I think we are jumping all over the place in our discussion, and that’s equally my fault. I can tell from your response that we disagree at pretty much every level even in terms of our understanding of how to approach understanding reality. Let me try to reign in the conversation without derailing.

The two core ideas that I think we need to focus on is (1) the metaphysics of a part and (2) the establishment of an absolutely simple being simpliciter.

With respect to #1, it is worth admitting that I do need to provide a clearer conception of its metaphysics (although I think its definition given before is perfectly adequate); and you are right to point this out. I still stand firm that a part is something which contributes to the composition of the whole—as its definition—but there are many prima facie issues with this definition that I need to address and resolve.

First, one may object that a thing could have parts which is not a concrete object (which I overlooked)—e.g., a singular feeling of disgust spanning 3 seconds, the parts of a word in a thought, numbers, etc.—and that such non-spatial (but yet temporal) things could legitimately be called divisible (going along with the idea that divisibility is related to the the idea of having parts such that one can divvy up the whole into them). To this, I say that the OP is talking about divisibility as it relates to concrete objects—that is, spatiotemporal objects. E.g., a singular feeling of disgust that spans 3 seconds is divisible in time—and thusly has parts—but not in a spatial—and thusly not in a concrete—sense; for a feeling does not exist in space (even if it can be causally explained in terms of brain processes). These kind of phenomena have parts but are immune to my OP’s argument because the OP is centered around spatiotemporal (i.e., concrete) beings when it outlines its premises. I therefore will refer to the parts which are relevant to the OP—and of which refer to spatiotemporal divisibility of objects—as ‘concrete parts’ to avoid confusion.

Second, one may object that, in the case of @Mww, space and time are pure a priori modes of our cognition and, thusly, exist but are not real; so a ‘concrete object’ would not refer to something that is spatiotemporal and yet there would be a clear distinction between what our cognition represents in time alone vs. what it represents in space and time—the latter being exactly what I am referring to by ‘concrete’ objects. In a view like transcendental idealism, all concrete objects would be non-spatiotemporal (or at least wouldn’t exist in the space and time which our brains attribute to them). To this, I respond that these non-spatiotemporal concrete objects would still be divisible and have parts in the relevant sense to the OP because we have to trust our senses and cognition to tell us that they are ‘other’ than us; and the way our brain’s do that is by representing that which is ‘other’ as separate. So, these objects—whatever they are in-themselves, even if it be non-spatiotemporal—must be divisible and have ‘concrete’ parts. I only refer to this objection to be thorough, as I don’t believe you accept the non-reality of space and time, but for now I think we can both establish concrete entities as simply defined in the sense in the first objection (i.e., as spatiotemporal objects).


With respect to #2, the OP argues for God’s existence in multiple steps; and I think we keep jumping around where you disagree about something midway in the argument when you don’t agree about something which is required for that part of the argument to work. So, let’s start at the basics and see what you are disagreeing with:

1. Composed beings are made up of parts.
2. A composed being exists contingently upon its parts in their specific arrangement.
3. A part of a composed being is either composed or uncomposed.
4. A part that is a composed being does not, in turn, exist in-itself but, rather, exists contingently upon its parts and their specific arrangement.
5. An infinite series of composed beings for any given composed being (viz., a composed being of which its parts are also, in turn, composed and so on ad infinitum) would not have the power to exist on their own.
6. Therefore, an infinite series of composed beings is impossible.
7. Therefore, a series of composed beings must have, ultimately, uncomposed parts as its first cause. (6 & 3)

By ‘composed being’ above, I am referring to a concrete object (as defined above) which has concrete parts (as defined above). Do you agree with 1-7? I am guessing you will disagree with 5.

As you quoted, the OP reaches God's existence as the conclusion of it. So I am confused why you think it is presupposed. The argument outlines why composition entails God's existence without presupposing God's existence to begin with.

Well in the first place esse != parts and essence != whole. Esse/essence is not the part/whole relationship.

That’s fair. I am starting to think my OP isn’t even arguing from Aquinas’ essence vs. esse distinction; so maybe this isn’t a Thomistic argument afterall.

What I am really doing, by my lights, is making an argument from contingency and necessity as it relates to composition; basically by way of arguing that an infinite series of composition is impossible because it would be an infinite series of contingent things of which each lacks the power to exist themselves.

, if you place all of the parts of a frog together in the correct configuration, there will still be no frog

Yes and no. If you were to take a dead frog and “sew it back to together”, then yes you are right; but if you configure the frog’s pieces to be exactly as it were when it was alive; then it must now be alive again….no?

If a cat loses an ear or a dog loses a leg it has lost a part but the cat or dog still exists

I agree.

The problem begins in premise (4), where you imply that there is an existence in the parts that is not in the whole, and thus we are upbuilding existence from parts to whole. Your idea is something like, “Parts are what primarily exist, and because they exist wholes exist. The existence of wholes is generated by the existence of parts.”

What’s the problem with that? Are you saying that it doesn’t account for a soul?

Why do you say that?
…
Think about it this way: is it easier for someone to deny the essence/existence distinction, or is it easier for them to deny that existence of motion/change?

That’s true, but I say that because Aristotle’s proof only works if we think of a thing having the potential to remain the same through time and that potential being actualized through time. Otherwise, the argument fails to produce a being that would fit classical theism which is the perpetual sustainer of everything; instead, we just get a kind of ‘kalam cosmological argument’ where this being starts everything off moving.

By ‘motion’, Aristotle is not just talking about, e.g., an apple flying in the air: he is talking about the change which an apple that is just sitting there is undergoing by merely remaining the same. That’s the only reason, e.g., Ed Feser’s “Aristotelian Proof” gets off the ground in the first place.

So, it seems like you are saying:

1. An absolutely simple being causing (ultimately) the existence of all things violates physics.
2. Therefore, it cannot exist.

