Hello 0 implies everything,

I see. Would you say your style of epistemological idealism is really just ontological idealism, but based on epistemological grounds instead of ontological grounds? That is, on a first-order level, you assert only the mental exist, but on a second-order level, you assert this assertion is not certain, but rather the best assertion; as opposed to a purely ontological idealism, which would assert the sole existence of the mental on all orders.

That is a fair assessment. I don’t really consider myself making a standard ontological argument for idealism because I am agnostic as to if there is a truly a physical substance; but I do know that it is, by my lights, indistinguishable from an empty concept—it thereby is still technically possible; and, yes, it is motivated heavily by epistemological idealism: I basically argue that there is no legitimate reason to hold there is an indirect “consciousness-independent” object when one’s “representations” could be 0% accurate (and they never come in contact with anything non-mental ever nor is it possible as a conscious being). Even if I could somehow go outside of my conscious experience and know that there is truly a physical substance of some sort, then I would still say that for conscious beings emergent therefrom they would have zero justification to think there actually is a physical substance.

Personally, I advocate for using the standard definitions. If the above paragraph is a correct description of your views, I would then refer to your view as epistemologically motivated ontological idealism. One must separate the contents of an axiom from its motivation, lest they be confused.

I have never heard of that term, but, yes, that seems to fit nicely!

No assumptions; from an absolutely skeptical standpoint. It may seem impossible to derive any propositions from no assumptions, but I believe I have. Nothing significant (yet) though.

Oh, I see. Have you looked into a priori knowledge?

In an objective idealism, there can be. If you, in addition to your idealist assumption, assume a regularity in reality (laws of nature), and a distributive awareness (God, mind at large, the simulator(s), etc.), then you can arrive back at science. Now, in such a framework, you'll have causality; and if it is restrictive enough, it will deny the possibility of non-mental objects interacting with your framework's solely mental reality.

Perhaps I am misunderstanding, but to me “causality” has been reserved for ‘interaction’ in a physical sense in the literature; but in the sense you just described there would be no ‘interaction’ other than mental events (e.g., the laws of nature are Ideas, platonic forms, etc. in the mind of God), which you are calling ‘causality’, which I don’t have any issue with (in the sense of defining 'causality' as simply a realist position pertaining to the 'cause' of sensations being objective).

Also, have you read George Berkeley’s idealism? If not, I think you may find it an interesting read.

Bob

Hello Mark S,

Objective moral judgments are proclamations dependent on the same objective aspects of our world responsible for cultural moral norms and our moral sense

To me, cultural moral norms are inter-subjective: why do you think they are not inter-subjective? I see it analogous to economic value: the value of a diamond (in terms of currency) is not dependent on my will (particularly) but, rather, on multiple wills. It is not thereby objective, like, for example, the fact that a diamond is made of carbon. It is, likewise, not subjective but, rather, inter-subjective. Why, on the contrary, do you think norms are objective?

Furthermore, what do you mean by “moral sense”? Are you talking about an evolutionary conscience?

The existence of objective moral judgments is not contingent on our wills. Their acceptance as moral obligations IS dependent on our wills since imperative obligation is not a necessary part of what is objectively moral.

I agree with this part: but why are cultural moral norms objective? Could you please walk me through that part? How do they meet the definition of objectivity (i.e., not contingent on wills)?

Perhaps you are still thinking something like “what is objectively moral is necessarily an imperative obligation”. This idea is “an illusion foisted on us by our genes" (as the philosopher of biology Michael Ruse likes to point out).

I see. I think that an objective moral judgment would be, by definition, a true obligation which is stance-independent; however, the truthity of the obligation as being fixated-upon (i.e., consciously decided to follow) would be relative to the subject at hand. I think this is essentially what you are saying in the second quote of you I made hereon: “ The existence of objective moral judgments is not contingent on our wills. Their acceptance as moral obligations IS dependent on our wills”. I agree (if I am understanding you correctly).

"It is moral to solve cooperation problems; it is immoral to create cooperation problems"

I really appreciate you giving an example: thank you! Let me try to dissect it and please correct me where I am wrong. The proposition “It is moral to solve cooperation problems” is directly translatable (by my lights) to “one ought to solve cooperation problems”. How is this proposition independent of our wills (in terms of its truthity). By my lights, the obligation to it is unclear (in an objective sense): could you elaborate on that? In other words, why is “it is moral to solve cooperation problems” itself true despite of anyone’s will.

It is objective (mind independent) in that it is the product of the objective aspects of our world responsible for cultural moral norms and our moral sense – cooperation problems and the strategies that solve them.

To me, this doesn’t prove that the obligation (previously expounded) is objective itself but, rather, that we need to cooperate to survive (or something along those lines). It almost seems like you may be arguing on these lines:

P1: One ought to consider what causes cultural moral norms and our moral sense objective moral judgments.

P2: Solving cooperative problems is the cause of cultural moral norms and our moral sense.

C: Therefore, one ought to solve cooperative problems.

Is that syllogism accurate? If so, I don’t see where the objective moral judgment is (besides defining, semantically, “objective moral judgment” in the sense in P1—but that isn’t what objectivity means: it is will-independent and that new definition would not be).

Bob

Hello enlightened,

Yes. it is possible occasionally that dishonesty can have good consequences, but not that it is 'a good thing'. It is possible that murdering Hitler would have had good consequences, but not that murdering people is a good thing. It is possible that abortion has good consequences sometimes, but it not a a good thing, in the sense that it is worth getting pregnant for.

I think you may have misunderstood my counter-example or perhaps I didn’t explain it well enough: it isn’t that faking objective moral judgments is sometimes beneficial; rather, I was outlining that 99% of the population didn’t think that there was such a thing as an objective “thou shall not kill”, but they kept promoting it as objective (thusly lying) because they recognize that it would be in their best interest to do so. In that example, lying is predominant and good.

If you are agreeing, then I think this throws a big wrench, at the very least, in your argument that lying is bad—unless, perhaps, you are saying that lying is only good in the case where we would be faking morality?

Bob

Hello Darkneos,

To be honest, I don’t think this conversation is very productive. You aren’t actually contending with my claims at all; but I am going to try one more time to respond adequately, and then if you still feel the exact same way, then we should problem just agree to disagree.

It's pretty obvious what it is.

I gave a fairly long, substantive response and I asked what you are contending with in my view (as you were simply disagreeing with me yet it sounded like, to me, you were actually agreeing with me without realizing it). Responding with ‘it is obvious’ does not help further the conversation.

My point in asking was not to send a condescending, rhetorical question: I genuinely don’t think you are seeing what I am saying and wanted clarification on what you are contending with. Your use of ‘feelings’ = ‘qualia’ is fine for you own view, but it doesn’t work to address my contentions. Let me ask you: why do you think ‘feelings’ are synonymous with ‘qualia’?

Again, no that is not what the PZ thought experiment is based on. A feeling cannot occur without being consciously aware of it.

The PZ experiment does not claim that a ‘feeling’ equates to ‘qualia’. Now, I will grant (as I already have many times) that many basic arguments for the PZ experiment are predicated on that assumption: but that is what I am questioning and arguing against. Telling me that the PZ thought experiment is not based on ‘feelings’ being disynonmous with ‘qualia’ just tells me that you are subscribing to that kind of argument: now tell me why feelings cannot be disynonymous with qualia (in the manner I already outlined it).

I am claiming that a feeling can occur without being consciously aware of it in the sense of qualia: you disagree. Now, tell me why.

The point is that a P-Zombie acts in all the ways a human would but it doesn't really feel anything.

This is just semantics: you aren’t contending with what I am saying. By ‘feel’ in your sentence, you are assuming it is synonymous with ‘qualia’. Let me put it this way. I agree with this sentence:

‘The point is that a P-Zombie acts in all the ways a human would but it doesn't really have qualia.’

I disagree with:

‘The point is that a P-Zombie acts in all the ways a human would but it doesn't really feel anything.’

You have woefully misunderstood the thought experiment not to mention your example is just wrong.

How is my example wrong? A person can still be screaming in agony if they do not have qualia: surely you agree with that. I think you are getting caught up in the semantics. The ‘screaming out in agony’, to me, classifies it under the term ‘feeling’; for you, it does not. Why?

No you don't, you assume that. All that you said requires qualia.

This is just blatantly false: a person doing a nice thing for me does not require qualia. The whole point of the PZ experiment is that a person could do a nice gesture for you and yet still not have qualia. If qualia were required for such actions, then there would be no point to the thought experiment: everyone would know that everyone else has qualia because they do those things. On the contrary, that’s not the point of the thought experiment at all: it isn’t enough that she drove all the way across town to get me something as a token of love—she must be consciously aware of it as well to ‘feel’.

They can perform the action but without the emotion it's not really care and concern.

Yes it can: I could be completely numbed up on morphine and still care about you.

People lie all the time, lead people on, so you're just wrong here.

I never said that a person lying is truly concerned: obviously that would be false. I said that I can determine if a person is genuinly concerned based off of their actions and, yes, some clever psychopaths can pass my tests.

