March 3rd. — Banno

May 3.

I think it's going to be a very dull campaign. Anything you think we should watch for?

The moral relativist can have a moral framework
— Tom Storm

What is the difference between a framework and an objective measurement? — Fire Ologist

A framework is a structured way of describing an approach, while an objective measurement implies a standard that is independent of personal or cultural perspectives.

Looks like political art out of the old USSR.

:up: I think this could be an interesting thread.

Why does anyone have any opinion about what others do or don’t do to others and their babies?

Once you care about others, only objectivity can to mediate a mutual, communicative, interaction among them. And a moral objectivity is supposed to make the interaction a “good” one.

Like this post. There is something objective here, or you wouldn’t know I was disagreeing with you.

My question is, for all moral relativists, why do you bother?

If there is no moral objectivity whatsoever, how can you say pushing the button to prevent the baby from suffering is “actually doing some good”? If you were beyond good and evil, there is no difference no matter what you do or don’t do - no good or evil results in any case. — Fire Ologist

Is this conflating moral objectivity with the ability to have meaningful moral discourse?

The moral relativist can have a moral framework, let's say that suffering should be avoided or minimised, because their values (whether these are informed by empathy, cultural values, or personal commitments) leads them to value well-being. The fact that we can communicate and disagree doesn't demonstrate moral objectivity. It shows that we share enough cognitive and linguistic structures to engage in discussion. Moral judgments, like preferring to prevent suffering, can be deeply felt and socially reinforced without appealing to objective moral truths. The relativist can still say that pushing the button is "good" within their framework of values, even if those values are not grounded in an absolute, external moral reality. Or something like that.

Other than making them feel as if they have made a difference of historical significance what benefit do they get? Money? Seriously dumb notion that the richest man in the world is doing what he is doing, subjecting himself to such rhetorical abuse, donating time and a portion of his fortune so he can make more money. That really is just one of the dumbest things I've seen in this thread. He has more money than most human beings can even contemplate. He can literally do anything that can be done materially. He can literally buy any experience and any kind of lifestyle that can be bought and yet he chooses to participate in fixing the way this country runs. Now disagree with his communication style or his methods but please stop pontificating on his motives which you can't possibly know. — philosch

This is certainly worth stating. The assumption that cupidity is the sole motivator seems banal. Such a conclusion involves a degree of mind reading or, at the very least, constructing a narrative from selective inferences. There is always the possibility that those whose approach and values we detest are acting sincerely, believing they are doing what is best. Someone like Musk likely thrives on problem-solving and the pursuit of significance. Vainglory is surely a far greater driving force for such a personality than money. One might have deep concerns about a person so consumed by ideology and the desire for status. I suspect the key to understanding all this is in how the change is managed and what its impacts are and how much Musk cares.

Well you gave the answer by referencing to a different interpretation — QuirkyZen

God is an idea with many interpretations. The cartoonish, literalist account of God is the easiest to undermine. People focus on it most because Biblical literalists have the loudest voices (and dominate American culture), while atheists find the cartoon version of theism the easiest to refute.

i won't ask them because you are a atheist too so you pretty much don't believe in this too so their is no meaning in that. — QuirkyZen

You don’t have to believe in Brahman to be well-versed in Advaita Vedanta. But fair enough.

They claim god is all merciful and loving yet there is so much cruelty and hate — QuirkyZen

Well this is only true if you think of god as a magic sky wizard with a plan. The literalist account in Islam and Christianity, for instance. But if you consider god to be not a person at all but the source of all that is and that we can understand God not as a being among beings, but as Being itself—the foundation of existence rather than a contingent entity.

In the view of philosopher and theologian David Bentley Hart, God is the infinite wellspring of goodness, beauty, and truth, not a cosmic manager intervening in history. From this perspective, suffering and evil do not contradict God’s nature but arise from the misuse of freedom within creation, which remains ultimately grounded in divine love. At least that's a more intelligent account of theism which has a long tradition. Literalism seems to be a product of the modern period. Personally I am an atheist.

We can barely have a reasonable discussions about the kind of consciousness we all live with every day. How much more difficult to discuss kinds of consciousness we have only heard about from the writings of a tiny percentage of people, who claim it cannot be described? — Patterner

That's a pithy and reasonable observation and I've often had similar reactions.

No worries. And I hope my response didn't seem crusty. All good. We're just fumbling our way through these things. :up:

What is the way we settle these matters? Well, that's part of these matters. — Banno

Nice.

I can get behind that but this is a subtle idea and flies against traditions, etc.

