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I was agreeing with Pantagruel that trying to learn a discipline required working with its language — Paine

I tend to intuit my way through, almost entirely by feeling and with a fair amount of imitation. Which might help explain why I have never taken an interest in maths, physics or technical matters.

I hope that I am slightly less ignorant than two decades ago, If that is true, it is because I feel and do things differently. — Paine

Not sure I can say the same. I wouldn’t even know how to assess this. I don’t think I feel or do things much differently. I am more competent in a range of domains but I doubt this has come with measurable wisdom.

Interesting information about axioms.

A lot of mathematicians involved feel that these will be true statements about the real sets. But clearly that is a subjective choice based on values about what axioms should do, and there is a cultural aspect to that. — Gary Venter

I don't have enough maths knowledge to drill down into this, but no doubt axioms or presuppositions (and their justifications) lie the core of postmodern investigation.

I'd be interested to know what those may be. But I think it takes more than imagination to create a work of art. — Ciceronianus

Which is why I wrote 'creative imagination.' Personal taste will account for much of this. For instance, I don't find Nietzsche appealing, but I think he was a literary giant. Things which don't resonate with us personally, which we may even resile from, may still be great and inspired works.

Saw the rest of Tár, and it picked up in the second half. It turns out to be something of a gothic/psychological thriller and feels a little like a languorous and formalist Kubrick movie. Not even sure how much of Tár's story really happens and how much is in the character's mind. But it's still boring...

Let's not sully art by claiming philosophers are artists. — Ciceronianus

There's a lot of pretty bad art out there and it kind of sullies itself IMO.

That said, depending upon one's definition of art, i would think that some of the works of great philosophical imagination (even if you hold they are wrongheaded) count as artistic responses, something like poetry.

Perhaps God IS an alien with advanced technology. — Agree-to-Disagree

Yes, I've sometimes said this myself, mainly as a provocation.

I am always mindful of Voltaire's statement, "if god did not exist, it would be necessary to invent him". — Agree-to-Disagree

I think inventing a magic man as a way to fill gaps in our knowledge is irresistible.

Don't forget paragraphs. Text slabs are hard to read.

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This is a tough one to answer. As I said earlier, I would probably need a god to show up and make its presence known or visible in a way that I can be sure isn't a hallucination or delusion. And all in a situation where this can be verified by others. This would need to be more than miracles/conjuring tricks: it would need to be big, like moving the planets around, changing the entire surface of the earth... that kind of thing. But there would also need to me a personal component, this god would need to speak directly to me and know things no one could know. All sounds kind of childish, I grant you.

With a question like this, I am always mindful of Clarke's third law, 'Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.' How do we tell the difference between an apparent miracle and something else?

What would you need?

What evidence or experience would convince you that (e.g.) "the God of Abraham" exists? — 180 Proof

Couldn’t say. But if this magical creature exists, no doubt it would know. I need god to show up in person and settle the matter.

There are some problems - the god of Abraham doesn't exist in as much as even many Jews and Christians recognise the allegorical nature of scripture. Yahweh as presented is likely a fiction (just as well as he behaves like a celestial Trump). So for the theists, who is it they suppose is really there, buried underneath those horrible stories in the OT?

Do we know if time exists outside of human cognition?

I'm not talking 'ancient' I am thinking more along the lines of embodied cognition studies - thinkers like Evan Thompson and Dan Zahavi - as one avenue of enquiry.

Joseph Rouse and Lee Braver are examples of contemporary philosophers who have no trouble moving back and forth between the two cultures. — Joshs

Indeed. I've found Braver accessible. He is also an excellent communicator in lectures and interviews.

I'm afraid I find philosophy very difficult and time consuming and at my age, with many other priorities, I am unlikely to acquire a useful reading of most thinkers, especially those who formulate more radical approaches. But I am keen to survey some of the directions and themes taken up.

But if I wanted to seek external opinions about if the universe is really "lawful" under the hood, I would seek the opinion of scientists first, physicists in particular, rather than ancient philosophers. I respect that that's not necessarily a popular opinion here — flannel jesus

Not being a philosopher or scientist, I have no commitments either way. But I think the quesion what are the presuppositions which allow science to be understood as reliable is inevitable here. Once you start asking 'why' of scientific inferences, you tend to head into philosophy and more metaphysical areas.

The way you tell it is almost as if our cognitive apparatus is unnatural, or supernatural. — unenlightened

Perhaps that's the way you read it.

You are certainly free to just say that, but some of us like to go on to think about what the reasons might be that we do observe those regularities. I respect if you're not interested in that question — flannel jesus

You left out the key part.

To what extent these regularities are a function of our cognitive apparatus or are in nature itself, I'm not sure we can say. Our physics and science are incomplete and our philosophical understandings of what humans bring to observation and the concomitant construction of what we call reality, are also partial. — Tom Storm

Perhaps Kant can help us? Or phenomenology? What methodology do you think you have access to that can answer the above and determine what direction this enquiry should take? Or do you think straightforward empiricism can resolve this matter?

