Hello unenlightened,

No, I haven't made any moral claims, and no one has to choose to keep surviving.

I apologize: I must have, somewhere along our conversation, misunderstood what you are claiming. Are you claiming there are objective moral judgments, or are you not?

But if one should choose not to keep surviving, there is no more choice and no more obligation. There is an inequality between living and dying. And out of this inequality comes necessity and from necessity comes obligation. If you want to die, don't be bothering me about morality, because I am concerned with living, I'm not interested in dying.

This is all fine and well if you are claiming that there are no objective moral judgments and, consequently, the obligation is ultimately subjective; but once one obligates themselves (by subjective affirmation) to keep living, then they must determine the best means to achieving that, which produce sub-obligations (so to speak). Is that what you are trying to convey?

Bob

Hello Mww,

I appreciate your response!

Is there a name you might use, by which this faculty is also known?

I purposely did not note an organ or what not which is responsible for such production because I don’t think a subject is reducible to its body and, even if it were, I do not know which organ(s) would specifically deal with producing norms. Regardless of which way one leans in terms of philosophy of mind, I don’t think it matters for all intents and purposes: by analysis of wills (i.e., subjects) we can come to understand how they issue norms (i.e., obligations) and see if there are any which are involuntary. By “faculty of normativity”, I just mean a power (i.e., faculty) which produces norms for a given being—whether that is a physical organ or a spiritual substance (or neither), I think it is irrelevant (but correct me if I am wrong).

To say one exists with a nature that fundamentally includes such an objective obligation, as opposed to some other decidable kind, seems to question the need for a faculty to issue it necessarily.

By “faculty”, I just mean the power to produce norms: are you questioning whether there needs to be a biological organ or spiritual substance that produces it? In other words, are you taking more a bundle theorist approach?

I mean it more generally, as I don’t think it matters what position one takes on that in philosophy of mind, but I could be wrong on that.

I get what you’re driving at; just trying to see if I can arrange what you say in my terms.

I totally understand: hopefully I did an adequate job of addressing your questions. Otherwise, please ask away!

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello unenlightened,

Not the point at all. What people want is absolutely to be removed from the equation. Animals take shelter from the storm, or the predator, or the heat or cold, or they die. No recourse to subjective wants explains how a yeast cell absorbs sugar and excretes alcohol. that's just how they work, and this is how humans work, - they shelter or they die. they arrange the environment just as rabbits do or birds do We don't have to invoke the subjective world of these animals at all, any more than we have to invoke the subjective world of a yeast cell.

Life does what is necessary to survive, or it dies. but if it dies, it is no longer life. Therefore life does what is necessary to survive. And human life is no exception. We need to control our environment or we die. And those that are homeless must make a shelter from cardboard and plastic waste as best they can.

Again, if you are going to claim that peoples’ wants are absolutely to be removed from the equation in terms of morals, then you must be able to ground objectively the choice to keep surviving. By my lights, all you are noting is biological (or otherwise scientific) facts and not moral ones: it is a fact that “life does whatever is necessary to survive, or it dies”, but why ought a person keep surviving? By noting that life either survives or dies, you have not thereby made any moral claims at all.

In other words, a person needs to control their environment (to some extent) to survive, but this tells me nothing of why I am obligated to keep surviving—why not just die? That is where the moral facts come into play (if any). All I know, at best, from your argument is that if I would like to keep living, then I must control my environment; but that is just, by definition, a hypothetical imperative.

Bob

Hello Banno,

Well, that's a stretch. As a counterexample, consequentialists claim to make moral judgements without reference to the (or a) categorical imperative...Now a categorical norm, like a categorical imperative, would be one that applies in all cases. That's not the same as being "objective". Something is objective if it is not the result of personal feelings, or something along those lines.

If a person who has consequentialist tendencies claims there are no categorical imperatives, then they are thereby squarely a moral anti-realist (metaethically). That's not to say that all consequentialists are anti-realists, but if they make that specific claim then I do think they are an anti-realist. A “categorical imperative”, in metaethics, I would argue, is an “objective moral judgment” (as they are used inter-changeably). When a moral realist claims there are true objective judgments, they are thereby claiming that there are categorical claims they can make about moral judgments (hence the use of “categorical imperatives”).

Now, with being said, I totally understand your distinction (and I agree) that something being objective does not entail that it is obligatory for a person to obey it (and so one could denote an objective moral judgment as disynonymous with a categorical imperative in that sense); but, traditionally, if a moral judgment is objectively true, then it is thereby obligatory for one to obey (and it is true and applies in all cases—which is a categorical imperative).

I, like you (as far as I am understanding), would push back on this presumption (that an objectively true moral judgment is thereby obligatory to hold) and I, instead of making a “objective moral judgment” vs. “categorical imperative” distinction, am inclined to make a implicit-moral judgment vs. fixated-upon-moral judgment distinction—but these are essentially (as far as I am understanding) expressing the same critique. Within how you are using the terms, I would say that I am claiming that there are no categorical imperatives (i.e., no absolutely obligatory moral judgments which are not grounded ultimately in a will) but there are true, objective moral judgments (i.e., involuntary obligations that are grounded in the nature of the being).

Seems to me also that your use of "categorical imperative" is nonstandard. You speak of a plurality, when there is usually only the one.

I agree that most ethical theories that invoke “categorical imperatives” tend to only have one, but the definition of a “categorical imperative” does not entail, by necessity, that there is only one.

Finally, the dissection between meta-ethics and ethics is perhaps not quite so clear as you seem to think, in that deontology, consequentialism and virtue ethics signify differences in meta-ethical approach as well as to normative ethics. Each may subscribe to or be implied by differences in metaethics.

I agree that normative ethical theories are fundamentally grounded in meta-ethical theories; but that doesn’t mean there isn’t a clear difference between the two different studies themselves. Normative ethical theories are not the study of the metaethical differences that each may instantiate—but, to your point, they are definitely pertinent to such discussions.

Bob

Hello Moliere,

Yes. Though I'm hopeful that the point is non-trivial to what you are asking. I pretty much hold this belief with respect to any discussions about determining what is real, so there is a general place I'm coming from in thinking here, though I'm trying to tailor it to the specific topic at hand.

General philosophical categories are frequently like this. They are not like the general category of "cars" because there are concretes to refer to. Here the elements of the set are philosophical positions, which themselves usually operate more like webs than isolated propositions. And as you hold certain parts of a view as true -- the metaphor of nailing them down within a conversation -- usually you can find various ways of interpreting a position as part of one camp or another due to the web-like structure of philosophical positions and how you can interpret them in various ways.

Correct me if I am wrong, but it seems as though you are noting that philosophical positions tend to be complex and hard to nail down precise distinctions between views, which I agree with; but, why would this entail that we can’t achieve one—or shouldn’t strive for it? I don’t think that we are barred from making “concrete” distinctions in philosophy, but I would grant it is exceptionally difficult to achieve such due to the nature of the study.

The reverse! We can make distinctions, but upon doing so we are no longer talking generally, but rather are creating a set of understandings that we can think through together.

But after making those distinctions, say you were to go to another group of people who are enthusiastic about philosophy, they won't hold in some general sense. New terms will have to be forged in that group.

But the general notions of realism or nihilism will still be there…

...But upon doing so we usually start holding terms steady. And that's when it seems that we're no longer dealing with some general philosophical categories which have distinct meanings but rather a loose grouping of positions which we can then explore together upon coming to a mutual understanding.

I agree that it is best to come to set definitions before discussing a topic, as we do tend to make general distinctions and then make (usually false) assumptions about each other’s views; but I do think that distinctions should and can have set definitions (including for general ones). Moral realism and anti-realism have set definitions (and are not, in terms of their definition, blurry), and I would argue that my position simply breaks it (and that is what I meant by “blurring the distinction”) in it being mutually exclusive and exhaustive options. It sounds like, and correct me if I am wrong, that you are arguing that we just simply don’t have set definitions at all (unless we dive in precisely into each other’s views)—whereas, for me, I would grant that humans tend to make ambiguous, general distinctions but, nevertheless, people should derive clear definitions of things (and certainly can if they put in enough effort) which includes general distinctions. In my opinion, the realist vs. anti-realist distinction was predicated on false presumptions, which is why I am able to validly (I would argue) break it; but that just means we need to re-think the distinction and make it better. To your point (I think), we can never truly know that we aren’t still operating on false presumptions until someone validly breaks the new distinction we make; but I still think we should be trying to achieve clear distinctions and would say that we can (just not in the sense of absolute knowledge).

I do agree, to your point, that we do seem to be no longer working with the general categories once we’ve been discussing each other’s particular views for some time, but if the general distinction is supposed to be mutually exclusive and exhaustive, then ours views should be squarely in one or the other. If we can provide a view which doesn’t, then we have successfully broken the distinction and need a new one—because the old one is ambiguous now.

And with what I've said so far I'd expect any particular philosophical position to be difficult to categorize within the general frames.

I agree, but I still think we should strive for it. However, I am starting to view general distinctions in philosophy as not mutually exclusive and exhaustive options (to your point).

From "real" to "not-real" -- the reversal is with respect to the judgment of a position as realist or nihilist.

I see; so a reversal would be to negate what one previously held (e.g., “this position was realist, now it is anti-realist”), is that correct?

Yes! A rephrase, though -- I don't think I could make the claim in history, because while I'm familiar with the terms I'm not familiar with the contemporary history. However, conceptually, that's what I'm saying. It may be that this was more an idiosyncratic example of a theory which forced me to rethink the categories, but I think I've managed to communicate myself by golly. :)

It seems as though we have a lot in common with our views; and that you’re response to my “blurring of the distinction” is that that is what the distinction is (i.e., blurry) by its own nature; but I still think we ought to strive to make clear distinctions (even generally).

Bob

Hello Moliere,

I don’t think I am still quite following, but let me address your points and you tell me if I am getting closer.

I'd formulate realism-nihilism as more of a gradient, I think, where the most extreme form of the gradient is exclusion/inclusion rules without any exceptions, in which case it would then be two mutually exclusive options. And to make it even more confusing, I'd note that even the rules for establishing the gradient are up for negotiation.

It sounds like you are noting that words are always up for redefinition: that, at every level, we could “cut it up” differently—am I correct?

If so, then it seems to me that this is true of all words, is it not?

Also, I was using "nihilism" more loosely to be synonymous with anti-realism, and just thought it sounded better than repeating realism vs anti-realism -- purely aesthetic choice there, but I should have stuck with your terms to keep the conversation more manageable.

Absolutely no worries! Please feel free to continue using that terminology, as I now internally know what you are referring to.

Given that I don't believe there to be a general theory of moral realism or anti-realism my support for my initial claim is only due to repetition of the above procedure

I thought the point was that they are only ever general theories? Are you saying there’s no way to make a distinction (even generally) at all?

We have cognitivism vs non-cognitivism, for instance, where the former is often interpreted as a form of realism, and the latter is often interpreted as a form of anti-realism. But then error theory is a response to the sense-making argument for cognitivism (that moral statements are meaningful, and used, so how could they be different from the other statements

I am a bit confused, as moral cognitivism and non-cognitivism are not indicators, in themselves, of whether a person is a moral realist or anti-realist: moral subjectivists, like nihilists (error theorists), also hold that moral judgments are propositional. If someone tells me they think moral judgments are cognitive, I do not thereby infer that they are a moral realist.

Is your point, perhaps, that error theory is an example of a moral anti-realist view that, somewhere along the history of the moral realist vs. anti-realist debate, broke the distinction; whereof they had to refurbish it to accommodate for it?

And here you're providing the realist interpretation of non-cognitivism in your OP :D -- at least if I'm understanding you correctly.

Exactly, I think that objective moral judgements are only possible as non-cognitive, whereas cognitive moral judgments are always subjective. It is, indeed, a very unusual realism (or maybe anti-realism: I don’t know (: ).

The procedure above is similar to the one I started with Kant's notion of Freedom grounding ethics. In general what I'd aim to do for any proposed rule for classifying an ethical position as moral realism vs moral anti-realism is provide an interpretation which reverses the initial determination. The stronger reversals do not add auxiliary hypotheses (which I think Error theory accomplishes), but I hope we can agree that a reversal can be accomplished through auxiliary hypotheses without that being controversial.

I didn’t quite follow this part: what does it mean to “reverse the initial determination”? I am failing to comprehend what a reversal would be.

Bob

Hello Unenlightened,

I think we may be slightly misunderstanding each other, so let me try and narrow down the disagreement.

Have you ever been homeless? It might change your mind.

I am not disagreeing that I do want to have a home (or a shelter) but, rather, that it is fundamentally my preference. If I were to give an argument for why I need a shelter, then it will ultimately bottom out at my will—not something objective. The fact that most people (or even if every person) wanted a home (or shelter) does not thereby make it a moral fact but, rather, a universalized subjective fact. In other words, my mind is absolutely in agreement with you that I do want a shelter, and that most people (if not everyone) wants one, but I am disagreeing that that judgment is fundamentally (i.e., ultimately) objective: the latter is what metaethics, I would argue, is about and not the former.

"Ultimately objective" is a curious term. I wonder how it it works?

What am trying to express is that I think that the derivation of reasons for a judgment ultimately bottoms out at a particular will, not something objective under your view, because you are simply invoking very common preferences people tend to have (e.g., have a home) or, arguably, the preference to abide by the basic objective needs of the body. No, it is not true that every human being wants a home, but I would grant, to your point, that the vast majority do; but that is not a moral realist position (as far as I am understanding you). By “contingent on a will”, I just mean that your examples are ontically true of most people (i.e., you are right that most peoples’ personalities waver towards achieving basic bodily needs—including me). It would have to be an ontological aspect of a will to be considered a moral fact (to me).