What is your response against the view that if we make morality together by doing, how do we evaluate this? Is not selecting a foundation, say virtue ethics or Nussbaum's capability framework, essentially a preference and we might instead chose negative values instead like Trumpism, say, which may seem to like virtue when seen from the perspective of others. What is the way we settle these matters. Is it just old fashioned consequences regarding harm and barriers to eudaimonia?

Devine command and evolutionary necessity do not cover all the options. This also makes the mistake of thinking that morals are found, not made - discovered, not intended. — Banno

Yes, I think this may well be the critical matter - "made" by our actions.

:up: Fair enough.

I think about suicide every day and have done so for 37 years. The main reason I haven't killed myself is that it would cause suffering to my family and extended family. I would love to be happy. I would love to be cured of my CPTSD, Bipolar Disorder and Chronic Nerve Pain. — Truth Seeker

Sounds like you have a lot of challenges to manage. Your question has much more impact hearing this. For what it's worth, I wish you well. You've been resilient and strong in the face of significant difficulties. :pray:

Again, Truth Seeker asked a question, and I answered. In all honesty, having an impact upon you hadn't entered my mind. — Patterner

That goes for most answers here when others chime in. The argument from "the remarkableness of life" isn't always effective and no one else had made that point.

I don't understand what it means to imagine that one does not exist or wish that one was not born. — Paine

I don't understand when people don't understand this. :wink:

Being a consciousness of human intelligence (more or less) is the most extraordinary thing in the universe. In 13,500,000,000 years, in the universe of indescribable size, there have been an estimated 108,000,000,000 of us, and possibly nothing similar anywhere else. Being able to think and feel as we do is a rare thing, and a joyous thing. — Patterner

Who cares? A series of zeros has no impact upon me.

I hold a largely positive view about the world - for the prosperous Westerner (which I am) life is good and mine has been mostly without difficulties and yet if I were faced with the improbable thought experiment - the choice of never having been born or living this life, I'm not convinced I would pick life.

Agree.

I’ll give a short reason or two that summarizes the failure of emotivism. Emotivism can’t explain how moral language functions in arguments or conditionals (e.g., “If stealing is wrong, then murder is wrong.”), as emotional content lacks propositional coherence, which undermines it as an account of ethical reasoning.

In other words, as already mentioned, expressions of emotions aren’t truth-bearing. — Sam26

Indeed. As I understand it the emotivist doesn't believe in oughts or ought nots since they are just expressions of your preferences which are emotionally driven. When you say murder is wrong you are saying 'boo murder'.

In other words emotivism is not a normative ethical system that prescribes how one ought to act. It's is a theory about the nature of moral language and moral judgments. It seeks to explain where moral claims come from (namely, our emotions) instead of establish moral rules or duties.

Is it correct? I'm not sure. I'm mulling it over.

Allen murdered Shelley's son. Murder is wrong because of the way the community reacts to it, and that reaction is emotional. — frank

The emotivism wouldn’t say murder is wrong because of the community’s emotional reaction as if that were a causal explanation. Instead, they’d say calling murder "wrong" is an expression of the community’s emotional reaction.

As I understand it, the emotivist maintains that moral judgments aren’t factual statements about the world; they’re expressions of approval or disapproval. So when people say "murder is wrong," they’re not stating an objective fact but expressing their collective condemnation, foudned in emotions like grief, outrage, and fear. The status of murder on this view, is not an inherent property of the act but a reflection of how people feel about the act. And this is contingent upon culture language and experince. WHich is why peopel tend to share emotional reactions (for the most part).

Isn't it entirely possible for that some act be emotional disgusting or repugnant, and yet you ought do it? Ever changed a nappy? Isn't it a commonplace that you often ought do things in defiance of how you feel? What is courage? And see ↪javra's examples. The very same actions can be commendable or culpable. — Banno

Good point. I guess the response here might be that an emotivist might acknowledge that we may sometimes be compelled to act contrary to our immediate emotions, but would deny that there is an objective "ought" beyond how we feel about it.

Yes, changing a nappy might be disgusting, but if you care about the child, that feeling of care outweighs the disgust. The "ought" in that case is just another emotional response. One that wins out over revulsion.

By looking to what we might do, we bypass the opacity of thinking and feeling, refocusing instead on our acts of volition, and how we might change things. Fundamentally, ethics and aesthetics are about what we might do. — Banno

It's what you do, not what you feel or think, that counts, isn't it? — Banno

I'm not a philosopher, so here is my obtuse response:

Can't it be said that it is emotions and attitudes that ultimately drive our doing? What we do is a reflection of what we feel and value, and moral language itself is an expression of approval or disapproval rather than a statement of fact.

