide an argument to back up your assertion and then I will consider your logic.

Words and thoughts need not correspond with empirical reality to be true, I can say something and your experience of this statement, asks for you to correspond - we do not need a third party - only agreement with our intellects(i.e. we need to be on a similar level intellectually). Intellect itself must correspond to empirical reality. — ghostlycutter

I agree. I do not subscribe to the correspondence theory of truth, but rather to the coherence theory of truth. Perhaps you are confusing my arguments for those of one of my interlocutors since I argue against the notion of an empirical standard for truth. Analyzing each others statements is more of a form of logical truth rather than empirical. Experiencing patterns of human scribbling does nothing without any semantic correspondence between you and I, and such semantic correspondence requires a particular syntactic conformity as well in order to be mutually intelligible.

Where you are perceiving things negatively(i.e. focusing on truth-aptness and not lie-aptness) when you've tried to take a leap forward, you've taken a few steps back. — ghostlycutter

How is truth-aptness negatively connotated and lie-aptness not? Why do you speak in riddles? It is as if you speak to me from the shadows and fear to step into the transparency and light.

You used the word moral a few times incorrectly, I was roughly (very roughly) correcting you. Fret not, I shall create a proper response in short coming. — ghostlycutter

Strange that your comment did not state it as plainly. Could you please show me exactly where I misused the term? I sometimes use moral when I should have used normative or evaluative. I didn't use the word 'evil' either as that is synonymous with immoral but with implies other things as well.

I'm sorry, but what does this have to do with the OP? Just to be clear, I don't understand what you are trying to say, but you have mentioned nothing relevant to the OP.

,

you are saying that a commitment to moral realism is part and parcel of moral subjectivism. — Bartricks

No, I am saying that the form of subjectivism that I have subscribed to is committed to the statement, "At least some moral statements are true," and that does not necessarily entail that I am a realist.

Er, what? That's really confused. I am not talking about non-cognitivism! I am talking about subjectivism. Why are you not getting this? It's simple.

I gave you the example of pain to try and show you how painfully simple this is.

Subjectivism about pain is uncontroversial, right? Pain 'is' a subjective state.

Does it follow that it exists? No. It is entirely possible that no-one is in pain right now. In which case pain does not exist and no statement of the "I am currently in pain" kind would be true.

Thus, subjectivism about pain does not entail that pain exists.

The same applies to subjectivism about morality. It is NOT equivalent to realism. If it were it would be logically impossible for subjectivism to be true, and yet for nihilism to be true. Yet the two are compatible.

This has nothing - nothing - to do with non-cognitivism. Nothing — Bartricks

That is the problem. I'm saying that some moral statements are true—not that they 'exist'. Same goes for pain, it may not necessarily exist but it is true that I feel pain. The only reason I brought up non-cognitivism is because you mentioned:

You can be a subjectivist and believe no moral statement is true — Cartesian trigger-puppets

Now, I would have said error theorist if you would have said all moral statements are false, but you instead said that none were true. I take that to mean that they have no truth value, thus non-cognitive.

What is meant by the term 'construct' is not our conscious building or formation of concepts by putting together parts of our experiences; but rather what it is meant to describe is how our experiences have, since before our birth, 'constructed' our concepts of the world by affecting the development of the brains physiological architecture.
— Cartesian trigger-puppets

You're confusing active inference modelling with synaptic pruning, they're not that same thing. — Isaac

I'm talking about consciousness in general. Our external and internal environments affect our conscious experience and the physical structure of the brain. We do not control all of our internal, nor all of our external environmental interactions. That is all I am saying.

No, many of the processes are deliberate and conscious. — Isaac

The term "many" is ambiguous. If you mean, "A large number of," then I agree; however, if you mean, "The majority of," then I'm not so sure. Either way, as long as we agree that we are not in control of all of them, then my point stands. This is becoming quite tangential to the OP at this point.

Even if I were to grant that we do possess such executive control over our subjective states, it would nevertheless fail to deliver an adequate objection for the premise that our subjective states exist and thus necessitates the truth of our evaluative propositions that describe our subjective states
— Cartesian trigger-puppets

It would, because one of the feedback processes involved through the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, as Morawetz shows, is to modulate emotional valence via our evaluative processes. The very act of attending to emotional valence changes the emotional valence assessment. In fact, as shown only recently by Ralf Wimmer https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/26503050/ the PFC can even modulate signals from the thalamus, affecting directly the interoceptive sensations that we use as data of the inference models. — Isaac

How does this have anything to do with the premise
(...our subjective states exist and thus necessitates the truth of our evaluative propositions that describe our subjective states)?

we know the phenomenological reality of our own qualia (the individual instances of subjective, conscious experience).
— Cartesian trigger-puppets

There is no "individual instances of subjective, conscious experience". There's never been any demonstration of the existence of such a thing and every study I've read on the subject has shown the concept to be shaky at best, if not completely fabricated. You construct your 'individual instances of subjective, conscious experience' in the process of introspection by selective attention, what type of experience you come up with will depend on what you're looking for at the time. — Isaac

What do you mean there is no individual instances of subjective conscious experience? It is the stream of empirical data that you are constantly receiving in your conscious states. Who denies that? Notice the contradiction formed by your own statements: "There is no individual instances of subjective, conscious experience," and, "You construct your 'individual instances of subjective, conscious experience' in the process of introspection by selective attention, what type of experience you come up with will depend on what you're looking for at the time."

You do admit that we do not possess absolute control of our conscious states. That is all my point was about. This is tangential to the OP.

Again, this is exactly what the paper disproves. We do not necessarily have the emotion 'fear' deriving from our desire to live and avoid pain. We construct the emotion 'fear' as a model of physiological interoceptions and part of the construction of that model will be other experiences (which we obviously can control), social influences (which we obviously can control), upbringing (which we obviously can control - as a society at least) and the cognitive process of construction itself (which we may be able to control - the jury's still out). — Isaac

I think we are likely using the term 'construct' to mean very different things. When I hear you say, "An emotion is constructed," what I take that to mean, and what seems to be the psychophysiological and neuroscientific meaning of the term, is that emotions are conceptual constructs; that emotions are concepts that are constructed by the brain.

I understand that the brain 'constructs' concepts from the integration of different senses into one perceptual experience. I understand that sensations are 'constructed' when a physiological stimulus (which is a detectable change to the physical or chemical structures of our internal or external environments) occurs, which is whenever a sensory organ (a network of sensory cells) responds to a physical signal.

A physical signal, for instance, could be the information,
or stimuli, in the form of light emitted from a smartphone or computer screen. The light functions as a detectable change in our environment as it enters the iris and excites the photoreceptor cells located in the retina. As a result, electrical and chemical events (such as depolarization) occur within the cells which trigger nerve impulses through the fibres of the optic nerve to the visual cortex of the brain where the sensory inputs are then processed into visual information.

Our brain is constantly receiving and processing the energy in a physical stimulus into information in the form of an electrical signal. This process is known as sensory processing: signal detection, collection, transduction, processing, and action. Such as with the above example of the visual system, whereby sensory cells in the retina convert the physical energy of light signals into electrical impulses that travel to the brain and 'construct' our visual experiences.

The brain processes every stimulation you ever experience. Every visual experience due to light energy stimulating the photoreceptors of your eye; every auditory experience due to sound waves of vibrating air molecules which stimulate the auditory nerves of your ear drum; every olfactory experience due to odors that bind to receptor cells in the nasal cavity; every gustatorial experience due to chemical reactions with taste receptors located in the taste buds of your mouth; and every somatosensorial experience due to receptor cells responding to chemical, thermal or mechanical stimulations, including noxious stimuli that produce the experience of pain. So, experience is ultimately constructed from neuronal stimulation.

All neurons have the same genetic coding, but as the brain and nervous system develops through our experiences in life (especially in early life), neurons change as they undergo specific gene activations. Our experiences likewise affect the formation of synapses that connect neurons and establish different pathways for brain function. These pathways control how we respond to what we experience each day. So, our experiences are 'constructed' from the stimulation and integration of neurons, which are affected by our experiences by virtue of environmentally specific gene activations, as well as affecting the formation of synaptic pathways which are essential to the transmission of nervous impulses that enable the communication of information between cells, which also play a role in the storage of information resulting in memory.

What is meant by the term 'construct' is not our conscious building or formation of concepts by putting together parts of our experiences; but rather what it is meant to describe is how our experiences have, since before our birth, 'constructed' our concepts of the world by affecting the development of the brains physiological architecture. Consider the following excerpts from Harvard University.