It's not just the action they have to actually feel and have love for you, which a P-Zombie cannot, ever.

But do you think that they need to have a conscious experience to love you? You keep using the term ‘feeling’, but that is just leading us to confusion. If conscious experience is what you mean by ‘feel’ in that sentence, then I think you are wrong because I don’t think one needs to have a subjective experience to love you; if you mean that they can love you without them being sincerely psychologically in love with you, then I agree. Do you see the distinction I am trying to draw (even if you still disagree)?

Acts of love aren't proof of love, they have to have the feeling for it to be so.

I disagree. To clarify, I don’t think that I can ‘prove’ that someone loves me with certainty; but I can pragmatically tell (and I would argue most people can too); and, again, when you say ‘feeling’, are you referring to ‘consciously aware of’ or ‘it is psychologically true that’?

Again the fact you can't understand why the emotion behind it makes all the difference is telling.

I am still, and have always been, claiming that emotions matter (in sense of emotions being ‘feelings’): but that term doesn’t translate to ‘qualia’ to me. You just keep trying to mesh the two terms together, because you use them synonymously, instead of trying to understand my distinction.

They have to be conscious otherwise it doesn't matter. Pretty much everyone knows this.

I can assure you that everyone does not know this: you are presuming that peoples’ actions only matter if they are consciously aware of them in the sense of a subjective, private, ‘along-with’ sensation.

It is entailed in the basic definition you gave me

No where did the definition use the term ‘feelings’: it used ‘qualia’.

Your whole chain shows you don't get it.

If you still think that there is no substance to what I am saying, then it may be for the best that we just agree to disagree.

Bob

Hello Mark S,

Not quite. You are missing a critical element: the subject of the objective facts. The subject is the function of cultural moral norms (norms whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment).

I am understanding you to be saying here that we are heavily coerced by sociological factors (i.e., “cultural moral norms” as you put it): is that correct? If so, then I don’t see how those are objective themselves as moral jugdments (but I do see how the empirical inquiry of them would be objective): an objective moral judgment is not, to me, just a description of a norm but, rather, a norm which is involuntary.

If the norm is voluntary, then it is contingent on a will which is, by definition, subjective. A descriptive fact that one volunteered (subscribed) to a norm does not thereby make the norm objective.

On the other hand, are you claiming that some cultural norms are involuntary for subjects and that is the objective morals you are wanting to investigate?

Assume it is objectively (mind independently) true that the function of cultural moral norms is to solve cooperation problems and cultural moral norms are fallible heuristics for parts of strategies, such as reciprocity strategies, which solve those problems. Knowing the function of cultural moral norms enables us to resolve many disputes about if and when cultural moral norms will fail this function or will fulfil it in a way that is contrary to our values and goals.

Fair enough, but here’s where I don’t understand:

Therefore, this function provides an objective standard for moral behavior we can use to understand cultural moral norms better and thereby resolve disputes about them.

It seems to me like you are really just arguing that we should commit ourselves to using this guideline of ‘cooperative strageties’ because pretty much any (if not all) rational people would agree—but that doesn’t entail that anything about that is objective morality. It would be inter-subjective at best.

Again, I am operating under the semantic use of an ‘objective moral judgement’ being more than just a description of proclamations which are contingent on wills (in a voluntary sense): would you disagree with that usage of the term?

For example, consider “Do to others as you would have them do to you” as a fallible heuristic for initiating reciprocity. When tastes differ and following it would create rather than solve cooperation problems, the proposed moral standard (solving cooperation problems) provides an understanding that it would be objectively immoral to follow the Golden Rule in this case.

To me, it seems like you are noting that it is useful (from a rational agent’s perspective) to use the Golden Rule; and if it stopped functioning as a useful tool then we ought to disband from it. That is fine to me, but where are the objective morals in that?

Maybe it would help me understand if you gave me an example, if you can, of what you would consider an objective moral judgment. Is the golden rule an example of one to you?

Again, the function of cultural moral norms provides AN objective standard for morality. This objective truth is silent regarding the existence of other moral standards that are either “objective features of the world” (as it is) or “involuntary obligations” (which it is not).

It sounds like, to me, you are just engaging in an inter-subjective agreement with other rational agents, which is not objective morality. If the moral is not an objective feature of the world nor involuntary, then it seems as though you are using the term “objective morality” is a way that sounds like ‘moral anti-realism’ to me.

Bob

Hello Unenlightened,

the sort of objectivity I am claiming is the objective inequality I mentioned way back – honesty is moral and dishonesty is immoral; similarly killing folks is immoral and keeping them alive is moral. It cannot work the other way around, and thus there is objectivity, without that being the kind of law like gravity that one cannot defy.

My confusion lies in the fact that you say “honesty is moral and dishonesty is immoral” because it cannot go the other way around in society, but yet you conceded that it can:

Yes, you have found an exception..If one were to pretend to believe something that was true, though one believed it false... one would be telling the truth while thinking oneself deceitful.

If you agree that people lying about there being objective moral standards (such as “thou shall not kill”) would actually sustain society (or at least not burn it to the ground), then you are conceding that it is possible for dishonesty to function as a ‘good’ thing in society. If that is the case, then I am not following what grounds you are claiming ‘lying is wrong’. As of yet, you were claiming that it is wrong because society would crumble if lying were predominant, but that example I gave (that you agreed with) negates that notion: there can be predominant lying which functions just fine in society.

Then I began to infer that you were claiming there is an actual objective standard, which is despite whether the given thing helps society sustain itself, based off of the previous quote I just made of you (i.e., “if one were to pretend to believe something that was true, though one believed it false...one would be telling the truth while thinking oneself deceitful). It was starting to sound like you were claiming there is a standard that goes beyond just a need for particular norms to survive (because you still think lying is wrong despite it having the ability to help one survive even in a grand scale—in the sense of it being predominant).

The dishonesty has to be, as Attenborough says 'very occasionally', because otherwise the warning would not work either as a deception or as a warning. And I would add that it is clearly an intentional deception, and thus the original sin.

I understand what you are claiming with your summary points, but I don’t see any objective morality in it is my problem; and, by your own standards, dishonesty would be able to be frequent in society as long as each person was good at it.

Bob

Hello unenlightened,

Yes, you have found an exception.

But doesn’t this fundamentally break your previously claim? Or am I misunderstanding? As far as I understood, you were claiming society cannot function predominantly on lies, but then you just admitted (as far as I understand) that there are instances where they can. Are you just claiming that most subject-matters need to be predominantly submerged in truth while some minority do not?

If one were to pretend to believe something that was true, though one believed it false... one would be telling the truth while thinking oneself deceitful.

In my scenario, the assumption is that it actually is false and they are pretending it is true (not that it it “was true”); but now it seems as though you are claiming that there is some sort of “objective moral law” which is independent of the inter-subjective cooperation required to survive as a species.

(Not that I really know what an objective law is, mind. It tends to make me think of laws of physics that one obeys without exception, rather than human prescriptions that one can and sometimes does break.)

Well, this is exactly what I would need to know, because if you don’t know what the objective law is then, to me, you don’t have one; so you can’t claim that their pretending of it being true is actually accidentally corresponding to something that is true.

However, I will concede that I generally agree with your definition of “objective morality” if you mean “laws of physics that one obeys without exception”. I just define it as a “description of the faculty of normativity of a being which is involuntary”: mine is just in more philosophical terminology.

Bob

Hello Darkneos,

That’s not what it means. It’s to argue against an alleged inner life that might be occurring in the person. They don’t have qualia, hence the wording of “considered” as having it but not really.

If by “inner life” you mean “qualia”, then you are correct—but what are you contending with in my argument? That is what I said too. As far as I am understanding, you are just repeating the definition I already gave: nothing about what you quoted from me claimed that a PZ still has qualia .

Again you misunderstand the PZ. It acts and has all the normal actions of pain but doesn’t really feel pain.

I suspect that by ‘really feel pain’ you mean ‘has qualia’, which, in that case, I agree and simply ask: what is the contention?

Pain is eliminated as a PZ or rather it never truly was

Again, by “never truly was”, I am presuming you are still operating under the assumption that in order for one to ‘feel’ they must have qualia: I am denying this. A ‘feeling’ can occur without being consciously aware of it. For example, imagine that you were stabbed right now: you would ‘feel’ it in the sense that your body would react to it and you would be conscious of that pain (assuming, from introspection, you know you are conscious). Now, imagine the same scenario except your conscious experience of that pain is not present (i.e., you are conscious of everything except the pain—so you can see them stab you, etc.): your body is still screaming out in agony (you just aren’t aware of it). Now, to clarify, this is a different scenario than one in which you are numb to the pain (where the pain isn’t occurring because, for example, you get morphine). The PZ thought experiment is predicated on the idea that your nerve endings are not malfunctioning, numbed by a drug, etc.: you are still screaming, still in agony, but you aren’t consciously aware of the pain. I think you are committed to saying there is no pain, or finding some kind of logical (or maybe metaphysical) impossibility in this above scenario. But if you say it is impossible, then you’ve also annihilated solipsism, because if it is impossible for you to scream out in agony without being aware of the pain (i.e., having the qualia corresponding thereto), then a normal person who is screaming in agony must have qualia (by your own logic). Now, I am not saying that that would be correct, but I am simply pointing out that my analogy holds (in the converse direction) on the same assumption of the PZ thought experiment.

