The crux of your argument is:

If you can't freely choose your own belief, there's no point.

I am just pointing out that this was not defended whatsoever in your OP; and, without any further elaboration, it is a non-sequitur.

In terms of your argument presupposing leeway free will, a problem with that is that it is a false dilemma. You can't validly tell someone "either you believe there is leeway free will, or that there isn't any free will": that's deceptive and misleading. Of course, you could argue that there is something wrong with compatibilism and, on those grounds, say that the only option left for a person is libertarianism if they believe in free will; but that's an entirely different argument than what I have been able to gather of your current one.

Another problem is this:

I'm arguing that 1) you ought to value leeway freedom (which I suppose is another argument in-and-of itself) and 2) if you value leeway freedom, then <insert above argument>

This is a peculiar argument (to me), because it does not care about the truth at all. #1 is completely unjustified in the OP, and #2 is essentially saying that if one values leeway freedom then they should believe it exists even if they know it clearly doesn't--i.e., you are telling people to believe in illusions so long as they like that illusion, as opposed to giving them the truth.

I guess it isn't irrational, per se, to believe in an illusion if it helps achieve one's goals; but I took your OP to be trying to argue the truth of the matter and not merely that we should lie to ourselves about free will.

Bob

You are judging a determinist from the libertarian point of view.

Not quite. I am a compatibilist: I was noting the differences between incompatibilism, libertarianism, and compatibilism.

So calling someone irrational for doing what they were predetermined to does not make sense.

I never claimed it was irrational to do what one is predetermined to do.

:sad:

Vaskane, it does not help further the discussion by insulting people whom you disagree with; and it certainly does not help to straw man their position, especially to the point where you have shoved, not just words but, complete ideologies (which I do not subscribe to) down my throat. If you ever would like to have an honest, genuine, and respectful conversation, then my door is always open; but I am not going to entertain, with all due respect, your ingenuine insults and wreckless, blatant misunderstands of my beliefs.

There is no doubt that beings with no free will can construct a society which is predicated off of having accountability for one's actions: what makes it irrational is that accountability, in its common use, is about holding a person responsible for their actions that they chose yet a hard determinist would like to hold people accountable for what they didn't choose to do.

For example, we normally wouldn't hold someone accountable for a car crash that they were uninvolved in, and hard determinists view everything akin to that: you deciding to go stab that person to death wasn't something you chose to do, just like how you didn't choose for that other person to crash into that other person with their car. Normally, we hold people accountable, and accountability only makes sense, for what we believe they have sufficient control over (in the sense of making choices).

What hard determinism is missing is exactly what is the difference between it and compatibilism: sourcehood free will is the answer to these problems.

???

How? If they accept sourcehood freedom? Is that not different from choice, or do you speak of leeway freedom, in which case I ask again, how does one choose if they can't do otherwise?

A choice is merely to decide for or against something, and this process absolutely can happen by something which is deterministic.

Even if I am completely determined, I am nevertheless generating reasons for and against particular actions and conclusion, weighing and contemplating them, and reaching a decision which is in conformance with my will: that, my friend, is a free act.

To be able to do otherwise is an extra-attribute which goes being merely reasoning and making conclusions (in accordance with one’s will): it is that, if one rewound the clock (and only the clock), one legitimately could, this time around, choose differently.

For example, I am debating on eating vanilla or chocolate ice cream. I think of various reasons for and against each, and ultimately reach the conclusion that I want vanilla. Now, I had the ability to choose IFF my reasons and conclusion originated from me--i.e., they are in accordance with my will--whereas I had the ability to do otherwise IFF I could have come up with different conclusion (and arguably different reasons too)(i.e., if one rewound the clock, although I chose vanilla the first time around, I have the ability to do otherwise only if I legitimately can choose chocolate this time around even with all other factors the same).

I think that I have the ability to choose because I can come up with reasons and reach conclusions in accordance with my will; but I don’t think I have the ability to do otherwise because if you rewound the clock, then I would expect nothing other than myself to generate the same reasons and reach the same conclusion—afterall, nothing changed other than the rewinding of time.

The ability to do otherwise entails that an agent is a source of indeterminancy.

There's no probability in this argument, there's no numerical "cost-benefit analysis".. I can further argue that our "ownership of beliefs" takes precedence over merely having true beliefs, because it is the reason for that value

Then you are not using Pascal’s wager properly (with all due respect). The wager is a cost-benefit analysis which, dare I say, ignores probably of each outcome.

It simply claims that if you value truth, and additionally, you value "ownership", i.e. "free control", over your beliefs, then the only way these two values are satiated occurs if you believe in free will

This claim just collapses, then, into “if one values “ownership”, then one should believe in free will even if it doesn’t exist”. That one values truth has nothing to do with this claim: again, a hard determinist can perfectly coherently value truth and deny that they have free will. If you deny this, then you are arguing, necessarily, that one cannot value truth as a matter of being determined to value truth; which is clearly, by my lights, false.

I can further argue that our "ownership of beliefs" takes precedence over merely having true beliefs, because it is the reason for that value.

This is incorrect with your claim that “if you value truth...and...’ownership’...then the only way these two values are <...>”: if one values truth, then they necessarily will value having only true beliefs. You are saying “hey, to all those who value truth, you should believe in a lie that free will exists because it gives you an illusion of ‘ownership’ over your actions”: you are preaching to the wrong crowd.

So let me ask you this to further the discussion: why do you value truth?

Firstly, it is a matter of my pyschology. I am simply wired, biologically and (probably) sociologically, to commend truth. In fact, I believe that my primary, core motivation is coming to know the absolute truth; and this is why I spend so much time trying to think about these kinds of things.

Secondly, I think that truth is good, and I value what is good.

Thirdly, I think that truth is useful and beneficial for society: no society can function properly if its citizens are very untruthful.

Will you argue that reasons for valuations don't matter, because so long as one just so happens to value truth, the argument is defeated?

Reasons for believing something always matter to me, but I don’t see how this is relevant to your OP. The problem that I pointed out was that your argument have presuppositions about what matters that no serious hard determinist is going to accept; and it is not internally incoherent for them to reject it.

Bob

That we do act as though responsibility exists, does not make it true that people have responsibilities.

If one really thinks that free will does not exist (and not even in the compatibilist sense), then they are being irrational by holding people accountable. Should implies can: viz., one is not responsible for consequence of an action that they did not choose.