"Brains are built over time, from the bottom up. The basic architecture of the brain is constructed through an ongoing process that begins before birth and continues into adulthood. Simpler neural connections and skills form first, followed by more complex circuits and skills. In the first few years of life, more than 1 million new neural connections form every second.* After this period of rapid proliferation, connections are reduced through a process called pruning, which allows brain circuits to become more efficient."

"The interactions of genes and experience shape the developing brain. Although genes provide the blueprint for the formation of brain circuits, these circuits are reinforced by repeated use. A major ingredient in this developmental process is the serve and return interaction between children and their parents and other caregivers in the family or community. In the absence of responsive caregiving—or if responses are unreliable or inappropriate—the brain’s architecture does not form as expected, which can lead to disparities in learning and behavior. Ultimately, genes and experiences work together to construct brain architecture."

"Cognitive, emotional, and social capacities are inextricably intertwined throughout the life course. The brain is a highly integrated organ and its multiple functions operate in coordination with one another. Emotional well-being and social competence provide a strong foundation for emerging cognitive abilities, and together they are the bricks and mortar of brain architecture. The emotional and physical health, social skills, and cognitive-linguistic capacities that emerge in the early years are all important for success in school, the workplace, and in the larger community."

—The Center on the Developing Child at Harvard University

The brain 'constructs' emotional concepts on a subconscious level and the feelings associated with each emotion may emerge whether we want them to or not. The brain 'constructs' emotions differently based on a number of factors including past experiences, current context, if your tired or rested, if your hungry or quenched, etc. We don't have direct executive control over our emotions, let alone our desires, but there is a role of executive function in emotion regulation. We cannot control which emotions surface within us, but we can use our conscious control of cognitive processes (i.e., executive function) whereby a deliberate effort with which the brain actively modulates information processing in order to try and regulate our emotions by changing their expression or their trajectory.

I would say that we are capable of some emotional regulation such as the frequency, intensity, duration or even to a degree which type of emotional responses we have (such as feeling frustrated rather than angry), but that is the limit to any emotional regulation strategies. So it isn't WE who construct the emotion 'fear,' but the subconscious, non-executive states of our brain.

It is true that a part of the subconsciouses 'construction' of emotion concepts come from other experiences—but we do NOT obviously have control over our experiences. Do you 'construct' which experience you will have from moment to moment so that they are exactly the right ones you planned on experiencing? No, that is absurd and the kind of control in which I was referring to initially.

It is also true that part of the subconsciouses 'construction' of emotion concepts come from social influences—but we do NOT obviously control these either. Did you have control over which figures were role models for you as a child? Do you control how others influence your feelings on a day to day basis? Do you never-ever-ever feel anger or fear as a result of social interaction?—if no, then why didn't you control it?

It is also true that part of the subconsciouses 'construction' of emotion concepts come from our upbringing—but it is not only NOT obvious that we can control these things, but NOT obvious that we have any control over these situations at all. We emerge in society and within our families without our consent nor our apprehension to what has or will happen to us therein. Since before our birth, our environment has continously influenced our physiological and neurological development. What is more, our genetic predispositions have been influenced in their development over the entire genetic lifetime of, at least, every ancestor in the evolutionary history of life on this planet.

And when you add, "As a society at least," it shows that you are not using the term 'construct' in the way that I am. What you mean by saying, 'We construct,' is more or less the same as saying, 'The processes of the brain construct,' or, 'The human race constructs,' or, 'A psychological construct,' etc, not the deliberate efforts of our conscious executive control over our cognitive processes—that I am speaking of.

Even if I were to grant that we do possess such executive control over our subjective states, it would nevertheless fail to deliver an adequate objection for the premise that our subjective states exist and thus necessitates the truth of our evaluative propositions that describe our subjective states. When I said that we may not have much control over these subjective states, it was to make it clear that irregardless of our lack of understanding with regards to subjective states such as emotions, and especially desires, these subjective states do exist and we know that they do because we have the epistemic access to the content of our own experiences, we know the phenomenological reality of our own qualia (the individual instances of subjective, conscious experience).

Which is the stronger epistemic state: the reality purported of the theory of constructed emotion, or the fact that you hold a belief of that reality as a cognitive part of your subjective states?

Why do you keep conflating subjectivism with realism? — Bartricks

I'm not conflating anything. Subjectivism, like realism, can be a form of cognitivism. Just as you describe subjectivism here:

Subjectivism in metaethics is the view that moral statements are truth apt and their truth makers are subjective states. — Bartricks

Realism in metaethics comes in a few different forms, each with a different set of commitments. The minimalist form of moral realism shares the commitments that moral subjectivisim is committed to and thus minimalist moral realism is compatible with moral subjectivisim. Both agree that moral statements are truth apt and that at least some of these moral statements are true. The difference is that with moral subjectivism the truth-makers are the subjective states of the individual indexed to the moral statements (the moral statements are thus the truth-bearers).

A robust form of moral realism, on the other hand, has additional commitments such as the truth of moral statements (the truth-bearers) being contingent upon the property of mind-independence or a correspondence with objective facts (the truth-makers) rather than subjective states. This description is not just my personal opinion, but also a reflection of descriptions from the SEP.

Moral realists are those who think that, in these respects, things should be taken at face value—moral claims do purport to report facts and are true if they get the facts right. Moreover, they hold, at least some moral claims actually are true. That much is the common and more or less defining ground of moral realism (although some accounts of moral realism see it as involving additional commitments, say to the independence of the moral facts from human thought and practice, or to those facts being objective in some specified way).

You can be a subjectivist and believe no moral statement is true. — Bartricks

I'm aware of the non-cognitivist forms of moral subjectivism.

Individual subjectivism is false. If it was true, then my approving of raping j, would entail that it is right for me to rape j. But that's clearly false - false that my approving of it entails its rightness.. Thus individual subjectivism is false. Indeed, insane. — Bartricks

Individual subjectivism holds that if the statement, "I approve of raping j," reflects the truth about your attitude towards the raping of j, then the statement is true, thus 'right,' if and only if you are the subject that the statement is indexed to. So, it cannot be the case that you, an individual subject of a specific instance in time, would hold contradicting evaluations with regard to the same act in all the same context (raping of j).

You could either approve, disapprove, or otherwise withhold any judgement. This of course could change once any contextual variables are changed such as instance of time, epistemic state, the configuration of experiential information, social or physical environment, etc. Even if you have an erratic attitude towards the act of raping j, you would never simultaneously hold a contradictory view in any one instance wherein all contextual variables remain unchanged. One of the following arguments accurately represents your view of raping j, in a specific instance of time wherein all contextual variables are held constant.

P1. If I approve of the raping of j, then the raping of j is morally justified according to moral subjectivisim.

P2. I approve of the raping of j.

Therefore, C. The raping of j is morally justified according to moral subjectivisim.

Or, as an alternative:

P1. If I approve of the raping of j, then the raping of j is morally justified according to moral subjectivisim.

P2. I do not approve of the raping of j.

Therefore, C. The raping of j is not morally justified according to moral subjectivisim.

The truth value of each moral statement is dependent upon the subjective state of the individual it is indexed to. Moreover, it is dependent upon the specific subjective state of the individual as it was within a specific arrangement of variables. Therefore it is possible to hold a particular subjective belief in one moment, and then, in the next moment (perhaps after a brief reflection), hold another particular subjective belief—even if the subsequent subjective belief is antithetical to the previous one.

It would be in violation of the law of identity to state otherwise, because, as I'm sure you would agree, just as our physical form undergoes constant fluctuations with regards to the microscopic materials that make up the whole of our bodies and likewise the whole of our surrounding environment (e.g., electron exchange, or ET reactions in biological terms); in the same way, our subjective states are also undergoing constant fluctuations with regards to the influence that continuous streams of information have on us as we process inputs from moment to moment.

Just as Heraclitus said, "No man ever steps in the same river twice, for it's not the same river and he's not the same man," so too, no moral propositions must necessarily retain the same truth value, for its not the same moral proposition (one that was indexed to a specific subject in a specific subjective state) and the individual has not necessarily the same subjective states (at the moment the proposition was stated).