If you accept that analogy, then you can see (hopefully if I have explained adequately enough) that, in that scenario, you have a scenario where you have no qualia but your body is still 'feeling' pain. The ‘machine’, if you will, is feeling pain indeed.

You’re butchering the thought experiment to fit your narrative.

I think you may be misunderstanding I am saying, or maybe I am not explaining it adequately enough. I am not re-shaping the PZ thought experiment: I am agreeing with it. I cannot know that you have qualia, which is the whole point of the thought experiment. I am contending with an unnecessarily metaphysical commitment that sneaks its way into the definition of ‘feeling’ that solipsists tend to deploy: that to ‘feel’, one needs qualia (i.e., one needs an extra, along-side sensation with the pain the body is having).

Perhaps I may have confused you into thinking that by ‘pain’ I mean an ‘uncomfortable sensation within one’s subjective experience’--because I would agree, in that sense, that a PZ doesn’t have pain; but I am not arguing that. I am saying that ‘pain’ ought to be something ‘less’ than having a subjective experience of it (in the sense of qualia). Maybe to you this seems like cheating. To define ‘feelings’ in the sense of qualia is to meddle in transcendent affairs that are completely unnecessary (in my opinion).

There actually is a need to add that extra property. It’s what makes the difference. The fact you can’t see that is..telling.

Perhaps you should explain how that extra property makes a difference instead of throwing insults.

Let me elaborate on my love analogy.

I can tell if a person is genuinely concerned with my well-being based off of their behavior, which expounds their intentions. Yes, I cannot tell that they have qualia, but I can tell, for the most part, if they are narcassistic or not—nothing about this, by my lights (but correct me where I am wrong), requires qualia.

My spouse does nice things for me, sticks by my side through any times (good or bad), and constantly expresses behaviorally a love for me: that is all I require to define a person as ‘loving me’. Now, clearly you do not agree: for you, there must be qualia, a conscious experience which is aware of that expressed love, for the person to ‘truly’ love you. My question is: why?

And again you’d still be wrong. One needs qualia to be concerned. I can ACT like it but it matters whether I feel it or not. Again people can tell.

I am not entirely following: are you claiming that you can’t tell if someone is genuinely concerned about your well being because they don’t have qualia? Again, to me, if they are constantly demonstrating acts of love, then they love you: there’s no need for them to be conscious, to have corresponding conscious experiences of the events they actualize, to love me.

Yes, I do think that most people think that ‘qualia’ is ‘feelings’, but I disagree. What do you disagree with in terms of that assessment?

Again no. If they don’t have qualia or feelings then they aren’t sincerely anything.

The whole contention I am raising is that ‘qualia’ is disynonymous with ‘feelings’: which one, in my terms, are you contending with here? I understand that you use them synonymously, but to do that in contending with my view is to not contend with it at all.

Again you’re not getting it. Did you even finish the math link?

No, I have not read the math link. If you would like to invoke that into our conversation, then please feel free.

You keep making up stuff like “ultra feelings” when the feeling behind an action makes all the difference. It’s just basic.

I think you are getting stuck on the ‘basic’ expositions of the PZ thought experiment: yes, it can be presented, in its most basic form, as essentially ‘qualia’ is ‘feelings’. I am making the argument that kind of basic form of the argument is wrong, but that isn’t the only argument (even in terms of basics) and certainly is not entailed by the basic definition I gave you.

Bob

Hello unenlightened,

That is why I call it immoral realism as much as moral realism.

Fair enough: I didn’t fully understand what was meant by “immoral realism” until now.

it is only when the charlatans become dominant that there is a collapse, and then the hard lesson has to be learned again that nothing can be done without virtue.

I can see that, but I am hesitant to say that all forms of insincerity would cause society to crumble in the event that it is dominant. For example, let’s say that 99% of the population were convinced there wasn’t an objective law prohibiting murder, but they realize that the best bet to not get killed (in very unnecessary ways) is to promote and insincerely affirm that there is an objective law prohibiting it. In that case, I don’t see how society would crumble. In other words, dominant pretending isn’t necessarily a highway to destruction.

Bob

Hello Banno,

I see. I don’t think that is a good use of the term ‘moral realism’ because it fundamentally shifts the focus from the sole purpose of metaethics: whether there are objective moral judgments. One can be a moral cognitivist and hold that there are or are not objective moral judgments: it makes no difference.

Bob

Hello Darkneos,

This point is still not true as when you realize they are a P Zombie then those things stop. It would have a bearing, especially since people can tell whether you mean something or not.

I think we may need to dive into what a PZ actually is in terms of its definition. To keep it simple for now, I am going to just use the basic, standard definition from Wiki:

A philosophical zombie or p-zombie argument is a thought experiment in philosophy of mind that imagines a hypothetical being that is physically identical to and indistinguishable from a normal person, considered as having qualia, but does not have conscious experience, qualia

I would like to note a few things pertaining to the definition. Firstly, the sole aspect of a PZ is that it doesn’t have qualia which, in turn, is subjective, conscious feelings: it is not that a being cannot feel in the sense of being capable of crying, being concerned, etc.; The whole purpose of the PZ though experiment is to say that a person who is demonstrating signs of depression, suicidality, is crying, is screaming in pain, etc. may not be feeling it in the sense that they are not consciously aware of it happening. The PZ still cries: “those things” do not “stop” because they are a PZ.

Secondly, the term ‘qualia’ is a very specific term which does not translate to ‘feelings’ in the sense that I was deploying them before: it is a subjective, personally sensation which occurs simultaneously with the physical events themselves, but not within space itself. This is what I meant by ‘ultra-feelings’: it isn’t enough that a person is going through pain in the sense that it demonstrable—they must also have ‘qualia’, a “conscious sensation”, along-with the pain. To clarify, it is not that pain is eliminated if one is a PZ but, rather, the conscious sensation allegedly corresponding with it. This is very important.

There are many ways to dissect the idea of ‘qualia’ and illegitimize it, but, to stick with my original claims, I will put a pin in that for now.

My point is that whether a person I am experiencing has ‘qualia’ or not, they still demonstrate emotions: they still cry, they still hold intervention meetings for addicted love ones, they still perform acts of love, etc.; these do not go away if they are a PZ. What goes away is a corresponding , ‘along-with’ sensation. This ‘along-with’ sensation is superfluous to me as it is not required to infer a person is ‘feeling’ (in the sense that emotions are demonstrated: e.g., crying, genuine crying, ingenuine crying, etc.).

Regardless of whether they are a PZ, my spouse still demonstrates every possible indicator of loving me fervently—there is no need to add in an extra property required to meet the definition of ‘feeling’ to me. Yes, I am saying that one doesn’t need ‘qualia’ to feel: maybe that is what you fundamentally disagree with?

But there is a need for that “extra” because again people can tell. There is usually evidence for it but it’s not something you can test in a lab. It has to go beyond machinery to have feelings. What you’re saying is simply false.

When you determine a person is genuinely upset vs. they are not, you do so by indicators which will never provide information about if they have ‘qualia’. They are either demonstrating genuine concern or they aren’t regardless of whether they are a PZ or not. Again, I am claiming one can be concerned without having qualia.

Think of it this way: imagine a chronically depressed person. They are crying, in visible torment, lethargic, etc.: the solipsist can still rightly point out that they could not have qualia. But this is independent of whether they are sincerely crying, sincerely in torment, etc.: whether there is a corresponding, special, and ‘along-with’ sensation to the crying and torment is irrelevant.

And you’d be wrong. The reason people mistreated those before is they took their actions to be that of a machine, in other words they didn’t really feel anything or mean it.

When you say “machine”, I think you are conflating it with a “sophisticated machine”, like a human (in this PZ thought experiment).

Except no they are not because they are a P Zombie. Again your entire argument is nullified by the definition of a p zombie.

Hopefully I explained adequately why this is false. Please let me know if I did not.

Bob

Hello Mark S,

Thank you for your response! I suspect we may be misunderstanding each other, so let me try to explain back to you what I am understanding you to being saying (and please correct me where I am wrong).

You seem to be essentially noting that we can derive objective facts pertaining to what norms societies are setup with (and sustain) and that these judgments (which are guided by the need for cooperation) are an objective standard for morals. Am I understanding you correctly?

I repeat, "Understanding what the function of cultural moral norms ‘is’ provides AN objective standard of what is good and bad." How could you argue that was false?

I understand that you are not arguing that the objective standard (that you outlined) is absolutely obligatory; however, my problem is, more fundamentally, with your standard even being considered ‘objective morality’. I understand that descriptions of norms are, in fact, objective; but that does not thereby make it ‘objective’ within the ‘moral’ sphere of discourse.

