because accounts of Biblical miracles, and miraculous events described in other religious literature, might constitute the kinds of examples you're referring to, but as a rule these are not considered, because they're not replicable and generally not considered credible by any modern standards. So what examples are being referred to? Where to look for the data?

Oh, I think I understand now: you are saying that, because you don’t think the examples which you have readily available are legitimate sources (or are problematic), that you can’t give any example of a phenomena that requires supernaturalism to account for it, correct?

If so, then I totally agree.

As it happens, there is one large body of records collected concerning allegedly supernatural events, which are the investigations of miracles attributed to those being considered for canonization as saints by the Catholic Church. These alleged interventions are the subject of rigorous examination - see Pondering Miracles.

Are you saying that miracles require a form of supernaturalism to account sufficiently for them? I can’t tell if you are giving me a history lesson, or providing an answer.

Aside from those, I mentioned Rupert Sheldrake's research in telepathic cognition, which is considered supernatural by some, in that it seems to require that there is a non-physical medium through which perceptions and thoughts are transmitted.

Could you elaborate more on their research? I do not think we can transmit thoughts to each other with solely minds; but I am open to its consideration.

are natural laws part of nature?

Yes.

It seems obvious, but it is contested by philosophers, and it is a question that itself not scientific, but philosophical.

Yeah, I guess I don’t see why it is so contentious.

Furthermore, where in nature do your examples of inductive and deductive logic exist? As far as I can tell, they are purely internal to acts of reasoned inference, they're internal to thought. Science never tires of telling us that nature is blind and acts without reason, save material causation; so can reason itself explained in terms of 'natural laws'?

I am not here trying to claim that reality is inherently rational. I am convinced that we do afford reality some rationality in the phenomena which are representative faculties produce.

I responded to your only comment (that I see most recently in thread).

There was a recent debate between Ben Shapiro and Alex O'Connor. I only watched a few minutes, but one of Shapiro's arguments was the exact opposite of what you say here, and I think he's right. The theist simply has a more justified recourse to inexplicability than the atheist or naturalist does. There is nothing in naturalism which parallels the opacity and transcendence of God.

Can you elaborate?

I don’t see how any phenomena requires an appeal to something supernatural; so I don’t see why a theist has more justified recourse to lack an explanation.

This is a strange claim, and I don't think it is even plausible. Theists posit things like incompatibilist free will, an eternal soul, transcendent moral norms, miracles, etc., and clearly these are not equally available to the naturalist. What in fact happens is that the atheist or naturalist tends to deny the very things the theist posits, in part because their system cannot support them

That is entirely fair; but that is the point of the OP! It is to get supernaturalists to name things that they think require supernatural explanation.

Let me go through your examples: let’s break it down.

1. Incompatibilist free will: I don’t see how supernaturalism affords a better answer. It is more parsimonious to hold an atheistic substance dualism or idealism. What’s incoherent with believing in a soul without believing in God? I don’t see why that couldn’t be a natural process. Bernardo Kastrup’s idealism is a great example: in that metaphysical view, one’s mind has supremacy over matter, because matter is weakly emergent from it. The minds which are derived from the universal mind are derived via a natural process of dissociation. The point is not that it is a correct theory, it is just that if a supernaturalist can posit a soul or incompatibilist free will, then so can a naturalist; but the latter will posit less entities.

2. Soul: already discussed in #1.

3. Moral facts: I am a moral realist and a naturalist. Irregardless, moral realism is more parsimoniously explained with atheistic accounts than theistic ones. Same goes for supernatural accounts that are atheistic, like neo-platonist accounts: they are less parsimonious than naturalist accounts.

4. Miracles: let’s just say, for the sake of the argument, that a ‘miracle’ can and has occurred in the sense of something fundamentally extraordinary happening which defies our understanding of the laws of physics. It seems, by my lights, to be a better and more parsimonious answer to say that miracles like that defy our understanding of nature and not nature itself (and there are thousands of examples why this is the case).

If a person does genuinely believe that there is something naturalism cannot account properly for, then, of course, this argument holds no water (for them). BUT, if one finds themselves, like me, in a situation with nothing that seems to demand the use of supernaturalism; then they should be a naturalist. I am sure you probably agree on that point, but disagree that naturalism affords us an equal footing on most of the examples you gave.

More succinctly, the prima facie problem with Oppy's argument is that theists and atheists hold to vastly different beliefs and explananda. This is a big oversight, and it becomes even more acute as one moves away from our secular historical epoch.

I think they do tend to, but I may be mistaken on that.

:up:

I am talking about an infinite series of atemporal and temporal causes (i.e., the sum of all causes). In this series, there may be atemporal causes (as I am at least, in principle, allowing their existence)--i.e., there are things which exist contingently but are not subject to time.

If you don't like the idea of atemporal causes, then I am talking about an infinite series of temporal causes and there are no other causes that are not in that infinite series.

The series, conceptually, can be represented as a set which I will call C.

C itself has no cause, because it is the series of all causes.

You are claiming either the series C is not infinite, or that C itself leads to a first cause. Neither can be true, so I am not following your argument for this part.

I believe so. At least, I use them interchangeably.

I would go further and say that all explanations based on reason are naturalistic.

I would not go that far. Reason can easily overstep its bounds, while still maintaining its principles, and this is why some supernaturalist accounts are logically consistent but still should be rejected.

I think you would be better off just critiquing the, external and internal, coherency of supernaturalist views than its application of pure reason.

"God did it" is not really a cogent explanation. Even if it were accepted as an explanation, there is no detail, no step-by-step explication of just how God could have done it. None that can really make any rational or experiential sense at all to us in any case.

I agree that it can often be very nebulous, but this is a straw man. Sophisticated theists have very detailed metaphysical accounts of God.

I do agree, and to the point of this OP, that when God is posited there are things about God which never are explained (and can’t be) and this affords naturalism an equal footing. As Oppy put in (in the link I gave in the OP), anything theism can posit with God is equally available for the naturalist to posit about the universe (or nature). If God is necessarily existent, then nature is. If God involves an infinite regress, then nature does. Etc. The interesting thing is that, because the same explanations are afforded to the naturalist, naturalism becomes the better option because it is more parsimonious.

But how would you find out? In the absence of that kind of data, what criteria can be selected?

What do you mean?