You are an individual subjectivist because of a basic error in your reasoning. You are confusing the cause of a belief or impression with its truth conditions. — Bartricks

No, I am an individual subjectivist because I believe that there are cognitive subjective states, such as beliefs, and that these cognitive subjective states are the truth-makers of moral statements because it is the truth of such moral statements to which they are the bearers of. The existence of our subjective states necessitates the truth of such evaluative statements that express our attitudes towards a specific act (of a specific arrangement of contextual variables). Such statements, of a particular context with all variables held constant, have a mereological sum which would be then be the truth-maker with regards to truth conditional semantics; however, as the subject to which these statements are indexed to, the subject to which these statements are but mere linguistic representations that express the subjective state of the individual subject, these statements themselves are the truth-bearers, semantics notwithstanding, because they necessitate the existence of the individuals subjective states that only they have epistemic access to.

Here's what you've done: you've started out with some psychological/biological theory about how we've come to have moral beliefs and feelings, yes? Then, satisfied that our moral beliefs and the statements we use to express then have been fully explained, you conclude that such beliefs and statements must be 'about' their subjective causes and thus have subjective states as their truth makers. — Bartricks

An individual moral agent possess a certain configuration of subjective states. Some of these subjective states are cognitive evaluations (normative or moral beliefs). When a moral agent forms a concept of a thing (concrete or abstract) that represents an event which affects the phenomenology of the agent itself, it thus provokes a process of introspection within the agent, which is followed subsequently by the agents subjective evaluations of the concept. We have private epistemic access to these subjective states and evaluations both as they emerge and as they evolve over time as the agent adapts to the changing circumstances that form the setting of an event and perceived value an event subjectively entails. Even as our subjective states are undergoing constant changes due to fluctuating contexts, they are nonetheless part of our being—our nature or essence. The existence of our subjective states necessitate the truth of evaluative propositions that describe the contents of our subjective states because it is a part of the essence of such evaluative propositions that they are true if our subjective states exist.

It's a rookie mistake. You need to recognize it now, as a matter of urgency, or your metaethical theorizing will go nowhere.

I have little time for contemporary metaethicists, but they do at least recognize the falsity of the kind of view you are defending. — Bartricks

This may be true. I am certainly capable of being wrong and it would not surprise me if, in fact, I was in error somewhere within this meta-ethical theory I've constructed. This is precisely why I have given my arguments to support my view as being the case, so that others may analyze my arguments and bring to my attention any inconsistencies found therein. You have done a miserable job at pointing out where my logic has failed because it is not persuasive to simply assert that I am confused, in error, wrong, insane, making a rookie mistake, etc, without providing any elucidation as to where the error is. If you wish to do so then, first accurately represent my views and then, if it is a logical problem, next show me which propositions form the contradiction.

So far, all that I have been made aware of are problems such as, "No objective moral standards," or, "Morals and values would then be idiosyncratic or arbitrarily determined," or, "Then anything is morally justified so long as I believe it to be"—as if to completely ignore the conditional requisite that any moral status only pertains to the individual subject that the statement is indexed to.

It may help matters immensely if we could agree on, or at least understand the specific definition of terms that are notorious for their philosophical ambiguity. Such as, what do you mean when you say something is true? What theory of truth are you subscribed to? What form of moral realism are you referring to? Do you not foresee the problems we will have by neglecting to first hash out the semantics here?

What the paper suggests is that the brain organizes emotion concepts from memories of past experiences to guide our actions and give our sense-datum meaning; that instances of emotion are constructed by networks of the brain.

What it does not say is that we have voluntary control of how and when these experiences emerge. I do concede that we are capable of some emotional control. Emotions are a reflection of reality and desires are an internal driving force within the agent to interact with reality (either altering it, or regulating it in some way). We do not control such things. For example, if you stumble upon a venomous snake, you may experience the emotional state of fear which comes from your desire to live and avoid pain. Now, we can moderate such emotions and desires do change with time, as with everything else, but we do not have the ability to just will fear away or keep it from emerging, nor do we have the ability to simply not desire things or keep desires from emerging.

I understand that the human nervous system creates the human mind. Im simply saying that this is not something that we control but we do experience it and therefore know the truth of these experiences. Even if they are all completely delusion, we would know that they are a part of our being.

though the subject may not be the author of her desires and primitive emotional attitudes, she is nonetheless cognizant of the truth of her desires and emotions and therefore they are the truth-makers to which her subsequent thoughts and statements — Cartesian trigger-puppets

This is not strictly true though. What we perceive as desires and emotions are constructions, models we build from physiological inputs and socially mediated expectations — Isaac

I understand that our perceptions are constructed from the nervous system as energy within our environments stimulate the sensory receptors of our neurophysiology which discharge electrochemical signals to our brain that we interpret as sense data. This was not my point.

My point was that we have desires and that we experience emotions, though we seem to not have much control over these things (e.g., we don't choose to desire things that are pleasing to us, we just naturally do), we are aware of them. We are aware of their presence and of the phenomenological being inside our minds. We are aware of our attitudes and our beliefs and we are sure from moment to moment that we are the subjects of such experiences. If you believe in ghosts, it matters not whether or not you are correct in this belief, my point is that you have the most certain knowledge that you in the moment hold such beliefs because you have private epistemic access to the states of your own mind.

It makes it difficult to qualify a truth-maker, as no-one could actually establish what was the case — Isaac

The content of your mind is the very being of your existence. It can be said to be true because it simply is.

There are three forms of moral realism: a minimal form, a moderate form, and a robust form. Proponents of the robust form of moral realism are committed to three theses: the semantic thesis, the alethic thesis, and the metaphysical thesis; whereas, the proponents of the minimalist form of moral realism leave off the metaphysical thesis. This is a highly contentious matter between moral realists and makes defining moral realism problematic. Here is a link to back up my claims:

https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2007/entries/moral-anti-realism/

You're just confused — Bartricks

This may be true. However, I'm not the only one who defines moral subjectivism (or ethical subjectivism) in such terms that is compatible with a minimalist form of moral realism. What is more, this seems to be a matter of contention between proponents of moral realism. Here is an excerpt from the SEP link above:

5. Subjectivism

To deny both noncognitivism and the moral error theory suffices to make one a minimal moral realist. Traditionally, however, moral realism has required the denial of a further thesis: the mind-dependence of morality. There is no generally accepted label for theories that deny both noncognitivism and the moral error theory but maintain that moral facts are mind-dependent. Here I shall use a term as good as any other (though one used not infrequently in other ways): “subjectivism.” Thus, “moral subjectivism” denotes the view that moral facts exist and are mind-dependent, while “moral objectivism” holds that they exist and are mind-independent. (Note that this nomenclature makes the two contraries rather than contradictories; the error theorist and the noncognitivist count as neither objectivists nor subjectivists.

An additional source defining moral subjectivism using almost the same terms:

https://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_ethical_subjectivism.html

From the Wikipedia article:

Ethical subjectivism or moral non-objectivism is the meta-ethical view which claims that:

1. Ethical sentences express propositions.

2. Some such propositions are true.

3. The truth or falsity of such propositions is ineliminably dependent on the (actual or hypothetical) attitudes of people.

Additional sources:

Harrison, Jonathan (2006). Borchert, Donald M. (ed.). Encyclopedia of philosophy (2nd ed.). Detroit: Thomson Gale/Macmillan Reference USA. ISBN 0-02-865780-2. OCLC 61151356.

Richard Brandt (1959). Ethical theory; the problems of normative and critical ethics. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. p. 153. ISBN 0132904039. LCCN 59010075.

Anyway, it is all beside the point as this thread is not about moral realism, but about the stupidity of the metaethical theories known as ecpressivism, naturalism and non naturalism - the dominant theories of contemporary debate. — Bartricks

I acknowledge that my original comment was somewhat tangential to the thesis of the OP, however, I did respond directly to specific claims that you made within it and you nonetheless made effort to defend those claims. You have done little else but quibble over definitions and assert that mine were false and yours (apparently) more accurate. You did little else but define a minimalist form of moral realism and ignore the fact that other forms exist and that their existence makes defining 'moral realism' not as obviously simple as you seem to be implying.

You have yet to substantiate any of your claims. You conveniently ignore my more specific points such as my issue with the correspondence theory of truth, minimalist form of moral realism that also ignores the metaphysical thesis that a robust form of moral realism would commit to, or the question I raised asking whether or not you find the content of your own conscious mind to be true—such a thing that I would hold as my most certain knowledge and highest epistemic state.