For example, let’s say that a particular society (or even all societies) have a rule “thou shall not kill”. That is an objective fact (in this hypothetical scenario) because it is a description of a norm which exists in that society (or all societies); however, by my lights, it is not thereby an “objective moral judgement”--on the contrary, the depiction that a society decrees “thou shall not kill” is not a prescription itself (it is simply a description of what is currently the case in society). Therefore, it isn’t an objective moral judgment: it seems as though you are advocating that it would be simply in virtue of it being a norm in society. Am I misunderstanding you?

The key to many miscommunications in moral realism discussions may be that one side is assuming the subject is "imperative obligations" and the other side is assuming the subject is "objective features of the world".

I think I followed and agree: I just want to explicate that I am not contending that you have to hold a moral judgment as absolutely obligatory in order to be classified as an “objective moral judgment”. On the contrary, I am questioning how the study of subjects (being objective features of the world) is a source of morality. How does “It is an objective fact that most people think I shouldn’t kill” translate to “I should not kill”?

Bob

Hello Unenlightened,

When the boy cries wolf when there is no wolf, he teaches the world to ignore what he says. When we all ignore what each other says, there is no meaning and nothing to understand. It seems so obvious to me that i struggle to understand what you cannot understand. You do know the story?

I am familiar with the story; however, it isn’t relevant (I would say) to the example I gave. Take our conversation right now: you are saying it is predicated on truth whereas I allow for the possibility of a functioning deception (e.g., that we are not trying to converse about what is true but, rather, just simply enjoying debating each other). The ‘moral’ of the story of the boy who cried wolf is that he demonstrated his lies and thusly no one cares anymore—I am not saying we are both explicating or ‘leaking’ our want to deceive each other. If we both were honest about the fact that we just wanted to debate each other (in the hypothetical scenario I outlined), then, yes, you would be right to say that that conversation is disfunctional (if we are saying we just want to debate but yet acting as though we are searching for the truth).

If the boy who cried wolf masked his narcissistic desire to spook his village with crafty, legitimate reasons for crying (whereof when they approached there was no wolf but everything indicated that the boy was sincere—even though he truly isn’t), then they would have kept showing up. I am not sure if I am explaining this adequately, but hopefully that helps.

Bob

Hello Darkneos,

I think we are misunderstanding each other, so let me try to explain in more depth (and let me know where you disagree).

When I was saying that a philosophical zombie has ‘feelings’ and ‘cares’, I was not contending that they have them in the sense that is in dispute for the term philosophical zombie—as you rightly point out that, by definition, a PZ ‘has no feelings’. However, what is meant by ‘having no feelings’ in that sense? My point was that the missing feelings in a philosophical zombie has, in actuality, no bearing on the ‘feelings’ which the average person, being a genuine person or a philosophical zombie, has: they still cry, they can hug you, they can demonstrate concern for you, etc. even in the case that they are a philosophical zombie.

The problem is that the feelings that are removed, by definition, from a philosophical zombie, I would argue, is a kind of ultra feelings which are described as ‘actual feelings’. A PZ can still cry, but it “isn’t real” because there’s an extra component of ‘being human’ which goes being the mere act of crying (allegedly); A PZ can show obvious signs of concern for your well being, but it “isn’t real” because there is something extra required, something beyond demonstrating obvious concern for another, which is required to be a ‘true’ feeling. This is my point: this ‘ultra-feelings’ is just another part of humanity’s mythology. There’s no need for anything extra nor is there any evidence of it, and a being doesn’t have to go metaphysically beyond a complex bit of machinery to ‘have feelings’ (in a non-ultra sense).

Although I don’t think human’s are robots necessarily, if you wanted to call a PZ a “highly sophisticated bit of machinery”, then I would still argue, in that case, that it still has feelings. The only reason we don’t do that with AI now, is because it isn’t a “highly sophisticated bit of machinery” like a human being: that’s the only meaningful difference for all intents and purposes.

Of course there is a world of difference when you’re interacting with a human who has feelings and emotions

I think you may have misunderstood me: I am arguing exactly that this is false. The reason historically people and animals were abused is based off of this false assumption: no, if a being is demonstrating obvious signs of being able to feel, being concerned, desiring, etc., then no matter if it is a lower life form or a robot, it thereby has feelings because that is the true standard of what it means to feel. Solipsism is providing something superfluous to the conversation: there has to be some impossible to attain component of existence that qualifies one as a ‘true’ feeling being. I am just trying to convey to you that (I think) it is a false dilemma--as regardless of whether a person is a PZ, where they cannot ‘feel’ in this ultra sense, they are still demonstrating the capacity to love, feel, and desire just the same as yourself (in a non-ultra sense): there just another component to your existence that you can’t verify for another person (i.e., that they are aware and feel in the same manner as you), and (I would argue) it isn’t actually relevant to solipsism (although I grant contemporary literature will disagree): I know there are other subjects, because by ‘subject’ I mean a will—not the whole package deal of ‘consciousness’.

Hopefully that clarifies a bit.

Bob

Hello Banno,

Don't misunderstand: I'm offering this as a clarification, a proscription, of the use of "antirealist", by way of bypassing the "contentious and unsettled nature of the topic". I'm basically stealing the use made of it by logicians such as Kripke.

Otherwise we will be prone to an unhelpful, even tedious, diversion into the many and various "..ism"s.

Oh, I see! So you are essentially saying that moral realism should be classified as simply moral cognitvism? Is that correct?

Bob

Hello Unenlightened,

This means we are already in a social relationship and already necessarily committed to a common purpose that involves truth and not falsehood

Although I agree (in the sense that I am trying to get to the truth, and I have no doubt you are too), I don’t see how it is impossible for a discussion board conversation to be, on both sides, geared towards what is false (masked as truth). We could both be, for example, just interested in debating each other and are thusly just communicating counter points to each other (and not for the sake of what we think is true pertaining to the subject at hand) for the sake of having a good debate. To clarify, I don’t find any evidence either of us are doing that, but, as far as I am understanding you, it seems as though that kind of conversation wouldn’t be able to function properly (especially on a grand scale)--but I am failing to see how it would degenerate. Fundamentally, I think this is our dispute:

In your terms, there can be no intersubjectivity that is not committed to truth

But there can most certainly be in terms of first principles. Sure, if I lie, then I think it is true that should lie (i.e., I have uncovered the truth that I think I should lie)--but the lie itself is the covering up of what was uncovered. I would agree that the bigger the society the harder it is to be oriented towards untruth, but I don’t think it is impossible (or fundamentally radioactive). For example, we could all proclaim that “thou shalt not kill” simply because we don’t want to die (and it makes most rational sense to promote that in society) while lying that it is due to an absolute decree (devoid of any personal feelings and taste): this would operate just fine in society—wouldn’t it?

This is very different from, say, establishing intersubjectively a rule for driving on one side of the road and not the other, which is necessary but arbitrary.

I like that analogy, but I don’t think it holds if you are arguing for an objective morality: if the judgments themselves are ultimately arbitrary (and are not depictions of involuntary obligations), then those judgments are subjective (or inter-subjective).

Truth, honesty, care for each other.

I agree that promoting those principles is the most rational thing to do, but I disagree that most of society has to be sincere about them.

Bob

Hello Manuel,

Thank you for the elaboration!

It's a bit tricky. It's species-dependent in so far as evidence pertaining to other animals being moral is shaky, some apes show the first glimmerings of such a capacity, but it's nowhere near the level of sophistication we show when we make moral judgments.

It seems as though ‘morality’, to you, pertains solely to biology—is that correct?

If so, then I don’t really think we should be deriving moral commandments from whatever we were biologically born to do. However, I do get that we do quite a bit of things simply because it is a part of our nature (and that is certainly a rational thing to do): but, with morality, it just makes one wonder why one ought to do something simply because it is a part of their nature? Are they simply subjectively affirming it (and thusly it originates out of taste)?

So, it's "objective" in the sense that human beings tend to agree on moral judgments, much more frequently that is otherwise stated

If I am understanding you correctly, then I would agree, but I would call this ‘inter-subjective’ and not ‘objective’ at all.

but we do not know if hypothetical alien species would necessarily have the exact same morality we have. It doesn't have the same level of objectivity physics has, for instance.

It seems as though ‘morality’, to you, is the convergence of biological empathy (or something along those lines)--is that correct?

Otherwise, I am not following why it would matter if aliens agreed with us pertaining to moral judgments, as, for me, the truthity of those judgments (if they are objective) would be separate from our or the aliens’ understanding of them.

At bottom of these judgments, there's a feeling of repulsion or wrongness that is hard to verbalize./quote]

Why is a conscience a good indicator of what is right and wrong? A human can be bread to do the ‘wrong’ thing and feel good about it, just as much as the can not do the ‘right’ thing because it would bother them to do it.