An organism exists in relation to an environment. It can only exist within certain environmental parameters to which it is tolerant, and conditions outside these parameters are lethal. So for example the antarctic is only survivable to humans with ongoing input of food, energy, materials, and shelter brought in from elsewhere. These are facts, no? The full details are complex, but most birds need to nest, and so do humans, even if their nest is a mobile or temporary one.

There is no necessity for there to be humans, or any life whatsoever, of course, but as a matter of fact there is life, and life has a necessary relation to its environment. Most of the planet is not survivable to humans without some constructed shelter. So what do you mean by saying it is subjective? shall I go into detail about how a clean water supply and waste disposal maintain the home as an optimised healthy environment along with thermostatically controlled air conditioning? Subjectively, you might prefer 60F, while I like 72F, but there is no liking to boil or freeze.

Correct me if I am wrong, but, to me, you are correct that these are facts—but they aren’t moral facts. It is a fact that my body needs food to survive—but why ought I care about survival (i.e., why am I obligated to keep surviving)? I think you may be conflating biological facts with moral ones (but correct me if I am wrong here). Perhaps, you are arguing that these biological facts should be moral ones?

Bob

Hello T Clark,

Thanks for your response. I must admit I haven't spent a lot of time thinking about it, but I don't think I believe in normative ethics, at least not as something driving our behavior. I see moral rules more as a reflection of personal and social judgements. If nothing else, your thread has helped me realize that.

I totally understand and partially agree: I think that moral facts are involuntary, and the moment one fixates thereupon then they have invoked their own preference; and I think that my normative ethics is grounded upon fixating on what are moral facts. So, I do think normative ethics are important because it gives us an ideal to persevere towards (regardless of whether we can fully actualize it) and, under my view, is just as much of an objective inquiry as epistemology (or in other words I setup moral norms the same as epistemic ones).

I don't want to send the discussion off on a tangent, so I'll leave it there.

My friend, if there is something that you wish to discuss, then please, by all means, bring it forth! I do not mind a tad bit of derailment!

Bob

I want to be a bit more realist than that. We do need buildings, and architects and all those ancillary workers i mentioned are the experts on these things.

The issue I have with this is that the “need” for buildings is subjective (or inter-subjective at best), so I think your analogy isn’t actually mapping to a moral realist position. Am I misunderstanding that part of the analogy? Are you claiming that the need for buildings is objective (and not subjective nor inter-subjective)?

But none of this makes architecture 'subjective', merely complex.

I would agree that there are objectively better ways to build, but the goal to build is subjective; so I am failing to see how this isn’t an anti-realist view.

Clearly, things ain't what they ought to be, otherwise we wouldn't need to talk about the way they ought to be.

To me, this just explicates that people have goals (which are subjective) to actualize things which are currently only potential. I am failing to see how this entails that “what ought to be” is objective itself (i.e., a moral fact).

In the same way, if I already had an adequate house, I wouldn't be wanting plans for another. But granting that things are not as they ought to be, already allows that they could really be better; and here's the plan...

They could be better in relation to what you want out of a house. Again, I am still failing to see how your idea of a “better house” is ultimately objective. I understand that if one wants a house that has a working stove, then … – but where’s the categorical imperative here?

'Flourishing'. The objective is coexistence with the environment

The objective (i.e., the goal) here, I would argue, is ultimately subjective. How is it objective?

Bob

Given any norm, be it consequential, deontic, virtue-theoretic, or somewhere in between, I claim that one can classify that norm as realistic or nihilistic based upon one's theory of realism or nihilism. The inclusion-rules for realism-nihilism can be modified without ever changing the normative-level theory. I believe it's a different question from the normative one, entirely, so as we change the rules for realism-nihilism we can include and disclude the normative-level theories -- which at least leads me to believe that there will never be a clean map between the normative and the meta-ethical. It will always be blurry, until we start nailing some terms down. And then it will be specific, and it won't be a general theory of realism/nihilism.

I am starting to understand more: thank you! It seems as though you are formulating two mutually exclusive options (which are different than the moral realism vs. anti-realism distinction, for nihilism is an example of the latter): “realism” or “nihilism”; where the former is the position that there are objective moral judgments and the latter is that there isn’t. Furthermore, this “realism-nihilism” distinction is fundamentally ambiguous (and only for general distinction purposes). If one derives an unambiguous distinction, then they are, according to your view, not making a metaethical distinction because that can only be general (which is ambiguous). Am I understanding you correctly?

If so, then it seems as though you are claiming one is barred from achieving a clear distinction in metaethics; however, I am uncertain as to why that would be true. Why, fundamentally, can we not achieve a clear distinction between objective and non-objective morals? I understand that I too am blurring the distinction; but I mean it more in the sense that the current distinction is blurred and not that I cannot fundamentally achieve a clear distinction in metaethics.

Likewise, I didn’t entirely follow the entailment from the fundamental, blurry nature of distinctions in metaethics (e.g., the “realism-nihilism” distinction) to there is always going to be a blurry line between metaethics and normative ethics: can you explain that further? I am understanding you to be claiming that the meta-normative ethic distinction is, likewise, blurry (and fundamentally always going to be that way): assuming I am understanding correctly, why?

Cool, cool. I'm shooting in the dark a bit. I don't mind being corrected, so correct away :)

I appreciate that, and please feel free to correct me as well!

to point out how there can be ambiguity in any set up of realism-nihilism, which is mostly what I'm pointing to I think: we're going to have to pin down some words and terms before being able to answer.

It sounds like to me that you are almost saying we could get a clear distinction going (if we only clarified our terminology in a precise manner); so I might have misunderstood your first paragraph.

Bob

Hello Hanover,

I appreciate your response!

As most of your message is directed at another, I will address only the part directed me: the definition from Wiki. That is, indeed, a good generic definition of moral realism, but I am failing to understand the relevance to my post?

Bob

Hello bert1,

Thank you for your response!

I thought the categorical imperative wasn't a name for a type of view, by the particular view of Kant, namely something like "act only on those principles that, if universalised (acted upon by everyone) does not lead to contradiction." Or something, there are various formulations. I've always thought it was complete bollocks but perhaps I don't get it. It's an attempt, contra Hume, to ground morality in reason rather than sentiment. Is that really what you wanted to talk about? It seems like it may be that you are looking to ground morality in reason as well perhaps:

I am not talking about normative ethics in my post but, rather, metaethics. Likewise, I am not invoking Kant, although the term “categorical imperative” originating with him, but, rather, it is a term in metaethics to discuss “objective moral judgments” in general (and not specifically a Kantian deontic normative philosophy). Kant and Hume are good examples of realism vs anti-realism in a traditional sense, but in my view I am seeing the lines between the two blur.

Are you getting at the tension between there being moral facts about the world, but the individual person is always able to say "So what? I don't actually give a crap bout that."?

Exactly. I can note that there are moral facts, but not hold that you are thereby inherently obliged to obey them, which, to me, seems like a key point that moral realist is going to disagree with (and anti-realists are going to agree with to some degree).

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello Moliere,

But also, no need to hold to "objective norms" or "there are/not categorical imperatives" as setting out the meaning of anti-realism.

I think, according to the standard definitions, moral anti-realism is the position that there are no moral facts (i.e., “objective moral judgments”). But I would be interested to hear more about:

Generally I believe meta-ethics tends to not map onto normative ethics -- usually you can find a way to defend a realist or anti-realist version of a norm, depending upon how you set out realism or nihilism.

What exactly do you mean here? I don’t think I completely followed.

The anti-realist could say something along the lines that these implicit and involuntary norms don't sound like categorical imperatives, because you couldn't choose them. Deontology, in its Kantian form (which I'm guessing that's appropriate given "categorical imperative") at its base, is an ethics of freedom -- so remove freedom, and it's no longer a moral choice (though it could be a legal choice, say if we brainwashed a criminal into becoming good, they would be following the legality of the moral law but not the morality)

I think that your critique is splendid for Kantian deontic philosophy, but that isn’t a contention (I would say) with the realist idea that there fundamentally are categorical imperatives. By “categorical imperative”, I am not invoking Kant (although the term does originate with him) but, rather, “objective moral judgments”. As far as I understand, one does not need to hold there is this Kantian notion (or rationalist notion) of free will (in the sense of autonomy vs. heteronomy) to be a moral realist. So an anti-realist (or, as a matter of fact, anyone) can validly state that my implict-moral judgments are not voluntary in the Kantian sense, and so Kant would probably disagree that they are moral judgments; but I don’t agree with Kant either.

So it'd be better to classify that kind of instinct as non-cognitivist -- an emotional attachment which has no reason. Hence, anti-realism.

The idea with an implicit moral judgment is that it happens regardless of whether one feels like it or not and it is objective, but you are correct that it wouldn’t be itself cognitive. This is a prime example why the lines between realism and anti-realism (in the sense of there traditional definitions) blur for me. I don’t think it is a non-cognitivist anti-realist position, but classically there are no non-cognitivist realists (but I techinically am one of those in a way).

Then, of fixated-upon norms, it kind of goes in reverse -- it's the very basis of choice which allows these to be moral! Hence, moral realism.

Interesting, I think fixated-upon norms would be anti-realist because I don’t think any of them are objective. I don’t think the thesis for moral realism entails that one has to have a basis of choice over it, but I could be wrong.

Error theory being a noteworthy example to highlight for blending those two sentences: they have a truth value, and they are false.

Error theory is not a moral realist position: it is an anti-realist one. They hold that:

1. Moral statements are propositional (i.e., cognitive).
2. They are all objectively false.

I guess I should clarify that by the realist position I do not mean that they just hold a position grounded in objectivity but, rather, that there are true objective moral judgments—sorry if that was ambiguous in my post.

I appreciate your response,
Bob

Hello unenlightened,

Contrary to your name, I think that your analogy was quite enlightened and thought-provoking: thank you!

Let me try to take a crack at it, with my current understanding, and correct me where I am wrong. It seems as though this kind of metaethical view is anti-realist (squarely), and your normative ethical view is pragmatic. Your analogy is fundamentally conceding, as far as I can tell, that there are no objective moral judgments but, nevertheless, if we all subjectively want to build a building (or most of us do) then there is a procedure we can take to pragmatically achieve that goal (in the most cogent means possible). Thusly, to me, your view (or analogy at the least) seems to hold that morals are ultimately contingent on wills (i.e., subjects) and that there are objective better ways to achieve those goals; but, importantly, I don’t think you are claiming there are objective morals themselves at all. Am I understanding you correctly?

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello T Clark,

I appreciate your response!

Are there consequences depending on which approach you pick? I mean moral consequences, differences in what behavior you consider moral and, more importantly, how you behave.

The metaethical one has tends to greatly shape (I would argue) peoples’ normative ethical theories. For example, most moral anti-realists that I know tend to try to found internal contradictions in another’s view to pursued them not to do some action and if they can’t find one then they just accept it as it is (because they don’t think there is any objective standard to hold that person to). Now that is just an example, and by no means every anti-realist is committed to that; however, realists, on the other hand, tend to command “do not do X” or “do X” based off of what they think is the objective standard. So you can imagine how different the normative ethical theories are that a realist and anti-realist would subscribe to.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello Banno,

Thank you for your response! I think we are semantically disagreeing, as I don’t think you defined the terms correctly; so let me explain my usages of the terms and let me know what you think.

Categorical imperatives are found in deontology, but not so much in consequentialism or virtue ethics.

You are correct that the term “categorical imperative” is found most notably in deontology (specifically starting with Kant), but those are normative ethical theories, not metaethical theories. As far as my knowledge goes, a metaethicist asks the question of “are there objective moral judgments?” (where “categorical imperative” is just a synonym for “objective moral judgment”), or more generally “what are morals?”, instead of “what is wrong or right (given our understanding of what morals fundamentally are) which is what a normative ethicist would be inquiring about. I am fundamentally questioning the metaethic distinction of moral realism and anti-realism, not anything pertaining to normative ethics (at this point); but if you think it is relevant, then we can definitely dive into normative ethics as well!

Moral realism is the idea that moral statements have a truth value - they are true or they are false.

I think you are partially correct: it is a two-fold thesis.

1. Moral statements are propositional (i.e., have truth value).
2. Moral statements are objective.

I think your definition only includes #1, which is also could be a moral anti-realist position (such as moral subjectivism).

So moral realism is not that "there are categorical imperatives" unless one already accepts deontology, which would be odd since if one accepts deontology one would presumably suppose that the categorical imperative is true, and hence be a moral realist.

Again, with a due respect, I think you are conflating metaetchics with normative ethics; but please correct me if I am wrong.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

I appreciate your response!

I think that's one of its virtues, actually: rather than asking if there are these immutable rules which are true for all moral agents, virtue-theoretic devices focus on attempting to build the kind of character which has a tendency to make wise decisions.

I generally agree; but I actually blend, in my normative ethics, both deontic and virtue-theoretic ethics together (and also consequentialism)--for I do seek and hold that there are "immutable rules" (in sense of being a part of one's nature) which are true for all "moral agents" (which I call "wills") and, at the same time, contend that a main focus which stems out of such is fixating on the development of one's character to become "wiser" (and the only means of progression is a pragmatic approach that incorporates also the notion of analyzing consequences).

I see anti-realism (regardless of whether it be error theoretic, subjectivist, non-cognitivist, or some other sub-camp underneath anti-realism) as the claim that there are no objective norms, which I think is half-incorrect (as there are implicit-categorical norms, but no fixated-upon-categorical norms); but, likewise, moral realism tends to be that there are objective norms, and this is taken to mean both fixated and implicit types--which I disagree with. So, I am, more and more, starting to give up on the distinction itself.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello jgill,

I apologize for the belated response my friend! I have been, unfortunately, very busy and haven’t had the time to look at the forum.

Now that I have been thinking about it more, I think you are right with respect to many regards: I do think that, in hindsight, I wrote the essay too vaguely and inadequately; so I totally understand your confusion.

To answer your question, what I was talking about was, in hindsight, transcendental logic (i.e., the study of the necessary preconditions, sometimes called a priori conditions, for the faculty known as reason); and so by “derive” I was referring to reason with no direct connection (or disconnection) to causality. Personally, I don’t think reasoning is a process which can be reduced to physical causality, but I don’t think it matters which stance one takes on that issue to accept PoR.

I want to apologize again and thank you for your responses!

Bob

Hello Philosophim,

As we already discussed, I apologize for the late and overdue response: I have been preoccupied with other things lately and, thusly, have not had the time to adequately respond.

Moreover, since it has been so long (which is entirely my fault), I have developed my view quite significantly since then; so much in fact, that I think a bit more elaboration on my end will suffice to relinquish all the confusion that has sprung thus far (as they are squarely, in my opinion, due to the vagueness and prematurity of my original essay).

Firstly, I would like to note which terminology (of which I used in the essay) that I find to be of no use anymore: pretty much all of it other than PoR itself. Sine qua nons are, in hindsight to me now, just an obscurity conceptually that need not be invoked to convey my view that pertains to the essay. Honestly, I should probably just re-write it. Likewise, infinites do not need to be invoked (or at least I don’t think) to portray the real, true underlying meaning I was so inadequately trying to express.

Consequently, I think it is better if I elaborate on what PoR really is instead of focusing on deconstructing my own essay (because it is too inadequate and confused to me now). PoR is really what I would consider the fundamental logic of reason (as the faculty of the mind) in a transcendental sense (i.e., the necessary preconditions for the possibility of being a mind). It is that which is implicitly required to be a mind, as opposed to something one is or is capable of fixating upon as a mind; so, to address your contention about provability, there is no requirement for a being to be capable of thinking “rationally” in sense of fixating upon formal logic or what have you to nevertheless fundamentally be governed by PoR; and there is no need for a being to “derive” in the sense of what the average human being does—as by “derive” I mean it in a more general, mere sense: an implicit conclusion. A plant doesn’t “decide” nor is it aware of its “conclusions” but it regardless “derives” to grow towards the light.

Which leads me to a giant cause of a lot of ambiguity in my essay: the incredibly blurry line between concepts and objects. I made it sound, with the use of infinites, like a sine qua non would be essentially a pure infinite object, which would just equate to an unterminating, absolute infinite of existence—which is not what I was trying to convey (but I inadequately described it). What really should have been described is that which a mind is contingent on in order to even be such (i.e., transcendental aspects of a mind) and that would have segued into PoR as an example of it.

To give you a bit deeper insight into my position now, I hold that all life is fundamentally will, and “will” and “mind” are inextricably linked—as to be a will is to choose one motive over another at any given point in time (which I would consider a process of a mind). Therefore, I view a plant just as much as a human as a will and, subsequently, as a mind where “mind” is meant to be interpreted in its most rudimentary sense (as obviously there is much difference in terms of a human mind vs a plant mind). I don’t think a plant is “thinking” in the sense that it is leveraging words and concepts to derive its next move but, nevertheless, it does fundamentally choose a motive over another (e.g., it grows towards the light). PoR is a guiding, necessary principle of being a mind (and a will): there are superordinate rules (i.e., subjectively affirmed guiding principles) which “derive” the conclusions (i.e., subordinate rules) which, in turn, guide the actions of the will. There is no person alive which can be without with principle (implicitly): no matter how disabled they may be, they are fundamentally a will and a mind which, in turn, entails that they performs actions (no matter how basic or ill-executed) based off of intentions which, in turn, are motives which were determined by obligations to rules (i.e., superordinate rules). To me, to posit hypothetically a being which has not PoR is to posit an unalive being (i.e., a being with no will: a corpse with no life).

Hopefully that helped clear up the confusion and if it didn’t them please let me know! Again, I apologize for the belated response and for the fact that my ideas have evolved since our last encounter but, nevertheless, I hope I adequately addressed your contentions (otherwise, please point out where I failed to do so).

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Bob, when one expands the sequence:

Awe, I see! I thought you were outlining a set because T was encapsulated in brackets, which I thought meant 'a set'. Correct me where I am wrong, but T = { } seems to be a set and not a summation (∑). To me, nothing about the notation of T = { ... } entailed that one is summing each t of n. My question to you would be, assuming I am simply misapprehending, what about your previous notation entailed (symbolically) the summation of T's elements? I understand that your use ∑ in your most recent post does, but I am failing to see how the T = {} does.

In terms of summing t of n, I totally agree and understand that starting at 1 will result in the limit approaching infinity to equate to 1.

The real numbers constituting [0,3] are uncountably infinite, but the set of these numbers is obviously bounded above and below. This would of course be a finite line segment.

Agreed.

No. S is unbounded above, and if one plots a graph of the terms of S (vertical axis) vs n (horizontal axis) one would need a piece of paper having infinite dimensions. However, the sum of that series diverges so slowly that the sum of the first 6,000,000 terms is less than 21 !

That is true; however, the entirety of mathematics is bounded philosophically speaking. For example, S is unbounded above because it approaches infinity, but S is a bounded concept of which I can negate: not S. This is where we start the philosophical inquiry which has no bearing on formal mathematics. If S were philosophically "unbounded" as a concept, then it would bleed into everything, so to speak: S would also encompass a jurisdiction over my apple I am eating right now, which we both completely understand this is by no means the purpose of formal mathematics whatsoever.

I think, and correct me if I am wrong, we are simply contextually utilizing the term differently for different contexts of inquiry (one of philosophy and the other of formal mathematics). For example, in mathematics, a line segment is bounded and yet has an infinite amount of points in between (due to intermediate value theorem), while a line that approaches negative infinite and positive infinity that is constrained to asymptotes x = 1 and x = 5 is also bounded with an infinite amount of points in between those asymptotes; for math, there's is a meaningful distinction between the two, but, in terms of what I am noting, they are both bounded infinites.

If you believe this to be a confusing conflation of mathematical terminology, then I am more than willingly to consider what you think would be better terms!

Bob

'Poetry' is a just a metaphor for these ideas that are not yet in mathematical shape. It's fair to expect some mastery of real analysis from an innovator. (Algebra and topology are natural mentions, but real analysis is the serious theory of the numbers we all are somewhat familiar with.)

I appreciate the elaboration: thank you! I understand what you are conveying and I think it is perfectly fair and reasonable. However, I would like to note that my essay is not within the actual sphere of mathematical discourse (in other words, it is not a paper intended within the context of formal mathematics): it is a philosophical work pertaining to metaphysics (which I am understanding your metaphorical use of 'poetry' to be synonymous with 'non-formal-math' so to speak). Although there is always much to read, I can say that the vast majority of philosophical works pertaining to metaphysics that I have read do not provide formal mathematical proofs because, quite frankly, it isn't meant to do so. With that being said, if you think I ought to provide a formal mathematical proof of something within the essay, then please feel free to let me know! I would love to hear your critiques.

Bob

Thank you jgill for the elaboration! I am most definitely not an expert mathematician and I most certainly do not want to come across as disconcerting. Let me attempt to adequately respond to your post and you correct me where you deem fit.

Unfortunately, I do not know how to properly format mathematical equations on this discussion forum, so for now I will have to write it in less pretty formatting (dearest apologies in advance).

S is countable, infinite, unbounded above but bounded below.

I think that I understand: there is a set, S, where S is the outputs of the function equal to:

f(n) = n + 1 / n

Where n is constrained to be positive integers (i.e., natural numbers).

It is infinite because the limit as n approaches infinity is infinity, i.e.:

limit n + 1 / n = ∞
n → ∞

Because 1 / ∞ is equal to 0 and thus we have ∞ + 0 = ∞

T is countable, infinite, bounded above and below.

This one is confusing me a bit, as I don’t see how it is bounded above. By my lights, since we are speaking of natural numbers, then the negative n values do not exist and, therefore, are omitted from our consideration. Therefore, although taking the limit of n → - ∞ is - ∞, it holds no relevance if we are speaking of only positive integers for n. Therefore, the limit one really ought to care about is n → 0:

limit n + 1 / n^2 = ∞
n → 0 +

limit n + 1 / n^2 = ∞
n → 0 -

They equal each other, therefore:

limit n + 1 / n^2 = ∞
n → 0

And, also, it is important that as n approaches infinity it also equals positive infinity:

limit n + 1 / n^2 = ∞
n → ∞

Both, in quadrant one, approach infinity and, consequently, I do not understand why the related function, f(x), that is the values contained in set T, would be “bounded above and below”: are you referring to the x = 0 asymptote (i.e., that it is constrained to natural numbers)?

I is uncountable, infinite, bounded below by its greatest lower bound, which it includes, and above by its least upper bound, which it does not include.
Y is countable, infinite, bounded below by its GLB, which it includes, but unbounded above.
X is finite and bounded above and below.

Makes sense.

I think that “bounds” in mathematics is simply asymptotes, limits, restraints to X or Y, and any finite segments (e.g., T would be bounded on the left and restrained to natural numbers—contrary to my previous contention--, and a line segment from the interval [0, 3] inclusive would be a bounded finite).

To explain my form vs content, take set T that you defined and, more specifically, take note of my previous contention/confusion (i.e., the limit exists for 0 even though 0 is an asymptote because the left and right converge to the same value, which is valid technically). The content of f(n) would be the y outputs and the form would be, with respect to the left in quadrant one, its bounds to the asymptote x = 0.

At a deeper level, though, the problem would be that any “unbounded” f(n) one could provide is bounded to the, in toto, concept of that two-dimensional spatial graph. Nothing about it is an unbounded infinite; although I understand the confusion now, as I am not refer to a contextual usage of the term “unbounded” as in n → ∞ = ∞.

Bob

Wonderful analysis as always Philosophim: let me try to adequately respond.

To my mind, the words total and toto is more like potential vs. actual. If I imagine the total amount of trees I can conceive of, its infinite. But if I imagine the tota number of trees I can conceive of, this seems to require a form of some sort, like trees. But, when speaking in total, I require some word like "trees" as well. There's no real difference in this instance, because both are still the unrealized concepts of trees themselves.

For clarification, in toto and in total are meant to describe totality in relation to forms vs. contents of concepts (as a distinction between them) and are not infinites themselves. In other words, I would like to clarify that neither “in toto” nor “in total” are concepts that directly entail an infinite: the former is a conception which is conceived (i.e., defined) as holistic, whereas “in total” is the conception of the summation of its parts (i.e., in content).

Therefore, one can have a conception, A, of which they conceive in toto (i.e., as complete in form) and be able to formulate a conception, B, that is the summation of the parts of A (which would be in total). For example, I can manifest a conception of a set of integers {1, 2, 3} and determine that the summation of the parts as 6: the former is a conception in toto, and the latter is a conception of that conception in total. Firstly, I would like to clarify that by “summation of parts”, I am purposely leaving it vague, like that of a protocol, which is merely meant as any sort of combination of entities (e.g., {1, 2, 3} could be concatenated or mathematically summed for all intents and purposes or even a limit: 123 or 6 or what have you).

Secondly, it is important, as you probably immediately noticed, to note that my previous example is of a concept of finite form and content: now, we must properly determine the possible permutations of both to provide further exposition into such a distinction. For both, I think it is reasonable to conclude that there are three options for each:

1. Indefinite
2. Infinite
3. Finite

And, thusly, we can analyze each permutation of such, like so (briefly speaking):

Indefinite form and indefinite content

Indefinite in content dictates we cannot determine it in total but, rather, only the scope which we currently have.

Indefinite in form is a bit trickier to imagine, but it is something which the individual at hand has neither asserted its finitude nor its infinitude. Arguably, this is simply a state of confusion; that is, I am fairly confident, given a confused example, that I could expose whether it is finite or infinite.

An example of this would be if I were to know that there is a function, f(x), which has a point (3.3, 4.27) and I were to conceive of its form as simply undetermined in bounds (i.e., I am simply confused or, at least, refraining from judgment). The knowledge of the point is a scope, so to speak, of which I know of the content of f(x) and my undetermined boundaries of the concept of f(x) is form. In terms of the former, I cannot determine in total, but I can meaningfully assert that whatever it is it must involve that point. In terms of the latter, regardless of how mislead I may be, I simply have not asserted a form (even though, as I stated previously, I think both of us would probably be able to tell which one it really is).

In terms of the essay, this kind of conception (in form and content) is simply a state of confusion or ignorance and, therefore, is not relevant to the principle of regulation.

Indefinite form and infinite content

An infinite content can be determined in total.

An indefinite form, as per the last example, is simply a state of ignorance, so I won’t linger on it any further.

An example would be a function, f(x), where I know it’s absolute minimum is y = 2 and that the limit as x approaches infinity from the right side is infinity (no rhyme or reason to those numbers, I just made them up). I can conclude, in total, that the sum of its parts (i.e., y values, let’s say) is infinity: for an absolute minimum at y = 2 indicates that f(x) is never negative ys and the limit from the right being infinity tells me that even if the limit to the left is a finite number that the summation of the ys will be infinity.

Again, I would say the concept is finite (that is, bounded), but technically I could be in a state of ignorance or confusion, thusly determining it as indefinite.

Indefinite form and finite content

This is really just ditto but with finite set of numbers (for example), so I won’t linger on this either.

Infinite form and indefinite content

So this is interesting, because it is incoherent: if I assert that a concept is infinite in form, then its content must be infinite. If I assert the content is finite, then I must, conceptually, either implicitly or explicitly, fill the remaining parts with voids (or a filler of some sort). Otherwise I am admitting the concept to be unable to be negated, for example, yet have a totally negatable finite content, which isn’t coherent. The only way to repair this conception is to admit of it void filler parts.

Infinite form and infinite content

This is the realm of sine qua nons (and, in virtue, the principle of regulation): a concept which is repetitive affirmation of negations would be an example of it. This kind of form entails, I must add, only one of its kind as a conception (and not just merely in existence).

Infinite form and finite content

Same situation as infinite form and indefinite content: I must either (1) fill with voids to ensure the form is coherent with the content or (2) strip the form to a finite.

Finite form and indefinite content

This would be a concept which we have limited scope of its content, but we do conceive of it in toto; that is, as a finite form. This is perfectly coherent in itself.

Finite form and finite content

There are ample examples of this one that I feel you are well aware of, so I will not linger.

Finite form and infinite content

This would be like the whole set of natural numbers.

Besides providing the aforementioned as hopefully a means of better explication on my end, the other main point here is that nothing about knowing “in total” grants anything “in toto”, and vice-versa.

So, let me finally address your trees analogy:

So for example
1. The total number of trees I can realize is the unformed potential of all possible trees. As they are unformed, we cannot establish them all. It is an unending pattern.
2. The toto number of trees I can realize is the actual number of trees I realize (perhaps through my life? Or X time?). Perhaps in your original conception we could say if you lived an infinite time, the toto number of trees would be all the trees you actually conceived of during your infinite life.

The concept of “trees” is a bounded concept because it is conceived in toto (that is, a holistic concept) and I can determine in total the summation of its parts. In other words, for example, I can negate your entire concept of “the toto number of trees ...” just as much as I can for your “total number of trees ...” because I can bundle them up into a holistic concept (i.e., both are actually in toto). Likewise, I would like to stress that nothing about me asserting it as conceivable in toto entails what the state of “in total” is (other than what one could infer from my explication of the permutations of form and content).

The point that I want to note is that there is no actual infinity, only a potential infinity. As we are limited beings, the actual of what we are cannot be noted in terms of infinity.

Arguably, I would say there is one which could be valid but if it is then there cannot be more.

As such, we could say the toto number of concepts would be the derivation chains I've conceived of, but in total, there are an unrealized infinite I could conceive of. Is this along the lines of your thinking, or am I still missing or confusing something?

If I am understanding you correctly, then I would say that you are noting something distinctly different from “in toto” vs “in total”; they refer to the same conception and, therefore, to convert your idea here, it would be more like: the number of concepts that you have conceived of would be finite in content and bound in form; or, if you wanted to attempt it, infinite in content and bounded in form; or, infinite in content and unbounded in form; etc.

This leaves the sqn. What I feel you are trying to imply is that a sqn is what is required for the potential of derivations to exist at all. Because the total number of derivations I can make is unrealized, we're not going through and cancelling a "set" of all unrealized concepts I would actually make, but the total potential of what I could make. Because this is unrealized infinity, there are no "numbers" or actuals to negate, only the potential itself. Does this work?

I believe so: a sine qua non (specifically denoted as the principle of regulation) is what is required for the potential of derivations to occur. A sine qua non is sort of like a procedure wherein one negates all concepts in total, but obviously by means of strategic elimination and not brute force (as that is impossible).

What is to prevent a person from defining derivation as something that is only subordinate? What if they made a different word for constructing a superordinate, and did not find that was a derivation at all?

Thinkers can most certainly (and arguably will) construct their own derivations that omit, in definition, the concept of superordinates, subordinates, PoR, sine qua nons, etc. To me, this is not a problem: I am not attempting to argue that it is impossible for one to miss this principle. By means of it, it is entirely possible to never realize it. In your philosophy, I would view this as analogous to “discrete experiencers”, which do not, for your argument to work, have to ever realize they are discretely experiencing. Nothing about this, to me at least, is wrong nor a contention with the essay. But please correct me if I am wrong!

Yes, you are doing so, but you didn't negate the fact that the being could not derivate. And this being may be a highly intelligent being, even another human. Such a human could not use the the PoR. But this is basically because we have defined it as such right? If something cannot conceive of both superordinate and subordinate ideas, by definition, it cannot derivate. The PoR is not a universal concept that can be used or understood by all thinking things. It is a descriptor of certain logical processes of some beings.

I guess I am a bit confused here: what, in terms of mere possibility, could be defined as a “thinking being” which necessarily does not derivate? I would argue, upon further reflection, that all life can be classified as using PoR. PoR itself holds no inherent necessity of the degree by which it can produce superordinate/subordinate rules: a plant grows towards light, a bee operates by means of calculated movements (albeit not necessarily self-aware), etc. By my lights, I am having a hard time thinking of anything that would be constituted as “thinking” yet cannot derivate (to any degree, more specifically).

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Nice to meet you Pie!

Or be revealed as poetry that can't be combed into a formal system ?

Could you please elaborate on what you mean by this? At prima facea, I don’t see how the essay would be poetry, as I am thinking of “writing that uses rhythm, vivid language, and often rhyme to provoke an emotional response “. In the essay, I am attempting at defining, clearly, a sine qua non and, thereafter, that the principle of regulation can be regarded as a such: I am not sure what emotional response can be derived therefrom, but I would be interested to hear what you think!

Bob

Can we have a sine qua nons for an unbounded infinite. Yes, but there is only one. That would be "not X". If not X were true, then X would not follow. Anything more specific may be a sqn for a bounded infinite, but it cannot be a sqn for an unbounded infinite.

My issue would be that “not X” is a bounded infinite and so is “without numbers”: they both must conceive of the concept in toto to negate it. Therefore, “without numbers” really is an assertion that negates itself: for I am forced to conceive of “numbers” in toto, which is a complete whole (i.e., a traditional numeric “one”) which entails I have not, in fact, omitted numbers thereby.

In saying this, I think (although correct me if I am wrong) I am, at prima facie, not only agreeing with your examples but also supplementing them here.

That is why a sine qua non is not “one” in a traditional, numeric sense: it is an infinite in total as opposed to in toto. I can posit as many in toto conceptions I want, systematically, (i.e., numerical wholes—one) within a sine qua non (as being negated) without contradiction.

Likewise, I also agree that two unbounded infinites is a contradiction in terms and, therefore, I will interpolate that into the essay (as I believe I can prove it without further axiomatic importations).

In other words, “one” sine qua non is not “one” in the sense of a numerical whole but, rather, in total; that is, the analysis of what it approaches without the ability to encapsulate it. Perhaps a distinction of a “numerical one” (i.e., “in toto one”) and a “in total one” would be useful in the essay?

The same applies to the principle of regulation. Within X words, Y meaning, and Z contexts we are still bound by words, meaning, and context. Let simplify this further. W = { X, Y, and Z } all without "numbers" or explicit individual representations. W is still bound by X, Y, and Z. The only way for W to be unbounded is just "W".

Again, I would say that all of this, including any conceptions “without numbers”, for all intents and purposes, is being conceived numerically (that is, in toto). “just ‘w’” could very well, depending on how one is noting its form, be “one” (in toto) or “one” (in total)--I am unable to discern given the context thus far.

In terms of the arguments for our contingency on words (as an example), that argument is ultimately contingent on PoR. A set of implicit or explicit superordinate rules were utilized to derive the conclusion (reasonable and rational conclusion I must add) that a human being is contingent on words to explicate their messages (or at least, heavily contingent, as body language is a thing technically). However, the argument from the essay is that without PoR not “a human being is contingent on words”.

Can thinking things within this limit form and use conclude the logic of the principle of regulation is necessary. Absolutely. But can this be concluded from "W" alone? No, I don't believe it can.

I am not quite following what you mean by “’W’ alone”: could you please elaborate a bit? The point of noting the form of an infinite is for the expression that one cannot omit it without absurdity in relation to the definitions provided: it, simply put, cannot be bounded. I feel like we are more in agreement then we may have realized.

No, I'm not stating this. I'm stating an unbounded infinite is not a concept. The moment we create a concept within it, we are now within a bounded infinite. As such, there is only one unbounded infinite. Anytime any explicit infinite is proposed, it is by nature bounded.

I view this as you defining “concept” as having an essential property of “bounded form”; however, it is possible to define it as “bounded or unbounded in form” and I do not see, as of yet, why this would be a contradiction or an absurdity. Therefore, I think, so far, we are merely semantically disagreeing. If by “concept” you mean something with necessarily bounded form, then I simply would have to come up with a different term. I think what you are trying to convey is that that term I create, whatever it may be, is necessarily bounded in form: but why? At the bare minimum, I can conceive of a concept which prohibits boundaries as a continual process (therefore, not merely within a context of space or time or what have you).

You shouldn't need sqn's to prove the principle of regulation to logically thinking minds. And even if you do, perhaps its something you could come back and show later? Is the concept of a SQN within an unbounded infinite absolutely needed to continue your line of thought from the PoR proposal? If you just started the sentence with, "If we have the ability to derive, the principle of regulation logically arrives," would that hamper what you want to do? I feel you have so much more to say, and possibly introduce greater thoughts that I would hate to see stopped over focusing on what may be a technical, and perhaps unnecessary detail to show us what you have planned.

I agree! I think that I am going to begin building off of the essay and, once I am done, I will post them all together (as I think doing it in segments has only produced more confusion). I think that this essay will be readily available to reference if a conversation requires it, but there’s no need to squander time on it right now. With that being said, I still would love to hear what everyone thinks, so continuing to contend with infinities is totally fine with me: I will just be allowing myself to continue my adventure whilst that is occurring.

This right here is where I think you should go into detail. Prove not only to yourself, but that none of us can conclude anything differently. If you do this, I don't think anyone is going to need the infinite. How in the absence of derivation must we all necessarily have the principle of regulation? If I am not a being able to derivate, could I conclude I could not derivate?'

Regardless of how one puts it, whatever they derive utilized the principle that the subordinate rule(s) could not contradict the superordinate ones. However, the tricky and slightly confusing aspect is that, they can most definitely utilize PoR in a manner where they are convinced that it is not true or the case.

For example, if I were to postulate a concept of “a being that cannot derivate”, then I am doing so by means of deriving something which cannot derive. Consequently, whatever concept I derive for “non-derivation” is contingent on derivation to have been manifested.

As another example, if I were to postulate a concept of a derivation that “is not the use of subordinate rules not being able to contradict the superordinate rules”, then I can readily identify the superordinate rules I utilized to even derive that very concept itself. As a particular example:

I concluded X.
Y was the sole superordinate rule within the derivation of X (i.e., I determined it solely off of X, let’s say).
X is and is not true of Y.
Therefore, PoR is not applicable to this derivation.
Therefore, PoR is not true.

If I take it as granted that each is true (e.g., Y actually was the sole producer of X), then I can dissect this further to realize it is being derived by PoR (as it is a mere facade that it is not applicable by means of the possibility of negating it). For example, for me to have concluded X, I abided by the rule that the following could not be true and false within the derivation: X can be true and false of Y and Y can still determine X, but thereof cannot be true and false lest “I concluded X” is indeterminate as is. Likewise, to determine something as the “sole contributor” requires its own set of derivation with this same exact relation (and PoR being not applicable by some deductive or inductive argument, and PoR not being true by some deductive or inductive argument, etc.). Likewise, my argument that it is required requires one, and so forth. I can quite literally keep abstracting, particularlizing, and more generally deriving this infinite nest whereof it never rests upon an absolute foundation, so to speak.

This even functions for irrational or absurd derivations, such as:

I think 1 = 2 is true and 1 = 1 is true

We can perform analysis on this in any direction, with any goal, in mind—but one of particular interest is that they seem to be committing to the idea that 1 is and is not 1 (i.e., the absence of the law of noncontradiction): that would be an implicit superordinate rule.

In explicating that to them, they may reject that notion as well:

I accept the law of noncontradiction and “1 = 2 and 1 = 1” is still true.

Assuming, for all intents and purposes, that they aren’t merely conceptualizing things differently or semantically refurbishing well known concepts, they are still abiding by some set of superordinate rules to be able to possibly derive it in the first place. It could be that they hold the law of noncontradiction as exempt from itself or some other goal motivating their derivation, but the point is that we never get to a point where we can rest metaphorically upon absolute grounds, so to speak. Even if I conclude that “they simply derived it arbitrarily”, then the rule of arbitrary randomness governed their derivation. And my conclusion thereof and its justification will be by superordinate rules as well.

Bob

I asked my questions about time vis-a-vis PoR because I want to know who does PoR as sine qua non have as his neighbors? I was conjecturing that time is one of PoR's neighbors. As such, time does not prove PoR as sine qua non. Instead, time is one of PoR's neighbors, which is to say time & PoR are a matched set. One always implies the other.

If I am understanding you correctly, then I would say that there is no “neighbor” to PoR. I think, and correct me if I am wrong, you are essentially arguing that time and PoR are biconditionally related. However, an argument for time (and, I would say, space) encompassing all one’s cognitive faculty requires the use of axioms which do not lie within the essay. The axiom, so to speak, for the essay is two-fold: (1) an engagement in the attempt to derive a sine qua non and (2) implicitly the use of the definitions without contradiction.

With that being said, I agree that “derivation” implies “time” (and space): it is just that that would require axioms not granted nor required to accept PoR.

I haven't forgotten your explanation to the effect that, by definition, two sine qua nons are mutually exclusive and thus cannot both belong to one set.

I think that, upon further contemplation, I can prove, without the importation of other axioms, that two or more sine qua nons cannot be true. For example, if there were two true sine qua nons, then they would, by definition, have to independent, but, also by definition, they would be, as independent “without which, not”, biconditionally dependent on one another. In other words, for one to be a sine qua non, the other would have to be dependent on it; but, since likewise for the other, they would really be two biconditionally dependent concepts, which would not be sine qua nons by definition. Therefore, there can only be one true sine qua non. I think I will interpolate that into the essay here shortly.

Some other candidates for neighbors of PoR might be superordinate & subordinate rules?

PoR is the principle that the subordinate rules cannot be affirmed and denied in accordance to the superordinate rules within the given operation of derivation (as a recursive principle). The terminology of “superordinate rule”, “subordinate rule”, “rule”, “in toto”, “in total”, etc. are merely a means of describing PoR itself and, therefore, I, as of now, do not see them as “neighbors” of PoR but, rather, more like a means of explication.

If PoR has no neighbors, how can it fulfill the role of sine qua non in total isolation?

I apologize: I may have lead you astray by not acknowledging that only one sine qua non can be true. A sine qua non is not isolated but, on the contrary, it is that which everything in total (as opposed to in toto) is contingent upon (including “contingency” as a primitive faculty of reason). Therefore, it is ever present (in total that is, not in toto).

When the temporality of an object is undecidable, is not the location of said object also undecidable?

PoR is what we utilize to determine what “time”, “undeterminancy”, “location”, etc. is. It is what we utilize to determine what is is, etc. It doesn’t have a location like a physical object in space (I would argue).

My underlying premise here is that even a purely cognitive "object," holding a priori status, by force of causality (inter-relatedness) obtains location. In this example, location of sine qua non is first member of a sequence.

I don’t think it is a priori or a posteriori because both require PoR to classify anything therein or to even construct the terms themselves. I don’t think it would make sense to classify it as a priori, for example, because that is merely something else we derive, given a set of implicit or explicit superordinate rules.

I'm starting to suspect that sine qua non, as absolute solitary, without neighbors covering peers & subordinates alike, in parallel to the singularity of the Big Bang, cries out for conceptual revamping that addresses the deeply problematical boundary ontology of origins.

Although I may just be merely misunderstanding you, I do not view a sine qua non as isolated whatsoever.

Bob

Hello Philosophim,

Wonderful points as usual! Let me try to respond adequately.

I don't think we can say an "unbounded infinite of negations". That's really, a "bounded infinite of negations"

By “negation”, to be more precise, I mean a “complete negation”; that is, that the entirety of what is negated is completely obliterated (so to speak). Therefore, I do not mean a “partial negation”. Consequently, I am in agreement with you that “not X” necessarily entails that X is bounded (which is what I noted as “being conceived in toto”) because to negate it I must implicitly treat it as completely not (as opposed to “partially not”).

However, as far as I am understanding you, you seem to be asserting that an “unbounded infinite of negations” (which, we are in agreement, is an “unbounded infinite of nots of bounded concepts”) is somehow entailed to be equivalent to “a bounded infinite of nots of bounded concepts”. In other words, it seems as though, from my point of view, you are rightly identifying the bounded nature of the contents of the unbounded infinity and, in virtue of that, extending it (or maybe misassigning it) to its form.

I can see an unbounded infinite negated, because an unbounded infinite is the base from which all bounded infinites are formed.

Categorically, I think it would be a contradiction in terms to posit the negation of an unbounded infinite: that is actually a bounded infinite. Let me try to explain:

But if we say that all possible bounded infinites are negated, isn't that the same as stating an unbounded infinite is negated?

I don’t think these are the same concepts that you just described and I think it is the root of our dispute. Firstly, it is important to note that I am not, at this point, attempting to prove that there is an unbounded infinite but, rather, I am merely trying to prove there is a valid concept of such that is at your disposal—for, as of now, it seems as though your contention lies in the denial of an “unbounded infinite” as a valid concept (i.e., it is really a “bounded infinite” assigned a new name).

To simplify it down for all intents and purposed for now, it seems as though, to me, you are essentially stating: an unbounded infinite of nots = not an unbounded infinite.

I would describe it as a difference between conceiving in toto and in total. Bundling up all those negations found within the unbounded infinite into a “complete concept” is to necessarily contradict the very concept (that is, attempt some operation which necessitates it to be conceived in toto). By “concepts” I am not entailing that it have a bounded form, which is what I suspect you are at least partially committing yourself to.

You are conceptually performing a different task to completely negate an unbounded infinite. What you seem to have done is analyzed the content of an unbounded infinite in terms of the sum of its parts to derive what it approaches (i.e., in total) and, thereafter, conflated that with in toto--thereby considering “not an unbounded infinite” valid; However, nothing about the sum of the parts of a concept entails that it can be conceived as a whole (that is, nothing about being conceivable in total entails that it is conceivable in toto).

This is the exact issue that required of me to explicate that, in the essay, a sine qua non is “without which, not” not “without which, none”; that is, the natural and swift leap from the sum of the parts of the content of a concept cannot entail its form in any way whatsoever (and nothingness is a great example of that). The unbounded infinite of nots does not necessitate nor prove a complete concept of nothingness (i.e., in the essay: “none”). The essay itself, consequently, does not even attempt to prove that “without the principle of regulation, there is nothingness”, because the PoR is also valid of the statement “without PoR, not nothingness” and “without PoR, not everythingness” (and so on): there is nothing which “escapes” it, so to speak.

The issue you may be having conceptualizing it is quite understandable, as with everything else we tend to swiftly conceive of finites and bounded infinites in toto based off of in total: but I have separated the two modes of thinking. For example, if one were to postulate what an infinite of empty sets would exist as in space, then they are more than likely going to quickly derive the summation of the parts to conclude that it would be nothing. This, however, in the sense of separating the two modes of thinking, is only valid by positing the form of the infinite as bounded. Therefore, I am noting the two different modes of thinking involved in the assessment:

First, the individual determined in total the infinite of empty sets, which is 0. This mode of thinking requires simply the ability to conceive what a sequence approaches (e.g., I cannot actually perform 0 + 0 forever, but I can nevertheless reasonably conclude it results in 0).

Second, the individual implicitly shifts their mode of thinking to in toto to “package” and “bundle” their conclusion into a wholly conceivable concept (e.g., 0 in space is nothing); that is, they assume that their evaluation in total of the infinite of empty sets warrants the ability to substitute the infinite for a bounded counterpart equal it in total (e.g., the total of the infinite is 0, therefore where ever I utilize the infinite I can substitute 0 for it). But, there is a distinction here, I think, in that they are not necessarily equivalent and, thusly, they are not always guaranteed to be valid of substitution: performing substitution of a bounded for an unbounded necessarily means that the form of the concept has been reshaped (by means, I would say, of utilizing a different mode of thinking). This substitution is only valid if the intents have no bearing on the form of the infinite: if the form matters, then 0 cannot be a valid substitution for an infinite of empty sets. Admittedly, a vast vast majority of the time I think the form is dismissable; however, my essay (I would argue) is an example where the distinction is vital.

The best I can think of is that we must be able to make conceptualizations out of/within the unbounded infinite. Because if something could not, then nothing could create any sort of differentiation between bounded, and unbounded. Does this somehow fit within your PoR?

I may be misunderstanding you here, but PoR can be utilized to make distinctions, but the very concept of PoR is also via itself. Therefore, the indifferentiation or differentiation of PoR from other things is via PoR. In that sense, PoR cannot be separated from anything, including nothing.

This again is where I have a hard time. Without a sqn, nothing can be. Which means without a sqn, concepts cannot be either. The way I read the essay and your explanation, it seems to imply without a sqn, the infinite, bounded or unbounded could not be.

Another great point Philosophim! This, I would say, is your other major contention with my work (which is not the same as what was previously mentioned). Let me explain it back to you (to ensure that I am understanding correctly) and then I will attempt to adequately address it. Here’s what I think you are essentially saying:


#1
p1. A sine qua non is “without which, not”
p2. Therefore, by definition of #1p1, a sine qua non contains “without which, not “concepts””

#2
p1. A unbounded infinite is a concept
p2. By substitution property and #1p2, a sine qua non contains “without which, not “unbounded infinite””
p3. By #2p2, it is a contradiction in terms to assert an unbounded infinite as a sine qua non.
p4. Therefore, an unbounded infinite cannot be a sine qua non.

The issue I would have is:

1. #1p2 is only partially true: I am allowing a “concept” to be incomplete in form and, therefore, a sine qua non only contains “without which, not “concepts with a complete form””. The mode of thinking matters to me.

2. Therefore, a sine qua non cannot contain a concept with an incomplete form.

Note: by “incomplete form”, I do not mean a concept merely conceived as incomplete in content (e.g., an incomplete apple) as that is complete in form (e.g., a complete concept of an incomplete apple).

Now, at face value, my response seems to be a contradiction: if a sine qua non is an unbounded infinite of negations, then it seems as though I ought to be able to negate it within itself, otherwise it cannot be deemed true. The answer is that one can subvert a sine qua non through itself; however, that is to necessarily erode its form to that of being bounded (i.e., to shift my mode of thinking to in toto), which is not really a sine qua non: I am thereafter dealing with an imposture so to speak and not the real thing.

Likewise, if only complete forms are allowed, then it seems as though there is something which persists with the negation of a sine qua non: concepts with incomplete forms, which contradicts the idea of it being a sine qua non in the first place. However, again, an incomplete form is an unbounded infinite or a contradiction in terms (e.g., either unbounded with infinite content or a contradiction wherein it is unbounded with finite content). In terms of the latter, it is invalid. In terms of the former, we must contend with it: does an unbounded infinite persist, as a concept with incomplete form, without a sine qua non? The answer is no, because, again, to posit an unbounded infinite as without a concept necessarily shifts the mode of thinking in toto, which contradicts the term itself. If this operation is permitted, then the unbounded infinite simply (1) is not an unbounded infinite and (2) does not persist without a sine qua non because its eroded bounded conception is wholly within the jurisdiction of a sine qua non (“without which, not”). Therefore, I submit to you that an unbounded infinite is not out of nor within wholly and, therefore, it stands not outside (without) a sine qua non and, in turn, it does not pose a threat to the concept thereof.

Again, I think that our dispute first lies in whether an “unbounded infinite” is valid as a concept, which hopefully I have proved herein, and, after that we can then discuss whether there is such a concept. As always, I could merely be wrong about the concept itself.

Bob

In isolation, I agree that your quote of mine makes little sense; however, in the context of the entirety of the response where it is contained I think it makes sense. I would suggest reading this post in its entirety (if you haven't already) and then feel free to ask specific questions about it.

If I had to extract certain parts of the linked response, then I would provide further context:

Within the scope of the essay, I would disagree (albeit incredibly reasonable to assume). Yes, it is reasonable to infer that the procedure and proof of the essay is necessarily that of temporal relations (sequences in succession of one another). The important thing is that, as of now, I find such a conclusion (i.e., derivation or the principle of regulation is temporal) to only be found by importation of other axioms (or, in my terms, superordinate principles which are not apart of the standard terminology nor proof explicated in the essay. My point here is not to completely discourage your conclusion here, but only to expose that it is by means of other superordinate rules other than what is required (I would argue) to prove PoR to be true. In other words, it is entirely possible for one to accept PoR as true and immediately thereafter assert PoR is in time, is time, is sans time, neither in or outside of time, etc

…

I am not entirely certain that a stable methodological approach can be establish to examine the properties or existence of PoR, but that is something I am currently contemplating. I find compelling arguments to assert it is aspatio-temporal (because there is no where which would reasonably pertain specifically to PoR and any derivation of its temporal sequences of derivation are simply via it), but, in contradistinction, I find it compelling to argue for its spatio-temporality (because being sans time & space seems merely to be a conceptualization under space and with time); however, I think both arguments are within the real of critique of derivation (as they are both inheriting from this PoR meta-derivation if you will) and, therefore, I think that, with respect to PoR itself, the best way to conceive of it for the essay is neither true nor false of the former nor the latter. It just simply seems inapplicable, but correct me if I am wrong.

Nothing about it has to do with the fundamentals being proven in the essay (i.e., that the principle of regulation is a sine qua non--being a true statement) I would say. If it is still confusing, then please let me know and I can elaborate further.

Another member of TPF has in the past submitted a lengthy and sophisticated essay on a theory of everything (or roughly that), starting with an assumption every fact in the universe can be encoded for use in Turing machines. But doesn't explain how.

I am not familiar with the essay you are referring to, but it seems disanalogous to mine. It seems as though the point of their proof was to show that their claim is true, yet their proof was vague: I don't find that my proof is vague, but correct me if I am wrong.

In terms of your other post:

This essay might get a larger following if all this infinite stuff were in mathematically acceptable nomenclature. Just a thought.

What exactly would you suggest in terms of mathematically acceptable nomenclature? What about our discussion of infinities is confusing within the apperception of mathematics?

Bob

It is true that 1=1 in the world defined by the definitions and rules of mathematics. The rest of us just accept this truth on blind faith based on the accomplishments and power of mathematics to be useful in the sciences.

I have brought up the pitfalls of 'true' in metaphysical reasoning. For metaphysics akin to mathematical reasoning, True is a binary value for evaluating dichotomies, any other use of truth is common but can be shown to be invalid or unsound. Since '1' is just like any other concept, it can not be true that '1' and '1' is anything other than '1'. Just as 'orange' and 'orange' are 'orange' and nothing else. However, instantiations of 'orange' are countable. 1 orange +1 orange = 2 oranges. And 1 apple +1 orange = 2 fruit

I would like to clarify that the essay pertains to the higher principles involved in the example given therein, as opposed to a critique of the derivation itself (i.e., of the example derivation of 1=1). Therefore, within the scope of the essay, nothing about it is meant to prove that you must accept 1 = 1 as true. This seems to be what you are contending with: am I correct? If not, please correct me where I am wrong.

Indexical means 'relative to context of utterance' - like 'he' or 'here', as you say. The term 'existence' does not seem relative to context in that way. You go on to say that it has different senses, which is different from indexicality.

Upon further contemplation, I agree with you that ‘he’, as an indexical use of language, is not analogous to my use of different senses. However, what I was really trying to convey in terms of “indexical” is “of or relating to an index”, which I do still think applies (although my example of ‘he’ was fallacious).

You may well be right. Hamlet exists as a character in a play and does not exist as a flesh and blood human being. So sure, there are different kinds of existence in that way. But to say for example that Hamlet exists but does not [open italics]actually[close italics] exist is confused and confusing.

I still think that there is a meaningful distinction to be made the sense of existence of a thing and there are different terms for such. For example, ‘ontic’ (e.g., noumena and phenomena) usually refers to the being of things and ‘ontological’ is the discussion of being of being (e.g., dasein). In terms of ontical consideration, I would simply dividing it up further:

There is a ‘colloquial’ sense of ‘existence’ wherein laymen tend to denote an objects tangibility.
There is a ‘phenomenological’ sense of ‘existence’ wherein in a person denotes that an object exists as an appearance, with no immediate classification of what it may exist as otherwise.
And so forth…

Now, to be honest, I slightly blundered in my use of ‘ontic’, in hindsight, as what I really was trying to convey was what sense they were meaning the term more generically than that.

When you say it is a confused outlook, I would agree if what you mean is that it would be a contradiction to assert that, for example, something exists phenomenologically and does not exist phenomenologically. However, I would be hesitant to concede that making such contextual sense of “existence” are unwarranted or that they are confusing.

You chose the cup in your hand as a straightforward example of something which exists, distinguishing it perhaps from the tiger in your hallway which (ex hypothesi) does not.

A cup does not uncontroversially exist, unless you are referencing a colloquial use of the term (e.g., it is tangible). Many philosophers, some of which I already mentioned, would not state a cup exists ontologically (or they may have other distinctions such as a cup as a noumena verses a phenomena).

It's a useful example specifically because it won't let us wriggle away from its existence.

If by “tiger in your hallway”, you mean an imaginary tiger, then I would say an imaginary tiger exists in the imagination: that’s still qualified as existing. Again, if you are thinking of colloquial “to be”, then, yes, an imaginary tiger is not tangible, therefore it does not exist (and that is a meaningful distinction in its own right).

The problem is that your cup doesn't exist sans your consciousness and the cup in your dreams also does not exist sans your consciousness. We are left with the problem of distinguishing a cup in the hand from a dreamed cup. That is, a real cup from an imagined cup.

This is true, and the subject can do so however they so please. In a colloquial setting, I typically denote a tangible cup (i.e., non-imaginary) as “a real cup” because I know most situations that is how everyone is thinking about it (they aren’t philosophers); however, I can easily and reasonably (I would say) assert that both the imaginary and non-imaginary exist in their own respects. Therefore, an imaginary cup is not the same as a non-imaginary cup, but nevertheless they both certainly exist.

Similarly, the cup in your dreams also exists contextually to phenomena and for all I know it may exist as one infinite substance as well.

I think you are committing an equivocation: just because two things are phenomena doesn’t mean they are equivalent. Just because I conceive of a chair and a table under the concept of “object” does not mean I can thereby assert them equal to one another. An imaginary and non-imaginary cup are both phenomena, but are nevertheless distinguishable in many meaningful ways. Likewise, one can most certainly reject the “phenomena” vs “noumena” distinction, as my main point pertained to possibility and not favoring one over the other.

But at some time, possibly outside the philosophy laboratory, we are going to have to distinguish the cup of our dreams from the cup in our hands, the car that hit ours from the car that did not, the positive bank balance from the negative.

Practicality is a worthy consideration, but I genuinely don’t see, as of yet, how one cannot pursue such within what I have posited hitherto. Nothing about what I stated necessarily determines imagination and non-imagination indistinguishable, an inability to distinguish different cars, nor an inability to discern bank balances.

I mean, while we enjoy this delicious atmosphere of confusion we must still keep a concept of 'existence' tucked in our back pockets for use when we actually need it and not just for when we are playing at metaphysics. And that, I submit - the concepts tucked away for use when we are serious - is our metaphysics.

I understand: it seems as though you are arguing for the practical over what you would deem the philosophical; however, I think the deeper issue is that they aren’t incompatible with one another whatsoever.

If the terms mean something like the interpretation I gave them, then I can get little sense out of this - except perhaps that if we fail to follow rules of logical inference, then we will fail to make logical inferences.

If there’s any way you think I can provide better clarification on the essay, then please let me know! What I can say is that it is not about “failing to make logical inferences”, as that is a contemplation of logic, which is not determined nor argued for in the essay.

Bob

I apologize for the belated response ucarr! I had a hefty week or so. With that being said, let me dive into your post.

WRT = with respect to

Thank you for the clarification: I was not familiar with that acronym.

Context ≅ Environment. In my thinking, environment suggests state of affairs, which suggests reality.

I wouldn’t quite go as far as to claim context is synonymous to environment (maybe that’s why you used a tilde equal sign?--to suggest an approximate equivalence). I would be hesitant to confine “context” to “reality” (which I would agree is implied with environment, at least to some degree). Therefore:

In your usage here, is individual… can transcend their own context an action symbolic or literal?

In terms of object relations, I would say that I can meaningfully produce contexts sans-my-body (e.g., I can see red, but they cannot).

In terms of consciousness, it is much harder to produce anything (or at least anything rational) without admitting the contingency of other objects on the sensations and perceptions of my object (i.e., the body). However, it is possible for a subject to posit things without their bodies (no matter how irrational/rational it may be), as it is possible to deny the contingency of something on such and, not only that, but people can produce meaningful predictions that involve positing their non-existence. So I wouldn’t holistically grant that I cannot posit sans-my-consciousness.

In terms of reason, I think that, although an individual can still assert its omission, the most rudimentary thereof is without omission (in possibility). This is the area of discourse which I am attempting to convey with the principle of regulation.

Now whether that is literal or symbolic, as I do not entirely know how you are utilizing those terms, I will leave up to you.

An essay is, at bottom, the logical language of argumentation

I think, in the sense you are positing it, I would agree. However, I would distinguish “logical language” (in the sense of a formal or informal theory of logic) from hyper-logic (maybe “meta-logic”?--I am not too sure as of yet). If you mean it in terms of the latter, then I agree. If in terms of the former, I disagree.

The stuff of logic is a continuum of conditionals that unfold sequentially, thus implying a temporal process

Within the scope of the essay, I would disagree (albeit incredibly reasonable to assume). Yes, it is reasonable to infer that the procedure and proof of the essay is necessarily that of temporal relations (sequences in succession of one another). The important thing is that, as of now, I find such a conclusion (i.e., derivation or the principle of regulation is temporal) to only be found by importation of other axioms (or, in my terms, superordinate principles which are not apart of the standard terminology nor proof explicated in the essay. My point here is not to completely discourage your conclusion here, but only to expose that it is by means of other superordinate rules other than what is required (I would argue) to prove PoR to be true. In other words, it is entirely possible for one to accept PoR as true and immediately thereafter assert PoR is in time, is time, is sans time, neither in or outside of time, etc.

Although logical expressions can be conceptualized as atemporal mental objects, continuity is always empirical & temporal

I would personally agree that derivation is always empirical and temporal; however, I don’t find, as of yet, that that is necessary to hold to prove PoR. Please let me know if you think I am wrong here.

If, as I interpret you to be saying with the above two claims, sine qua non is not of anything, and, moreover, is not at all contextual, then I get the impression the whereness of sine qua non is more mysterious than the position of an orbiting electron at any given moment. Is that the case?

I am not entirely certain that a stable methodological approach can be establish to examine the properties or existence of PoR, but that is something I am currently contemplating. I find compelling arguments to assert it is aspatio-temporal (because there is no where which would reasonably pertain specifically to PoR and any derivation of its temporal sequences of derivation are simply via it), but, in contradistinction, I find it compelling to argue for its spatio-temporality (because being sans time & space seems merely to be a conceptualization under space and with time); however, I think both arguments are within the real of critique of derivation (as they are both inheriting from this PoR meta-derivation if you will) and, therefore, I think that, with respect to PoR itself, the best way to conceive of it for the essay is neither true nor false of the former nor the latter. It just simply seems inapplicable, but correct me if I am wrong.

I now have an impression of your essay’s essence via use of a helpful metaphor wherein your sine qua non holds status akin to the singularity that precedes the Big Bang.

If there’s even a particle of truth in application of my pre-Big Bang metaphor to your metaphysical claim, then hopefully I can proceed to an understanding you’re wrestling with the boundary ontology of origin.

If I am understanding the analogy correctly, then I think I would more or less agree. PoR is simply what (I think) can be proven to be a sine qua non, which essentially means that it is the meta-derivation (so to speak). Although I think there’s a strong case to make that I am acting as if PoR is what ontologically exists, I can’t say I am able to place that within the essay itself (for the same reason as my previous elaboration on spatio-temporality).

One could, I suppose, think of PoR as a spark of derivations. Is that what you mean?

I would emphasize that the essay is not making reference to “reality” though, so it is not entirely analogous to the Big Bang.

Boundary Ontology of Origin – continuity via hyper-logic across the super-position of a non-localized QM event.

By QM, do you mean Quantum Mechanics? If so, the essay is not meant as an exposition of any quantum mechanical principles (nor is it meant to assert for or against any given scientific principle). Again, the essay is meant to be a inquiry into higher reasoning (or lower depending on how one wants to visualize it).

In terms of superpositioning, do you mean to reference its use from quantum mechanics? If so, I would say the same thing as previously, but please correct me if I am misunderstanding you.

The above definition is my best-to-date exposition of a hairy beast of a concept that is one of my works-in-progress. I won’t elaborate it’s possible pertinence to your essay because that would entail an inappropriate digression from your work. I will say I expect it to inform some of my commentary upon your work henceforth.

I appreciate and respect your effort to keep our conversation pertinent to my essay, but if it helps you elaborate on your views (in contrast to mine), then please feel free to discuss them!

Since you reject time_sine qua non, I think it imperative you state (If you have not done so) whether PoR_sine qua non is temporal, or atemporal.

I don’t find time to be a consideration necessary to prove PoR as a sine qua non and, furthermore, any assertion of atemporality, temporality, spatial references, etc. is via PoR (thereby dependent on it). As I alluded to earlier, I think for the sake of the essay it may be best to conceive of a sine qua non as neither in time nor not in time.

I’ve been understanding regulation in the everyday sense of a transitive verb that controls & shapes an object under its influence. I don’t presently see this function as being atemporal.

I agree, but by “regulation” I was meaning “to govern or direct according to rule”, which (I think) coincides with my construction of superordinate and subordinate rules. I am honestly not sure what “modulation” would entail beyond “regulation”, but if you think it is a better term for what I am trying to convey then please feel free to critique me!

Your above statement, speaking potentially, has a lot to say to the project to bring the rules of inference into congruence with QM.

If I am understanding correctly, I don’t think our ideas are perfectly aligning, but are similar. Maybe in due time we will determine them to, indeed, be equivalent.

If the above claim contains a particle of truth, then your sine qua non, as presently perceived by me, embodies something akin to the Original Utterance, itself, in turn, akin to the pre-Big Bang Singularity, itself, in turn, akin to God’s “Let there be light!”

I hope you’ll forgive the tincture of theism_Jungian psychology pooling into my assessment of your essay.

Might sine qua non, per your essay, be your Logos?

Although I don’t mind you invoking theology, I don’t think PoR is synonymous with the vast majority of conceptions of God, Logos, or the Original Utterance. The essay isn’t positing it as what created the universe, it is simply where I hit bedrock: it is the most rudimentary aspect of me (that is, me as reason: the subject).

If you think it is more alike to theological conceptions than I would grant, then I would love to hear why!

Bob

I entertain hope that your above claim expresses a/the crux of your essay's purpose.

I think that the two biggest cruces are (1) whether the individual at hand can transcend their own context (which is what you and Philosophim brought up, I would say) and (2) whether the idea of the essay preceding “logical languages” (or theories of logic) is question begging. Those, I would say, are the most concerning aspects, fundamentally, of the essay. So I would agree with you on that.

PoR can never be excluded from context

I agree, but I want to clarify that, more abstractly, it is “PoR can never be excluded”--it isn’t just contexts. For example:

Proving this logically renders PoR as sine qua non WRT context.

I am not sure what “WRT” stands for, but a sine qua non has no prepositions (as noted in the essay), so it is not sine qua non of WRT context. This may be me just splitting hairs though, because a context that is universal I really wouldn’t constitute as a context, but if that is what you mean, then I would agree in saying that PoR is a sine qua non (without a preposition).

Does this imply the concomitant> Derivation can never be excluded from context.
Does this lead us to> Context contains at least (2) sine qua nons: PoR & Derivation

Although I completely understand why you were inclined to conclude this, I don’t think it is correct. Firstly, a sine qua non is “without which, not” (where “not” is an unbounded infinite negative) and, therefore, the possibility of “without PoR, not derivation” invalidates “derivation” as being a sine qua non. Secondly, this is exactly why, derivation not being a sine qua non, produces the possibility that someone can completely remove it within their derivation (no matter how irrational it may be, as someone else could easily mention that I just literally said “someone can remove derivation from their derivation”), whereas they cannot remove PoR without utilizing it. Let me know if I need to explain more, as this is definitely where it starts becoming necessary to be precise with my terminology.

Likewise, time is by no means something one can posit as sine qua non, as “without PoR, not time” and, honestly, there are many principles that are required for it to be affirmed in the first place (i.e., faculties of reason which allow one to determine that time is enveloping of oneself, or that there is a non-temporal true claim, or neither true nor false, etc.).

I think where you may be misstepping (or I may just be wrong) is that the essay does not utilize a logical language and, therefore, many axioms that most people are more than comfortable swiftly deploying is beyond my reach in the essay. All that is utilized is the use of PoR to derive if there are any sine qua nons and, thereafter, the proof of one.

Likewise, you may have also noticed that it isn’t logically (meaning from a constructed logical language) coherent (at least on most logical theories) to claim multiple sine qua nons as true—for if there existed two then they are thereby not sine qua nons (that’s a contradiction). In other words, if a sine qua non is “without which not”, if we allow ourselves the importation of useful logical axioms, then only one can be true by definition (otherwise we have a situation where two principles are supposed to be negatable in relation to one another, but yet the source of an unbounded infinite of negations respectively). However, this is not argued for in the essay because it is, albeit enticing, something which would require the use of logical axioms and, therefore, I don’t think, as of yet, it can be argued for.

Please elaborate how regulate & modulate compare.

By “modulate”, what are you referring to? I am not completely following.

Bob

On this view, from the proposition that X exists we may not infer that X actually exists - it is not 'necessitous.' That's awkward. If you have a theory that your cup may not actually exist (having proposed it yourself as a straighforward example of something that uncontroversially does exist) then you've made a muddle.

I would say not quite. “existence” is indexical: is it awkward that I can refer to different people with the same word ‘he’? I personally don’t think so. I can posit, without contradiction, that the cup in my hand “exists” (by constituting, for example, its existence as phenomenal) while denying it as existing in an ontic sense. I gave a couple examples, such as Spinoza to illustrate this clear distinction: do you disagree with that distinction as demonstrated in the examples? If I were to posit, for example, that the cup in my hand exists (contextually to phenomena), but really exists as one infinite substance, then, regardless to its truth, there is a distinction being made there within the concept of “existence”. Another example is that a cup may exist in the sense that I can interact with it, yet not exist sans my consciousness. Again, just an example of how there is a distinction here to be made.

To ask "What does it mean for something to exist?" is sensible enough. To give an answer that denies actual existence to the very thing you have chosen as an example of something that exists is confused.

It is confusing if and only if one is conceptualizing “existence” as one universal context (as opposed to separate contexts). Again, I can say “this thing exists as a phenomena and not as a noumena”.

It may be that your cup exists but that your cup is not the thing that I think it is. Just as, for example, stars exist but stars are not the things that the ancients thought they were. They may not even be the things that we think they are.

I think that if one is to accept that something may not exist as they deem it, then there’s necessarily a split between “existence” which I constitute of things and “existence” as things-in-themselves (or potentially things from someone else’s perspective or what have you). If you are, on the other hand, uniting “existence” under one context, then I don’t see how you can state “this star exists as X, but its actual existence could be completely unrelated to my conjecture”: there’s an implicit separation into two contexts there.

You think it's clear but I say needs an example or two. E.g. a 'subordinate rule' is 'Don't walk on the grass' and a 'superordinate rule' is 'Notices in this park are posted with authority of the Town Council'. 'Derivation' is 'If p, then q. p. Therefore q.' 'Derivation of derivation' is 'If 'if p, then q. p. Therefore q', then 'If p, then q. Not-q. Therefore not p'. 'Recursive' means, well, I don't have an example. A 'sine qua non' is for example. Examples are the baby-walkers of the mind.

There is an example in the essay (as you note later on), but I suspect you found it unsatisfactory (which is totally fine).

An example of a subordinate rule can most certainly be ‘Don’t walk on the grass’ and a superordinate rule, contextually to that subordinate rule, could be “because notices in this park are posted with authority of the Town Council”. I don’t see anything wrong with this example if it makes more sense to you (it’s perfectly fine). I would note that this can be continued further (if one wants) to question the authority of the sign, etc. and through the whole process, continually, one is performing it via PoR.

By “derivation of derivation”, I mean to derive “derivation” itself. So, instead of discussing whether a particular set of premises and conclusions are true, it is a consideration of the process of derivation itself (i.e., how is derivation itself possible?). If conceptualizing that as specifically “if p, then q. p therefore q” for derivation and “if if p then q. p therefore q, then p. p therefore q” as second order derivation (i.e., derivation of derivation) then that is fine: that would be an example within the realm of “logic”, which is a form of derivation.

By “recursive utilization”, I mean that the idea is to abstract up to higher orders of derivation until (if at all) we reach a recursive use forever. By “recursion”, I mean, like a program, the utilization of itself by itself. This is most common in software engineering, wherein programmers will code functions that invoke themselves some finite set of times. However, within the essay, it would be a recursive use for an unbounded infinite (that is, to be more precise, an unbounded infinite of negations). A sine qua non is not an example, I would say, of a recursive principle, as it is merely a definition: without which, not. If some principle were to exhibit that sort of concept (i.e., sine qua non), then it would be an example of a recursive principle that is unbounded infinite of negations. It is entirely possible to have finite set of recursions, like in programming, which is not the focus of a sine qua non.

What makes this a rule? What makes it superordinate?

The reason it was a superordinate rule was because it was, within the context of the example, “a regulating principle (rule) having greater importance or rank as another”. In other words, it was meant as an example of an explication of the implicit overlying guiding affirmations of the subordinate rule (in this case: 1 = 1 was the subordinate rule, which can be also simply noted as an conclusion).

It looks like a proposition. I have say it also looks false

As noted explicitly in the essay, the focus of the example is not the truth or falsity of the derivation, it was about the higher principles involved: it is about what is occurring for the derivation to occur:

“However, before the demonstration, a couple clarifications must be noted. Firstly, the proof of the principle of regulation has no bearing on the derivation demonstrated in the example but, rather, on the higher form of derivation itself; that is, the higher procedure, as abstracted, utilized to perform derivation itself. Therefore, the reader is urged to focus heavily on the higher principle(s) engaged in the derivation of derivation as opposed to focusing on the derivation.”

You can most certainly negate my example derivation (for example, that “1” and “1” are actually indiscernable as opposed to what I claimed) by means of deriving that conclusion which, in turn, inevitably is by means of the PoR. The point is the overarching process in play, not the specific conclusions themselves. With that being said, let me address your contentions with the derivation:

I take 'indiscernible' to mean 'impossible to tell the difference between'. I have never been able to tell the difference between "1" and "1" or between 1 and 1. I can tell the difference between several instances of mentioning the number 1. I would happily buy the proposition that 1 is identical with 1 and that to mention "1" at the start of a sentence is different from mentioning it at the end. Is that what you mean?

I mean more of what you said at the end there: the law of identity. That is, we use 1 and 1 interchangeably for most situations but understand that they are discernible. As you noted, location and time are arguably the two biggest factors that make 1 and 1 most definitely not equivocal. Nevertheless, I am still able to postulate, assert, command, state, etc. that 1 = 1.

If so, that seems OK, but it does not look like a rule. It looks like an observation helping to distinguish an entity from the mention of an entity.

By “rule”, I mean “a regulating principle”. Within the context of my derivation in the example, 1 and 1 being identical but not indiscernible was the superordinate rule guiding my conclusion that 1 = 1 (in part); in other words, a regulative principle determining the course of my derivation. Does that make more sense? If not, let me know!

Bob

bam! You hit the nail on the head! That's what I was trying to ask and you answered it very well I might add.

I am glad I finally was able to understand and address your contentions properly!

So now hmmmmm... So then whats the next essay? I'm dying to see how this all ties into the next part not that I'm smart enough to know how to do anything with it LOL but nonetheless I'll pretend like I am lol

The next essay will pertain to the investigation of the obligation to affirm PoR (or lack thereof) and the consequences of affirming PoR. However, I do not want to actually spend the time writing it until I think that all the contentions with this essay are resolved (someone may convince me that I am partially or holistically wrong, which would render any further essay that builds off of it useless to me).

Bob

why are they beyond the scope?

The reason that the consideration of what exists and what is known (or lack thereof) is outside the scope of the essay is because to conclude anything with respect to either is to import an epistemology and/or ontology, which the essay is not aimed to lock anyone into or against any given epistemology or ontology; for the essay pertains not to derivation (which is what would be utilized to construct any resemblance of either) but, rather, the process of derivation itself and, therefore, the essay is true regardless of what one posits for either. Derive that this particular epistemology is most suiting to you and it will have no direct relevance to the principle of regulation; derive that this particular epistemology is not suiting, downright false, absurd, etc. and, likewise, it will have no effect on the principle of regulation (nor sine qua nons). Same goes for ontology, logical languages (i.e., theories of logic), etc.

In attempt to resolve some of the confusion, let me try to explain what I think you are asking and, thereafter, you correct me where I am wrong. Moreover, let me, for the sake of the conversation, step past the bounds of the essay to hopefully help guide the discussion.

I think that you are essentially inquiring how one can truly deem any given proposition true given the fact that they are limited in their faculties of reason and, therefore, it could be entirely possible that one is really analogous to a child who is right given the context of their limited faculty, but, on the contrary, wrong in relation to an adult (who is typically capable of much more sophisticated reasoning).

If I am understanding you correctly, then here is my response:

Firstly, this can be posited for any given theory, statement, assertion, etc. For example, one can most certainly question whether humanity can deem something true of anything: is Special Relativity true or are we simply like children that think they are the best bicycle rider? How can we be certain, in other words, that some of the top discoveries, the top minds, aren’t just ignorant of their child like boasting?

Secondly, I think this is, abstractly, really an issue pertaining to the postulation of something outside, or completely transcendent, of oneself: truth, knowledge, existence, etc. For the sake of conversation, let me step outside of the bounds of the essay and acknowledge that any of the aforementioned (i.e., truth, knowledge, existence, etc.) can be viewed, prima facea, as transcendent of oneself. If one does that, then they are faced with this dilemma I believe you are voicing: how do we ever know, prove to be true, or claim existence to anything when we cannot be certain that what we deem so truly coincides with that transcendent truth, knowledge, existence, etc. The problem here, I would say, is that, in a deeper sense (i.e., not prima facea), nothing transcends reason (in relation to the subject at hand): not even the very concept of nothingness. There is no transcendent truth, knowledge, existence, etc. It is a contradiction in terms to hypothesize about something “sans reason” when reason was what derived “sans itself”.

So, when I claim that the principle of regulation is “true”, I do not mean “truth” in the sense of something which transcends, in relation to me, myself, nor, in relation to you, yourself. To be honest, it’s not that I would deem it a figment of the imagination but, rather, simply a contradiction in terms.

and that was the point that I was trying to use to compare is that you're giving parameters and limitations and within those parameters and limitations the tools appear to be real and do work in the manner that they need to because when we question them we're questioning them within the parameters you've set and when we do that they are rendered as real and usable and good but is that only because we're stuck within that narrow parameter?

I can only ever provide what I deem worthy as true, which could be false (I don’t consider myself God (; ). Furthermore, I cannot prove it aligns with some sort of transcendent of myself “truth”, if that is what you are asking. In terms of the simple child analogy, I can deem it to be proven to consume all derivation, which removes the possibility for its exclusion; however, I could be wrong (as always).

If we were to expand further past would we find something else?

There’s two ways I am interpreting this: (1) expansion in the sense of allowing other considerations (e.g., importing a wide range of other held view, beliefs, etc.) and (2) the expansion of the understanding (i.e., reevaluation in hindsight).

In terms of #1, I think it is proved in the essay that expanding into other considerations is all in vain—for all of those importations would be via derivation, which the process of which is performed via the PoR. If there’s anything you would like to introduce into the mix in terms of consideration that you think would potentially invalidate my essay, then please do!

In terms of #2, I cannot, in all honesty, ever solidify any of my views as 100% guaranteed to be right, in the sense that I could guarantee that I will never be able to negate my current views. So, in this regard, I don’t really see it as an issue as this can be posited for anything.

The hidden #3 would be, I would say, the idea of expansion into what transcends the subject at hand—such as a “truth” which is “sans subject”. I think I already addressed this: there’s no such thing. However, I want to clear that, in some of this, I am overstepping the bounds of what is required to prove PoR: one can hold there are truly transcendent “truth” via PoR.

Now I'm by no means calling your essay limited stupid youthful barbaric or any of those other things by any means it's actually way more complex than my brain is used to dealing with but I was simply using the analogy in comparison of limitations not of complexity by any means.

No worries! I completely understand!

But regardless you're still not getting the point that I'm trying to convey and I'm having hard time trying to figure out how to convey it so bear with me while I try to gather my thoughts

Let me know if I did a more adequate job at addressing your contentions. If I am still completely missing the mark, then please correct me as you deem fit.

Bob

@MAYAEL & @Cuthbert,

I would also like to clarify that, despite ontology and epistemology being considered out of bounds of the essay, I don't want you to feel like you cannot argue for why it should be a consideration (if that is something either of you wish to do). As of now, they are considered beyond the scope, which I can elaborate further if either of you would like, but I am completely open to any counter arguments you may feel inclined to provide.

Bob

Like you were saying this entire essay in subsequent essays might work under the rules established in the original essay and everything might function perfectly fine but like you said how do we know that it's real beyond the confinements of the essay itself like you said if we take the essay and throw it away what are we left with how does it affect other things because although it might function the way it says it will function within the essay does it actually function that way in the real world or is it just a mirage

Within the essay, it is proven to be true. I am arguing for its proof as utilized as an unbounded infinite, which quite literally means that someone cannot even posit what “is real” without its underlying (or overlying) utilization. Even if someone were to negate the entire thing, then I would argue they still utilized it. Does that sort of answer your question?

And kudos to Bob for being so patient with us he truly has a virtuous personality LOL it's like a single daycare worker working overtime by themself with a room full of 3-year-old brats that their parents forgot to pick up from school and somehow in the midst of this he remains calm if that ain't zin then I don't know what is LOL

I appreciate the compliment, but I wouldn’t regard anyone in this discussion board (thus far) as a “brat”: I think that some of my contenders are conceptualization the essay in a different light than I am, which more conversations will help each of us understand each other better.

Let's say there are two kids playing with their bicycles one kid does this cool stunt going really really fast totally impresses the other kid so when they go to school the other kid is bragging about his friend and how fast he was and says he's the fastest bicycle rider in the world now when other kids hear this they want to test him so they go out and have a little competition and he beats all of them

now does that mean he's the fastest bicycle in the world?

The claim that this kid is the fastest bicycle rider in the world is false, because we can prove it. For example, let’s say we are constituting the fastest by means of the current record holder. If that is the case, then we can prove, deductively, that he is not when we time him and find out it is nowhere near the world record.

Likewise, let’s take this more literally: let’s say, by “fastest bicycle rider in the world”, we mean that literally out of every single person on the planet they are the fastest. Now, the world record is usually recorded in a manner that requires a hierarchical competitive structure, which usually omits people who didn’t have the opportunity to race. There are many factors that go into bicycle races, which I will spare you the boredom of meticulously exposing. My point here would be that we deductively know that the claim, as posited now, is an induction; that is, the premises do not necessitate the conclusion and, therefore, we cannot know that anyone is the fastest bicycle rider in the world right now.

This is not the case whatsoever with the essay (I would argue) that I wrote. It is proved deductively (which rules out the idea of my second aforementioned example of an inductive argument) by means of proving it to be true and, therefore, it is not open ended like the bicycle example.

Likewise why aren't we questioning if that is in fact what is happening with the things presented in your original essay?

Questioning anything within the essay to be true or false is perfectly within the scope of the essay, and, furthermore, I would love if you did!

However, right now, I don’t think you have contended with the actual proof in the essay, which is meant to prove it is true. If you think that the essay is not, in fact, proving that it is true, then I would love to hear why!

I believe you answered this and you replied to me saying that that was beyond the scope of this essay which is fine if that's the case but my question is why?

So, what I meant is that epistemology and ontology are out of the bounds of the essay (i.e., “is it known?”, “does it exist?”). However, questioning its truth (as in, whether it is true) is perfectly within the scope of the essay. Although I may be misremembering, I don’t think you have actually, as of yet, argued why it is false (or, at least, if not false, why it isn’t proven to be true).

The essay is most certainly meant to prove that the principle of regulation is true.

Me personally I tend not to waste my time with things that aren't as true as possibly can be and I don't find interest in exercising my brain with exercises that don't actually reflect a bigger picture usability and only work within the scope of their intended use because I feel like that can create bad habits and or give a person a false sense of reality kind of like playing video games too much makes you less sociable with people because it's not a good representation of actual reality likewise I only entertain things that are as real as can be

So, you seem to be using “as true as possibly can be” and “real as can be” synonymously; however, I am merely clarifying that (1) the principle of regulation is argued as true, and (2) epistemic and ontic claims are beyond the scope of the essay. Let me know if I need to clarify further on this, as I may still just be misunderstanding you.

I'm not saying I'm judging your essay by any means in a negative way I understand people like to do mental exercises for various reasons and that's totally cool I was just stating my personal preference

I totally understand! I think the more we discuss, the better we will be able to narrow down our differences and potentially come to an agreement!

Bob

So your cup exists but it does not really exist. It exists in a colloquial sense but not in an ontic sense.

The ontic sense is clarified by adding italicised 'really' to 'exists'. But this does not seem to add anything to the sense. I'm writing this post. Am I really writing this post? If I'm writing it, then I'm really writing it. If I'm really writing it, then I'm writing it. 'Really' is an intensifier, adding to emphasis, but not to sense.

I wasn’t claiming the cup does or does not exist in an ontic sense but, rather, the meaningful distinction I find between different usages of the term “existence”. Let me try to clarify with an example: let’s borrow a couple different philosophers to demonstrate what I am attempting to convey (that is, by means of my interpretations of them).

Let’s say I am holding a cup in my hand.

From my interpretation of Spinoza, he would not deny the existence of the cup in my hand as it appears, but would deny it in an ontic sense—as he would claim that the cup actually exists, in an ontic sense, as apart of one absolutely infinite substance (i.e., God).

From my interpretation of Kant, he would not deny the existence of the cup in my hand as a phenomena, but would deny it in an ontic sense—as he would claim that what exists is actually noumena, of which we can only ever know it by means of negative judgments. In other words, he would claim, in a nutshell, that the noumena conforms to the mind a priori (most notably time and space).

From my interpretation of Schopenhauer, he would deny that there is a valid separation between phenomena and noumena, and, thusly, would posit that they are the same thing; furthermore, he would posit that what actually exists, in an ontic sense, is an infinite will. In other words, the cup exists as an object (phenoma are noumena), but what really exists is an infinite, blind will.

My point here is that, to my comprehension, there’s a meaningful distinction between objects put forth in front of me and what lies at the bottom of existence (or what actually is existence); that is essentially what I am trying to convey. It is most certainly possible to assert that what “actually exists” is the same as what “exists” (which would be essentially claiming that whatever is deemed “existent” must be also in an ontic sense), but my point here is that that is not necessitous at all (personally I would find it problematic).

Are they useful tools?

“useful” is relative to the individual at hand. I can attest that I find it useful to understand, metaphysically, how derivation works, but that doesn’t necessitate that others find that useful.

What did you create them in order to achieve?

I created sine qua non (the term) and discovered whether there are any ‘true’ sine qua nons: I would clarify that I didn’t simply create the principle of regulation.

I wanted to discover whether such foundations exist, or whether it is essentially arbitrary (or contextual).

Are they valid - do they exist?

This is where, I would argue, it becomes necessary to be precise: “validity” is not necessarily linked to “existence”. One can most certainly package them together, but that is not necessary. That is why the essay proves that the principle of regulation is true (being defined precisely in the essay, which would be constituted as valid) and not what exists. So, I would answer two-fold: yes the principle of regulation is valid, and the essay doesn’t state yes or no to its existence (in an ontic sense specifically).

What questions or problems are you trying to address - what task did you create the tools for?

The task, or purpose, is to derive if there are any sine qua nons, of which one is determined to be true (i.e., principle of regulation). Given the definition of sine qua non, it essentially is meant to derive whether there are actual foundations to derivation or not. I think that is a pretty fair and important purpose, but please correct me if you think otherwise.

You seem to be looking for validation that they are good, useful tools.

Not quite, I would say. Again, the essay explicitly states that value is of no consideration therein (i.e., usefulness I would attribute to that area of discourse) and by “good”, I am not sure what you mean: can you please define it?

On the other hand, I am looking for critique of the essay, so in a way anything that remotely critiques it is fair game (so if you think the essay should address its usefulness or unusefulness, then that would be a fair critique to explore!).

But the essay proves, as it has been written as of yet, that the principle of regulation is true. Not that it is useful.

I am sorry that I can get little sense out of the one you emphasise most. The principle of regulation as formulated seems not to have a clear meaning.

By “the one you emphasise most”, I am starting to suspect that you may be under the impression that the essay proves multiple sine qua nons: it only proves one (i.e., principle of regulation). So I just wanted to clarify that that is the only one proven.

In terms of not having a clear meaning: how so?

I asked whether this principle can be denied or asserted with equal consequence. Suppose I say - hang on, the opposite is the case - what difficulties would that create for me, what absurdities or contradictions would it land me in?

The absurdity would be that the denial of the principle of regulation thereby utilizes it. However, it is still, nevertheless, possible for someone to simply reject it (as anyone can reject anything). I am not positing that the principle of regulation is something which can be separated from the subject at hand. For example, if we were to debate about whether redness is an inherent property of the cup I am holding, then we could, upon ending our discussion, continue our lives without such a consideration—as many concepts are completely independent of whether redness is an inherent property of a cup. This is not the case with the principle of regulation: if I reject, then I used it (and vice versa)--but that doesn’t negate the possibility of someone simply living their life ignorant (willfully or not) of their utilization thereof. Maybe that clarification will help resolve some of the confusion; otherwise, feel free to hammer me harder.

Bob

With my scant knowledge of philosophy (or metaphysics) I can't tell whether Bob is out on the cutting edge or is being cleverly deceptive, ala Sokal affair. Has he taken simple ideas of generational derivations and convoluted them on purpose, or am I just failing to appreciate his insight?

Although I may be misunderstanding, I am slowly extrapolating that you may be refraining from voicing your full concerns (pertaining to the essay) because you are not vastly knowledgeable in metaphysics: my friend, I want to clarify that I would nevertheless love to hear your contentions—regardless of your knowledge on the subject at hand. If you don’t want to, then that is completely fine as well though.

On a separate note, I can assure you that my intention is not even in the slightest to convolute a simple idea; however, if you think that is the case, then I would love to hear why! I think, with respect to the essay, it is incredibly easy to deviate from the intentions of it and, therefore, I am doing my best to be as precise as I possibly can. I think for some it is being interpreted as mere whimsical, superfluous verbiage that means arguably less than nothing, but I can assure that that is not my intention and, consequently, I am genuinely interested to hear everyone’s contentions.

Bob

I can't speak for Mayael but I can say how I understood his questions. By 'tools that actually exist' I understood the question to mean the same as I asked. Let's suppose that everything you wrote is the exact opposite of the truth. Let every sentence be negated. Let the principle of regulation be rejected and let sine qua nons go back to being what they were before. If we do that, what has been lost? What problems would that create for us? Is the whole thing a chimera, an airy nothing - a non-existent - a pretence? I am putting the matter more starkly - rudely - than Mayael - who in any case may not have had quite that in mind. So, for what it's worth.

I can see how your contention is similar to Mayael’s; however, I have not understood, as of yet, Mayael to be making your contention (but I could be wrong). Thus far, I need further clarification from Mayael to help me understand what they are precisely trying to convey.

In terms of your contention, if you could please review my response here, then that would be much appreciated. Perhaps you did respond and I simply missed it?

Please feel free to refer me to your response if that is the case; otherwise, I would love to continue our conversation if you could provide a response to mine.

By "a tool that is what it says it is" I understood to mean use of language with clear sense and purpose and without equivocation or confusion

As far as I have comprehended, Mayael is speaking much more broadly than “use of language” as a tool: it seems as though, although again I could be wrong, they are speaking in terms of “a means to an end”. However, Mayael can most certainly provide an alternative definition if I am misunderstanding here.

'Ontic' means 'related to existence' and there is no special ontic sense of the word 'existence'. Ontic existence is a kind of existence only in the way that canine dogs are a variety of dog.

Let me clarify what I meant by “ontic”.

Language is utilized most definitely not used in one universal contextual sense and the most generic subdivision is “colloquial” vs “formative” usages of languages: by the former I mean a looser, but adequate for everyday life, use of a term, whereas the latter is a highly specialized and precise definition for the branch of study (or even particularized further if you will) meant for the formation of new ideas (or critiques or what have you of existing ideas within that given field). A word can quite literally be the exact same and be posited in an utterly different manners depending on the context (and each within their own rights and proper justifications).

By “ontic”, I do not merely mean “related to existence”, I mean something related to “ontology”--which is a branch of study pertaining to what “really exists”. It is, as I was utilizing it, quite literally a contextual usage that is not within the realm of colloquial use (i.e., it is within a formative sense). For example, I may proclaim to my friends, at a casual gathering, that “this cup I am holding exists” and everyone , unless it is a highly philosophical moment, will know exactly what I am referring to—as I am merely deploying the term “exists” in a loose, colloquial sense (and that is totally fine). However, that was not an ontic claim, whereas if I were to claim that noumenon, one substance, one will, etc., then that would be. Ontology is about what “really exists” as opposed to a looser, colloquial use of the term (which usually is deployed to merely depict something resides outside of imagination or what have you). Therefore, that is why I was asking for clarification and I can assure you it is no pointless, superfluous invocation of fancy terminology.

Bob