I have also explained why individual subjectivism - which is 'not' a subject of contemporary debate - is false. You have not responded to that criticism, but instead gave two unsound and question begging arguments, one for individual subjectivism and one for expressivism. — Bartricks

It is pointless to attempt to argue one way or the other whenever we have yet to agree with how to define terms. I am seeking clarity with regards to a few claims that you have made and I'm happy to return to any other claims left on the table once some kind of convergence is made with the few. I'm interested to see how you respond with the sources I've provided you with. I assume that you would at least have to change your previous positions from "You are wrong" or "You are confused" to "Your sources are wrong" and "Your sources are confused".

It's just the definition of moral realism. Moral realism 'just is' the view that moral statements are truth apt and some of them are true. — Bartricks

That is the minimalist definition of realism, which is a contention between the moderate and robust forms of moral realism. As far as I am concerned, the minimal realist is compatible with subjectivism.

Most realists believe that moral statements are truth-apt, that some moral statements are true, and that moral statements are true in an objective sense. Anti-realists, such as subjectivists, deny at least one of these claims. I understand that there are some forms of realism (minimalist) that do not hold to the metaphysical thesis, however I feel that it is the fundamental difference between moral realism and moral anti-realism.

But I don't know why we're discussing this - of what relevance is it to what I have claimed in the OP? — Bartricks

You claimed moral subjectivism was false, did you not?

It's obviously false - what actual evidence do you have that it is true? Actual evidence, not just painfully perverse re-interpretations of moral statements. — Bartricks

Evidence that our beliefs are what we believe? I suppose it would have to be taken axiomatically. Do you not think it is true that you believe in your own beliefs?

It doesn't appear to be true (wrongness seems to be something I recognise, not something I do). If it did appear to us to be true, then it would appear to us all that all we are using moral language to do is to boss each other around. If I say "Xing is wrong" I am just telling you not to do X becasue I disapprove of it (and we would recognise this). Well, then "get lost!" would be an appropriate response. Yet "get lost" as a response to "Xing is wrong" doesn't make sense. — Bartricks

This is a misrepresentation of what I said. The truth of moral statements are dependent upon the individual subject they are indexed to. Moral subjectivisim gives moral statements a different meaning structure whereby a moral statement is indexed to the individual who made the statement, thus making it true if and only if it is interpreted accurately—that when we state a moral proposition we are actually expressing something about themselves. If you say "Xing is wrong" you are telling me that you would rather I not to do X becasue you disapprove of it. The statement "Get lost" is an imperative statement that expresses a command, so it wouldn't have a truth value.

You seem to be expressing quite a bit of your beliefs
on this matter. Is it true that you held these beliefs the moment you expressed them?

Proposition one states that the position of Individual Moral Subjectivism falls under the meta-ethical framework of cognitivism, which is a view in philosophy that ethical statements express propositions. A proposition is simply a statement which is capable of being true or false (it has truth value; is truth apt). — Cartesian trigger-puppets

Yes, I know. But I didn't say 1 was false, did I? I said 2 was false.

You're building a commitment to moral realism into individual moral subjectivism. That's just confused. — Bartricks

I didn't say that you said proposition one was false, did I? I was simply trying to provide clarity for the entire set.

I don't understand how claiming that some moral statements are true commits me to moral realism. I understand that in accordance with the traditional philosophical accounts of truth, namely the correspondence theory of truth, which says that the only true propositions are propositions that correspond with a fact of the world. In this sense, true propositions are necessarily confined to views such as realism and objectivism which only seem to provide satisfactory models within the confines of empiricism, naturalism, etc. Though I agree, such frameworks seem to produce the most accurate descriptions for the way the world really is and in a way that is true independent of the proposition itself, I do not think they produce the same satisfactory results with regards to evaluative propositions.

Evaluative propositions seem to be capable of expressing things beyond that which is physical, natural, material or concrete, and it is here where realistic models struggle, if not fail utterly, to provide satisfactory descriptions. Such propositions seem to be the physical vehicles which transport abstractions or other such non-physical entities between beings of similar sentience. Aside from Platonic forms, or Aristotelian and other subsequent attempts to fit such entities into a realist framework, such approaches, on the whole, seem to unravel upon crossing over to the metaphysical threshold. I think this is because, unlike with more concrete ontologies, meta-ethical semantics require a different approach and one in which certain exceptions may be made with regards to the rules which govern non-evaluative, non-material and non-empirical language.

When we use non-evaluative language to express a proposition, we are describing the way something is; a fact about the world. For example, if I say, "The earth is round," I am referring to the earth, which is concrete, and by assigning a quality to it, such as with it's shape in this example, I am able to say something capable of being true or false and by virtue of Earth's physical and material qualities, I am able to point to a feature of physical reality and objectively provide an empirical account for why the statement, "The earth is round," is true by virtue of corresponding to reality itself.

On the converse, non-evaluative language, such as if I were to say, "Torture is wrong," what I am expressing is a feeling or opinion about torture. When I say "Torture is wrong," what I mean is something like, "I disapprove of torture," or "I have a preference against torture". Since moral language seems to express the speaker's beliefs, it seems that me being against torture is what makes my statement true when I say "Torture is wrong." Though it is fallacious to reason, "I believe x, therefore x is true" using descriptive language that assesses the state of the natural world, as with other fields of knowledge, it seems to work for ethics for this reason.

I'm not quite sure which theory of truth best reflects my views on evaluative statements, perhaps coherentist or deflationary, but nonetheless I think that we can say that it is a psychological fact that we believe a statement is true. Even if I held the belief that the Earth was flat, and that statement could be proven false, it is still a fact that I held the belief that the world was flat.

As a moral subjectivist, I am committed to three propositions.

1. Moral statements are truth apt.

2. Some moral statements are true.

3. The truth aptness of moral statements are dependent upon the subject in which they are indexed next to. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

No, that's not correct. 1 is true. But 2 is false - you are not committed to realism. — Bartricks

Proposition one states that the position of Individual Moral Subjectivism falls under the meta-ethical framework of cognitivism, which is a view in philosophy that ethical statements express propositions. A proposition is simply a statement which is capable of being true or false (it has truth value; is truth apt).

What I try do when engaging in philosophical discourse is first to practice effective listening concerning my interlocutor. I perform a critical analysis of what it is that they are trying to tell me by requesting clarity (an attempt to identify, reduce, and eliminate ambiguity), isolate any propositions, identify any arguments those propositions form, consider the validity of the argument structure, and weigh the soundness of the propositions that form the premises of the argument.

So what I am proposing is that moral statements such as "Genocide is wrong" express a proposition similar to non-evaluative statements such as "The sky is blue". I'm saying that both these kinds of statements have the property of being either true or false.

Proposition two is not stating that the truth of moral statements exist as a property of the world, but rather it is saying that the truth value of some moral propositions are true. This is a distinction between error theory, which also agrees with proposition one (that moral statements are truth apt) but goes on to conclude that the truth value of all moral statements are false.

Realism also makes the claim that moral statements have a truth value, and that some of those truth values are true, but, in addition, realism also claims that such truth values exist objectively, as in a mind-independent property of the world. Realism states that moral propositions refer to objective facts. It is this last statement from which the divergence of realism and non-realism arises. We agree that moral statements are capable of being true and that some are indeed true, but we do not agree that the truth value of moral statements refers to objective facts.

Proposition three explains just how moral statements express propositions that can and sometimes are capable of being true without the additional ontology of referring to objective facts. Instead of the truth of moral propositions referring to objective facts of the external world, on the view of individual subjectivism, it is said that the truth of moral propositions refers to subjective facts contained within the psychological states of the individual subject.

So moral statements such as, "Genocide is wrong" refers not to some external property of the act or of the surrounding environments of which the action exists, but rather it refers to the psychological states of the individual subject who is making the moral statement, thus indexed next to it, ad it reflects the attitude and preferences that individual. What the individual really seems to be saying is that "To me, genocide is wrong" or that "I have a preference against genocide" which is a statement of truth value which is true as a description of the subjects psychological states.

If individual subjectivism is true, then if I tell myself to do X, then necessarily it would be right for me to X (for by hypothesis the rightness of Xing 'is' my instruction to myself to do it). Yet it is as clear to my reason as that 2 + 2 = 4 that if I tell myself to do X, that does 'not' entail that it is right for me to do X (anymore than if I tell myself that 2 + 2 = 5, then it will = 5). Thus individual subjectivism is false. Moral norms and values appear to have an external source. — Bartricks

I don't think that is a strong representation of individual subjectivism. We all tell ourselves that which we believe to be right based upon whichever moral framework we believe to be operating within. It is how we come to
such conclusions for what constitutes right from wrong and whether or not there is an external or intrinsic source at work.