Bob

I see. Although I did not read the whole thing (admittedly), I would like to note that that is not a mathematical proof: it is formal logic; and no one can prove solipsism (nor anything in actually as a matter of fact) from pure, formal logic alone (albeit they may not be claiming that, as I didn't fully read it yet). Logic is about the form of an argument, and says nothing pertaining to the content. The whole article is too long for me to read right now, but eventually I will get around to it.

But if philosophical zombies were real then it would affect how I feel and treat people. Since they don’t have feelings or care about me then I would be colder, it would also leave me hugely depressed.

A philosophical zombie still has 'feelings' and 'cares' in the sense that you can see with your own eyes: they can express gestures of gratitude, they avoid pain, sit down and listen to your problems, they can still love you, etc.;

I think if you really reflect about what you can know (directly from experience), you will find that the warmth or frigidity of other people is a reflection of your pyschological state of mind. For example, imagine you sincerely believed that solipsism was false, wouldn't that bring some wanted warmth into experience for you? even though nothing changed about reality other than your state of mind, you would now experience a warmer kind of coexistence with other people. Now, imagine you believed it is true (or maybe that it is even indeterminate), then you lose that warmth--see how this is not a reflection of the truthity of the actual position of solipsism? It is a depiction of your state of mind. If you dive into yourself, then you can fix the issue without getting an answer to solipsism.

Bob

Hello unenlightened,

It seems as though, to me, that you are a “moral realist” in the sense that you do think that there is a real conflict between social interest and self-interest—but these “interests” boil down to inter-subjectivity and subjectivity respectively (and, therefore, are not objective moral judgments).

Are you just trying to note that your attitude is that of a moral realist in the sense that there are things which must be done societally to preserve the nation, which have very minimal concern for any particular individual’s wants?

Bob

Hello Banno,

An antirealist will say that there are moral statements that are not either true nor false

I think this is incorrect: moral subjectivists are cognitivists and so are nihilists.

And not being statements, they may not have a truth value.

This is only a depiction of non-cognivitist moral anti-realist views and not moral anti-realism in its entirety. An error theorist claims that they do have truth value, but that they are all false; and, likewise, a moral subjectivist claims that they do have truth value, but it is relative to the subject at hand.

Whereas deontology and consequentialism may say that there are moral statements, and that these are either true or they are false, and thereby take a realist stance, what you might call an objective approach.

One could be a moral subjectivist, for example, and accept that stance you just explicated.

I wasn't able to follow your "fixated" and "implicit" account. It looked a bit like Anscombe's direction of fit.

Unfortunately, I am not that well versed on “direction of fit”, but from a basic reading off of google it was interesting. By “implicit” moral judgments, I mean that it is an involuntary obligation that occurs simply because a being’s nature is designed to orient in that manner, whereas an “fixated-upon” moral judgment is an obligation which one has voluntarily focused on to abide by it (and is possible for them to thusly not-focus, not-fixate upon it).

Bob

Hello Manuel,

In this example, I think so. To kill an innocent person for no reason, is not only irrational but outright evil.

I also agree that it is evil—but is ‘evil’ referring to something objective? And are we absolutely obliged to fixate upon “thou shalt not kill an innocent person” or does it bottom out at a subjective affirmation (that one ought not kill an innocent person). Ultimately, is “thou shalt not kill an innocent person” a matter of taste or is it stance-independently wrong?

I mean, it's even a bit embarrassing to spell out why killing an innocent person is evil.

In every day-to-day talk, you are absolutely right; however, philosophy accepts no presumptions and will question everything—even what we take for granted as right or wrong.

Having said that, I think it's important to realize that, at a certain point, it boils down to this is wrong (or this is good), without any further understanding of what this wrongness entails, beyond it being wrong.

So, you think the origin of morals is indeterminate?

I suspect that our understandings aren't elaborate enough to explore this topic with much more depth. If an alien species exited that had a higher overall intelligence, they would know significantly more about these topics.

I don’t think I quite understood this part: why?

Bob

I would push back and say that if they were philosophical zombies then yes that would change my experience of them.

How would it change your experience of them?

Again I'm pretty doubtful about my interpretation of the math one but I'm not versed in math to check what he's saying.

I reviewed your first, initial board post and I don’t see any linked papers making mathematical claims about solipsism: did I just miss it? What math argument are you referring to?

The vernon press one I'm not touching either, though my brain keeps obsessing over bits and lines in that text and it's really hard for me to reject the COMPULSION to open old wounds again. It's also making me think that he proved it true as well.

It sounds like to me the issue is not that it might be true, but that, for some reason, you would be tormented by the fact that it is true. Why does it bother you that it could be true?

I understand what people mean by doing the work when it comes to philosophical inquiry, but that doesn't work for everyone and definitely not for me. Not only can I not read those papers (TBH I'm surprised I managed that much from the math one) but I don't get the arguments they use. It's why I need other people to help because they get it, I'm (to be blunt) not smart enough to.

My friend, you underestimate yourself! How are you ever going to be able to hold views and ideas for yourself (as your own) if you rely on everyone else to give you theirs? Abide by what you think is true, not what other people necessarily say. Use their views to sharpen your own. I believe in you!

It's why I need their help with the papers so I can put it all behind me.

What makes me worried about this sentence is that it seems like you are thinking the solution is to prove solipsism is false (or to, at least, disprove those worrying papers you read): you must understand why it makes you upset in the case it is true and root that out, then it won’t matter anymore.

Bob

Well, I am in that boat, but only reluctantly so. I have been able to derive things from the empty set of assumptions, and as such, I might be able to derive ontological idealism

What do you mean by “empty set of assumptions”?

I think it might be possible via realizing restrictions on causality

What do you mean by “realizing restrictions on causality”? Idealism eliminates the possibility of causality: there is no physical interaction analogous to a physicalist worldview.

All knowledge is directly derived from the mental (by definition of the mental), and in order to know that we can know of the non-mental is to know that there is a completely reliable mapping between the mental and non-mental. However, any such knowledge would be mediated by the mental. How can we know of a mapping if we do not have access to both the domain and its image?

The problem I would have with this is that it is still positing a concept of “consciousness-independent” object, and simply noting we can’t be 100% sure we are understanding the physical correctly (by the logic you already explicated); but that is still fundamentally conceding that one can know of the physical as the entire conceptual model is predicated on the idea that the mental is a sensing of the physical—which places the physical still conceptually as primary. Which, in turn, to me, makes the view very anti-idealist, because idealism is, at its root, that the mind (or mental) is primary. Now I understand that is valid, in the contemporary literature, to use “epistemological idealism” to refer to the kind of argument you noted, but, to me, it is just a severely skeptical physicalist or substance dualist view because it is still conceives the world as fundamentally and primarily physical (hence the outlook that the mental is an image of the physical). In my kind of style of epistemological idealism, I do not conceptualize the world that way: I do not concede that the senses are of something independent of them. I just don’t see how one is an idealist in any sense if they are still viewing the world as fundamentally (and really ontologically I would argue) physical (or some other mind-independent thing). For example, Kant is considered an epistemological and trancsendental idealist (and to an extent I get why), but I think his view simply was incoherent with idealism in truth because he was still positing these realist notions of objects which we interpret as minds.

Bob

How about judgement and reason? Is a rational judgement, like a syllogism, reducible to sensations?

I hold that awareness, will, and reason are non-physical and aren't really objects--as all three are dependent on the will or is the will itself. What I was trying to convey was that all objects (i.e., physical stuff) is reducible to sensations themselves and there is no need to posit conceptually some kind of sensation-free object.

Bob

Hello Banno,

Realists say that all statements, even those about things we we don't believe, know, perceive or whatever, are either true or false. Antirealists say that at least some statements either do not have a truth value at all, neither true nor false, or have some third truth value that is neither true nor false.

I don’t think this is an accurate depiction of either view. To me, moral realism is the thesis that:

1. Moral judgments are cognitive (which you mentioned); and
2. They are objective.

Whereas, moral anti-realism is that there are no true objective moral judgments, and there are three main sub-categories: subjectivism (i.e., expressivism), non-cognitivism, and error theory (i.e., nihilism).

The subjective/objective discussion remains mired in imprecision, sometimes being about the difference between public and supposedly private statements, sometimes being about distinguishing the world from supposed mental states, and sometimes being about grammatical differences between first and third person accounts.

It seems to me that you might have inadvertently carried the ambiguity of the subject/object discussion into the realist/antirealist discussion.

That is fair. I think that, upon further reflection, that I failed to separate out clearly the distinction between an “objective” moral judgment and one that is absolutely obligatory: but I think that my “fixated-upon” vs. “implicit” moral judgment distinction suffices.

Bob

Hello Benj96,

I appreciate your response!

for me the morality/ethics of a phenomenon is dependent on the entity/being or even system to which we concentricise/centralise the moral question.

That is fair, but at that point, I would argue, it is a matter of studying inter-subjectivity and not objectivity (which is fine if you aren’t claiming moral judgments are objective).