How does it violate physics?

1. There is no example we can give of an infinite regress of reality being powered by itself.
2. Therefore, its is impossible.

How is the argument I noted any different?

I didn’t argue that: that would also be an argument from ignorance. I specified exactly why it is impossible.

What I'm noting is your example of a simple being outside of time and space powering 'the first gear', is also impossible.

I didn’t give an example of that. As I said before, the example of the gears was to demonstrate that your idea of an infinite series explaining the causality of composition is impossible.

Because what is possible must be known at least once.

This is standardly false. Right now, we are discussing actual possibility; but even if we keep it more generic possibility in principle refers to something which may not have ever happen but can happen. What you just described by possibility is not a modality: it is historicity.

Even if you disagree, I am using the term ‘possibility’ foremost in its common sense definition of being the modality of what can happen; and more specifically in terms of what can happen relative to physics. It is actually impossible (and impossible in the common sensical definition) for an infinite set of moving gears to exist by themselves; it is not actually impossible—or at least you still haven’t demonstrated why it is impossible—for an absolutely simple being to the transcendent grounds for physics itself by way of demonstrating, first and foremost, that the composition of objects entails such a being in the first place.

a simple being that exists outside of time and space cannot interact with time and space. To affect time and space, the thing must touch time and space, and must be in it at the point of interactivity. Its simple physics

It is commonly accepted that time and space, assuming they are real, are not fundamental to reality. E.g., Einstein’s space-time fabric implies a block time whereby the relations of things must be determined in ways independent of a strict temporal succession like we intuit.

Your point here requires that space and time are real substances which every existent thing is in and of; and I don’t see why that is case nor how science backs that. On the contrary, quantum physics and einsteinien physics demonstrate that they are not fundamental at all.

But you use the argument from motion to show the infinite regress of gears is impossible. Again, the same standards must be applied to both arguments. And if you're not arguing that there is a simple being powering the first gear of regress, I don't understand what you're trying to say

I am saying that an infinite series of rotating gears ceteris paribus is impossible; and analogously an infinite series of composition for an object is impossible. If it is impossible for a composed object to be infinitely composed, then there must be a first member; and that member must be uncomposed—which means it is absolutely simple.

How is this any different from a simple being starting the first gear in the chain of causality?

Because I don’t think that this simple being is the cause of the composition of objects analogously to a thing perpetually moving the first gear in a series. Moving a gear in a series would require something physical moving it, at least immanently (directly). Again, I do find Aristotle’s argument from motion convincing, but that’s a separate argument that runs on separate lines of thought.

If you wanted to make it analogous, then you would have to posit that there is an infinite series of gears (in the manner we discussed) but that the movement is supplied to each gear equally from some aspect of their own composition; which would, as you can guess, make them ‘magic gears’. The analogy falls apart if we try to make it analogous in that sense.

It doesn't succeed in demonstrating this because you need a simple being to be understood in terms of real causality just like the gear example.

Which premise fails?

Without understanding what a simple being is, and how it could begin this causal chain, you can't prove your OP.

That’s false. If all the premises are true, then the conclusion in the OP logically follows. How it causes the existence of things is a separate question.

Its not a red herring, its to show that thoughts are parts.

A thought does not have parts. Your brain has parts. Are you arguing that somehow your brain has parts and your thoughts have parts?

A simple being would be like that, 'red'

Red in the sense of the phenomena or the wavelength? If the former, then it doesn’t have parts and is absolutely simple but is not a concretely existent thing; and if the latter, then it is made of parts but is a concretely existent thing. Either way, it isn’t an example of an absolutely existent thing in concreto (viz., ontologically).

The correct statement here is that forms of intelligence reduce to physical parts, so there is a flaw in your OP.

What’s the proof you have of this?

A simple being of red, a simple being of green for example. If a being has both green and red, it is no longer simple. If a being can think, it is no longer simple. You're noting a simple being, and a simple being would have severe limitations because it has no parts within it. A god of intelligence in no manner of logical thought is simple.

Again, you are using the term ‘part’ too loosely. A part is something which contributes to the composition of a whole in concreto. A thought; a feeling; the phenomenal experience of a color; the taste of pizza; etc. do not have parts and are not concrete objects.

A simple being is one, it has no other parts. There could be another simple being that also has no parts, and that would not contradict the first simple being. Therefore it is not true that two simple beings cannot exist.

Again, you just argued by way of begging the question. I have no good reasons so far to accept that you are right that two simple beings can exist. I already provided a proof that that is impossible. If two things lack parts, then they cannot exist separately from each other; for a thing can only be concretely distinguished from another thing by way of its parts. There would be no boundaries between two absolutely simple things because they have no parts to allow for such limitations.

and that, rendered, is God as presupposition.

Not at all. God is not a presupposition of the argument in the OP.

That is, we presuppose God exists, therefore God exists:

This is a blatant straw man: did you read the OP?

sound theology, not very good philosophy, and nothing scientific at all.

If the philosophy is unsound, then so too is the theology unsound.

But it seems to me that given your "generic existence," then it is difficult - actually impossible - to think of anything that does not exist. Yes? No?

No. On the contrary, if you are a pluralist, then two things can exist in two or more different kinds of being itself. So X may exist in type A being, and not exist in type B being.

The question arises, how does X interact with type B existent things? Hence, a problem of interaction arises; and of which only establishing a communal type of existence will solve it. The, we end up with an argument of parsimony for monism; because why would we posit three (or more) types of existences when you still need to posit one generic type that they all inherit???

Also I forgot to mention:

Not a worry, it was only referenced if it would help you to understand what I was getting at. I wrote it specifically to detail 'cause' more, so I am a bit disappointed you think its not detailed enough. After were done here it would be kind if you would point out where you think its still lacking.

Sorry, I am not trying to disappoint you; and I will re-read your OP and respond in that thread sometime soon so we can discuss that as well.