As a moral subjectivist, I am committed to three propositions.

1. Moral statements are truth apt.

2. Some moral statements are true.

3. The truth aptness of moral statements are dependent upon the subject in which they are indexed next to.

A robust moral realist, by contrast, is also committed to three propositions.

1. Moral statements are truth apt.

2. Some moral statements are true.

3. The truth aptness of moral statements is determined only by the correspondence between cognitive representations of reality that refer to objective features of the world.

We are semantically compatible insofar as we agree that moral statements have meaning and that they can be expressed as propositions which can be true or false. We also seem to alethically agree, at least with respect to the second propositions relation to cognitivism within the framework of a theory of truth.

As with my objections, you likely deny the third premise. Here are my arguments to support proposition three.

(Argument 3 supporting P2: Argument 2)

1. If moral statements are cognitive expressions of propositional attitudes, then they express propositions about the attitude of an individual subject.

2. Moral statements are cognitive expressions of propositional attitudes.

3. Therefore, moral statements express propositions about the attitude of an individual subject.

(Argument 2 supporting P1: Argument 1)

1. If moral beliefs are cognitive evaluations and propositions are objects of belief, then moral statements are cognitive expressions of propositional attitudes.

2. Moral beliefs are cognitive evaluations and propositions are the objects of belief.

3. Therefore, moral statements are cognitive expressions of propositional attitudes.

(Argument 1 supporting proposition 3)

1. If a subject's attitude is both psychologically inherent to themselves, and the beliefs expressed by the subject only reflect propositional attitudes when indexing 'cognitive evaluations' to 'subject' so that moral statements purport to report only the subjects own predisposed attitudes, then the truth aptness of moral statements must be dependent upon the subject in which they are indexed next to.

2. It is the case that a subject's attitude is both psychologically inherent to themselves, and the beliefs expressed by the subject only reflect propositional attitudes when indexing 'cognitive evaluations' to 'subject' so that moral statements purport to report only the subjects own predisposed attitudes.

3. Therefore, the truth aptness of moral statements must be dependent upon the subject in which they are indexed next to.

Your argument against individual subjectivism can be formalized into the following modus tollens structure.

P1. If the statement "'X' is right" is a true statement necessarily entailed by the conditional, "If I say 'X is right', then the statement 'X is right' is true", then individual subjectivism is true.

P2. The statement "'X' is right" is not a true statement necessarily entailed by the conditional, "If I say 'X is right', then the statement 'X is right' is true".

C. Therefore, individual subjectivism is false.

Everything seems to have an external source. That is because information itself is assumed, as well as intuitively apparent, to in some way be at least tethered to an external reality. If there is an external reality, it appears as if the inputted data received by our internal systems from this external source is largely a demonstrably false representation of what external reality would actually be like. For example, we observe chairs and tables but not as they seem to more accurately exist as a randomized organization of atomic material that we have arbitrarily assigned some meaning upon based on pragmatic assumptions.

I think there is something external to us from which we receive these assumed external inputs that we become increasingly more aware of by virtue of an ever broadening contrast between the elements within itself as the constant flow of information comes through. This contrast provides us with a sense of differentiation from which we can compare, attach a meaning to, and evaluate each input based upon our particular sense of the meanings derived from past experiences and in anticipation of future expectations.

In other words, if information comes from an external source, then the meanings we assign to everything either comes from or is sensitive to such external sources. I would agree with you on empirical facts that we correspond with some measure of truth based on objective properties of the external world. For example, we can look at heavy rain clouds and then empirically deduce events, happenings or patterns from previous experiences with relative margins of success

That's not correct. Naturalism and non-naturalism are are not theories about what actually exists. — Bartricks

That was not the point I was making at all. I probably should have described them as the two main subdivisions of moral realism rather than the two main theories of moral realism. I do consider each as being a distinctive moral theory as one stands in direct opposition to the other, over whether or not moral terms and properties co-refer or are reducible to non-moral terms and properties.

The meta-ethical distinction between naturalistic and non-naturalistic versions of moral realism lies within the metaphysical nature of their disagreements regarding the reducibility of moral properties. Both are ontologically oriented towards independently existing moral properties, notwithstanding whether or not such properties exists within nature or beyond nature. Moral realism, on the whole, takes a view that moral properties exist and from such properties ethics may be reduced to a set of moral propositions that are true of human actions, regardless of whether or not we believe them or know about them.

Moral realism is, for a moral realist is someone who believes that at least some moral propositions are true, and thus that their truth-makers exist. — Bartricks

Moral realism goes further than that. Only an error theorist would disagree with the statement that some moral statements are true. Also, they not only claim that their truth-makers exist, but that they objectively exist. Besides, the truth-makers of a proposition lie in the essence of a being within proposition itself, but only if the thing exists.

Your milkshake example, for instance, when you say that milkshakes are made of milk and flavouring, you are describing the necessary essence that necessarily must belong to the being of a milkshake. That a milkshake must contain milk and flavouring. In fact, the truthbearers for "milkshakes are made of milk and flavouring" is that milk and flavourings belong to the essence of all milkshakes in that they must in every possible world contain milk and flavouring. The truth-maker is supposed to be something concrete that actually exists. The truth bearers of your example would be the ingredients of milk and flavouring, but for the claim that bears on the truth that milkshakes are made from milk and flavourings to be true, the fact that milk and flavourings necessarily belong to the essence of being a milkshake, depends on the existence of the truth-maker, that milkshakes exist.

As for the rest of what you say, well, it's not a response to the OP, but just you telling me all you know about metaethics. Why? — Bartricks

Because calling a thing dumb or stupid or batshitcrazy are all meaningless statements. To say something is wrong because it is stupid is just as vacuous as saying that something is bad because its disgusting. The terms 'disgusting' and 'stupid' are premises that both assume the conclusion. If you want to argue that a thing is false then you appeal to empirical facts that contradict how something is, not make a statements that are essentially tautological in nature.

I like the topic of the OP, but don't think you really said anything meaningful about it. I'm fairly new to philosophy but I just read your OP as something lacking but was genuinely curious to hear your objections to individual subjectivism, if for no other reason than perhaps finding potentially motivation for myself to interact here more often and more deeply.

Neat summation. — Banno

Thanks.

Is it even possible to divorce the esotericism from philosophical discourse? I would much rather use common language that is broadly accessible but then terms and phrases seem to expand into essays or treatises. I just make mouth sounds and hope for the best most of the time.

I say 'objective' because no contemporary metaethicist would defend individual subjectivism about morality (because it's really, really stupid). — Bartricks

What are your objections to individual moral subjectivisim?

contemporary metaethics seems to be dominated by three main kinds of theory: naturalism, non-naturalism and expressivism. — Bartricks

Naturalism and non-naturalism are the two main theories of moral realism, whereas the latter refers to a branch of non-descriptivism. I would break it down a bit differently I think. First, since we are discussing meta-ethics, let's start by posing a meta-ethical question. Let's consider a question that raises some of the issues dividing realism from anti-realism.

"Are moral statements truth-apt?"

If no, then we have established that you are a non-cognitivist.

If yes, then you are a cognitivist.

To press further, if no. "Are there at least some moral statements which are true?"

If no, then we have established that you are an error theorist.

If yes, I'm still unsure. "Are there any moral statements that are objectively true?"

If yes, then its official, your some type of realist and we can probe deeper by changing our focus a bit to include your now ontological, or more broadly, your now metaphysical beliefs of morality. Down this path we are likely going to be tasked in keeping up with three modalities: metaphysical, semantical and epistemological frameworks will intersect with one another.

If no, then your definitely an anti-realist but there is still more to uncover here.

Perhaps you view that we can make moral judgements that contain truth value, but that the truth value of any moral statement is dependent upon the subject to which it is indexed next to. If so, then you rely on a figurative theory of truth, nonetheless it remains between correspondence theory, deflationism, or some otherwise modified theories of truth.

If you do believe that moral truth is fundamentally dependent upon our attitudes but that moral terms can be defined by non-moral terms, thus dismissing the fact/value distinction, then I suppose you would have to either be in the camp of synthetic or analytic naturalism.

If you hold that both moral and non-moral terms co-refer, or share the same definition, do they then name the same property?

If no, then you are either a non-reductive analytic naturalist or a non-reductive synthetic naturalist.