In terms of your examples, I think you are rightly noting that our actions have consequences (e.g., environment crisis leads to an inhabitable planet, etc.), but is there any “objective” or “absolutely obligatory” moral judgments guiding (or should be guiding) our actions?

Bob

Hello Manual,

I appreciate your response!

I suppose I'd take the pragmatic approach here and ask the question, what practical differences in our conception (and action) of morality follows from one being either a moral realist or an anti-realist?

Generally speaking, one’s metaethical position is going to shape their normative ethical and applied ethical positions; in other words, metaethics asks the fundamental question of what it means for something to be “good” (“right”) or “bad” (“wrong”), normative ethics uses that definition to determine what is considered “good” and what is considered “bad” (and usually tries to formulate them as rules), and applied ethics is an attempt to apply those normative ethical rules to nuanced, every-day-to-day situations to see what the “right” or “wrong” thing is to do.

For example, if one is more of a moral anti-realist (generally speaking) then they don’t think there are objective moral judgments and so there general outlook on moral philosophy is to determine what is right or wrong based off of usually either their “desires” or their “will”; whereas, moral realists tend to view the world as if there are absolutely obligatory moral decrees and they must obey them regardless of their own personal stance.

I mean, one can claim that they don't believe that murder is a crime. But rarely do such views lead to such acts. On the other hand, those who are serial killers, may actually believe this, and act according to this belief.

Metaethics, although it definitely influences what ought to be laws, is not itself a study of what should be a crime: it is whether there are any objective moral judgments. I agree that simply whimsically thinking that one doesn’t think killing (in the sense of what is normally considered murder) is wrong will usually result in nothing, as they don’t sincerely and deeply believe it. I can tell myself I don’t belief something that I belief, but that won’t thereby make me unbelieve it (as I am think beliefs are involuntary to a large degree). But, imagine that someone does sincerely believe it is right to kill an innocent person as they take a walk passed their house: are there any absolutely obligatory judgments that you can point to to condemn their behavior? That would be a metaethical question.

Bob

Hello unenlightened,

I'm not saying that. "Come buy my snake oil, it will make you immune from snake bites." Some people do lie all the time.

I am understanding this analogy to be agreeing that your moral system doesn’t purport to have objective moral judgments, is that correct?

It is corrosive to society. I'm saying that one cannot in good faith say say it is good to lie. One cannot found a society on the practice of lies, because lies only work at all in a social context of trust and honesty

This is all fair enough, but, to me, when you use the term “good” you are invoking a moral term. This term, so far, has not been demonstrated to be objective nor absolutely obligatory; which, as far as I am understanding you, you aren’t trying to claim that. But…..

It is an argument against subjectivism and against error theory.

Then you state this: your view, as far as I understand, is moral subjectivism. You are claiming:

1. Moral judgments are propositional (i.e., cognitive); and
2. There are not true objective moral judgments; and
3. Moral judgments are ultimately grounded in the subject (i.e., moral expressions truth is relative to the subject at hand).

Which is the definition of moral subjectivism. If you are refuting that position, then I think you would have to refute one of the above theses of it.

Bob

Hello Darkneos,

I am sorry that you are being tormented by solipsism: I hope that you find a way to overcome the negative impact it has had on you!

Let me try to give a brief “remedy”, but let me first note that this is from my perspective (so I am importing my philosophical positions): do what you will with it.

Firstly, one must understand what aspects of solipsism are “irrefutable” and which aren’t. In its most generic form, it is the view that only one’s “self” exists, that only one’s “mind” exists, or that only one’s “consciousness” exists (or all three)—but these are entirely different things! A “self” is what one is identical to, a “mind” is a faculty of reason, and consciousness can be described as awareness and sensibility. Therefore, to me, a “self” is a will, a “mind” is the faculty of reason which gets its obligations from oneself (i.e., a will), and “consciousness” is just the ability to or/and actuality of sensations and awareness.

The solipist could be arguing that they can only know of their own “self” (which is a will), but, in that case, we can clearly acquire from our experience that there are other wills (regardless of whether they stem back, ultimately, to one will or many). They could be arguing that they can only know of their own “mind” (e.g., do other people have thoughts?), but we can infer very reasonably that other people think (and thusly have a mind): just ask me to do a hard (or honestly even easy) math problem and take note of how long it takes me to come up with an answer. They could be arguing that they can only know that they are “conscious” (i.e., aware and sensing), but, to me, we can know they are aware: just watch a human for 30 minutes and note their concerns, as “concern” is what is fundamentally awareness; and we can know people sense: watch someone get stabbed. However, what the solipsist is going to note, which is the irrefutable part, is simply that one cannot know that all of these observable reactions and interactions with other people (previously described) aren’t a product of something other than what we would infer (e.g., how do you know that they all aren’t mechanical robots—philosophical zombies?); and I can’t say with absolute certainty that they are wrong.

But let’s think about it for a second: I can provide extreme skepticism to virtually anything. For example, let’s say you are in the company of two people who are essentially foil characters (i.e., they have complete opposite personalities) and I point out to you that you can’t be 100% sure that their wills aren’t ultimately one will (i.e., how do you know that, in reality in the sense of what transcends our current experience of the two, that they aren’t really a part of one will expressing itself differently?). Can you refute it? No. However, can you really ever know either way? No. Can you know that they have two different personalities and are embodied by two different bodies? Yes. Isn’t that enough to treat them like two different wills? These kinds of extreme skepticism simply removed the ability to be absolutely certain about empirical things, but that doesn’t mean it is valid to affirm their claims (e.g., just because it is logically possible that they are one will, deep down in reality, doesn’t entail that it is the most cogent belief to accept).

Likewise, let’s say they are actually right (that there are philosophical zombies, with no minds, no consciousness, and let’s say no wills of their own): does that change your experience of them? No. Are you justified in doing abhorrent things to them now that you know? No. Are you alone?. NO: you still interact with them, can talk to them, they can relate to you, they can love you, you can love them—and why would it matter that you are able to think of your own accord while they cannot?

Secondly, the fact that you think solipsism is true and that it is making you suffer are two separate things: and the latter, I would argue, is the only problem. Right now, I am presuming that you are thinking that the solution to eradicating your torment (suffering) is to find a refutation of solipsism, but that is no permanent cure. “Suffering” is the “attachment to what is outside of one’s control”, and it appears as though you are attached to the idea that other people can think of their own accord, can feel (in the sense of consciousness), etc.; but you can’t control the truth pertaining thereto--so why fret about it? Now, I know that fret is not something one can just shut off on a whim, or on a thought, but I would strongly suggest looking into stoic philosophy (such seneca and marcus aurelius) and start practicing and working at detaching from what is outside of your control: just because the world is a particular way which is outside of your control, does not mean you need to suffer about it. Again, I totally understand that you can’t control it immediately: but you can indirectly work towards reshaping yourself to eliminate that suffering (if that makes any sense).

With respect to depersonalization and derealization: I also had that. I no longer do (in a unhealthy sense) because I detached from everything outside of my control and realized that what is real is experience (the direct): it is acquiring answers to transcendent (and unattainable) questions which torment us the most. “We suffer more often in imagination than in reality” – Seneca.

There’s much more to say, but hopefully this provides a bit of insight.
Bob

I understand you to be saying (here and elsewhere) that fixating on a cultural moral norm (encoding it as a moral norm in your moral sense in my terms) makes it an objective moral judgment – an involuntary obligation.

Not quite! I am saying the opposite: fixating on a moral judgment is subjective; and moral judgments which one cannot opt-out of (cannot unfixate upon) are objective.

A key miscommunication between us is what the “function of cultural moral norms” refers to. “Function” refers to the primary reason cultural moral norms exist. Clarifying what this feature of our universe ‘is’ should shed light on how to best define “objective moral judgments”.

Assume for a moment that there is a mind-independent feature of our universe that determines the primary reason that culture moral norms exist (what their function empirically is). Understanding what the function of cultural moral norms ‘is’ provides an objective standard of what is good and bad.

Thank you for elaborating on this, but, to me, I don’t see why a “primary reason” for norms existing would be thereby an objective norm: why is that the case?

The empirical observation of the ultimate source of cultural moral norms carries no innate bindingness. This function’s bindingness may be subjective and the choice to fixate on it to trigger the feeling of bindingness a matter of preference. But the ultimate source of human morality is an objective truth not a subjective one.

As you can probably guess, I am confused by the last sentence: why would that be an objective truth of moral judgments? Are you claiming there is a force (or something) which is the ultimate reason why we do what we do?

So what is the mind-independent function of cultural moral norms? To solve cooperation problems that are innate to our universe.

I went ahead and read your initial post for that discussion board, but, nevertheless, I don’t see how cooperation problems are objective moral judgments nor how it pertains to morality itself. I don’t think something is determine right or wrong solely on whether it helps us cooperate better. Also, even if is the case that cooperation is a key driving factor for why people tend to have certain obligations, that would tell us nothing about whether those obligations are objective or not.

But could it be normative? By the SEP, normativity sounds likely:
"The term “morality” can be used ... normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational people."

