It seems that if the subjectivist is a correspondence theorist, and they accept P2, then they have an inconsistency. But is that inconsistency fatal to the overall idea?

Yes, this OP presupposes correspondence theory of truth; which is widely accepted. A moral subjectivism could, prima facie, sidestep this (potentially) with another theory of truth; but I think, in the end, it will fall prey to this same issue.

Taking coherentism, for example, there isn't a really coherent way to account for the difference between a belief and a proposition; so sidestepping the issue by subscribing to that theory just creates a deeper issue.

:up:

If you are talking about the SEP link to "Moral Anti-Realism", this is the whole of what is says about moral subjectivism:

Sorry, I thought there was a moral subjectivism section in there: it is actually here. It appears as though SEP has refurbished the term from ‘subjectivism’ to ‘non-objectivism’ in their newer articles. So let me address the quote you had:

This entry uses the label “non-objectivism” instead of the simple “subjectivism” since there is an entrenched usage in metaethics for using the latter to denote the thesis that in making a moral judgment one is reporting (as opposed to expressing) one’s own mental attitudes (e.g., “Stealing is morally wrong” means “I disapprove of stealing”). So understood, subjectivism is a kind of non-objectivist theory, but there are many other kinds of non-objectivist theory, too.

Yes, this is accurate...but there’s no need to get this far into the weeds for the OP. If we must, then there is a couple things worth noting:

1. Moral subjectivism is a form of moral non-objectivism: the former is the three-pronged thesis I already explicated, and the latter is a broader term for any view that holds moral judgments express something non-objective.

2. Moral non-objectivism includes only one other family of positions other than moral subjectivism: moral inter-subjectivism. They don’t use the term ‘inter-subjectivity’, but it is clear that they are referring to this.

3. My OP addresses moral subjectivism, and technically NOT moral inter-subjectivism; but I think my line of reasoning plagues both.

4. None of this suggests that there are not generally understood definitions. All you are doing, is trying to explode the conversation into a “who shot john” situation: at this point, I think it may be a sophistical tactic you are trying to deploy. If it helps, just contend with the underlying meaning in the OP and not the semantics.

It is as if certain terms must be avoided and replaced to avoid confusion regarding terminology.

What terms should be avoided? They avoided using the term moral subjectivism because they were not just discussing, in that section, moral cognitivist and moral non-nihilist views that claim moral judgments are expressing something subjective. The OP is not discussing moral non-objectivism.

Rather than there being general agreement there is, in his words, no general consensus of understanding about 'realism'.

Realism is generally understood a three pronged thesis:

1. Moral judgments are propositional.
2. Moral judgments express something objective.
3. At least one moral judgment is true.

At this point I don’t really care if you agree with the semantics: that’s besides the point of the OP.

We are at an impasse. You treat this as if it were a terminological problem. My position is that treating ethics as if it is about terminology is the problem

There is absolutely nothing in my OP that hinges on semantics, nor have I had to go into this painful, semantically discussion with anyone else in this thread. Somehow, no one else was worried about the terms….

Do you have anything to say about the actually ideas expressed in the OP?

I was thinking we can stuff all those details into the name "Independent" -- but I'm mostly just after the basic form because I've been missing it, which you provided in your follow up.

But, then, you are just muddying the waters in an attempt to clear them.

OK so...

P1: All B's are X's
P2: X's ~Relate-to Y's
C: B's ~Relate-to Y's

So rather than

All P
All Q

it's

All P
Some Q

(with a middle term relating them)

That work?

I am not following what you are trying to do…

(And yes, the sentential form helped a lot -- I was struggling from the plain-language to the logic, and then I was struggling with the predicates because that's all beyond my actual education and only "gleaned" at this point -- usually I just translate predicates into single-variables or bound sentences so it's still propositional just not predicate. And I wasn't see the All/Some or the All/there-exists-a structure until you explicitly pointed it out)

I am basically arguing:

P1: Ss relate to Ps in manner R.
P2: All Bs are Ss.
C: Bs relate to Ps in manner R.

Although, this isn’t completely accurate...but the accurate version is what I gave.

If there cannot exist a relation between Ss & Ps and every B is an S, then it plainly follows that the same relation cannot exist between Bs & Ps.

Unfortunately, we are just talking past each other; and I would just be reiterating if I responded. So I will let it rest.

Take care, Philosophim! :kiss:

:kiss:

I think we by-at-large were talking passed each other. Take care, Janus!

How do you feel about this rendition:

All stances are independent
All beliefs are stances
All beliefs are independent

?

It seems incomplete: independent...of what?

I'm not sure what the rule of inference you're using in the formalization. It doesn't appear to follow to me.