If yes, then you are either a reductive analytic naturalist or a reductive synthetic naturalist.

If you hold that moral terms cannot be defined or have a reference fixing relation described by non-moral terms, but that they may still refer to properties that are nearly identical with, or constituentive of ones, that are naming non-moral terms, then your at least not a non-naturalist.

Non-naturalism contains some spooky duelist metaphysical beliefs that are, for sure, quite strange.

Back to the line of questioning.

Can we say anything meaningful regarding the metaphysical nature of these non-natural properties?

If yes, you are likely a robust realist.

If no, you either have a queitist take (an acceptance of things as they are without attempts to resist or change them), or some other variant adherent to moral sense theory, but only if you hold that moral knowledge cannot be a priori, otherwise, if you do hold to such a view, your probably working within some form of intuitionalist framework.

This is why people dismiss meta-ethics.

Why should one invest in Tesla?

Earlier in our discussion, I believe that you have stated that you think someone has to think that rape is always wrong or rape is always not wrong. This is confusing to me because pretty much every consequentialist thinks that rape is usually bad but it can sometimes be good if it produces a good consequence. — TheHedoMinimalist

Actually, I was describing the moral perspectives of a strict deontologist, not what I, myself, think, but a particular view in normative ethics. A consequencialist, as the name implies, focuses on the outcomes that occur as a result of an action when it comes to moral evaluations, whereas the evaluations of a strict deontologist would only focus on the action itself. I was trying to explain how making statements such as "Rape is bad" or "One should never rape", while pragmatically advantageous (many would assume—myself included) as a general heuristic for a society, it presents a problem in the much less practical field of meta-ethics when we analyze the syntactic and semantic relationship between the subject and the predicate of such statements. It both yields logical contradictions when making such a universally generalized claim "Rape is wrong" followed by a particular claim "Rape is almost always wrong" whereby the latter claim stands as the negation of the former. This can be worked around however as I tried to explain by establishing consequencialist thresholds surrounding the deontological framework. Threshold deontology.

I want to point out that I think there is an important distinction between actions and behaviors and you asked me earlier if I agreed that morality was based on actions. Well, I think it’s a lot more plausible to think that it might be based on something more broad like behaviors. But, I don’t think that means that morality is based on actions. — TheHedoMinimalist

There is a difference but I'm not sure that it matters too much. I'm not sure if behaviors are broader than actions—I guess it depends on the particular context and frame of reference. The way I distinguish actions from behaviors is that an action is singular either in response or by initiation, and furthermore an action that is repeated over a prolonged period of time would then be considered an activity; whereas, a behavior can likewise be described as repeated actions, it otherwise has to do with a particular pattern in which a collection of such actions seems to possess. For example, if someone burps at the table that would be a single action (that may or may not have a behavioral contexts depending upon the way in which the act was done), one of many one will inevitably make upon a dinner table, but the overall pattern in which their collective actions is what makes up their behavior which could be otherwise proper table etiquette.

I think nonetheless that you are correct since these terms are not entirely interchangeable, but for the sake of progress, could we not be a bit more charitable, please?

Also, I’m not understanding how you are able to smuggle the concept of moral duties into your understanding of morality if there are plenty of moral realist philosophers that don’t believe in the existence of moral duties. — TheHedoMinimalist

Again, I am not describing my understandings of morality but rather providing examples of normative ethical approaches that are "Duty-centered". Would you not agree that deontology is a duty-based ethic?

I don’t think that means that morality is based on actions. — TheHedoMinimalist

Not based, in essence intimately connected to actions.

I wouldn’t call being honest or being benevolent an act. — TheHedoMinimalist

No, it would be a character trait, which is earned through repetitive behavior, which is based on specific patterns of activity, which is entirely based on sequences of actions. This is where my confusion comes in with your framing of behavior as more broad. Broader in overall complexity, perhaps, but that would be a top-down perspective and I'm more of a reductionist so I prefer breaking it down bottom-up.

I actually don’t think that saving the lives of 5 would necessarily produce a good consequence. This is because I have a much more positive opinion of death than most other people do mainly because if I allow the 5 people to die then I might actually be preventing those individuals from having to undergo the potentially painful organ transplant and any suffering that might come afterwards. — TheHedoMinimalist

You appear to be waffling a bit here. So, you take the view that we should deny people with an immediate need for organ transplantation? Or do you just emergency transplants as not worth the risk? The patients will certainly die without them and your positive opinions of death will likely offer them little comfort. I think that you are probably right about egoistic hedonic utilitarianism being likely what best describes you. You just don't seem to know that you are.

I don’t think that it does. I think it actually supports the logic that all human lives are pretty equal as you wouldn’t allow the 5 people to die just because you have to keep that one person alive. I actually think it’s kinda discriminatory to value the life of this single person over the life of the 5 people. — TheHedoMinimalist

And exactly how do we select which ones get to live and which ones get to die? The five people are unfortunately in bad shape but that doesn't mean that a completely healthy individual should therefore die in an effort to save them. The logic is clear in the act itself.

P1. If we kill the one individual, then five individuals will survive.

P2. Five lives are more valuable than one life.

C. Therefore, we should kill the one individual.

How is this not placing a value upon the fives lives over the one? Also notice that the argument is not crossing the is-ought divide by assuming an evaluative statement in P2, which is unfounded in my opinion.

Well, I don’t think there could ever realistically be a genocide that would be beneficial to a majority of people. — TheHedoMinimalist

Then you haven’t studied history.

At the very least, there would be probably be a more efficient way of benefitting a majority of people than a genocide. Which kinda brings up another problem that I have with these sorts of trolley problem scenarios. I think they leave out an important 3rd option that people have to just say “I don’t have time to resolve this moral dilemma, I need to spend my time helping a world in a more significant way”. — TheHedoMinimalist

Again, your waffling. You don't get to defeat the thought experiment by manipulating it based on practicality—it is a thought experiment and not limited to practicality. You also cannot hand wave away the dilemma without appreciating, first, the fact that it is a genuine problem in philosophy, and through conceding that, second, you don't know how to interact with it. At least you cannot do such things and still consider yourself a philosopher. Be a volunteer or whatever it is that your implying to be more significant (which sounds a lot like a meaningful achievement, btw), as you are free to do so if you please and I certainly have nothing but admiration for such self sacrifice.

This would basically translate to the person not committing the genocide only because that person determined that the time and effort that it would take to commit the genocide could be spend helping the overall population in a better way. — TheHedoMinimalist

You don't get to alter the thought experiment. This is not how philosophy works.

I’m assuming that you’re going to want me to assume that the hypothetical genocide in question is the absolute best way to help the world(which is extremely unlikely I must add). If there really was some kind of a super magical genocide that is the absolute best way to help the world, then why wouldn’t I support such an amazingly supernatural genocide(assuming that it also doesn’t harm me)? — TheHedoMinimalist

No. It only has to benefit five groups per each group that is being genocided in order to remain consistent with the logic. Again, the unlikely nature not withstanding, it is a hypothetical thought experiment and can be as absurd as we can imagine. It just can't be impossible, which means it cannot contain a logical contradiction. And it doesn't. Also if you were apart of the five beneficiary groups, then you would almost certainly be a part of the necessary majority that committed the lesser whole to take part in this. You would, not because I assume to know you or because it fits your moral system that you have offered me so far, but rather, and obviously so, you would as a sheer matter of probability. The five groups approve, thus the majority of each population would approve (assuming the groups are democratic) and you would most likely be a part of the majority in a matter of probability.

I think every ethical theory has these cases where you can posit an extreme hypothetical to say that something like genocide is acceptable. — TheHedoMinimalist

There are ethical theories that do a much better job than the ones that have been mentioned thus far. This is of course not a fact of the world but a fact of my attitude towards such, but I can offer quite compelling arguments for my moral system.

I don’t see how being a deontologist necessitates that genocide is always wrong because it wouldn’t be wrong presumably if a hypothetical genocide is such that you don’t have a duty to avoid performing it. — TheHedoMinimalist

This is where threshold deontology shines. Remember that i was referring to a strict form of deontological ethics.

I guess I would say that rape is amoral because I’m not a moral realist but I think it’s almost always bad from the standpoint of general decision theory. — TheHedoMinimalist

So, if you could have it your way, then I suppose that you would release all of the individual rapists that we have been unjustly detaining within our correctional systems and halt any further actions from taking place within our judicial systems? I mean, it cannot be just to punish people for committing an amoral act, can it? If you were to witness such a rape, then, of course, you would see nothing for better or worse?