Its not complexity per say, its about more existence measured in identities and potential per material existence. Higher morality is often times going to be more 'complex' as a result
…
As noted, its not complexity per say, but the existence of the highest number of identities and potential existence over a period of time

I find this peculiar and a bit confusing. The same amount of existence is there irregardless; so how is it really ever more, other than by the waive of a magic wand?

It seems like, to me, you are trying to find the most complicated arrangement of being—that is the best interpretation I have been able to conjure. The ideal state of anything for you appears to be the most complicated possible arrangement of entities and composition thereof.

To my mind you have a different way of viewing subjectivity then most would take, but I have little disagreement with your overall view in how we understand the world.

By common standards both in metaethics and colloquial discourse, a moral judgment is objective if it is stance-independent and, subsequently, a moral theory is a form of moral realism or, colloquial, of “objective morality” IFF it describes what is stance-independently wrong and right; and the justification you gave for it being objective was merely that any rational agent would agree or, if I remember correctly, that it is internally incoherent to posit otherwise.

For life to have its full potential, suffering should be minimized where possible as it prevents life from acting as fully as it could.

This doesn’t seem to imply that it is wrong, though, to torture someone in a manner where they do not benefit from it. For example, it seems quite plausible that in some situation allowing a person to torture someone else would actually total net increase potential existence by “unlocking” the full creativity and potential of the perpetrator.

An easy example would be the following. Let’s say there is a severely ill person, Billy, and a psychopath, Dave. Billy is terminally ill and is, as a matter of 100% certainty, going to die in 1 hour. Dave was recruited by a major government as a part of their special forces, and, in order to unlock his full potential, wants to torture and kill Billy before that 1 hour is up. Is that immoral for Dave to torture Billy in your view?

It is not clear at all that Dave torturing Billy will result in less potential existence, all else being equal, as Billy has not much time to live and Dave will increase, arguably, expressive and potential “existence” by torturing Billy.

I don’t see how “The benefit of another being having a pleasant emotion is overall a net negative for existence, and therefore wrong”.

Bob

Expand on this, if you would, because the implications of lacking free will make it clear to me that we can't hold any real (free) value in something like truth.

If one is a compatibilist, then they would respond with (something along the lines of) “because causal determinism [or some weaker variant] is true, one cannot do otherwise but they can choose; thusly, they can choose what they value and what they don’t, and if one values the truth then they will believe that it matters if they believe something that is false”.

If one is a incompatibilist, then they would respond with (something along the lines of) “because causal determinism [or some weaker variant] is true, one cannot do otherwise and they cannot choose; however, this does not negate the fact that they have values and, thusly, if one values the truth <...>”.

In either case, one can have values without being able to do otherwise. I value the truth and even if it is the case that I am utterly determined by causality it does not take away from the fact that I value truth.

What this really boils down to, I suspect, is that you don’t value anything unless you have the ability to choose and had the ability to do otherwise when you chose; and this is the underlying axiological position that is fueling your argument.

Starting with B, surely valuing truth implies avoiding error, and perhaps some sort of pride or otherwise virtue in comporting with reality. But, such a value implies we have the power to "avoid" error, i.e., we have a certain freedom to do otherwise

One can try to avoid error without having the ability to do otherwise nor to choose: this is just a non-sequitur. Likewise, valuing something just means that one assigns it a worth and not that they had the power to choose that valuation nor to have chosen otherwise.

The only major (counter-intuitive and practical) implication for incompatibilists, irregardless of its truth or falsity, is that if one has no free will (whatsoever), then there is no accountability nor responsibility: this is the only substantial difference (other than considerations about whether it is simply true or not).

we can not value our belief in the truth of this proposition, because we could not avoid erring.

Again: non-sequitur. The formulation of a value judgment has nothing whatsoever to do with “avoiding erring” [in a libertarian nor compatibilist sense].

So there is nothing to lose for believing in free will, and, by C, everything to gain (which is where the parallel to Pascal's Wager comes in, even though they don't function on exactly the same principles).

Pascal’s wager is a bad argument, because it renders the probability of the consequence occurring omissible when, in fact, it is the most critical factor for analysis.

Bob

Firstly, A-D are all presupposing certain axiological claims that I would completely reject. For example, A and B are false. What matters is relative to values; and values are subjective and relative (e.g., if one values truth, then it absolutely matters if one believes that they have free will even when they don’t).

Secondly, pascal’s wager is a poor argument: one should never believe something out of fear of the consequences, despite its probability, of believing it. E.g., if I don’t go out tonight with my friends, then I can’t get run over by a car; or if I go, then there is a chance I will: best case scenario, I have fun; and worst case scenario, I die. According to Pascal’s wager, I am to stay at home because the worst case is “clearly” what I should avoid over such a trivial best case scenario (if I were to do the contrary). Pascal’s wager ignores probability, and this is way it is a bad argument.

Thirdly, leeway free will (i.e., libertarianism) seems plausibly false. If one rewound the clock (and only the clock), then it is unreasonable to expect any other decision to be reached and action to be made by an agent: the ability to do otherwise is incoherent with physics.

Fourthly, I think your argument works perfectly fine, notwithstanding my previous worries mentioned above, with compatibilism: what exactly is the ability to do otherwise, instead of just the ability to choose, doing in your argument?

Bob

Here's a good question: how does your theory handle suffering?

By my lights, suffering is not a relevant factor at all to the complication (or increase) of "existence"; so it would appear, prima facie, to not have any relevance to moral decision making.

For example, imagine a person who stops or prevents another person from torturing someone else on the grounds that it would cause the victim tremendous, unnecessary suffering: it seems as though, prima facie, your theory would dictate that they have done absolutely no morally relevant calculations (as suffering is not itself a factor in the maximization of potential and expressive existence). So, the question becomes, in your theory, did this person make a morally relevant calculation here? Did they blunder? Did they merely do the right thing by chance (being done for the wrong reasons)?

Bob

Hello Philosophim,

I am still finding it unclear what principle you are using to decipher when to to use what UOM, but, if I may, I think I can serve a solution: if more existence is better than less, then whatever UOM, and (not to mention) what measuring tool, is most precise is ideal; however, whatever is practical will prevail, which is really just the most precise tool and UOM available in any reasonable manner, because we haven’t created such an ideal tool (yet or perhaps ever, although we would strive towards developing it if your theory is adhered to). If this is something you agree with, then I think we have resolved my confusion about UOMs.

