I tend to agree with Banno on this one. If you require argumentation to establish that a bunch of cells trumps the personal autonomy and rights of a woman, there's a problem.

You are, then, begging the question; and using "obviousness" as a cop-out to actually put in the intellectual work to have a coherent position. Anyone can make an argument that X is true because if X is false then something must be wrong: that's just lazy, circular logic.

If you cannot provide any reasons for why the zygote does not have a right to life (in your view); then you are just wasting everyone's time, because you don't have a view.

My apologies on the long delay on my reply! I had intended to reply to this another time as I had some other conversations in play, and only remembered this recently.

No worries at all, my friend!

If we say 'experience' here is 'empirical data', then I'm fine with this. Our thoughts, memories, etc are all 'experience', but I suppose not define here

I would say it is also independent of the imagination, thoughts, memories, etc. being that it is the necessary preconditions for that as well.

True 'non-empirical' based experiences are what we would call 'instincts'.

Not quite: an instinct is a way one is predisposed to reacting to experience; whereas the a priori means of cognizing objects is a way we are pre-structured to experience. To your point, we could very well say that there are a priori instincts we have vs. ones we learn. My point here is just that you are invalidly forming a dichotomy between ‘instincts’ and ‘experience’ which turns out to be a false one.

A JTB theory of knowledge has long been countered by "The Gettier Problem".

I no longer see the gettier problems as problematic at all (tbh); but you are correct.

What is apriori knowledge if apriori is simply instinct? The moment a baby kicks, it knows what its like to kick through its empirical sensations. The moment a child learns about ''the number 1' its now empirical knowledge. 'Apriori knowledge' is a misnomer. It doesn't make any sense.

You aren’t thinking about it properly, and this is what is the root of the confusion. Not everything that is a priori is instinctual (like I noted before); and a priori knowledge is any knowledge which has its truth-maker in the way we experience as opposed to what we experience.

This is why Kant noted that math is a priori; because no matter what you are experiencing, the propositions in math are true in virtue of the way we cognize objects in space and time which is true for anything a human will experience. “1 + 1 = 2” is true as grounded by the way our brains cognize, the mathematical axioms which it has, and not because of something we learned about something which we experienced (in terms of its purely empirical content). This is why Kant famously said that all knowledge begins with experience but that does not mean all knowledge arises out of experience.

All bodies are extended is something we empirically learn by experience, not anything we are born with.

Again, all knowledge begins with experience—not all knowledge arises out of it. The space which objects are presented to you in is purely synthetic: it is something your brain added into the mix—not empirical data.

The problem you are having is that ‘experience’ encompasses both an a priori and a posteriori aspect; and so there are equivocations being made here by both of us in our discussion. I will try to be more clear from now on. What we are discussing is not if knowledge begins with experience, but if there aspects of our experience which are not experiential.

Its similar, but not exactly the same. The most like apriori is distinctive knowledge

No, my point is that your theory sidesteps the question: it doesn’t address it and doesn’t eliminate its possibility. Nothing about distinctive vs. applicable knowledge negates the possibility of a priori knowledge: the a priori vs. a posteriori distinction is a different one than you are addressing in your theory; and I am merely noting that a priori knowledge is not incompatible with your view.

There is no instinct to do math in any base. It takes time for this to develop in humans.

Bases are just different ways to represent numbers: I am talking about numbers themselves

If you are going to claim, like @Banno, that a zygote does not have a right to life or (if I am being overly-charitable) that there are different degrees to a given right, then you must be able to back that up with good reasons and, overall, a cogent and internally coherent ethical theory. Neither of you have demonstrated that at all: Banno just keeps blanketly asserting "it's obvious!".

What???

You just keep asserting it, without giving any ethical reasons for believing it. Why believe that a zygote does not have a right to life? Answer that.

All your argument has been thus far, is that zygotes don't have rights. I want to know why you believe that.

Moreover, no, you cannot give zygotes a degree of rights cogently: that converts it into privileges.

So, why do you believe a zygote does not have rights, such as the right to life? Where or when does a human being get those rights?

It's not clear what you mean by teleology.

