I am not saying that we have no way to decipher what is good or bad, I was saying that there is no exact equation to do it--e.g., deontolgy and consequentialism fail miserably.

We determine which is good or bad just like we separate different colored blocks: we induce the general category of the colors and, as best we can, intuit where each given block should go. There will be some blocks with odd shades of colors that really murky the waters, and that is fine because the world is a sticky place.

We induce 'the good' vs. 'the bad' from obvious examples (e.g., torturing babies for fun, helping the sick, being generous, being kind, being selfish, torturing animals, etc.) and then use our current knowledge of them to infer what action to take in a particular nuanced situation.

I would say we can induce 'the good' as, most generally, acts which care about life to the maximal extent possible; and 'the bad' as the negation of it. However, I freely admit that inductions are not necessarily true and that this method of inquiry is sort of scientific.

(yes, there's some incredulity in this question) Are you seriously comparing 'ethical views' to the reality of categories of triangle?

I used a valid analogy for the sake of my conversation with another member.

because this lack of formula does essentially mean you cannot predict 'which' category an act falls into at all, rather than imprecisely

I don’t see why this would be the case. We can induce what ‘the good’ is from its instances, just like how we induce what a triangle is from its instances; and we can use our current knowledge of ‘the good’ to make informed decisions about what can be classified as such.

Your moral intuitions only can do so. They are your categories.

Non-moral intuitions are used to determine the category of ‘the good’, no different than how we non-morally intuit the concept or category of triangularity.

Think of it this way, I can have complete disregard for being kind to others and still being able to derive that it is the subsuming of other actions into one category—e.g., generosity, being nice, respectful, etc. I can recognize this while saying “I don’t want nor am obligated to be kind”: this does not take away from the fact that there is such a thing as kindness, and that category, apart from semantics, is stance-independent. I can choose whether to be kind or not, but it is a fact that being generous, nice, respectful, etc. are kind acts because they are of that category of acts.

Same with the good. Kindness, altruism, truthfulness, etc. are of the category of the good; but, of course, I can choose not to care about them.

My understanding is that realism entails that whether an act is good or bad can be established as a 'fact' in any given instance

Moral realism is a three-pronged thesis:

1. Moral judgments are propositional.
2. Moral judgments express something objective; and
3. At least one moral judgment is true.

Yes, this theory affirms 2 (and 1 and 3, but emphasis on 2 to your point) because the good is stance-independent: there really is a separable category between the good and the bad.

Here’s some extra things to chew on about this unconventional theory:

1. Not all moral judgments are normative judgments, because categorizing actions as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ is purely non-normative.
2. The normative moral judgments stem from a subjective moral judgment; namely, that “one ought to be good”.
3. It follows from #1 and #2, that none of the normative moral judgments in the theory express something objective, but, rather, only the non-normative moral judgments.

This means, that this view affirms #2 only technically insofar as we are talking about non-normative moral judgments; which means that this view is a sort of hybrid between realism and anti-realism, whereof it does affirm that there are moral facts, but none of them are normative. I am not sure what to make of it yet: it definitely exposes my deep anti-realist sympathies.

Therefore, we are stating P. We are also stating X. Thus, we are stating P and X. As I demonstrated here:
…
it entails logical contradiction.

I think we may be circling back around, and I am not sure how else to explain my point of view here other than by repeating: that !(P ^ X) does not entail X is logically impossible—not even relative to P. You are just noting that accepting P and X results in a logical contradiction because !X is affirmed on a non-logical contradiction.

But the goal of the thread was to find something logically possible and metaphysically impossible

Let’s take metaphysical theory, Znot, which posits that philosophical zombies are metaphysically impossible, and let’s call the claim ‘philosophical zombies can exist’ Z, albeit logically and actually possible. Z is considered false in Znot because it is incoherent with another proposition (or set of propositions), let’s say A, that Znot affirms such that !(A ^ Z) ^ A.

This is an example of exactly what you are asking for. Z is logically possible and metaphysically impossible relative to Znot.

Giving us no way of finding something logically possible but metaphysically impossible.

I disagree. Let’s take this by analogy (to actual impossibility):

X = “A human being can fly”

Firstly, X is not logically impossible. Secondly, I think your line of reasoning, and correct me if I am wrong, is that X becomes logically impossible if we accept a theory in physics, P, that posits !X; but this is false.

X is not logically impossible even relative to P when !(X ^ P): instead, we just find it logically impossible to hold X and P—this is different. If X were logically impossible in P, then the logic in P would produce, itself, (X ^ !X); which is does not in the case that P → !X.

Instead, P → !X because of an incoherence, not a logical contradiction in P, with positing X within P. E.g.,:

Y = “X violates the law of gravity”

Which, what they would want to say in this case is that, !(Y ^ X) ^ Y → !X. P, in this case, does not produce a logical contradiction with X such that X ^ !X but, rather, that X ‘violates’ the law of gravity, which Y, and posits if that is true than it is “incoherent”, albeit not logically contradictory, with X. It is perfectly logically validly to posit that “a human being can fly” and “’a human being can fly’ violates the law of gravity”: nothing logically wrong with that.

I think you are conflating the logical impossibility of someone accepting X outside of the theory logically contradicting the theory (i.e., !{X ^ [P → !X] }) with the theory itself demonstrating the logical impossibility of positing X.

In this example, it is logically possible that X but actually impossible that X; but according to your reasoning actual impossibility would collapse into logical impossibility: which does not happen here.

So, with that in mind,:

A spiritual being is logically possible. :up:
A spiritual being is metaphysically possible. :chin:
A spiritual being is physically possible. :down:

For brevity, let’s say “a spirit exists” = X and let’s assume, like you, a physicalistic theory, P, that demonstrates some incoherence with the theory and X such that !X.

1. X is logically possible and is logically possible relative to the axioms and inferences of P.
2. X is metaphysically impossible, because there is at least one proposition, Y, in P that is incoherent with X such that !(Y ^ X) ^ Y → !X.
3. X is actually possible, since you defined it as a “non-physical thing”, as it does not violate the laws of nature, being above nature itself.

Hopefully that helps, let me know.

There being no formula of what is exactly wrong or right in any given situation does not make the categories empty.

Take an example by analogy: Imagine I gave you a bucket of colored blocks and asked you separate them into piles by color. You pick up a red one, put it in the red pile; blue, in the blue pile; etc.

Now, you pull out a block that is an odd mixture of red and yellow such that it is still really red: which pile does it belong in?

Now, I don't answer the question, instead let's say we don't have a great answer: we don't have a formula that let's us know exactly which pile this one should be in. Now, let's take your contention here and see how it holds up. You are saying, analogously, that the categories of 'red block' vs. 'yellow block' vs. 'orange block' are empty because we don't have a formula which exactly determines which block belongs in which one; likewise, you are claiming that it is somehow circular logic that we are informed by the category of 'red/yellow/orange block' on which pile to put blocks. Hopefully, it is clear in this analogy that the categories not empty because we have no exact formula and they still inform us of which goes in which pile.