More generally, I have been reflecting upon your theory and have come to the conclusion that the real issues with this theory are at its core and not in the derived conclusions (contrary to my initial thoughts)—i.e., the problems are with what is, at the core, being derived from and not what ends up being derived itself.

The two main issues, in summary, I would say, is that (1) “existence” is an entirely too vague an idea in your theory (thus far, I believe it to be roughly equivalent to complexity and not being) and (2) there is not an ounce, if I may be so bold, of proof that more existence being good is not good as a matter of subjective dispositions.

Nevertheless, if one accepts that “more existence is good”, and understands that “existence” refers here to “complexity”, then it is clear and correct the project which you are working on by denoting ‘material’, ‘potential’, ‘expressive’, etc. ‘existences’ and your conclusions seem pretty, by-at-large, accurate relative to that project.

The more I have thought about it, your theory starts from bottom-up but, although it is important and necessary to start with that approach, requires an up-bottom approach to determine an ideal state of reality. This is something I was overlooking with my examples, as I think, from an up-bottom approach, this theory, as well as (I am realizing) my theory, requires finding balance. This is why, as you noted before, although more intelligent life is prioritized generally over non-life, each being necessary to maintain the balance is necessary. On this, our theories actually converge; however, we diverge in that for you the balance is just a means towards what is good (which, in turn, for you, is the greatest complexity of being) whereas, for me, the balance (i.e., harmony) is what is good. I say that not to derail our conversation into a comparison of theories; but I have just grown to see the similarities in our views that I had not seen before and wanted to share (:

So, I think we may be able to dive into more complicated applied ethical dilemmas, like trolly problems, if you would like; or discuss something else pertaining to the theory that you may be digesting or wanting to discuss.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Sorry for the late response!

I think it may be beneficial for us to distinguish the unit of measure from the unit being measured. A ‘liter’, ‘gram’, etc. are units of measure, whereas a ‘molecule’, ‘atom’, etc. are units being measured.

You agreed, in your response, that 2 liters of water is better than 1 liter; and this does not reference any distinction between measuring an ‘atom’, ‘molecule’, or the ‘paper’ (nor does it need to). Same thing with a gram of paper vs. 2 grams of paper.

I think a way we can sidestep this whole issue of which unit to measure, is to only use discuss what unit of measure to use. The unit of measure does need to specify a unit being measured (viz., a gram of paper is a gram irregardless of one thinking of the paper as simply ‘a paper’ or ‘a glob of molecules’).

To keep things simple, I denote a unit of measure as a UOM; and I denote a unit capable of being measured as UCOM.

However, the cost of this is that it also sidesteps most of your means of calculating ‘more existence’; as you have focused heavily on the (actual and potential) relationships between UCOM and very little has been said of UOM.

If you still would like to evaluate ‘more existence’ in terms of UCOM, then I simply have failed to grasp why you insist on calculating in terms of ‘UCOMs one step down’ as opposed to uses the entity as a whole: why do you prefer calculating in terms of a thing’s composed parts instead of itself?

You seem to agree with me that there are some legitimate cases where one should use the thing instead of its parts (e.g., ‘one potato or two?’) but I failing to see why you keep insisting on using its parts in other cases (e.g., why use molecules instead of the paper?). If you could please elaborate on this, then that would be much appreciated.

If you accept using UOM instead of UCOM (or a combination of both), then I would need to know exactly how those are hierarchically organized as well—e.g., do we use liters over grams?

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

I agree that morality has a prescriptive element to it; but 'what is good' is not prescriptive at all. I very much subscribe to the ontological is-ought gap.

However, as a final note, I will say that, if your theory is accurate, it ought to be conducive to harmony (otherwise what is the point?) In fact, it appears to have had the exact opposite effect. Which tends to testify against its validity.

I don't understand: could you please elaborate?

:confused:

Natural systems do not exist in a state of "peaceful congruence." Natural systems if anything exist in a state of far from equilibrium meta-stability governed by non-linear dynamics.

How natural systems are has nothing to do with how they should be, in the sense that how it is does not directly inform us of how it ought to be. So I don't see how this is a valid counter to my position.

What comes across is an attempt to foist a common-sense, naturalized umbrella encompassing everything that you feel aligns in some way with the notion of goodness, that does not in any way do justice to the notion of morality.

Just to clarify, I am not claiming that morality is just about ‘what is morally good’: this is, indeed, an invalid oversimplification. It is about assessing what should be, and thusly what actions should be conducted, relative to the standard of moral goodness. The moral goodness analysis is only one piece of the puzzle.

So, just to clarify, I am not claiming that it does complete justice to our notions of morality and not even goodness but, rather, moral goodness.

Hopefully that helps.

Bob

Let's hear about what isn't good in your philosophy. Or, since I can turn literally everything into utility everything and every action is good?

Firstly, let’s take it one step at a time: do you agree or disagree with my response to your use of the term ‘harmony’? It is impossible for us to make any real headway, if you keep sporadically seguing into different points.

Secondly, you have misunderstood the OP: I never argued that something is morally good if it has utility, nor that it is relative to utility. I strongly suggest you re-read the OP.

Or do we have a 0-100 point scale we can't see, some sort of RPG statistic, that increases and decreases on the goodness scale depending on our collective actions and so long as we're in the 51% utilitarian "by at large" we are goodness?

Firstly, you have to specify which type of goodness you are referring to. Here, I am assuming you mean moral goodness.

Secondly, I would say that the property of moral goodness is ‘being in a state of self-harmony and self-unity’, and we attribute that property by degree of how well it sizes up thereto. E.g., something might have the property of ‘being straight’, such as a line, without actually being perfectly straight—the property doesn’t change here and it doesn’t itself have degrees but, rather, our attribution of that property to something does.

No you're fucking not. You've had multiple people come here challenging your definitions and claims. Which has only served to highlight the self serving prejudice behind your position.

Not a single person, as of yet, has provided much justification for this other than blanket assertions; and not much discussion has, unfortunately, been had about it. I am more than happy to discuss this further if you would like.

Thing is you think God is Omnibenevolent. You're cute enough to think there is one, but even cuter than that is your God is omnibenevolent

What???? Please re-read the OP: this demonstrates a clear lack of understanding of the OP. I never claimed any of this: not even in the responses I have made in this thread. Not once.

Since you brought up with completely irrelevant point, I will clarify that I am, in fact, an agnostic: so, no, I do not believe in God or gods as I suspend judgment on it.

Anything can be believed so continue believing in whatever it is that makes you feel good about yourself I guess. Sounds trolling, but wtf have all philosophers done? Believe in their own philosophy and their own prejudice.