My first consideration is how each decision option would impact my own hedonistic welfare. If all things are completely equal by that criteria(and they probably won’t be), then I would choose to save the 5 women from being raped. Though, I suspect that if allow that one woman to get raped then I would get condemned by my loved ones and society and this would make my life hedonistically worse. Given this, I would probably realistically choose to just do nothing. — TheHedoMinimalist

Well, luckily for you we are within the reality of the make-believe! I will propose a hypothetical scenario wherein only you and the six women exist (and I suppose some rapist but they disappear from existence shortly thereafter) and the only condemnation that could possibly exist would have to be that of your own conscience one. The women are real, their suffering or lack thereof is real in this thought experiment, but they are unable to gain any information about your involvement. Its you and them. One suffers or five suffers. The choice is your. Which choice seems best for you and why?

On your view, is an act such as murder always wrong? This would be a deontological view on normative ethics, but deontology alone takes us to absurd conclusions on its own. Consider the famous trolley problem. Imagine yourself near a train station wherefrom you are observing two sets of workers on two divergent tracks; five working on the main track and one working on a side track nearby.

Suddenly, you notice a runaway trolley barreling down the main track towards the five workers who are unaware and busy with their work. The trolley is sure to kill all five of them in seconds, this you are certain of. However, you then just happen to notice that you are standing by a lever that if pulled would divert the trolley away from the main set of tracks, thus saving the five workers, but the one worker on the side track would then be killed instead. Do you pull the lever?

You have two options:

1. Do nothing and allow the trolley to kill the five workers on the main track.

2. Pull the lever, thus diverting the trolley onto the side track where it will kill the one worker.

Murder is murder right? If you pull the lever you are committing a murder. A person who would have otherwise had been just fine will die as a direct result of your actions if you pull the lever.

Do you pull it?

What on Earth are you even trying to begin to talk about? — Outlander

This is a variation of a series of popular thought experiments known as "The trolley problem". It illustrates a hypothetical scenario that presents an ethical dilemma that has become a common exercise in moral philosophy. I used a similar thought experiment here but instead of illustrating a classical variation of the hypothetical scenario, I framed a nuanced variation based on the contexts of examples both @TheHedoMinimalist and myself have presented to one another in our attempt to understand and represent each others, as well as our own, positions and disagreements with regard to normative and meta-ethical beliefs. Excuse the provocative nature of such illustrations as they are merely rhetorical devises intended to tease out emotive responses underlying ethical presuppositions.

Cool name btw, was wondering where it came from/what it meant to you? — Outlander

In reading "Neurology and the Soul" by Oliver Sacks, wherein he mentions that "Even in the work of C. S. Sherrington, the founder of modern neurophysiology, we find an explicitly Cartesian viewpoint: thus Sherrington regarded his decerebrate dogs as "Cartesian trigger-puppets" deprived of mind; he felt that physiology—at least the sort of reflex physiology he set himself to study—needed to be free of any "interference" by will or mind; and he wondered whether these, in some sense, did not transcend physiology and might not form a separate principle in human nature."

http://danbhai.com/rsns/sacks_neurology_and_the_soul.htm

A criminal action is a criminal act and will be neutralized and/or punished to the fullest extent of the law. Any person who does not believe this is a savage and will be punished.. heh, even if they try to duck out and think death will save them. I am proud to say, this is not so. — Outlander

This is a discussion in normative ethical theories and a meta-ethical analysis of the semantic content of moral language as well as the logical force behind normative, moral, and prescriptive statements in comparison with the logical force exerted by positive, or non-evaluative descriptive statements when inserted into the framework of an argument as the constituents (premises and conclusion) therein.

Law is what a society creates for a basic system of governance in order to enforce some standard of behaviour necessary for the success of the community. There is very little attention to detail in law which is very sloppy and prone to make mistakes. You seem as if you represent a judge, jury and executioner in your statements. A lack in belief makes someone a savage in need of punishment? Laws are under construction and destruction all the time and this is a result of fluctuations in what we believe in as a society. Does this make every well organized body pushing for legislative change savages?

Now, my question was very specific and I don't believe that your objection accurately represents what it is that I'm trying to get you to concede to. Here is my exact statement:

Would you agree that the essence of morality lies in it's connection to action? — Cartesian trigger-puppets

Take notice of what it is that im specifically suggesting to be the primary focus of morality. I'm saying that the focus of moral philosophy is, in essence, centered around human activities; the focus is upon an intimate connection to actions or behaviors. This connection to action is best captured by the ethical modalities represented by each of the three normative approaches: consequentialism, virtue ethics, and deontology.

There is a particular mode of action, a mechanism, or a means whereby the ethical framework of each of these three normative approaches is either focused upon, or is making a fundamental connection to, actions or behaviors. For example, within a deontological framework (i.e., a duty framework), the focus is on moral duties and obligations with the ethical modality towards performing the correct action. You appear to concede to this point within the language used to express the reasons supporting your very objection—as seen in the following.

I actually wouldn’t agree with that because it seems that there are plenty of moral philosophers that focus more on consequences or personality traits when thinking about what constitutes moral behavior. — TheHedoMinimalist

"...many moral philosophers that focus more on consequences or personality traits **when thinking about what constitutes moral BEHAVIOR**."

Your argument implies that much of the attention of moral philosophy is either focused through the lense of consequential ethics, or focused otherwise through the lense of virtue ethics. I would agree, however, only upon the inclusion of the omitted lense of deontological ethics. Your statement appeals to a proportion of moral philosophers represented by two of the three classes of normative ethical theories.

First, the consequencialist (i.e., outcome-based) approach, wherein philosophers pay particular attention to the results of an action or a behavior in order to make a moral judgment. As you might put it, the proponents of consequentialism represent many moral philosophers who focus more on consequences when thinking about what constitutes moral behavior.

Second, the personality trait-based or character-based approach of virtue ethics, wherein virtue ethicists assume that we acquire virtue through practice. That an action is moral if, and only if, it is an action which moral exemplars (i.e., a virtuous person) would carry out in an identical scenario. Virtue ethics is agent-based rather than action-based (i.e., focusing on the person rather than the action), but it nonetheless focuses on the virtues possessed by an agent (i.e., the moral character—which includes personality traits—of a person) based upon the type of actions an agent is carrying out. In other words, and in anticipation of the foreseeable objections to a connection between virtue ethics and action: though virtue ethics focuses on a virtuous person, a virtuous person, as defined by virtue ethics, is a person who ACTS virtuously.

Virtue ethics, in contrast with deontology or consequentialism—that otherwise focus on the ethical duties of the agent; the rules to guide the agents behavior (as with the former), or (as with the latter) that focus on the consequences of the agents particular actions; the outcomes subsequently produced by an agents particular behavior—may, initially, be seen as the exception to my universally stated proposition ("the essence of morality lies in it's connection to action"), and thus form its negation on pain of contradiction (e.g., "All moral theories are connected to action" and "There exists a moral theory that isn't connected to action"). This is not necessarily the case.

Upon further inspection, it becomes clear that, while virtue ethics is a normative ethic that emphasizes the moral character of an agent, rather than emphasizing the duties (deontology) or the consequences (consequentialism) that either dictate or result from our actions or behaviors, virtue ethics nonetheless remains intimately connected to action. Virtue ethics, the agent-based rebuttal notwithstanding, remains a normative ethic that despite lacking an emphasis with regard to action, as is the case with action-based theories, is nonetheless connected to action, and thus represents a normative ethic that is consistent with the view that morality is *CONNECTED to action*. Virtue ethics is connected to action because a moral exemplar, or virtuous person, is defined as such by practicing such acts as being honest, being just, being benevolent, being generous, being wise, etc, thereby developing the requisite behavior and moral character necessary to be a virtuous person.

For example, Jeremy Bentham was a moral philosopher and he didn’t believe that actions were universally right or wrong and he also didn’t necessarily think that we had moral duties. — TheHedoMinimalist

Bentham was a consequencialist moral philosopher, as a hedonic utilitarian who evaluated actions based upon their consequences. Bentham regarded the morality status of actions as 'good' based on their tendency to promote happiness or pleasure and 'bad' based on their tendency to promote unhappiness or suffering. Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill are the quintessential developers of the principle of utility and the consequencialist derivative of utilitarianism as a normative ethical theory. Utilitarianism is necessarily connected to action because measures various actions based on their outcomes with imaginary units known as utils—representing the amount of utility an action provided.