Yes, and it was a revelation to me when I finally saw the film and realised what the Network had left out.

Like you I love Altman's The Long Goodbye. MASH never did it for me but I appreciate its influence.

Suicide is painless
It brings on many changes
And I can take or leave it if I please

Original lyrics to the MASH theme (removed by network TV)

A lot of people have periods where they wish they never existed. And some hold the view that, although they are not particularly unhappy, the burden of living isn't all that fabulous, so never having been born at all might have been preferable.

But, having never existed seems to me the best version of reality. — AmadeusD

Yes - just as I was writing the above.

One could imagine a person not responding emotionally and yet able to recognize that a particular action is immoral. Why? Because most people recognize that certain actions are objectively immoral. The example that illustrates this point is the following: Imagine a person — Sam26

I guess that’s where we differ. I don’t believe any preference we have or decision we make is independent of our affective state. Reasoning is post hoc and the reasoning we find compelling or "satisfying" is shaped by how we feel about it. Emotion doesn’t always manifest as tears or laughter; rather, it forms the underlying foundation of our identity and preferences.

Note, I am not an emotivist, I might become one on further investigation but for now I think it is an interesting way of looking at morality. I do think emotion is critical to who we are.

Because most people recognize that certain actions are objectively immoral. The example that illustrates this point is the following: Imagine a person cutting off the arm of another without good reason. The harm done to the person is objective, viz., the blood loss, the arm on the ground, the screams, and the reactions of family and friends. — Sam26

An emotivist would likely respond that even though the physical harm of cutting off the arm is indisputable, the leap to labeling the act as "objectively immoral" still rests on subjective emotional responses rather than inherent moral facts. Your description of screams and reactions illustrates the observable consequences of the act, but it is our emotional reaction to these consequences—our feelings of horror and disapproval—that ultimately drives our moral judgment. In other words, while the physical harm is objective, the construction of this act as immoral is not derived from the harm itself but from the shared emotional attitudes that society cultivates in response to such violence. And humans (within time and place), seem to share fears, horrors, anxieties.

I disintinguish betweem emotions and moods. Anxiety and depression sometimes have emotions - some specific thing that I am anxious or depressed about. — Ludwig V

I don't currently make those sorts of distinctions. Mood is affect. Anxiety is affect. Enjoying music is affect.

As Wittgenstine said "The world of the happy man is quite different from the world of a sad man". — Ludwig V

Sure. But we can also say that the world of the happy man A is quite different from the happy man B.

So, for me, emotional reactions are the emotions. (You seem to be positing that the emotion is something orther than the reactions). — Ludwig V

Yes, I am suggesting that emotion shapes our identify and may be the foundational platform over which our identity (choices, decisions, preferences) is constructed.

That's an elegant summary.

Ok, but then my point still stands. One can't derive any consequent from "boo stealing!". At the very least a moral statement worthy of the name needs to apply to more than just oneself. — Banno

I agree with this.

A pathway to developing moral systems via emotivism would probably involve arguments about cooperation: a code of conduct that provides safety and predictability, because most humans feel more comfortable that way. Or something like this.

Emotions are not simply "expressions" like "ouch!" or "boo". They include a cognitive element, which is identified when we say "I am angry because..." or "I am afraid of..." "boo stealing" includes the belief that the addressee has taken possession of something that does not belong to them. — Ludwig V

Maybe, but I’m not sure. For me, emotional reactions are likely to be preconcpetual, prelinguistic experiences to which we apply post-hoc rationalizations. "I am angry because..." what follows is the post-hoc part. I've often held that human preferences are primarily directed by affective states, with rational deliberation serving as a post-hoc justification rather than the initial determinant of choice.

I don't like emotions or descriptions as an understanding of moral rules. Yet they include - are related to both. So a compatibilist answer is required. Perhaps something ike this. Moral rules encode our expectations and requirements of people's behaviour. There are facts of the matter whether certain rules do encode our expectations and requirements. But we do not respond to people following or violating those rules in the same way as we respond to "plain" - morally neutral - facts of the matter. — Ludwig V

You can be an emotivist and a compatibilist. I'm not sure what your points mean in relation to emotivism. Can you clarify this?

Whether it is true is a very different question to whether it is truth-apt. — Banno

Yes, but my point, perhaps badly worded, is that if the statement 'stealing is wrong' amounts to no more than the emotivist's "boo stealing!" This can't be truth-apt. I'm not convinced yet that the emotivist is wrong about this.

We can still argue that stealing often leads to social disharmony and suffering and if we find this discomforting the inference is obvious.