I expect rational people would prefer to live in cooperative societies and therefore would be interested in basing their moral system on solutions to problems that block cooperation.

Personally, I just don’t think that description by SEP is correct: morality is not an appeal to the populace.

Bob

We are trying to communicate.
Communication depends on honesty.
It is open to us to be dishonest, and only pretend to want to communicate in order to manipulate each other rather than understand each other.

But the moment either one claims that they are not intending to communicate but to manipulate, the meaning of their words is lost, and the discussion is over. Our social relations depend on honesty and -cannot depend on dishonesty.

Nowhere in this do I find a moral judgment. You are simply noting that if one wants to communicate, then they must speak the truth most of the time.

The part which one cannot choose in that example is something which is not a moral judgment: it’s the best means of abiding by the moral judgment—it is the means not the judgment itself.

Social relations presume morals, and the particular morals are necessary features of social relations.

I agree and totally understand; however, it seems to me that you are simply noting that one cannot control the sub-obligations which emerge as a result of the ultimate obligations that one commits themselves to (which I agree with): I am failing how those moral judgments are objective in that case. It seems as though they are ultimately objective but there are better ways of achieving them (or abiding by them).

Bob

I find your qualitative/quantitative typology to be a bit imprecise. For example, idealism is often a priority monism (one basic concretum, which is God), but typically not an existence monism (one concretum, i.e. it has no proper parts). Perhaps I am wrong on that, but either way, I'm sure you see the importance in differentiating between priority and existence monism.

That is fair: I should have included that distinction in my synopsis.

I am familiar with the argument from parsimony, and although I find myself somewhat agreeing with it from a pragmatic point of view, I am in the enterprise of creating a theory of absolute certainty. Thus, making ontological assumptions based on pragmatic considerations is not really what I am about.

In that case, I think we are both in the same boat then: the only valid ontological position in philosophy of mind is in principle agnosticism.

I do think, however, that epistemological idealism is obtainable by the argument from parsimony.

Furthermore, the argument from parsimony is not an argument for how it is impossible for the mental and non-mental to interact; instead, it is an argument for how it is unlikely and/or how it is most economical to assume they do not, one the basis of the how it is uneconomical to posit/unlikely that the non-mental exists.

Just to clarify, I wasn’t trying to claim that the argument from parsimony is related to the problem of interaction: you are right that they are two separate things.

Bob

Hello 0 implies everything,

I have not found any proof/argument of how it is impossible for the non-mental to interact with the mental

It sounds like you may be referring to the “problem of interaction” for substance dualists; and the argument is founded on the acceptance of substratum theory (and so is the stereotypical subtance dualist position): simply put, substratum theory is the conjecture that properties require a substance to bare them. In other words, properties are bore by a “bare particular” which is distinct from the properties themselves. For example, from a substratum theorist perspective, the properties of a chair (e.g., material, color, etc.) are bore by a bare particular which is the compresence for the chair’s properties. This is how they would explain how objects have properties which are “tied” or “glued” to themselves as opposed to being “floating” properties.

This is where the idea of a “substance” comes from in philosophy of mind: it is the ultimate substrate which bears all the properties of that “type”.

Under this substratum theory, originates the first fundamental distinction in philosophy of mind: qualitative (i.e., pertaining to “types” of substances) vs. quantitative (i.e., pertaining to “tokens”, or “how many”, compose fundamentally reality within each “type” of substance) considerations. With respect to the former, here are the basic distinctions:

Qualitative:

Monism: there is one “kind” of substance.
Pluralism: there are three or more “kinds” of substances.
Dualism: there are two “kinds” of substances.


Within the latter:

Quantitative:

Monism: there is only one “thing” within and of the “kind” of substance (in question).
Pluralism: there are three or more “things” within and of the “kind” of substance (in question).
Dualism: there are two “things” within and of the “kind” of substance (in question).

Sometimes the “thing” is referred to as a “token”.

Now, within philosophy of mind, under this substratum theory, there are five main (stereotypical) categories of views:

1. Physicalism (also sometimes used synonymously with materialism): a qualitative monist, quantitative pluralist view whereof the “kind” of substance is physical (or matter, depending on how the terms are hashed out) and there is fundamentally many of that “kind” which make up the real world.

2. Property Dualism (also sometimes called irreducable materialism/physicalism): a qualitative monist, quantitative pluralist view whereof there is one “kind” of substance which is physical but the mental is irreducable (somehow) to the physical (i.e., strong emergence) and there is fundamentally many of this “kind” which make up reality.

3. Substance Dualism: a qualitative dualist, quantitative pluralist view whereof there are two “kinds” of substances which are physical and mental and there is fundamentally many of both “kinds” which make up reality.

4. Idealism: a qualitative monist, quantitative monist view whereof there is one “kind” of substance which is mental and there is one “thing” which fundamentally constitutes reality (which is usually God).

5. Non-dualism: a qualitative pluralist, quantitative monist view whereof there are three or more “kinds” of substances which are usually mind, matter, and an unknown God-like unifying substance; and it is usually one “thing” which fundamentally constitutes reality (usually God in a pantheistic sense).

Now, I want to note that these are just stereotypical, basic definitions and many people will not fit nicely into them. For example, I am a subjective idealist (more or less), and definitely am not a quantitative monist. So do what you will with those definitions: I just thought it may be useful.

In terms of the interaction problem, by definition two substances have no communal attributes (as they are two fundamentally different “kinds” of existence): so one “kind” cannot, by definition, have any interaction with the other “kind” unless one is positing that two things can interact without sharing at least one communal property.

In terms of arguments for idealism, I will briefly elaborate on the argument from introspection and parsimony:

When one introspects upon their experience (which is consciousness), they will begin to realize that every object within their experience is wholly reducible to a collection of sensations. Now, unless there is a reason to posit conceptually external (consciousness-independent) objects to explain the data of one’s experience, then by occam’s razor one ought to hold Idealism over the other positions because it is more parsimonious (i.e., it explains the same data with less entities). The million dollar question you must ask yourself is thusly this: do you need to posit (conceptually) a consciousness-independent object to explain any data within your experience? If not, then Idealism is for you. If you do, then it is not for you.

Now, what your argument seems to be what is sometimes called a “malicious” argument (although I don’t find it such at all) that even if there was hypothetically a non-mental substance somehow, from the perspective of the subject it would still be all consciousness and they wouldn’t ever need to conceptually posit consciousness-independent objects (even if there actually were some). To some extent, I sympathize with the view because I, likewise, do not think I can rule out there being something non-mental nor that the non-mental isn’t, from a transcendent perspective, physical (or neither or what have you) because I do not subscribe to substratum theory.

Bob

Hello Banno,

In summary, seems to me that the realist/antirealist distinction and the objective/subjective distinction are very different, but that your account does not recognise this.

Hmm, I see: could you please elaborate on that more?

Bob

Hello Unenlightened,

I agree with your first paragraph and I think I understand better what you are saying: thank you!

However, your last sentence is confusing me:

One can choose to be moral or immoral, but one cannot chose what is moral and what is immoral.

To say someone can choose to be moral (or immoral) is to concede that there is a standard ultimately outside of themselves for what is moral (or immoral); and, likewise, to say that they cannot choose what is moral is to say the same thing. However, I thought in agreement that your position doesn’t have any objective moral judgments in it: so how is there a standard of what is moral which no one gets to choose?

Bob

Hello Mark S,

Wonderful response! Let me see if I can adequately respond.

I think that, firstly, I must, regrettably, dive into a bit of semantics, as I think you are alluding to such a discussion with:

My response's point is that your definition of moral realism is less useful than the “objective features of the world” definition based on the above advantages and disadvantages. These are just definitions. We are free to choose, assume, or advocate the most useful.

I certainly agree that we can use terms how we please; so let me explain how I am using the terminology and why so that we can compare.

By “objective moral judgement” (and “categorical imperative”), I mean “a description of an involuntary obligation”, and, by my lights, the only valid source thereof is a will. However, this is not a contemporary definition in terms of the traditional definitions of moral realism and moral anti-realism: it would be, technically speaking, a niche subgroup within moral realism—but I disagree that it should be there as I think it also agrees with fundamental aspects of moral anti-realism (and thusly think the distinction fails to function properly).