(Unrelated)
I appreciate your references to sources that can better educate me with regard to terms such as 'prudential' and phrases such as 'prudential values' for their meanings within the lexicon of philosophy or as philosophical nomenclatures.

I would like to emphasize that my question which shortly follows this statement is a meta-ethical one and as such I will point out the problems I have with your answer.

What is your view on rape, in general?

If you had the ability to stop a typical rape from occurring, without risking any personal harm, would you stop it? If so, why? If not, why? — Cartesian trigger-puppets

As a meta-ethical question, we cannot properly answer it with such terms as "Repugnant" as you did here:

I find the idea of raping someone to be repugnant — TheHedoMinimalist

We cannot appeal to such normatively-loaded terms because in doing so we are begging the question. If I ask what makes rape immoral on your view and you reply thereafter with something along the lines of, "Rape is immoral because rape is repugnant", then you are simply assuming the immorality of rape by using a term that is synonymous with 'Bad' within your premise. It is reducible to a tautology since the term 'Repugnant' can easily be defined as: "Unpleasant or disgusting" and thus to say something is repugnant is to describe something with an adjective that is synonymous to 'Bad' or similar adjectives that likewise evaluate a noun in negative or otherwise implicitly immoral terms. It is analytically equivalent to the argument "Rape is bad because rape is bad".

Your reasoning, as shown by the following, exhibits another problem that I would like to point out.

I don’t understand why someone would prefer non-consensual sex over consensual sex. — TheHedoMinimalist

If asked for reasons to support your view that rape is immoral, the above premise represents an error in your reasoning. It is a fallacy in informal logic known as, Argument from incredulity, because what you are asserting is, essentially, that the proposition "Rape is moral", or in other words, "Rape is good", must be false because you cannot understand how it could be true since it goes against your personal expectations or beliefs (that someone would prefer non-consensual sex over consensual sex).

(Brief digression)
On a separate note, whether or not someone prefers non-consensual sex over consensual sex has nothing to do with the issue of whether rape is good or bad. One could prefer consensual sex over non-consensual sex and still perform the act of rape. Furthermore, such a preference one way or the other doesn't provide us any information about whether rape is good or bad.
(End of digression)

This way of reasoning is fallacious because your inability to understand how a statement such as, "Rape is good" can possibly be true gives us no further information about whether the statement is actually true or false. For example, if a fundamentalist Christian asserts the proposition, "God exists" predicated on their inability to understand or imagine a world wherein God doesn't exist, provides no additional information other than appealing to their own ignorance and obstinacy.

I don’t understand why some people would want to have sex with someone that doesn’t want to have sex with them if it would actually be always easier to find someone that does want to have sex with you. — TheHedoMinimalist

To make another tangential point, this is a very naive understanding of why people sometimes rape. It fails to consider the perspectives of those unfortunate individuals who are extremely unattractive in either physical appearance, social demeanor, or both. Also, people who suffer from pathological afflictions that prevent them from participating in otherwise normal social interactions necessary for sexual relationships, yet experience normal, or even hyperactive sexual drives. It also fails to consider rape through a psychopathic perspective or a sadistic personality or under the influence of schizophrenic delusion, etc. Please prioritize my main points over my tangential ones.

I find the idea of forcing someone to have sex with you to be disgusting. It causes me suffering to think about such stuff. — TheHedoMinimalist

This is another instance of begging the question with the term "Disgusting" followed by an emotive response in place of actual reasoning.

If all those other considerations were equal, then I think it would be better to prevent the 5 women from being raped at the expense of the single woman who does get raped. — TheHedoMinimalist

This commits you to a consequencialist position with regard to this scenario. It also commits you to hold the position that a rape can be justified so long as it results in an approximately more favorable outcome of at least one order of magnitude or greater. We can imagine a scenario such as human organ trafficking or the forced organ harvests of humans where one human is sacrificed in order to save five or more other humans who would otherwise die without acquiring the organs of the human who is being sacrificed. Since according to such consequentialist logic, one such reductio that would be necessarily entailed would be the view that such actions are justified so long as it results in favorable results (such as sacrificing one to save five). Such logic promotes the notion that some humans are worth less than others and that human life is just another commodity with a price.

This commits you to support forms of slavery and forms of genocide so long as the end results in a net positive gain that measures at least in a 5:1 ratio. So, it follows, then, that a majority of a society's population consisting of at least 80 percent of the society's members could justifiably enslave the remaining 20 percent of the society's members who make up a sufficient minority of the society's population, so long as there are favorable results gained by the 80 percent thereby compensating for the unfavorable results endured by the 20 percent. Moreover, it additionally follows, then, that an entire nation or ethnic group could justifiably be completely exterminated, holocausted, or genocided, so long as the unfavorable outcome endured by the single group also resulted in favorable outcomes for at least five other nations or ethnic groups with a relatively equivalent number of individuals contained within or with a relatively equivalent capacities to experience suffering or pleasure in totality.

Putting these normative ethical dilemmas aside, I want to know what your answer is with regards to the meta-ethical question: is rape moral, immoral, or amoral—or otherwise under your evaluations considered to be good, bad, or neutral? For context, consider the previous ethical dilemma of causing the rape of 1 woman in order to prevent the rape of 5 women—with just that information to work with. What is your decision? Why is rape, in general, moral—otherwise considered good or immoral—otherwise considered bad on your view alone?

I apologize for the lapse in time between my responses, but my intellectual resources were entirely needed elsewhere in my personal life.

I appreciate the effort of explaining how you approach decision options and analyzing future outcomes, but that is a bit too much for me, and a bit of a stretch for you too, I think. I mean, we can't foresee the future and there are way too many variables to speculate that far. I would much rather like to understand your view rather than your assessment regarding the views of others. In your example, both dating Sue, going to the bar with my friends, and interacting on the philosophy forum, all seem to be too vague to evaluate, but nonetheless, the acts in and of themselves seem to be, at best, moral, and morally neutral, at worst. Instead of analyzing the unforeseeable future, we should of analyzed the broader context of each scenario. For example, what are my intentions for going on a date with Sue? What are her expectations? What kind of girl is she? What is the context of her life? And the same with the bar of philosophy forum, a broader context is needed in order to evaluate one action to another and weigh outcomes and reasons for each action, in order, and within a more cognitively accessible duration whereby this sequence of events takes place.

All this is further complicating things. I still don't understand your position on matters such as rape, or killing, or how you lack a moral system, etc, and I understand that you need more context, but a general take would actually quite well inform me. I just want to ask you a few questions to fill in the gaps for myself.

What is your view on rape, in general?

If you had the ability to stop a typical rape from occurring, without risking any personal harm, would you stop it? If so, why? If not, why?

If you had an opportunity to save five women from getting raped, by taking action with no risk to yourself, but at the cost of another woman getting raped, a woman who would have otherwise not been had it been for your involvement, would you?

Please answer from your point of view, what you would say and what you think the right thing to do would be.

Prudential values are often an umbrella term that is used in philosophy to describe values regarding mundane and non-moral decisions that we make in our life. For example, there are financial decisions that we make in our life like the decision that we might make to invest into Tesla. It doesn’t seem to be a moral decision because it is outside of the scope of what is considered to be moral philosophy. — TheHedoMinimalist

I'm not as familiar with that particular term. I think we need to do some semantic unpacking because we seem to be arguing past one another. First, let's agree upon a definition for what makes a statement moral. Would you agree that the essence of morality lies in it's connection to action? For example, when making a moral judgment, it seems we are fundamentally concerned with an evaluation of an action. Every moral philosopher considers morality in terms of what you 'should' do or how things 'should' be. What most compells us to explore morality comes as we reflect upon our actions, asking ourselves, "What should I do?" or "What is the right thing to do?". As a result of such questions, what we are motivated towards achieving in ethics is to provide ourselves with answers. So, when making a moral claim, we are actually providing an answer, such as "You ought to do this," or "You should do what you ought to do", that, if true, establishes that someone has a reason to act or be a certain way.

Even with your statement, though I agree it is does not seem to be, there are moral underpinnings and presuppositions embedded in our meaning. Any statement that prescribes an action (or suggests an action) be taken, if called into question, will reveal moral assumptions. A Socratic approach would elucidate this, but that requires you to follow line of questioning and that is not easy done through text. But, i could give it a go, I suppose.

1. Why should I invest in Tesla?