This is all completely irrevelant, ad hominem attacks...and 99% of them are completely false anyways. I am not a theist, and I don’t know where you got that idea (in this thread).

Bob

I mean the peaceful congruence of all parts of a thing, when I say a thing is in 100% self-harmony. This is not equivocal to being the synthesis of two extremes.

Which is not the same thing as finding the synthesis between complete disarray and order. The latter is one particular instance of the former, and you are treating it as if they are equivocal.

Here you go again not engaging in the conversation... :roll:

Hey man, use whatever definitions you need to feel good about yourself.

I am using the definitions that make the most historical sense when the historical notions of goodness are refined to the level of a conception.

Part OneOn the Prejudices of Philosophers

1

The will to truth, which is still going to

This is a completely irrelevant passage from Nietzsche, that doesn't address anything I said in my response nor the OP.

You will fail as all the dogmatists did before you. In finding that elusive unicorn of "objective morality."

Here go again asserting the Nietzschien assumption of moral anti-realism; without a shred of evidence to back it up.

You're just foolish enough to think you're the first to see this concept of yours.

When did I ever say that??? This is so disingenuous.

Since any utility is good... be my slave and become utilized

You are now importing your own view of what is good without any shred of justification for nor elaboration on it.

Harmony still equates disarray, completely organized is the opposite of complete disarray Harmony is the synthesis between the two.

Nope. I am using in the sense of "agreement or concord", "the quality of forming a pleasing and consistent whole", "pleasing arrangement of parts : CONGRUENCE", "internal calm: TRANQUILITY", etc. These are all colloquial definitions that fit what I am conveying.

If me demonstrating how your examples are subsumable under my position is 'ad hoc'ing it' ('ex post facto'ing it') and 'thusly' invalid, then, Pantagruel, what are you looking for me to do to justify my position to you?

How can I possibly convince you otherwise, if you see every possible justification as ad hoc explanations? I chose to ask you for a virtue so I can demonstrate how it is subsumable under my terms because I thought that would help you see my position; but it seems like, even then, you wouldn't. So, what would convince you? What can I do?

You're not doing a good job of expressing your position, I'm only attacking you at certain points in order to uncover it more fully

I see. Hopefully I can clarify my position as we converse.

Conversely however, goodness obviously did not stem from the perspective of satisfying all needs, but rather from the perspective empowering the needs of the powerful few, and thus goodness obviously does not satisfy any condition of perfection

My response to this still is:

The historical analysis that you quoted here is all fine and correct, but you conclusion from it is not.
In short, the farther back one goes into human history, the closer a person’s notion of (moral) goodness is to the most egoistic context of self-harmony and self-unity; and the farther forward goes into human history, the closer a person’s notion of (moral) goodness is the most universal context of self-harmony and self-unity. All Nietzsche is doing in the Genealogy of Morals is providing most of the justification for this (without meaning to). He just sees this evoluation as a shift in tastes towards universal harmony and unity as opposed to an actual objective (moral) progression towards it.

So, yes, there are periods of history, a while ago, where it was common to define ‘good’ terms relative to the elite’s tastes or values; but, to my point, they still by-at-large recognized, implicitly at least in their notions of goodness, that what is good, in its most abstract form, is self-harmony and self-unity; which is self-apparent, in the case of an aristocracy, when one asks an elite noble what is good for them. People recognize almost innately the form of The Good when it comes to themselves: that’s why I think the most fundamental, primitive, and easily-understood context of moral goodness is egoism—it is incredibly obvious to almost anyone that what is best for them is to be in harmony and unity with themselves even if they cannot abstract out this form and apply it universally.

This is my first conundrum, as Goodness stems from a person's own wants and desires, not perfection.

If by this you are just talking about your belief that the term ‘good’ reflects nothing more than opinions of those who are very powerful, then I refer you back to my quote above.

If you mean something more than that, then please elaborate so I can adequately respond.

You boil that down to two parts too and not even in a contrasting manner as you were trying to do: Complete Disarray (imperfection) vs Harmony and Unity (perfection), then you make the blunderous error of saying "and Unity," well unfortunately, Harmony is a unity of two (or more) already, it's a coming together, a hybrid of two or more.

You are correct that harmony is the union of two or more things into a peaceful congruence; but I merely add unity to emphasize the union of everything in question and not just the mere harmony of certain subparts. Perhaps I should come up with a better way of describing it, but I think it conveys the point.

Secondly, complete disarray is the opposite of harmony [and unity]: the former is 100% disharmony [and disunity]; so I am not sure which part of the contrast you are saying is incorrect here.

Which you then boil those down into a Higher and Lower Goodness

No. Moral goodness is identical to self-harmony and self-unity; and the adjectives ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ are simply indicating the scope: the larger the context (viz., the larger the entity attributable to the property), the larger the good (i.e., the more good there is).

I am not boiling down goodness to higher vs. lower; they are further considerations about the scope.

The higher goodness being "that which is goodness in-itself."

No. Goodness in terms of levels is just the hierarchical structure one can formulate of the analyzable scopes—i.e., the highest good is going to be universality with 100% goodness, the lowest as particularity with 0.000...0001% goodness, and all kinds of levels in between those two—like a spectrum.

You've basically said what Nietzsche makes fun of in BGE 11: Or is it not rather merely a repetition of the question? How does opium induce sleep? "By means of a means (faculty)," namely the virtus dormitiva (the sleeping virtue), replies the doctor in Moliere,

Nietzsche, in that quote, was criticizing Kant because he didn’t think that Kant supplied any real explanation of how synthetic a priori knowledge is possible. To try to be charitable, I am assuming you mean that this is analogous to by claim that the highest goodness is that which is universal harmony and unity; but, then, I don’t see how it is actually analogous: I gave ample justification for it.

You: "The Higher Goodness is that which is Good in-itself!"

As noted earlier, this is completely incorrect.

You see with conundrums like these I can't really take your argument seriously

Hmmm

I mean you use Harmony as the extreme which contrasts complete disarray (Harmony is a middle ground betwixt multiples; hence it takes several notes to make a harmonic

You are confusing my use of harmony with one specific use of the term: it doesn’t just mean resonation of things by finding a middle ground, like in musical tunes. Harmony is also, in a different but related sense, about peaceful congruence; which isn’t always finding the middle between two extremes.