Ethics cannot be done from an armchair, and there is no exact formula one can use to determine what to do in any given situation: ethics is a science (of sorts).

I would say that we do it like any other categories we make: we induce it from particulars.

I see this right triangle, that obtuse triangle, that isosceles triangle, etc. and I formulate/induce the general category of a triangle. I see someone helping the needy, being nice to someone else, being respectful, upholding a beings sovereignty, etc. and I induce the general category of the good. I see someone torturing a baby for fun, a person being incredibly rude, a person demeaning another, a person being incredibly selfish, a person having complete disregard for life, etc. and I induce the category of the bad.

Just like how I can separate triangles into one pile and squares into another, and more generally shapes into one pile and non-shapes into another, I, too, can put generous acts into one pile and respectful acts into another, and more generally good acts into one pile and bad acts into another.

Am I going to sort each into each pile 100% accurately? Probably not. Does that take away from the plentiful evidence that the categories do exist? Certainly not.

While it's correct to say that a spiritual being is logically possible, it's a contradiction to say a spiritual being exists & physicalism is true.

My point is that X is not logically impossible because X is metaphysically impossible; and pointing out that !(X ^ M) doesn't help prove that it is otherwise. Just because positing X and M entails a contradiction it does not follow that X is logically impossible. I only bring this up because you said something originally along the lines of 'every metaphysical system which X contradicts, makes X logically impossible'. Metaphysical impossibility does not entail logical impossibility. That X ^ M is logically impossible is not the same as X being logically impossible, which is what you need for this to work.

Likewise, I don't even think that all propositions which are regarded as metaphysically impossible are reducible to an axiom in the metaphysical theory. To take your example, physicalism is typically the view that reality is fundamentally 'mind-independent': it may still be metaphysically impossible for their to be a spiritual being even though it does not produce a logical contradiction with this fundamental belief to the theory, as they may say it is metaphysically impossible because the being, let's say, would violate the laws of nature and, let's say, in this particular physicalist theory, everything must be natural--so spiritual beings cannot exist because that is incoherent with, not logically contradictory to, these beliefs they have.

"Everything should not exist" leads to the fact that, "This statement of morality should not exist" and seems quite irrational, we're going to assume the more rational choice.

You say it is irrational…but I still don’t see why.

therefore encouraging and preserving existence should be the fundamental goal.

Encouraging or mandating? This is what I would like to know. Is it morally permissible in your view to not create more existence when there is an opportunity to?

No, that's a bit far of a jump ahead. It would really help at this point if you avoided any sense of human morality and just went along with the fundamental building up of morality. We'll get to human morality, no worry.

See, this is doesn’t make sense to me. What you do evaluate morally if there is no subject? What if a rock had the ‘opportunity’ to create more exist by interacting in a partular way but ‘chose’ not to? Well, obviously, this makes no sense because the rock doesn’t ‘decide’ anything, so why consider what would be better morally for the rock to do? Instead, it is a question of what should we do to the rock, no?

For now, what do you think about my evaluation of expressed existence? Also, did you get to the example of the submarine in the ocean? Let me know what you think Bob.

I admittedly don’t have a good grasp of the theory yet, but I can take a crack at it! Let me attempt at re-reading the OP:

1. If existence is good, then more existence is better.

This seems to be mandating the creation of more things.

2. Any existence which lowers overall existence is evil.

If I have to kill 20 people in my lifetime in legitimate self-defense and I never contribute to the creation of more life and #2, then wouldn’t it follow that I am evil?

Likewise, if we could calculate out that force castrating 10% of the population, let’s say convicts, would total net increase the amount of people or lives, would this then, under your view, be righteous?

What counts as ‘existence’ here? Just things that are alive? What if I am constantly destroying rocks, is that lowering the overall ‘existences’?

Likewise, I don’t think your ‘material’ vs. ‘expressional’ existence answers my above question.

When existence A collides with existence B, something happens. That something is an existence, but a fleeting one. How each individual material reacts when an interaction happens with another material existence would be the expression of each material existence
…
If more existence is better, than more expressions of existence are also better.

This makes it sound like more collisions equals better: but this is just chaos, pure chaos, then, no?

a. Expressions of existence which can yield more potential expressions of existence are better than those that cannot.

This seems, again, like the best world in your theory is one with the most chaos, because that would be what a world would be like with maximal expressions of existence: thing colliding and bombarding other things.

b. Expressions of existence which destroy material existence, or those that lesson the number of possible expressions of existence would be considered evil.

Similarly, it seems to be evil under your view to limit chaos.

Let us take a situation in which a submarine has crashed to the bottom of the ocean. There is no communication with the outside world, no way for the submarine to recover, and everyone on the submarine will die. No one will ever discover what happens on the submarine, as it will be crushed by gravity into a pulp. There are currently 10 people aboard the ship. There is enough air for 1 person to breath for 10 hours. An explosion could happen which would kill 9 people and leave one alive. Which is more moral, 1 person living 10 hours, or 10 people living one hour?
…
Meaning, while the unique life expressions are the same, the potential existence of what those unique life expressions dwarfs that of the single individual. Meaning that it is equal material existence, but more potential existence for ten people to live on hour that 1 person live for ten hours.

But, wouldn’t it be better, if “If more existence is better, than more expressions of existence are also better.” and more existence is better, to cause the submarine’s parts to collide, by way of explosion, with as many things as possible so as to maximize the odds of expressions of existence?

For now, I would like to wait and here your response to these questions before continuing.

Bob

The word is dependent on the content. I suppose you could say it that way too. It's distinctness comes from its dependence. What's in a name?

I don't have a problem with this: that's what I was essentially saying too.

When we choose a certain metaphysics M, a statement that goes against it, for me, would be a statement that goes against one of the theorems of that metaphysics (t.i. logical contradiction), and assuming that every theorem of M ultimately goes back to the axioms of M, we would have (X ∧ ¬X) extending from (X ∧ Y) extending from (X ∧ M).

I believe I agree with everything except for this part. I just don't think that 'going against one of the theorems [or beliefs or statements]" in M entails necessarily a logical contradiction. I also don't see why every incoherence with M would be derivable back to, ultimately, an axiom which results in !X.

I don't see how one can "extend" !(Y ^ X) to (X ^ !X) in virtue of some axiom in M, such that every possible metaphysical theory, M<i>, has that setup.

Of course the word relates to content, but another word can be swapped for that word and related to the same content; thus, the word is distinct from the content. The fact that the word relates to the content does not entail that the content is somehow modified or transformed depending on the word used. That's all I am trying to point out for the sake of the conversation I was having with the other person, and I don't think it is that controversial (but correct me if I am wrong).

:up:

Semantics is about meaning, which is about how and what words relate to what underlying content; and has nothing to do with that underlying content itself. Nature does not care what word you call it.

The only reason I brought it up was because another person in this thread, that I am discussing with, was thinking that the metaphysical mode of modality was tied solely to semantics of the metaphysical theory at hand, which is false.