It is not scientifically peer-reviewed that ‘a=a’, ‘1+1=2’, ‘every change has a cause’, ‘p → q, q, therefore p’, ‘truth is the correspondence of thought with reality’ (or whatever theory of truth you would like to insert here), ‘knowledge is a justified, true, belief’ (or whatever theory of knowledge you would like to insert here), etc.

It is nonsense to think that scientism, which is what you are arguing here for, is true.

We believe things based off of evidence-based reasoning; and science is not the only form of valid evidence (as clearly exemplified in my examples above).

As far as theism and atheism is concerned, the traditional divide formed between naturalistic science, which seeks explanations purely in terms of natural laws, and non-physicalist or metaphysical philosophies which are often but not always associated with religion (another very hard term to define!) But surely, in effect, naturalism leans towards explanations in terms of what have been known as natural laws - but then, there’s a whole other issue there, in philosophy of science, as to whether there are ‘natural laws’ and what that means (per Nancy Cartwright ‘How the Laws of Physics Lie’). And that debate, again, is not itself subject to a naturalist explanation, as it’s ’theory about theory’.

You seem to be trying to win by means of drowning your opponent in over-complicated, irrelevant information.

For intents of this OP, naturalism is the view that everything in reality is a part of the processes of nature; and supernaturalism is the view that some things transcend those processes of nature.

In terms of laws, it is commonly accepted that there are laws of physics; but it doesn’t matter either way for all intents and purposes of the OP. Even if you reject the existence of laws proper, if you believe everything in reality is a part of the processes of nature, whatever they may exactly be, then you are a naturalist.

This doesn't answer the question in the OP; and isn't necessarily true.

I just linked it at the top.

Interesting: I will have to check out their work!

However, I think the point in the OP still stands: what phenomena requires us to posit God's existence to explain? That is the million dollar question.

When Oppy speaks of the "theory" of theism he is clearly construing theism as a hypothesis.

Oppy is not speaking of the "theory" of theism as a scientific hypothesis; which is what Feser, in the link you gave, was complaining about. Oppy does not think that a metaphysical theory that posits God's existence is something verifiable via the scientific method: that's nonsense.

I don't think that one needs to limit themselves to what is scientifically peered reviewed or easily replicable. However, every example I have heard seems, to me, to be better explained naturalistically.

Unfortunately, I am not that familiar with the debate between scientific realists and anti-realists; but I do hope that naturalists and supernaturalists can engage in fruitful discussions herein!

As @Wayfarer rightly pointed out, the terms "naturalism" and "atheism" are not synonymous nor is "supernaturalism" and "theism"; and this OP revolves around the former of each, and not the latter.

In the case of supernaturalism, the obvious example is going to be (classical) theism; and for naturalism, it is going to be a form of physicalism (in conjunction, presumably, with other views compatible with it---e.g., a theory of truth, moral realism/anti-realism, etc.).

That quote you gave is dancing dangerously close between atheism and theism.

In a classical sense, God is absolutely separate from the nature that He created. Some of what you quoted, sounds an awful lot like pantheism; which, I would say, is really just a form of atheism.

There are arguments against naturalism from perspectives other than the theistic.

True. But that is not the topic of this OP.

Phenomena are appearances - that is the origination of the word. And from a non-theistic philosophical perspective, something this doesn’t account for is the nature of the being to whom phenomena appear.

We only have appearances to directly work with; and we only posit anything besides them to account for them.

You are absolutely right that ontology is not itself directly knowable from mere appearances, but such appearances are the content of which we extrapolate (reason) about what ontology there probably is. So, in short, I think you are sidestepped the conversation by trying to point out a technicality, which does not, in the end, serve your purpose.

But from a theistic perspective the problem with this argument is that it makes of God one being among others, an explanatory catch-all that is invoked to account for purported gaps in naturalism.

Not at all. The idea is that the phenomena (viz., those appearances) can be explained more parsimoniously with naturalism than (classical) theism.

One is not presupposing naturalism and then trying to add on supernaturalism; but, rather, posited both theories, and seeing if one is more parsimonious than the other.

. Quite why that is then turns out to be impossible to explain, because any argument is viewed through that perspective, for example by the demand for empirical evidence for the transcendent.
…
That is not an empirical argument.

I, nor do I think Oppy, claim(s) that God must be empirically verifiable: that’s nonsense. I wouldn’t even say everything that is natural is empirically verifiable. In fact, I would argue that certain perfectly natural studies are not capable of scientific investigation. Ethics is a great example; so is math, logic, (metaphysics of) truth, and epistemology. Nor, @Leontiskos, do I think that God is a hypothesis, in the scientific sense of the term; and I don't think that negates anything in the OP.

I think the proper theist response is not to try prove that God is something that exists, but is the ground or cause of anything that exists.

I don’t think you are fully appreciating the OP’s argument: it isn’t demanding a proof, per se, of God’s existence: it is demanding an example, at a bare minimum, of a phenomena (i.e, an appearance: event) which cannot be explained more parsimoniously with naturalism (over supernaturalism)---in other words: is there anything which seems to demand we posit, conceptually, something supernatural? That’s the question.

Bob

Thank you: I will take a look!

I would begin by questioning the soundness of accepting a principle such as the principle of parsimony. Why would a simpler theory be prima facie preferable?

The principle of parsimony is NOT that the simpler theory is better: it is that the theory which posits the least conceptual entities to explain the same thing is better than one that posits more.

I have no doubt that Oppy means "naturalism is simpler" in this sense.

The reason this seems to be a sound epistemic principle, is that a theory which is less parsimonious [than another theory which explains the same phenomena] has patently extraneous/superfluous concepts.

What I have in mind are much the things you would expect me to say as a supernaturalist: places like Heaven and Hell, entities such as angels and demons, but also events such as the miracle of Fatima, and other miracles that I believe in as a Christian, such as the resurrection. I realize that the occurrence of such supernatural phenomena may provoke incredulity from a naturalist. Belief in these things is not only through testimony, but also an article of faith for me.

That is fair. To Oppy's point, I think it is more parsimonious to explain the empirical data (that you would use to justify your belief in such things) under a naturalist account.

For example, just to take one, any miracle you give me seems, to me, to be better explained via naturalistic events--e.g., demonic possession described in most old texts was really seizure-related (e.g., epilepsy), etc.

I don't think you are fully appreciating yet what I am offering here. So, to get right to the point, here's what I would like to address:

"Come up with whatever crazy idea of universal origin you want. It doesn't matter. It will always inevitably end up here."

For the sake of the argument, I am going to step up and respond with "My 'crazy' idea of reality is that it is an infinite series of atemporal and temporal causes, and this doesn't lead to there being a first cause".

By your admission in the quote above, you are arguing that somehow my claim here does end with a first cause. So, how does it?

Then, what makes more beings good? Is, somehow, more beings directly correlated to more Being? Is that the idea? — Bob Ross

It is the above idea I'm trying to get at.

I am just uncertain as to if more beings actually creates more of Being itself; so I am going to refrain from commenting on this part.

I agree it is not incoherent if an objective morality does not exist.

I am saying it is not incoherent even if an objective morality exists.

But we've gone over that and agreed to disagree on this for now. I appreciate you humoring me as if it were so. This means that even if what we're exploring here sounds viable, you get full rights to say, "Eh, but its just a theory." :)

Mhmmm, “its just a theory” is a comment only a person who doesn’t know what a theory is says as a cop-out: not my forte. But I get your point.

I believe there is a clear distinction between reasoned and deduced conclusions versus intuitions.

There’s a clear distinction, but they are not distinguishable in the sense you want it to be. Induced, abduced, and deduced conclusions all rest on intuitions. You cannot escape intuitions epistemically: there’s no such distinction whereof one concludes something without the aid of an intuition. Again, I mean “intuition” in the sense of an “intellectual seeming” and not a “gut feeling”.

Why? Do you disagree because it doesn't make sense for the theory, or do you disagree because it clashes with another theory?

As an external critique.

In terms of your theory, I see how sacrificing one for five overall increase “existences”. However, it seems very immoral, by way of an external critique based off of moral intuitions. Also, I would like to mention that, if you accept it in the case of lizards, then I don’t see why you don’t accept it for humans: it is basic consequentialistic calculation you are making here. It is just as clear to me that saving five humans produces more “existence” overall than than if the one being sacrificed were to be preserved.

In terms of common folk ethics, the vast majority of people think that sacrificing one for five is immoral. It doesn’t seem right to violate one in order to save five, especially (although I know this example is about lizards) with humans.

In terms of my theory, it does not seem to promote nor progress towards universal harmony by allowing the violation of one member of a species for the sake of five other members. This seems to violate basic, implicit, rights. It gets a little trickier with larger numbers though.

In other words, the universalization of such a principle as “one ought to sacrifice one to save five” leads to an overall worse world (by way of external critique); but if it is a better world (according to your theory) then it simply seems as though you have blundered somewhere.

What value does being a better torturer give?

Originally, I was saying it would help him as a member of a government agency; so presumably to save lives by torturing captured opponents. However, to keep this really simple, let’s say it is just for its own sake. Dave is practicing torturing people for the sake of being better at it; just like how one can practice basketball for the sole sake of getting better at it. — Bob Ross

Sure, this one is a little more defined and straight forward. What we need to do is establish the worth and value of human emotions, where I did prior in terms of actions. Self-improvement alone is simply for the emotion of self-satisfaction. There is no other value in honing a skill if one's goal is simply to hone a skill. Taken in comparison of emotion vs emotion alone, one person's satisfaction is not worth another person's horror. Add in bodily degradation and cell damage, and torturing another person for pleasurable self-improvement is definitely not moral. Finally of course there are several other ways to improve one's ability to torture that do not inflict unnecessary harm on another individual.

You answered! Let’s break it down.

There is no other value in honing a skill if one's goal is simply to hone a skill.

It increased potential existence, which, according to you, is a valid moral consideration. So this is not irrelevant at all: having a skill increases the potential existence that they could actualize. All else being equal, me knowing how to play (let’s say) basketball increases my capacity to produce “unique existences” by way of engaging in the sport which, in turn, increases potential “existences”.

Taken in comparison of emotion vs emotion alone

Firstly, as said above, it is not a comparison solely of the worth of emotions: it is a comparison of actual and potential existence in terms of the consequences of which action one takes.

Secondly, emotions are irrelevant themselves to your theory: what is good, according to you, is “more concrete entities”. You evaluate this in terms of actual and potential concrete entities.
The only way emotions are valuable in your theory, is if they contribute overall towards the more total net “existence”.
The emotional damage inflicted on Billy for that hour does not, total net, contribute more to ‘total existence’ than Dave, who is not terminally ill, acquiring a skill.

The point is that Dave, by acquiring a skill in torturing Billy, is actually increasing the total net potential “existence”; and the actual nor potential “existence” of Billy being tortured doesn’t seem to outweigh it.

Emotions which compel us to decrease societal cohesion or hurt other people for fun compel us to lower existence.

Not necessarily. A psychopath may very well increase potential and actual “existence” by torturing other people. Likewise, many kings historically have committed series atrocities, but total net increased “existence”. This is the problem with pure consequentalism: it only cares about maximizing the goal (in this case, goodness) by way of an outcome.

Bob

If by causality, you really mean temporal causality; then that needs to be clarified in the OP. Your OP clearly, taken literally, is discussing an infinite causality in 6 and not an infinite of temporal causality.

The issue with making your argument with an infinite of temporal causality is that it affords you no grounds to prove that an infinite of causality leads to a first cause. You are not contending with what you need to (which is all possible options for causality) when you attack an irrelevant (straw man) of the concept of an infinite causality proper.

You have not negated the possibility of an infinite of causality which does not lead to a first cause; instead, you have now negated the possibility of an infinite of temporal causality not having itself a cause (at best).

First cause - The point in causality in which there is nothing which caused a set of existence

This isn’t proven, because you are now shifting your argument to discuss the impossibility of an infinite temporal causality having no cause; well, that’s simply not what one would argue if they are arguing that causality is infinite proper. You have straw manned their position.

If I were to rewrite this today, I would not use the term "First cause", but I would still use the underlying concept. That there is a point in causality that is always reached in which there is no cause for that state in question.

If all states are contingent and there is an infinite of them, then they can be represented in a set, C, which has an infinite amount of elements, k. In C, there is absolutely no state, k, which is not contingent (and thusly caused). If C is eternal, it is not eternal analogous to God (to use your example) because positing God posits an external entity to that set of causality; whereas the infinite set of causality is being posited itself as eternal; thusly, there is no first cause. Every cause is a member, k, of C. You haven’t negated this at all, but, rather, posited a subset of C, let’s call it T, which contains every member of C that is temporal.

I would also like to mention, that one could also posit coherently that T is equal to C because all causes are temporal; and that C/T is eternal and that C/T is not a first cause. In other words, using T instead of C doesn’t help your case, because T being eternal doesn’t make it a first cause.

Now:

I mention this, because you may be having an issue with the phrase. If you do, dismiss the phrase.

Will do. However, if I interpret your idea of “first cause” as merely “something which is no cause”; then this is a vacuously true truth that no one, atheist nor theist, will deny; and has nothing to do with the ordinary idea of a ‘cause’.

Bob

Unfortunately, I was unable to parse exactly what you are trying to argue.

In set theory, it is vacuously true that the null set is a proper subset of all other sets because technically there are no members of the null set that are not in the given (other) set; and the intersection of the null set and any other set is just the null set.

It seems like you are trying to argue that since the set of all causes intersection with the null set would result in the null set, that something not having a cause is impossible. The problem with such an argument is twofold: firstly, that something that has no cause would not be a member of the set of all causes NOR a member of the null set and, secondly, the intersection of two sets equaling the null set just means that it has no communal members (which doesn't itself entail that it is impossible for there to be a member of either of the sets).

Let's say the set of all causes is C and that the set of all non-causes is N.

N cannot equal the null set, unless it has no members. So, if there were a thing which has no cause, then, being a member of N, N's intersection with C would result in the null set not because it was the null set but because they share no communal members. Crucially, this just means that the two sets have no communal members and NOT that it is impossible for there to be a thing which has no cause. It is expected that they would not share communal members, so I am failing to understand what you are trying to argue.

When you posit that C is the set containing all causes (i.e., contingent events) and that the universe has a cause (i.e., is a contingent event), then the universe is a member of C and NOT C. You are conflating them.

What is happening is you are starting with C (an infinite set that contains all causality) and then treating C as if it is one of its members (k) without realizing it.

Philosophim, you must remember that the stipulation you gave is that C, which can be whatever you want to call it, is a set of infinite elements containing every cause; so the only way you can get the result you are wanting (which is that C is a cause and is the set of all causes) is with an incoherent circular dependency: C := {..., C, ...}.

The series itself is not a first cause. The answer to the question, "What caused the infinite universe to exist?" is the first cause. Its, "Nothing". So once we reach that point, we've found our first cause.

If the series itself is not a first cause and there is no cause for the series; then there is no first cause.

OR

The series itself has no cause, and this makes it the first cause. But then you are saying the series is the first cause.

You also must consider that we're not evaluating the set, we're evaluating the set as part of a causal chain.

An infinite set of all causes is not a part of a causal chain.

My overall point is that anywhere in a causal chain we will always reach a point in which there is no prior cause within the chain.

My point is that chain of all causes, being infinite, will never reach such a point; and the series itself is not caused and thusly is not a first cause.

The infinite series of 'causality' is really the infinite series of causality-es, and asking "what caused-e this infinite series?' is an incoherent question, so we throw it out. — Bob Ross

Its a perfectly coherent question.

It can’t be. Let’s break it down.

Let’s call the set of all causes, C.
Let’s call a cause, k.

C, when evaluating if this set were infinite, would have an infinite amount of members.

Asking “what caused this infinite series?” is asking for a cause (k) that is not in the set C, but this is impossible because every cause (k) is a member of C (by definition). That is why it is incoherent, and, actually, logically impossible:

!{ ∀k ( k ∈ C ) && ∃k ( k ∉ C) }

Now, if by “cause” you mean merely what explains the set C, then that is not incoherent because C’s members are causes, and not mere explanations. That’s why I separated semantically cause-e from cause-i.

A brute fact is not necessarily a cause.

Working through the answer might seem incoherent because people don't like to accept that we've reached an end to causality (and what it entails

The issue is that you won’t reach any end in the set C when enumerating each k; and saying C exists as a brute fact does not make it a first k. You are conflating things here.

Interesting. I think the Stoic approach to death is the only healthy approach towards it. Anything else is an exemplification of a personal attachment to what is outside of one's control.

Stoicism is about equanimity not indifference.

:fire:

--
"the longest-lived and those who will die soonest lose the same thing. The present is all they can give up, since that is all you have, and what you do not have, you cannot lose"

"there is a limit to the time assigned you, and if you don't use it to free yourself it will be gone and will never return"

"Concentrate every minute like a Roman--like a man--on doing what's in front of you with precise and genuine seriousness, tenderly, willingly, with justice. And on freeing yourself from all other distractions. Yes, you can--if you do everything as if it were the last thing you were doing in your life, and stop being aimless, stop letting your emotions override what your mind tells you, ..."

"And what dying is--and that if you look at it in the abstract and break down your imaginary ideas of it by logical analysis, you realize that it's nothing but a process of nature, which only children can be afraid of"

--
Marcus Aurelius.

Stoicism is about acquiring and maintaining equanimity, and is a very practical philosophy. It instructs one to focus on what is within one's control rationally, and to not worry about what is outside of it.

The Stoic interpretation of death is NOT indifference, but rather the healthy recognition that it is inevitable. The Stoic ensures that their decisions keep in mind that they are mortal, but equally ensures that they do not become irrationally engulfed by it.

It is natural and inevitable that one will die and, thusly, is outside of one's control: so why would it, let alone should it, bother them? Focus on the present, use it to shape the future; and remember that your time is limited so that you never squander a moment of it.

And here is culprit of why your OP doesn't prove that there must be a first cause:

And if nothing did, then the answer to what caused the universe to be infinite is the same as "What caused X to exist?" Nothing. Either way, we reach a point in causality in which there is no other cause for a state's existence.

That the infinite series of causality just is, doesn't make it a cause; thusly, it is not a first cause.

The cause of the infinite series of causality is NOT a cause: the use of the term 'cause' in 'the cause of the infinite <...>' is mere accidental word-play. That the infinite series of causality has no explanation for its existence does not entail that it is a cause: it is a brute fact, but not a cause.

If this is true, then the infinite series of causality is a valid option that doesn't collapse into a first cause; whereof every cause is in the infinite chain and the infinite chain itself is a brute fact.

The fundamental problem is that you are using this 'alpha' as a first cause in two different sense. Perhaps it would help clarify by denoting it with two different words. I shall call a cause in the sense of a contingent event a 'cause-e' and a cause in the sense of an explanation a 'cause-i'.

The infinite series of 'causality' is really the infinite series of causality-es, and asking "what caused-e this infinite series?' is an incoherent question, so we throw it out. Asking "what caused-i this infinite series?" is perfectly valid, and the answer is, according to you, 'nothing'. So the cause-i of this infinite series is nothing, and, consequently, the infinite series is a first cause-i in the sense that it is a brute fact.

That it is a first cause-e is incoherent, and makes no sense. That it is a first cause-i has nothing to do with whether or not it is a cause-e. Your argument conflates these two, muddies the waters, and claims that it is merely 'a first cause'. The reason, prima facie, people will disagree with you is that a cause usually, in colloquial and philosophical settings, refers to cause-e, not cause-i.

Bob

It all starts with the idea that "Existence is better than no existence". What is existence? What 'is'. Matter, thoughts, concepts, etc. But how do we separate existences into discretes?

You conflated them again. “existences” here refers to beings, and ‘existence’ refers to Being.

If "Being" is existence, then "Beings" are just descrete identities within existence. Meaning that from my definition, more discrete identities is equivalent to more existence

The first sentence I have no quarrel with; but the second doesn’t follow. More discrete identities equals more beings, and definitely not more Being.

I am thinking of Being as a substance: that substance, by my lights, is not increasing when you are able to meaningfully separate, through identity, two different things upon one emerging from the other. Are you claiming to the contrary?

"Existence is good." I'm not
sure "Existences" are innately good;

By my lights, your whole analysis or ‘increasing existence’ is actually ‘increasing identities’; so it is confusing me that you are saying that you are unsure as to whether existences (beings) are good.

it is the fact that they are part of the glob of existence which is what makes them good

Then, what makes more beings good? Is, somehow, more beings directly correlated to more Being? Is that the idea?

I think the best that I can argue is that if there is an objective morality, "Existence is good" must be at the base of it all.

This is, if I remember correctly, because you think it is internally incoherent to posit that non-existence is good; but I don’t think it is.

Another issue, that I may have failed to mention before, is that just because it is (internally) incoherent to posit X, it does not follow it is thereby (internally) coherent to posit not X; and vice-versa.

Likewise, even if it were (internally) coherent to posit “existence is good”, this does not entail that the truth of the proposition “existence is good” is stance-independent.

Intuitions are subjective, while facts are objective.
…
Let me define intuition. Intuition is a strong feeling that bends us for or against a decision/conclusion.

I was meaning ‘intuition’ in the philosophical sense: an intellectual seeming. If by ‘intuition’ you mean ‘a gut feeling’; then I rescind my earlier comments about it. Inuitions, in your sense, are useless to epistemology.

Nevertheless, you are absolutely correct that intuitions (in both of our senses of the term) are subjective, and facts are objective; and that the latter trumps the former. However, this does not negate my original point, which used my sense of the term, that epistemically all knowledge is predicated on intuitions (about evidence); so the proof that the earth revolves around the sun being a fact is predicated on some set of intuitions—being that it is epistemic. Ontologically (or, I should say ontically) you are absolutely right that facts trump intuitions; but, in reality, from a subject’s point of view trying to know the world, intuitions are king. I cannot prove to you that anything is a fact without appealing to some intuition I have about the evidence I present to you; and you must share a similar intuition to accept it. This is unescapable.

For example:

If I intuit that eating meat that's been on the counter for 2 days will be fine, food poisoning will demonstrate that intuition to be wrong.

That one will likely get food poisoning from eating meat that has been left on the counter for 2 days is predicated on intuitions (about evidence): epistemically, a debate about this would boil down to intuitions vs. intuitions. There’s no way around it.

think we can both agree that 'truth' is something outside of knowledge. A fact however, is objective. No matter my personal viewpoint or opinion on the matter, it still stands.

I totally agree here; and I don’t think our points are incompatible with each other.

No question-dissect the first lizard and save the others if there was no chance of failure or complications.

I disagree with that.

The next scope after individual human beings is society.

Why? That’s entirely arbitrary.

They key difference is whether the doctor respects the agency from the human being involved. Volunteering your life is fine, but taking it against your will is not.

Why? How would it, total net, in society, decrease “existences”?

We are sacrificing a life for...what?

Dave is torturing Billy to practice torturing.

What value is returned?

Dave is better at torturing people, and this increases the “potential beings/existences” he is capable of.

Why is torturing good?

That just begs the question: I am asking you whether or not it is immoral for Dave to torture Billy in this scenario. I am surprised you are going to such extents to avoid answering.

To be completely transparent with you, I think you already know that most people would automatically say “no, it is immoral for Dave to torture Billy, because it is does not respect Billy’s rights” without needing any further elaboration; but I think you equally recognize that your theory doesn’t afford such an easy answer, because the deciding factor, by-at-large, for you in this scenario is going to be potential existences. Quite frankly, I think you are committed to saying it is morally permissible and obligatory all else being equal (but I don’t want to put words in your mouth).

"If we torture this man 1 hour prior to his death, we absolutely will save five lives."

I understand that you want me to add in something like “and Dave will only have been able to torture an evil captive effectively in order to save millions of lives from a terrorist attack with the practice he got from torturing Billy”; but I am not going to do that. Right now, the scenario is claiming Dave will increase overall, all else being equal, potential “existence” (as you put it) because he has a new skill, and is better at it.

If you can't quantify it, then we can't answer it according to the theory.

This doesn’t make sense. You are saying that you cannot answer if Dave is acting immorally when he tortures Billy for practice; when answer should be an emphatic “yes”.

This current example just needs to be made more clear and other questions implicit in the example need to be solved first.

Please ask away, then; and I will do my best to answer adequately.

What value does being a better torturer give?

Originally, I was saying it would help him as a member of a government agency; so presumably to save lives by torturing captured opponents. However, to keep this really simple, let’s say it is just for its own sake. Dave is practicing torturing people for the sake of being better at it; just like how one can practice basketball for the sole sake of getting better at it.

What is the moral value of human emotions?

That’s for you to decide implicitly with your answer: it begs the question to ask me before answering.

How does torturing a dying man help with getting information from a soldier who wants to go back to his family?

Since this is taking much longer for you to answer than I expected, let’s just say, for now, that Dave isn’t working for a government agency but is just torturing Billy for the sake of being a better torturer. Is it immoral?

If you can answer that, then we will move on to adding in that Dave is working for allegedly the greater good.

This is one of the first questions people will ask who are not familiar with the trolley problem.

This is because people don’t generally understand the nature of hypotheticals and don’t get what “all else being equal” means.

I'm asking you for the limitations of the thought experiment.

Ask away, then!

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Lets edit this to: "If there exists an X which caused any infinite causality exists, then its not truly infinite causality, as there is something outside of the infinite causality chain."

This doesn't resolve the ambiguity but, rather, re-enforces it: when you use the term 'cause' in the infinite chain, it does not refer whatsoever to the same thing as when you use the term 'cause' outside of it. You are using the term 'cause' in two toto genere different senses, and conflating them.

To say that X 'caused' the infinite series of causality is NOT to claim that the infinite series is caused in the same sense as each member of its causality. X 'causing' the infinite series is really an non-causal (in the sense that you used it to discuss the infinite series itself) explanation of why the infinite series is there.

Otherwise, if you mean to refer to 'X "caused" <...>' in the same sense as causality within the series, you are simply not contending with an actual infinite series of causality when positing X: if the infinite series is the totality of all causality, then there is necessarily no causality outside of it and, thusly, X cannot 'cause' the infinite series but, at best, can only be afforded as a brute fact explanation.

Brute facts are not necessarily causes; although they could be.

As far as I understand, and correct me if I am misremembering, your point with 6 is intended to posit the infinite series as itself a cause and to say it is the first; but this only works if one is conflating your two senses of the term 'cause'.

In summary:

Number 6 in the OP is false, and springs from a conflation of an originally valid conception of causality into a conception of explanation—i.e., number 1 starts with a standard conception of causality about events and by the time one gets to 6 it somehow transformed into a conception about explanations without conceding that the conception changed.

If one sticks to the original use of the conception of causality, then 6 doesn’t follow because an a need to explain an infinite chain of events is not an event; and if they accept the use of causality as merely explanations then 6 doesn’t disprove the possibility of an infinite chain of events (which is required for the OP's conclusion to hold).

My hypothesis would be that your mind is uneasy about but also somewhat satisfied with identifying goodness with happiness because you recognize that happiness, all else being equal, is good but yet you also intuit, notionally,that what is good is not identical to happiness.

For me, I would say, being a bit of a neo-platonist in a very (very) loose sense when it comes to ethics, that what is identical to goodness is 'being in self-harmony'; and this would explain, in my mind, why happiness, all else being equal, is good but that simulated happiness takes away, by-at-large, from the overall good (because achieving harmony is a process more valuable on the actual as opposed to simulated).

I'm not sure whether or not I'm a compatibilist, but whatever determinism the world appears to have I believe is theoretically compatible with the ability to do otherwise, although the reasoning does invoke a type of indeterminancy.

In a traditional sense:

Libertarians believe in leeway freedom, compatibilists in sourcehood freedom. The former believes agents are sources of indeterminacy, the latter that we are not. The former believes that we have the ability to do otherwise, the latter does not.

In a looser sense:

A compatibilists is anyone who believes that we have free will but not that we have the ability to do otherwise. So this could include, for example, people who aren’t convinced determinism is true but still do not believe that we have the ability to do otherwise.

Personally, I am a compatibilist in the looser sense. I am not particularly convinced that everything is causally determined, but, at the same time, I do think that, when it comes to agents, we clearly do not have the ability to do otherwise. If anything has that ability, it would be (by my lights) something at the quantum level and that doesn’t meaningfully make is sources of indeterminacy when it comes to our actions.

For example, let me ask you this: how would you describe the determinancy of a die roll?

If one rolls a 6-sided die and it lands on a 5; and then the clock of cosmic time were rewound such that one rolls again; then I have no reason to believe that that person would not roll another 5 and every reason to believe they would (considering all the relevant factors are the exact same: nothing has changed except for rewinding time). Unless time itself is doing something magical here, then I don’t see how it would be anything other than a 5. In fact, every time we were to perform this experiment, it would always turn out to be a 5. Now, if we were to add in the mix that a spec of dust changed along with rewinding the time, then I am uncertain what will result in the rolling of the die (because I am not sure how impactfull that causal change will be on the outcome).

Because to me a die roll can basically function as determinant so long as the chance governing the die roll does not change

I am not sure what you mean here: could you elaborate? Probability still exists if determinism is true: probability doesn’t entail that there is some sort of indeterminacy (ontologically) going on but, rather, a preemptive calculation of the odds of rolling any number given a fair die.

I don't think it is clear enough in the OP that you are making an argument, not about the truth of the matter, but the weighing of costs of believing either way. Perhaps I just misread it (:

If you were just trying to argue that:

we have nothing to lose if it ends up being false, and everything to gain if it is true.

Then, I don't see at all in your OP, upon a quick re-read, where you argue for that. I think your OP would be much better if you just outlined what we gain from believing that we have leeway freedom as opposed to believing the contrary. As of now, I don't see what benefit(s) it has over compatibilism.

Also, I should note that, if I am understanding you correctly now, your argument isn't about what we gain if it is true but, rather, by believing it (which is not technically what you said in the above quote).

If hydrogen and oxygen had no potential to combine into water, that would be much less existence in the world. For one, life as we know it would be impossible. So its a fact that there is more existence in the universe that hydrogen and oxygen can combine into water.

I think our dispute here requires me to get a bit more specific (to convey it better). It is critical to distinguish ‘Being’ from ‘beings’—which, if you happen to be familiar with Heidegger (although it is not imperative that you are) is the difference between ontology proper and ontics (viz., the difference between studying the nature of ‘to be’ itself vs. the natures of beings). You seem to be conflating these two in a manner that actually matters for this discussion.

“More existence” is not synonymous with “more entities”, and you seem, so far, to be confusing the two (with all due respect). When you denote something with “more existence”, that is more of Being, not more beings.

Why is this important? Because, if you are claiming “more entities is better”, then your argument is about finding maximal complexity and number of beings; whereas if you are claiming “more existence is better” then your argument is about the increase of Being itself. These are two very different claims. By my lights, your entire analysis so far is “ontical” and not “ontological” (in that Heideggerian sense)—i.e., it has been about “more entities” and not “more existence”. Perhaps my analytical mind is overcomplicating this, but I genuinely can’t tell which claim you are intending to make; and so far it seems like you intend to provide an “ontological” analysis but then provide an “ontical” one.

For those reasons, I find your response to that portion of my response to still be plagued by this issue; and thusly it has not been resolved (by your latest response).

Thus it is by no means an empirical conclusion, but a logical one.

I would never, nor should anyone ever, demand your to prove via solely empirical tests that morality is objective because that is impossible: metaethics is, and always will be, philosophical. This does not, however, mean that no proof can be provided; nor that metaethics is not a science.

By proof, I just mean an argument which provides reasonable evidence for, that hopefully I will find sufficient to conclude that, your position at least validly purports that “more existence [or entities] is better” is objectively true.

It is an attempt at building something objective, though this can only be proven with exploration.

There is never going to be a way for you to explore your way into proving that “more existence [or entities] is better”: that is a prize sought after in vain—for ethics, at its core, will always be arguments from reason without a definitive scientific test that can be performed to verify it. Viz., you will never run into a phenomena that “more existence is better”, nor any test of phenomena that renders it (definitively) true. Tests and empirical evidence can be, nevertheless, used to provide more credence and credibility to the ethical position—but it will not definitively prove it akin to test gravity.

I would say intuitions are generally what spark disagreement. An objective morality, if discovered, would transcend intuitions.

No insofar as, epistemically, all knowledge is predicated, at its core, on intuitions (i.e., intellectual seemings); and this is unescapable. Nothing epistemically transcends intuitions. Yes insofar as ontologically (or, to keep with my Heideggerian usage of the term, I should say ontically) it, yes, would transcend intuitions (being that it is objective).

"Your intuition is objectively wrong, and here is rationally why."

This is impossible. Your “rational why” is predicated off of intuitions as well. You are shooting yourself in the foot by trying to argue with an inuitionless perspective.

Our intuitions that the Sun circles around the Earth my exist, but they are objectively wrong.

That they are objectively wrong is based off of intuitions of the (overwhelming) evidence that the earth revolves around the sun; and not some sort of epistemically inuitionlessly obtained “objective truth”.

Again, you are shooting in the foot here.

Taking into consideration that the person does not know the value of the human beings on the tracks, and the statistical likelihood that any one person is going to equal or surpass the impact on existence that 5 people will in total, you should change the track to hit the one person every time.

What about the 5 patients thought experiment? Is is moral for the doctor to kill and dissect one innocent, healthy person to save 5 terminally ill patients?

No, that's a much more defined problem. In fact, I can answer that now.

I think my example is just as defined, I think you are just fully appreciating that everything else is equal.

There’s one person on one train track and 5 on another. A train is coming on the track and cannot stop. It is, by default, going to run over the 5, being it is on that track. You have access to a lever that will switch, if pulled, the train to the track with the 1 person instead of the 5. Should you pull the switch?

There’s a person that is terminally sick, named Billy, that is going to die in 1 hour (from now). Another person, named Dave, is a trainee torturer for a government agency. Is it morally permissible (or obligatory) for Dave to torture Billy to death (up to or prior to that 1 hour ending, when Billy would have died anyways) to practice torturing people?

They are both easily understandable, and both imply that all else is equal. There is absolutely nothing more I need to add in either case for you to answer.

b. You cannot exclude the consideration of alternative ways of 'unlocking potential', or at least give me a reason why.

Because this is exactly analogous to if you were to respond to the 5 to 1 trolley dilemma with “why can’t I consider other ways to save them than just pulling the switch?”. It makes no sense to ask that, when one grasps the hypothetical as all else being equal.

c. We need to start simple and work our way up to complex problems.

We do not need to do that in order for you to answer. You can answer “no” or “yes” with a brief elaboration without us sidestepping the hypothetical and derailing into a treatise on emotions.

Give me some credit Bob, I'm not trying to dodge. :)

I understand that it is not your intention (and I have no doubt that it is not your intention); but you nevertheless are. I can give a parody of this (invalid sidestepping you are doing) with the 5 vs. 1 trolley problem to demonstrate if you would like (and one example I gave above).

Second, is this the 'only way?'

Not a valid question in this case. The question is “in this scenario, would Dave be doing anything immoral by torturing Billy?”. — Bob Ross

No, a completely valid question when using the theory of existence. Its a theory about measuring existential gain and loss.

I think that if you understand that it is invalid to ask “what other ways could one save the people that are tied to the tracks besides pulling a switch (and condemning one party to death or letting one party die)?” then you can understand that it is invalid to ask “what other ways could Dave practice torture without torturing someone?”. You are inadvertently trying to smuggle new variables into the equation….not on my watch (:

"This man will now be able to extract information from an enemy better than he would not have been able to before."

Oh I see. I would think that it would make Dave better at torturing by practicing torturing: I think that is a pretty uncontroversial point [that practicing a skill makes one better at it].

It wasn't intended to derail, only explain some initial thoughts I had when I first started this theory years ago. This theory is not a carefully concocted theory that I've spent years mastering. Its a baby. With babies you like to talk about some of your feelings about them sometimes. But to be fair, you're probably more interested in the theory then my feelings about it. I'll try to keep the commentary down and just focus on the points. :)

I totally understand and am more than happy to discuss! However, I do not want it to be at the expense of sidestepping thought experiments.

Appreciate the conversation as always Bob!

Same to you! (:

Bob

Because two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom next to each other are not the same as water.

Different existence isn’t more existence.

Being is just what is in the sense of the whole; and the whole is not increasing when you combine two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom. It is a transformation of parts of the whole into different stuff.

While including the observation that sustaining this over time is more more existence overall then something which concentrates too much and causes collapse

I think we are in agreement, then, that your ideal state is the most complicated actually possible state of arrangements of entities in reality with the addition that this state is self-sustaining. I think that amendment covers your concerns here.

I generally understood your view of subjectivity to mean the fact we could not ever understand the thing in itself and were therefore 'subjective' in any attempts to capture it. I agree with the portion about being subjective beings, or 'subjects', but do not find that to be what 'subjectivity' describes. We can handle our attempts to define things concurrent with things in themselves objectively or subjectively. But, the act of being a being or a subject which can attempt to attribute identities that are concurrent with things in itself is not 'subjectivity' as usually understood

1. I wasn’t referencing my view of ‘objectivity’, because it is irrelevant to my earlier point (about your view lacking evidence and argumentation for it being, in principle, about objective morality). I was using the standard definitions in metaethics and colloquial settings.

2. My definition of objectivity is that it is that which exists mind-independently.

3. My definition only precludes direct knowledge of what is objective—not any knowledge thereof.

4. My interpretation of the consequences of #3 has slightly changed, although it isn’t relevant to #1 at all: our representative faculties are sufficiently accurate to give us indirect knowledge of the things as they are in-themselves: it is a mistake to confuse the things-in-themselves with absolute truth—and that is what I think you are doing (and so is Kant btw).

While you may believe the moral theory is subjective

Do clarify, I am not saying it is subjective because we only have direct knowledge of subjective representations of things: that’s your argument against yourself. My argument is that you have not provided sufficient elaboration how, in principle, “more existence is better” is a moral judgment which expresses something objective; or, in other words, how, in principle, the truth of the proposition “more existence is better” is stance-independent. These are standard ways of thinking about moral objectivity.

and I do agree that parts of this discussion must be subjective as we do not have the means to elevate certain points to testable objectivity,

I am just talking about your claim that “more existence is better”.

realized that a subjective form of ethics gives people wiggle room. It allows most people to rely on intuitions, and we can rely on a general good in society that usually keeps things together.

All moral theories, and all epistemic theories, rely fundamentally on intuitions: that isn’t unique to ‘subjective moralities’. However, I agree that, under ‘subjective moralities’, it is entirely possible for one person to be right that something is wrong (that a normal person would intuit is wrong, such as “torturing babies for fun”) while another person could be equally right that the same thing is right—since the proposition is indexical.

If our intuitions tell us its wrong, we need a VERY good reason and clearly proven means to say, "This is still objectively true despite our moral intuitions".

Agreed. The intuition needs to be demonstrated to be sufficiently unreliable; which requires sufficient evidence to support such a claim.

So in your case where you invent a scenario that goes against both of our moral intuitions, you need to present a much more specified and provable argument for it to be taken seriously.

Absolutely not! That was a basic, reasonable hypothetical akin to any hypothetical you will find in normative ethics; and, as such, you need to be able to respond and contend with it without trying to shift the burden of proof on the opposition. Now, if you need further clarification because I am overlooking (perhaps) some critical details which will determine whether it is wrong for dave to torture billy, then it is perfectly fine to ask for such and I will be more than happy to provide it; however, your response here is wholly inadequate. That’s like you asking me: “In your theory, how does it handle the 5 vs. 1 trolly problem?”, and my response is “the scenario you have invented needs to be presented in a much more specified and provable argument to be taken seriously”: obviously, that’s a derailment and a shifting of the burden of proof (in an invalid manner).

Lets examine your scenario more closely and I think we'll see its not an objective scenario

The conclusion of whether Dave should or should not torture Billy is stance-independent and thusly is objective. I don’t know why you would claim the scenario itself is non-objective: it is an hypothetical.

First, what does it mean to "unlock potential?"

It meant, in the scenario, that Dave, through experience, increases his abilities to torture people which is used in the field. Without it, arguably, he will not perform as proficiently in his work nor will he do it as creatively and skillfully as he could have. This, consequently, inhibits the potential existence he could have created throughout his work in the field.

I think we can both agree that a person gains skill, and increases (all else being equal) potential existence through gaining and mastery that skill, only via experience. My potential as a human being is inhibited, and is thusly not fully reached, if I am not exposed to sufficient opportunities to recognize and realize my full potential.

If part of Dave’s potential (as a human being) is to be a great torturer (which in this case can be used in the field), then preventing Dave from acquiring sufficient experience to recognize and realize that potential (all else being equal) inhibits potential existence. On top of that, the avoid any derailments, I stipulated that Billy has only an hour left to live, so it isn’t like Dave is significantly inhibiting or decreasing Billy’s overall potential (and subsequent potential existence Billy could conjure with his skills and creativity)(such as if Billy were not to be terminal and suffers tremendously from the after effects of being tortured, and this prevents him from realizing his full potential [as a human being]).

Second, is this the 'only way?'

Not a valid question in this case. The question is “in this scenario, would Dave be doing anything immoral by torturing Billy?”.

Third, is this proven or assumed?

Doesn’t matter: it is assumed as proven. That’s the whole point of hypotheticals (:

With respect to your treatise on emotions, I think it derailed the conversation: I would like you to start with the hypothetical and answer it. If I am confused by your answer, then it is on me to ask for clarification. Is it immoral for dave to torture billy or not?

If so, then elaborate briefly on why; and it is on me to ask for clarification from there.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

I agree. In order to avoid this, I think the OP needs to clarify that it is arguing for it being true that one should believe in leeway free will even if leeway free will is false. If it were presented that way, then I don't think it would be a fallacy anymore.

Oh, I see now. Let me clarify.

What one is predetermined to do may be irrational, but one is not irrational for simply doing what one is predetermined to do.

I am not irrational for doing something, like holding a contradiction as true, simply because I was predetermined to do it; but, nevertheless, I am engaging in something that is irrational (e.g., holding a contradiction as true).

The difference between the two claims is that one is questioning the rationality of doing what one can only do, and the other is questioning the rationality of what one can only do. It is not irrational to do what one can only do, because they cannot do otherwise or choose (depending on one's conception of free will)*; but, what they can only do can itself nevertheless be irrational.

* I actually don't think one's conception of free will matters here, because in a compatibilists' interpretation, the choice would be an irrational one iff what they chose is irrational but the fact that they chose an irrational choice would not itself be irrational because they cannot do otherwise.

Hopefully that helps clarify.
Bob

I stand by that quote of me, and I am unsure as to what you are arguing about it.