You mention the omnibenevolence of God here:
When I say that historically people have used notions of goodness that refer to either hypothetical or actual perfection (in the sense that I outlined it in the OP), I mean theism as an example of it. It is not a coincidence that the historical progression even within theism about God’s omnibenevolent nature has evolved such that we have slowly understood it to be universal harmony and unity. — Bob Ross

You're a dogmatist, through and through, and aren't very well up to snuff with Nietzsche... you think:
quite frankly, he takes as granted the Dostoevskian idea that ~”without God, everything is permitted”

Without elaboration, I have no means of responding adequately to any of this part. I stand by my critique of Nietzsche, and you didn’t even try to refute it.

That said, sorry if I did actually offend you, take any actual insult as blustering/questionably ethical information probing.

Although it may not have seemed like it, I am and have not been insulted by you (:

I simply do not wish nor like to engage in ad hominems and unsubstantive banter. It’s not productive, and it doesn’t make either of us more knowledgeable nor better.

And I did offer you an aphorism from BGE by Nietzsche, expressing the utility, the pragmatic goodness, of the use of opposites in language, even if their examples in the real world are often somewhere in between. Hot and Cold, Left and Right, Up and Down, Pragmatic and Moral, East and West, but even on the axis of East and West, there are 358 other degrees/angles (if only counting WHOLE NUMBERS).

Yeah, I just don’t see these as reductionisms; other than that, obviously, conceptions and ideas are phantasms of the real world—but this is true of all language and renders this counter-argument trivial and useless.

Bob

Oh, I see. Properties can have degrees; e.g., something can have the property of 'being functional' without being 100% functional. Something can have the property of 'being in self-harmony and unity' without being in 100% self-harmony and unity.

Moral goodness when considered at 100% is perfection; but the lesser degrees, when a thing isn't quite at 100%, can still be considered good proportionally to what degree it sizes up to 'being in self-harmony and self-unity'.

So, no, it isn't that nothing morally good exists; but, rather, that nothing 100% morally good exists. Perhaps we can find common ground there (;

Your entire OP is based upon a false definition followed by an unending stream of equivocation between goodness and perfection, which are manifestly not the same thing, as pretty much everyone has agreed, except for you. Trying to further equivocate with harmony only makes your reasoning more precarious.

Literally every major use of the term “good” (or an equivalent in a different language) has been used, at its core, in one of the two senses. That is why I use the definition.

By goodness being identical to perfection, I do not mean to exclude the possibility of degrees thereof: I am more than happy to agree that something can be 58% good and thusly not perfect. In other words, just to clarify, I am not saying that a thing is only good if it is perfect but, rather, that 100% goodness is identical to perfection.

Although I may be misunderstanding you, it seems like your worry of equivocation [of the two] is predicated on the idea that I mean that something cannot be good, in any sense or degree, if it isn’t perfect.

The reason I didn’t go into depth on this in the OP, is that I wanted to keep it short and sweet; and see where the conversations lead me. I could whip up a much longer, substantive OP if you would like.

The primary historical meaning of goodness is not perfection, it is virtue, which is understood to be independent of pragmatic concerns

Virtue is certainly an example of one of many uses of the term ‘goodness’ in a moral sense; and I can demonstrate how it is subsumable under my conception of moral goodness.

Any and every virtue ever considered in a serious manner by people, especially experts in the field of study (even prior to there being a formal field of study for it), is virtuous in virtue of cultivating a character that habitually strives towards universal harmony and unity. My challenge to you is to give me any virtue, which is considered a virtue in any serious literature or by-at-large by any society, and I will show you how it is only virtuous, at its core, in light of my conception of moral goodness. (:

Okay, that is fine if you accept that. But it still stands that, since there are no concrete examples of these, they are no more provable than beings with pink and yellow spots. Just because YOU BELIEVE them to be true, it doesnt mean that they are. As your belief, that is fine, and i totally respect that, but if you want to state this as a fact, you need to back it up with proof. And there is no concrete proof from real life, as we know it.

What exactly are you questioning the facticity of (in my view)?

I never claimed that it is a fact that a 100% morally perfect entity exists. This was never something I even attempted to claim, nor would I.

Whether or not we can 100% realize moral goodness universally is a separate question from (1) what moral goodness is and (2) what factually gets us closer to that state and (3) what helps us preserve our progress.

Damn dude, to think I kinda took you seriously before

Vaskane, insults do not help further the discussion: I am not interested in disrespectful, unproductive, and ingenuine comments.

You still have of yet to properly defend your only point (that I have been able to decipher) which is that the moral and pragmatic categories of goodness are mistaken reductionisms of morality; and since you refuse to engage in the actual comments I made in our discussion multiple times now, I am going to assume you don't have any support for your claim (until you actually engage in it).

now I know that Binary thinking has you skewed like fuck to the point you posit the US as "Good."

I was not claiming that the US has only ever done good things; rather, that by-at-large they have been good for the development of humanity (especially in the west). This is not binary thinking at all: binary thinking on this subject would be to say that the US is either done 100% good or 0% good (i.e., 100% bad). Admitting there are degrees to it and conceding that they have also done bad things does not fit your narrative of me.

I think it was the omnibenevelence of God comment that shows how blunderous your binary thinking is

I have no clue what comment you are referring to: could you please quote it?

You obviously have yet to go "Beyond Good and Evil," with that black and white duality of thought.

With all due respect, you keep alluding to Nietzschien thought without being able to elaborate and backup those claims. Just to give you an idea where my head is at, I am very well versed in Nietzsche [believe it or not (; ], as he is one is one of my favorite philosophers; so it isn't helpful for me to understand your view when you simply make quick-witted, allusions to Nietzschien thought: you need to dive in deeper and explain and defend that position so that we can have a productive conversation. I tried to do that a while back by elaborating on my thoughts about Nietzsche, but you ignored it and, instead, sent this unsubstantive response (and I say that with all due respect: it is clear you put no effort into this response, and this makes it very hard for me to have a productive conversation with you).

EDIT
Also, just as a side note, "Beyond Good and Evil" is literally a work about, at its core, moral anti-realism. I just note that because I am not sure if you realize that Nietzsche is not arguing for merely that good vs. evil is a false dilemma (i.e., a mistaken reductionism); but, rather, he is arguing for the non-facticity of morality itself. If you are actually using that as your justification, then we will need to dive into metaethics; because my OP is about a moral realist position. Just food for thought (:

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Strange that to make an abstract point you had to use the industrial mass murder of Europeans as an example, instead of something like euthanising serial killers or castrating rapists.

It was one example that illustrated the point: you are splitting hairs here.

I wonder why. Perhaps the same reason why such a moral perversion as the hypothetical and historical nuking of civilians is relativised. I said strange but I was not shocked at all; the longer I live the better I see what Evola meant with racial soul.

I am not interested in derailing the conversation into politics. It has absolutely no relevance to the OP. If you would like to discuss, then please create a new thread, and I will respond in there.

Isn't it your position that morality is objective? So how does it depend? If morality refers to a verifiable fact outside of the mind (meaning of objective), surely it does not depend on opinion, ¿no?
It seems sufficiently transparent to me that either both nuking Germans and running a plane into the twin towers is moral (under this hypothetical), or neither are moral, or morality is not objective.

You are just cherry-picking information and reading quotes out of context. I never said that what is morally good is stance-dependent. Never once. What you quoted is me saying that whether or not you believe the US is by-at-large good (or better for the world than if it didn’t exist) is going to depend on politics (of which I am not interested in derailing into). Whether or not they are by-at-large good is stance-independent, but not your belief. For the sake of the OP, all that is worth mentioning on this point is:

More abstractly, the point is that the goal is to try to work towards universal harmony and unity; and to do so in a manner that ensures its preservation. If you believe that bombing the twin towers does this, then, in principle, yes it would be morally good. I just don't believe that is the case.

One of our beliefs is factual or neither are factual; and I believe that the US has by-at-large helped progress the west into a morally better (set of) societies. That’s not to say the US is a saint.

That's going to depend on politics, especially how good/bad one thinks the US is. I am a supporter of the US (by-at-large) and I am not convinced that what you described was a progression towards universal harmony and unity, so I would say no.

More abstractly, the point is that the goal is to try to work towards universal harmony and unity; and to do so in a manner that ensures its preservation. If you believe that bombing the twin towers does this, then, in principle, yes it would be morally good. I just don't believe that is the case.

So you are assuming that rationality has a universal value

I don’t know what you mean by this, so I am going to default to answering “no”.

I was saying that rationality has pragmatic worth/value for moral progression. If that’s what you mean here, then “yes”.

What about aesthetics? What about sentimentality? What about the inherent value of free-will? Perhaps the inherent value of free-will is the culmination of "harmonious value" - qua the material product of the evolutionary process.

For aesthetics, I would say it has no analogous worth for moral progression and preservation; other than perhaps some consequences for helping motivate people.

For sentimentality, ditto ^.

For free will, this is prerequisite to rationality; the degree of rational capacities is proportional to the degree of free will a thing has. So, yes, this also has proportional (to rationality) pragmatic worth/value for moral progression and preservation.

In which case, the most harmonious universe is actually the one filled with the greatest degree freedom.

So we need to be careful here: I am not saying that the most harmonious possible world is the one with the most rationality. All else being equal, it is entirely possible for there to be a 100% rational world with 0% harmony. I was pointing out, rather, that the best possible world which has achieved a state of universal harmony will have 100% rationality geared towards the preservation of that state. Same goes for free will, being a prerequisite of rationality.

Bob

I did see you giving an example of a calculator and a jungle, but i couldn't find an example where you explained how each part of it was in harmony. I don't think this would be possible, and that is the problem.
…
But there is nothing that is PERFECTLY efficient and harmonious, and this is what your definition stipulated.

Firstly, the examples I gave are examples of actual perfection; but they do not exemplify necessarily anything in the actual world.

Secondly, you are absolutely correct in questioning the actual possibility of actual perfection, in the sense of something being at 100% perfection, because it is foreseeable that everything in reality is subjected to change by external pressures/things which, in turn, will hinder its ability to be 100% in harmony and unity. This is a perfectly reasonable worry to expound. My response to this is to note that this is an ideal and, as such, does not need to be 100% actualizable to be impactful in ethics. Every major ethical theory, and any worth any salt, are driven, at their core, by ideals and not the limitations of the foreseeable, actual world.

This is why it is impossible to describe this kind of total harmony, because we only have a vague idea of what it would be, as we have never experienced it in real life.

Total harmony is easily describable: it is when everything in question is resonating in a peaceful manner with each thing. One can know things that they have never directly experienced (e.g., 1 + 1 = 2, a → b, law of noncontradiction, law of excluded middle, etc.). Likewise, we use ideals all the time, which by definition have never been experienced at 100%; for example, that “no innocent person should go to prison” is a commonly accepted principle BUT it is not clear that it is actualizable, 100%, in society: there’s always someone that gets convicted of a crime they didn’t commit and put in prison. Math is another great example, our mathematical models of reality are estimations and not exact, precise descriptions. Logic is another great example. Etc.

But unless you can see an example of this in real life, it is possible that it does not exist, or it is as likely to exist as the pink and yellow spotted beings. You are going into the realm of all things that MAY be possible, which could be anything, including pink and yellow spotted beings. This idea of something being in perfect harmony could simply be something you made up in your head.

If we are to take this critique seriously, then we would have to reject all knowledge that isn’t knowledge derived from experience; which is going to a heck of a lot more than you think. You will need to reject math, logic, the principle of sufficient reason, all known laws of nature, all ideals, pretty much all of ethics, etc.

I am perfectly happy admitting that one can have valid knowledge that goes beyond the possibility of all experience. No problem.

Sure, we may know what harmony and unity is, but not PERFECT harmony and unity.

100% harmony and unity is (actual) perfection, and 100% self-harmony and self-unity (i.e., 100% perfection) is, of course, plausibly impossible. That’s fine.

What would we need to do if everything was perfect?

Live our lives, in peace.

But i seriously doubt we will ever reach perfection, if it is even something that exists, or could exist.

The point of an ideal is not that one can ever reach it: it is that, even if one can’t reach it, they strive towards it.

For example, human society generally strives towards world peace and equal rights of humans; but this isn’t foreseeably realizable either. Right now we do not know if it is even possible to setup a society or societies on earth such that there is 100% equality. Does this mean we give up on it or claim it is an invalid pursuit? Of course not!

Bob

But how can we progress towards something that MAY be possible, but that we can see no real example of in the world in which we live?

The world is full of examples of this form of moral goodness. Have you not seen something that is in an optimal degree of self-harmony and self-unity such that its parts produce a task incredibly efficiently? Have you not experienced a state of peace between things, as opposed to conflict and violence?

Or how is this any different from such skeptics’ suggestions of, for example, the world being controlled by pink and yellow spotted beings, which are controlling our minds from brains stored in vats?

The difference is that these hypotheses you have mentioned are unparsimonious and unfalsifiable. The form of moral goodness is parismonious and falsifiable. Not to mention, some of them are just nonsense with no real evidence for them (such a the pink and yellow spotted beings); which is clearly not the case with my analysis of moral goodness.

But if we all woke up one day and everything was working in perfect harmony, would we all just automatically, magically know?

You would know it just as much or as little as when you wake up to there being yellow and pink spotted beings. Most people, I think, are able to comprehend what a state of harmony and unity is, just as much as what a spots of yellow and pink are.

But if we were all perfect, why would we even have to know anything?

One needs knowledge to act. In a world full of subjects with universal harmony and unity, actions still exist. Subjects are still doing things.

Bring me back varying levels of imperfection, and with it the joy of working bloody hard against all odds and seeing improvements and feeling a sense of real achievement.

I am not claiming that everyone will value moral goodness; I am merely outlining what it is.

Moreover, yes, it could be less satisfactory for humans, as we are now in our evolutionary process, to be in a perfect world; but this doesn’t mean we should strive for imperfection but, rather, that we have evolved in a way to feel that way.

Can you demonstrate an instantiation of perfection about which we can all agree upon so that I can see what perfection 'looks' like? — Tom Storm

I am pretty sure the answer to that was 'no'.
I would be interested in your example of perfection. — Tom Storm
Still no evidence of one, at least that fits with what I've asked for below (which I think is what you were also looking for.)

I suggest that you read the entirety of me and Tom Storm’s interaction, because I gave several.

Bob

As I put it, however, it is not clear that this is anti-thetical to universal harmony. The human race is arguably more anti-thetical to universal harmony than would be its elimination.

Ah, I think I see what you are asking about: essentially, is a world with harmony and unity without any subjects equal to, greater than, or less than in moral worth to one with subjects?

My answer is that, all else being equal, they are equal in moral worth because they are equally (actually) perfect (in terms of their state). However, not all else being equal, the world with subjects (which are properly aligned with moral goodness) has a better length of preservation of that state (of actual, universal perfection) and, consequently, is going to be a better possible world.

Now, a couple things to address with that being said:

1. The human race, being capable of the greatest capacities of rational behavior, are not more anti-thetical to universal harmony; in fact, they are essential to upholding and enacting such a world.

2. The more intelligent a being is, the more useful it is towards reaching and upholding actual, universal perfection; and so it is going to be pragmatically more valuable for morality than less intelligent beings as well as non-life.

Because of this, it is pragmatically better for morality to train and modify the views and behaviors of humans to be aligned with reaching and upholding universal harmony rather than eliminating them. So, with that in mind, it is anti-thetical to reaching and preserving universal harmony to eliminate humans (in the grand scheme of things).

In other words, in a nutshell, if we are just considering the state of universal harmony (and unity), then both worlds (mentioned at the onset of this response) are equal in moral worth; BUT, if we are also considering the length of preservation of that state [of universal harmony], then the best possible world is one with the maximum amount of intelligent beings with the maximal amount of intelligence whereof all of them are perfectly aligned with upholding universal harmony.

Hopefully that helps.
Bob

I apologize for the belated response! I have not found the time to respond adequately until now.

It is manageability combined with relevant accuracy. I noted a while back that when we use a staging level as a base, what is reasonably relevant is one step up, or one step down.

Ok, so, correct me if I am wrong, you seem to be going for calculating ‘more existence’ in terms of the nearest scientific measuring unit of a thing: is that correct?

Paper is just a combination of molecules one step down (unless there's another name for a 'particle' of paper)

Unless I am correct above, then I don’t see why you would choose to use molecules rather than pieces of paper; nor mass of the paper. It isn’t always clear what “one step down” really is.

For example, take water. I could say that 2 Liters of water is more existence than 1; or I could equally say 100 molecules of water is more existence than 50. There’s no clear “one step down” here.

Secondly, let’s say I am correct in that you are trying to use scientific units of measure. Ok, a piece of paper doesn’t qualify then; but, it really doesn’t take away from my point: cutting a piece of paper cleanly into two pieces retains the molecule count and (total) mass. So it is an morally indifferent action under your view?

If so, then you need to clarify (I think) better in the OP what you mean by “more existence is better”, because it clearly isn’t “more → better”.

Thirdly, why use only scientific units of measure? It seems perfectly coherent and reasonable to say “two pairs of glasses are better than one pair of glasses”: why eliminate normal and valid units of measure?

I do think fundamental entities are an important part of the overall theory for certain invented scenarios

The problem is that it is all-too conjectural. Neither of us know the nature of fundamental entities other than they are the smallest parcel of reality: they may not even be analogous to atoms combining; and, on top of that, it serves no legitimate purpose to your calculations.

. Why I feel like their needs to be an adjective there is to separate it from a purely subjective identity

What I was trying to convey, was that you need an adjective to distinguish the too and not htat you should call them both ‘identities’--that would produce even more ambiguity and confusion. The problem is that you are using the phrase “fundamental entity” in to toto genere different ways.

While atoms may combine with molecules, they also have the potential of unbonding and becoming just atoms again. That is overall more existence then if such bonds were permanent

I don’t see how this creates more existence; because, again, I don’t know exactly how you calculating this: it is also very vague so far.

As an example, if the combining of two atoms which produces a molecule (let’s say) is better than those two atoms just being two, separate atoms; then the combining of molecules of two pieces of paper into one piece of paper is better than those two pieces being separate pieces. BUT, it seems like you would reject the unit of measure on the second example, even though it is directly analogous to the example you accept; and, might I add, without further clarification, they both produce one, new expression entity.

So atoms can combine, uncombine, recombine, etc. They are not permanently locked in thus losing potential existence.

Ah, so it is because the ability to recombine has more potential for other existences. How do you calculate the comparison between expressions and potentials? For example, what’s better: (1) a process of entities producing expressive entities ad infinitum that has no ability to recombine, or (2) a set of expressive entities equal to the beginning quantity of expressive entities for #1 that have the ability to recombine but are indefinitely idle?

You just need clarification. "Is it better to have two pieces of paper of equal mass or 1" is different from, "is it better to divide a mass of paper into two smaller pieces".

Sure, let’s get an answer to multiple of these style of questions:

1. Is it better to have two pieces of paper of equal mass or 1?
2. is it better to divide a mass of paper into two smaller pieces than not to?
3. Is it better to combine two pieces of paper into one big piece of paper than not to?

I still think it is perfectly reasonable to analyze it in terms of non-scientific units (e.g., is better for there to be one potato or two?); but let’s go with that for now.

Bob

:up:

Good question! @Beverley this is another example that I think fits in with your questions.

Ok Bob. How does the perfect nuclear weapon fit into your schema? Since human beings are arguably impairing the perfect balance of our eco-sphere, utilizing the perfect nuclear weapon to erase humanity would seem to be an ideal example of goodness.

A nuclear weapon is hypothetically perfect if it suits a particular purpose well (e.g., if my goal is to cause mass destruction, then this is perfect for that); and it is actually perfect if its parts are in harmony and unity. However, I think what you are trying to convey is that it is painfully obvious that nuclear weapons are not better for the greater good--so what's going on here?

The problem with your implication here is that my brief elaboration of hypothetical and actual perfection are within the context of all else being equal. The further context, which breaks that stipulation, is required for your implication here to hold water.

All else not being equal, a nuclear weapon is not something that would be in the best of possible worlds because it is anti-thetical to universal harmony and unity (i.e., self-unity and self-harmony where the self-reference is a universal context).

Likewise, it is entirely possible, with all that being said, that the use of a nuclear weapon may be "good" insofar as it is good for working towards universal harmony and unity (e.g., maybe bombing the Nazis pans out as a good action, overall).

In practical life, we use pragmatic goodness as a stepping stone towards moral goodness.

Bob

Perfection (for a purpose or as it is in-itself) is always (pragmatically or morally) good all else being equal. All else not being equal, the context matters.

For example, it may be that a clock is good for telling the time but that, for a particular person, they want a clock that also looks beautiful and, so, a particular clock that, all else being equal, is pragmatically good [for telling the time] is not "good" for this particular person (because it is, let's say, very ugly).

For example, it may be that a nerve-agent poison is good because it is actual perfection all else being equal (because it is in self-harmony and self-unity) but that it not something which is "good" in the greater context of societal or universal self-harmony and self-unity.

Hopefully that helps.
Bob

I appreciate your elaboration!

Although you didn’t cite it, it appears as though you are quoting the Genealogy of Morals. Firstly, I will just briefly comment that I think Nietzsche does a good job at outlining the historical facts about the development of [human] morality, but I don’t think his conclusion that “there is no objective morality” (to paraphrase) is correct. For example, I see absolutely no incoherence with me accepting Nietzsche’s genealogy of morals, and accepting that morals are stance-independent (albeit obviously not what he was going for). The common problem with Nietzsche’s moral anti-realism is that the evidence and support for it is entirely lacking in his works, because, quite frankly, he takes as granted the Dostoevskian idea that ~”without God, everything is permitted”. He makes absolutely no positive case for moral anti-realism in any of his works, and just primarily asserts it as an implication from the premise that God doesn’t exist.

Anyways, let me address specifically your use of his work here.

Unfortunately Goodness stemming from the term God (hence coming from perfection) is post the origins of the concept of "Good."

This is correct and perfectly well with my theory (although I am sure you seeing it as in opposition to my view in the OP): people have associated what is good with what is God (e.g., classical theism) for a LONG time; and it has only been recently in human history that we have found God to be irrelevant to what is good (or at least this is increasingly popular view amongst moral realists nowadays).

When I say that historically people have used notions of goodness that refer to either hypothetical or actual perfection (in the sense that I outlined it in the OP), I mean theism as an example of it. It is not a coincidence that the historical progression even within theism about God’s omnibenevolent nature has evolved such that we have slowly understood it to be universal harmony and unity.

We can see, that historically, the origins of goodness were deeply entwined with social status, power dynamics, and subjective perceptions of the aristocracy, rather than with any abstract or objective standards of perfection.

The historical analysis that you quoted here is all fine and correct, but you conclusion from it is not.
In short, the farther back one goes into human history, the closer a person’s notion of (moral) goodness is to the most egoistic context of self-harmony and self-unity; and the farther forward goes into human history, the closer a person’s notion of (moral) goodness is the most universal context of self-harmony and self-unity. All Nietzsche is doing in the Genealogy of Morals is providing most of the justification for this (without meaning to). He just sees this evoluation as a shift in tastes towards universal harmony and unity as opposed to an actual objective (moral) progression towards it.

So, yes, there are periods of history, a while ago, where it was common to define ‘good’ terms relative to the elite’s tastes or values; but, to my point, they still by-at-large recognized, implicitly at least in their notions of goodness, that what is good, in its most abstract form, is self-harmony and self-unity; which is self-apparent, in the case of an aristocracy, when one asks an elite noble what is good for them. People recognize almost innately the form of The Good when it comes to themselves: that’s why I think the most fundamental, primitive, and easily-understood context of moral goodness is egoism—it is incredibly obvious to almost anyone that what is best for them is to be in harmony and unity with themselves even if they cannot abstract out this form and apply it universally.

Regardless this is more than enough to show your binary approach is ham-fisted and cherry-picked at best.

I don’t see how your quote about aristocracies demonstrated my dualism (with respect to goodness) is a false dilemma or, as you put it, a reduction. I think, to be charitable, that you think that the fact that people have used terms like ‘good’ in very egoistic ways is somehow not completely reflected in my binary analysis—and I am here to say it does (;

There is of course a general usefulness to reduce something to binary opposites, especially in use for discussion, but it most certainly is an inaccurate representation of the many vary degrees and gradations of reality.

I understand the general approach you are taking, but you still have not given an example of a form of goodness that cannot be fit into my dualism; nor have you demonstrated, in the abstract, that it is, in the case of goodness, a false dilemma.

Aesthetic goodness is the same as your ‘beautiful goodness’, as far as I can tell, and I have already addressed how that is subsumable under my category of pragmatic goodness because, as mentioned before, it is the analysis of a thing’s perfection for being beautiful. Aesthetic goodness, then, is not something that is being reduced away with my dualism.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

It is really difficult to have a productive conversation if you cannot contend with my responses. I am not sure how to proceed from here, but, then again, it seems like you aren't interested in having any conversation about it (and if that is the case, then we can end our conversation here: no problem).

(hypothetical and actual) perfection is (are) identical to goodness (as a property); and so I would respond with, yes, something is 100% good only when it is 100% perfect (whether that be qua utility or qua perfection).

With all due respect: prove it. Respond to the historical examples I just gave.