I'm noting that if you apply the same approach to your idea of a simple being being the start of it all, you run into the same impossibility. If that is so, and you are noting that something impossible is possible, then an infinite series is equally impossibly possible.

So, I want to focus for second on the fact that you believe both a finite series with an absolutely simple first member and an infinite series of rotating gears are impossible.

I demonstrated here that the latter is impossible as follows:

1. Change is the actualization of a potential.
2. A gear cannot change itself.
3. Rotation is a form of change.
4. A gear cannot rotate itself.
5. An infinite series of gears that are interlinked would never, in itself, produce any rotation amongst the gears.
6. Therefore, if an infinite series of gears that are interlinked are such that they are each rotating, then something outside of that series is the cause of that rotation.

You still have not demonstrated that the former is impossible. This seems to be the crux of your rejoinder, so what is your argument for that?

Here’s the closest I saw in your response to an argument:

Can you give an example of a monopart that exists apart from space and time yet is able to interact with the space and time of a gear to start it all? Of course not, its impossible, yet we say its possible anyway.

This is a bad argument. You are saying:

1. There is no example we can give of a being that exists outside of space and time and yet can still interact with things in space and time.
2. Therefore, it is impossible.

That is, ironically, an argument from ignorance—that’s a God of the gaps style argument.

I would like you to focus on providing me with a sound argument for why it is impossible; because that’s the crux of your argument. However, I do want to briefly address some other points you made: feel free to ignore the rest of this response to focus on the above if you need to.

What you're saying is there is essentially one gear that gets powered, then powers all the others. How can that be 'perfectly simple'?

The gears example is analogous to the composition argument only insofar as I was demonstrating that an infinite series of beings which lack the power to instantiate a thing and of which exhibit that thing is impossible per se. I am not arguing that there is an absolutely simple being at the beginning of a finite series (or an indefinite series with a starting point—i.e., a potential infinity) of gears moving. As a side note, Aristotle would argue that, by analogy, the gears are an infinite series that are rotating each other and the pure actualizer is the external cause for that rotation. I don’t want to get into his argument from motion because it detracts from the OP (which is about composition).

My argument is from composition: it is the idea that an absolutely simple being that is purely actual is the start of the chain of causality for the existence of things in terms of their composition. Think of it more like the atom composes the apple, and not the apple is thrown by the person.

This makes no sense then. If a single gear powers the others, it powers it by transferring energy from itself to the rest of the gears. If not, then how does it transfer?

This doesn’t matter if the OP succeeds in demonstrating that an absolutely simple being needs to exist to account for the existence of contingent beings. Again, you keep shifting the goalpost to questions about how this absolutely simple being actualizes the existence of things instead of whether or not the OP succeeds at proving there is such a being that actualizes them. These are separate questions.

They actually are. You can tie those feelings to your brain, which is many multiple parts. A person can be lobotimzed to the point that they cannot think about ice cream nor feel sad anymore.

I agree that consciousness can be reduced to our bodies; but that is a red herring to what I said. It is uncontroversially true that your thoughts have no concrete, proper parts.

You could try to argue that the absolutely simple being cannot be absolutely simple if it has thoughts because thoughts require physical parts to arise; but I am going to deny that because the OP demonstrates such a being must exist; so it must be the case that not all forms of intelligence are reducible to physical parts. Again, that’s why I keep trying to get you to address the OP; because if it succeeds then these points you are making are good but irrelevant.

But how can something which does not exist in space or time power the first gear?

Again, this doesn’t entail it is impossible. This is an argument from ignorance.

Two beings are distinguishable from each other's parts, not from their own parts within themselves. A simple part is mono, meaning it cannot be multiple. Meaning we can have two different monoparts. They would be distinguishible because one mono part would not be the other monopart.

If a thing has parts, then it can be distinguished from other things. An absolutely simple being has no parts, so it is impossible that this ‘mono’ thing you referred to as having ‘their own parts within themselves’ is absolutely simple.

Likewise, you just blanketly asserted that we can have two different ‘monoparts’ when that’s literally what are supposed to be providing an argument for. You basically just said:

1. An absolutely simple being is ‘mono’.
2. There can be two different monoparts.
3. Therefore, it is false that two absolutely simple beings cannot exist.

That just begs the question.

Where?

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/961602

Gregory, you keep jumping all over the place. I keep addressing your points and then you just move on to different point without engaging and then you circle back to the original point I already addressed.

E.g.,:

The gears coukd have eternally moved by gravity if they are on a slant

I already demonstrated that gravity doesn't work like that and that your counter-example using it does not provide any rejoinder to the argument from composition; and even if it did it wouldn't negate anything I said to Philosophim. The 'thing' which would be actualizing the potential for the gears to move would, like I pointed out, be external to the series. In this case, you are positing it is some sort of gravity.

I don't believe that existence has different types because I am a monist about it; so a thing either exists or it doesn't in the sense of generic existence.

God would exist supernaturally, because God would be the basis of nature but transcends it.

In terms of proof, it is always worth mentioning that no philosophical argument is a strict proof; but I would say the OP "proves" that God exists from composition, and it is an inherently philosophical (namely metaphysical) argument.

Its more than that. Its a reference to creating an argument of mysticism to fill in when there's a problem that's difficult to solve. I find the belief in the infinite mystical, and used to dodge the question of universal origin.

But nothing about the OP is mystical nor does it cite anything mystical. I challenge you to show me which premise in the OP is making an argument from ignorance.

If it were an absolutely simple being, no parts, then how does it power a thing that has parts?

The OP is just establishing that an absolutely simple being must be the underpinning (ultimately) for the actualization (composition) of the composed being: how it scientifically works is separate question that digresses from the OP.

Is this what you are referring to by ‘mysticism’? The OP doesn’t need to demonstrate how it scientifically works for us to know that it must exist.

Wouldn't a part of the immutable being need to interact with that part?

No, because there is no parts to the simple being; but, yes, it does ‘interact’ with what it actualizes insofar as it keeps it in existence.

Energy itself is a part, so it would have to impart some to another thing.

Energy is just the ability to do work; so I am not following what you mean here. Energy doesn’t have parts just as much as space itself has no parts; however, it is worth noting that they are not absolutely simple concrete beings.

The problem is a definition of a partless immutable entity powering everything else contradicts how causation and power work.

What do you mean by power? I was just using it loosely to refer to actualization.

How does it contradict how causation works? Causation is just the actualization of potentials.

That would be an infinite regress by time though. This is the same as an infinitely existing bar spinning itself. What powers this infinite existing being?

It is not in time.

It also can't be partless if it is to have agency, intelligence, and infinite existence.

I don’t see why it couldn’t in principle. By partless, we are talking about in concreto parts. My feeling of sadness and my thought about maybe eating ice cream later are not parts of my (in concreto) being.

No, absolutely simple and something like a God do not fit. God is complex and can be identified in parts by expression at the least. Something perfectly simple would have no parts, no expression, and agency, no will.

I demonstrated the exact opposite is true in the OP: please feel free to contend with any of the relevant premises.

Such a thing is not bound by logic in its existence.

That doesn’t follow from what you said so far. A necessary being could, in principle, be bound by logic such as the law of identity.

. But if this is the case, there is no logic preventing an infinite regress from existing either, as it too would have no rules or reason for its origination of existence.

That misses the point. Like I said before, the problem is that you are positing an infinite series which is contradicted by what we know exists; so it is impossible. The idea of such an infinite series ceteris paribus, to your point, is possible.

The problem I'm trying to note is that you need to apply the same criticism against an infinite series of no outside origin to a finite series of no outside origin. I posted a rewrite of my "Probability of a God" example a few days back where I cover this concept. You don't have to post there, but a quick read may clarify what I'm talking about. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/961721

I am more than happy to discuss that in this thread if you want or in that thread; but the same issues I have voiced before still seem to be there. E.g., the term ‘cause’ is being used entirely too loosely.

Since we've already injected an eternal energy force without prior explanation, its not any less absurd to note the gears run infinitely regressive and share the infinite energy source which makes them run without prior origin.

Here’s a simple way of demonstrating my point with the gears:

1. Change is the actualization of a potential.
2. A gear cannot change itself.
3. Rotation is a form of change.
4. A gear cannot rotate itself.
5. An infinite series of gears that are interlinked would never, in itself, produce any rotation amongst the gears.
6. Therefore, if an infinite series of gears that are interlinked are such that they are each rotating, then something outside of that series is the cause of that rotation.

There is no analogous argument that an absolutely simple being cannot actualize things.

My point is that if we're positing that one thing can exist that seems impossible can exist without prior cause, we draw the line at another thing that seems impossible but can exist without prior cause?

As shown above, one is impossible; the other you are blanketly asserting is impossible, and of which I deny.

Why does it need to be immutable?

That’s in the OP:

15. The purely actual being is changeless (immutable), because it lacks any passive potency which could be actualized.

If the initial push was strong enough, the pusher doesn't need to be there anymore.

This argument is not about temporal causation nor per accidens causation: it is about per se causation; which entails that this example you gave does not apply since it is an example of the former. If the atoms in the apple cease to exist, then so immediately does the apple itself: this is not like begetting children where the son can beget children even after his father dies (or a person pushed doesn’t cease to exist when the person who pushed them does).

Does an infinite God which is entirely simple have the ability to move itself?

No, and this does not make Him lesser than omnipotent (in my view).

Leontiskos reply suffices to answer your question: please let me know if you need me to provide more clarification.

I agree that makes sense but it's inconsistent with Thomism. How can God be perfectly simple yet have thoughts that are not him?

It makes no sense under any theory to say that a being is identical to its thoughts. That’s like saying you are identical to your thoughts: no, you think.

Secondly, that God is perfectly simple is not to say that God is conceptually simple: it is that God has no parts. God still has a will, intellect, etc. without having parts; and God is not ‘simple’ in the sense that God is like one singular atom.

:roll:

But how is it properly reconciled with the 'macro' world?

So I personally do not like the idea of an infinite regress, and view it as a 'god of the gaps' argument

A god of the gaps argument is an argument for God’s existence by appeal to ignorance. Nothing about the OP’s argument does that; so it can’t be a god of the gaps argument.

But for this argument in particular how is this any less 'impossible' then something that has no prior cause having the energy to start and power everything else that comes after it?

This ‘energetic and powerful’ entity which has no prior cause that keeps things existent would be the absolutely simple being. As the OP demonstrates, the existence of composed objects necessitates an absolutely simple being at the bottom.

In other words, whatever being you are positing here as having the energy to power everything would have to be absolutely simple; and then you end up looping back around to the idea God exists (:

2. Infinite regressive causality has no prior cause. Yet it somehow has all the energy to power infinity to A which powers B which powers C.

This is absurd, and not actually possible. Again, go back to the gear example: you are saying that an infinite series of gears moving each subsequent gear is possible because “somehow the infinite series is such that each can do that”; but if you understand what a gear is, then you no that no member of this infinite series would be capable of initiating the change. Something outside of that infinite series would, at the least, have to initiate the movement.

Likewise, if you have an infinite regress of members which do not have the power to keep the next member existing and yet each depends on the other, then something outside of that series is powering it.

Infinite regressive causality has no prior cause.

An infinite series itself cannot be treated like an object: it would not have any ability to do anything, because it is just itself a series.

If something can appear without prior cause that powers everything,

I do not hold that a thing can appear and then actualize everything: I hold that there is an eternal and immutable being which is absolutely simple and purely actual.

why is it not possible for an infinite series of 'gears' for example that has infinite power spread all over itself to power it all at once?

Because what I think you are missing is that the gears don’t have the ability to move themselves; so this “infinite power” would have to come from something outside of that series which affects the series. Right now, you are positing that an infinite series of powerless things have infinite power coming from nothing. Something does not come from nothing.

Its good to chat with you again!

You too!

I don't know, a lot of this quantum physics stuff I think gets misinterpreted into voodoo; or, worse, tries to force us to disband from the truths about macros things that I am certainly not willing to give up. We still have no reconciliation of QP with newtonian nor einsteinien physics; and this indicates that we are getting some stuff wrong here.

Like real numbers series (i.e. continuum), like unbounded surfaces, like fractals ...

What is an unbound surface? Can you give a concrete example of that?

What is a fractal? Ditto.

Real number series are not concrete entities, so they are not a valid rejoinder to the argument from the composition of concrete entities.

"Exist" is not a predicate of any subject but instead is merely a property (indicative) of existence like wet is a property (indicative) of water (such that whatever is in contact with water is also wet).

I don’t understand your point here: could you elaborate?

The compositional beings exist for sure, but they are contingent; and an infinite regress of contingent beings is actually impossible.

conflates his abstract map(making) with concrete terrains.

I don’t know what this means.

Okay, and yet another anachronistic metaphysical generalization abstracted from pseudo-physics – of no bearing on contemporary (philosophical) usage of "causality" ...

How would you define change? How would you define causality?

If he is his thoughts he cannot move his mind but if he doesn't move his mind than he cannot move. To have thoughts mean movement.

Like I said in that quote, God is not his thoughts and God doesn't move himself; so nothing you said here has any bearing to my response that you, ironically, quoted.

Also, as a side note, to have thoughts does not imply movement: movement is physical, thoughts are mental.

It means that a being which is complex, which has composition, has parts which comprise it.

In time it could be eternal. In space it is infinitely divisible. See Kant's antimonies

Even if that were true, it doesn’t negate what I said:

Even if there was a thing which was uncreated, if it is composed of parts then that composition cannot be an infinite regress

I was noting that it would have parts; and this is true if you are thinking about ‘eternity’ in the improper sense of persistence through time. Temporality itself provides parts to something, as can be divvied from each temporal succession.

A part is not actualized by the whole. That would mean it actualized *itself* with the rest of the whole

Not at all. The parts which make up the whole actualize the potential for the whole to exist; and, yes, I understand that is a controversial take on change. Irregardless, when we think of it in terms of composition, the parts make up the whole; which must bottom out at an absolutely simple thing at its base.

Yes it does since you say God is existence itself and the world exists

You aren’t understanding Thomism properly. By God’s essence entailing esse, Aquinas is noting that nothing else is pure actuality; and this pure actuality is not the only thing that exists but, rather, the bases for why it exists. They are obviously separate and this is internally coherent within Thomism; although, of course, one can have cogent reasons for disagreeing with it.

The premise here is a purely actual being cannot have parts. Why is the premise the conclusion? This is what Aquinas does. All the 5 ways have the conclusion in the premise

Nothing about what I said was begging the question: you keep randomly misquoting me.

So now the parts instantiate the whole. You can't keep your story straight

:roll: :lol:

You need to take things slower and actually read what I am saying: nothing I have said is incoherent nor logically inconsistent even if you disagree with it.

. Imagine a slide that flows water down infinitely from infinite height downwards. The gravity is the prine mover, not some person you invent who has no parts lol. If you don't prove a mind you don't prove a God

First of all, gravity is the displacement of space-time fabric which is relative to a relationship between the two objects effected; so this example is nonsensical.

Second of all, to be charitable, let’s assume that there is some sort of natural law that causes the water to flow down infinitely. This wouldn’t negate this argument from composition, which would, unlike an argument from motion, dictate that the water and the slide cannot be composed of an infinite per se series of parts and, thusly, God must exist. Either way, you end up with God’s existence (:

Now, natural laws and other real substances (if you are a realist about them)(like space and time) are immanently immune to the argument of composition and motion because they aren’t proper objects; however, crucially, the proper objects are what those arguments begin with and from them it can be derived that there is a purely actual and simple being; and then one can deduce that those laws and real substances must also be dependent (for reasons I see you have already read from my comment to someone else, so I do not feel the need to reiterate).

if God is his thoughts and he knows he moved his mind to create the world, this brings new knowledge to God and since he is his thoughts he has therefore changed. Therefore to create is to change for God. Simple

God is not his thoughts.

God doesn’t move his mind: that makes no sense.

God acquiring knowledge from His own creation is an interesting thought; but even if it is true it would not negate that God is omniscient in the sense described in the OP nor would it entail that God has changed. Change is the actualization of passive potential, and God would still lack any ability to be changed in that manner.

Lastly, God doesn’t create things in the sense like we do in time; and so it doesn’t seem incoherent to posit that a God knows everything that is going to happen and has happened and what is and what will be all the while creating and keeping it going. I admit, this is a bit confusing though.

Hello again Bob! My busy end of 2024 schedule has relented, so I have time again to properly engage with your posts

No worries and glad to have you back, my friend!

What is a part?

A part is something which contributes to the composition of the whole. I keep it purposefully that vague, because I don’t think a more robust definition is necessary for intents of the OP.

Is there any part that is not also composed?

That would NOT be a part of the definition; for a part is a word which refers to a thing’s relation to another thing and not what some other thing may be in relation to it. Viz., whether a part is composed is just to regress into whether or not a part has its own parts, and this certainly is (and should) not (be) included in the definition.

To answer your question directly: in principle, there could be a part which is composed or uncomposed—those are the two logical options; and there is nothing, thusly, about a part per se which entails one or the other.

For example, lets say I find an Aristotle atom, or a thing that is 'indivisible'. Could we not look at a part of that and say, "That's the front, back, and sides of the atom?'

No, that is a contradiction. Nothing which is spatiotemporal can be absolutely simple (i.e., an ‘aristotelian atom’); for everything in space and time is divisible.

In addition, can it be proven that we cannot have an infinite series of parts composing other parts?
Number 5 seems to assume this cannot the case

That’s fair and a good question. I would say that the idea is that there is a form instantiated in matter by way of particular things arranged in particular ways—and so, as a side note, this argument presupposes realism about forms—and complex being has its form contingently on the parts which make it up (in some particular arrangement). This means that, similarly to how Aristotle notes that an infinite per se series of things changing do not themselves have the power to initiate that change (e.g., an infinite series of inter-linked gears have no power themselves to rotate each other, so an infinite series of rotating gears is ceteris paribus absurd), forms comprised of other forms comprised of other forms comprised of other forms <…> ad infinitum do not have the power to keep existence (let alone to exist at all). If each is dependent on the smaller comprised thing—which exists with a form and matter alike in the same contingency patter—then there could not be anything at all there (without something that they subsist in); just as much as if each gear does not have the power to move itself then there can’t be any of them moving (without some outside mover).

You note that something which is not composed of parts must exist on its own. But if it exists on its own, then there is no reason for it to, or to not exist besides the fact that it does. If this is the case, can it not also logically be that there is an infinite regression of parts, and there is no reason for it to, or not to exist besides the fact that it does?

If I understand your question correctly as asking why an infinite per se series of a composed being’s parts cannot just be explained as necessary, then I would say that that is because it is absurd (as noted above). To say there is an infinite regress of things which lack the power to exist but somehow do exist makes no sense. The infinite regress being necessary would not make any member in that series necessary, which is what needs to be the case for the whole series to exist in the first place; just as much as an infinite regress of moving gears, to take my previous example, needs some member which itself can actualize (innately) and such an infinite regress itself being changeless would not provide any of its members with this ability to purely actualize anything.

So the argument I saw in the Summa Theologica is:

I answer that, God loves all existing things. For all existing things, in so far as they exist,
are good, since the existence of a thing is itself a good; and likewise, whatever perfection it
possesses. Now it has been shown above (Q[19], A[4]) that God's will is the cause of all
things. It must needs be, therefore, that a thing has existence, or any kind of good, only
inasmuch as it is willed by God. To every existing thing, then, God wills some good. Hence,
since to love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it is manifest that God
loves everything that exists. Yet not as we love. Because since our will is not the cause of the
goodness of things, but is moved by it as by its object, our love, whereby we will good to
anything, is not the cause of its goodness; but conversely its goodness, whether real or imaginary, calls forth our love, by which we will that it should preserve the good it has, and receive besides the good it has not, and to this end we direct our actions: whereas the love of
God infuses and creates goodness

This is the same argument I put forward in the OP; but it weirds me out: is it really a demonstration of being all-loving to will the good of everything by merely keeping it in existence? Also, what about the clearly conflicting so-called love of each being (such as organisms tearing each other apart and eating each other alive)?

If I only desire to will that you stay alive, or that you should exist to begin with, than do I really love you?

When I first read the argument I thought of what David Oderberg calls "Reverse mereological essentialism," and you've here confirmed that this is an issue

Interesting, I am not that familiar with that position. Is it essentially the idea that the esse (viz., the parts) depend also on the essence (viz., the whole)?

It's not quite right to say that substantial wholes depend on their parts, because in a more primary sense the parts depend on the whole

I agree with this insofar as living beings aren’t just composed like non-living beings: they have a form that has to do with a process of maintaining and developing as an organism. Is that what you are referring to by “substantial form”?

For Aquinas existence is granted to the parts and to the whole, but it is not granted to the whole mediately through the parts.

I guess I am not seeing the issue. I would say that a form is instantiated by way of the parts arrangement in such-and-such manners; and so the essence is not strictly reducible to the parts which comprise the being which has it; but this doesn’t seem to negate the fact that the essence itself is contingent for its existence on the parts.

The second is more difficult, and it is Aristotle's belief that prime matter is uncreated and the universe is eternal. Aquinas is very conscientious of Aristotle's position on this.

Now perhaps you are not positing a finite universe, but I think a subtle difference on the nature of prime matter (between Aristotle and Aquinas) may come into your argument. This is because if prime matter is necessarily eternal, then in some sense it is not a composition of essence and existence.

That’s fair, and I hadn’t thought of that. I think this OP, if true, would necessitate that the universe is finite and that matter is not eternal; or at least that matter is eternal only insofar as it subsists in being (from God).

We can also, I would say, object in a similar manner to time, space, and natural laws. None of these have parts themselves, and so they would be immune to the OP; but my point would be that the OP establishes the requirement for God, and establishes the nature of God sufficiently to know that these kinds of things which have no parts themselves must be only in existence through God as well. I would say this because nothing can affect a purely actual being (since it lacks passive potency), granted such a being exists, and given natural laws (or time or space itself—if you are a realist about those) would be a medium which does affect such a being’s ability to actualize, it follows that no such purely transcendent natural laws (or time or space) can exist; for God must be more fundamental than them, as their own actualization. They equally have a potential to exist or not, and God actualizes that potentiality.

Why doesn't Aquinas appeal to the essence/existence distinction very often in his simpler works? I think it is because it is difficult to understand and know

That is fair, but my thing would be that Aristotelian idea of ‘motion’ is misleading for modern people; and makes them be too dismissive of the argument.

If God is pure act he would be everything

Absolutely not. Pantheism would be false under this view, because the composed part is separate from the thing which ultimately provides the ability to actualize it; whereas if it were true, then the composed part just would be a part of God.

A thing being purely actual means that it lacks passive potency: it does not entail that everything actualized by a purely actual being is a part of that being. On the contrary, we can prove this is impossible; for a purely actual being cannot have parts and for everything to be a part of God entails that God has at least everything in the universe as His parts, therefore God must be separate from the universe.

It looks like you disagree with every premise; so I am going to ask you to pick one that you would like us to discuss, and I will respond to that. Responding immediately to every rejoinder to every premise at the same time is an unattainable and unproductive task (I would say). So, which one do you want me to address first?

The original text probably would have had ‘created’ where this text has ‘composed’, would it not?

No, as far as I understand, Aquinas didn’t forward this exact argument; but his version is of essence vs. esse.

Using the word ‘created’ shifts the focus towards per accidens causal series; which Aquinas believes could—in principle—go on for infinity. Using this word would essential focus the argument into a kalam cosmological-style argument (like William Lain Craig’s).

1. Created beings are made up of parts.

The problem I have is that a created being does not entail that they are necessarily made up of parts; at least not when beginning the argument. Composed beings are made up of parts (obviously); but we only learn that there is an uncreated being from a deduction from the originally inferred absolutely simple being—not the other way around. Even if there was a thing which was uncreated, if it is composed of parts then that composition cannot be an infinite regress.

Ancient and medieval philosophy recognised the ‘creator-created’ distinction which is fundamental to this form of argument.

I don’t remember Aristotle’s argument for God (as the Unmoved Mover) talking in terms of created vs. uncreated things…

As we see ;-)

That is true :smile:

No 'mind' or 'will', for that would be a composite system that has memory, foresees, plans, designs, implements forms, etc.

I don’t see why that is the case at all. The OP clearly demonstrates that an absolutely simple being—with no parts—has active potencies; and one of which is willing. One would have to reason from some other starting point than the OP to derive (perhaps) what you are saying. My question would be: from which are you starting your reasoning?

Rather, it is energetic, and so stillness is impossible, and higher and higher forms come forth from the elementary 'particles', unto our complex minds that have doing - this at the opposite end of the spectrum, but not as the simplest. Higher being lies in the future.

The Ground-Of-Determination', G.O.D., underlies all, but it isn't a God Being.

I don’t know what this means; and I am not following how it relates to the OP.

Arcane, with all due respect, everything you say is just superfluous and superficial. I am advancing this Thomistic style argument, as mentioned in the OP, because I think it is true.

Why not?

Because it would be an infinite series of beings which lack the power to exist (i.e., are contingent).

This statement does not follow (e.g. numbers are infinite and each is an infinite composite).

Numbers are not composed beings—at least not in the concrete sense I am discussing in the OP.

Besides, classical atomists argue otherwise.

Good point. Here’s my response:

Here an Atomist will say that atoms (or whatever fundamental building block they choose) is purely simple and yet distinguishable via its "spatiotemporal properties." That is, the spatial location of something is an accident of that thing, but why think it is a compositional "part" of that thing?

That’s a good question. I would say, if the thing is spatial, then it must have parts; because anything that is spatiotemporal can be broken up into smaller parts. Anything, e.g., with extension must be capable of being broken up into the succession of some unit—e.g., a succession of dots form a line. Something is space is necessarily the succession of some some smaller things; and something in time is the succession of a thing temporally, which is also a form of being dissimilation.

"Cause" here is undefined

By cause, I mean it in the standard Aristotelian sense of that which actualized the potentiality.

but even so, this idea corresponds in conception to atoms in void.

What do you mean?

even if both "lack parts" they do not occupy the same positions simultaneously in space and time – necessarily "exist separately".

They cannot lack parts if they are in space and time: spatiotemporality implies divisibility.

This statement does not make sense since there are "two" which implies differentiation by more than just internal composition. "Parts" (i.e. internal compositions) are a necessary but not sufficient condition either for describing or of existing (see my reply to #9 above).

The point of #10 is exactly what you just noted (I believe); as two purely simple things could not exist since that implies differentiation.

On the other hand, if by this you mean to imply that two uncomposed beings could be differentiated by some sort of relation (which is non-spatiotemporal since the contrary would imply parts) then I would need more elaboration on that.

Sorry, I thought you were just copying and pasting something you found elsewhere. I will look at it more closely given that you wrote it yourself. :blush:

Thank you, I appreciate that :smile:

I know you know more about Thomism and Aristotelianism than I do; so your input is much appreciated.

It's actually pretty creative, and I can see some of the things you are drawing from. I have never seen an argument phrased in quite this way. Interesting thread. I will respond again to the OP eventually.

Yeah, I wanted to write it in a way that made the most sense to me and was less entrenched in Aristotelian and Thomistic concepts. For example, change, as far as I understand, for Aristotle is any actualization of a potential and everything around us has passive potency; so a thing persisting as it were through time is considered change for him, which to the modern mind sounds bizarre.

Ed Feser still keeps in line with this tradition, and talks about the need for a cause for the, e.g., apple persisting as it were on the table (without being affected by other things); and from which he draws essentially from Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover argument.

The closest to it I found, and which inspired the argument from composition over motion, was Aquinas’ argument that if all essences do not in-themselves necessitate esse than none of them could exist; and so there must be an essence which is identical to its existence—God. It makes more sense to me to formulate it in terms of ‘composed being’ than forms and matter.

I am reading "infinite series of composed beings" as individual composed beings ordered in a series. That is, we can't just be referring to the composition of a being because we are talking about the way that multiple beings are related to one another in a series.

I am not sure I followed this. The infinite series of composed beings I was referring to is an infinite regress of composition for any given, single, composed being. Sorry, I see how that might be confusing in the OP: I will rewrite that part.

Going back to my suggestion that the premise requires defense, why should we accept it? What is the rationale?

The idea is that there is a form instantiated in matter by way of particular things arranged in particular ways—and so, as a side note, this argument presupposes realism about forms—and complex being has its form contingently on the parts which make it up (in some particular arrangement). This means that, similarly to how Aristotle notes that an infinite per se series of things changing do not themselves have the power to initiate that change (e.g., an infinite series of inter-linked gears have no power themselves to rotate each other, so an infinite series of rotating gears is ceteris paribus absurd), forms comprised of other forms comprised of other forms comprised of other forms <…> ad infinitum do not have the power to keep existence (let alone to exist at all). If each is dependent on the smaller comprised thing—which exists with a form and matter alike in the same contingency patter—then there could not be anything at all there (without something that they subsist in); just as much as if each gear does not have the power to move itself then there can’t be any of them moving (without some outside mover).

For Aquinas’ essence version, it is the idea that the essence of a thing normally does not imply its existence, and so the essence of a thing is distinct from its existence. If there were an infinite per se series of composition of things sorts of essences, then none of them could exist; for they are all contingent. There would have to be some essence—which he argues is only one of this kind—where it just is identical to its existence (i.e., is a necessary being).

Here an Atomist will say that atoms (or whatever fundamental building block they choose) is purely simple and yet distinguishable via its "spatiotemporal properties." That is, the spatial location of something is an accident of that thing, but why think it is a compositional "part" of that thing?

That’s a good question. I would say, if the thing is spatial, then it must have parts; because anything that is spatiotemporal can be broken up into smaller parts. Anything, e.g., with extension must be capable of being broken up into the succession of some unit—e.g., a succession of dots form a line. Something is space is necessarily the succession of some some smaller things; and something in time is the succession of a thing temporally, which is also a form of being dissimilation.

Well, if your argument had only two premises and a conclusion, like a syllogism, then it would be easier for people to read, and more difficult for people to attack.

If it were a proper syllogism, then it would be utterly superficial and meaningless for an OP.

A simple syllogism that aims to prove that God exists is much, much more difficult to formulate than an argument that has around 40 premises, give or take

No it isn’t. It is much easier to formulate two premises that necessitate a conclusion than to provide a substantive argument for something. A proper syllogism is vague and usually frail.

I could see your point if you wanted it trimmed down to like 10 or something; but 2 is over-simplification. In this case, I went with just enough premises for a laymen to follow the argument.

do you really need 40 odd premises to begin with?

Yes.

It's not possible to simplify this argument of yours?

If you don’t think some of the premises are necessary, then I am all ears to hearing which ones and why. So far you are just saying “well, it seems like 41 is a lot”. Again, keep in mind that this OP is meant to outline robustly each step to getting to God’s existence.

Thomas Aquinas famously stated five arguments, also known as five ways, for one to be able to arrive at the conclusion that God exists. He did not resort to 40 or so premises in any of the five proofs that he gave.

First of all, none of the five ways in their common form try to prove all of God’s attributes: this one is supposed to and given that Thomas needs about 10 premises for each of the five ways just to prove one aspect of God, I think 41 is pretty short for proving all of them.

what is it about your argument that can be characterized as "Thomistic"?

It is literally his argument from essence vs. esse and his conclusions about God’s attributes that can be deduced from Him being absolutely simple. Aquina's didn't just argue for God's existence with the five ways: those were more of a cheat sheet for laymen.

Arcane, it is not helpful to say that there are 41 ways someone could object to a 41-premised argument.

But this is not a real argument.

:up:

The argument is reminiscent of classical theism, but to prove 12 predicates [of God] in a single proof is excessive. Where did you find this?

So it is an argument for classical theism—as opposed to theistic personalism—and I created it myself based off of various neo-Aristotelian arguments for a pure, unactualized actualizer. The three main one’s I read were Aristotle’s argument from motion, Acquinas’ argument from essences, and Ed Feser’s “Aristotelian Argument”.

With respect to the first and third, I think the way Aristotle uses ‘motion’ is counter-intuitive now; so I didn’t want to word it that way.

With respect to the second, the essence vs. esse distinction works but I think it harder to explain to people.

This probably requires defense. It looks like the Kalam Cosmological Argument, which Aristotle and Aquinas disagreed with (but others, such as Bonaventure or now William Lane Craig, uphold). I forget the common scholarly name, but it is the question of an infinite series of contingent beings ordered per accidens.

So, in the OP, I am referring to the composition of a being and not a temporal succession of causes; so it would be a per se series according to Aquinas because without the part you cannot have the whole: this is not like begetting children, where without the father the son can still beget children.

I can add in the concept of per se causal ordering into the OP if that helps clarify it.

The conclusion is too ambitious in my opinion:
…
but to prove 12 predicates [of God] in a single proof is excessive

But doesn’t it succeed in doing so? I get it is an informal pseudo-syllogism; but each point follows logically from the previous.

Two things might be indistinguishable in their parts, and yet be numerically distinct. We don't distinguish two identical marbles by their parts, but by their distinct bodies occupying distinct spatial locations.

The spatiotemporal properties are properties of the part; so it does hold that we distinguish them based off of the parts even if they are identical notwithstanding their occupation of space or place in time.

For one, there are just too many steps for them all to have any hope of withstanding scrutiny.

I second this observation. Think of it like this, Bob: your argument has 41 potential targets.

This is the most controversial part of the argument, IMHO.

None of these are arguments, rejoinders, nor valid criticism.

What do you get out of the aphorism you provided? I guess, I am just not understanding it yet. Is it the idea that we should strive towards being with those who think differently than those who think the same?

Ah, I see. But what does it mean? An aphorism has an underlying principle of (practical) wisdom.

The idea that western values are superior to eastern values in no way implies nor entails that the white "race" is superior to any other "race".

Like "whiteness", "the west" is a myth

Firstly, my OP is not arguing for white supremacy; and I don't know why you went there.

How is the west a myth? Historically, the democratic values we all tend to love originated out of the west and the east has been playing catch-up.