I bet you hate emotivism. :wink:

Can you show me how stealing is wrong is truth apt?
— Tom Storm

Odd.

It is true that stealing is wrong.

"Stealing is wrong" is false. — Banno

But stealing may be permissible in certain circumstances or not harmful and even do good. How do you make the journey from such a statement (which seems to reflect context, preference and emotion) into truth?

I think generally morality is rooted in the harm done, i.e., X is immoral because of the harm it causes. — Sam26

When you say "morality is about harm done," it seems to me thsi is expressing an emotional reaction to harm. How does harm become objective? I can see hwo if you accept harm as a presupposition, you can then set objective steps towards its minimization.

I don't see how a moral statement can be considered truth-apt.
— Tom Storm

And yet they are. It goes with the territory of "statement" — Banno

Can you show me how stealing is wrong is truth apt?

There could be many foundational moral statements of this sort. That's a conviction you hold to that's bedrock, you accept it as true, a given. Like a rule of chess. — Sam26

Indeed.

I don't see how a moral statement can be considered truth-apt. I believe morality is rooted in emotion (though I don't necessarily subscribe to emotivism or expressivism) and also involves intersubjective agreements - cultural values.

However, if we accept the foundational principle of preventing or minimizing suffering, it seems possible to establish objective approaches that promote this principle, even though disagreements over definitions are inevitable.

Interesting and thoughtful response.

It's an interesting question, but in my daily life it's really just a word I don't use often (I did in this thread, for obvious reasons). And that means when talking on the topic I have little at stake, but it's also never homeground. So do I have faith in... something? Maybe. Then what follows from that? — Dawnstorm

Nothing much.

For me, we are creatures of prediction and habit. If a particular framing helps us make sense of the world, we tend to stick with it. In reality, any number of fantasies could probably serve this purpose for us.

Many believers find it important to argue that secular people also live by faith, probably as a way to equalize the discussion. They do not want to be seen as irrational or as relying upon magical thinking.

Sure, but then neither is faith in all its meanings always equivalent to unquestioning obedience to some authority or else in some authoritative given - this as per the Abraham example as written.

As ↪unenlightened remarked early on, in common speech one and one's spouse are said to be faithful - full of faith - toward one another. Or as another example, having faith in humanity, or else one's fellow man. In neither of these contexts is faith taken to be about blind obedience to authority. Nor is it about mere belief.

I'll venture the notion that faith is about a certain form of trust - a trust in X that can neither be empirically nor logically evidenced. Belief (also closely associated to the notion of trust) can and most always should be justifiable in order to be maintained - as is the case in JTB. But faith eludes this possibility in practice. — javra

You raise a good point about language use which I think is one reason why we get confused about faith. We often use the term "faith" with cavalier imprecision. Sometimes all we mean is that the evidence points in a certain direction. To me, "faith" serves more as a poetic or metaphorical expression than as an accurate description of certainty. Our language abounds with figurative expressions. Just as we say we're "drowning in paperwork" or "surfing the web" to capture a broader meaning, "faith" may also be used to convey a sense of confidence rather than strictly referring to an ineffable religious experience.

There's also the matter of scale. I have a reasonable expectation that my plane won’t crash (although perhaps this expectation has diminished in the U.S. under Trump?). In contrast, using faith to justify the belief that the world was created by a magic sky wizard -the literalist's deity- operates on an entirely different level. How can these two phenomena be meaningfully compared? It’s not merely that faith is a poor analogy for reasonable expectation; it's also about the magnitude of the claim being justified. The assertion that we can know the will and actions of a world-creating entity is significantly different from an empirically grounded confidence that air travel is safe. Perhaps the scale of the claim says something about why faith is a necessary concept for some.

H'm I'm not sure what to make of the last sentence there. But I think you are missing my point. The fireman (person?) heading into a burning building has lots of equipment and training, not to mention protocols behind him. They cannot sort all that out for themselves. They need to have faith - to trust, if you prefer - that all of that is as it should be and that their project is worthwhile. You and I might want to say that they need to trust in science and reason. My point is that, so far as I can see, that trust is hard to distinguish from the trust of a believer in whatever they believe, whether it be God, or luck, or the stars. I realize that's heretical, but the question does not just go away. — Ludwig V

I said "poetically" because I believe that using the word "faith" outside of a religious context serves as a literary or evocative expression rather than a precise or useful descriptor.

So we clearly disagree on this. I understand your point, which many religious people also make and I find it unconvincing. I don't agree that faith is a synonym for commitment.