So in answer to your question, I wouldn't personally frame it as "obeying". Nature isn't obeying some laws defined from outside, rather nature IS those laws. There's not a separation between nature and the laws, our reality at its root is what it is because it is defined by those laws. — flannel jesus

I've never much liked the word 'laws' in this context. Apart from the metaphysical implications, it also implies a law giver or other mysterious entities. And leads to the the use of the word 'obey' which also seems irresistibly anthropomorphic.

Can't we just say that humans observe regularities and patterns in nature? To what extent these regularities are a function of our cognitive apparatus or are in nature itself, I'm not sure we can say. Our physics and science are incomplete and our philosophical understandings of what humans bring to observation and the concomitant construction of what we call reality, are also partial.

An example would be four posts up where I said that I believe that if you practice a certain skill more often you will get better at it sooner, contrary to the example I gave in that post. — HardWorker

As already discussed. That example was not philosophy and you're missing the point of the allegory. It's teaching about patience, not karate, using irony.

I wonder if this is teaching an additional lesson - that when people think something is 'wrong' it may simply be that it doesn't fit with or isn't compatible with their current ability to make sense of the world. Which is a different thing, but often mistaken for the former.

Why don't you talk us through a particular philosopher - say Heidegger or Plato and provide your reasoning for why they were wrong and what the significance of these errors might be?

Just tried to get through Tár, the Cate Blanchett vehicle. Lasted an hour. I found it dull, theatrical and self-aware. Blanchett's mannered performance feels like a recital and the character fails to come alive. A torrent of clever dialogue hemorrhaging from the mouths of characters, especially Cate's, has an enervating effect. It all feels deeply contrived. I hear the second half is better. I might brave it later on.

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Appreciated. Thanks.

though the grunt, growl, and purr lack discernable syntax, it could be risky to interpret them as semantically void. — Arne

Indeed. I'm not arguing this. I'm just saying they are not propositional and are not as clearly beholden to local axioms as a more fully developed linguistic system is. My point was a minor one - that between silence and linguistic 'coherence' lies noise.

I maintain that bodily experience can not he reduced to language and culture. Our bodily sense of situations is a concretely sensed interaction process that always exceeds culture, history, and language.

This is an intriguing position and I am sympathetic to embodied cognition. I'm not sure what it means to 'exceed' culture. Does he mean that bodily experince is primary and the others later and derivative? Or is there more of a reciprocal relationship?

It will incorporate the insights of postmodernism and move past the dead end where postmodernism seems to stop. I

Do you agree with Gendlin's account here? Does postmodernism lead to a dead end?

↪Tom Storm chicken or the egg. and with no language to express the axioms, silence. and speaking only for myself, silence is preferable to incoherence.↪Fooloso4 — Arne

I'm quite partial to incoherence, but it depends on the context. I think between language and silence there are also grunts, growls and purring....

I would have thought language depends or is grounded upon the logical axioms: identity, non-contradiction and excluded middle. Without which... incoherence...

As a matter of fact I do. I once heard a story of a fellow who asked a karate instructor how long it would take to get a black belt — HardWorker

That clarifies things. I don't think this example counts as philosophy - unless you are using the word metaphorically. It's an allegory using irony to teach patience. Furthermore, if you are taking this story literally and applying categories of right or wrong to it then you are not understanding it. The allegory is likely intended to teach the right attitude to personal growth and has nothing really to do with karate.

Now back to philosophy. What do you consider philosophy to be? And a follow up question, to what extent are your binary categories of 'right' and 'wrong' useful?

I was thinking similarly. :wink:

If philosophy ever gets around to proving an objective morality, then it would become science. The great mysteries that philosophy has yet to solve are: Morality, knowledge, and (my opinion) art. Perhaps there are others, but those are the big three. — Philosophim

I'm curious - you don't think reality is one of these - or do you have a presupposition about the nature of reality which informs the others?

Is this a serious OP? Would it not be obvious that no one can be familiar with all philosophies, let alone agree with them all? What does it mean to say you 'agree' with a philosophy and what counts as a philosophy?

But do you need a good understanding of philosophy in order to determine which philosophy has merit or not? How does one make such a distinction?

Philosophies have been shown to sometimes be wrong. — HardWorker

Do you have an example in mind?

So, it appears to me that PM mathematics is mostly a factor in mathematics education. I have never known or even met a research mathematician who considered themselves post modern. Guess I'm not either. — jgill

I'd expect that. My original quesion was intended to understand how that rather lose category of ideas called postmodernism might understand maths. Maths interested me because it is an approach which appears to be universal and consistent across cultures. This, I have assumed, is anathema to many postmodern projects. I also thought it would also be an interesting way to see how pomo might deal with the age old quesion - is maths discovered or invented?

The audience isn't supposed to see it as objective truth, the point is precisely that it is ridiculous, as this gets it into the mainstream media which in turn makes it real in a way, because once something is in mass media then people need to take a side based on their identity allegiances. It's trolling, which is at the heart of the Alt-Right. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Interesting. Although I suspect that like religion this may in practice operate at two levels - there are the literalists who believe the conspiracies (they have a simple faith) and there are those who consider them allegorical.

Only today there is no one comparable to Plato or Aristophanes. I don't think it was a matter of manipulating the good, but rather, in the absence of knowledge of the good, making images of its likeness. — Fooloso4

That's interesting. How did they consider poetry was able to do this - by aesthetic distraction and emotionality? Poetry as truth's false gold?

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Well I disagree with this antirealist suggestion, Pez – "concepts" do not "change" themselves, we change our concepts in order to adapt. Turning on house lights at night in an unfamiliar house does not change the house, rather you change only your capability for orienting yourself within that unfamiliar house. Likewise, given that we inhabit the world, the 'models (i.e. pictures, maps, simulations) of the world' which we make conform with varying degrees of fidelity to the world and thereby inform our expectations of how we can adapt to the world. For instance, GR & QM were as true about the physical world in Aristotle's day and in Newton's day as they are today even though Aristotle, Newton and their contemporaries, respectively, were completely ignorant of them. Thus, changing our concepts of reality, in effect, only changes us and not reality itself. — 180 Proof

That's very elegantly put. Thanks.

But I've come around to denying Quine and thinking philosophy is different from science -- so I'd say postmodernism is philosophy, and mathematics is science, so the relationship is a bit open to explore and depends upon particulars. — Moliere

In crude terms, the various strands of thinking often loosely described as postmodern seem to be a form of skepticism and a disavowal of metanarratives and foundationalism. They are also known for relativism and perspectivism. From conceptual frames like this, I wonder how math and its underlying assumptions are understood. Particularly given maths status as a universal language, with exceptional effectiveness.

Joshs said something interesting here:

You’re right to see maths as a central concern of pomo thinkers. They recognize that the essence of modern science is the marriage of the pure mathematical idealizations invented by Greek and pre-Greek cultures and observation of the empirical world. The peculiar notion of exactitude which is the goal of scientific description has its origin in this pairing. — Joshs

This notion of 'mathematical idealizations' which are essentially empty seems a promising direction as per below -Derrida followed by Joshs

“I can manipulate symbols without animating them, in an active and actual manner, with the attention and intention of signification…Numbers, as numbers, have no meaning; they can squarely be said to have no meaning, not even plural meaning. …Numbers have no present or signified content. And, afortiori, no absolute referent. This is why they don't show anything, don't tell anything, don't represent anything, aren't trying to say anything. Or more precisely, the moment of present meaning, of “content,” is only a surface effect.”

The contentlessness of numeration leads to the fascinating fact that its components originate at different times and in different parts of the world as a human construction designed for certain purposes . And yet, even though these constructions emerged as contingent historical skills, their empty core of the identical ‘again and again’ allows them to be universally understood. — Joshs

Derrida, writing in Margins of Philosophy, says:

Every sign, linguistic or nonlinguistic, spoken or written (in the usual sense of this opposition), as a small or large unity, can be cited, put between quotation marks; thereby it can break with every given context, and engender infinitely new contexts in an absolutely nonsaturable fashion. This does not suppose that the mark is valid outside its context, but on the contrary that there are only contexts without any center of absolute anchoring. This citationality, duplication, or duplicity, this iterability of the mark is not an accident or anomaly, but is that (normal/abnormal) without which a mark could no longer even have a so-called “normal” functioning. What would a mark be that one could not cite? And whose origin could not be lost on the way?

I guess I've been curious how this approach applies to maths. What does it say about the certainty and universal reliability of equations?

I hear you. I find the range of ideas which flow around the categories of post structuralism and post modernism very interesting. The antipathy they frequently generate makes it even more fascinating. On this site I’m mostly interested in the conversations we create. If I were of a studious disposition I’d probably just read books and avoid untheorised fora opinions.

Has pretty much been the way I've been thinking about the question. At a certain point "postmodernism" isn't a useful frame for thinking -- you have to dig into a particular author because they don't necessarily agree with one another. — Moliere

Yes, I am aware of this - it's generally one of the first things people say when you use the term postmodernism. I chose to keep it broad to see what would come in since I am no expert. I'm not really interested in any particular writer and I wanted to see what people would select and highlight. We've done ok with 4 pages so far.

Socrates wants to banish the poets from the just city. The philosophers and not the poets should be the educators, the myth makers, the makers of truth, and of proper conduct toward men and gods. — Fooloso4

Thanks. I thought Plato saw poetry as immoral, distracting folk from truth. Doesn't he also agree that poetry has a role some later works?

How are we to understand this today - sounds like a culture war. Was it that poetry functioned a bit like sophistry, using its artfulness to manipulate rather than identify the good?

Plato referred to it as 'the quarrel between philosophy and poetry'. — Fooloso4

Nice - can you expand a little?