I can write it out in sentential form (if that helps):

P1: ¬∃sp (Stance<s, p>→ p) && ¬∃sp (Stance<s, p>→ ¬p)
{ There does not exist any s and p, such that s is a stance about p and s entails that p is true; and there does not exist any s and p, such that s is a stance about p and s entails that p is false }

P2: ∀bp ( Belief<b, p> → Stance<b, p> )
{ For every b and p such that b is a belief about p, b is a stance about p. }

C1: ¬∃bp (Belief<b, p>→ p) && ¬∃bp (Belief<b, p>→ ¬p)
{ There does not exist any b and p, such that b is a belief about p and b entails that p is true; and there does not exist any b and p, such that b is a belief about p and b entails that p is false }

The rule of inference is from the existential and universal quantifiers: in short, if there cannot exist some relation for Xs and Ys and all Bs are Xs, then the same relation cannot exist for Bs and Ys.

P1 seems generally uncontroversial -- our stances towards some proposition don't imply whether that proposition is true or false (although I think I'd carve out the weird sentences for other topics, like the Liar's)

Agreed, and that is the point...that most of these moral subjectivists are missing in here (;

So a subjectivist could deny 2 on the basis that beliefs don't imply stances with respect to P -- the belief could be "Everyone deserves q", and the stance could be "As a member of Everyone, John deserves q"

Hmmmm...I would need a rebust exposition of what a ‘belief’ is then.

There is no agreed upon standard as to what moral subjectivism means. From the article you cited on moral anti-realism, (another term without an agreed on definition):

Did you read the moral subjectivism section?

It supports the claim that there is no single agreed upon definition of terms.

No. SEP is just being very careful to include the nuances of the topic. There is a generally agreed upon definition, that I already outlined.

Some authors do treat ethical relativism as a form of moral subjectivism. From the IEP article on moral relativism:
In principle, the standpoint in question could be narrowed to that of a single individual, in which case, the relativism becomes a form of moral subjectivism.

You are misunderstanding: moral relativism stands opposed to moral absolutism. Generally speaking, moral relativists are moral realists. Of course, since relativism vs. absolutism is a different debate than objectivism vs. non-objectivism, some moral relativists are moral subjectivists; but moral relativism IS NOT the same as moral subjectivism.

You are trying to hide behind some nuanced disagreements philosophers have, as if there is a gulf of disagreements about these terms.

It goes on to say that it is:
unlikely that the label “moral anti-realism” even succeeds in picking out a definite position.

Of course! This doesn’t help your point at all. Moral anti-realism is the negation of moral realism, and is defined as such: there’s no controversy to that definition.

Moral relativism is also a contested concept. It can refer either to a culture, a group, or an individual.

That the definition encompasses many positions in a broad fashion, does not mean its definition is contested. Moral relativism is any cognitivist view that holds that the truth of moral judgments have an indexical element. This is uncontroversial, and I suggest you read up on the literature more.

Of course it does! There are various forms of moral or ethical subjectivism.

I never said that there aren’t various forms of moral subjectivism: that doesn’t negate the fact that there is an uncontroversial definition of moral subjectivism. Each form of moral subjectivism, meets the basic criteria of moral subjectivism. It is a family of theories, and not one particular theory.

I cannot remember a single time in Nietzsche's work where he references a pluralist idea or notion of truth. Not a single time; in fact, he thought it was nonsense (just like pretty much every other philosopher out there).

This argument seems to be: truth-apt propositions are stance-independent, the MS claims that moral propositions are stance-dependent, so — for the MS — moral propositions are not truth-apt, thus they are not propositions at all unless the MS rewrites it as "I believe X", which is not moral anymore. Is that right?

Not quite: that would beg the question and would be false. As painfully noted in this thread, a proposition can be true or false relative to a belief, but that is not what the OP is saying is inconsistent: instead, it is that a belief about a proposition cannot make that proposition true or false.

It is stance-independent, only insofar as the proposition-at-hand cannot be true or false relative to a belief about it.

Moral subjectivism is standardly, in the literature, a family of moral anti-realist theories that posit:

1. Moral judgements are propositional (i.e., moral cognitivism).
2. Moral judgements express something subjective (i.e., moral non-objectivism).
3. At least one moral judgement is true (i.e., moral non-nihilism).

This is standard: I would suggest, as a good entry article, to look at SEP. No serious philosopher is going to disagree with this, although they may have more to add.

this link, without elaboration, was not helpful. Some of it, wasn't even about moral subjectivism (e.g., ethical relativism is NOT a form of moral subjectivism, let alone a form of moral anti-realism).

this one is an article states nothing that helps your case. I think you just linked these half-lazily thinking I would do your argumentation for you...which I am not going to do (:

But what if we formalized a bit? How would it read?

P1: ¬∃sp (Stance<s, p>→ p) && ¬∃sp (Stance<s, p>→ ¬p)
P2: ∀bp ( Belief<b, p> → Stance<b, p> )
C1: ¬∃bp (Belief<b, p>→ p) && ¬∃bp (Belief<b, p>→ ¬p)

Couple things to note:

1. The only part that isn’t just standard predicate logic, is that I am representing the predicate ‘stance’ with two typename arguments: position 1 is what is the stance and position 2 is what the stance is about (e.g., if s is a stance about p, then it is true that Stance<s, p>).

2. The transition, in sentential form, from a ‘something’ to a ‘proposition’ is implicit. As can be seen in the logic, it doesn’t matter if one sticks with ‘something’ or refers to specifically a ‘proposition’.

P1 reads like a definition to me.
…
P2 also reads like a definition to me.

P2 is a definition; P1 is an assertion about the nature of a stance and how it relates to what it is about.

@Philosophim

Actually, it is also circular logic (come to think of it). One would be saying E is morally good because of some relevant property of G, but also saying G is morally good because of some relevant property of E.

The hypothetical stated that they cannot both co-exist; but I understand what you are saying: it just doesn’t address the issue. — Bob Ross

How? I don't understand. Please give an example of the issue in another way so I can understand then. You can use the grandfather, the grandson, and the explosion to demonstrate if you wish.

1. If X creates more existence than its absence, then it is good.
2. If Y creates more existence than its absence, then it is good.
3. X creates more existence than its absence.
4. Y creates more existence than its absence.
5. X is good. (1 & 3)
6. Y is good. (2 & 4)
7. X creates more existence than Y.
8. Only X or Y can exist (by way of actualizing it), but not both.
9. X should exist, and Y should not exist. (5 & 6 & 7 & 8)
10. Y should not exist, but is good. (6 & 9)
11. Good is ‘what should be’.
12. 10 is then incoherent: Y should not exist, but it should exist. (10 restated in light of 11)

Your response, was to sidestep the issue by denying 8 and commenting on if they both could co-exist. That’s blatantly not the point.

In order for there to be a standard, there must exist already something that is morally good. If this is true, then existence cannot be that standard; because that would be circular. — Bob Ross

A logically necessary requirement for something is not a circular fallacy

I didn’t say it was circular logic: it is ontologically circular.

If what is morally good (let’s call it G) necessitates that existence is good, then existence (let's call it E) is not what is morally good—it is good insofar as it relates to what is morally good.
To say that existence is what is morally good, would, then, to be to claim that existence is actually what makes G morally good; while G is what makes existence morally good.

The problem is, if I reject that morality is objective, you might conclude that I must therefore be a moral subjectivist, and if I am a moral subjectivist I must believe whatever Wiki says I do.

I never implied or said this. Moral subjectivism is a specific moral anti-realist position; and is not merely the negation of moral objectivism. There are other forms of moral anti-realism (e.g., non-cognitivism, nihilism, etc.).

The mistake you are making is believing that I think there are moral propositions, when I think I have made it quite clear that I don't think there are.

Are you serious, Janus?!? Your whole position here has been moral (inter-)subjectivism from the start. You’ve admitted implicitly and explicitly to moral judgments being propositional countless times:

here you did:

If torturing babies is wrong because normal people think it is wrong then it is true that it is wrong for most people, I have not claimed anything beyond that

You cannot use an if conditional if “torturing babies is wrong” is non-propositional. This implies that “torturing babies is wrong” is a proposition; and you are claiming that it is true relative to beliefs people have about it.

here as well:

If a proposition expresses how something ought to be for some individual, then it is the fact that the individual believes that proposition that "supports the ought", so to speak.

You literally called it a proposition in this one, so…..

here as well:

There is nothing about any moral proposition that obligates anyone to adhere to it. If torturing babies is morally repugnant to me, I am unlikely to torture babies,

If I say, "I believe torturing babies is wrong" then that amounts to saying, "I believe no one should torture babies".

:yawn: Need I go on?

Your position obviously has been holding that moral judgments are propositional but that they are true or false relative to beliefs about them...and that’s called moral subjectivism.

Unfortunately for your argument you are depending on something which either doesn't exist or is unknowable. It is nothing more than an empty tautology to say that what is morally good is a truth maker for what is morally good.

Whether or not you think that we can adequately account for moral propositions or not, is independent of whether your ad hoc fix is internally coherent. It isn’t. If you really believe this, then you should abandon the idea that there are moral propositions and, thusly, abandon moral subjectivism. Become a non-cognitivist or nihilist.

How would we know if it corresponded to reality? What kind of reality? Certainly not an empirical reality

The only reality there is, and we can absolutely investigate what is right and wrong naturalistically (and empirically). Like I said, I take a neo-aristotelian view that eudamonia is the highest moral good.

You're really not paying attention. I've already said I don't think anything is "morally binding"

Thank you for finally admitting this. You need to take more care in the words you use to express your views. You’ve been speaking as if you do believe there is moral bindingness and it is essentially peer-pressure (in the form of laws):

The only truth of moral beliefs, the only normative force they could possess, the only bindingness, lies in the fact that most normal people believe them, think and/or feel them to be true.

The problem is not me failing to pay attention; its your failure to coherently explain your position.

Now you're starting to get it.

You keep flip-flopping as we go. One minute you argue against what I am saying and then, once you realize it doesn’t work, you switch while admitting no fault. You were literally arguing that moral statements have the form of a proposition but are not “proper” propositions (like mathematical ones). Now you just act like you were denying this all along.

I said that what people believe, morally speaking, makes it true for themselves, in the sense of being "true to themselves"

If you don’t believe moral judgments are propositional, then this is incoherent; the only way it can be true for themselves is if it is propositional: propositions are the only kind of statements which can be true.

You should just abandon moral subjectivism and go for something like emotivism.

Rereading this argument -- your P1 doesn't match 1 from above it:

It is not supposed to: 1 matches P2. P1 is more general: it is the major premise.

"Cognitive" doesn't necessitate truth-independence

All I was claiming is the that the cognitive stance about something is independent of the truth about that something. This doesn’t require that all cognitive stances necessitate that they are about something...although I happen to believe that as a well. I think a belief always latches onto a proposition, and if there isn’t a proposition then one will pretend, implicitly, if there is and latch onto that. But this is not a required position for the OP.

The Liar's sentence, for instance: we can think "This sentence is false", meaning we can cognize it, but the truth, or falsity, of the Liar's sentence is wholly dependent upon how we interpret the sentence.

The liar’s sentence is non-cognitive: just because you can try to interpret what the sentence means does not mean you can evaluate it as true or false.

What if the MS was a coherentist on truth? In that case beliefs fit within an inferential web, and that web just is what truth is, so they'd claim to be a cognitivist while stating that they do believe that beliefs depend upon one another for their truth or falsity.

That’s an interesting point: I am not sure how that would work—my OP is directed as correspondance theorists. The problem with taking the coherentist theory of truth, is that truth is reduced to beliefs (which is convenient for a moral subjectivist) but just pushes the issue back further. If a moral subjectivist came around and objected to the theory of truth presupposed in the OP, then I would have to take a step back and demonstrate why their coherentist (or whatever) theory is nonsense (; before getting into the OP.

The problem is you are treating moral "propositions" as though they are empirical, logical or mathematical propositions.

They would have to be, or they aren’t propositions at all. That’s the mistake you keep making: you think there are types of propositions.

You can't or won't say what kind of imaginable truth makers apart from people believing them there could be for the former

I already did: I said it would be what is morally good (which is not dependent on beliefs). A moral proposition is not special with regard to the overall form: it is a proposition, afterall.

If you want more details, then I am a moral naturalist and neo-aristotelian. I think that what is intrinsically valuable are various states of being which living beings are capable of having—the highest, or most intrinsically valuable, of which is eudaimonia. To be a eudaimon is the highest moral good of them all, and to reach it one must fulfill their nature.

You just keep claiming this. You need to give an argument for why moral propositions, if they could be known to be true, would be binding.

Janus...I did and you ignored it!!!

Let’s try again:

What part of the following do you not understand?:

If “I should not torture babies” is true, then I should not torture babies.
If I should not torture babies, then I am obligated not to torture babies.
“I should not torture babies” is true.
Therefore, I should not torture babies.
Therefore, I am obligated not to torture babies.

The other point is that you apparently cannot explain how a moral proposition could ever be known to be true.

It can be known to be true, if what the proposition refers to corresponds to reality. It terms of what about reality they correspond to, besides noting it is what is morally good, one would have to delve into a specific moral realist position.

The only truth of moral beliefs, the only normative force they could possess, the only bindingness, lies in the fact that most normal people believe them,

Then, that is not truth, nor are they normatively binding (in the strict, traditional sense). You cannot have the cake and eat it too (;

Because moral statements are not truth-apt

Then they don’t have the “form of a proposition”.

I don't see how they qualify as propositions in the sense that empirical, logical or mathematical do

Then, you don’t think they are propositions; and should abandon your view that beliefs make moral propositions true or false. You can’t just ad hoc change what a proposition is because you don’t believe moral statements fit the standard description.

coherence of your reference to moral beliefs, feelings, thoughts or statements as "propositions" hinges on it.

I have never invoked any moral beliefs, feelings, or thoughts that are propositions; but, yes, a statement can be one...that’s just the nature of propositions 101: a proposition is a truth-apt statement.

What I am denying is that thinking constricted by select definition of terms leads to what is true at best. Rather than appeal to a definition we should determine what someone means when they use a term. It is foolish and wrongheaded to insist that what someone means is not what they say they mean but rather what you found in a definition.

What I was saying, is that, at best, what you were conveying (viz., the underlying meaning of which you were speaking) was denying moral subjectivism.

My suffering does not begin with the concept of suffering. I do not need to form a concept to know that it is bad. Most of us are capable of empathy and do not first develop or appeal to a concept of empathy in order to be able to empathize. We do not need a concept of care in order to care. We do not need a concept of something mattering in order for something to matter to us.

What I meant to say is: “every analysis starts with concepts”. I have no problem with the idea that we start with notions and not ideas; but a proper analysis starts and ends with ideas (i.e., concepts). You cannot analyze X if you do not have an idea about what X is.

I don't think so. Make your argument and we'll see how it stands up.

I already did, and I will, at this point, refer you to the OP. You are still fundamentally claiming that propositions can be made true or false relative to beliefs about them which is quite obviously the issue I was expounding in the OP.

No, most people hold to finding murder, rape, etc., morally wrong because they feel compassion for the victim, and that is normal.

Even if this is true, it doesn’t have anything to do with whether or not they are right. They are, in fact, in this case, being irrational and holding an internally inconsistent metaethical theory (without realizing it). Feelings about a proposition cannot make it true or false.

You keep talking about truth being binding, but it's not.
…
What other imaginable criterion could there be?

What part of the following do you not understand?:

If “I should not torture babies” is true, then I should not torture babies.
If I should not torture babies, then I am obligated not to torture babies.
“I should not torture babies” is true.
Therefore, I should not torture babies.
Therefore, I am obligated not to torture babies.

You are confused about how moral propositions, beliefs, and truth work: if they are true, then they are binding irregardless if the subject-at-hand realizes it or is motivated by it.

There is no reason other than a love for truth that would bind someone to accepting a true claim

As seen above, this is obviously false: love for truth assumes that it is something beyond truth that binds us to the moral propositions when that is clearly not the case. Again, by ‘binding’, I am not commenting on what convinces people to care about what is morally (factually) true.

I have nowhere spoken about forcing anyone to do or not to do anything. In any case the most significant moral prescriptions, those regarding what are considered to be serious crimes, are codified in law, and those laws would not hold if most people didn't agree with them.

Lol. You denied my claim and then immediately affirmed it. If laws are merely determined by what most people belief is wrong and those beliefs do not get at what is actually true (which you are affirming because you deny that moral propositions exist like “one ought not <...>”), then you are advocating to impose beliefs that people have which, by your own concession, do not, even in principle, attempt to correspond to the truth.

Janus, you don’t believe that there is a truth of the matter about moral judgments; so I don’t see how you are confused about this: the moral judgments you are advocating for are not even attempting to get at the truth because there is no truth of the matter. This plainly follows from what you are saying.

This is classic! People can propose whatever they like, valid or not. It's the soundness, not the validity of moral "propositions: which cannot be established

It is patently incoherent to think that a statement can and cannot be propositional; which is what you just said (with word-salad).

I think you need to ask yourself whether you can imagine any kind of truth maker for such "propositions".

This is an entirely separate question: I am just trying to get you to see the implications of your moral anti-realism; because you don’t see it yet.

I would say that the truth-makers for moral propositions is whatever in reality would make it true (by way of the proposition corresponding to reality)...no differently than any other proposition. I am a moral naturalist: I don’t think there is anything special about moral propositions when it comes to how to evaluate them (as true or false). Ultimately, it will boil down to what is morally good, and what is the highest moral good.

Within the context in which both can co-exist, it is good for both to co-exist

The hypothetical stated that they cannot both co-exist; but I understand what you are saying: it just doesn’t address the issue.

. In the context in which only one can exist, it will be a greater good for one of them to exist over the other.

Here’s a great example of you using the concept of good incoherently with your definition: there is no way to rewrite that sentence in terms of “greater should exist” or “should exist more than” without losing the original meaning (in the sentence) of “greater good”. That’s why I used the example: there is one thing that is good but should not exist; which contradicts your definition.

Also, on a separate note, I’ve always thought something fishy is going [ (; ] on with your derivation of existence being good but couldn’t pin point it: I think I found it. In order for there to be a standard, there must exist already something that is morally good. If this is true, then existence cannot be that standard; because that would be circular.

I think what you are really noting, without realizing it, is that whatever is morally good will presuppose that it is morally good for it to exist. I think you are just extrapolating invalidly too far by concluding that “should something exist or nothing?” is the fundamental question because of it.

That's not coherent to my claim. I already mentioned if both could co-exist then both should as that's more existence. The only case in which we decide one over the other is if both cannot co-exist, or we only have the capacity to choose one over the other.

You sidestepped what I said: mentioning that both co-existing would be better doesn’t address the hypothetical I gave you. ‘What should be’ is a final consideration: it leaves out any discussion of a hierarchy of good things that never make the cut for being things which should exist.

I'm still scratching my head at this Bob. If good is "What should be", then that's what good is. If "X is good" then I am ascribing X as good. Can you give me an example of your terminology division?
…
Right. Good = "What should be". If "X is good" then "X should be".
…
is this the division you're looking for between good and what is ascribed as good?

That’s fine, I was talking about your response which tried to discuss that existence is good to address what is good. Saying existence is good doesn’t address what good is. This just loops back around to the various incoherencies with the concept of ‘good’ being ‘what should be’ that I already mentioned (e.g., a clock that is good for telling the time is not necessarily a clock that should exist, etc.).

Its not a question, there's no question mark! :D If I used the phrase, "This is what is", you understand that's not a question. Same here.

That’s fair! I misread that (:

‘to ought to be’ — Bob Ross

That's just an odd phrase. You can just drop the 'to' and leave it as 'ought to be' if the 'what' part of the phrasing is causing issues.

That’s fine: it means the same thing.

If truth is objective, then propositions are true or false stance-independently.
If propositions are true or false stance-independently, then a proposition, X, cannot be true or false relative to a belief about it.
If a proposition, X, cannot be true or false relative to a belief about it, then the only way one can express X in a way that would be true or false relative to a belief about it is by writing a new proposition, Y, that is "I believe X".

I don't understand what you are missing: the only way to evaluate statements that are truth-apt which have their truth-value relative to a belief is to write it is a valid proposition.

You keep resorting to reverting back to your initial claims, without engaging in my responses. Whether or not you claim moral propositions are true or false relative to one or a several beliefs about them does not get around the issue expounded in the OP. Your moral “inter-subjectivism” falls prey to the same internal inconsistencies.

They are binding socially (normatively) only insofar as most normal people hold to them.

There’s a difference between a proposition being binding, and people being forced to honor something: the former is binding purely in virtue of the truth-value of the proposition, whereas the latter is binding insofar as one wants to avoid the consequences of not obeying it.

In your sense of moral obligation, its just the avoidance of consequences of not obeying what people think or desire that obligates; which isn’t real obligation in the moral sense.

but when it comes to significant moral issues like murder, rape, child abuse, theft, and so on I think it works well enough.

What you have described, is the irrational position that we should impose beliefs which do not even attempt, in principle, to correspond with the truth on other people. Do you see how irrational that is?

That’s like me forcing you to drink gasoline because I (1) believe that you should although I (2) know that my belief (that you should) doesn’t correspond to anything true. That’s just masked psychopathy and narcissism.

Moral judgments can be stated in propositional form, but this does not mean that they are propositions.
We do not regard something as right or wrong or good or bad as the result of propositional acceptance or analysis.

Then you are denying that moral subjectivism is true at best; saying word-salad at worst (e.g., how can something be stated in “propositional form”, yet not be a valid proposition?).

You are looking through the wrong end of the telescope. Moral philosophy should not begin with some set of contested definitions.

Everything starts with concepts: there’s no way around that.

Moral subjectivism holds that moral propositions have no objective truth values independent of individual belief.

Correct. That is why a moral subjectivist will deny that, strictly speaking, “one ought not torture babies for fun” is propositional; instead, they will say it needs to be rewritten as “I believe one ought not torture babies for fun”.

You see you're stuck in this objective "True" or "False" mode. There isn't a "True" or "False" to a subjective moralist.

I never claimed to the contrary. Moral subjectivists do not contend that propositions are made true relative to beliefs about them…

They're all the same argument, or it seems that way to me, and that's why I was getting at your bias definition for belief and truth.

I am open to there being an incredibly rare, perhaps nuanced, moral subjectivist view that is not incoherent and does not fall prey to the issue expounded in the OP...I have never heard of any.

Trying to get around the OP by claiming beliefs about a proposition make them true (i.e., that truth itself is subjective) is not going to work: it explodes into triviality. We would not be able to coherently determine what is true or false—i.e., any proposition, P, would be true or false relative to beliefs about them and, therefore, P cannot be valuated as true or false other than trivially in terms of whether or not a person believes it is true. Truth would collapse into belief; and we would have to come up with a new word for truth proper.

If I came to you and said your belief is false because it's not my truth, then I'm being objective.

“my truth”, “your truth”, “their truth”, etc. is patently incoherent; and no legitimate philosopher will back that kind of idea because they know it is nonsense.

If you want, we can dive more into the nature of truth; but I will leave it there for now. Truth being subjective holds no water, is not a respectable position, and is not a required position for moral subjectivism...and I don’t say that lightly.

(@Lionino)

Moral subjectivism is a three-pronged thesis:

1. Moral judgments are proposition (i.e., moral cognitivism).
2. Moral judgments express something subjective (i.e., moral non-objectivism).
3. At least one moral judgment is true (i.e., moral non-nihilism).

@Molieres attempted solution, if I remember correctly, denied prong-1 (at best); so it is not a form of moral subjectivism. I think their view is probably a form of emotivism. Moral cognitivism is about cognitive attitudes.

Can you drill into that more?

I was referring to:

For example, the title is " In any objective morality existence is inherently good". If "good" is "ought to exist", then "inherently good" is "inherently ought to exist": there is no such distinction between intrinsic (inherent) and extrinsic 'ought to exist". Either something ought to exist, or it shouldn't.
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Also, you define "good", as a concept, in a moral sense when it should be being defined in its generic sense: otherwise, you have invalidly omitted goodness simpliciter.
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I don't think this is internally coherent for your position: you use the term 'good' to denote things which you do not thereby concede should exist. Let's take it by example.

Imagine you could combine two elements (in the periodic table) to formulate another element and, let's stipulate, this would produce "more existence" than if the combination were not done. This combination would be, then, "good".

Imagine, though, that you could combine those two elements with two other elements to formulate another element and, let's stipulate, that would produce "more existence" than if the combination were not done. This combination, likewise, would be, then, "good".

However, imagine that the first combination doesn't produce as much existence as the second combination: they are both "good", when considered in themselves, but the second one is more "good".

Let's say you can only perform one of the combinations (as performing one eliminates the possibility of performing the other): obviously, you would choose the second one (because it is more "good"). However, if you what you mean by "good" is merely "what should exist" then both combinations should exist; but it seems perfectly coherent for you to say "the first combination is good, but it should not exist because the second combination is better (i.e., 'more good')".
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As an external critique, the other issue is that defining goodness in this manner eliminates many commonly accepted usages of the concept; e.g., by saying that this clock is good for telling the time, one is not at all implying that the clock should exist.

Claiming that “good” is “to ought to be” is incoherent. Talking coherently about existence being “good” in the sense that it ‘should be’ doesn’t help: that’s talk about what you are ascribing as ‘good’, and not what ‘good’ is itself.

Considering good is "What should be"

This isn’t a definition of ‘good’ as a concept: ‘what should be?’ is not a concept, it is a question.

I'm not seeing what you're stating. Should "X" be? Then it is good.

This doesn’t explain what ‘good’ is. That's like:

Me: “X is green”.
You: “What is ‘green’”?
Me: “It is ‘green’ because X has color”.

That is besides my original point, though: if I grant ‘good’ is the same as ‘to ought to be’ (which would avoid the above issue), then we are back to the original issues (that I quoted above). None of these issues get addressed by explicating that you think existence is good.

the nature of a proposition: they are always objective and absolute — Bob Ross


I see no meaning in this phrase.

:brow:



If you are not talking about a position which holds that moral judgments (1) are propositional, (2) express something subjective, and (3) at least one is true; then you are not talking about moral subjectivism.

Now that you have abandoned your first refutation, please elaborate on where in the OP I make any such conflation?

If you are just noting that some people hold truth as subjective, then that is true; but it is a minority position, certainly is not the majority position for moral subjectivists (nor classical moral subjectivism), and is absurd. There's nothing biased about it.

That is the standard way of thinking about a belief, see:

SEP Entry
Wiki Entry
Britannica Entry

I'm saying that for me to say torturing babies is wrong is equivalent to me saying I believe torturing babies is wrong.

That’s fine; but it makes no comment on whether or not “torturing babies is wrong” is (1) propositional nor (2) true: you would need to abandon moral subjectivism to get there.

It's like if I say to you "Your wife is having an affair" when I don't have hard evidence for it but I believe it very strongly for whatever reason; what I'm really saying is I beleive your wife is having an affair if I am honest,

The difference is that you agree that “your wife is having an affair” is (1) propositional and (2) expressing something objective; and your belief is, thusly, formulated as best you can to the facts. All you are noting, is that someone can have varying credence levels about whether or not a proposition is true.

If you make it so that “your wife is having an affair” is true relative to your belief about it, then you have committed something patently incoherent: now you have stripped out the original proposition, replaced it with “I believe your wife is having an affair”, and conflated the two.

I can't make sense of the claim "torturing babies is wrong" if I take that to be saying it is wrong tout court, because I can't imagine anything that could make that true, apart from what most people would feel and believe.

Then you can’t say “torturing babies is wrong”…

All you can say is that “you believe that torturing babies is wrong”; and this is not normatively binding nor is it a moral proposition.

Which means that the proposition is inextricably tied to belief, mine, someone else's, even most peoples'.

NO. You cannot deny that “torturing babies is wrong” can be evaluated as true or false (which can only be done objectively) and then turn around and say it can be if we just evaluate people’s beliefs about it. You have now transformed the propositions into one’s about belief...which are not the original propositions nor are they normatively binding.

As I explained in the absence of any other truthmaker belief is all we've got.

Belief is not a truth-maker: the facts that demonstrate that the statement corresponds with reality is the truth-maker.

It is nonsensical to think a belief makes statements true.

Me: “cucumbers are yellow” is true.
You: “Why? It seems quite false.”
Me: “Because I believe cucumbers are yellow, and beliefs are truth-makers”.

You are talking about committing a semantic contradiction

Please see my OP: it is not a semantic contradiction—it is a conceptual contradiction that arises out of a gross misunderstanding of the nature of a belief and proposition.

Really nothing is morally binding: people can believe something is wrong, even feel terrible shame in doing it, and yet do it, nonetheless

That something is morally binding, has absolutely nothing to do with how motivated a person is in abiding by it.

This is true. Again, it seems I need to go into the second part where we actually measure what existence is and how we calculate it. For now as an intro, I'm not bothered by these issues. We'll see if they remain pertinent on the next drill down.

If this is true, as you have stated, then your concept of 'good' is incoherent; which will not get resolved by elaborating on what you think is good (i.e., this or that is good: existence is good). You are confusing an explication of the property of goodness with what can be predicated to have it.

On the strength of what would I be obligated?

The obligation towards a moral proposition, is its truth-binding nature. If you deny this, then you are saying that you can affirm that it is true that “you should not torture babies” without affirming that it is true that you should not torture babies.

That’s it: there nothing more that needs to be said.

And what would it mean for such a claim to be true beyond my feeling or thinking it to be so?

It would mean that propositions like “one should not torture babies for fun” can be evaluated as true or false; just like how propositions like “1 + 1 = 2” can be evaluated as true or false.

PS: again, “one should not torture babies for fun” cannot be true or false relative to a belief. See the OP for more on that.

Would there need to be a lawgiver who would punish me if I transgressed.
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Are you invoking God?

This is a completely separate question from what you were asking: an investigation of the nature of normativity does not require anyone to answer what exactly is (objectively) morally good.

A normative proposition is any proposition about what ought to be: that answers your original question.

Now, if you want, I can delve into what I think is (objectively) morally good; but I will refrain for now. I don’t think it involves God, and I don’t think moral obligation has anything to do with a law giver.

If a proposition expresses how something ought to be for some individual, then it is the fact that the individual believes that proposition that "supports the ought", so to speak

I have no clue what you mean by “support” here: a belief an individual may have about a proposition which references themselves certainly does not make that proposition true or false.

If you want to go beyond that you need to discover what "supports the ought"—you need to address that question.

I can think of two ways of interpreting this statement: either what you are asking about is “what is morally good?” or “what makes a moral proposition binding?”. I cannot tell which one you are intending to ask.

You are just saying "an emotional commitment makes the proposition true or false" with different words; and that is incoherent.

The only other thing I could envision you saying here, is that you are not commenting on whether or not the proposition is true or not with desires; instead, the desires just tell us whether or not a person behaves as though it were true. That would provide a gap between the proposition and the desire that isn't incoherent; but, then, it becomes an open-question what your position is on the actual moral proposition (judgment). The original question you are supposed to be addressing is whether or not moral judgements are propositional, true, and objective; and not whether or not people treat moral judgments as if they are propositional based off of their desires.

The problem is that you are using a concept of "good" that is incoherent; and it is the base of your entire theory. Without a proper concept of "good", I don't think one can delve into ethics.

For example, the title is " In any objective morality existence is inherently good". If "good" is "ought to exist", then "inherently good" is "inherently ought to exist": there is no such distinction between intrinsic (inherent) and extrinsic 'ought to exist". Either something ought to exist, or it shouldn't.

Also, you define "good", as a concept, in a moral sense when it should be being defined in its generic sense: otherwise, you have invalidly omitted goodness simpliciter.

These are just issues that your theory, to be complete and have a proper foundation, needs to address (I would say).

I am not following, I guess. Are you saying that moral judgments are propositional, but that they are made true by desires? E.g., "one ought not X" is true or false relative to whether or not "I desire one ought not X"?

If so, then that is plagued by the same issue: a desire about a proposition cannot make it true; and that's why emotivists reject that moral judgments are propositional---they have to.

a proposition cannot be made true or false relative to a belief, and this is why they have to rewrite it as "I believe <...>" as they can't evaluate coherently "<...>" relative to a belief — Bob Ross

The first part of the above quoted is what you are setting out to prove, the second part I can't figure out what it means. What is the part that can't be coherently evaluated? "One ought not to kill"? All the parts of the phrase are well-defined and refer to outside things, even "ought", which is that a course of action is preferrable over another. Janus expressed the same feeling above. The MS evaluates the proposition according to whether he believes it or not. Yes, the belief includes the proposition, is your argument that this goes in a circle?

In that quote of me, I was presupposing that one understands the nature of a proposition: they are always objective and absolute. If one wants to deny that, then they are not talking about propositions in the traditional sense of the word. I have never met a moral subjectivist that would deny this point.

Propositions are not made true or false relative to beliefs about them; and this is why the moral subjectivist wants to rewrite “one ought ...” to “I believe one ought ...”. Saying “one ought ...” is true or false relative to a belief is incoherent with the nature of a proposition: it would no longer be truth-apt.

unless you are referring to MSs that do explicitly convert moral propositions X to «I believe X»,

If you think that X, which is a proposition, is true or false relative to a belief about it; then you don’t understand what a proposition is. Propositions are truth-apt, and they can only be truth-apt if they express something objective. That’s why a moral subjectivist has to rewrite them.
Another way to think about it, is that if a belief about X made X true or false; then X is just the belief. You can’t have a separate claim which is being verified by a belief about it. That’s patently incoherent.

There is nothing about any moral proposition that obligates anyone to adhere to it. If torturing babies is morally repugnant to me, I am unlikely to torture babies,

If “I should not torture babies” is true, then you are obligated to not torture babies. You can’t affirm that it is true that “I should not torture babies” without conceding it is true that I shouldn’t torture babies: that’s incoherent.

It follows that I believe it to be a normative claim.

But it wouldn’t be a normative claim, and that’s the point.

How do moral propositions become normative under your view?

If the proposition expresses something about how something ought to be. Saying “I believe one ought to ...” is not a proposition about what ought to be: it is about what one believes ought to be.

Truth isn't a truth-maker, though. In the same way that states of affairs make statements true (but the state of affairs isn't truth) so goes it that the sentiments make moral propositions true.

The moral proposition is still true, but truth is not an emotion, and so it's perfectly fine to claim that emotions are the truth-makers of moral propositions.

This is what a moral subjectivist would be inclined to say; but it isn’t a rejoinder to my OP: as far as I can tell, you just explicated the position that I was arguing is internally inconsistent. What you described, is that a belief about a proposition can make that proposition true or false.