Firefighters do not rely on faith in their equipment any more than passengers rely on faith when boarding a plane. We have ample evidence to justify our confidence in both aviation and firefighting, as both fields are underpinned by proven safety records and reliable procedures. Where is this good reasoning and evidence when someone uses faith to justify faith healing ?

There is no way to asses a faith, so far as I can see, but by its fruits. Religious faiths come out with a pretty mixed record. Are we sure that science and reason (Enlightenment) comes out much better? — Ludwig V

We can evaluate faith by examining the ideas it justifies. When faith allows children to die becasue the people believe god will heal and medicine is unnecessary, we can see how poor that chocie is. I'm not advocating for reason or science here; I'm simply asserting that faith is a poor pathway to truth. When individuals claim on faith that black people are inferior—a view I've encountered among some Reformed Christians in South Africa—they offer no reasoning, merely justifying bigotry. However, if they were to use eugenics to support their views, then we could engage in a rational discussion about the matter and the efficacy of the failed science of eugenics.

My point is that faith is a poor way to arrive at truth because there is nothing it can't justify. Which is why I've generally said if you have good reasons for believing in something, you don't need faith. For me faith is best understood as the excuse people give for a belief when they don't have good reasons.

The science we have now is far beyond anything they considered. — Banno

Indeed and often demonstrates that the shoulders of those giants are not resting on good foundations and cannot bear the weight of progress.

For me using the word "faith" outside of a Christian or Islamic religious contexts is problematic.
— Tom Storm
Why so? That makes no sense to me. — Ludwig V

For reasons I have explained: that it is not properly comparable. I understand that you disagree, many do, particularly those from Christian backgrounds.

On the other hand, the people we are talking about consider their choice to be well founded and likely to succeed. That's what faith does. — Ludwig V

Disagree - faith is blind, as it says in Hebrews 11 "Now faith is confidence in what we hope for and assurance about what we do not see."

The fireman has foresight: knowledge of how buildings react to fire, an understanding of possible floor plans, specialized training, experience, and equipment. If anything, he possesses reasonable confidence that his actions can succeed, and this confidence is supported by demonstrable knowledge and equipment that can be shown to others. On the other hand, no such supporting evidence exists for gods. A fireman who relies solely on faith will probably face grave consequences. If he survives and is seen to take a reckless risk (which is uncommon today), he would likely face disciplinary action

But will you allow them to make their choices? Or, better, at what point are you prepared to intervene and prevent people acting in accordance with their faith, even if you consider their choices to be poorly founded and certain to fail? — Ludwig V

Where possible, and depending on the level of risk, I would advocate for authorities to intervene. In Australia, we sometimes have the ability to do this. I don’t generally agree that we should allow people to act solely based on what they believe to be right. Religion doesn't get a free pass. However, this is a complex issue, the doorway to which leads to a labyrinth of nuanced considerations.

Why do you think that is? Obviously one strand here is that faith has been marketed by certain religious institutions as a convenient way to decide things and to shut down further discussion lest it lead people to sound reasoning. As my fundamentalist friends often say, "Don't think, don't reason, have faith."

Second, it seems to me that the soldier or fireman who chooses to risk death to save someone must have some faith on a similar level. A faith that the risk is worth it, perhaps. At some level, if there is something that we live for and that we will face death for, it may not be the same as religious faith, but it occupies the same place in our lives. Even to have no faith in anything (if that's possible) is to have a faith of a kind. Is this what the existentialists meant by commitment. — Ludwig V

People, are forever trying to fit faith into secular choices so I am bound to disagree. It's an equivocation. But I certainly understand your point. To me taking an informed risk is not faith. Mostly it's taking a punt, that the skills, training, equipment, knowledge and physical strength you have as a fireman or solider will make the activity a success, knowing full well that you could die. I don't see this functioning as faith, but I can see how poetically it can be made to fit. For me using the word "faith" outside of a Christian or Islamic religious contexts is problematic.

First, I still have to respect the choice they made. The people close to me who made that choice caused me pain and anger at the time, but still, they have the right to choose. — Ludwig V

My own personal stance is that I don't respect people's choices if I consider the choice to be poorly founded and certain to fail.

And this is the culpability of faith, when it encourages folk to cruelty. — Banno

Which is pretty much my problem with faith. There is no act so barbaric that it can't be justified by an appeal to faith. As a way of deciding action, it is very poor and entirely unaccountable.

There is something spiritual — Gregory

Certainly some people believe this. As long as they play nice with others, it doesn't matter to me.

Doesn't "phenomena" imply that it is mystical, and doesn't mystical imply miracles (miracles from the spiritual)? — Gregory

I doubt it. Is this important?