By incoherence, I mean the strong opposition of two things. That I have both long and short hair, right now, seems very incoherent given the standard understanding of the property of longness and shortness with regards to hair; but it is, nevertheless, not a logical contradiction for someone to have it because the form is ∃x (Bob<x> ^ LongHair<x> ^ ShortHair<x>).

Hey Bob, for some reason I completely missed that you had replied to this. Came in to review it and saw it luckily!

Absolutely no worries! I was wondering… (;

So, the two major problems I have are:

1. I don’t see why it is internally incoherent for moral realists people who accept there is objective morality to affirm that “there should be nothing” if that particular theory accepts that it is a moral fact that “there should be nothing”.

2. I don’t really understand your idea of morality being objective, and I think a lot of our disagreement is due to the murky waters here. You seem to think that a moral judgment is objective if it doesn’t violate the laws of logic and can be accepted by rational agents, I don’t think this is at all what objectivity is.

I don’t think we are making much headway on the above, so I am just going to continue and see where this goes.

So, let’s say “there should be something”: does this simply mean that “existence is preferable to non-existence” or does it mean that “we must create as many existent things as possible”? I seem to get, from re-reading the OP, that the latter is what you are going for—but, if that is the case, (1) I don’t see how this follows from disaffirming that “nothing should exist” (as I can very well accept that it is false that “nothing should exist” without thereby conceding that “we must create as many existent things as possible”) and (2) this seems to contradict common-sensical moral intuitions (which perhaps isn’t relevant to your point) in the sense that it seems to be a sort of biting of a bullet (e.g., we would have to force people to procreate, etc.).

If I don't know if "Contradictions should be encouraged" is real, I can follow the logic to realize it contradictions itself, so then in conclude contradictions should probably not be encouraged.

This is circular...but, then again, so is all fundamental reason and logic. — Bob Ross

Circular logic is self-confirming. This is self-contradicting.

That’s true, but my point was that you were self-confirming (as you put it): you presupposed that it is false that “contradictions should be encouraged” in order to prove it should not be.

Morality is a choice between two potential realities. Of course reality as it is right now does not tell us how it should be, because we're not evaluating a change in reality by either comparing to the past, or evaluating a change for the future. Only when we think, "Well, what if we change reality to include X, would that be better?" are we discussing morality. P1 only regards the present therefore does not regard morality.

Exactly, this is why I affirm P1 (and it sounds like you do to): which would entail moral facts cannot exist. Again, I still don’t understand what exactly a moral fact is under your view...it seems to just be something rational agents affirm.

If there is an objective morality, this is the only way tor it to be rationally coherent.

Why? There’s nothing internally incoherent with a moral realist claiming that “nothing should exist” because that is a moral fact.

Take the idea that if it is true that "Existence should be" is the foundation for an objective morality, lets have fun thinking what that would entail based on the OP.

I’m trying (: , but I don’t understand what you mean by objective morality at this point. Maybe we can move on to my questions (above) about what exactly is meant by “existence should be”.

Can you elaborate on this? I am not sure what you mean by underlying contents or underlying meaning, as something that could be beyond semantics. Do you mean the relationship of that semantic content with other semantemas?

Semantics is about words—i.e., what is the best or chosen word to describe something—and not the what those words reference themselves (i.e., their underlying content). “Car” is a word, comprised of 3 characters and is from the english language, which refers to that which we call a ‘car’: the underlying content which the word ‘car’ refers to is a car (I denote the word—viz., the semantics—with quotes and the underlying content it references without it here). You may come along and say: “but, bob, what you call a ‘car’ would be much better described, in english, as a ‘biscobbo’” and I say something to the effect of “I don’t even think that is a word in the english language and therefore, within the context of english, is not a better suited word to describe what I mean by a ‘car’”--this is semantics.

When I say X violates the laws of M, I mean that the proposition X is the opposite of one of the laws of M. So basically, by stating M, we state all its axioms, and by definition of X, one of its axioms would be ¬X. By stating X and M, we entail a logical contradiction therefore, no? Because we are stating X∧¬X.

Firstly, metaphysical impossibility does not entail that it is derived from an axiom of the system. In its most abstract, a proposition, X, is metaphysically impossible for a metaphysical theory, M, iff M → Y ^ !(Y ^ X) [i.e., M entails a proposition, Y, which is incoherent, but not necessarily logically contradictory, with X]. In this form, it is clear that something could be metaphysically impossible yet logically possible, because Y ^ X is not a logical contradiction; instead, the argument rests on the idea that Y strongly, in a non-logical sense, opposes X.

Secondly, you threw a curveball here because you posited !X as itself simply affirmed in M, so, of course, affirming M ^ X leads to a logical contradiction (in this case). However, it is important to note that the logical contradiction here does not lead to X being logically impossible, it leads us to X ^ !X being logically impossible--which is not what you are trying to argue. This is because M ^ X leads to a logical contradiction which is only due to the fact that one also affirms M which leads to !X—so X is not logically impossible but, rather, it is logically impossible for it to be true that M ^ X in this case because it can be expanded to [M → !X] ^ X.

My main point here is that metaphysical impossibility does not entail, necessarily, logical impossibility.

while I am using a definition that also talks about whether one of the premises of a statement contradicts the other statement.

You may, then, be using it in the sense of a non-logical contradiction, which is perfectly fine; but that would not get you to logical impossibility. Only by conflating non-logical contradictions (like actual/physical and metaphysical contradictions) with logical ones would one be able to bridge that gap.

P1 Socrates is a human
P2 Every human is a non-reptile
C Socrates is a non-reptile
P3 (C) Socrates is a non-reptile
P4 Socrates is a reptile

No this is a logical contradiction, not a non-logical contradiction or incoherence. The abstracted form is essentially:

ϕ := ∀x (Human<x> → !Reptile<x>)
φ := ∃x (Human<x> ^ Reptile<x>)

The logical contradiction is that ϕ ^ φ → ∃x (!Reptile<x> ^ Reptile<x>)

So, basically, when we say, it is metaphysically impossible for something to happen in a metaphysical system, we are saying, given a metaphysical system M and a proposition X, "In M, X is impossible"

Correct.

it seems that whether X is possible or not boils down to the semantics of M, that is, whether some of the properties or consequences of X are in contradiction to the axioms of M, making untrue analytic statements.

I wouldn’t say that metaphysical impossible is derived solely from the semantics of M but, rather, the underlying meaning associated with those semantics. Semantics is just the analysis of words, not its underlying contents.

I guess you could say the same about physical statements, in a sense.

Correct, the physical/actual mode of modality is analogous to both the logical and metaphysical modes thereof: it is possibility, necessity, contingency, and impossibility juxtaposed with the presupposed mode of interpreting them.

But the issue is that the laws of physics are given to us through the scientific method, while metaphysical laws are not, each person has their own metaphysical views

A contention about the methodology of physics vs. metaphysics is of no concern to the definition of metaphysical impossibility.

However, as a side note, I agree that metaphysics is a much looser study than physics; however, there are actual methodological conventions which (good) metaphysicians adhere to. The difference mainly is that there is far less education on what metaphysics is let alone what the proper method is for its inquiry, so most people who engage in it do it very poorly.

Then the statement P1 "In S, light goes faster than c" is logically impossible

No. “In S, light goes faster than c” is logically possible because the logic, if generated within a truth table, does not result in every result being false (e.g., there is no logical contradiction in it); whereas it is physically/actually impossible given our current scientific knowledge.

Remember, the logical mode of modality is only concerned with, well, logic, which pertains solely to the form of reasoning. P1 is just a proposition, p, which cannot itself entail a logical contradiction: you would need to demonstrate, in the form of the argumentation, that, in its most abstract, a truth-table of the formula results in false all the way down.

On the issue of metaphysics, however, for a metaphysical system M and a self-consistent proposition X that violates the laws of that system, "In M, X" seems to be logically impossible

It will always be logically possible so long as the logic does not always produce false (e.g., has no contradiction in it), even if M is internally incoherent (viz., ‘incoherence’, as I use it here, does not refer to a logical contradiction but, rather, a looser contradiction in the system such that two propositions held as true in M seem to strongly oppose each other, although there is no logical contradiction therein).

So in the case of epiphenomenalism, we end up with a logically impossible statement or a logically possible statement that has no evaluation in metaphysics yet

I am not sure I followed this part, so I can’t really comment.

I hope this post was not jumbled and that it was understandable to you, as I think you drive a good point that suffers from the issue I posed above. Maybe I made some grammar mistakes or skipped a word which made a sentence unintelligible; tell me so, so I can fix it.

I appreciate your response, and I hope my response here is adequate enough to address your points!

Bob

Good OP. Personally, I don't see why we should accept that space and time, or space/time fabric, is a substance--as they seem, to me, to be merely the forms of our experience. If they are simply the modes by which we cognize objects, then the objects themselves are beyond space and time, or space/time fabric. I honestly don't think we will ever understand the world sans space and time (conceptually) because it is so ingrained into our mode of experiencing it; and this is why we end up with all sorts of problems with the big bang theory when taken not as a convenient model but, rather, as if it is literally what the universe is in and of itself.

Yes, it is entirely possible that some things have no causes or that there is an infinite of them: I don't really see how one can decipher which one is more plausible: if time and space are not substances, then causality (in a spatiotemporal sense) doesn't exist either but, rather, is a representation of (nonspatiotemporal or otherwise) relationships of objects in-themselves.

Another interesting point (to me) is that knowing the negation of a concept doesn't necessarily entail any real knowledge of it, and, in this case, thusly, being directly acquainted with temporality (like we all are) doesn't give us any insight into the nature of atemporality. Most people think "well, atemporality would just be no change, and so I envision an object, like a chair, which is frozen in time": but is this a really accurate understanding of the nature of atemporal objects and their relations to other objects? I don't think so. So when people start trying to come up with hypotheses about 'prior to time' in the big bang, I think, in summary, (1) time doesn't exist (as a substance) and (2) even if it did neither of us have any clue what the nature of atemporality really is at all.

After all the metaphysical reductionism, desire is a mere want, the satisfaction of which is anything sufficient for it, hence, contingent. A desired goal may be specific in itself, but makes no allowance for its satisfaction, which may still, then, remain contingent. An accomplishment indicates a satisfaction in itself, a particular goal, but a necessary accomplishment manifests as a satisfaction of a specific goal achievable only under a certain condition, hence not contingent.

I think I understand now, the ‘desire’ is just the want for something; whereas the ‘accomplishment’ is the happiness it may bring us upon achieving it—correct?

This relates to the topic at hand iff the adherence to a subjective principle from which an act according to a categorical imperative the principles prescribes follows, is the one and only permissible means leading to a necessary accomplishment, re: worthiness of being happy.

I see now. So ‘worthiness’ is being used in the sense, here, of ‘accomplishment’, right? From this, it follows that we only ever accomplish, and consequently acquire happiness, when we have performed something worthy or perhaps have a character that is worthy (virtuous). Correct?

In this way, a guy may be worthy of being happy, even if the prescription from his own principles cause him to act in such a way he feels no happiness at all.

So, are you saying that in order to accomplish a goal, which brings about happiness, the means may itself not bring any happiness—is that right? Because I can agree with that.

Happy and happiness are just words, those alledged “fuzzy concepts”, that represent a specific kind of feeling. One could use righteousness, positive well-being, or the like. The word as used here is meant to indicate a fundamental human aesthetic condition. Call that whatever you like, I suppose

Fair enough. I think my issue is that worthiness of happiness (i.e., what constitutes an “accomplishment”) seems to be, in your view here, fundamentally “regarding other people as ends in themselves”--but this is predicated on the assumption that everyone would subjectively agree to this, and I don’t think most would. Also, what if they gain accomplishments by defining worthiness in a different way than “being considerate of others”? That seems feasible, at least prima facie, to do, doesn’t it?

In other words, what makes someone actually worthy of being happy other than completing their own subjectively defined goals such that they accomplish them; which could certainly include “regarding people as worthless”.

In a system where the agent is a causality, contradiction is impossible

True.

If there were such a thing, and it was a universal condition, there would be no need to, e.g., turn the other cheek, or, engage in the ol’ eye-for-an-eye routine. And that would make everybody happy, or if not so much happy, then at least to release them from having to worry about being a target of them.

For it to be a universal condition, everyone would either have to agree to it; and I don’t see what convincing argument one can give to get everyone on board with a single (subjective) principle.

Takes an awful lot of presuppositions for this all to work, but none of them are particularly far-fetched.

I like where your heads at, and am intrigued to here more: it, indeed, is not bad at all (:

I just mean historical, pyschological, and physiological analysis of human's seems to point to a 'boiler plate' human, although we don't have complete knowledge of it yet, such that there is a way which a human--absent of outside infringements, impediments, and influence as well as biological defects--would develop into as time goes on and on...until death. It seems, indeed, like we are 'wired' a particular way, but we can be influenced (externally) or damaged to the point where we do not live up to our human (biological) potential. Does that help?

Actual, or also called physical, possibility is a mode of thought in modality whereof something is possible iff it does not violate the laws or currently held beliefs about nature (about the physical world).

I would have thought that metaphysical impossibility precludes actual possibility.

It very well might, depending on whether one believes in a higher 'realm', so to speak, than nature herself--e.g., it is, for some theists, actually impossible for someone to jump to the moon, with nothing but their bare body, from San Francisco but it is metaphysically possible for a God-incarnate to.

Sort of. I wouldn't say that the argument is that we should do whatever keeps us at balance to survive, but, rather, align ourselves with our nature as a species: does that imply homeostasis? I thought homeostasis was just an individual's ability to maintain balance in the physical system of which is themselves (i.e., their organism).

What is the question?

There is no such thing as freedom because everybody is enslaved to either ego or conscience.

Firstly, it is incredibly important to define what one means by freedom in philosophy of free will: I suspect this definition of 'freedom' is toto genere different than contemporary definitions. For me, as a compatibilist, I would say that 'free will' is 'the ability to choose in accordance with one's will'.

Secondly, ego vs. conscience is a false dilemma--e.g., my conscience could force me to be egoistic and my ego could compel me to follow my conscience and, not to mention, I could be driven by neither.

Fourthly, even if one was forced to either follow their 'ego' or their 'conscience', then it depends on what exactly one means by that whether my definition (above) of free will is compatible with it or not. If you just mean that they are abiding by their own will, which happens to be to follow their conscience or to be super egoistic, then I see no reason to accept, even if it weren't a false dilemma, that free will does not exist.

Metaphysical impossibility is any proposition which violates the presupposed metaphysical theory, no different than how actual/physical possibility is predicated on our scientific theories. The main difference is that metaphysical theories are way more controversial than scientific theories (and there is absolutely no consensus on the former).

E.g.,:

For some in philosophy of mind, philosophical zombies are metaphysically impossible, but actually and logically possible.

For some theists, it is metaphysically impossible for there to be more than one god; for something to exist which is not contingent on God; etc.

For some in metaethics, it is metaphysically impossible for moral facts to exist, albeit actually and logically possible.

For physicalists, it is metaphysically impossible for there to be a mind which is more fundamental than matter (or whatever fundamental mind-independent entities constitute their theory).

And the list goes on and on, and is contingent on the specific metaphysical theory (worldview) in play.

I just meant the function in terms of a perfectly healthy organism relative to its species, not that there is an author to those functions. We say "a human is 'intended' or 'biologically wired to' see if they are not defective.

Right off the bat, maybe I shouldn’t comment, being more a subjective moralist than a normative ethicist,

Your thoughts are always welcome, Mww :heart:

…..in which is violated the fundamental moral condition, re: the worthiness of being happy. The argument is that he who is a moral agent in the strictest sense of the idea is thereby worthy of his being happy, which is the same as his happiness being given by his accordance with his own moral law.

My only worry here is that it isn’t the necessarily the case that a person’s absolute end is their own happiness—viz., happiness may be a means towards something else for someone, or not a means nor an end at all.

I would say that I agree with this section if we replace happiness with, more abstractly, one’s absolute end.

so if you claim I should not treat myself as a means to an end because it violates the FET, there’s something wrong with the FET.

This is fair: if I cannot use myself as a means towards an end, then I am not actually able to set out my own absolute ends. The idea was supposed to be that no one can be used as a sole means toward any end, so that would technically include oneself.

The something wrong might be as little as….. an end cannot be a desired goal, as you say, but is instead a necessary accomplishment

I didn’t understand the distinction here between “desired goal” and “necessary accomplishment”: could you please elaborate?

Now, ethically speaking, or, speaking from the perspective of a community predicated on moral agency, which just is a kingdom of ends in its strictest sense, putting the pieces of this particular puzzle together, you get to the conclusion that, if all members of the community are worthy of the happiness they each have, they must have all acted in accordance with a subjective moral principle. And if they are all happy within the community, which is the same as all happy with each other, they must have all acted in accordance with a subjective moral principle common to each member. Another name for a principle common to all which abide by it, is a universal law. And that subjective command which adheres to such law, is a categorical imperative, the formula for which in a community would be, then, treat each member as an end in himself, just as I treat myself.

Notwithstanding my quibble with happiness being necessarily the core of moral agency, I think this makes sense; but my issue is, although it is very practical, that it isn’t a commitment one has simply by being committed to being rational; instead, people have to genuinely (subjectively) obligate themselves to get along with other people: they must accept being a part of a kingdom of ends.

I am trying to avoid these kinds of moral anti-realist motivated normative theories, because moral realists are going to have an easy time dismissing them (and I think most people will not find it convincing): why should I care about being a member of a kingdom of ends?

Instead, I think, it would be much more convincing (especially to the layman) if it followed from the avoidance of a logical contradiction—e.g., because if you don’t, then you are being irrational...that’s a much harder bullet to bite then simply lacking the preference to care about other people. I am having a hard time coming up with one though.

Disclaimer: without “happiness” as the fundamental human aesthetic condition, re: what everybody wishes he had, and without “worthiness of being happy” as the fundamental human moral condition, re: what everybody ought to have, and a method for relating one to the other, none of the above is of any use and can be disregarded without fault.

What do you mean by “worthiness of being happy”? What would make one worthy of that in this view you have outlined?

Here's a new argument I was thinking of:

P1: One should abide by the intended function(s) of their organism.

P2: It is an intended function of the human species to care about the well-being of minds.

C: TF, a human should care about the well-being of minds.

What do you think?

I mean its incoherent, and therefore likely not going to be the objective morality if it exists.

Why is it incoherent? I think we both agree it isn’t internally incoherent, but why is it externally incoherent? Are you just saying it is incoherent with what most people consider to be moral/immoral? Because I can agree with that.

If I don't know if "Contradictions should be encouraged" is real, I can follow the logic to realize it contradictions itself, so then in conclude contradictions should probably not be encouraged.

This is circular...but, then again, so is all fundamental reason and logic.

The conclusion is, "Existence should be."

So, the original argument doesn’t work, because you were saying it is due to a contradiction—which we both agree now doesn’t exist. So what is the new argument for “existence should be”? Is it that it doesn’t coincide with our moral intuitions?

None of these reasons mean that there is an objective morality, but they are reasons I think its worthwhile to search for one.

I understand that it can be very compelling that [human] morality is something objective of which we are grasping, as opposed to projecting; and I’ve even flirted with moral non-naturalist views, like moral intuitionism, to try and get there...all to no avail.

1. There are universal moral decisions across cultures. Why? What's the underling fundamental that causes that?

Because the human species is a standard deviation curve, and, just like intelligence, there are certain moral intuitions which tend to be biologically baked into our species.

2. We are moral to animals. Some animals even show signs of morality

Again, something being biologically motivated doesn’t make it objective itself. With evolution, I would expect that other species, like intelligence, will have bits and pieces of what we do...we are the more complex biproduct of all those tiny steps evolution took and they are also a part of that.

3. There are various other contradictions and debated issues with many versions of subjective morality. That tells me that over the eons we've spent studying it, we haven't come up with an acceptable solution.

Doesn’t entail that moral realism is true.

4. There is great value to having an objective morality. Such an understanding can bridge cultures, religions, and further the understanding and progress of humanity.

I would say there’s great value in having an agreed upon moral standard, not that it is ultimately objective.

5. Humans are made out of matter. I do not see us as separate from the universe, but very much a part of it.

Agreed.

I find it odd that suddenly morality pops up and its only a human condition. I believe there is something underlying this beyond just evolution that allows morality to express itself through us.

And this is where I started flirting with moral intuitionism (; I don’t think there is anything underlying it other than biological motivation.

None of these reasons mean that there is an objective morality, but they are reasons I think its worthwhile to search for one.

Fair enough. I do think that there are many reasons (that are compelling) to be a moral realist but, at the end of the day, it is false; and this is why I really like my counter-argument to moral judgments expressing something objective:

P1: The way reality is does not entail how it ought to be.

P2: Moral facts are ways reality is such that it informs us how it ought to be.

C: TF, moral facts cannot exist.

It cuts right to the chase...sure, you can initially find it intuitive that morality is objective, but if you accept P1 then there’s not way they do.

But first we have to build up what morality actually is when it gets to the human level.

I don’t understand quite yet, within your view, what the moral facts are true in virtue of and so this makes no sense to me. “existence should be” is a claim, a reason, a statement, which is subjective: it’s that it corresponds to something objective that makes it true in the case of objective morality.

This entails that when you affirm that morality is objective that there are moral judgments which are made true in virtue of reality, and are not made true in virtue of our pyschology—so what is it, then? Platonic forms, naturalistic empirical inquiries, etc.? — Bob Ross

So far? "Existence should be" As I noted earlier, its time to read the rest of the OP.

Two things:

1. Your proof no longer works for “existence should be”, because there is no contradiction.

2. That is a claim: what is the underlying state-of-affairs in reality that makes it true? Or what makes it objectively true in your view?

Your OP doesn’t explain at all why it is objective, just that it is allegedly true because its negation leads to a contradiction.

If the objective morality that exists is "Existence should not be," it doesn't matter, that's what it is. I'm not debating that. Just like if the real morality is "Contradictions should be encouraged in life". If that's what it is, that's what it is.

Agreed.

What I'm noting is that if it is, according to itself, it shouldn't be.

What’s really wrong with this, in principle, though? It doesn’t even seem incoherent to me.

For now? Morality is the analysis of what should or should not happen. Keeping to what should or should not be is moral, while going against the precepts is immoral.

This is too vague. For example, if you are a moral non-cognitivst, then what should or should not happen has not truth-aptness: they are not propositional. Literally anyone will agree with your definition here of morality, but I want to dive deeper: what are the properties themselves? Not what is morality, but what are the nature of moral properties? E.g., is the property of ‘goodness’ reducible to something natural? Or are you a non-naturalist?

The nature of objectivity is a rational deduction that persists despite differences in subjective experience.

What is a “rational deduction”? It can’t just be something that is deduced, because, again, I can give you a perfectly sound deduction for almost anything and certainly things that are immoral (like eating babies).

The nature of subjectivity is a rational or irrational conclusion that relies on one specific subjective experience.

So how many convergent subjective analysis constitute an objective one then, in your terms? Is that how it works?

The guidance of objectivity is the understanding that there are certain conclusions which are apart from our desires or personal viewpoints. Meaning an objective conclusion has the potential to violate everything we wish and stand for.

I can get on board with that, but why do you think there are moral judgments that exhibit this kind of objectivity (viz., that there are moral conclusions which are despite our desires or viewpoints)?

Which leads me to: what states-of-affairs in reality are morally relevant, then? What out there are we able to access that is of moral signification?

The default child-like state is to believe that one's perspective is unalienably correct, and reflective of reality. Objectivity is meant to raise a person's thinking beyond this, while subjectivity is its contrast and reminder to be conscious of our own limitiations.

Sure, that’s fine. But I wouldn’t say that subjectivity is solely people’s perspectives being unblameworthy.

What is rational is to connect information together in such a way that is reflective of reality.

Fair enough. This entails that when you affirm that morality is objective that there are moral judgments which are made true in virtue of reality, and are not made true in virtue of our pyschology—so what is it, then? Platonic forms, naturalistic empirical inquiries, etc.?

I don’t think there is anything in reality that tells us what we ought to do, so it does not matter how much a rational agent reflects accurately about reality: the normative or morally relevant information comes from within, not without.

It is a judgement that accurately reflects reality.

This is fine, and good.

I can get on board with, more or less, your terminology here because we basically use them the same way; and I would say that I don’t think there is anything about reality that makes moral judgments true—so no moral facts. You disagree: so why do you think otherwise?

Yes, but can you give an example of that 'something' that isn't a mind?

No, there aren’t any.

Contradicting a person's nature is not the law of non-contradiction.

So, the idea is that when one treats an end, E, as solely a means, they thereby implicitly concede the contradiction that “E is and is not solely a means” which is a logical contradiction (i.e., E → [ B && !B ] ). So the idea is that contradicting a person’s nature actually leads to a contradiction itself, which a rational agent should avoid.

Now, to be completely honest, I am rethinking this normative theory; because I don’t think it works anymore. I have this darn habit of writing something up, and quickly defeating my own position—back to the drawing board! ):

The reason I don’t think it works is because I think the contradiction doesn’t actually exist if one disambiguates the language: kind of like how B and C were really easy to conflate in your theory, being an being with the ability to set out absolute ends is different than being an absolute end. And the contradiction only arises if I set out for myself an absolute end and then treat it as solely a means.

I will have to think about it more...

Stating that something is self-evident doesn't demonstrate that its also not an equivocation though. If minds are not identical to ends-in-themselves, then we would need to see some difference between a mind and an end-in-itself. If you aren't seeing equivocation, could you note how they are not simply the same thing?

A mind is an emergent process of a brain or a soul (take our pic) which is capable of having desires, cognizing, and having a conscious experience or an awareness of its environment; whereas, an end-in-itself is just a shorthand for something capable of deploying absolute ends.

For me it is that I should value an end in itself beyond an opinion that I should do so. I see nothing concrete that binds me to it, or demonstrates a provable ethical decision

Ok, which premise then?

I think we both agree now that there is no incoherence or contradiction with positing A, so let me move on.

So then, its not an ontological necessity that if an objective morality exists, that it conclude 'Existence should be.' Its more that such a morality seems so at odds with itself and with our general sense, that it doesn't fit

We need to revisit metaethics, because I can already anticipate how this is going to go if I point out my contentions without us diving into what you think the nature of objectivity and morality is (:

For example, I don’t see how morality, if it were ‘objective’, would be ‘at odds with itself’ or that it ‘doesn’t fit’, in principle, if A were true. In principle, what is morally right or wrong is determined by the morally relevant facts under moral realism “objective morality theories”, so if there is a moral fact such that “nothing should exist”, then that would be a true moral judgment which expresses something objective—full stop: it doesn’t matter if that doesn’t coincide with the general consensus or what not.

BUT, if by ‘objective’ you just mean ‘what rational agents can agree upon’, then it depends on what you mean by “rationality” (what is implied by it exactly) whether or not, within your terms, my contention matters.

So, let me ask you again:

1. What is the nature of moral properties? I am assuming, based off of our previous discussion, that you hold that moral judgments express something objective, that they are truth-apt, and that some of them are true.

2. What is the nature of objectivity? I am assuming you mean “that which can be rationally agreed upon”.

3. What is the nature of an “objective moral judgment” or a “moral fact” to you? What is a fact?

Without understanding what you think the nature of objectivity and morality is, then I cannot adequately assess your position in light of your own terms.

I will say, to be totally honest, I think your position is a form of moral subjectivism (; You are a comrade in disguise....

I think I am beginning to understand what you are trying to go for, which is, if I am not mistaken, that morality itself contains a ‘moral’ judgment that ‘the reason must/should exist’ if it is to have ‘moral’ signification and then you are trying to demonstrate that this contradicts B. Is that sort of right?

Anyways, I see many worries with this; but I will refrain until I confirm whether that is what you are saying or not.

I would like to suggest that you write out all 9 (or what not) points with their logic to the right of them so that I can see exactly what’s going on. You have introduced new points without their logic explicated, and, given the confusion in the past, I don’t want to make any assumptions. Whether it is proposition, predicate, or some other logic; I don’t really care as long as it demonstrates a logical contradiction: then I at least understand where the contradiction is and we can move on from there.

4. For B to be true, it must not contradict itself B = B && B != !B

I would just like to note that I think your logic here is not what you intended (if I am understanding correctly). ‘B != !B’ is, even when conjoined with ‘B = B’, a tautology that is not equivalent to the law of non-contradiction, which is ‘!(B && !B)’. Just a side note, I am going to move on assuming you just mean the LNC here.

6. Because it is moral that 'nothing should exist' the reason should also not exist

This one is more of a question than a critique: is ‘moral’ signifying anything special here? To me, this point would lose none of its substance if that word were left out, because it just notes that the reason ‘nothing should exist’ entail that that very reason doesn’t exist. The ‘because it is moral’ is just throwing me off a tad bit, and wanted to make sure I am not missing something.

7. But for 'Everything should not exist' we have a reason that does exist, that should not exist.
8. But if the reason should not exist, then it is immoral for the reason to exist. Thus B is false. !B
9. if the reason should not exist, then 'Existence should not exist' should not exist either. !B <-> !A

Firstly, I don’t see a contradiction here in the logical form: could you please explicate it?

Secondly, 8 seems to just claim that B is false, not that it both B and !B are true.

Thirdly, I don’t understand the difference between 7 and 6: they seem to be a reiteration of the same claim.

Fourthly, 8 making a new claim altogether that I don’t know: namely, that it is immoral for the reason to exist and that thereby makes it false. Why? It is immoral for it exist in the sense that it should not exist, but that doesn’t entail that B is false: that entails that B entails C. Remember, for B to be false, it must be false that “everything should not exist” and NOT “B should exist”: I think you just may have made the same conflationary move again that I explicated with B vs. C.

Lastly, 9 is just another reiteration, as far as I can tell, of 7 and 6: you just repeat that if a reason entails its own non-existence, then it should not exist. However, I would like to add that the logic is wrong here, as it should be ‘B ↔ C’. ‘!B ↔ !A’ would be, as expressed in a colloquial sentence, “if the reason that ‘everything should not exist’ (or that statement as a reason itself) is false, then it is false that ‘everything should not exist’. Also, 1 and 5 are the same claim, techinically, as A = B at this point: if B is the reason ‘nothing should exist’ then it is A, since you defined in 1 A as ‘everything should not exist’--although I understand what you are getting at, I would suggest making A the claim ‘nothing should exist’ and B whatever reason it is for that (which could be technically anything for the sake of the argument, since you are trying to prove a contradiction with just assuming B’s relationship to A).


To me, it seems like you have just come up with different words to conflate B with C, and added extra points that reiterate the same thing. To me, you are just claiming the following:

P1: If the claim ‘nothing should exist’, A, is true, then there is a reason, B, for why A is true. [A ↔ B]
P2: The claim ‘nothing should exist’ is true. [A]
C1: TF, there is a reason for why A is true. \[B\]

P3: If there is a reason for why A is true {and A is true}, then that reason should not exist. [ (B {&& A}) → C ]
P4: There is a reason for why A is true {and A is true}. <C1> [ B {&& A} ]
C2: TF, that reason should not exist. [ C ]

So there’s not contradiction, but you seem to be trying to argue with 8 that:

P5: If B should not exist {C}, then B is false. [ C → !B ]
P6: B should not exist {C}. <C2>[ C ]
C3: TF, B is false. [ !B ]

P7: One should abide by LNC. [ N ]
P8: C1 and C3 contradict each other. [ B && !B ]
C4: TF, one should not accept A {because it leads to a contradiction}. [ {N → !(B && !B)} → !A ]

But, crucially, I contend P5. I don’t see how that implication is true at all.

This is the part I'm not understanding. Can you clarify? What does must/should mean?

Let’s skip this for now.

Correct, that's not the same as what point 2 is saying. Its an odd thing that I agree with practically everything you're stating yet I can't understand the overall point you're trying to make. :) We're almost there I feel though, so please keep trying.

We are definitely getting closer! (:

Thank you for the exposition of your logic for the argument, because I see exactly where (I think) it goes wrong:

3. If B is true, then B should not exist. B -> !B

B != “B should not exist”, so there is no contradiction.

A := “everything should not exist”
B := “reason that A”
C := “B should not exist”

Now, we see:

A ↔ B
B ↔ C

P1: A ↔ B
P2: A
C: B

P3: B ↔ C
P4: B
C: C

No contradiction. You conflated B with “B should not exist”. Those are separate propositions.

Almost, but not quite. We're assuming if 'everything should not exist', [then] there must be a reason. Its not an identity.

“There must <...>” is the same statement as “There should <...>”: same issue. — Bob Ross

Now I'm confused. Didn't you just have an issue with me swapping 'should' and 'must' earlier? I agree you had that right. What should exist is not the same as what must exist.

These two claims are not equivalent. The hypothetical in the top quote is just using ‘must’ in a non-normative ‘moral’ sense to indicate that if there is a reason, then there is a reason (i.e., it is a tautology); whereas the assertion in the second to top quote is that there simply must/should be a reason, not that if it were to exist, then it would exist.

Almost, but not quite. We're assuming if 'everything should not exist', there must be a reason. Its not an identity.

It was identity in your point 2:

2. There must be a reason that everything should not exist

When reformulated, this just tautological:

2. For there to be a reason that everything should not exist, some reason should [has to] exist [such that everything should not exist].

If you are conveying, instead, that “if everything should not exist, then there must be a reason” then that is not taulogical, but that is not equivalent to point 2 (you made).

Anyways, here’s the crux though:

So if the truth of its own premise is that it shouldn't exist, but it must exist if it is to claim that it shouldn't exist, we're left with a contradiction

There’s no contradiction here. If I must exist to obligate myself to kill myself, then it does not follow that I am contradicting myself.

Since you seem to think there is, I would like to offer a suggestion, to move the conversation forward, that you provide a valid syllogism for it. If it is a logical contradiction, then explicate clearly that the form of the argument leads to p ^ !p; if it is an actual contradiction, then explicate how positing A is incoherent with natural laws; and if it is a metaphysical contradiction, then explicate how positing A is incoherent with your metaphysics; or if it is none of those, then please explicate what you mean by ‘contradiction’ and demonstrate it with syllogisms.

On my side, I am not sure how to demonstrate how this is not a contradiction anymore than reiterating that a reason entailing its own annihilation is not a contradiction and offering some analogies:

1. A thought that I have which claims “I should not have any thoughts” is perfectly coherent, but also requires that it must have existed in order for me to have the thought and that itself should no longer exist if it still does.
2. An AI can be programmed to seek nothing other than its own death, such that it must exist to have the obligation to kill itself—I see nothing incoherent with this.
3. A bomb that is set to blow itself up is setup such that it ought to blow its self up and it has to exist in order for that to be true—ditto.

I think you are trying to do a paradox move, like “all statements are false” which would entail a contradiction if it were true; but this is not analogous to a thing which must exist in order to claim that it should not itself exist.

2. There must be a reason that everything should not exist

This is still incorrect: the claim is that if there is a reason that everything should not exist, then there is a reason that everything should not exist. “There must <...>” is the same statement as “There should <...>”: same issue.

If you wanted to assert there is a reason, which is different than asserting there should or must be a reason, then you would have to word it as “there is a reason that everything should not exist”. Or if you wanted, then you could say “if there is a reason <...>, then there must be that reason <...> [because it is exists]”, which is not equivalent to “there must be a reason <...>”: the latter is making a normative “moral” claim, which is not about what is but what should be, and the former is just noting that if there is a reason then there is a reason. I think we should use “there is a reason that everything should not exist” to avoid any normative “moral” vs. indicative/descriptive confusion.

So, the rewritten argument would be:


2. There is a reason, A, that everything should not exist.
7. If A exists, then it claims A should not exist. [ this should be an assertion not a hypothetical: ‘A implies A should not exist’.

And I think it is clear now that 9 is completely false:

9. Because A cannot assert the truth of its own premise, or contradicts itself, it cannot exist.
Therefore 2 is contradicted, and there cannot be a reason for why everything should not exist.

The truth of its own premise is that it shouldn’t exist, not that it should and should not exist. 2 & 7 do not imply nor claim that a part of its truth is that it should exist.

Reason's Greetings & Happy New Year, Bob! :sparkle:

You too!

If something is solely a means to an end, then it can’t be an end itself because it is just a means towards some other end. If it is also an end then it is not just a means towards an end. — Bob Ross
Repeating your definition doesn't make it more substantive than just a definition.

I am not sure how else to explain it. They are categorically different: are you asking why a means can’t ever be an end in a different context?

P2 notes that minds are ends in themselves, and this is because minds are the only beings with the nature such that they are their own end—i.e., they are an absolute end
Circular to the point of being tautological.

I don’t see how it is circular. I am saying that the nature of a mind is to set out means towards their own ends (which is what it means to have motives, desires, and a will) whereof the ultimate end is themselves. What is tautological about that?

C: One should not treat a mind as solely a means towards an end, but always as (at least) simultaneously an end in themselves.
Again, this conclusion does not follow validly from your mere 'definitions' (& otherwise 'hidden premises' e.g. what is conceptually meant by "minds").

Why?

1. It is required to note that minds are ends in themselves because the identity of ‘an absolute end’ does not entail itself that those are only minds — Bob Ross

This is why I asked earlier if you could give an example of an end in itself that wasn't a mind.

There aren’t any: my point is just that I am predicating that only minds are ends-in-themselves and not equivocating them.

Yes, this is my general problem with ethical theories and why I feel we have a lot more work to do on the matter.

Agreed. Ethics is a science, and as such we have to learn as we go: there’s not exact formula that tells us, to the T, what to do: we rely heavily on moral intuitions.

Right, but that's the answer to any valid syllogism. If we accept the premises, then the conclusion must necessarily be so. Yes, proving that first is essential. But after its proven, the question becomes, "Can you prove that I should accept your premises?"

So that’s what I was asking about before: which premise do you currently reject? We can discuss further whichever one that is.

We can revisit this later. For now, I do not believe that one should be rational is a subjective moral judgement. But we have to get the base down first before we build to that. :)

I don’t see how this would be the case, as your argument for ‘there should be something’ (which we are currently discussing) is not more fundamental than your claim that ‘one should be rational’ is objective: the former actively presupposes the former. So I don’t see how you can build off of the argument we are discussing to get there, but we will see (:

2. For there to be a reason that everything should not exist, some reason should [has to] exist [such that everything should not exist].

It is false that if a reason exists that it should exist, which is what you said in this point 2. When I convert, to try to be charitable (as shown in bold and strikeout), it becomes a mere tautology that informs us of nothing: if there is a reason <...>, then there is a reason <...>.

7. if A should exist, then it claims that A should not exist.
…
9 But if A should not exist, then it cannot assert that it should exist.

A doesn’t claim that A should exist, it claims that A should not exist. I think you are trying to infer this from point 2 (as far as I can tell), and 2 is just false or, when converted, a mere tautology that cannot be used to support the antecedent of point 7 (being that it is also false).

A contradiction is clear if the assumption of X assumption leads to its own negation

So, I would say, this is different than your claim in point 2: point 2 claims that A entails that A should exist and that it shouldn’t, whereas A negating itself, in the most loose sense of that terminology, just implies that A demands its own annihilation—which is not a contradiction. If I obligate myself to kill myself, I have not conceded that I should and should not exist: which is what you seem to be saying about A (although, of course, you are not referring to people killing themselves: just an analogy).

If you still don't see it, can you point out why A does not negate itself?

If you just mean that A is the obligation to A not existing, and consequently A ‘negates itself’ in the sense that it implies its own annihilation, then I completely agree; but this isn’t a contradiction: the negation of existence is not a contradiction. A contradiction is, in its most basic sense, when two ‘things’ oppose each other so strongly that they can’t both be true. More specifically, logically contradictory when a proposition is both true and false; metaphysically contradictory when a proposition strongly opposes (or is incongruent with) one’s metaphysics; and actually contradictory when a proposition strongly opposes (or is incongruent with) natural laws.

According to your definition of subjective, everything is subjective Bob.

Not at all; and I am talking about the standard definitions, not my specific ones. I am just noting, although you can use the definitions however you would like, that your using ‘objectivity’ in a way that is obviously ‘subjectivity’ to everyone else.

Please use the definition I've put forward for now. It doesn't mean I'm right, it just makes sure we're on the same page. We can discuss which definition should be used after we get through the meat of the argument first.

Fair enough.

What do you mean by “rationally or logically countered”? If make a syllogism that is logically valid which contains a moral judgment, is that moral judgment thereby ‘objective’ under your view? — Bob Ross

If you can prove that it is so, then yes. Rationality and logic are the best reflective tools we have about reality. It is in my view, the only way we can meaningfully assess it. Meaning if you have an argument that is air tight rationally and logically, which means it cannot be contradicted by reality in any way, you have an objective moral judgement.

Just food for thought, then:

P1: If one should eat babies, then they should find babies to eat. [p → q]
P2: One should eat babies. [p]
C: One should find babies to eat. [q] {Modus Ponens}

This is a logically sound and valid argument, and according to your own concession the contents of which are then objective. Likewise, we can all rationally agree that the logic is sound, but clearly the moral judgments are not thereby objective. Big problem for your semantics I would say…

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob