I reject that good has properties

I was referring to the property of goodness, and not properties of goodness. It is one property, just like redness is the one property of ‘being red’.

Good is an ideal of pure practical reason

This seems to contradict your previous point though: if practical reason is attributing to things ‘good’ or ‘bad’, then it is assigning things the property of goodness and badness. No?

that principle which serves as the ground of determinations of will which satisfy the worthiness of being happy.

Am I understanding correctly, that you, then, view what is good as whatever makes one happy? Again, wouldn’t that entail that, contrary to your first point, happiness is good (which entails it has the property of goodness)?

I agree with Moore, insofar as to define an ideal principle does little justice to it, while at the same time, all moral judgements are a priori in necessary reference to it.
…
Moral philosophy is not transcendental in a Kantian sense.

Then, what do you mean by moral judgments being a priori?

…..Real things, re: reality writ large, belong to Nature, insofar as Nature is their causality, and are given to us for the use of pure theoretical reason in determining how they are to be known;
…..Moral things, re: morality writ large, belong to us, insofar as we are their causality from the use of pure practical reason in determining what they will be, and are given to Nature.

This sounds like you are saying that moral judgments do not express something objective, correct?

Given this obvious and universal dualism, the dual aspect of pure reason itself is justified.

I reject this as a false dichotomy. How reality is can dictate how it ought to be (for me).

That’s the question: what is it that just is this sense and from whence does it arise

I would say biology.

I have maintained from the beginning of this discussion thread that I think Moore was right that good is an absolutely primitive and simple concept. E.g., (although this wasn't addressed to you) this post. I am not saying you need to be aware of all my posts to other people in the thread, but I never suggested to the contrary in my discussion with you. My point was:

That bringing happiness is good is a predication of goodness; and not a definition of what is good. You are putting the cart before the horse: the OP person needs to start at the basics.

I was talking about the concept of good, and of which one must have an understanding of before they can accurately assess what can be predicated to have it. This is a classic mistake that Moore rightly points out: ethics starts not with what is good, but what goodness even refers to---whereas, most people do it in the opposite order (or merely engage in the latter).

Begin at looking what brings happiness.


Why would they do that? They need to first understanding what it means for something to be good, then explore what is good. You are having them skip vital steps here.

(PS: the Nichomachean and Eudemian Ethics are good reads indeed: no disagreement there).

Where the conversation turned into a quest into Moorean ethics, was:

I was talking about the concept of good, and of which one must have an understanding of before they can accurately assess what can be predicated to have it. This is a classic mistake that Moore rightly points out: ethics starts not with what is good, but what goodness even refers to---whereas, most people do it in the opposite order (or merely engage in the latter). — Bob Ross


Where did Moore say that?

I never suggested that the concept of good was definable in the sense that can be adequately defined.

So, going back to the actual point I was making, do you think the OP should start analyzing what is good by looking at what makes them happy (like you originally suggested) or what they think goodness even is in the first place? Do you still want them to put the cart before the horse?

EDIT:

I think what happened is you took my (consistent) approval of Moorean thought on the concept of 'good' as an admission that one shouldn't start out by analyzing what they think goodness is. I don't think that the person in the OP should start out with my idea of goodness, which is very Moorean, but, instead, should begin with their own understanding of it. A person just getting into ethics shouldn't start with other peoples' ethical theories: they should start by building their way up. What you, and most people on this thread did, is nudge the OP in the direction of your own ethical theory; instead of nudging in the direction of how to think about ethics for themselves.

This response makes absolutely zero sense in the face of what I have said.

I already outlined in this post; and of which you didn’t respond at all.

IF you were being charitable, it would be painfully obvious (and, i've checked this by running the set of exchanges by a third party who has no skin in the exchange) that what I have said there is exactly what it says - an example that ab objective Good would need to be circular.

The euthyphro dilemma refers to whether or not God is determines what is good or if what God determines is good because it is good: this has nothing to do with my position, nor anything I have said.

You seem to think that the euthyphro dilemma refers to objective goodness being circular (or needing to be circularly defined): it doesn’t.

I will say it one last time: my definition is not circular, and I agree with Moore that it cannot be defined properly.

The problem with our conversation is that you birthed it out of half-assedly wedging yourself into my conversation with someone else. Again, your first quote in this exchange was an abysmal attempt at engaging in conversation.

It seems to be the case, that your reading the original text was not very through or accurate.

How do you know? You've never read it lmao.

I thought it was not a waste of time at all, because it helped someone to correct his misunderstanding on Moore. :D

Nothing was corrected about what I said: I refer you back to my response. I have maintained the same position throughout this discussion, and you are merely confused about Moore and my claims (as they relate thereto) because you haven't read him.

EDIT: I also refer you to your original post that I was responding to <here>.

Warnock was a professor of Philosophy, and the book is a good introduction to modern Ethics. I don't think you need to read The PE, in order to understand Moore, unless you are specializing in his Ethics.

:lol:

It is good that you admit your misunderstanding Moore, and your claim was wrong. :cool:

:roll: I find it interesting that the person who has never read Moore, who doesn't see a need to, thinks they are understand Moore better than someone who actually has.

This conversation is a waste of my time.

I didn’t ask about goodness, and I’m not interested in meta-ethics.

Perhaps I misread, then: I thought you asked about what is good—no? Goodness is just the property of being good.

It seems to me you’re advocating somewhat of what you claim Moore is refuting

I am just advocating that a person who wants to begin understanding what is good must start with analyzing what they think the concept of good is; then what can be said to be good. That’s it. I don’t think the person in the OP should start with our understanding of what we think goodness refers to.

There is no legitimate warrant for determining how good a thing is, re: its goodness, without an a priori sense of good itself. Just as you can’t say of a thing its beauty without that to which its beauty relates.
…
Clock’s ticking, Bob.
(Grin)

Well, this just opened up a can of worms (;

Now we inevitably begin discussing transcendental idealism again haha. The question you raise, is an interesting, Kantian one—viz., if we cannot know how the things-in-themselves are, then how can we know what is in-itself good?

In short, I think this falls prey the same issue that transcendental idealism has with its in-itself vs. “for-us” distinction: by ‘in-itself’, I take Kant to really be meaning (whether he likes it or not) how a thing exists independently of any experience of it; and there’s another common meaning for ‘in-itself’, which is just the nature of a thing (and this can be based off of conditional knowledge of it). I find no reason to believe that I cannot have indirect knowledge of reality as it were in-itself in the second sense of that term.

So, for me, I would say that we have a sense of what it beautiful just as much as what is good (and just as much as what is a car) by our conditional knowledge of the world around us. All we need in order to grasp what is good (conditionally), is the intellect. That is, I guess, the “a priori sense of good itself”—although I am certainly not referring to exactly what you meant here (since you probably meant a faculty of some sort that is special for grasping morality). Or are you thinking that by concept of good, I am referring to an a priori concept of good?

EDIT:

It is also worth mentioning that moral non-naturalists will nod their approval your way on this one; and say that we do have some sort of extra sense for morality that allows us to sense the supersensible or that God gives us divine revelation.

I have responded to this as presented in several of your posts in this thread. Not the bare quote which I used to represent it. That bare quote would, one would think, cast you back to your entire position

No, one would not think that AmadeusD; because for anyone who actually read my posts, I took a Moorean position on the nature of goodness which is not circular. Again, you just quoted me out of context when I was talking about how goodness is objective.

Your notion of 'objective good' is circular. I have made that much clear about my position, whether you agree with it or not.

All you said was this:

This is tautological. This is unhelpful. This is not an answer to any of the questions. What's good is *insert definition* is the correct form of this statement. Everyone has their own. And that's absolutely fine. — AmadeusD

All you did is address that, when taken literally, “what is good is good” is tautological and doesn’t give a real definition. You absolutely did not address anything about my idea that goodness is objective. Now you are just trying to ad hoc rationalize your laziness.

AmadeusD, I try to be charitable; but on this one I can’t...it’s too painfully obvious what you did. You read a tiny snippet, which had nothing substantial to do with the post in which it was, that said “what is good is good” and assumed I was trying to define goodness as goodness.

It could be objective and circular, as Euthyphro shows is almost certainly the case, if an objective good were to obtain.

The Euthyphro Dilemma is about God and God’s relation to any objective goodness to demonstrate that God can’t really be the standard for it; and does not provide any reason to believe that an objective morality cannot exist.

Where did Moore say that? From my memory, Moore said it is impossible to define what good is, and one must start from what one ought to do from the knowledge of what morally good actions are, rather than asking what good is. (Ethics since 1900, by M. Warnock)

My understanding of the Principia Ethica, when I read it a while ago, was that his whole critique was, first and foremost, that ethics hitherto had not even thought to question what the concept of good even is and, instead, skipped over it to a discussion of what can be predicated to have it. This is not to say that Moore, upon conducting (what he considered to be) the necessary investigation into the nature of goodness (as opposed to what The Good is—what can be said to be chiefly good), concluded that we can define it accurately. In fact, you are absolutely right that he considered it an absolutely simple and primitive concept; and I am inclined to agree with him on that point.

If it is from the actual reference from the original texts and academic commentaries on these points, you should indicate the source of the reference with your claims.

“Ethics since 1900” was not written by Moore. If you want to understand Moore, then you need to read The Principia Ethica:

But our question ‘What is good?’ may have still another meaning. We may, in the third place, mean to ask, not what thing or things are good, but how ‘good’ is to be defined. This is an enquiry which belongs only to Ethics, not to Casuistry; and this is the enquiry which will occupy us first.

-- (Principia Ethica, Ch. 1, Section 5)

I said what brings happiness to all parties involved is good. So it was an inferred definition of Good.

Even if I grant your point, my point still stands:

And your response to them was to suggest starting with analyzing happiness; when that is clearly not a good starting point for metaethics. — Bob Ross

The OP is asking where to start to understand what is good, and I am merely pointing out that you are trying to have them start with Aristotelian ethics (at best); and starting with an already existing, robust theory is not the proper way to start. One needs to start by studying what the nature of goodness is: that is the beginning of metaethics.

It is not possible to define what good is, according to Moore.

That’s all fine: the OP is about where should a person start. Do you think they should just skip over asking themselves “is good definable?”? Do you just want them to skip that step?!?

I don't disagree with that: I think we learn about all concepts through experience; but that doesn't mean that we can skip steps and put the horse before the cart.

My answer of what the concept of good is, is found in this post:

For example, I would say that Moore was right that the concept of good and bad are absolutely primitive and simple—like being, value, time, space, etc.—as opposed to derivative and complex concepts—like a car, a cat, a bat, etc.—and thusly are knowable through only pure intuition. I would say that the concept of good—which can only be described inaccurately through synonyms, analogies, metaphors, etc.—refers to that which should be; that which should be sought after; that which is best (or better); etc. — Bob Ross

That doesn't matter for my point I was making: I was pointing out that the OP is asking where to start, and surely they must start with the concept of 'good' and not what can be said to be good. This is a basic distinction that shockingly no one else in this thread seems to cares about: everyone is just nudging @Matias Isoo in the direction of their metaethical and normative ethical commitments. I am not here to do that, because that's not what the OP is asking about. You don't start with someone else's robust ethical theory when starting ethics: you build your own way up.

Yes...... :brow:

PS: I refer you back to this comment, because you never actually addressed it.

The reason I am being so harsh with you, is because you obviously cherry-picked one sentence from my most recent post to someone else......

When I said that, I said:

I think it does. You're just attached to this little rock going nowhere for a short amount of time. Love and do what you will.


That’s just a red herring. What does that have to do with anything? What is good is good: who cares if you are just on a “little rock”? What about your view would help give some objective form of goodness?

Of which the phrase "what is good is good" clearly refers to the idea it is objective, and not that I am defining 'good' circularly.

It isn't productive to cherry-pick peoples' responses and address something utterly irrelevant to the conversation.

We can talk about what we mean by "good" without worrying about moral realism

:chin:

What meaningfully is there to talk about other than whether goodness is objective; whether judgments about what are good are cognitive and some of them are true; and so forth? Sure, we can venture into metaethics without explicitly dealing with realism vs. anti-realism, but there core tenants of each are going to be addressed irregardless...

Because the what goodness is is presupposed in what can be said to be good, so how can one accurately predicate goodness to something when they have not a clue what goodness is itself? That's blind metaethics, my friend....

The problem I was raising is that the OP is asking:

So I decide to build my own set of rules and values, this is my first attempt and I will need your help, so where should I begin? What question should I make?

And your response to them was to suggest starting with analyzing happiness; when that is clearly not a good starting point for metaethics.

You just randomly misquoted me to try and pick a low hanging fruit (without reading anything I said). Either engage in what I am saying and give a useful (or at least genuinely attempted) response, or don't wedge yourself into other people's conversations.

It's my own view, home grown in my own little brain, but yes, it's echoed by Nietzsche, and it's in keeping with the essential teachings of Jesus. So it has that going for it.

Nietzsche’s thoughts on morality are completely incompatible with Christianity. Moral anti-realism is incompatible with Jesus’ teachings. Beyond good and evil is about creating one’s own values, which are non-objective, and imposing them on themselves and other people: how is that compatible with Christ’s objective morality which is (allegedly) grounded in divine law?

I think it does. You're just attached to this little rock going nowhere for a short amount of time. Love and do what you will.

That’s just a red herring. What does that have to do with anything? What is good is good: who cares if you are just on a “little rock”? What about your view would help give some objective form of goodness?

I would also mention that it is exceedingly difficult to actually justify moral realism with Christianity (although I understand that is a very hot take)….the euthyphro dilemma still holds to me. Also, even if God’s nature does facilitate some sort of (objective) goods, then it seems that it would only relativistically apply to God (teleologically) (no different then how the human good refers to humans—not God).

:up:

If you read my post again, it would be clear what the concept of moral good is from Aristotle. Good is a quality or property of actions which brings happiness to all parties involved.

You misunderstand me: the concept of good refers to whatever 'good' means, not what or how one can predicate something to have it. Viz., the concept of value does not refer to what may be valuable. One must first understand, explicitly, what 'value' even means, not just as a word but as a concept, to determine what has it.

That bringing happiness is good is a predication of goodness; and not a definition of what is good. You are putting the cart before the horse: the OP person needs to start at the basics.

I caught that too.

No worries, and fair enough. You are right that the concept of ‘evil’ does arise out of religious ideologies, being closely connected to ‘sin’, but I don’t think we have to use it that way.

My understanding being: one 'likes' not suffering, suffering is virtually in de facto agreement by everyone to be unethical, ergo, the relationship between human ethics and what the subject of the whole matter's preferences are (what is liked, what is disliked, the fact inflicting suffering is unethical, etc.) is not without noting

I agree that most people would agree that suffering is bad, but this doesn’t provide the necessary connection to show that it is actually bad. E.g., if everyone thinks that red blocks are bad and blue blocks are good, then does that thereby make it so? Of course not: that’s just inter-subjective agreement.

What you would have to do, if you are a moral realist, in order to do proper ethics, is demonstrate how suffering is bad by way of explicating what badness is, how to assess something as bad or good, and apply that to suffering.

For example, I would say that Moore was right that the concept of good and bad are absolutely primitive and simple—like being, value, time, space, etc.—as opposed to derivative and complex concepts—like a car, a cat, a bat, etc.—and thusly are knowable through only pure intuition. I would say that the concept of good—which can only be described inaccurately through synonyms, analogies, metaphors, etc.—refers to that which should be; that which should be sought after; that which is best (or better); etc.

As a neo-aristotelian, I would say that objective goods, which are just ‘goods’ in their proper sense (as opposed to moral anti-realist concepts of it), and “bads” arise out of the teleology of things as relativistic to how the thing was supposed to be (as demonstrated by its Telos). E.g., a good farmer, a good human, a good clock, a good bubonic plague, a good lion, etc. These are not hypothetical goods nor are they non-objective—e.g., a good farmer is not hypothetically good at farming nor are they good at farming only because one wants them to be nor are they good at farming only because one thinks they are: they are, in fact, good at farming.

Suffering is generally bad, then, because it represents a (living) being not living up to their Telos properly (either voluntarily or by force) as suffering is normally the bodies way of telling itself what it is designed to do is not happening (and, on the contrary, what anti-thetical to it is happening). However, I would note that suffering simpliciter is not bad, because suffering is required in order to properly fulfill one’s duties, roles, and (utlimately) Telos.

I am not advocating that you need to agree with me on my analysis of what is good here; but I merely advocate that you do the same with respect to your theory. Otherwise, you are prone to many mistakes by venturing in muddied waters.

You could say it's Beyond Good and Evil, yea.

Then, you are not giving them a starting point for investigating ethics: you are giving them a Nietschien, moral anti-realist, position to explore.

The OP has a starting place. He or she is an atheist.

Sure: I don’t see your point. They were asking where to begin to understand what is good: being an atheist doesn’t preclude moral realism.

I was talking about the concept of good, and of which one must have an understanding of before they can accurately assess what can be predicated to have it. This is a classic mistake that Moore rightly points out: ethics starts not with what is good, but what goodness even refers to---whereas, most people do it in the opposite order (or merely engage in the latter).

How can one determine what is good without understanding what it would mean for something to be good in the first place? Isn't that putting the cart before the horse?

Agreed. I was just noting that people find this very compelling, hence why (I would argue) most people find libertarianism appealing and are confused what compatibilism even is.

Good is whatever is conducive to the arrow's path toward your vision. Evil is whatever makes the arrow deviate down some other path

That's just another way of saying there is no actual goodness and badness; because you defined it as whatever suits a person's own non-objective dispositions. My biggest complaint is not that you are siding with moral anti-realism, but that the OP wants to know where to start and this makes them think, if they accepted it, that they should collapse ethics into pyschology. They need to explore, first, what goodness even is: not go on a psychological quest.

This is also why, as a side note, I call moral anti-realism only ethics insofar as it is its negation.

Begin at looking what brings happiness.

Why would they do that? They need to first understanding what it means for something to be good, then explore what is good. You are having them skip vital steps here.

(PS: the Nichomachean and Eudemian Ethics are good reads indeed: no disagreement there).

Good doesn’t have a definition, but if you think you can build your own set of rules, you must already have an idea of what good will be.

This sounds like a Moorean intuition of goodness, am I right? (:

I would start with: which good - personal or social?
Social good is whatever contributes to the well-being of the community.

This seems to put the OP in a box that isn’t needed though: why start with personal and social goods? Why not start with what it would mean for something to be good in the first place?

Personal good is whatever contributes the individual's continued survival, welfare and happiness.

So it is good, then, for me to kill an innocent person to ensure my survival? That would be a “personal good”?

So it is good, then, for me to avoid my duties to my children because it makes me happier?

Social good is whatever contributes to the well-being of the community.

So it is good for society, then, to torture one person in order to ensure its own survival?

These definitions don’t accurately reflect what either an individual nor social good would be.

Philosophers tend to avoid use of (or for that matter, even belief in) the word and its prescriptive concept of "evil" over more objective and easily defined concepts such as "socially-destructive" and "willfully inhumane and unethical".

No, they absolutely do not. All ethicists talk fundamentally in terms of what is good, bad, immoral, moral, etc. What you seemed to do here, is migrate the discussion immediately in favor of moral anti-realism; when the OP is asking more generically about ethics.

What, assuming you are like most people, would you not like done to you, and why?

What you described here is pyschology, not ethics. What one likes doesn’t matter when one is trying to decipher what the concept of good is: either there such a think as ‘being good’ or there isn’t—who cares if you like it? Even in the case of moral anti-realism, their concepts of good are themselves objective (albeit they refer to something non-objective).

If by "veiled theology" you mean that a person might ad hoc rationalize their belief in (traditional) theism with libertarianism (in order to provide a solution to the problem of evil), then that is of course possible. How often does that happen? I am not sure. I think a far more common ad hoc rationalization for libertarianism is moral responsibility, not a justification for theism itself. I think most people intuit that they cannot hold people morally responsible for their decisions if that person did not have the ability to have done otherwise; and so it becomes more like a companions in guilt style argument.

I apologize: I missed that. Nevermind then.

So I decide to build my own set of rules and values, this is my first attempt and I will need your help, so where should I begin? What question should I make?

Good luck, my friend! Ethics is an interesting topic indeed.

If I could do it over again, then this is what I would advise my younger self (in this order):

1. What is the concept of ‘good’? What does that refer to?

2. What would a kind of ‘good’ that is objective be (in principle)?

3. Are there any such objective goods? Viz., is there anything that is objectively good?

4. If there are no objective goods, then what would a non-objective good be like (in principle)?

5. What is morality? What is that the study of?

6. What kinds of goods, be it objective or non-objective, would be morally relevant?

7. How should one behave in such a manner as to abide by what is morally good?

8. How should we, as a society, pragmatically setup our institutions to best establish and preserve what is morally good?

My biggest advice is: don’t skip steps. It is really enticing and easy to skip steps, but it will ruin your ethical theory. Most people want to start with the cool and interesting thought experiments: don’t do that—build your way up.

I don't think it is just veiled theology: if there is no free will, then there is no moral responsibility at all. You can't blame people for murdering, raping, etc. if they don't have the right kind, sufficient degree, or basic free will: even if they do not have the ability to have done otherwise.

1. Everything in nature is either determined or random
2. Free will is neither determined nor random
C. Free will does not exist.

P2 is the most controversial premise. I don't see why free will is incompatible with causal determinism. As a compatibilist, I believe in a form of sourcehood freedom such that one has free will if they have the ability act in accordance with their own will (i.e., to act voluntarily); and one has free choice if they have the ability to reach a decision through rational deliberations (i.e., to choose through reason).

The special aspect of a human brain that makes it capable of free will and choice, is that it has the ability to will against it's nature in accordance with its own conative dispositions and to reach a conclusion through the principles of reason. We do not think via the laws of nature, and we do not will necessarily according to natural appetites.

I’m not interested in what is not; I wouldn’t say reason is not grounded in the brain. I work with what I know, and how reason is a product of the brain, while being a deduction logically consistent with experience, cannot itself be an experience

But you were denying this before. So to clarify: you do, in fact, believe that the brain is the ontological grounding for reason?

which is to say, whatever the brain is doing is not contained in my internal analysis of my own intelligence. I already opined as much, in that the human subject in general does not think in terms of natural law.

I agree that we do not think in terms of natural law; because we think in terms of the laws of reason. This doesn’t negate the fact that the brain is ontologically what facilitates that reasoning.

And is found here the inconsistency regarding the notion and subsequent application of transcendent law, that which even if the idea of which is thought without self-contradiction, can give no weight to the possibility of empirical knowledge, the attempt in doing so is where the contradiction arises

What do you mean?

How can natural relations, cognized in accordance with empirical conditions, be transcendent?

It is a map of the territory. We use math, e.g., to model laws which do not pertain to way we cognize (e.g., law of gravity). You would have to deny this.

I disagree one presupposes the other,

That A and !A cannot both be true presupposes that A = A.

So if I claim the LNC just does pertain to how we cognize objects, I have no need of admitting any such possibility?

That is exactly why you would be admitting such a possibility; because you are restricting LNC to only what we experience as opposed to what exists in reality. Therefore, if LNC only applies to our understanding of reality, then it plainly follows that it is at least logically and actually possible for an object in reality, independently of our understanding of it, to both be and not be identical to itself. That is absurd.

.I’d posit that the brain is the organ necessary for all human intellectual functionality, but it is in no way clear how it is responsible for all by which its subjective condition occurs

But it seems to fit the data well, right? The alternatives are much less plausible. The brain seems to be the external representation of whatever ‘thing’ is doing the cognizing. That seems pretty clear (to me).

I appreciate your response! Philosophy of mind is an intriguing topic indeed. The problem I am facing is that I think you are absolutely right to point out that physicalism, and methodological naturalism, have not and probably will not sufficiently explain consciousness (in the strict sense of the word) but you seemed to focus on the wrong points. Awareness is easily explained through the brain and its processes (i.e., seeing, hearing, moving, thinking, intending, etc.); however, consciousness is not insofar as we mean qualia. Chalmers rightly pointed this out: we can explain, e.g., intentionality just fine through brain processes; but where the issue is lies in the fact that there is something it is like to be us and that there is a qualitative experience which we subjectively have. E.g., that our brains can cognize colors based off of wavelengths and cones does not entail any sort of adequate explanation why, on top of deciphering those colors, the brain creates a qualitative experience such that there is something it is like to be one having it. This is what I was anticipating you would use as your objection, and not that we cannot explain these things neurobiologically (like intentionality). Even if we could not explain intentionality now, it is, in principle, plausible that we will in the future in naturalistic terms; but what, in principle, cannot be is qualia. There is no way to explain why there is a subjective, qualitative experience on top of our brains being aware of and judging reality.

By themselves they are simply meaningless patterns of electrochemical activity. Yet our thoughts do have inherent meaning

This is just a misunderstanding of how the brain works: it is like a super-computer. By analogy, think of an AI that intends to pick of a banana because a human asked it to. According to Feser, that was not intentional, then, because the physical and software activity is “meaningless”.

As soon as one tries to step outside of such thoughts [i.e. by describing them in terms of neurological activities], one loses contact with their true content

Of course, when one describes physically anything at all one loses some of the meaning; because words and concepts cannot grasp 100% what was experienced. I am failing to see why that is a big deal.

The long and short is, though we know that a functioning brain is a necessary condition for reason, this doesn't establish that reason is meaningfully a product of the brain. It might be something that having a good brain enables us to recognise - but we recognise it, because it was already the case.

Even if I grant that we can’t ever explain through methodological naturalism how or why a brain has qualia, wouldn’t the idea that it is produced by the brain fit the data better?

I want to hear what alternative theory you have for what is facilitating our ability to reason, intend, etc. ; It would have to be some sort of dualism or idealism. If you go the idealist route, then I don’t see how the brain isn’t the external representation of the thing which is facilitating it—even if that be in-itself an immaterial mind. If you go the dualist route, then I have no clue how one would explain how the brain and the “whatever is” (perhaps a mind) interacts with each other.

By positing the mind, or what not, as separate (but perhaps inextricably related to) the brain you seem to create more conceptual problems for yourself.

@Mww

The connection between goodness and rightness is as follows: if X is good, then one ought to behave in such a manner so that X is the case.

The problem, I think, in your OP is that you fail to recognize three things about ethical contemplation: (1) goodness is not necessarily about behavior, (2) goodness is largely contextual, and (3) rightness can be pragmatic.

Viz.,:

1) Goodness is just about what ought to be—not what one ought to do. E.g., it is good not to get cancer, independently of what is the right thing for a person to be doing. Your OP presupposes that goodness is just connected to rightness.

2) Goodness is contextual, even if one believes in some sort of absolutism (e.g., platonism, divine law, etc.): what is good, i.e., in X ceteris paribus may not be good given more factors.

3) What is right, which is about good behavior (and not what is good simpliciter), has an ideal and pragmatic element to it. Viz., just because I should do X in a perfect world does not entail that I should do it in the real world right now. E.g., in a perfect world, I shouldn’t eat other animals, but that doesn’t mean that it is impermissible to eat them given the circumstances that I need to them to survive and the fact that they are not persons.

For example, most people would agree that selling all your worldly possessions and donating the money to charity is something that would be good

I don’t believe that most ethicists would agree with this; because it entails that is good to be purely selfless, which disrespectful to oneself. Why would it be good to give someone all your food, and then starve to death?

They certainly would agree that one should donate their excess of goods to charity, all else being equal, or that duty may require a person to be purely selfless (like a soldier sacrificing their life for another); but not that it is good to just donate everything, all else being equal, to charity.

However, if it were good to donate everything to charity, then it plainly follows that one should be doing it; but this is all else being equal: it may be the case that it is good ceteris paribus but not good given <…>….e.g., if you need to feed your family, then it is not good to donate your food to charity, but if we are analyzing the mere donation to charity all else being then it is a good act. Your OP has conflated all the possible contexts into one.

However, that doesn't mean that one is obligated to do so

Rightness and wrongness are the primitive properties of moral (i.e., behavioral) discourse; and are not to be conflated with obligatoriness. Permissibility (and its negation), ommissibility (and its negation), and obligatoriness (and its negation) are complex properties built off of the former properties.

Just because it is good to do X, which does entail that one should be doing X ceteris paribus, it does not follow that one is obligated to do X. That is, just because, e.g., I should do X it does not follow that I am required to do X.

Has your position been that transcendent has to do with that by which laws are determinable, as transcending the experience required to enounce the objective validity of those laws?

I am saying, viz., that there are laws which exist that constrain and regulate the ontological groundings of those transcendental principles, judgments, conceptions, etc.; and these laws are, then, transcendent because they are do not pertain to way we cognize reality but rather how reality is in-itself.

The brain (…) has no part to play in the tenets of such process.
—Mww

Interesting. What, then, is responsible for it? A soul? — Bob Ross

Reason.

That isn’t an answer to my question: I agree that reason is epistemically responsible; but what is ontologically if not the brain?

You would have to posit some sort of soul or immaterial mind, I would imagine, to go the route that you are—i.e., reason is not grounded in the brain. For me, the brain is clearly the organ responsible for facilitating reason.

There are natural relations, represented by laws the conceptions of which are empirical.

These are transcendent, no?

These are the most fundamental, but not of Nature but of pure reason. Where is Nature in A = A?

Because of this:

Identical to itself makes no sense to me. Best I can do, is say that for any given thing, it cannot simultaneously both be whatever it is and not be whatever it is.

The law of non-contradiction, which you noted here, as it relates to external objects presupposes the law of identity; and doesn’t just pertain to just how we cognize objects. Otherwise, you are admitting the actual possibility of an object that exists in reality which is not identical to itself….or/and identical and not identical to itself…etc.

Maybe present some theory-specific examples of transcendent laws?

I can only give a priori representations of them—in the sense that we cannot understand reality other than by using our own modes of cognizing it—but examples would be:

F = MA
A = A
!(A && !A)
F = G([m<1> * m<2>] / r ^ 2)
!(1 > 2)


Really anything that describes a necessary relation between things as it were in reality in-itself as opposed to rules by which our brains cognize it.

The brain, on the other hand, even if it is the mechanism by which metaphysical processes are possible, has no part to play in the tenets of such process.

Interesting. What, then, is responsible for it? A soul?

Humans do not think in terms of natural law. The certain number of phosphate ions required, at a certain activation potential, as neurotransmitters across certain cleft divisions, in some certain network or another, never registers in the cognition, “black”-“‘57”-“DeSoto”.

Sure, but it seems like, there are natural laws; would be my point here. The most fundamental would be logical laws; I mean, do you think an object as it were in-itself can be and not be identical to itself?

No problem at all! I look forward to our next conversation :smile: .