↪Metaphysician Undercover Your response seems disingenuous. On the one hand you claim that Planck units are "fictitious" and then on the other you claim that "falsity often works well". :roll: — 180 Proof

Amen!



I think the characterization of your latest post by 180 Proof is spot on.

I strongly suspect process philosophy, as expressed in its claims, is much more nuanced than your present language communicates.

Over time I think you should re-read process philosophy with an aim to achieving a closer and deeper reading of the material. At present your interpretations are simplistic and your defensive counter-narratives broadsides that don’t do justice to the ideas.

You and Banno are telling me Kant, no less than Einstein, was a physicist. From this we understand language is an integral component of physics, and thus our thoughts possess materiality no less than the mountains and rivers surrounding us. Experimental results showing inescapable entanglement of observer and observed, with macro-scale dimensions of super-atomic universe stabilizing super-position of the wave function into discreteness, confirm the interweave. This is simultaneously confirmation of Logos in the Neo-Platonic and Christian senses. Thus the miracles of Jesus, sinless practitioner of Logos, are scientifically verifiable phenomena. — ucarr

Nor this [Nor does the above follow logically]. — Banno

In counter-narrating the claims of Joshs, I assert the physicality of language (and therefore the physicality of metaphysics). As examples of the physics of language, I cite the Pentatuch (Genesis) and the miracles of Jesus.

Show me where my logic is flawed.

In section two above, Joshs claims

these [metaphysics_physics] are not separate, potentially overlapping domains. — Joshs

And he also claims

There can be no physics without linguistic conceptualization, and there can be no physics without metaphysics as its condition of possibility. — Joshs

We see from the above that Joshs links metaphysics_physics as cofunctions, with the additional detail that metaphysics is a pre-condition of physics. This conjunction of co-functionality and causality intuitively feels to me messy and wrong. Also, the temporal element of causality placing metaphysics prior in time to physics I think contradicted by empirical experience.

You can't cogitate the metaphysics of a material object prior to its existence because material objects cannot be cogitated - which to say, cannot be rationalized - into being. The existence of material objects is always axiomatic. No existence of any kind has ever been rendered such (extant) via reasoning.

This leads me to the following difficult conceptualization: all of existence is physical, and yet the metaphysical is integral to this physicality. I proceed forth from this puzzle by claiming metaphysics_physics are coordinate and contemporary with each other. Furthermore, metaphysics_physics are both independently and mutually non-reductive. Lastly, all of the preceding suggests to me our universe is an upwardly dimensional axis of progressively complex dimensionally unfolding matrices.

By way of summary of what I have said:

Some of what is called metaphysics is just nonsense.
Some of what is called metaphysics is integral to physics.
Some of what is called metaphysics has been clearly defined, by Popper, Watkins, etc, according to it's logical structure.
So, some of what has been called metaphysics is legitimate, some not. — Banno

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↪ucarr

Is the above an example of physics masquerading as metaphysics, or is it an example of authentic metaphysics sharing fundamentals with physics?
— ucarr

This is like asking if physics masquerades as linguistic conceptualization, or if linguistic conceptualization shares fundamentals with physics. Of course, the answer is that these are not separate, potentially overlapping domains. Rather, the former is the pre -condition for the latter. There can be no physics without linguistic conceptualization, and there can be no physics without metaphysics as its condition of possibility. — Joshs

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You and Banno are telling me Kant, no less than Einstein, was a physicist. — ucarr

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In the first section above, you say "Some of what is called metaphysics..." implying this "some" can have a legitimate label other than "metaphysics." As an alternate, legitimate label, I say "physics." It's logical for me to say this because, in your statement, you claim this "some" is integral to physics.

in·te·gral | ˈin(t)əɡrəl, inˈteɡrəl |
adjective
1 necessary to make a whole complete; essential or fundamental: games are an integral part of the school's curriculum | systematic training should be integral to library management.
The Apple Dictionary

If a is essential to b, then a is of the essence of b.

es·sence | ˈesəns |
noun
the intrinsic nature or indispensable quality of something, especially something abstract, that determines its character: conflict is the essence of drama.
• Philosophy a property or group of properties of something without which it would not exist or be what it is.
The Apple Dictionary

As "essence" is defined above, we see that if a is of the essence of b, then a is of the intrinsic nature or indispensable quality of b. This is another way of saying a and b are one. In making your claim above, you are equating some of metaphysics with physics. It follows from here that therefore, Kant and/or other metaphysicians, when making claims essential to physics, and thus identical to physics, are no less physicists than Einstein, an indisputable physicist.

Show me where my above logic is flawed.

I can only hope we are not witnessing the invincible rise of the "machine men" to whom rigid normativity and correctness are the new gods. — Janus

:up:

I think Kubrick was also trying to say, 'yeah you lot wish you could get some useful supernatural advice written on stone tablets but the best you are ever going to get is sci fi stories like this one. The rest is on you, it's your burden to figure it all out, including all the mysteries. There are no gods to help you!' — universeness

Well said, and now, let me segue into saying, "The monolith is a MacGuffin." Tricky Kubrick knows how to stir the public imagination visually with that sleek, black slab of commercial mysteriousness. Keep cogitating on it folks, and while you're at it, keep ringing those turnstiles with repeat, paid viewings.

Is a rectangular, black, 10 feet tall monilith in any way something that would be familiar to pre-sapiens? Very unllikely, and to that extent it's a bad idea. — Agent Smith

:up:

Or current sapiens? (Sex and) mystery sells, especially when hawked by the cognoscenti.

In attempts to clarify the underlying issue of the role metaphysics (as a philosophical study) plays in physics (as the study of that which is physical):

How would anyone, yourself included, justify physicality per se without use of metaphysical concepts? — javra

jus·ti·fy | ˈjəstəˌfī |
verb (justifies, justifying, justified) [with object]
1 show or prove to be right or reasonable: the person appointed has fully justified our confidence.
• be a good reason for: the situation was grave enough to justify further investigation.

The Apple Dictionary

A foundational plank in the edifice of my concept of ontology says, "Material objects cannot be justified." No loquacious metaphysical treatise on material objects (that I know of) can justify (arrive at) the basic fact of a material object's existence. When science looks at the (physical) world, subsequently making claims about said world, it assumes, axiomatically, that such (physical) world is there, with or without an observer. This is not a denial of QM entanglement. Yes, the observer is physically entangled with the observed. This entanglement shows that the observer (even in relation to him_her-self), no less than the observed, proceeds on the axiomatic assumption of existence of self.

Descartes, in saying, "I think therefore I am." goes wrong in an interesting way. Are there a lot of people who think they think themselves into existence? There is no "I think therefore I am." There is only "I am." Likewise, there is no "I've reasoned the world of material objects into existence." There is only, "The world of material objects exists."

Like Michaelangelo's painting of God pointing his finger to the finger of man, analysis (metaphysics) makes a close approach to physics (existence), but there is a gap. Science, when commencing to proceed forth towards making a claim about the world, axiomatically fills the gap with "I am." and "World is." I know of no metaphysical treatise that adds anything further to this.

In the effort to make metaphysics anything other than coordinate and contemporary with physics, the reasoning claimant slams against a logical conundrum: in order for metaphysics to be a ground of physics not coordinate and contemporary with physics, it would have to be greater than (outside of) “I am.” However, “I am.” = existence, which encompasses metaphysics. Problematically, metaphysics cannot be greater than “I am.” because that means it’s greater than itself, a logical impossibility. This tells us that, because “I am.” encompasses metaphysics no less than material objects of the physical world, metaphysics is physical. This lets us claim metaphysics = physics, a tricky way of saying metaphysics and physics, although distinguishable, nevertheless are coordinate and contemporary with each other.

You've left out "the good" of Platonism here, which is not the same as "the One" of Neo-Platonism. For Plato, the ideal is "the good", but it is distinct from "the One". "The One", for Plato is a mathematical Form, a fundamental unity, as explained by Aristotle, yet "the good" is an unknown, as explained in "The Republic" which falls into the class of "Many" as implied by the arguments in "The Sophist". Therefore "the One" cannot be the same as "the good". — Metaphysician Undercover

This argument is irrelevant to the question I posed. "Do you think process philosophy shares some common ground with Platonism_Neo-Platonism?" You acknowledge both philosophies posit oneness as foundational. Your arguments for process philosophy mostly tend towards a foundational oneness obscured by artificial partitioning. I conclude the answer is "Yes. Process philosophy borrows heavily from Plato."

Let's imagine you and I standing on the street having a conversation. I think we exist as discrete individuals. You deny we exist as discrete individuals. How does your experience of the conversation differ from mine?
— ucarr

The fact that we are sharing words, conversing, indicates that there is no real boundary between us, and the idea that we are distinct individuals is an illusion, an artificial creation. This is an illusion which you seem to believe in. — Metaphysician Undercover

An example of a pertinent answer to my question "How does your experience of the conversation differ from mine?" would have you telling me what I'm thinking based upon your ability to read my mind. Your ability to read my mind follows logically from your claim "there is no real boundary between us, and the idea that we are distinct individuals is an illusion, an artificial creation..."

Are you claiming that the activity of walking consists of a series of static positions? Come on ucarr, get real. Each of those "positions" would be an instance of standing, and any activity of walking would occur between the instance of standing.

But clearly, walking does not consist of a series of static positions. If it did, then what would we call what happens between these static positions? How would the person get from one static position to the next? They couldn't walk from one static position to the next because that would just imply more static positions. — Metaphysician Undercover

There's a classic puzzle questioning how humans move through the real world since any line is infinitely divisible into an endless sequence of points. If math savvy folks are following our conversation, perhaps they can weigh-in with an explanation of how the puzzle was solved.

I can, however, say the following: regarding the separation operation, when you locate yourself at a definite position, say, the address of your home, that separation is valid and real by your own acknowledgment of transitional states of being. These imply movement between discrete positions, even if they're other transitional states!

If I take a prism and hold it before a source of white light and a subsequent spectrum of red and blue and green light emerges, are these three primary colors of radiant light, each one measurable, non-existent illusions?
— ucarr

I will address this when you show me how you will place an exact boundary between each colour. If you show me the exact division, where each colour ends, and the next starts such that there is no ambiguity, and you base your boundaries on principles which are independent from one's which are arbitrarily chosen by human beings, then you will have an example for me to address. Otherwise, your example just hands me a continuum without any real boundaries, with you insisting that there are boundaries. — Metaphysician Undercover

You misrepresent my position. I don't deny overlapping transitions between boundaries. I'm not at war with ambiguity. I've already asked you,

Does process philosophy exclude transitory existence from its list of possible existences? — ucarr

I see now, from your argument above, the answer is "No. Process philosophy does not exclude transitory existence, and thus does not exclude transitions from existence." This means, at the very least, that process philosophy does acknowledge fluid partitions between different states of existence. This renders false your claim individuals, per process philosophy, don't exist.

In your own words, cited in my previous post, you establish your understanding of yourself as a consistent POV who transitions through different states of being across a continuum of time. This is a confirmation of human individuality - yours - not a refutation.

...I'm saying that perhaps we randomly create distinct things by arbitrarily... proposing boundaries within something continuous. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I understand the above, you're claiming humans insert partitions that break up a continuum into (artificial) parts. In line with this configuration, you're fusing three different states: steam, water, ice into one continuum, H2O. Breaking up H2O into three different states or fusing three different states into H2O, either way, human performs a cognitive operation. Share with me the logic you follow to the conclusion that the fusion operation is more valid than the separation operation.

I am different today from what I was yesterday, — Metaphysician Undercover

but these differences do not make me a distinct thing from what I was yesterday. — Metaphysician Undercover

In having it both ways, as you do above, you confirm the equal validity of the partition and fusion operations.

Your example confuses "different" with "distinct". — Metaphysician Undercover

dif·fer·ent | ˈdif(ə)rənt |
adjective
1 not the same as another or each other; unlike in nature, form, or quality: you can play this game in different ways | the car is different from anything else on the market | this land seemed different than the rest.
• informal novel and unusual: try something deliciously different.
2 distinct; separate: on two different occasions.

dis·tinct | dəˈstiNG(k)t |
adjective
1 recognizably different in nature from something else of a similar type: the patterns of spoken language are distinct from those of writing | there are two distinct types of sickle cell disease.
• physically separate: the gallery is divided into five distinct spaces.
2 readily distinguishable by the senses: a distinct smell of nicotine.
• [attributive] (used for emphasis) so clearly apparent as to be unmistakable; definite: he got the distinct impression that Melissa wasn't pleased.

The Apple Dictionary

As you see above in the definitions of "different" and "distinct," the two words are synonyms, thus your claim I "identify wrongly; mistake" "different" as "distinct" is false.

Check for them as synonyms in a thesaurus and you'll find "different" under "distinct" and vice versa.

Yards and inches are based on human decided lengths, perhaps coming from some original object with no exact size, — Bylaw

Does the measurement of a material object ever have an irrational number?

Doesn't a movie exist as a succession of distinct still-frames? — Metaphysician Undercover

No. A movie is a movie; a still frame is a still frame. Two different states: strip of celluloid stationary; strip of celluloid in motion. Is one more fictitious than the other?

...in process philosophy it's an event which 'exists' discretely. Now, my question would be, do these discrete events really have true existence as discrete entities, distinct from other events, or do we just artificially conceive of them in this way, so that we can talk about them? — Metaphysician Undercover

In parallel to this, we can look at three different states of H2O: steam, water, ice. Does H2O changing between three possible states lead us to conclude each state is a non-existent fiction? In general, if a given state is impermanent, does its impermanence eject it from existence?

I'm saying that perhaps we randomly create distinct things by arbitrarily (meaning not absolutely random or arbitrary, but for various different purposes) proposing boundaries within something continuous — Metaphysician Undercover

If I conceive of H2O as a continuum event comprised of steam_water_ice, does that lead me to conclude my action last night of drinking a perceived glass of water was a non-existent fiction?

...it may be that there is just one big continuous event, and depending on what our purpose is, we'll artificially project boundaries into this continuity... — Metaphysician Undercover

If I take a prism and hold it before a source of white light and a subsequent spectrum of red and blue and green light emerges, are these three primary colors of radiant light, each one measurable, non-existent illusions?

Does process philosophy exclude transitory existence from its list of possible existences?

When I walk down the street, I move through a sequence of transitory positions while I remain in motion. Does process philosophy claim that while in motion, I'm an event-cloud of probable positions, none of which holds possession of discrete boundaries?

What's the effect of applying process philosophy to your everyday experiences?

Let's imagine you and I standing on the street having a conversation. I think we exist as discrete individuals. You deny we exist as discrete individuals. How does your experience of the conversation differ from mine?

Until we discover the real basis for any such division of the assumed continuous substratum, into discrete units, any such proposed individualities will remain completely fictitious. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you think process philosophy shares some common ground with Platonism_Neo-Platonism?

Neoplatonic philosophy is a strict form of principle-monism that strives to understand everything on the basis of a single cause that they considered divine, and indiscriminately referred to as “the First”, “the One”, or “the Good”.Jan 11, 2016

Neoplatonism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
https://plato.stanford.edu › entries › neoplatonism

How is Neoplatonism different from Platonism?

Platonism is characterized by its method of abstracting the finite world of Forms (humans, animals, objects) from the infinite world of the Ideal, or One.

Neoplatonism, on the other hand, seeks to locate the One, or God in Christian Neoplatonism, in the finite world and human experience.

My OP or the conversation?

You're baking a cake. When you do this, are you claiming that all of what baking a cake entails is non-existent?
— ucarr

Yes, that's what I am saying. Baking a cake is an activity. And, we cannot say that activities exist. You would say that activities necessarily involve existents, like baking a cake involves ingredients, but this is what process philosophers dispute. They claim that activity is fundamental and there is no need to assume any ingredients — Metaphysician Undercover

My takeaway from your claims is, presently, that Process Philosophy is kinda like metaphysics of fluid dynamics -- without the practicality of the quantitative equations -- wherein the practitioner puts on, as it were, a pair of QM glasses, subsequently viewing life as a movie, except it's a movie stuck in a state of super-position, wherein no discrete individualities are distilled. We're inside the cloud of probabilities that plays like lightning in a bottle. Thus, parent_child_grandchild are as one within an indivisible conglomerate of activity, with heads, arms, legs etc., (mere evanescences, not material realities) showing themselves more illusion than individualities.

...we cannot say that activities exist. You would say that activities necessarily involve existents, like baking a cake involves ingredients, but this is what process philosophers dispute. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here's the rub. Somewhere down the line, even process philosophy has to talk about something that exists discretely, otherwise there's nothing intelligible or linguistic to talk about.

So, activity is a discrete thing, although ambiguously so.

All of this puts me in mind of what I wrote to Joshs. Could it be the time element, at low resolution on the super-atomic scale, parses the flow mechanics of super-position into apparently discrete individualities? Furthermore, does this tell us that logic, in its syntax, if not in its semantics, is temporal? If 3D logic of the everyday world is semantically atemporal, then that's a strong indication 4D logic exists. As such, 4D logic "parses" atemporal semantics of logic. What does atemporal grammar look like? How does it shape physical things? Does it tell us the super-position digit in a quantum computer is a physical thing? What might be the behavior of a super-position sentient being?

If you're not interested in QM, then your lens for viewing physicalism is probably Newtonian, and thus your POV predates the 20th century.
— ucarr

I hold no particular views on physics as I have no qualifications in the area nor is it a particular interest of mine. I just find it amusing that QM is used by so many woo peddlers to assert idealism or that some quasi-spiritual metaphysics is true. I'm generally the "I don't know guy" and am constantly surprised by how many people with no qualifications and flawed reasoning think they can explain reality after reading some shit on line, or watching youtube. :wink: — Tom Storm

↪ucarr Isn't the issue here that no one really avoids metaphysics, no matter what position you hold? If you are making paradigmatic and presuppositional claims about the fundamental nature of reality you're doing it, right? The claim that reality is described by the 'laws of physics' is itself a metaphysical claim. — Tom Storm

You said it yourself. No one really avoids metaphysics. "I'm generally the 'I don't know guy.'" This is your shield. You hold it up to protect yourself from possible blunders. If beer, football and racetrack odds were your only interests, you wouldn't be posting here.

Laughing at

...people with no qualifications and flawed reasoning think they can explain reality after reading some shit on line, or watching youtube. :wink: — Tom Storm

is like laughing at an infant learning to walk. I try to cheer on the commoner who dares talk back to a snotty academic who, aside from stopping to get his shoes shined, refuses to make eye contact with anyone lacking advanced degrees from an Ivy League school. Leonard Susskind, a brilliant physicist who won an important debate with Stephen Hawking, worked for years as a plumber.

I'm an example of a no-degree commoner who scours Wikipedia, speed-reads shit online, watches YouTube videos and then makes postings here.

The general public's absorption of top-flight thinking and ideas does lead to some whacky theories and diatribes and I, too, laugh. I don't dismiss.

I allow myself to be terrible in public.

Some of what is called metaphysics is integral to physics. — Banno

Is the above an example of physics masquerading as metaphysics, or is it an example of authentic metaphysics sharing fundamentals with physics? — ucarr

This is like asking if physics masquerades as linguistic conceptualization, or if linguistic conceptualization shares fundamentals with physics. Of course, the answer is that these are not separate, potentially overlapping domains. Rather, the former is the pre -condition for the latter. There can be no physics without linguistic conceptualization, and there can be no physics without metaphysics as its condition of possibility. — Joshs

You and Banno are telling me Kant, no less than Einstein, was a physicist. From this we understand language is an integral component of physics, and thus our thoughts possess materiality no less than the mountains and rivers surrounding us. Experimental results showing inescapable entanglement of observer and observed, with macro-scale dimensions of super-atomic universe stabilizing super-position of the wave function into discreteness, confirm the interweave. This is simultaneously confirmation of Logos in the Neo-Platonic and Christian senses. Thus the miracles of Jesus, sinless practitioner of Logos, are scientifically verifiable phenomena.

Much hinges upon the interweave positing language as physics and vice versa.

...the answer is that these are not separate, potentially overlapping domains. Rather, the former is the pre -condition for the latter. There can be no physics without linguistic conceptualization, and there can be no physics without metaphysics as its condition of possibility. — Joshs

It could be that the differential between your perception and mine is the time element. Let's remove the time differential from your perception> the former is the pre -condition of the latter. No. Metaphysics is neither existentially nor temporally prior to physics. Priority herein is an artificial separation caused by the (apparent) stabilization effect of super-atomic physical scale.

Maybe I'm herein looking at an essential function of time> spatial separation such that a four-dimensional matrix, acted upon by time, gets its dimensional extensions segregated into the discrete physical_material objects of our three-dimensional reality.

Existence and Essence entangle each other. Soul is the integral of their co-functionality.

This is like asking if physics masquerades as linguistic conceptualization, or if linguistic conceptualization shares fundamentals with physics. Of course, the answer is that these are not separate, potentially overlapping domains. Rather, the former is the pre -condition for the latter. Therencan be no physics without linguistic conceptualization, and there can be no physics without metaphysics mad it’s condition of possibility. — Joshs

If you're saying metaphysical physics is the necessary pre-condition for physical physics, then how do you explain away the physical brain observing the physical earth being a ground for not only the discipline of physics, but also the ground for cerebration populated by metaphysical notions?

Is this an argument that grounds existence upon language (and thus grounds language upon itself, which reflexivity is an origin ontology puzzle)? I smell the presence of idealism herein.

I do not know how you distinguish top from bottom in your analysis... — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you unfamiliar with "subordinate" and "hierarchy"?

...process philosophy puts processes at the bottom, as the foundation for, and prior to, existence. And not only that, it is processes all the way up. That's the point of process philosophy. The appearance of "an object" is just an instance of stability in a system of processes, such that there is a balance or equilibrium (symmetry perhaps), of processes. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have the impression process philosophy assigns premium value to motion_dynamism_change. Regarding these three, I don't care if they're physical or metaphysical, in either case they populate a continuum of existence.

Your approach defeats your proposed purpose of "rationality" by causing contradiction. If it is the case, that we can only talk about existent things, and because of this you are inclined to define the non-existent as existent, so that you can talk about non-existence, then your approach is producing contradiction. You need to change your approach, and allow yourself to talk about non-existent things as well as existent things, to avoid this contradiction which you have just forced onto yourself. This means that you need to redefine "exist", to allow that we talk about non-existent things as well, because you find yourself inclined to talk about nonexistence. — Metaphysician Undercover

In your last sentence above, you do exactly what you fault me for doing: creating a contradiction in order to be able to talk about non-existence. I was doing so intentionally. I'm not sure you were.

This is a good example of the deficiency in your approach. You create a vicious circle between consciousness and existence, which traps you, and incapacitates you from understanding. That's what happens if you define one term (consciousness) with reference to another (existence), then turn around and invert this by defining the latter (existence) with reference to the former (consciousness). — Metaphysician Undercover

Cite me an example of consciousness in the absence of existence. You're the one trapped in contradiction. The reasons for this I've already articulated in my post above yours.

...the better way to proceed is to use increasingly broad (more general) terms, always assigning logical priority to the broader term. So for example, we can say "human being" is defined with "mammal", which is defined with "animal", which is defined with "living", and then "existing". In this way we do not get a vicious circle. And we can avoid an infinite regress by moving to substantiate, that is, to make reference to individuals. — Metaphysician Undercover

Throughout our conversation, you've been acting in violation of your dictum above. Notice how you ascribe highest logical priority to "existence." When you deny existence-in-process ( a denial of existence itself), you destroy the individuals to whom you try to make reference.

When you claim dynamic processes that culminate in existing things are non-existent, your make confetti out of process philosophy, a philosophy that gives centrality to processes.

Since things, or objects, are what we attribute "existence" — Metaphysician Undercover

You're baking a cake. When you do this, are you claiming that all of what baking a cake entails is non-existent?

Since things, or objects, are what we attribute "existence" to, then form this perspective there is activity which is prior to existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your parents conceived you. Does process philosophy say that, before your birth, your parents and your conception were non-existent? If this is the position of process philosophy, I claim it has done away with much of (if not all of) causation (and causality). Following from this, how can objects come into existence in the terms of process philosophy if the means of creation of objects are non-existent?

If you replace "existence" with "end result" I think your position becomes more tenable.

By way of summary of what I have said:

Some of what is called metaphysics is just nonsense.
Some of what is called metaphysics is integral to physics.
Some of what is called metaphysics has been clearly defined, by Popper, Watkins, etc, according to it's logical structure.
So, some of what has been called metaphysics is legitimate, some not. — Banno

Do you agree that philosophy has an interest in distilling those attributes common to all types of metaphysics deemed valid? This interest strives toward defining metaphysics in terms of broadest generality.

Some of what is called metaphysics is integral to physics. — Banno

Is the above an example of physics masquerading as metaphysics, or is it an example of authentic metaphysics sharing fundamentals with physics?

Wikipedia - Process philosophy - also ontology of becoming, or processism is an approach to philosophy that identifies processes, changes, or shifting relationships as the only true elements of the ordinary, everyday real world. It treats other real elements (examples: enduring physical objects, thoughts) as abstractions from, or ontological dependents on, processes. — ucarr

This is poorly written. If processes are the only elements of the real world, then there is no such "other real elements. Someone made a mistake writing that Wikipedia piece, and you are running away with the mistake. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I read the Wikipedia definition above, it claims that process (a fluid, dynamical phenomenon) is the principal operator in Process philosophy. Other operators, such as material objects and thoughts, although objectively real, hold subordinate positions of importance beneath processes. It doesn't claim processes are the only elements of the real world. Rather, the claim says there is a hierarchy with processes at the top. Are you denouncing this hierarchical definition?

I can't see how you can conceive of a small volume with unlimited application. That seems incoherent. As a matter of fact, i can't see how you would conceive of anything having unlimited application. That in itself appears incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover

Suppose that non-existence = unspecifiably small volume of unlimited application. — ucarr

My weird language above, as definition of non-existence, exists because I'm contorting it into something that does exist in order to talk about non-existence with a semblance of rationality. When trying to talk about something non-existent, we're thrown into the paradoxical land of talking about non-existence as an existing thing.

Predetermination is not existence. You might like to claim some sort of principle like, only something existing could predetermine, but I think the proper position is that only something actual could act to predetermine, as cause. And it is not necessary that an act is an existent. I think that is the point of process philosophy. — Metaphysician Undercover

Whenever I see a claim of non-existence, I'm reminded of the question "Why is there not nothing?" My answer to the questioner is "Because you exist." This is a way of saying ontology has a special problem of perspective. This problem of perspective is rooted in the fact that existence is an all-encompassing ground WRT consciousness. Query presupposes consciousness, and consciousness presupposes existence. Existence, when it queries "Why existence?" presupposes itself in the asking of the question, which presupposes the ground for asking the question i.e., existence.

The question is a prompt for entering the fast lane to circular reasoning. It demonstrates the fact that WRT consciousness, existence is a closed loop.

Speaking linguistically, you cannot claim something doesn't exist because, in making the claim, you posit the existence of the thing denied existence. Coming from another direction, when you deny the existence of something, that denial contradicts itself.

All of this folderol is a way of saying conscious beings cannot think themselves out of existence, nor can they think material objects out of existence.

When you say "Predetermination is not existence." I suppose you want to say something parallel to saying "Unicorns don't exist." Unicorns do exist as thoughts, as proven by the denial.

Overarching all of this verbiage is the fact, as I believe, there is gravitational attraction between thoughts and the material objects they conceptualize. This claim leads into a separate, major topic I won't presently elaborate further.

Well, generally physics rests upon the assumption that the natural world can be understood and that reality is physicalist in origin — Tom Storm

Since the world can be understood through a lens either physicalist or non-physicalist, and moreover, since the practice of (western) academic physics does not preclude a non-physicalist commitment (I'm guessing there are physicists who are also Christians), physicalist metaphysics should not be categorically ascribed to academic physics. It might be true that a professional physicist, if s/he also be in possession of a philosophical turn of mind, stands best poised to assess effectively the intricate interweave of physics_metaphysics.

Note how "metaphysics," in making its approach towards meaning, incorporates "physics."

Also note how metaphysics, epistemology and consciousness studies are currently grappling with the experience of and conception of matter.

What is matter? What is physical? What is the interweave of matter and consciousness? These are questions very much intestate.

If you're not interested in QM, then your lens for viewing physicalism is probably Newtonian, and thus your POV predates the 20th century.

I can't see how you can conceive of a small volume with unlimited application. That seems incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover

You quote me incorrectly. Below is a correct rendering of the quote.

Suppose that non-existence = unspecifiably small volume of unlimited application. — ucarr

I'm trying to render "non-existent" with a counterpart definition using language that can be modulated, which is to say, devise a version of "non-existent" that can be manipulated with a greater measure of precision. I expect to use this enhancement in the near future.

"Unlimited application means something unspecifiably small is such in all of its conceivable attributes (and beyond).

... — Banno

what metaphysics is legitimate? — Banno

we might proceed by having a discussion about the definition of metaphysics. And then we would be doing philosophy. — Banno

...not all metaphysics is legitimate. — Banno

Your above statements are not intelligible unless one assumes (the limitations of verbal language acknowledged) they're predicated upon your commitment to the notion of a broadly inclusive set-of-varieties-of-metaphysics (some valid, some not) being valid.

Naturalism is a counterpart to theism. — Tom Storm

The Natural and the Supernatural, being related by contrast (a complicated affair) don't strongly suggest themselves to me as being counterparts.

“… God could understand his language and his thoughts about the world, apart from any interaction with the world. (Joseph Rouse)
— Joshs

...many naturalists still implicitly understand science as aiming to take God's place. — Joshs

If God understands the world apart from any interaction with it and, if many naturalists implicitly understand science as aiming to take God's place, then the latter statement leads us to conclude naturalists have a wrong understanding of science. The scientist, unlike God and the naturalist, interacts closely with nature.

↪ucarr Isn't the issue here that no one really avoids metaphysics, no matter what position you hold? — Tom Storm

If you make this claim aboard the premise that physics_metaphysics are associates with considerable measure of reciprocity of grounding functions and attributes, then yes. I make this stipulation because, as I understand it, the upshot of this discussion-within-a-discussion concerns the particularities of the interrelationship of physics_metaphysics.

The claim that reality is described by the 'laws of physics' is itself a metaphysical claim. — Tom Storm

I can use your above claim as an example of reciprocity between physics_metaphysics; metaphysics claims existence of physical laws >< physical things exhibit public, measurable and repeatable patterns of behavior.

Some people believe, probably because they are rooted the Western physicalist/naturalist tradition, that science has no metaphysical presuppositions. — Tom Storm

If there's no definitive causal relationship between metaphysics and physics, such that metaphysics is an epiphenomenon of physics, or, perhaps, vice-versa, then argumentation about precedence does not automatically lead to the conclusion metaphysics is the ground of science, a claim the not-physicalists seem to be implying here.

Also, do you really need to have any metaphysical commitments in order to conduct scientific research? Can't you just smash some atoms together and see what happens?

To really grasp the nature of metaphysics and its role in our lives is to realize that , when it comes down to it, science also is nothing but a bunch of folk sharing just-so stories after smoking a crack pipe
— Joshs

When they're explaining their theories, sure. But they're also comparing their just-so stories with each other and providing experiments which support the stories in a way which is very appealing to the critical mind. Do metaphysicians have anything comparable? — coolazice

:up:

Predetermination is not existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

Suppose that non-existence = unspecifiably small volume of unlimited application.

Consider: Predetermination is not existence. The infinitive "to be" gives us an equal sign. The negation gives us existence unspecifiably small in volume of unlimited application.

In the absence of existence, what we have here is an esoteric a priori concept> Predetermination is not existence.

Wikipedia - Process philosophy - also ontology of becoming, or processism is an approach to philosophy that identifies processes, changes, or shifting relationships as the only true elements of the ordinary, everyday real world. It treats other real elements (examples: enduring physical objects, thoughts) as abstractions from, or ontological dependents on, processes. In opposition to the classical view of change as illusory (as argued by Parmenides) or accidental (as argued by Aristotle), process philosophy posits transient occasions of change or becoming as the only fundamental things of the ordinary everyday real world.

Specifically considering - "It treats other real elements (examples: enduring physical objects, thoughts) as abstractions from, or ontological dependents on, processes."

If we take this definition from Wikipedia and link it to Metaphysician Undercover's argument herein presented, then we have a metaphysics as a kind of fluid dynamics.

In this ontological fluid dynamics, however, the process precedes the thing processed. That's predetermination. (Notice how Wikipedia Process philosophy considers “thoughts” real, something Metaphysician Undercover denies with “Predetermination is not existence.”)

It then follows that dynamical processing is an axiomatic ground of evolving things.

From here it follows that existing things pop into existence as decreed by seminal utterance of esoteric Divine Will.

Why is this so? It is so because> Predetermination is not existence.

In short, the ground of reality is (non-existent) language. This claim Venn diagrams with the ontological dualism of Plato (and later of Berkeley).

Process Ontology (per Metaphysician Undercover) says existence is grounded in non-existent, a priori concepts dynamically processing existing things.

Physicalism says existence is grounded in a posteriori concepts derived from practical interaction with existing things. Moreover, physicalism acknowledges that the ground of existence precedes and transcends analysis and therefore that knowledge is a posterior to existence, or, as Sartre proclaimed, “Existence precedes essence.”

I think people often retrofit foundations and presuppositions - to explain things to themselves and others. — Tom Storm

No doubt of this on my part.

I'm arguing that our Rosetta Stone of knowledge, the axiom, gets most directly approached by science, not metaphysics. This I claim because science is hands-on regarding existing things within our empirically experienced, phenomenal world.

And that's why I'm giving a :up: to Raul for

Ok, next time you get sick don't rely on the science of medicine, don't go to hospitals, you can do a lot of metaphysics, something like 1 hour of metaphysics in the morning and another 1 hour in the evening and I'm sure you will recover quickly... well... you could get a huge headache as side effect :-)

Would be funny to show your sentence to Hipocrate... you tell him, look all the progress made by science in medicine is ridiculous, we keep curing and treating people the same way you did 2400 years ago...
Same applies to engineering, physics, astronomy, etc.............. — Raul

There's a tight interweave binding philosophy_science, however, in the world of everyday experience, such as sickness, the difference between philosophy practitioner and medical science practitioner is glaring.

To the extent that we can separate the scientific and the philosophical, which blur into each other in so many ways, — Joshs

This is my central point of reference in our discussion. The interweave of philosophy_science, acting as a control that modulates my range of argumentation, either pro or con WRT oneupmanship science/philosophy, keeps me aimed on the win_win of a good fight raising all boats.

What you’re describing isnt science, it’s scientism, which assumes that science, through its methods, has a privileged access to empirical reality. — Joshs

I get that scientific researchers, like all others, bring personal POVs to their methodologies and findings thereof. Is effective science good science? It tries not to be. Conversely, good philosophy tries to find the good, oftentimes equated with "truth."

You're mid-air on a plane whose engines have died. Soaring over rocky, mountainous terrain devoid of flora, you face a philosopher and a scientist, both also on the nosediving plane. The philosopher says, "On the basis of cerebration, I think this parachute I've constructed will work." The scientist says, "On the basis of repeated, aerodynamic testing, I know this parachute will work." After visually inspecting the two parachutes, you see no apparent similarities of design or function. Due to limited supplies, you can only take one parachute. Will you take a parachute? If so, which one?

Science has no privileged access to empirical reality. What science does have is a principle of direct access to empirical reality. When the savvy philosopher reads up on cutting edge, scientific methodology, s/he accesses the work done by others in service of philosophical ruminations in route to a narration of same. Cerebration. Books. It isn't hands on. It isn't in the field. The philosopher could do these things. In choosing not to do these things, the seeker manifests as philosopher. If the seeker chooses to do these things, the seeker manifests as scientist.

If an empirical researcher in psychology or biology has not assimilated
the most advanced thinking available in philosophy they will simply be reinventing the wheel. This is what most of todays sciences are doing now. They are regurgitating older insights of philosophy using their own specialized vocabulary. — Joshs

By arguing philosophy is the source of which science is a tributary, you deny that philosophy is an epiphenomenon of science. Against this you might argue that philosophers of antiquity, long before emergence of modern science, walked in the shoes of the scientist. This reminds us that ancient academics, before the specialization of modern times, were more broadly inclusive.

In making this denial, you deposit yourself within the camp of ontological dualism. Therein, you stand philosophy alongside the seminal utterances of a supernatural God. In the beginning was the word. And the word mandates our natural world of physical reality. Continuing in this vein, the scientist, acting under the suasion of Logos, the divine word, takes hold of presuppositional essences that decree physical likenesses. These likenesses, as explained by Plato, come to be held within the imperfect hands of human.

Existence precedes essence.
— ucarr

Not really. When a thing comes into existence it must be already predetermined what it will be, or else there would just be randomness, consequently no thing, as a thing has structure. Therefore a thing's essence, (what it will be), must precede its existence, (that it is). — Metaphysician Undercover

Some interesting puzzles of perspective here.

When a thing comes into existence it must be already predetermined what it will be — Metaphysician Undercover

Here you describe a thing coming into existence already predetermined what it will be.... Predetermination of what it will be IS an existence so, coming into existence is voided by this language. Also, how does predetermination of what will be come into existence? Infinite regress. Why? When you try to speak analytically regarding existing things, you plunge into infinite regress. This is why useful analyses begin with axioms.

or else there would just be randomness, consequently no thing, as a thing has structure. — Metaphysician Undercover

As above, "randomness" is an existing thing. Your language indicates this: ...there would just be randomness...

I would argue instead that science was and always will be merely an applied , conventionalized form of philosophical inquiry. — Joshs

I grant that the scope of philosophy encompasses science, thus making the latter conceivable as a sub-division of the former. However, evidence contrary to the independence of scientific philosophy comes in the form of Aristotle's erroneous science postulations, dismissed by scientists more than a thousand years ago. I suspect much of scientific philosophy, without science, would continue in the vein of Aristotle. If not, then such a scientific philosopher, being scientifically valid, by my appraisal, has left the philosophical field and entered into the scientific field. The methodology of science has a baked-in practicality not borne by philosophy.

To claim essence precedes existence is ontological dualism. Matter, energy and phenomena as decreed by seminal utterance evokes the voice of God. Going the opposite way, knowledge becomes an asymptotic accretion, approaching what is. The inexpressibility of what is, Wittgenstein's silence, is how universe should be, an inexpressibly large volume of possibilities rendering all origin stories mythic.

All ideas rest on foundations and pre-suppositions. — Tom Storm

This claim approaches the Rosetta Stone of knowledge: the axiom. Existence precedes essence. I believe Sartre is correct in making this claim because when you get down to the ground of philosophy and science both, random, unsupported assumption as a necessary starting point for acquisition of knowledge is necessary. Neither philosophy nor science has any independence from axiom. Today, as during antiquity, all humanity can say in response to existence-as-existence is "axiom."

A philosophy is to a grammar as a science is to a library. IMO as complementaries, while the latter without the former is unintelligible (or less intelligible than formulating its problems requires), the former without the latter is ineffable (or less effable than clearly expressing it requires). — 180 Proof

As to precedence, is the face-off of philosophy_science really a wash, as your statement implies?

Existence, in the context of your quote directly above, takes form as grammar, the existing thing. You can analyze it, thus making it intelligible, except for the stark fact of its existence, which you have to take for granted, which is the mystery of creation. Thus arises the question: who sources whom? Does intelligibility source itself, with existing things (including itself) popping into existence henceforth? Don't we, like Arthur C. Clarke, know that human approaches monolith (of ancient civilization) with sensory input sans intelligence? No. Existence precedes essence. Our space adventurer didn't get to the planet of the ancient civilization until several millennia later and, even then, was only an animal under observation and preservation within a cage.

To claim essence precedes existence (something you don't do) is ontological dualism. To claim the reverse is ontological mystery.

How would you define ‘fares better’? If you want the next best thing to a crystal ball reveal of the future of the sciences, look to the leading edge of contemporary philosophy. This has always been the case. Philosophy has always taken the lead in sketching out the basis of new developments in the sciences, offer a century ahead of time. — Joshs

I align with Sartre regarding existence preceding essence.

I don't see how such a statement can be true. Aristotle's The Physics preceded Isaac Newton's Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica by nearly two millennia withoit anticipating any of the latter's significant breakthroughs or findings. — 180 Proof

Through science I see that existence, not thought, is the ground of reality.

That scientist and philosopher alike are essential to understanding the world, I grant you.

By fare better I mean that within the interweave of science and philosophy, hands on experimentation and practical vetting count for more than conversation and literature. The two disciplines are each of such complexity and difficulty as to compel specialization in one or the other. Of the two I think science can better stand alone. Banish the scientist from all contact with philosophy and I think the discipline will continue along its merry way without much faltering. As for the reverse, philosophy sans science is like a race car without an engine. No, the bailiwick of science is What is Life? whereas the bailiwick of philosophy is What is good life? When the philosopher correctly foresees the way forward for science such person walks in the shoes of the scientist.

Whereas the sciences concern possible models for experimentally explaining transformations among 'aspects of nature', metaphysics, to my mind, concerns the concept – rational speculation – of 'nature as a whole' that necessarily encompasses the most rigorous findings of the sciences as well as all other human practices and non-human events/processes. Statements in metaphysics are paradigmatic and presuuppositional, not theoretical or propositional; (ontological) interpretations of the latter are only symptomatic – insightful though still speculative – of the former (e.g. MWI, mediocrity principle). — 180 Proof

Good amendments - metaphysics makes no propositions? - I do, however, give science one up from philosophy because axioms are better vetted when subject to practical examination as opposed to vetted when subject to cerebration; real life is more strange than what we can conceive.

I would argue instead that science was and always will be merely an applied , conventionalized form of philosophical inquiry. Any substantial development in scientific understanding of the world relies on a shift in metaphysical presuppositions grounding empirical explanation. The philosophical clarification does come later , it is the precondition for the intelligibility and advance of a science. — Joshs

I agree with much of this. There's a tight interweave between science and philosophy. I do think science without philosophy fares better than the reverse.

:up:

I'm not saying he was a metaphysician, but Nietzsche endures, in part, because he was a good storyteller.