This is an idea you have of yourself that you identify with, and claim as your self, in relation to some meaningful others. There must be many other relations, familial, professional, neighbourly, social, from which you derive all sorts of other characterisations — the joker of the family, the only one in the office who actually does anything, the fight defuser at the bar, the guy who always came top in metalwork at school. And the sum of these various ideas is your 'narrative identity'. and all your experiences are the experiences of that identity, and your response are the responses of that identity, which develops through time with experience. And this self is always comparative and thereby judgemental - I am smarter than a brick and faster than a snail, but not as beautiful as a sunset.
A non-linguistic animal cannot form a narrative identity; they learn things - not to eat the yellow snow, but they never form the identity "I don't like yellow snow", they just avoid it when they see it. So they do not live in time, psychologically. they are always just here and now, with whatever they know, which is nothing of themselves. — unenlightened
And the crux of all this as you have correctly identified, you crude thinker, you, is that I propose a state of enlightenment, where the self is 'transcended' and one again lives without time and without the comparing judgement that becomes morality, but retaining the glorious creative potential of language. This is the fulfilment of human potential, and the end of the narrative self that otherwise has to end in mere death. — unenlightened
Modern philosophy with its psychologized idealism is not my cup of tea. — introbert
Kant says he is an empirical realist and a transcendental idealist. I think for Kant sensory appearances are real. — Janus
The story so far is that we (humans) have fallen out of the present continuous of living, into a story that is always a moral story, always judgemental. We do not live in what is, but in what was, what might have been what could be and what ought to be and ought to have been.
There can be no return to the innocence of not knowing. But we live in the story of what ought to be, and it contradicts what is that we still also inhabit, willy-nilly — and the only way to resolve that conflict is to make the word flesh; which is to say to make the life we lead the same as the life we know we ought to lead. — unenlightened
You are lost in an endless forest of signposts all pointing in different directions. — unenlightened
The interaction is the problem, basically. At least for now, to our present knowledge, the speed of light is a bit of an obstacle.
If we solve our "limitations in our understanding" and create the faster than light hyperdrives or teleportation, then there's a bit more to the subject of interaction with aliens. — ssu
No, I won't have to concede that, because I don't think reason without sense data produces knowledge. It is not a valid inference from the fact that sense data combined with reason produces knowledge to a claim that reason on its own can produce knowledge. — Janus
I've been reading the Google preview of that book, and have just now ordered the hard copy. It is an account of Schopenhauer's reading of the Upaniṣads, of which he had a Latin copy, translated from a Persian edition. According to this book, published 2014, they along with Plato and Kant were the major formative influences on Schopenhauer's mature philosophy. — Wayfarer
One’s political views are going to be dependent on one’s morals and amoral goals—no metaphysical view in-itself tells us what to do here, but it can end up being what formulates our morals (e.g., if we shouldn’t hurt what is a part of ourselves and we are of the same mind, then we shouldn’t hurt each other). — Bob Ross
Any view can lead to nihilism, although some more than others, and anyone can be happy under any of them—nihilism is a reflection of one’s psychology and nothing more. — Bob Ross
But the underlying philosophical point is mistaking the illusory for the real, although of course for that to be meaningful, there must be some kind of inkling of a higher reality, which is also pretty non-PC in today's culture. — Wayfarer
For example, it seems to me that very often, if not always, the motivation for believing in idealism is the hope that the self does not perish with the body. — Janus
Only a few brain-washed nuts actually attempt to walk through walls, which, according to subatomic physics, are 99% empty space (image below). — Gnomon
As far as I can tell, the Universal Mind adheres to strict laws.
— Bob Ross
There’s no legitimate reason to think that, insofar as it contradicts the notion that the universal mind does no meta-cognitive deliberations, which it would have to do in order to determine what laws are, and the conditions under which they legislate what it can do, which determines what it is. — Mww
We really have no idea what either physicality or mentality are in any substantial sense. — Janus
I think that Foucault's The Care of the Self is a close examination of this "Epicurean" virtue. — Paine
Do you wish that UFOs, Alien Abductions, and Alien Visits were, in fact, REAL, meaning our planet has been visited by aliens from another star system, and that aliens may be present on our planet right now? — BC
Or, do you fear that UFO stories may actually be true, and it frightens you greatly? — BC
Or, do you think this is all malarky? — BC
In any case, he’s not a climate denier and seems to reject capitalism, so he’s certainly not doing any harm, in my view. — Mikie
But it could also be interpreted not as an exaggeration. What is it to “have reasons”? If it’s to have arrived at the love through ratiocination, or if it means that reasons are somehow constitutive of it, or are the motivation for it, then the statement is accurate. I don’t decide to love someone based on a deduction.
So under that interpretation, giving or thinking of reasons post hoc is not what “having reasons” means.
Neither does it mean the causes of your love. An omniscient psychologist’s discovery of the objective reasons that you love a person—the causes of your love—is not what is being discussed. What it’s about is having reasons of your own, as justification for your feeling.
It’s a rich insight (though hardly an original one), so try to understand before rejecting. Be curious. — Jamal
He's a serious philosopher who made the "mistake" of having a sense of humour, being entertaining, and relating his work to everyday life. — Baden
I think it would be very difficult on reading and understanding one of his books to come to that conclusion. I've fully read "Violence", "Enjoy your Symptom", and "How to Read Lacan" so far, as well as much of "the Parallax View" and "the Sublime Object of ldeology". — Baden
Having the feelings I have is no effort at all for me, I love my wife and my children unconditionally or a Zizek says, 'for no reason' - unreasonably. And when one of them screams at me and rushes off slamming the door, it hurts, and I still love them. And there is no reason why. — unenlightened
No one seems to discuss his ideas or contributions, although he’s published books. — Mikie
Keyword: things. Logic is not a thing. If a label is required for some reason, I’d just call it a condition, or maybe a axiom or fundamental principle of a theory. Heck, maybe just a merely necessary presupposition, in order to ground all that follows from it. All of which lend themselves quite readily to analysis. This is metaphysics after all, immune to proof from experience, so there are some permissible procedural liberties, so maybe logic is just that which prohibits such liberties from running amuck.
Besides, it is possible that the human intellect is itself naturally predisposed to what we eventually derive as logical conditions, so maybe we put so much trust in the power of pure logic for no other reason than we just are logical intelligences. Maybe we just can’t be not logically inclined. — Mww
t's the only school of philosophy to which I ever felt attracted. Not a card-carrying member, mind you, but it sure sounds better than most of them. — Vera Mont
Further Epicurus' theory gets at something fundamental about desire -- that our desires can be the reason we are unhappy, rather than us being unhappy because we're not satisfying those desires, and so the cure of unhappiness is to remove the desire rather than pursue it. Which is a very different kind of hedonism from our usual understanding of the word since it's centered around limiting desire such that they can always be satisfied and you don't have to worry about them rather than pursuing any and all of them. — Moliere
The desire for riches should perhaps not always be understood as a simple hunger for a luxurious life, a more important motive might be the wish to be appreciated and treated nicely. We may seek a fortune for no greater reason than to secure the respect and attention of people who would otherwise look straight through us. Epicurus, discerning our underlying need, recognised that a handful of true friends could deliver the love and respect that even a fortune may not.