For example, I totally understand that moral cultural relativism (which, correct if I am wrong, is what it seems you are at least partially describing) is a moral realist position in the literature; however, within my view, I don’t see it is a view that is holding truly objective moral judgments as existent. To me, it is describing inter-subjective judgments at best (i.e., judgments which are not contingent on one particular will but, rather, on multiple—but is still contingent on wills and thusly not objective). Nevertheless, my view is not a mainstream, traditional definition when it comes to the moral realist vs. anti-realist distinction; and that is why, I would presume, standford keeps the definition incredibly ambiguous:

“Moral realists are those who think that, in these respects, things should be taken at face value—moral claims do purport to report facts and are true if they get the facts right. Moreover, they hold, at least some moral claims actually are true. That much is the common and more or less defining ground of moral realism (although some accounts of moral realism see it as involving additional commitments, say to the independence of the moral facts from human thought and practice, or to those facts being objective in some specified way). ...It is worth noting that, while moral realists are united in their cognitivism and in their rejection of error theories, they disagree among themselves not only about which moral claims are actually true but about what it is about the world that makes those claims true” (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-realism/)

So, to answer:

Do you have a reference for a formal definition of “objective moral judgments” consistent with

No. The reason I use my definition is because I think there is a lot of ambiguity and overlap between moral realism and anti-realism. Something being “objective” means for it to be “will-independent” (by my lights), “subjective” is to be “contingent on at least one will”, and “inter-subjective” is to be “contingent on wills”. The study of what laws we put in place, as a cooperative society, is an objective study of inter-subjective facts.

A valid definition of objective moral judgments is that they refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately.

I suspect that you are using a different definition of “subjective opinion” than me, as I don’t think societal norms and laws are truly independent of wills. What do you mean by a “subjective opinion”? Is it being used more in a whimsical, colloquial sense of the term?

Now let me try to address your disadvantages of my definition:

No such involuntary obligations appear to exist.

I actually do think such involuntary obligations exist: I can elaborate on them if you would like.

Resulting moral antirealism claims based on this definition are confusing if moral judgments refer to objective features of the world.

Firstly, I agree and understand my view is confusing, but I would argue it is confusing in light of the moral realist vs. anti-realist distinction; in other words, it is only confusing when one tries to fit it into one category or the other as traditionally laid out. Secondly, I would like to clarify that the objective moral judgments (i.e., involuntary obligations) which I refer do not result in moral anti-realist claims: the involuntary obligations are squarely within a realist’s perspective of the world; however, anyone’s obligation to fixate on those objective moral judgments is squarely within a moral anti-realist’s perspective (since I don’t think there is such a thing as a fixated-upon-stance-independent judgment). In other words, the term “objective moral judgment” has the idea of “absolute fixated-upon obligation” stripped out of it completely.

Offers no objective (mind independent) basis for resolving moral disputes.

I think it does (in just the same manner any other moral realist could argue for): we resolve our disputes by committing ourselves to fixating upon any objective moral judgments.

Let me know address your advantages of your definition:

Objective features of the world exist that are the basis of moral judgments as summarized by cultural moral norms. Those features are strategies that solve cooperation problems.

If “objective moral judgments” are defined as “will-independent”, then those are not objective features pertaining to moral judgments. At best, it is really objective features of events which themselves are inter-subjective facts about societies.

Understanding the function of cultural moral norms provides an objective, mind independent basis for resolving disputes about cultural moral norms.

Maybe I am just misunderstanding you, but I don’t see how this provides a “mind-independent” basis: it seems as though you are making laws and cultural norms the standard of what is good.

Understanding the function of cultural moral norms explains the origin and function of our innate perception of moral obligations as involuntary.

In a literal sense of the term, cultural norms and laws are not involuntary at all. They are very much voluntary—albeit sometimes hard to get away with disobeying (but that isn’t thereby involuntary).

Also, I don’t understand “this definition fundamentally accepts that everything is ultimately subjective” when the subject is objective features of the world. Science is good at being objective concerning features of the world.

Let me try to explain with an analogy. Let’s say I wake up in the morning and, despite my bodily wants directing me to go back in my cozy bed and fall back asleep, I decide to workout. I then workout. Now, from a post-analysis, it is an objective fact that (1) I “wanted” to workout (in the sense of myself as a will and not my bodily wants) and that (2) decision (which is an obligation I issued upon myself) originates from my will (and is thusly contingent upon it). In this example, it would be incorrect to say that my decision that “I ought go workout instead of fall back asleep” is objective because it one can post-analyze the events that occurred. In other words, the fact that I worked out because I decided to doesn’t make the judgment (which is my decision) objective.

I think that is what you are doing with cultural norms and laws: you are correctly noting that we can post-analyze the events, which ultimate originate from wills, and that those events are objective facts—but that doesn’t make the judgments themselves (which originated from the wills) objective.

Bob

Hello Banno,

See, that doesn't work. A consequentialist claims that the worth of an action is found by looking at its consequences. This stands in opposition to the deontologist looking at a moral rule, such as the categorical imperative.

I see. The problem (I think) is that consequentialism does not entail, in itself, any metaethical position specifically. I wasn’t trying to claim that all consequentialists tend towards the view that there are no categorical impertatives, as simply noting that one is going to derive “the good” from consequences (and not intentions—like deontic normative ethical theories) does not entail anything about the fundamental origins of this “good”: it could be objective or subjective (or inter-subjective or what not). So, to clarify, I think that a consequentialist can be a moral realist or a moral anti-realist; but, fundamentally, if a given consequentialist claims there are categorical imperatives, then they are thereby a moral realist and if they claim there aren’t, then they are thereby a moral anti-realist. The “good” which a consequentialist is analyzing in the consequences of an action is what a metaethicist is going want to get a clear answer on (and that isn’t really a part of normative ethics to answer that question itself).

Same, I think, goes for deontic normative ethical theories: one is simply noting simply that one has a duty to a rule, and that rule could be grounded in a subject (i.e. a will) or something objective. Simply telling me that one has deontic ties (or is wholly subscribed to a deontic normative ethical theory) does not, in itself, tell me whether one is a moral realist or anti-realist. Now, I will grant that it is usually a safe bet to assume they are a moral realist, but that isn’t actually deducible therefrom.

Hopefully that clears things up. If not, then please correct me where you think I am wrong!

Bob

Hello Moliere,

Oh I think it's OK to strive for impossible goals. Else philosophy would surely disappear! :D

Just noting that as we move from different communities that we sort of have to start rolling the rock from the bottom of the hill again. (EDIT: And sometimes even within the same community!)

Fair enough my friend!

Yup! I think we understand one another now!

I think so too.


As I am unsure what to segue into now, I would like to just tell you that I really appreciated our conversation Moliere, and I look forward to many more! I think, as of now, we understand each other, so I don’t think there’s much more to say; but please do not hesitate to contact me (or respond to this message) if you have anything you would like to discuss further!

Bob

Hello Mww,

Cool. I was just thinking…..Enlightenment moral philosophy proposed freedom as a causal “what not”, the necessary condition for production of objective obligations.

If by “causal freedom” you are referring to libertarian free will, then I do not think that such is necessary for one to have obligations (as I am equally perfectly happy with a compatibilistic view as much as a libertarian one).

If we actually do have objective obligations, we should expect a source sufficient to provide for them, and usually our will is considered that way.

Exactly! I would say that a description of an involuntary aspect of our will would be an objective moral judgment.

Irrelevant sidebar: there was a guy on PBS in the early 70’s, had a painting technique demonstration broadcast, from upstate Vermont, on Saturday afternoons. His name was Bob Ross.

This is the man wherefrom I get my name (;

Bob

Hello Mark S,

I appreciate your response!

Assume we use your definition of moral realism as the reality of “categorical imperatives”, which I take to be imperatives about what we somehow ought to do regardless of our needs and preferences. Then I would argue that moral realism is unlikely to be true.

I agree, as there is no such thing as a “stance-independent” judgment.

By wikipedia’s definition, I support moral realism. My realism claim is based on the empirical observation that past and present cultural moral norms (ethical sentences) refer to parts of cooperation strategies (reciprocity strategies for the most part) which are objective features of the world, independent of subjective opinion.

Very interesting! To be honest, I have a hard time conceding this definition as truly a moral realist position (but please correct me where I am wrong here): it seems to me that this definition fundamentally accepts that everything is ultimately subjective, but it adds that there can be inter-subjective norms. By my lights, these inter-subjective norms can persist and function very similarly to objective norms (insofar as any given individual can die an the norm is still present in some manner—i.e., laws) but are not themselves objective (for they are not stance-independent nor are they deptictions of involuntary aspects of one's will): they are formulated based on collective agreement). To me, theoretically, the only valid definition of “objective moral judgments” is essentially that it is a description of an involuntary obligation (of a will).

2) accept the empirical data that the function of cultural moral norms is to solve cooperation problems (which implies a kind of moral realism).

Again, I have a hard time understanding how this is actually a moral realist position: can you please elaborate?

Thus, the most useful definitions of moral realism and other terms in moral philosophy could be based on what we empirically observe about morality.

The problem I have with this is that it seems to conflate description about prescriptions with the prescriptions themselves. The fact that you can describe that I obligated myself to X does not thereby make that obligation objective; that is, the empirical inquiry of obligations is not itself an indicator of obligations themselves being objective—it is just an indicator that we would like to study them.

Perhaps the difficulties you refer to in your opening post are due to a mismatch between your chosen definition of moral realism and the reality of what human morality is?

This could the issue: I am not sure. However, currently I don’t think it is: I think that the moral realist vs. anti-realist distinction is broken for my views; but it could be due to me misunderstanding them or formulating an invalid metaethical theory—that is partly why I create this discussion board!

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob