With all due respect, there was a lot of straw manning going on in your reply; and I could tell that you responded by way of reacting to each paragraph in chronological order (instead of analyzing my response as a whole) because you raised objections to things which you then disregarded further along as you were reading (my response). Reading your response, was like witnessing a live reaction (:

In order to convey this theory to you, I ask that you read my responses in their entirety first; and then respond with the whole in mind.

The good news, amidst the straw mans, I did notice a glimmer of progression! I think you are at least one step closer to understanding the basics of the theory. So let me address what you got right first.

What you call ‘moral value’ is equivalent to ‘intrinsic value’, and ‘moral goodness’ is equivalent to ‘intrinsic goodness’. I was hesitant to concede any sort of ‘moral value’ distinction, but that’s fine. I am claiming that morality is the study of what is intrinsically good, and not generically good—and there is good reason for that. Traditionally, morality has always been about actual (i.e., intrinsic) goodness and not extrinsic goodness. For example, morality has never, ever, been the study of the utility of a thing, which is to assess how good a thing is relative to a subjective purpose. If you want to claim morality is the study of generically what is good, then you will have to include studies, like axiological pragmatism, which have never been included in the study before. I am not willing to do that: I want to keep morality the study of what it traditionally has been.

There are some interesting things to note in here as well:

In conclusion:
valuableness is more fundamental than goodness
Value = Goodness (What is goodness? Is value less fundamental than valuableness?)
Moral goodness = that which has intrinsic goodness.
Moral value = that which has intrinsic value.
Value = that which has extrinsic value

You are absolutely right that valuableness = goodness; and that valuableness is not more fundamental than goodness: I was thinking of ‘value’ when I said that, not valuableness.

It is worth noting a blunder I made: when I was claiming valuableness is unanalyzable and primitive, I was actually thinking of ‘value’. Valuableness is easily definable, and it is ‘to have value’ (duh!).

‘Value’ is a more fundamental building-block of goodness and valuableness, because it is used in their definitions—that’s what I was meaning to convey before, but muddied the waters with my explication. Likewise, my example of ‘beingness’ was a bit off too: the property of beingness is not unanalyzable but, rather, ‘being’ is. Same analogy holds though, for ‘value/good’ and ‘being’.

So:

1. Goodness = valuableness = to have value.
2. moral goodness = to have intrinsic value (or to be intrinsically good: take your pick, it doesn’t matter since they mean the same thing).
3. value != goodness. The former is not a property, and the latter is.
4. moral value = intrinsic value.
5. value = good = ? . Both are unanalyzable and primitive, like being.

Hopefully that clarifies the confusion on that part. Good point, Philosophim!

Now, let’s dive into all the things you misunderstood (and I say that with all due respect).

This statement has unnecessary redundancy Bob. Lets simplify this to clearer language. Intrinsic value is what a thing demands.

NO. Intrinsic value is value that a thing demands of is own accord (i.e., from its nature). Saying it is ‘what a thing demands’ leaves out what is being demanded: I don’t mean it that generically.

But subjects are those that evaluate and determine value

Epistemically, of course we determine value: just like we determine truth, what exists, etc. The question is whether or not what we deem is valuable, actually is. And it only actually can be, if it is intrinsic. Otherwise, one is talking about how well a thing sizes up to its subjective purpose, which clearly isn’t actual value.

The state is not compelling anything. We are reacting to a state and have to make a decision. I don't understand the rationale behind the personification of states still.

You don’t think the state of pain compels you to eradicate it? Come on, Philosophim, I find it hard to believe you don’t understand this example.

So in your view, it seems my Dad violated the intrinsic value of pain and committed an immoral act.

Philosophim, did I not say to forget your parents and think only about the state of severe pain you are (hypothetically) in?

The answer to this, though, is no: on the contrary, it would be immoral to be addicted to opioids insofar as it is a state with intrinsic negative value. Why? Because the state of addiction has a compelling to be avoided. Another way of thinking about it, is that it violates what is most intrinsically (positively) valuable: universal flourishing.

When I am using the example of pain, I am using it just to convey the idea of intrinsic value to you, because you don’t seem to be able to even grasp that, and not to say that avoiding pain has the most intrinsic value nor that one should strive, as The Good, to always void it. You are skipping steps: we are talking about lego blocks, and you want to skip to sky-scrapers.

And no, the 'insistence' to get off the pain pills was not stronger.

Of course not, because he was not in a state, such as flourishing, which compels stronger than a state of degeneracy (such as severe addiction). I am not claiming that a person in the state of pain nor addiction will experience (necessarily) a stronger compelment towards flourishing; but if they were placed in such a state, which is a state without addiction, they would surely recognize, if they are sufficiently cognizant and unbiased, that it has more (positive) intrinsic value than their opioid addiction.

You are having a hard thinking of the strength of a state in terms of itself because you are trying to compare it in a different state. When one is in a state of severe pain, they aren’t in a state of extreme flourishing; so obviously, from that state of pain, the pain is stronger because they aren’t in a state of flourishing. But when they are in a state of flourishing, true flourishing, it is stronger, and in a positive sense, than a state of severe pain. Do you see what I mean?

Imagine you are in severe anger: you are seriously telling me you cannot fathom how the state of anger compels you to value its acceptance, and stab that guy with a knife because he insulted you, all else being equal?

A couple things to note:

1. Perhaps I didn’t clarify this before, but there are two types of intrinsic value: negative and positive. The former is value in its negation, whereas the latter is value in its presence.

2. Anger itself has negative intrinsic value, and this is easily recognized when in a state of extreme anger: the emotion of anger is something which compels one to avoid and eradicate it, and that is what compels them to give in to whatever will help subsidize it. This is no different than pain: put a person in enough pain, and they commonly will do anything to eradicate it.

3. You are confusing whether or not anger has intrinsic value, with whether or not the thing which one does or strives towards due to their anger has intrinsic value. If I am really angry and I could subsidize it by punching someone in the face, then that wouldn’t make ‘punching someone in the face’ intrinsically valuable: the anger is intrinsically negatively valuable because it naturally compels one to value its avoidance and eradication.

What you're doing here Bob is saying that whenever we are compelled to make a decision one way, that it is the state of the experience expressing its intrinsic value, or good.

Not at all. I am saying that IF the state itself compels us to some degree, then to that degree it has intrinsic value; and whether or not it is negative or positive is dependent on whether it compels its avoidance/negation or its presence. See what I mean?

So whatever we are most compelled to do is good. Meaning if I'm strongly compelled to gas some people because I'm a Nazi and love my country, that's intrinsically good. There are some serious problems here.

This is beyond a straw man, and I am genuinely surprised you responded with this. Philosophim, when did I ever say “whatever we are most compelled to do is good”? What nonsense! What we are compelled to do, can be utterly subjective (such as a desire or cognitive approval).

You're saying that moral evaluation is to be done by majority vote of what people really want to do?

This was the most prominent straw man in your response, and I am disappointed in it.

As an institution, knowledge is preserved by way of majority vote of experts in the respective fields—e.g., that’s how peer-review studies work, Philosophim—but does that mean or even imply that truth is subjective? Of course not: what nonsense!

I am, and never was, claiming that what is intrinsically valuable—i.e., what is morally good—is contingent on our vote; I was saying that any institution we could create would preserve and gain knowledge of what is intrinsically valuable by way of convergence of experiences of states, as agreed upon by experts in the field.

Philosophim, this is no different than science. Our institutions safeguard and declare scientific knowledge by way of expert consensus. As humans, we have no other way of doing it (institutionally). Does that mean what exists is subjective? Of course not! What nonsense!

No, its pretty clear at this point that its value rests on minds and is absolutely subjective. I'm not seeing the case at all that it exists independently of people's judgements

Think of yourself in severe pain. Forget everything else.. Imagine you believe that the avoidance of pain is completely valueless: you will still behave like it has some value (in a negative sense). Why? Philosophim, if pain has no intrinsic value, then your belief or desire that it has no value should be enough to conclude it isn’t valuable; but it clearly isn’t enough, because pain, by its nature, compels you to value it.

Now, to clarify further, I get the sense sometime you think that by intrinsic value, I mean ~”anything that compels a subject to value it”. I, of course, don’t believe this; as other subjects can compel each other, and this is not an example of intrinsic value. The state of pain is objective, insofar as it is there irregardless of your feelings or approvals/disapprovals: states are objective in this manner—irregardless if one accepts the existence of qualia.

The rest of your response, was just a reiteration of the above misunderstands and straw mans, so I don’t feel the need to repeat myself in response.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Now you have to identify worth though. None of my questions have changed, just replace my points about 'value' to 'worth' now.

I already noted, and was the first to note, that ‘value’ and ‘worth’ are synonyms: I already answered objection by explaining that valuableness is a primitive property, like beingness.

I still think you are misunderstanding what the property of valuableness, in principle, is. It doesn’t reference how much value a thing has—only that it has value. That is the property we discussing: it is the very idea of ‘value’.

Also, I think you completely misunderstood my response (with all due respect) because you kept using ‘moral value’ throughout your response, demanding an analysis of it, when I clearly indicated it does not exist. My theory doesn’t have any notion or idea of ‘moral value’, because it is does not exist. Now, what I have not noted, is why it does not exist. If you reflect back on my definitions, you will notice that valuableness is more fundamental than goodness. Moreover, you will notice that goodness is only where a moral distinction is made: this is because morality is about what is good, not what is valuable (although valuableness is relevant insofar as it is part of the definition of goodness). Value itself has no ‘moral’ markers: it is just value. Where a ‘moral’ marker comes in, is when one denotes a specific type of value, that being intrinsic value, and this is called ‘good’ in a moral sense. I am assuming you mean to ask about an analysis of intrinsic value, and not moral value.

I’ve already outlined very clearly what I mean by the properties themselves, so I will not reiterate them here.

I think the real issue you are having, is that you don’t think intrinsic value, in the sense I am using it, exists; nor how it possibly could; nor how one could go about deciphering what has it, and to what degree.

So, let me try again. Intrinsic value is ‘value which is demanded by virtue of a thing’s nature’. The only kind of thing which can demand value, is a state because it the only kind of thing, other than a subject, that can ‘enforce’ its own value (and a subject doing so is the enforcement of value derived from subjective purposes: i.e., extrinsic value: and so it doesn’t count here).

I blundered here before, by saying, at this point in my analysis, that only states which are associated with (sufficiently) living beings: I was confusing epistemology with ontology. A state which can demand (i.e., innately insistence on having) value is one which IF it were experienced by a subject, then it would compel that subject to value it to a degree equal to its insistence; but such a state could exist, of which no current subject has the capacity to experience it. So that was my mistake, I recant that portion of my analysis.

So, how do we determine that a state has intrinsic value? By experience. No subject can know that a state demands value if they lack the representative faculties, or over-arching cognitive faculties (aka: reason), to recognize it; albeit really there. However, the epistemic window we have, for everything, is experience. We experience a state, such as pain, and it is clear (to any reasonably rational person with the proper capacities to produce pain [neurologically]) that it compels value in its avoidance. Think about, Philosophim, from your own perspective: forget your parents, forget everyone else. Imagine you are in severe pain: you are seriously telling me you cannot fathom how the state of pain compels you to value its avoidance, all else being equal? I genuinely doubt that. You may have further reservations, but I am just trying to convey the basics to you here. Now, like all other empirical studies, our knowledge of intrinsic value as an institutionalized study would be a convergence of perspectives on empirical studies of states, such that we could sufficiently conclude that certain states do compel to be valued, and to a degree equal to its force of compelment.

It is important to note, that my view, unlike yours, is not a form of moral naturalism: it is form of moral non-naturalism. I don’t hold that valuableness, and subsequently goodness, is a natural property: you can’t scientifically investigate the property, because it is supervenient on the physical constitution of entities (viz., it is supervenient on the natural properties). For example, let’s say the fair market value of a diamond is $1500: can you figure that out solely from an investigation into the diamond’s physical properties? Of course not! You have to have further knowledge of the fair market to determine such. You need to examine the diamond to acquire its physical properties, and then, in addition to those properties, understand the fair market; then, you can attribute the property of value, and specifically a quantitative value of $1500, to the diamond—and this property which is does possess is no where to be found in its physical constitution. Therefore, the property is non-natural, because natural properties are physical properties (of things).

Now, it is equally important to note that by saying we cannot scientifically investigate the value (and moral properties) of things, I am not meaning to say that it is not an empirical investigation. We come to know that what states have the ability to demand value, by (1) understanding our representative faculties (such as their limitations) and (2), if our faculties are sufficient enough, empirically investigating, by means of experiencing, the state and seeing (A) if it compels, simply from its own nature, to be valued (e.g., if I really like pizza being thrown across the room, that doesn’t make pizza being thrown across the room inrinsically valuable: whereas, whether I like it or not, being in pain, by its nature, compels me to avoid it) and (B), if so, by how much force (of compelment).

Intrinsic value is factual, because it is value which is objective; and it is objective because its value is exists mind-independently and the truth of the matter whether it exists is stance-independent.

Does that help?

This still doesn't answer what value or goodness is. This doesn't answer what good is, or how we can objectively evaluate it.

I was surprised you responded with this: you even quoted my definition which clarified this. Goodness is ‘to have value’: so how can you say I haven’t answered what goodness is? You can disagree with what I claimed it was, but you certainly can’t say I didn’t answer. Likewise with valuableness: I said it is an unanalyzable property, like beingness, which is akin to beingness. That’s an answer.

We evaluate what is good, by analyzing what has intrinsic value; and we understand what has intrinsic value, as per my explanation above, by experiencing states and determining whether the state itself compels the valuing of it.

Moral goodness? What would immoral goodness be then?

Ah, I am not intending to use ‘moral’, as the adjective here, in the sense of ‘being good’—as that is circular—but, instead, to denote a sub-type of goodness which pertains to morality.

Moreover, you asked why is intrinsic value morally good? I answered this a while back: it is because moral goodness is identical to ‘having intrinsic value’; and it is identical to it because otherwise goodness pertains to what is and not what should be.

so then a state that can have intrinsic value must be something that is alive

Two things worth noting here:

1. I have altered my understanding of states such that a state which can have intrinsic value is not only states which subjects are capable of experiencing; and

2. Even if I didn’t, it would not follow (from what I said) that alive beings are intrinsically valuable (which is what you said here). Rather, the state, which only an alive being could experience, would be intrinsically valuable.

Under your theory, its fine to destroy matter as we wish as long as it does not affect life.

Correct. This is because the states which have intrinsic value, are only possible for beings which are sufficiently alive.

If only states of life can have value, why?

No. States which are not attributable to beings that are alive can have value—it just isn’t intrinsic. — Bob Ross

There's a bit of a contradiction here. Are you trying to say, "Those with intrinsic value cannot be outright destroyed, but those with value can?" If so, once again, how do we determine value objectively?

I apologize, I read your first quote wrong in haste. Whether or not one should destroy matter which doesn’t affect a life, depends on whether it has value—irregardless of whether it is extrinsic or intrinsic. A state which cannot demand to be valued, could still have value—it would just be endowed to it by a subject (viz., it would be extrinsic value). Extrinsic value is value determined by how well a thing serves a subjective purpose. There isn’t any intrinsic value in a clock; but I nevertheless won’t destroy mine because I value it for telling the time.

No, Kant isn't confused here.

I think Kant is, but I don’t think this is very important to what I am saying. By noting that a thing has value in-itself, I am noting that it has value intrinsic to its nature. I don’t see why our dispute here matters for intents of this conversation: do you deny that we can obtain conditional knowledge of the natures of things? I doubt it.

Bob

Sounds good!

Reading through your critiques of my view of valuableness, I get the feeling you may be making the same conflation between “valuableness” and “what has value”, just like your conflation between “goodness” and “what is good”. “Valuableness” is a property, and thusly does not mention what can be predicated to have it. To evaluate whether something has the property of valuableness, is just to assess that it has worth and not how much; which is to say nothing beyond saying it has value. How much value is not something determinable from the (general) property of valuableness itself: if that were the case, then we would have to posit an infinite amount of properties to account for each value—which is clearly misguided. So, how one can determined the exact value of something, which is an ‘evaluation’ in the sense that you implied, has no bearing on whether or not the property of ‘having value’ is primitive or not because the property will necessarily, even if it could be defined, not contain a means of evaluation but rather is the mere idea of ‘worth’ in general.

Because I genuinely do not understanding what you are claiming is valuableness nor goodness; I am going to refrain on commenting on my objection that valuableness != ‘to ought to be’. Please give me a clear analysis of the following:

1. What is ‘goodness’? NOT MORAL GOODNESS
2. What is ‘moral goodness’?
3. What do you consider to be validly predicated as morally good?
4. What can be predicated as the highest moral good?
5. What is ‘valuableness’? NOT MORAL VALUABLENESS.
6. What is ‘moral valuableness’?

I will answer all 6 for mine now, to provide reciprocal clarity to my position:

1. Goodness = ‘to have value’.
2. Moral goodness = ‘to have intrinsic value’.
3. Anything which has intrinsic value—e.g., pain, pleasure, flourishing, happiness, prosperity, etc.
4. Universal flourishing.
5. This is ‘to have worth’, and this is just to reiterate ‘to have value’ with a synonym. The property itself is primitive, and unanalyzable.
6. This subdistinction within the property of valuableness does not exist.

Why should anyone care about what I insist my intrinsic value is?

Whether or not someone should care about what has intrinsic value, does not in takeaway from the fact that it has intrinsic value.

Moreover, that you insist on your own values being imposed on me, is not the same as an innate insistence from a state: the former could be the imposition of extrinsic value, whereas the latter is always the imposition of intrinsic value.

Likewise, why you should care about intrinsic value, is that it is morally good; and if you are a virtuous person of morally good character, then you will. There is nothing that forces, per se, anyone to value anything—but this does not takeaway from the fact that there are moral facts. All you are noting, by asking why anyone should care, is that people can devalue (or not value at all) facts.

A rock can have a state of being.

I wasn’t using ‘state’ this generically, but that is fine. It is fine to think of states as ‘states of being’, for all intents and purposes, and, to that, I would then clarify that the state of being that a rock has does not have intrinsic value because that state is incapable of any innate insistence/demand (of value).

Under your theory, its fine to destroy matter as we wish as long as it does not affect life.

Correct. This is because the states which have intrinsic value, are only possible for beings which are sufficiently alive.

If only states of life can have value, why?

No. States which are not attributable to beings that are alive can have value—it just isn’t intrinsic.

They do not have intrinsic value, because those states do not have the ability (innately) to compel or demand value.

Intrinsic value, is value which is demanded in virtue of the nature of the state: that is a very clear definition. It is value a thing has in-itself; which leads me to give a comment on transcendental idealism:

The chief mistake Kant made, is thinking that because a thing-in-itself is not directly experienced that it cannot be known at all—which is clearly false. Appearences, phenomena, are indirect experience of the things as they are in-themselves, and thusly give conditional knowledge of the nature (the things in-themselves) of the things. In a sentence, he is confusing absolute knowledge with things-in-themselves: no one has to concede that they have absolute knowledge of a thing-in-itself to say they have conditional knowledge of it, by way of theirs senses. Noumena, in the traditional sense before Kant butchered it, was the nature, the in-itself, as it expresses itself in appearances (phenomena): and this is more correct of a way to think about it than Kant’s way.

For example, let’s take your reasoning seriously that a thing-in-itself is unknowable because we only every directly experience a representation of it. Ok. Take an apple, for example: does it have mass in-itself? It seems like it does: every bit of evidence points to that conclusion—but, Kant will insist that we can’t absolutely know it is true, because we only have representations to go off of. That’s fine, Kant; that doesn’t takeaway from the fact that we have good conditional knowledge to claim that the apple itself, which is to immediately discuss as it is in-itself, has mass. See the conflation Kant made?

So, I have no problem analyzing the nature, the essences, of things—which you cannot do if you take your position seriously because the essence doesn’t pertain to mere appearances but, rather, what a thing’s actual properties are as it is in-itself—while conceding I have only conditional knowledge of it.

Even if you disagree, I don’t think this makes a difference for my use of value of a thing in-itself: by ‘in-itself’, I am not referring to absolute knowledge of the nature of a thing, but, rather, conditional knowledge of the nature of a thing. I doubt you deny we can evaluate the natures of things.

Which implies that healthy rational people automatically choose better states. This absolutely begs the question: "Why are healthy and rational people always able to evaluate higher value states 100% of the time?

Begging the question is when one presumes the truth of the conclusion in a premise, and that is not what is happening in your example here. Even if I were claiming that healthy and rational people always recognize intrinsic value 100% of the time (which I am not), that isn’t presupposing that my claim (conclusion), that we should think of what has intrinsic value in terms of value that a rational + healthy person would recognize in that state, is true as its own premise.

Now, I don’t think a rational + healthy person would always 100% of the time recognize that something has intrinsic value but, rather, that 99.99% of the time a rational + healthy person would behave as if it had value when put in that state—and that is what I mean by “they can only superficially deny its value”. Whether they recognize the value, cognitively their faculty of reason, is a separate question; and the answer is the vast majority probably wouldn’t conclude it has intrinsic value; because they don’t know what that means.

Bob

Great response! However, I don't think we are making any real progress, because we are having ~10 discussions about ~10 different subjects at once (:

Therefore, I would like us, if you agree, to dive into one of those subjects; and then move onto the next once we finish (and so on and so forth). I would like to leave it up to you: which major point do you want me to respond to (in depth) first?

Bob

@Corvus

(A -> B) -> (~A -> ~B) is false. "A -> B" is not biconditional implication (i.e., IFF): it means that if A is true, then you can infer B is also true.

If A is false, it is entirely possible for B to be true; because all you know is that when A is true, B is true but not that B can only be true when A is true.

To prove this, flannel jesus, you would need (A <-> B) -> (~A -> ~B).

Great discussion! Unfortunately, as I was parsing your response, I have found it to be going in too many directions for my mind to manage properly. So I have condensed it into the parts I think are most critical to our conversation (so far). Feel free to include more if I have missed something that you deem also critical. Let’s dive in.

Firstly, you demand an analysis of valuableness, and I expected no less. However, I must note that you seem to be conflating this a bit, in the way you were expressing this concern, with an analysis of intrinsic value. I was not intending to give an analysis of valuableness thus far, and am only attempting it for the first time in this discussion right not.

Valuableness in an unanalyzable, primitive property: all that can be described of it is with synonyms (e.g., ‘to be of value is to have worth’, etc.). Now, to substantiate this claim and be brief, I need to (1) demonstrate that your idea of valuableness (as identical to ‘to ought to be’) is a blunder and (2) provide an analogy to another unanalyzable, primitive property that I think you will be able to appreciate.

With respect to #1, it is obvious that valuableness is not identical to ‘to ought to be’ by way of examples (of its valid use). For example, when one says “that diamond is worth $1500”, they are not commenting on whether it should exist per se but, rather, that it has a specific, quantitative worth. In short, it is impossible to convert quantitative values to the property of ‘to ought to be’. Only after a comparison of value, can one determine which things out of the things which have value should exist and, thusly, the two properties are not identical.

With respect to #2, a great example of an unanalyzable and primitive property is ‘beingness’. It is impossible to explain ‘beingness’ without circular reference (e.g., it is ‘to exist’, it is ‘to be’, it is ‘presence’, etc.). There is simply no way to analyze ‘beingness’, and this is because it is so primitive of a property: we can only explain properties by means of other properties when they are not primitive. The primitive ones are what we use to describe the non-primitive ones, leaving us nothing but intuitions to guide us for the former. I submit to you, that ‘valuableness’ is akin to ‘beingness’. We say it is ‘to have worth’, but ‘worth’ is just a synonym for ‘value’; just like ‘being’ is synonym for ‘exist’.

If you cannot grasp, by way of intuition, what ‘beingness’ is, then I simply cannot afford any help other than to cite synonyms for it (e.g., ‘to exist’, ‘to be’, ‘presence’, etc.). Likewise, if you cannot fathom what ‘valuebleness’ is, then I simply cannot afford any help other than synonyms, like ‘it is “to have worth”’.

You find this unsatisfactory, but I urge you to think about ‘beingness’, and see if you feel the same about that property—I doubt it. If you do, then we will just have to agree to disagree on this part; being that we are disputing a primitive property, which makes the dispute very peculiar indeed.

Secondly, I don’t see it as an advantage to posit rights as relativistic. I absolutely agree that our moral principles cannot be absolute; but what it is a right, for it to be a right in the traditional sense, requires that it is irrevocable but does not require us to posit an absolute principle—e.g., the right to life is not the same as the absolute right to live nor the right to everything one needs to stay alive, but this takes nothing away from the fact that the right to life is irrevocable.

Of course, I also agree that we refurbish them; but this is not because the fact of the matter about what is a right has changed but, rather, our understanding of it.

When you relativize rights, you mask mere privileges under the name of something with much more vigor to its name.

Thirdly, you ask for evidence of intrinsic value. I have already given it, but there are some things worth clarifying:

1. You are correct that the nature of a thing demanding value is a personification: I was mistaken on that.

2. When I say a thing demands value, I mean it in the sense of innate insistence.

3. One thing I have failed to mention, is that intrinsic value is only possible for states; because nothing else can provide innate insistence on value. Thusly, to take your rock example, a rock can’t have intrinsic value, simply because it cannot innately compel whatsoever. However, the state of pain can.

4. A very legitimate concern when endeavoring on the discovery of intrinsically valuable states, is how one can safely distinguish the value of a state due to extrinsic vs. intrinsic value; and this I think you have mentioned a couple times (in different words). I answer, to your dissatisfaction, that a rational and healthy person would only be able to superficially deny its value when in that state. This does not beg the question, because I am not presupposing the truth of the conclusion in an (implicit) premise; and it is not confirmation bias because I am not saying that a person is definitely unhealthy or irrational if they deny it in a non-superficial sense: I am saying that, based off of the empirical knowledge on rational + healthy people in such states, it is sufficiently proven that they confirm the value of such states.

Fourthly, you noted the Kantian position on things-in-themselves again; and I wanted to briefly note that I deny that altogether. I think you are conflating absolute truth with things-in-themselves: the former is what you are really arguing is unobtainable (by my lights).

Fifthly:

"Goodness" is a state of reality with the embodiment of "What should be" as "What is".

“what should be” and “what is” are both not properties. You have failed to give an analysis of the property of goodness again. I am assuming, to be charitable, you mean that goodness is identical to ‘to ought to be’. If that is wrong, then please correct me.

Sixthly:

Explicated and identified Good = moral value

&

I have the answer of what a value is (what should be)

I am not following. First, I thought you were saying ‘goodness’ is ‘to ought to be’; now you seem to be agreeing with me it is ‘to have value’. You have also said

Good = "what should be"

but now are saying it is “moral value”: which is it?

Are you saying ‘to ought to be’ and ‘having value’ are identical?

Then, to make matters more confusing, you have also said that

To know what ought to be, you have to know the value of what is

: that implies you need to determine the value of a thing before you can determine whether it ought to be, but you have also indicated (above) that what is good is both ‘to have value’ and ‘to ought to be’ which indicates they are simultaneous judgments one would make.

Seventhly, morality does not boil down to the question of “should there be existence?”, nor is that a moral foundation. A moral foundation is the core of an ethical theory, and that is going to be, in any good theory, an outline of the hierarchy (i.e., the ontology) of things with intrinsic value.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

We don't exactly get to tell a hungry lion, "I have a right to life." No one is there to care.

That one has a right, is different than whether anyone else recognizes it.

Its the right of a society of 1.

A right is innate to a person, if one admits that it applies even if there is one person left: saying there is a “society of 1” is confused language for “one individual”.

But if they are societally objective, as in these rights to individuals improve and strengthen societies more than those who do not have them by fact, then there is data for one society to point to.

This gets you out of the first objection, but not the second: a right is something which cannot be violated in any circumstances. Within your idea of a right, it is something that can be taken away in various circumstances where it benefits the society (e.g., sacrificing one innocent citizen to save 1,000,000 citizens)—that is what is normally called a privilege.

I believe your real issue is that in both cases, these things are determined by societies and not any one individual

It is more than that though: if the society needs to violate one citizen’s rights to save itself, then, unless I am misunderstanding, in your view that is morally permissible (at best) and obligatory (at worst). It is not a right if it can be taken away: that’s a privilege.

How would you define a right then?

A ‘right’ is an innate and unalienable entitlement to be in (or not in) certain states (and, consequently, to be permitted [or not permitted] to perform certain actions which do not [or do] violate those entitlements).

Our difference, is that you consider entitlements to always be created by societies; whereas, I think societies create laws to uphold entitlements, of which are derived from innate features of the ‘thing’ which is entitled.

Your ‘rights’ are alienable; mine are not.

For example, it does not matter if me sacrificing you could save the entire rest of my city: you have a right to life, being that you have not forfeited that right (either voluntarily or by way of violating someone else’s rights), and I cannot violate that to save my city. Your right is unalienable: it is not something I can decide, upon the circumstances, to (validly) revoke.

You have to understand that in 'the traditional sense' we have not had an objective morality

There has never been, to my knowledge, a society which was predicated off of the use of moral anti-realism: they have always been forms of ‘objective morality’.

You may not found their versions of ‘objective morality’ compelling or true; but it is a misconstrual to think society has, by-at-large, been operating in institutionalized moral anti-realism: people are largely moral realists, and laws are derived, historically, from what has been considered moral fact.

robbing someone is generally bad because of the expected outcome.

Then, under your view, robbing someone isn’t wrong in-itself; because you are not looking at the nature of the action but, instead, looking at its consequences. I think the nature of the action demonstrates sufficiently that it is wrong to do.

True, but it must be objectively demonstrated why robbery is bad in itself. I haven't seen that yet in a way that isn't subjective.

It is wrong in-itself because it is a form of depravity and a violation of a person: that why it is generally held by people, even throughout history, as morally (factually) wrong.

More specifically, under my theory, the reason depravity and the violation of a person in this sense (of robbery) is wrong, is because it is anti-thetical to universal flourishing—which is what has the most intrinsic value.

I can objectively conclude robbing others is generally bad due to probability.

I don’t see how the probability would not be 100% that it is wrong: the nature of the crime is itself immoral. That’s like saying rape is sometimes good, because there isn’t a 100% probability of it being bad: the nature of the crime is abhorrent, irregardless of what consequences may be brought about by committing it (in each circumstance).

My overall point is that if intentions are good in themselves regardless of the outcome, then logically we can create a situation in which an intention always has a negative outcome and yet it would be considered moral.

I didn’t understand this part. An intention can be bad, and its nuanced consequences good; and vice-versa. This makes sense to me: are you contending with that?

Now, on to answering your questions about my theory.

By ‘objective value’, I am assuming you mean value which is objective; and this is not synonymous with intrinsic value per se. Any value which is objective, is just any value which exists mind-independently and the truth of the matter (whether it has such value) is stance-independent. Where intrinsic value ties in, is that it is the only possible form of ‘objective value’ because it is the only type of value which is inscribed, so to speak, on the thing per its nature: it is the only form of value that is of the thing in-itself. The only other option is extrinsic value, that it is obvious why that is not objective.

Now, my view allows for value, which is intrinsic, that is not merely an axiological judgment made by a subject: intrinsic value is embedded, superveniently, in the thing which has it. Whether or not a subject values it, is independent of the truth of the matter of whether or not it has value.

A useful way of thinking about intrinsic value, by my lights, is that the thing which has it demands recognition as valuable; and that is how one can decipher whether or not one simply values the thing because of their own (cognitive or conative) disposition, or whether it has actual value. I do not mean ‘demands’ in a personified sense.

A great example is the pain example, but I have already explicated that one; so I will leave it there.

In an abstract armchair sense of 'people will always choose the more positive state', it sounds good. In reality, people aren't like that. Many people choose the state that we we would consider less valuable.

This isn’t a contention with anything I said, and I wholly agree. Some people simply lack the cognitive ability, or the wisdom, to see that the state is better; and some are so defective or damaged that they no longer can recognize it, even though they could have earlier in their life.

Your mother is a great example (and by the way, I am sorry to hear that your parents were addicts and I hope that they both find a way to beat it!): the addiction of alchohol, like many drug addictions, is so damaging, after a long time of abuse [of it], that it negatively affects the person into yearning for it over and over again. This does not mean that the state they are in is the most valuable, nor that it has intrinsic value (in a positive or negative sense).

My point was that, in isolation, and reasonably healthy and intelligent person will not be able to deny the value of a state that has (negative or positive) intrinsic value if put in that state. Of course, if you put a defective person, a damaged person, a really cognitively impaired person, in such a state, then we would not expect them to fully grasp that state properly (due to their condition).

Now, on to your analysis of goodness.

1. Good = "what should be" A clear definition.

“Good” is not a property. Your definition needs to of the form “goodness is <insert-definition-here>”. Likewise, “what should be” is not a property. Thusly, you have not analyzed the property of goodness whatsoever in making this remark.

To be charitable, let’s just say you mean that “goodness is ‘to ought to exist’”. Ok, let’s break this down.

The first issue with this was, interestingly enough, already explicated by you:

To know what ought to be, you have to know the value of what is

If:

1. the property of goodness is not ‘being valuable’; and
2. one needs to know the value of what is to know what to predicate as ‘”oughting” to exist’; and
3. you reject the idea of intrinsic value

Then what can be predicated as good under your view is dependent on subjective dispositions because what is valuable is always extrinsic.

The second problem with this is that, on a similar note, what we determine as good is relative to what is valuable; and it seems incorrect to posit vice-versa (or something else entirely). One cannot tell what ‘should be’ without ‘what is valuable’; but, of course, I guess, depending on how you hash out the terminology, there may be a coherent way to posit ‘goodness’ as ‘to ought to be’--I just don’t see it.

The third problem is that by ‘goodness’ I am assuming you mean ‘moral goodness’ with your definition, and the property of ‘to ought to be’ is not a purely objective analysis and, consequently, your view of moral goodness is not solely about what might be objective.

With mine, on the other hand, moral goodness is ‘to have intrinsic value’, and so it is always an objective matter of dispute what is morally good; with respect to how you defined it, that is not the case. Disputes about what ought to be by means of subjective dispositions are still about what is morally good under your metaethical view of ‘goodness’.

Existence should be is logically concluded as being the most reasonable conclusion when faced with our limitations. So existence has the property of being good.

Your argument here is:

If it is most reasonable to conclude that something should exist, then it should exist.

This is not morally objective at all, because it does not reference any sort of objective value nor normativity. One can simply deny it without violating any objective value nor normativity.

On the other hand, a claim like:

If something has intrinsic value, then it should be.

This is morally objective, because what is intrinsically valuable is a matter of objective dispute; and should is entailed from value. To contrast, if I were to say:

If something has value, then it should be.

This is not expressing anything normatively objective specifically; because it entirely possible to value something extrinsically.

I don't understand what you're trying to say here. What does [than ...] mean?

I added in ‘[than ...]’ because your original formulation of ‘more existence’ doesn’t make literal sense: ‘more’ implies a comparison—so I added in a filler [than …].

Bob

:up:

Vehemently disagree, but I also have no idea how I would enunciate why. I don't think he did philosophy. I do not take Shakespeare to be a philosopher, either.
…
Nietzsche would be analogous to something more like Sunday school, in my eyes. Interesting ways to teach children fairly obviously co-operative strategies.

What books have you read of Nietzsche?

Perhaps I should elaborate more on the difference between answering "what can be considered good?" and "what is [the property of] goodness?".

When one says "this car is red", they do not mean to explain anything about the property of redness; but, rather, that the car has such a property. It is still perfectly valid to ask: "what is redness?".

When one says "more existence is good", they do not mean to explain anything about the property of goodness; but, rather, that "more existence" has such a property. It is still perfectly valid to ask: "what is goodness?".

Your theory presupposes a property of goodness, of which your analysis (so far) is the discovery of what can be predicated to have such a property, but, interestingly, doesn't give any analysis of the property itself--it is merely a presupposed, notional, property that is utilized for the rest of the analysis.

Now, instead of meaning "more existence is good" in an analogous sense to "this car is red", you may mean it as an identity relation---that 'is good' here refers to "goodness is identical to the property of 'having more existence' [or something like that]" (i.e., goodness = having more existence). I think there are good reasons to believe that goodness cannot be reduced to such a claim.

Firstly, goodness, then, would not be normative; because it only refers to whether something has or does not have 'more existence' than some other possibility. This transitions ethics into a science of what is, and not what should be.

Secondly, it doesn't seem correct that "having more existence [than ...] is to have more existence [than ...]" is identical in meaning to "to be good is to have more existence [than ...]": the latter seems to add something extra, in meaning, by denoting what is good as opposed to expressing a tautology. It is important to note that, if a property is identical to goodness, then the sentence that expresses a tautology [of the property] must be identical to a sentence that expresses the property as goodness---and this is true because they are (supposed to be) identical, which makes them interchangeable.

Just something to think about (;

Bob

I need to define society. A society occurs when there is more than one person involved.

Ok, I was using society in the sense of an institutionalized state.

Rights only come about with the interplay of the individual and societies

They are only explicated in societies. You still have a right to life even if you are the only human left.

If we are talking universal rights, yes. Because what we also must consider is the interplay between societies.

The interplay of societies doesn’t imply rights in the sense that you have set up: if the societies determine rights, then two societies which are not subsumed under another, larger society would have no way to resolve any disputes between society members of one vs. the other.

Privileges are permissions from society. Rights are restrictions on society.

If society is making up rights, then they are also permissions.

I think your main issue is that I've noted society is the one that grants rights, and you see that no different than granting privileges except by degree. The point I'm trying to make is a right is a restriction on society that provably benefits it overall. So even if a society does not grant free speech for example, it would be better overall if it did grant such a right.

Correct. A ‘right’ in the traditional sense of the word does not exist in your view; and both what you call a ‘privilege’ and a ‘right’ are subcategories of what I would call ‘privileges’.

You have removed the possibility of having rights despite what one’s society considers a right.

What do you mean 'all else being equal'? That doesn't convey anything to me in this sentence.

It means ‘excluding all other factors [than what was explicated in the sentence]’.

Right, but why was your intention bad? With my answer, its easy to understand. Lets say that 99% of attempted robberies result in harm. Just because this 1% resulted in something good, doesn't suddenly make attempting to rob people a good intention. This is about expected results.

It is bad because it violates a general moral principle that robbery is (generally) wrong. It is generally wrong, because it is morally bad, when analyzed in isolation, to rob someone. Why this is the case will depend on the ethical theory in play.

It isn’t about what one expects to happen if people start robbing by-at-large per se, although that is relevant too, but, rather, about whether or not robbery is bad in-itself. If robbery is bad in-itself, then an intention to do it is bad.

When they get angry and explain that it is also an insult, I insist that I will continue to the use the word as my principle demands that I use 'sir' when talking to people

This is just a conflation of words, and not an absurd insistence on one’s duty to a principle. The principle would be ‘one should be polite’, not ‘one should say the word ‘sir’, specifically in English’.

Without outcomes to measure intentions, there's nothing to back 'what is virtuous' besides subjective op
inion

What backs it is if the action is virtuous or not. Whether it is virtuous depends on moral principles.

I admit to a little confusion. How is pointing out "The Good" missing an analysis of The Good?

“The Good” refers to what can be predicated to be good (i.e., what has the property of goodness) in a supreme and ultimate sense (viz., the highest good); whereas ‘goodness’ is the property being predicated to “The Good”.

When you say “existence is good”, you are saying “one can validly predicate ‘existence’ with the property of ‘goodness’”. It is still an entirely valid question to ask: “what is ‘goodness’?”.

The Good and goodness are not the same thing.

To be objective, you need a solid foundation. What is objective value? What determines value?

Not at all. To be objective, is to exist mind-independently. Goodness is identical to ‘having value’ because that is, at its core, what the ‘being good’ is about. An easy way to demonstrate this, is to think of what ethics, axiology, and pragmatism would be if it had nothing to do with value: it would be merely about what is and not what ought to be—and this is a fundamental shift from what the studies traditionally are about.

“Objective value” is just intrinsic value; for it is the only type of value which a thing can have in-itself. The other option is extrinsic value, and this is not itself objective.

If I'm going to get surgery, feeling the pain from the knife serves no purpose at that point.

The point is that, all else being equal, avoiding pain has value in-itself.

But this is not intrinsic value, but extrinsic value. If something motivates you to do something that is good, it is good in virtue of its ultimate outcome, not good merely in itself.

The value is intrinsic, because it is value a thing has in-itself. Another way to describe it, is that intrinsic value is value which if a thing has it will be value demanded solely due to its nature.

The fact that someone can be motivated to value or not value it, is not relevant itself to whether the thing demands to be value because it has intrinsic worth.

Why is flourishing valuable?

It is intrinsically valuable, because, as per its nature, it demands value. Which can be easily understood when one is in such a state.

My mother desires pleasure far more than flourishing.

Flourishing has more intrinsic value than pleasure, and this can be demonstrated with a hypothetical.

Imagine two states that your mother could be in. The first is constant pleasure obtained by being an alcoholic. The second is a persistent state of flourishing, happiness, and prosperity.

She may say, without being put in both states (to compare), that she prefers the first; but really, the second is better. And she would realize that if she were put in the second.

Are we saying my mother determines value? Or is there a value beyond a person's personal desires? If so, what objectively determines that value?

Intrinsic value is objective. She does not determine whether or not a state of flourishing has intrinsic value nor how much.

How is it undeniable? Where is the proof?

It is impossible to non-superficially deny the value of a state that has intrinsic value when they are in that state: it is, of course, easy to say when not in the state.

That's a fine opinion, but not an objective argument.

I don’t see how it isn’t an objective argument; insofar as the argument demonstrates (to my satisfaction) that morality is objective, and The Good is universal flourishing.

There are a lot of assumptions here that need clear answers.

In a trivial sense, of course. I can’t write an 800 page book as my response (:

Besides that, what assumptions?

My question is what is objective value, and why is flourishing part of that objective value?

“Objective value” is another phrase for ‘intrinsically valuable’; and flourishing has intrinsic value because the state demands to be valued in virtue of its nature, and this is hard to demonstrate if you haven’t experienced it—this is an empirical claim, and not something abstract.

Of course, because your criteria for goodness is mutual flourishing.

No. Goodness is not ‘mutual flourishing’, let alone ‘flourishing’. Goodness is the property of ‘having value’.

Well done Bob, I'm enjoying digging into these ideas.

You too, my friend!

Bob

A 'right' would be a limitation on society that has been deemed to be of greater benefit for the individual to have for the benefit of society

Under your definition, then, people who are not a part of a society do not have the right to life nor bodily autonomy.

I would say that rights are innate. It is a mistake to think of rights as relative to societies, because they are then subject to the whims of the society and not subject to what is good (morals).

It may be for the benefit of one society to persecute and enslave outside members, whether they be a member of another society or not, and I would say that this still violates their rights.

Also, I would consider your definition to be a form of privileges, because it makes no difference to me if society is constraining themselves from doing something to the individual or allowing the individual to do things—and, as a matter of fact, they sound like essentially the same thing: an allowance requires others to constrain themselves insofar as they cannot violate what has been allowed.

Everyone is someone's son/daughter. How many parents would want justice or revenge? Society runs on trust.

This is a perfectly fair point, and I see why you would conclude this in your theory. I think that, still your view also agrees (along with what you said here above) that all else being equal it is better to save the 5 by sacrificing the 1. I don’t think we are going to progress anywhere on this point, but it was worth mentioning that the two claims are perfectly compatible with each other.

Why is the intention, not the result, good? Can this be proven?

I agree that results (consequences) can be good or bad, as I am not a deontologist, but the point is that intentions are also either good or bad. Whether the intention is good or bad is completely despite any consequences that my be brought about.

For example, if I intend to rob someone and end up accidentally saving their life, then my intention was bad and the consequences of my actions was good. If one is only evaluating how good or bad intentions are relative to the consequences (actualizing it) brings about, then there is no room to declare the intention bad in this case: the intention of robbing them was good. This is obviously wrong.

The intentions and consequences matter; hence why I am not a consequentialist nor a deontologist.

I have a hunch that you do not mean ‘consequentialism’ in the traditional sense of the term, and probably agree with me on these points.

They have a choice to torture or not torture Billy; but the reason Dave should not torture billy is certainly should not be relative to what else they could be doing — Bob Ross

Under this theory, it certainly is. Can you explain in this moral theory why its not?

If whether it is immoral to torture billy is undefined without explicating all possible skills Dave could be acquiring instead, then something is very wrong with your theory.

Honestly, I am not going to go into detail, because I think you simply aren’t appreciating what ‘excluding all other variables’ means.

The word 'seeming' implies its an inductive reason.

A seeming is not an induction, and seeming is a grasping of something. It could seem to be correct to induce or abduce X, but the seeming is not identical to the induction or abduction itself.

I don't think there's any 'seeming' to it. 1+3=1 is just objectively wrong. This phrase seems confusing at best and unnecessary at worst. Is there anything this phrase serves that cannot be conveyed using common language?

The difference between an ‘intellectual seeming’ and ‘feeling’ serves the purpose of distinguishing a cognitive grasping of something vs. having a particular feeling towards it.

Let’s take a different example that may suffice to elaborate. Imagine you get up in the morning, walk into the bathroom, and start brushing your teeth. The question pops into your head: “am I in a simulation?”. You conclude: “Nah, it seems like, given my experience and knowledge, I am not in a simulation, although it is actually and logically possible.”. This abduction is your reasoning, sherlock-holmes style, about the information you have that makes you conclude that your aren’t in a simulation; and the seeming is that you find the abduction valid and correct: it seems right that this abduction demonstrates that you are not in a simulation.

EDIT:

Silly me forgot to completely convey the point. Imagine that I added to the hypothetical that you really wanted to be in a simulation: would that change that it seems to you that you are not in one? Of course not.

Oh, please do! I understand the respect here, and yes, feel free to give your own moral conclusions and why you believe they are objectively true.

I shall indulge myself then, and briefly explain my theory and apply to an example.

Firstly, when analyzing morals, it is chiefly important to understand the an analysis of ‘what is good’ is split into two main subsections: (1) an analysis of the nature [of the property of] goodness, and (2) what can be predicated to be good. Most people skip #1 and go straight to #2, it causes all sorts of problems.

For example, I, with all due respect, consider your theory to be making such a mistake (of skipping #1): when you declare, even if I were to grant it as true, that “existence is good”, I do not take you to mean that “[the property of] goodness is identical to [the property of] beingness” but, rather, that “what can be predicated as good, in a supreme and ultimate sense, and of which all other ‘things’ which could be predicated as good are good, is existence [or, if you like, more existence]”. Such a statement says nothing about what goodness actually is, but rather what can be said to ultimately be good. Your is missing an analysis of the nature of goodness: it only covers, at best, The Good.

For me, I will briefly say that goodness, in my theory, is identical to ‘having value’ and moral goodness is identical to ‘having intrinsic value’. I will leave out the details on why for now.

‘What is good’ in the sense of ‘what can be predicated as being good?’, in my theory, is thusly identical to asking “what can be predicated as being intrinsically valuable?”. To answer, I am required to give an analysis of intrinsic value.

To keep things brief, I consider ‘intrinsic value’ to be value which is demanded by the ‘thing’ in virtue of its nature: it is value which can be ignored or denied, but only superficially. A great example (to initially convey the point) is pain: pain has intrinsic value (in the sense of avoiding it) insofar as one can superficially say or feel that “avoiding pain is not valuable” but when put in a state of serious pain it is undeniable that it there is value (all else being equal) in avoiding it . It is hard, in an active state of pain, to actually believe that the avoidance of it has no value: this kind of demand from the nature of the ‘thing’ is what I mean by ‘intrinsic value’. Now, it is common to take the analogy too far, and conclude that pleasure and pain are themselves, beings intrinsically valuable, are The Good: this is a mistake. There are states which demand more value which, if grasped by the person, can lead one to overcome (some or even all) pain or pleasure to acquire it; and the end result is far better than mere avoidance of pain and pursuit of pleasure. An easy example of this is Aristotle’s eudamonia (i.e., ‘flourshing’ or ‘happiness’, as roughly translated): for one to truly flourish, they must overcome and even volunteer to be in pain or give up pleasure. This state is, when properly understood, more demanding of value in the sense that it, when compared to other states (such as a state of pain), is even more difficult to deny the value of it (over other states [such as a state of pain or pleasure]). A person can easily say “this pleasure I am currently having, albeit it fleeting and swift, is more valuable than a state of supreme flourishing”, but if that person were put in such a state of (supreme) flourishing (viz., they had a deep sense of fullfilment, their goals were being realized, they were optimally mentally and physically healthy, they had loving relationships with others, etc.) then it is hard to imagine, if that person has reasonably sufficient cognitive capacities, they could genuinely deny its superior value (over that pain or pleasure): if they did, then it would be very superficial of a denial indeed. Now, although eudamonia (i.e., ‘flourishing’ or ‘happiness’) is intrinsically valuable, it is not The Good. Just like how it may be hard to understand how more demanding (of value) flourishing is over pursuing pleasure but, nevertheless, if one were placed in such a state their denial (of the supremacy of such a state) would be superficial, so it is when one who is taken out of a state of flourishing and put in situation wherein there are mutually, harmonized flourishing between subjects. For example, if one who has achieved an optimal state of flourishing must relinquish or sacrifice some of it, or even most of it, to help them and another achieve mutually beneficial flourishing, then this will be an undeniably better state than the first. One can deny it, but have a person who was alone in their flourishing achieve mutual flourishing with another, and this achieved state will demand recognition as better than the first—any denial of it is superficial. In fact, one can abstract these movements of reason, as exemplified in my examples, until they get to one supreme state (of which nothing can be demanded with more vigor): universal flourishing.

The Good, in my theory, is thusly universal flourishing (which relates very closely to universal harmony).

This theory, since it posits the The Good as universal flourishing, is not subjective: whether or not a ‘thing’ is flourishing is not stance-dependent—it is not dependent on conative nor cognitive dispositions. There is a fact of the matter, and we can investigate and acquire these facts because moral judgments are cognitive and some are true. Therefore, this is a form of moral realism.

Let’s take the Dave example to illustrate one difference between our views. In your view, whether or not it is immoral to torture Billy to acquire the skill of torturing is undefined; in mine, it is immoral, because torturing a person for the sake of acquiring a skill does not uphold nor progress towards a state of mutual flourishing between them.

This is getting long, so I will stop here (;

Bob

Sure, nietzsche didn't have a degree in philosophy; but he was still very much a philosopher, and one of the most influential, just like plato, aristotle, etc.

I am inclined to agree that most people out-grow his view in a holistic sense; but so did everyone out-grow kantianism. There are still, in both views, some positions (that each took) that seem very true and accurate.

Likewise, I do think Nietzschien thought is found deeply rooted in post-modern thinking, and is the culprit for most of (what I would consider) radical political views. The core of his views have become the norm now, and it is disheartening.

Nietzschien thought is NOT an affirmation of nihilism, as you seem to suggest in your OP, but, rather, an (alleged) antidote to nihilism. Nietzsche hates nihilism, and associates it with pretty much every major philosophical movement ever created--e.g., he thought Christians are closeted nihilists.

If I had to summarize Nietzsche's works, then it would be that Nietzsche anticipated the slow, inevitable poisoning of society with nihilism due to the "death" of God; and his works are a wrestling with and overcome of that poison.

Thus Spoke Zarathustra is what Nietzsche considered to be the new bible: Zarathustra is supposed to be analogous to Jesus insofar as he has the ("divine") prophetic message (a gift) to give us. It's no coincidence that the story is riddled with religious, especially biblical, references and allusions (e.g., it is not a coincidence that Zarathustra descends down to earth's surface to give his gift to mankind).

The point of the book is to outline the Ubermensch, which is the ideal man in Nietzsche's thought that has completely overcome nihilism. The Ubermensch is the sublimation of slave and master that affirms life to such an extreme that they would live their life as an eternal reoccurrance. The Ubermensch is completely self-reliant, and is a law-maker and law-obeyer.

Your observation that Nietzsche's work has similarities to stoicism is understandable, but it is worth noting that stoicism is not compatible with his view; for Nietzsche considered the Ubermensch to be driven completely by passions, and not reason. Honestly, though, I drew the same kind of links to stoicism that you did, because Nietzsche often references principles of self-reliance that can be found (at least a little bit) in stoicism.

Although I disagree with Nietzsche on many things, I think his chief contribution is his work on self-development and self-reliance.

I apologize: I missed this response!

What will we take to be a sufficient and adequate explanation of a given phenomenon?

Exactly what is sufficient in order to explain something has a hint of subjectivity to it; but, generally, I would say that the explanation is sufficient if it has ample evidence supporting, and it explains the full range of questions that could be asked of it. Of course, we may bicker about what exactly constitutes ‘ample evidence’ and ‘evidence’, but generally I think that is what we mean.

I'll give an example: let's suppose there is a storm.

You are absolutely spot on with your anticipation of my responses: I would say that the explanation of why there even is a water cycle is going to be akin to the explanation of how a storm works.

Now this explanation either proceeds on infinitely, or it has a starting point. If it proceeds infinitely, I am inclined to regard that as a most unparsimonious account of reality

So, upon reading this, I am not so sure I am really a naturalist in the full, ontological sense of the term; but perhaps just a methodological naturalist. As I don’t find any good reasons to believe that causality is finite nor infinite; and I certainly don’t think that we understand exactly, even in terms of naturalism, what the most primitive, fundamental natural entities are.

I find that a lot of the metaphysics around it on both sides is just pure speculation—analysis deprived of empirical content.

The final and proper naturalism, which would have the answers you are seeking here, would only be the final result of the meticulous expedition and analysis of reality (if that is even possible for us to do).

My point with the OP is that it seems like naturalism is a better choice because it seems, so far, to explain everything more than adequately; and if there isn’t anything demanding the need to posit something supernatural, then why do it?

Okay, as in plants, animals, people, rocks, and so on and so on, these are the natural members correct? Tell me again how laws fit into that ontology?
…
I don't think laws can be derivative of natural things, otherwise they would be ordered by the natural things not the other way around, right?

By ‘things’, I would not referring to objects but, rather, just generic ‘entities’. Laws are ‘entities’ in this sense.

If I were to indulge myself by coming up with a complete (ontological) naturalism, then I would probably say that some Law is supreme, and all other laws derive from it, kind of like Platonism but without the supersensible abstract object realm, and so, you are absolutely right that, laws are more fundamental than objects.

The problem with indulging myself like that, is twofold: (1) as already noted, it is too speculative (since we do not have any sufficient empirical content to analysis it with) and (2) nature has proven, time and time again, to behave really weirdly (as a giant web of inter-relations) of which our mathematical and physical models only do just that...provide a map of the territory.

Bob

Although you have not responded yet to my question, I decided to just respond.

I will note that, if you are a moral particularist, then we will have to pause our discussion, discuss that, and then resume: it will remove the possibility of positing standard ethical thought experiments. I am assuming that we are both moral generalists for this response.

I also want to note that I try my best, although I know you claim I am straw manning your position, to use your terminology when I can; but I will not refrain from importing terms when I think your schema is lacking for purposes of conveying a point. For example, I refuse to use the term ‘identities’ to refer to what you clearly mean as ‘concrete entities’: you simply are using a more ambiguous word here than me (which is completely your prerogative to do so).

Firstly, is ‘one must sacrifice the one to save the five’ a general moral principle under your view? You say not, I say it is. Going back over the comments, I do have to concede that I was mistaken in thinking we were completely congruent on this point. in this comment, you partially accepted it; but disaffirmed it when one considers societal factors:

If we are not considering the complexities of human society, then yes. Let me clarify. Lets replace the human beings on the table with lizards. Lizards don't care about one another, and they don't form societies. No question-dissect the first lizard and save the others if there was no chance of failure or complications. Recall earlier when talking about moral issues that scope can go up or down by one. The next scope after individual human beings is society. While killing the one innocent person against their will to save five others might seem fine outside of society, how would that affect society?

With lizards, as well as everything else considered in isolation, it is true (and I think you agree with me on this) that ‘one must sacrifice the one to save the five’; for it plainly follows that saving the five contributes (total net) more potential and actual concrete entities than sparing the one at the cost of the five.

Where you begin to disagree, and correct me if I am wrong, is when it comes to humans specifically because they are a part of a society and that society cannot function properly if there is no reassurance of at least basic rights.

I would remark multiple things:

1. I don’t see how sacrificing one to save five, even if it were institutionalized, would result in overall less potential and actual concrete entities; and so I think you are miscalculating by your own theory’s standards.

2. If I were to grant that when one includes society into the calculations that it maximizes potential and actual concrete entities, then it does not (still) follow from that that people should be granted rights. An easy example is if we were to change the thought experiment from 1 vs. 5 to 1 vs. 1,000,000: sacrificing the one now, even when considering society, maximizes potential and actual concrete entities, and this would violate that person’s rights. So rights are not something you can adequately account for, as legitimate, in your ethical theory. Remember, rights are not privileges: they cannot be rightly refused or violated.

3. So, if #2 is right, then your justification only gets us to privileges; and the privilege of ‘being alive’ is, apparently, unless you deny the 1 vs. 1,000,000 example, only valid when the disparity between the number of people sacrificable and the number savable is small (enough). Then, we loop back to #1: it doesn’t seem to help maximize potential and actual concrete entities by having society have fake rights.

Secondly,

Its the consequence of having the intention that makes the intention valuable, not simply the fact of having the intention itself

I completely disagree. The intention is valuable if the intention is for doing good: it does not matter if the foreseeable or actual consequences when actualizing the intention turn out to be good.

An example may suffice to explain the difference between our views here: imagine I intent to help a person who is choking, and I end up, in actuality, contributing (on accident) to their suffocation (and death).

In your expounded view of intentions, the intention is only good IFF its consequences bring about maximal (or sufficient) good (which is, in your case, potential and actual concrete entities). This means that my intention here was bad.

On the other hand in my (and a deontologist’s) view of intentions, the intention is only good IFF it is about duty towards what is good; and this means that my intention in the example was good.

I think you may be thinking about deontology a bit wrong in this part:

And I currently don't see in any possible objective attempt at arguing for duties and principles that there would not be some objective consequence, or outcome, that is behind the objective reason for holding them

Consequences can inform intentions, but the intention is not good or bad, in deontology, due to the consequences its actualization brings about.

I am expecting, based off of that quote, for you to respond to my example (above) with something along the lines of: the intention is good because it is meaning to perform an action which would, if it actualized correctly, produce more potential and actual concrete entities. This kind of answer is false if you are a pure consequentialist, because the intention cannot be good if its consequences are bad and one is must analyze its worth relative to its consequences.

Thirdly:

I'm asking you what the person could do except torture Billy, and you tell me they have a choice. But then in the following you say its a question of whether they should or should not torture Billy.

They have a choice to torture or not torture Billy; but the reason Dave should not torture billy is certainly should not be relative to what else they could be doing. If it is under your view, then you are conceding that it is not immoral, excluding all other factors, to torture someone for the sake of acquiring the skill of torture. Philosophim, you cannot have the cake and eat it too.

Also, there’s no contradiction in what I said: I did not, in what you quoted of me, say that Dave has no choice but to torture Billy and has a choice to. I simply never indicated that; instead, I indicated that you should exclude from consideration the other possible skill Dave could accomplish instead of the skill of torture.

Fourthly:

“Also, once again, you're claiming things I have never stated nor implied. I have never claimed the means justify the ends. This is once again a contextual existential evaluation theory of morality. My theory claims, "The means are part of the ends." You need to analyze everything.”

I apologize, that was supposed to say “the end justifies the means”, and you are certainly affirming that. It is not a straw man, but simply follows from what you have said. The end is ‘maximizing potential and actual concrete entities’ and the means is whatever is needed to achieve it. If it maximizes the good, then it is the right thing to do under your view; since it is consequentialist.

Fifthly:

There was an interesting question you asked of (essentially): why are these competing moral realist theories, of which I have been citing and using as a part of my critiques, objectively correct, as opposed to yours, pertaining to the various conclusions I have outsourced therefrom?

Two things. Firstly, I mention that most moral realists disagree fervently about some of your conclusions, and so does the vast majority of the west (at least), simply to demonstrate that it goes completely against the predominant moral intuitions. this does not mean that your conclusions are false. Secondly, I say, and many others, that some of your conclusions are objectively wrong because they are incoherent with the moral facts. However, I cannot substantiate this claim without importing my own ethical (moral realist) theory—so I refrain for now, unless you want me to.

Sixthly:

I fully accept that there is a desire to say its immoral

It is not a desire, it is an intellectual seeming. — Bob Ross

Without a rationale, I don't see the difference.

A desire, a gut-feeling, an emotion, is conative and unreliable; whereas an intellectual seeming is cognitive and reliable.

I can feel very strongly that 1+3=1, but, upon intellectually grasping the proposition ‘1+3=1’ (which requires me to contemplate it as unbiased as possible), it does not (intellectually) seem right that 1+3=1; in fact, it seems perfectly right that 1+3 != 1. I can still feel, upon understanding it is false, as though it is right, because my emotions have not wavered, but that doesn’t make it right.

A gut-feeling, a desire, etc., is not reliable because it is emotion based—not rationality based.

Bob

So understand better your response, I would like to ask a quick question: are you a moral particularist?

I think it is best we agree to disagree at this point; as anything else I say will be a reiteration. Your very question is logically contradictory on a couple fronts (i.e., [1] you concede it is infinite in "what caused there to be an infinite set of all causes?" and then turn around and say it is finite; and [2] you are asking presupposing that a cause could exist which is not a member of a set of all causes).

If you are being logically consistent, you will need to ask "what caused there to be an infinite set of some causes?": that's all that can be afforded to your position without conceding the truth of a logical contradiction.

Seems contradictory to me to say that the same Nature is both orderly and disorderly

That's not what I claimed. Nature has elements of order and disorder.

Does naturalism explain the phenomena it purports to?

Yes, but so does all metaphysical theories per se. The question is whether or not it succeeds in explaining sufficiently phenomena in general. I would say so--obviously, that is a contentious claim.

what does naturalism say requires an explanation

All phenomena--i.e., appearances--of which we experience. Every metaphysical theory, if it is robust, will claim to have a good framework for explaining all phenomena (in general) or all explainable phenomena (in general).

and does naturalism succeed at explaining what it says requires explaining?

I think so.

Similarly, would you mind expounding the Naturalism Thesis?

I would say the thesis of naturalism is that everything in reality is natural. By 'natural', some mean 'capable of scientific investigation'; however, for me, I mean 'a member of nature'.

The idea is that the phenomena which we all experience is best explained by appeal to natural entities--i.e., entities that are members of nature--and nothing else. The Nature with which we are all well acquainted, can be extended to all of reality.

it seems to me that if we talk about laws, we must talk about a lawgiver, although you seem to disagree with this.

Correct. I don't see how a 'law' presupposes an agent which created it. It seems perfectly plausible that 'laws' are behavioral patterns of how things relate to one another, and perhaps they are fundamental or derivates of other natural things.

I don't see anything incoherent with positing that some of nature is orderly, and some may not be.

The toe is not a 'life' but composed of several cellular lives. Same with the foot. The consciousness of the brain is the combination of cellular lives that creates something more than just a mere coexistence of life, but a mind.

I was referring to a person by ‘life’, not something that is merely alive.

I fully accept that there is a desire to say its immoral

It is not a desire, it is an intellectual seeming.

It would be helpful if you could explain why its immoral either within the theory, or somehow contradicts the theory.

As internal coherence goes, it is sound: no question there.

As external coherence goes, even within moral realist circles, it goes against common intuitions—and I mean that in the sense of an intellectual seeming, not a desire or gut-feeling. Most moral realists will completely disagree with you that it is morally good to, all else being equal, sacrifice the one for the many (even though it would increase the actual and potential concrete entities).

Since we have no objective means of morality to measure, any outside subjective opinion of its immorality can be considered, but ultimately boils down to an opinion.

That is irrelevant to my external critique: I am saying that it is objectively wrong to sacrifice one for the many, all else being equal. I am outsourcing (i.e., comparing with) another form of moral realism, as well as claiming most forms of moral realism agree with it (on this specific point).

But this is not a principle according to this theory.

You affirmed it in your justification: you said you should absolutely sacrifice the one to save the many because it increases, all else being equal, potential and actual concrete entities (e.g., cut of the arm to save the body); and I am absolutely inclined to agree with you that your theory would need to conclude this.

The outcome of the example is based on particular circumstances and context.

With all due respect, I don’t think you know what ‘all else being equal’ means. Here’s a link to a blog post about it.

In a theoretically objective morality, consequentialism is the only real conclusion.

Absolutely not. If you affirm this, then you are disregarding duty and principles—which are entirely deontological.

To have a good moral realist theory, or any ethical theory at that, one needs a little bit of both. Personally, I am a virtue ethicist: I don’t affirm consequentialism nor deontology.

Some actions are wrong merely because they violate an ethical principle, and not because the action’s consequences do not maximize what is good. That one should not, all else being equal, sacrifice one person to save 1000 people is wholly because one has a duty towards upholding a person’s rights, being an object of respect, and nothing to do with whether or not the action would or would not produce, as a consequent, more good.

According to deontology, the intention is what determines if the action is good, and not the consequences of the action; according to consequentialism, it is the contrary.

If true and reasoned through correctly, there should be a clear right or wrong answer.

This is perfectly correct within moral realism; but has nothing to do with consequentialism directly. That there is a right or wrong answer—independent of tastes, desires, preferences, dispositions, etc.—is because morality is objective and NOT because one should determine what is right or wrong relative to the consequences that an action (reasonably) would produce.

Can you imagine an objective morality that is not consequentialist?

Yes, many. Kantianism, Aristotelianism, mine, etc.

The problem with consequentialism is that it makes the evaluation of right and wrong solely a matter of analyzing the consequences of actions; which precludes intentions, duty, principles, etc.

Likewise, it has absurd results in some cases (e.g., utilitarianism’s enslavement of 1% of the population, sacrificing one for the many, etc.).

As a very clean example, take the 1 vs. 5 trolly problem (we discussed before). A consequentalist is usually inclined to say “sacrifice the one for the five”; and a deontoligist is inclined usually to say “do not pull the lever”.

The consequentialist only is thinking about the consequences of the action of pulling the lever in terms of maximizing what is good; the deontologist is thinking about their duties to moral principles, and how best to uphold them.

A conseqeuentalist will usually say something like “one should sacrifice the one for the five because it increases <well-being, concrete entities, etc.> overall”; whereas the deontologist will usually say something like “one should not pull the lever and let the five die, because they have a duty to respect persons and they would be violating the one person’s rights by sacrificing them for the five”.

Personally, I am neither: I am a virtue ethicist. I am inclined, in the 1 vs. 5 trolley problem to side with the deontologists.

Ok, this means that Dave could not have been doing anything else but torturing.

This is so irrelevant. The question is if Dave is right to torture Billy to acquire the skill of torturing. You are misunderstanding what ‘all else being equal’ is and constantly sidestepping the hypothetical by importing new variables that don’t matter.

By positing that Dave could have been doing something even better by acquiring a different skill is to completely sidestep the hypothetical; and is no different than adding into the 1 vs. 5 trolly problem that one should not pull the lever because the 1 is a convicted rapist: that wasn’t in the hypothetical when it was presented, and ‘all else being equal’ indicates you need to refrain from injecting new variables into it.

What is the choice the person has Bob?

The choice is whether or not to torture Billy to acquire a new skill (of torturing people aptly). Obviously, the hypothetical never postulates that Dave has to torture Billy; which is the conflation you have now made.

Correct. My problem here is we can imagine alternative things the person could do to improve themselves besides torturing.

Please see the link I attached for more information on “all else being equal”. Asking what alternative things the person could be doing in this example, is the exact same thing as asking how else one could save the 5 other than by pulling the lever in the trolley example.

Wouldn't society have been better off if the kind enacted policies which grew and supported people?

No (if I view it through the lens of your theory). — Bob Ross

You're going to have to explain this in more detail.

If only what is good is to maximize the number of concrete entities, then it will not always pan out such that societies which enact such policies (as you described) are morally better.

Like I already said, the optimal society for you is a totalitarian regime that forces people to contribute maximally to the creation of concrete entities.

s I'm quite sure we can imagine a scenario, or even find one in history, where a monarchy was overall more prosperous to its people, rights, and culture than a particular republic elsewhere in the world.

Not at all. My point was that there have been, and theoretically could be, monarchies that produce total net more concrete entities than republics: it is not apparent at all how a republic, all else being equal, would be the best society under your view.

The point is that you are just thinking about it in terms of “the means justifies the ends”; and you have too, since you have committed yourself to consequentialism. I reject it.

Happy Easter by the way! Whether you celebrate it or not, I hope the holiday treats you well. I may be slow in replies this week.

You too, my friend! I hope you enjoy the holiday!

:roll:

I am addressing the argument. Your OP has to demonstrate that every logical possibility, not actual possibility, leads to a first cause; and this means that if reality is an infinite set of all causes that that must also logically necessitate a first cause (still). However, it cannot have a first cause if one understands properly what an infinite set of all causes is. It is logically necessary that it does not have a first cause, ironically.

Thusly, it is not logically necessary that there is a first cause.

The second you say that C is not the entire end to the chain of causality, is the second you conflate C with something else. C is the series of causes in total, so, by definition, you cannot be correct in that there is a cause which is not a member of C.

The point is that cannot prove, in principle, that the dew which affected the fleece (and nothing else that day) was a direct result of a divine, ultimate creator.

Either way, yes, I would be inclined to say that there is a natural explanation for it; whatever it may be; for we there have been many examples similar to this that were explained naturalistically.

For example, on some steep hills a car will naturally roll up the hill. Now, just like the dew example, you could ask "do you really believe that the natural phenomena of gravity would cause the car to go up?". This line of questioning is just incredibly flawed: you are relying on an argument from ignorance.

I would view it as an intricate web of relations of things; so, yes, there are the relations and there are the things. I don't see what the puzzle is though: what about what I am saying leads to nature being its own negation?

I think what makes a miracle evidence for the supernatural would be that it displays a certain type of intentionality. If a new, bright star appeared in the sky out of nowhere, defying all our theories of star formation, we would not tend to think of this as necessarily miraculous. It would be a confusing new natural phenomena.

If several new stars appeared in the sky spelling out "Allah is the Greatest," we would almost certainly take this as miraculous. To me, the difference seems to be the intentionality and the fact that it seems directed towards us for some purpose.

This is a good thought; and, upon reflection, I agree. @Leontiskos, let me refurbish my earlier statement: a phenomena that consistently or demonstrably violates the laws of nature in a manner that indicates divine intentionality should be considered supernatural, all else being equal.

If some thing in the world can be fully explained in terms of some other things, then we are able to remove that thing as a sort of ontologically basic entity (making the system more parsimonious).

I see, and agree. So, it seems like epistemic parsimony is about concepts, and ontological parsimony is about (concrete) entities.

But current forms of naturalism have a great many "brute facts." The more brute facts you have, the more ontologically basic things you have.

I think I see where you are going. Theism, being that it posits one supreme entity, is the ultimate ontology, allegedly, because it is monistic; whereas, allegedly, naturalism is pluralistic. Correct?

I don’t think an ontology is more parsimonious all else NOT being equal just because it is a form of monism, would be my reply. Since we start out with natural entities, which both theists and atheists have to ontologically posit, it seems more ontologically parsimonious to go with naturalism IF it can all be sufficiently explained that way—even if it has more brute facts than theism.

For example, imagine, to take your example, there are five basic atoms which everything is ontologically reducible to. Imagine a theist says “this ‘atomic five theory’ doesn’t account for miracles”, and we need to posit God to explain them. IF the ‘atomic five’ naturalist can explain sufficiently such “miracles” under their theory, then it seems, to me, to be more ontologically parsimonious, even though God would provide a form of monism whereas ‘atomic five theory’ does not because the latter doesn’t have to posit a whole new category of entities.

It's just hard to take you seriously when you compare this rain example or your jumping jacks example to Gideon. It's like you're not even trying. The irony is that Gideon's grasp of "naturalism" is more keen than your own.

Testing whether something is a banana by doing jumping jacks is analogous to testing whether something is God by asking it to put/remove dew from a mat.

If you disagree, then please demonstrate why the analogy does not hold: hurling unsubstantive insults does not help further the conversation. I am after truth—and only truth.

If naturalism is true then there must be counterfactuals which would demonstrate the supernatural, else the thesis of naturalism is entirely vacuous and unfalsifiable

I already conceded with amendment to my position in my previous post. I already conceded I was using naturalism too liberally. In principle, if a phenomena is seemingly violating the laws of nature; then, prima facie, all else being equal, that counts in favor of supernaturalism.

however, if these laws are just nature or a part of nature, it is difficult to see how they could order nature

The problem with your assessment is that you have encapsulated nature into one entity, ‘nature’, which includes such laws, and then immediately denied that the laws are a part of that one entity.

For instance, if there is a shovel buried in the ground, and I was like, "I need that shovel to dig a hole here" and you said to me "well just use that shovel to dig it out" then I would be puzzled, it cannot be used for the task that we have appointed to it because it is embedded in that which we are trying to apply it to.

I am not sure I entirely followed this analogy, other than that nature cannot arrange herself. I would say nature can, but I am not saying that there is an entity which modifies itself (like a human organism can do to itself); rather, I mean that the laws are in the whole, which is nature; and they have some jurisdiction over some aspects of nature.

A part of nature: in the case of naturalism, it would have to be. The telos would have be a part of how nature functions, as a whole.

I think I may be being a bit too liberal in my assessment of naturalism: I am starting off, conceptually, too entrenched in naturalism to fully appreciate supernaturalism.

I think that if there were phenomena which reasonably could not be explained with our knowledge of the natural order, in the sense that it was consistently violating the laws of nature and there was no good naturalistic explanation, then that would, prima facie, all else being equal, count in favor of supernaturalism. I think I have to concede that, in order not to beg the question.

However, I think that the reason I am so inclined to view phenomena in the light of naturalistic events, and thusly say things like "violations of the laws of nature are really violations of our understanding of the laws of nature", is because there is (at least to me) overwhelming evidence that everything is a part of nature; and so I am inclined to stick with that hypothesis.

Take miracles, for example. I think most people, even theists, agree that the vast majority of them are nonsense: it is usually only a small minority of purported miracles that a theist believes are legit. That minority of miracles, I think are better explained like the rest: fallacious/misunderstandings. This seems more parsimonious, because I can not only fit the data nicely into the theory but I do not have to posit an extra entity (or entities) that are above nature.

Another noteworthy point on miracles, is that, given our understanding of nature (and how mystical it really is--e.g., quantum physics, general/special relativity, etc.), it isn't implausible that an extradimensional being (or one with representative faculties capable of representing not in time or space) may exist and still be a part of the natural processes of nature. It seems like one could still, even if one does not want to posit that minority of miracles as misunderstandings, more parsimoniously posit a natural, extra-dimensional being over a supernatural one. Making is supernatural just seems very extraneous.

@Leontiskos:

"Does Gideon possess rational justification for his conclusion that he is dealing with God?" That's not rhetorical. You need to actually answer it.

I already answered this in depth in my response: you just ignored it. No, I don't think Gideon possessed rational justification for believing God was helping him.

If you were Ahaz in Isaiah 7 (or Gideon), is there some sign you could think of, some test, that would prove to you that you are dealing with something other than natural occurrences?

With respect to having rational justification for believing in a supernatural entity in general, I would say no. Back then, we had very limited understanding of nature. Any test I would have been able to, plausibly, come up with, just like Gideon, would most likely be in vain: this is the same reasoning that every civilization has had for believing in their own gods (e.g., if <this-god> exists, then it will rain tomorrow and, what do you know, it rained!) and it is by-at-large very faulty reasoning indeed. However, iin principle, if there was some phenomena that could not be adequately explained naturalistically and has much positive support for it (viz., it is not enough to just posit, as a gap-like explanation, that it is supernatural because we have not explained it naturalistically; instead, the positing of something supernatural must be supported by sufficient evidence of the laws of nature and how the phenomena seemed to have truly violated those laws), then yes.

With respect to God, I already mentioned, which you ignored, the fact that there is absolutely no test that can demonstrate "God exists": not even in a non-scientific sense of the term "test". There is always a lesser being to God that would be more parsimonious for explanation of something else.

It depends on how you define parsimony. How many "brute facts," does naturalism require? The jury is out on that. Seemingly, it might be quite a lot.

I think it would be both epistemically and ontologically parsimonious to posit naturalism than supernaturalism, if there is no need to posit supernatural entities because we start out with nature.

I am not sure that I see the real difference between ontological and epistemic parsimony; because the explanation is what posits the ontology.

So you end up with a lot of things that have no reason for being, they just are, irreducibly. Just from the Fine Tuning Problem, you would seem to have quite a few.

An explanation where God creates the world to have life only has to posit one such fact that "is its own reason."

The idea is that one who posits God to explain life, has to posit all the same conceptual entities as a naturalist and add in an extra conceptual entity of God. So unless there is some need to posit God, it is less parsimonious.

If parsimony is considered from the point of view of explanation, it doesn't seem possible to beat theism. The answer "from whence comes..." always has one ultimate answer.

An explanation is not more parsimonious when it posits monism over pluralism IF it posits extraneous entities to get to monism.

But from the perspective of ontological entities, I would agree that the argument holds in favor of naturalism.

I think, perhaps, you hold a distinction between epistemic and ontological parsimony that I am not fully appreciating.

Because we have human society, and human society is a greater existence than the individual as I noted. Think analogously to your body. If we could destroy a toe to save a foot, that seems good on its own. But if a side effect of saving the foot by destroying the toe was that the person went into a life long coma, that wouldn't be the correct action. Yes, the foot survives, but the greater part of the body, the consciousness, dies.

If the toe had a mind of its own (and was a person), then, no, I don’t think it would be moral to cut it off to save the body. The problem with your analogy is that the toe is inert and lifeless; while the individual is a life.

I understand, however, that, according to your view, sacrificing one for the sake of saving the many, all else being equal, is good (because it leads to a maximal quantity of the “entities”); but, as an external critique, that seems immoral (to me).

The problem is this word "universalization". The only universal is, "More existence is good"

All I meant, is that “one ought to sacrifice on to save five” as a principle is leads to a worse world (by my lights). Again, this is an external critique. Under your view, if it leads to maximal concrete entities, then it is good: period.

You are just too consequentialist for me (;

What could the person have been doing instead of torturing the victim?

Dave could not have been doing anything better: disregard it for the thought experiment.

All else being equal, learning a skill increases the potential for concrete entities; and I don’t think you are denying that.

That which creates better harmony, to use your terms, is going to be more existent that one which puts unnecessary stress on the body and lowers its health.

Yes, but how does it lower the potential or actual concrete entities? I don’t see a direct causal link between negative emotions and the decrease in potential/actual concrete entities.

Did they create more existence through those atrocities?

Yes.

Wouldn't society have been better off if the kind enacted policies which grew and supported people?

No (if I view it through the lens of your theory).

We know that monarchies as a form of government do not create the kind of robust, wealthy, and happy societies like republics for example.

A monarchy could create, total net, more actual concrete entities than a republic. In fact, it would: if everyone was forced to work non-stop on creating more concrete entities in a sustaining manner, as opposed to doing what they want with their time, then that would be morally better (according to you). Authoritarian regimes would be the best bet at accomplishing that: not goverments that are predicated on providing maximal freedom to individuals, like republics.

Take napoleon, for example: his dictatorship inflicted much suffering onto people and unnecessary conquest; but he furthered the society in ways, which would not have been done otherwise, by use of force—e.g., higher education, public roads, public sewer systems, central banks, etc. The man was not a good person, but incidentally did good things that were very impactful on society. Total net, he was good for humanity IF one only thinks about it in terms of the consequences of his actual total net; I personally do not, and so I think he was wrong even though he did some good things (accidentally, and implemented them in immoral ways).

Here’s another scenario for you to digest:

There are two people: Daisy and John. Daisy is not using her time in an efficient manner (towards maximizing concrete entities in reality): John is. Daisy is not, however, harming anyone by being inefficient in this manner: she is just not taking the actions (out of the possible ones she could take) that would maximize concrete entities in reality. John notices Daisy’s inefficiencies (towards what is [morally] good [according to you]). John cannot convince Daisy to change her ways to be more efficient, and the only other option (by way of me stipulated it right now) is to force her to change her ways: is it moral for him to do so?

Seems like it would be under your view.

If God can only be thought of as a wholly unknowable entity, then how is it that billions and billions of people across the world think they know things about God? The things you are claiming are rather remarkable, and clearly false.

I agree. It is a straw man that Janus is arguing against (most of the time).

Now are you going to tell me that Gideon has no rational justification for his belief that he is dealing with God?

I appreciate you providing an example, and quite an interesting one at that!

The problem I have with this example, and most like it, is that I don’t think it demonstrates, even if the events were all granted as having occurred, justification for believing in God’s existence (even if just for that particular subject in the example) because the tests are wholly incapable of verifying the claim.

Let me give you a much easier example of what I mean (that I believe we can both agree on): let’s say I am holding something in my hand, and you say “that’s a banana”. Now, let’s say I do not know if it is a banana or not, and so I respond “if what you say is true, then do five jumping jacks...if you can do five jumping jacks, then I know what you say is the truth”. Lo and behold, you drop down and do five jumping jacks: am I justified in believing that the object in my hand is a banana? Of course not! Why?

It is because the test I deployed to verify the claim has no potential, even in principle, to actually verify it.

I know there is more to the story and there are many other similar cases Christian’s site, but, to keep this simple, I find Gideon’s test to be analogous to the jumping jack test example: at best, it demonstrates that there is a being that is more powerful than Gideon, who can remove or add dew to a fleece of wool.

How could such a test, in principle, ever verify that the more powerful being is omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, etc. let alone the creator of the entire world? It can’t. It just demonstrates, at its very best, that there was at least one being, in that day and age, capable of doing things humans could not.

Adding God into the explanation for this phenomena (of experiencing the wool with dew vs. not in accordance with what was demanded preemptively) is extraneous. A person who says “yeah, if that really happened, then there must be some being capable of performing things humans did not seem to have the capabilities to perform back then” is giving a more parsimonious explanation than one who says “God, an all-supreme creator of everything (who is omnipotent, omnipresent, etc.), performed those things which the humans were not capable of doing”.

there is no X that would yield any form of rational justification for the claim that one is dealing with God

This is an interesting thought. With respect to there being supernatural entities (in general), I can envision scenarios where it would be perfectly rational to believe in them—e.g., positing numbers are Platonic Forms, if there were beings that were consistently violating our understanding of the laws of nature then that would lend support to the belief in something like an ‘angel’ or ‘demon’, etc.). In terms of God, I must profess I cannot envision any; and perhaps you can help me see some (if there are any). It seems like God’s attributes are so extravagant that positing even a slightly less extravagant being would be more parsimonious to explain a set of supernatural phenomena that positing God.

How do you think this affords naturalism an equal footing?

With respect to what you quoted of me, my point was that if a theist can appeal to ambiguity; then so can a naturalist.

If you say “God’s infinite”, I can say “Reality is infinite”. If you say “God is eternal”, I can say “reality is eternal”. If you say “God is so unique and supreme, that we cannot give a full explication of His nature”, I can “Nature (reality) is so unique and supreme, that we cannot give a full explication of “Her” nature”. Etc.

Obviously, and to your point, if one believes that there are certain phenomena which naturalism cannot afford an answer; then naturalism is no longer more parsimonious than supernaturalism.

Is a system which posits an infinite being on "equal footing" with a system that denies an infinite being, so far as the inexplicable goes?

Naturalism does not preclude the existence of an infinite being. It just doesn’t. Another great example is Arthur Schopenhauer, a staunch atheist (and naturalist), that was an idealist that believed reality is universal will; and that will is infinite...but it is not God because it has no mind and is impersonal (since it is not a person).

In a more mainstream sense, a naturalist that believes the universe, or multi-verse or something similar, is infinite also doesn’t fit well with your quote (above) here.

What is the proportion of naturalist incompatibilists to non-naturalist incompatibilists? Why?

In the literature, I would say most libertarians are non-naturalists, but not supernaturalists.

Among the masses, I would say most libertarians are supernaturalists—hands down.

It is because most people don’t believe that libertarianism is compatible with naturalism; but this doesn’t lend any support to your argument, because most people lack proper education on the subject. Most people use “naturalism”, “materialism”, and “physicalism” interchangeabley; and they still yet misrepresent all three with stereotypes. So, so what if most people think naturalism is incompatible with libertarian free will? That doesn’t settle the matter at all.

Generally we would say that someone who believes in a universal mind is a theist.

Nope. Theism is the view that there is a personal universal mind. If the mind is not a person, then it is not God. Schopenhauer is rolling over in his grave (:

I spoke of transcendent moral norms, not moral realism.

For a moral norm to be transcendent, it must be objective; and I am assuming moral cognitivism and non-nihilism here (to save wasting time). If there is some sort of nuanced distinction between the two, then please elaborate.

Again, what is the proportion of naturalists who believe in transcendent moral norms (or also moral realism) to non-naturalists who believe in such a thing? Why?

In the literature, the vast majority of atheists and naturalists are moral realists, hands down. So you are wrong there.

Among the masses, the vast majority of atheists and naturalists are moral anti-realists, hands down. Again, who cares? We are talking about the average, ignorant person. The question is whether there are any phenomena that require supernaturalistic explanation—not if people generally believe it does or doesn’t.

"Well, 90% of incompatibilists are non-naturalists, but incompatibilism is still way more parsimonious on naturalism," which is a prima facie irrational claim.

I don’t see how it is an irrational claim. I think that positing that a soul is perfectly natural, and analyzing it in terms of scientific investigation, would make more sense than going the supernaturalist route. Why are we assuming that one cannot have a soul (i.e., an immaterial mind) under naturalism (i.e., that everything is a part of the processes of nature)?

Beyond that you still haven't told us (and specifically @NotAristotle) what parsimony has to do with anything, much less truth.

I have said it many times, and will say it again: if naturalism is on equal footing with supernaturalism, then it is more parsimonious to go with the former over the latter. Now, if one doesn’t think they are on equal footing, then they have no reason to accept the consequent because they have rejected the antecedent.

miracles like that defy our understanding of nature and not nature itself — Bob Ross

Then you've botched the definition of a miracle, and you are equivocating.

Implying that a ‘miracle’ cannot truly be one unless it is supernatural is merely begging the question. I am providing why a ‘miracle’ would be more parsimoniously explained naturalistically.

The very fact that so many people are and have been non-naturalists is itself strong evidence against the OP.

Not at all! The OP is not about “how many people believe that there are phenomena which require supernaturalistic explanation”.

If naturalism was such an obviously better explanation then everyone would be naturalist.

Who said it was obvious?

They do, and that's the point. For example, theists (tend to) believe in miracles; naturalists don't. The explanandum differs

Obviously, the “explanandum” differ insofar as theists posit some things are supernatural (which is all you just said here): the question is whether naturalism can account for the same phenomena, because then it is more parsimonious to be a naturalist than a supernaturalist. I don’t think you are fully appreciating the OP yet.

Each camp is attempting to account for a different set of existing things, because each camp believes different things exist.

Not at its core. People are trying to explain the same phenomena: the differing is in what people posit ontologically to account for them.

What is my purpose?

I am assuming you mean objective purpose, and I think a naturalist could just say there is a purpose embedded into the evolution of nature: a law, or set of laws, that provides Telos overtime. No need to add God into the equation.

Where do I ultimately come from?

Nature.

Why do bad things sometimes happen?

Because it is up to sufficiently intelligent beings to uphold the moral law.

What is justice, or love for that matter?

Justice is the act of providing a fairness which, in turn, is derived from what is (objectively) good.

I find “love” to be a bit too ambiguous: there’s a reason the greeks had like 9 words for it. There’s “love” in the sense of a sexual, primitive attraction; “love” in a maternal/fraternal sense; “love” in a selfless sense; “love” in a ‘soulmate’ sense; etc.

because accounts of Biblical miracles, and miraculous events described in other religious literature, might constitute the kinds of examples you're referring to, but as a rule these are not considered, because they're not replicable and generally not considered credible by any modern standards. So what examples are being referred to? Where to look for the data?

Oh, I think I understand now: you are saying that, because you don’t think the examples which you have readily available are legitimate sources (or are problematic), that you can’t give any example of a phenomena that requires supernaturalism to account for it, correct?

If so, then I totally agree.

As it happens, there is one large body of records collected concerning allegedly supernatural events, which are the investigations of miracles attributed to those being considered for canonization as saints by the Catholic Church. These alleged interventions are the subject of rigorous examination - see Pondering Miracles.

Are you saying that miracles require a form of supernaturalism to account sufficiently for them? I can’t tell if you are giving me a history lesson, or providing an answer.

Aside from those, I mentioned Rupert Sheldrake's research in telepathic cognition, which is considered supernatural by some, in that it seems to require that there is a non-physical medium through which perceptions and thoughts are transmitted.

Could you elaborate more on their research? I do not think we can transmit thoughts to each other with solely minds; but I am open to its consideration.

are natural laws part of nature?

Yes.

It seems obvious, but it is contested by philosophers, and it is a question that itself not scientific, but philosophical.

Yeah, I guess I don’t see why it is so contentious.

Furthermore, where in nature do your examples of inductive and deductive logic exist? As far as I can tell, they are purely internal to acts of reasoned inference, they're internal to thought. Science never tires of telling us that nature is blind and acts without reason, save material causation; so can reason itself explained in terms of 'natural laws'?

I am not here trying to claim that reality is inherently rational. I am convinced that we do afford reality some rationality in the phenomena which are representative faculties produce.

I responded to your only comment (that I see most recently in thread).

There was a recent debate between Ben Shapiro and Alex O'Connor. I only watched a few minutes, but one of Shapiro's arguments was the exact opposite of what you say here, and I think he's right. The theist simply has a more justified recourse to inexplicability than the atheist or naturalist does. There is nothing in naturalism which parallels the opacity and transcendence of God.

Can you elaborate?

I don’t see how any phenomena requires an appeal to something supernatural; so I don’t see why a theist has more justified recourse to lack an explanation.

This is a strange claim, and I don't think it is even plausible. Theists posit things like incompatibilist free will, an eternal soul, transcendent moral norms, miracles, etc., and clearly these are not equally available to the naturalist. What in fact happens is that the atheist or naturalist tends to deny the very things the theist posits, in part because their system cannot support them

That is entirely fair; but that is the point of the OP! It is to get supernaturalists to name things that they think require supernatural explanation.

Let me go through your examples: let’s break it down.

1. Incompatibilist free will: I don’t see how supernaturalism affords a better answer. It is more parsimonious to hold an atheistic substance dualism or idealism. What’s incoherent with believing in a soul without believing in God? I don’t see why that couldn’t be a natural process. Bernardo Kastrup’s idealism is a great example: in that metaphysical view, one’s mind has supremacy over matter, because matter is weakly emergent from it. The minds which are derived from the universal mind are derived via a natural process of dissociation. The point is not that it is a correct theory, it is just that if a supernaturalist can posit a soul or incompatibilist free will, then so can a naturalist; but the latter will posit less entities.

2. Soul: already discussed in #1.

3. Moral facts: I am a moral realist and a naturalist. Irregardless, moral realism is more parsimoniously explained with atheistic accounts than theistic ones. Same goes for supernatural accounts that are atheistic, like neo-platonist accounts: they are less parsimonious than naturalist accounts.

4. Miracles: let’s just say, for the sake of the argument, that a ‘miracle’ can and has occurred in the sense of something fundamentally extraordinary happening which defies our understanding of the laws of physics. It seems, by my lights, to be a better and more parsimonious answer to say that miracles like that defy our understanding of nature and not nature itself (and there are thousands of examples why this is the case).

If a person does genuinely believe that there is something naturalism cannot account properly for, then, of course, this argument holds no water (for them). BUT, if one finds themselves, like me, in a situation with nothing that seems to demand the use of supernaturalism; then they should be a naturalist. I am sure you probably agree on that point, but disagree that naturalism affords us an equal footing on most of the examples you gave.

More succinctly, the prima facie problem with Oppy's argument is that theists and atheists hold to vastly different beliefs and explananda. This is a big oversight, and it becomes even more acute as one moves away from our secular historical epoch.

I think they do tend to, but I may be mistaken on that.