I mean it in its standard sense: science of purpose [behind things as opposed to the physical cause of things].

If you just mean that a zygote is highly likely to naturally develop a rational will

No, I mean that a zygote will naturally develop into a being with a rational will all else being equal; no different than how a zygote will naturally develop into having two hands, a body, a brain, etc. per se (whereas, per accidens, it may not fulfill the Telos of which it has for various reasons [e.g., improper gestation, etc.]). When you say it is “highly likely”, you are not noting what it was designed to become but, rather, the probability of, in reality, under the nuanced circumstances, of its environment allowing it to develop into what it was supposed to become.

3. Pulling the lever moves the box containing five zygotes onto the primary track, before the box containing one baby (stopping the trolley from travelling further).

This is an example, if I am understanding it correctly, of a trolley problem which would be analogous to @RogueAI’s example; and it would equally be immoral to do so.

#3 is fundamentally different than #2 and #1 because it is the only example Michael has (in their thought experiment) where the zygotes are a means towards saving the baby. I am suspecting neither of you understand this, and this is the root of your confusion.

But if you still insist that (1) and (3) are morally distinct, then what if you don't know which of (1), (2), and (3) is the manner in which the baby can be saved? Each is equally likely. Should you pull the lever or not?

I would say this would be immoral; because you are not noting the probability of weighing who might likely save but, rather, the probability of doing something immoral vs. permissible. This would be a sadistic game that I would encourage anyone to avoid playing.

If we were talking about probabilities of producing bad side effects then that would be a different story.

In my mind the answer is clear; always do what you can to save the baby, irrespective of how or how many zygotes are killed in the process.

That’s because you don’t believe they have rights; and I do. If you thought they had the right to life, then you wouldn’t make this kind of claim.

How many times are you going to ask the same question?

The answer is still no, I would not use the zygotes to put out the fire. I've elaborated in detail why that would be wrong: please ask questions if you are confused at all on it.



This is a really bad ethical principle. If I take it seriously, then we should kill and harvest the organs of physically disabled people to save the lives of normal, sick people. It is nonsense.

I understand your confusion, but I've clarified this many times now. A zygote is not a person (in that strict sense that you mean) but has a nature that marks it out as going to be a person (aka: "will be" a person, as you put it). It is not, under my view, the immanent personhood that grounds rights but, rather, the teleological nature.

When I said "because they are persons", I was speaking loosely in the sense of the teleological claim; which how persons were defined in the pre-modern sense. In the modern sense, you are right to point out that they are not persons.

To clarify, this teleological account of rights IS NOT equivalent to grounding rights in potential persons; for "potentiality" is a very loose term that covers more than telos (e.g., perhaps a cow has the potential to be a person since we could give it a brain chip).

For your view, as you and I have noted, you have to ground rights in actual personhood; and this leads to absurd results (e.g., a knocked out human has no rights while knocked out).

One cannot just ground rights in the organism nor personhood: it must be grounded in the consideration of the nature of the organism.

In short, to make this painfully clear, in modern terminology a zygote is not a person (nor is a knocked out adult) and I would say they are teleologically marked out to become a person; and in pre-modern terminology (which I prefer) a zygote (and a knocked out adult) are persons because their nature marks them out as such. Either way you prefer, human beings have these rights because they are teleologically set out as (becoming) persons.

It is also worth mentioning that non-persons still have rights---they just aren't the same. E.g., a cow has the right to not be tortured for fun.

I apologize: I was not intending to alter the example to my benefit. I am not following what difference it makes if the tactical bomber cannot retreat. What are you suggesting?

DID YOU READ MY MESSAGE?!? I am losing patience with you, my friend. Literally in the quote you made I addressed that!

Interesting, I guess we will have to see what happens then.

There is no such example: I pull the lever if the one is being sacrificed is substituted for any number of zygotes; and this is not incoherent with my position. Like I said, you don't understand it.

Pouring zygotes on a building to put out a fire (to save a child) is not analogous to pulling a lever to save five by sacrificing N-amount of zygotes, for the zygotes are directly intentionally killed in the former as a means towards the good end whereas they are indirectly intentionally killed in the latter not as a means but rather a bad side effect of using the means to bring about the good end (and, at this point, with my principle of double effect, saving the child is always going to significantly outweigh the bad side effect of killing the zygotes but this is only valid for analyzing side effects NOT means).

I know many Republicans that believe that abortion should be allowed up to a certain point in the pregnancy for any reason. I don't know one Republican that says that if prior birth control (condoms, the pill, etc.) failed that the woman should be forced to carry through with her pregnancy.

I could see that (although I have many examples of Republicans that do not support that at all); because they lack a coherent position.

To me, the issue becomes moral only when the fetus develops a nervous system and is capable of feeling pain. Zygotes do not have nervous systems.

None of this matters; and can be demonstrated as useless considerations simply by observing that you probably eat other animals that can feel pain and have a nervous system much more complex than a fetus’ and your argument here would apply equally to all those animals. Viz., the principles which you are analyzing and committing yourself too, would entail, if granted, veganism.

If someone was raped or the birth control they were using failed,

Also irrelevant. Aborting a child from rape or a failing in contraception is no different than killing an infant born out of wedlock—two wrongs do not make a right.

Traditionally, a rational will; i.e., a sufficiently free will. That is a serious and impactful difference between humans and other species: most, if not all, other species lack the capacity to go against their own nature and inclinations such that they are motivated by pure reason.

Traditionally, a being which has a Telos such that it will have, if not already has, a rational will are called persons (because their nature marks them out to be such); and their will must be respected.

More technically, a being which has a such a "rational Telos" is not necessarily a person but, rather, will be; and their nature marks them out as such; and this is what grounds their rights (and not whether or not they currently are a person).

The argument is pretty clear, and has been stated a few times. Whatever standing the cyst has is negligible in comparison to that had by Mrs Smith.

This is entirely too vague. Do you think the blastocyst has a right to life or not?!? You are purposefully avoiding the question, because you know if you grant it rights then you cannot make this kind of argument that Mrs. Smith has more of a right to bodily autonomy.

They are persons.

Except that the double effect was part of an extended discussion of abortion involving Philippa Foot and Anscombe, the very one in which what 'mercans call the "trolly" problem was first deployed.

What do you mean "except"?

You are confusing the end with the intentions. I can directly intend something which is not the end I am trying to bring about (e.g., start my car to go to the grocery store). A woman who opts-in for an abortion is directly intended to kill an innocent human being as a means towards the end of upholding her own bodily autonomy; because the abortion (1) at least partially (if not totally) facilitates the end and (2) it is a part of the direct intentional flow of the act.

This is entirely different than your example before, as a tactical bomber is directly intending to bomb, e.g., a military base and only indirectly intends to kill innocents (as a statistical certainty) as a side effect of the means of bringing about the end; which is evident from the fact that if there were no innocents that were to die, then the bomber would still perform the same tasks towards the same end. Whereas, with the abortion, if an abortion is not needed then it changes the act itself; for the act's end stays the same but the objects change (which is not true in the tactical bomber scenario).

The most common republican view, although not officially, is that abortion should be illegal except under certain grave circumstances. E.g., https://news.gallup.com/poll/246278/abortion-trends-party.aspx#:~:text=Views%20on%20Legality%20of%20Abortion%2C%20by%20Party%20ID .

Democrats commonly want it legal in all or most circumstances. You are making it sound like both republicans and democrats see eye-to-eye on abortion....not at all.

You don't understand my position; and have straw manned it time and time again. If you want to understand it,then we need to actually discuss it from the foundation up. Otherwise, you will continue to be confused from your own perspective.

I am assuming that this was a rhetorical question, since you quoted my answer.

Is it never warranted for military officers issue orders that are almost certain to result in the deaths of their innocent men?

Yes (under certain circumstances), and this gets into the principle of double effect; and is not pertinent to the abortion discussion.

Technically, it is always wrong to directly intentionally kill an innocent human being—I usually just shorten it to “don’t kill innocent humans” to keep it simple

I don't think that is true at all. Red states are predominantly conservative; and conservatives are not pro-choice.

I appreciate your thoughtful response. I think I understand now what you are going for, and I agree despite our semantic differences :up: .

Like I said before, I just think it is best to reserve the term 'real', 'actual', etc. for 'it exists'; and 'existence' as 'being'. Otherwise, you end up having to posit that something can not be real but exists or what exists may not be real (depending on how the semantics are hashed out).

Good discussion, Wayfarer!

Are you arguing that a both have rights, but one trumps the other? Or are you arguing that only one of them has rights?

If I were to hold up a hand and say "here is a hand" and you asked for proof, there would similarly be little more to say.

Banno, do you really believe that it is equally as obvious that a woman should have a right to abortion as the fact that your hand exists? C'mon man.

I think it is a complex issue, and is clearly not resolved in the philosophical literature on abortion.

That's not quite right. If there were a vote in 'merca, it would be legal

There have been votes; and red states vote no; and blue states vote yes. There is no consensus.

I have shown a method that can be applied to ethical issues in order to cut through the bullshit. We differ as to what we think folk should do.

You haven't and that's what I am asking you to do: what method?????? You have offered nothing but a blanket assertion that a woman has more rights, or a higher degree of a right, to bodily autonomy than the zygote has to life. Nothing else has been elaborated on.

Second, I'm not doing politics here, but ethics

I am not asking politically: I am asking ethically. You have been refusing to engage in ethics, not politics.

I appreciate your elaboration!

But, and again from a high level, what I'm calling attention to the sense in which the mind constructs reality on an active basis moment by moment.

I don’t disagree with anything you said in your response; but what I am wondering is if you believe that there are forms to reality as it is in-itself or not (which is what ‘realism’ and ‘nominalism’, which you brought up, are debating). If you agree with me that the forms of reality are really attributed by our cognition; then they are not ‘real’ (in the realist’s sense) but rather transcendentally ideal; and this would be a position which is neither nominalist nor realist (in the sense of those terms as you defined them). What are your thoughts?

See, this is good question to spark the conversation. I wish @Banno would have brought this up, because, if I were doing the arguing for them, this exactly what I would offer in favor of supporting that a woman has a different moral status than a zygote.

I would save the child over the billion zygotes, and prima facie this supports @Bannos point; however, upon deeper reflection, I don't think it helps their case. I am not saying that we cannot have different moral weights for different relevant moral factors when morally analyzing a situation: I am saying that we cannot violate someone's rights.

You may ask: what is the morally difference, then Bob? It's simple: it is always wrong to kill an innocent person, but it is not always wrong to let an innocent person die. Omissions are not morally calculated the same as commissions. In your scenario, if I had to go use the zygotes to put out the fire to save the child, then I would be doing something immoral; but if I am letting the zygotes die because I cannot save them and the child and the child has more moral weight (in this situation) than the zygotes, then nothing immoral is happening. This is no different than having to choose between saving a 90-year old or an infant---one should save, all else being equal, the infant because age can be a morally relevant factor in that kind of dilemma. HOWEVER, age is not a morally relevant factor to whether or not you can violate a 90-year old's rights---e.g., you cannot use the 90-year old's life to save the infant.

Hopefully @Banno decides to engage in the conversation.

Yeah, that's why I would have to think about it more. That's a good point.

You are right: I didn't ask that. So why did you comment on my post? I am not following on what your response has to do with my response to Banno. What you brought up was not even remotely relevant to what we were talking about.

Abortion is a super controversial topic, and there absolutely no consensus, like in physics in your analogy, that pro-choice is the right answer. What you are doing, is lazily asserting your position and then saying it is obvious as justification.

E.g., "Why should a woman be allowed to abort a child?"
Banno: "Because it is obviously true"

What kind of intellectually lazy, disingenuous response is that?!?

I respect you Banno, and I want to have a substantive conversation about this topic that challenges both of our positions; but in order to do that you have to actually give an account of why you believe pro-choice is the right answer. Otherwise, there's nothing for me to engage with you about.

As a side note, how do you expect to convince a pro-life person that your position is correct if you just blanketly assert and say it is obviously true as justification?

My apologies Mww, I forgot to respond.

Because of the definition in play for the conception of reality, which is a category, having all the real as schemata subsumed under it, re: “….Reality, in the pure conception of the understanding, is that which corresponds to a sensation in general; that, consequently, the conception of which indicates a being (in time).…”

Ahhh, I understand now. For me, what is real for my understanding, in the Kantian sense, is not the same as I would define “reality”. My understanding is limited, and deploys a limited concept of ‘real’ in order to construct my conscious experience. Through reason, pure reason, which is purely self-reflective, I can know that reality must be far more than what the understanding determines it to be.

The parenthetical is wrong: a thing can exist and not be given to the senses. Without the parenthetical the statement is a contradiction, re: there could be a thing in reality but is not.

Perhaps I used your terms incorrectly: then it would be “you are saying that there could be a thing which is in reality but is not (i.e., is not real because it cannot be given to the senses).”

I think I get where you are coming from now: you are using the concept of ‘reality’ which is a transcendental category of the understanding; and deny, for some reason, the concept as understood by self-reflective reason—by meta-cognition.

Like I said before, my first point would be a semantic note: when something is not real, it does not exist because it is not—under your view, this does not hold because some things which exist are not real.

My other point, now, would be that our self-reflective reason has the ability to understand, just like it can about other transcendental things, that the true concept of reality cannot be identical to that category of the understanding which you refer; because something can be which is not sensed.

If you deny this, then the very concept of ‘reality’, as a category of the understanding, is not real; nor anything which is not currently being sensed; nor anything else transcendentally determined. I think you are just going to bite the bullet on this; so let me just point out that if there really aren’t these a priori modes of cognition (which they cannot be real according to your view) then that undermines the grounds that anything object which is cognized is real—for how can something which isn’t real cognize something which is?????

YEA!!!
(Does the happy dance, feet just a’flyin’, enough to make Snoopy jealous, I tell ya)

(:

I don't want a footnote Wayfarer: I want a response (:

I don't think so; although I would have to think about it more. I would imagine that, all else being equal, cremating a body is done out of respect for that dead person in order to give it to loved ones to cherish. Since they are dead, there is nothing really being violated about them by doing that (like disrespecting their corpse by having sex with it would).

For me, it is fundamentally about properly respecting life relative to the nature and Telos of each life-form (as best as possible).

I am asking you why you believe that a zygote does not have the same fundamental right to not be killed when innocent like a woman does; and you refuse to engage. No, you do not get to blanketly assert that a zygote does not have the right to life and then try to pin it on me to explain (again) why I think it does.

Are you going to actually answer the question and engage in a discussion on ethics?

You didn't address anything we were really discussing about: I am asking @frank if it is morally permissible (and subsequently legally permissible) to have sex with a corpse, and there answer was ~"no". My point is that this is wrong, as it is wrong to have sex with a corpse; and any view that grounds rights completely in the quality of being alive will have to admit that, in that theory, it is never impermissible to do heinous things. So far, @frank has dodged this problem instead of biting the bullet.

What you are asking, is whether or not, separately from my discussion with frank, it is morally permissible to have sex with a corpse if that now dead person signed a contract giving proper consent to it being done. This presupposes that the dead person prima facie has a right not to be used as a sex doll, which is incompatible with @franks position. For me, I am going to say it is impermissible; because I believe that it is possible to commit immoral acts upon oneself, which are beyond the purview of justice (because it does not relate to how one should treat other people), and one such act is allowing people to degrade your corpse with sexual acts. However, I would say that not everything that is immoral should be illegal; as laws are about justice, which is a sub-branch of morality. The law should not regulate that what specifically you should do with your own body, as we have seen how much of a disaster that becomes. So, in short, it would be immoral but not illegal (according to me).

The modern take would be to say that it should not be illegal and whether or not it is immoral is irrelevant; because each person should be able to pursue their own conception of the good.

You are just sidestepping the conversation and begging the question. I have tried many times to inquire on what moral grounds you believe this and you keep sidestepping.

If I take your position seriously, then we cannot say that a dog fossil is a dog fossil.