Well, it's not my belief but rather me interpreting others' stances and trying to put them into words. (I'd rather say -- from each according to their ability...)

I'm not sure it's the taxes that matter, at large, as much as people perceiving another person as somehow "contributing", whatever that entails. Having an income is seen as "responsible", and so is a marker for whether someone is really disabled vs. someone who can "tough it out" or is "too sensitive". The other marker usually being having a family and children.

Is disability a social construction? Is there a coherent way to define disability at all? — Banno

So going along with this question -- I'm suggesting that "disability" is largely a social construct based around socially enforced expectations of what an adult ought do: work being the obvious bare-minimum whereby even if someone doesn't accept you you have the ability to tell them to fuck off because you can take care of yourself even if they remain ignorant about the facts of disability.

Those without such autarky are usually who are meant, and that's why pity is frequently offered -- even if it is not desired. (for instance I have no desire for anyone's pity, or any judgment for that matter; I'd much rather be able to take care of myself with reasonable accommodations)

Autarky and work and social expectations of adulthood all look like social structures to me -- so those who are un-able to fit within those molds are given accommodations as seen fit, but they have to argue that they are the exception based on this way of understanding.

Now the Americans with Disabilities Act requires certain things of public buildings like ramps and wheel-chair accessibility and such. So that requirement on others to accommodate isn't absent current practices. But I think it is still largely fought for on the basis of sympathy for the afflicted, and means-testing for the not-afflicted-enough-to-warrant-sympathy.

So I can see the desire to highlight the social practices around disability, regardless of the medical component of disability. Basically I could see still addressing abilities -- for those so distressed -- medically while acknowledging there is also a social dimension (and one that's much larger than the medical concept of disability -- with its norms of the body -- suggests)

Yeah, that's what I meant.

EDIT: Yes to your question. I meant "downswing" -- I was thinking of the metaphor that depression comes in waves, so "dive" came to mind because we dive into the water.

I'm sorry to hear. I often wonder if I could go through another deep dive these days since it's been so long. I'm not sure where to go from there -- though then that seems to be indicative of the mood. If we knew what to do to fix it then obviously we'd do it, but thus far...

Thanks :).

Alas, the OP's author has left us...

Is there a defensibly “normal” human body? — Banno

No. Though we can still have a norm that functions socially like this.

Nor mind, for that matter, which I'd include with "the body" in terms of the medical model. So a person with depression is not able to want in the manner seen as not-depressive, though with training can be taught to act as if not depressed to fit in with the social expectations of people.

Interesting note there for similarity in terms of ability: a common symptom of depression is feelings of worthlessness or being a burden upon others. Others are able to care for the unable -- in this case largely defined by the economic model. Those with income are not a burden, those without it, or who "need" government assistance to live are the social burdens of the world. Hence the emphasis on curing or restoring ability to some norm, in this case the ability to pull a paycheck large enough to sustain oneself and not have to ask for "handouts", as they're often called by those not-disabled.

Which in a way shows that there's a connection here between body and sociality -- yes, the body feels worthless (mind), and the social world reinforces those feelings by setting up a norm by which to divide the providers from the feeders, the earners from the dependents, the worthwhile from the worthless.

It was Mary Midgley, and here's @Banno's thread on it: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/11175/philosophical-plumbing-mary-midgley/p1

do you have a better alternative to explaining the bizarre death sentence that "the 11" gave him? What was Socrates trying to accomplish? — ProtagoranSocratist

I take him at his word in the apology. He's a gadfly trying to move the city towards a healthy way of life.

And now, Athenians, I am not going to argue for my own sake, as you may think, but for yours, that you may not sin against the God by condemning me, who am his gift to you. For if you kill me you will not easily find a successor to me, who, if I may use such a ludicrous figure of speech, am a sort of gadfly, given to the state by God; and the state is a great and noble steed who is tardy in his motions owing to his very size, and requires to be stirred into life. I am that gadfly which God has attached to the state, and all day long and in all places am always fastening upon you, arousing and persuading and reproaching you. You will not easily find another like me, and therefore I would advise you to spare me. I dare say that you may feel out of temper (like a person who is suddenly awakened from sleep), and you think that you might easily strike me dead as Anytus advises, and then you would sleep on for the remainder of your lives, unless God in his care of you sent you another gadfly. When I say that I am given to you by God, the proof of my mission is this:—if I had been like other men, I should not have neglected all my own concerns or patiently seen the neglect of them during all these years, and have been doing yours, coming to you individually like a father or elder brother, exhorting you to regard virtue; such conduct, I say, would be unlike human nature. If I had gained anything, or if my exhortations had been paid, there would have been some sense in my doing so; but now, as you will perceive, not even the impudence of my accusers dares to say that I have ever exacted or sought pay of any one; of that they have no witness. And I have a sufficient witness to the truth of what I say—my poverty. — Plato, Apology

I think the world, in general, is pretty bad overall. I'm not so sure about "worse" as much as I've become more knowledgeable about how the world works.

But what has gotten better is my ability to live with depression, and that's made a huge difference in my life satisfaction.

A large portion of the fruitless arguments here on the forum result from lack of metaphysical clarity. — T Clark

How do we achieve or pursue metaphysical clarity?

It's interesting to know also that "Metaphysics" isn't even a precise way to label his book, it's terminology after the fact. — ProtagoranSocratist

Yup. That much is good to note, I think, because it shows how Aristotle isn't the arbiter of metaphysics, but rather the term was developed over time and became to mean something.

In the name of simplicity: I agree with you!

Now what?

So @Wayfarer is not committing the genetic fallacy by referencing Aristotle.

I understand that instinct, but to reject Aristotle on the subject while comparing him to cartoons is to misunderstand the subject.

It's simple until it is not simple :D

I think it's not so easy to define, but I agree with your assertion that metaphysics is about the nature of reality.

"Being qua being" would be the Aristotelian approach, as I understand his metaphysics.

I suppose really I just want to highlight that even giving a suggestion for a starting point -- be it a quick and easy definition or a reference to a historical text -- is the sort of thing which metaphysics can question, which is why it's hard to define.

He is engaging and really funny, though I have to note that his history is almost more of a joke book than a proper history of philosophy. It says true things about the ancients, but it skips over the medievals and bastardizes the German philosophy (in an albeit funny way).

My reason for responding to @Clarendon was because I thought Clarendon might be committing the same fallacy he's accusing @Wayfarer of, but not noticing it because it has been used for less time.

I.e. to ascribe a real meaning to "metaphysics" such that one can say "That's not how to understand 'understand metaphysics" is to simply point to a different body of texts that define it differently, rather than to argue for why that's the better way.

Given my various stances on metaphysics I've said it's a similar bubble-popping method that I'm employing.

That Aristotle's work so named is concerned with similar enough things that starting with Aristotle isn't bad.

It's a serious question. What is the way to understand what 'metaphysics' means?

I am saying that it is not the way to understand what 'metaphysics' means. — Clarendon

What is the way to understand what 'metaphysics' means? Listen to @Clarendon says on it?

I'm still struggling slowly through "Question and Answer". — Jamal

Oh yes much more can be said on each of the sections. I sort of jumped ahead because the text started to flow, but in that way where I'm just seeing one pattern -- i.e. if something didn't quite click I let it go to keep going and move with the thoughts as I was perceiving them.

Just noting it as a mark for where we're at roughly. (I've found myself rereading each of the sections multiple times so far in our reading group and never regretting the reread like it was a waste of time. the text is very dense, in the good way)

(In no way equating marriage to murder, btw. :grin: ) — javra

Well, not today at least. There are times...

That said, again, my interest here is in what Epicurus himself taught.

I'm interested in that too. And in helping people to understand the philosophy generally. I had mistaken your counters to @180 Proof for what they are.

But

I can concede there. Still, improper expressions can all too easily lead to improper interpretations and the misinformation that can then follow. I do like your general rendition of Epicureanism, though. — javra

Hard to argue with that, isn't it? :D Thank you.

Whether the rendition is correct: I know more needs to be said, which is why I began with the tripartite theory of desire, but the down-and-dirty version of what is good and what is bad -- which the philosophy itself sort of doesn't pursue at all -- made sense to me. It's not like it's easy to summarize these ancient philosophies so they're digestible.

As to the quote you presented, please notice that I did not state that "romantic love always leads to unnecessary pains" or something similar whereby it is "a bad/wrong onto itself", but that it is best shunned because in most cases, aka typically, it does — javra

Sure, makes sense. Though I'd put it that this was the man speaking more than the philosophy -- yes, Epicurus the man cautioned against it. But the Epicureans calmly went about doing it anyways as evidenced by the continuity of the texts from Epicurus' time to Cicero and Lucretius. How to explain that?

For one thing, I don't agree with Epicurus that everyone ought to be an ascetic like he was. For starters, just because most cases of romantic love lead to pains that would not have otherwise occurred does not to me entail that therefore romantic love ought to be shunned by one and all as a form of wisdom. — javra

Is the part that made me think so, along with the other two examples you meant to counter @180 Proof's summary with.

It occurs to me that we may just be disagreeing on what constitutes a good enough summary -- I read your examples as something which were counter to Epicureanism in addition to @180 Proof's rendition, but is that wrong? You're disagreeing with Epicurus, in one sense of with the man himself, and you're disagreeing with 180, in the sense that his rendition is incorrect?

But, in point of fact, in “not really” concluding that you are then concluding that peer-reviewed quotes such as this with scholarly references are erroneous.

Epicurus actively recommended against passionate love and believed it best to avoid marriage altogether. He viewed recreational sex as a natural, but not necessary, desire that should be generally avoided.[38]
— https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epicureanism#Ethics — javra

I do not think that scholarly reference is erroneous. That's why I said:

If it be a romantic love in the sense of Romanticism -- full of pathos and self-justifying -- then that sort of love I think Epicureanism is opposed to. But Epicureans did marry and have children, even if The Master did not. So there must be a kind of sexual love that was generally deemed as OK. Even if there be a honeymoon phase that fades away -- that's only natural. — Moliere

Yes, there's a kind of love Epicurus cautions against. No, that does not mean that marriage is a bad unto itself.

Rather it's a natural, unnecessary desire -- Epicurus didn't want to marry, but that does not then mean that marriage is bad.

I then take it that you find Epicurus wrong in his stance that romantic ("passionate") love, and marriage, are to be generally shunned. — javra

Not really -- I'm giving an exposition of what I think a reasonable Epicurean response to your example. As in Epicurus wouldn't say "Do not marry", but would instead contextualize your action back to why you're doing what you're doing. Romantic love is not to be generally shunned -- it's not a bad unto itself. It depends upon why you're motivated towards it.

If it be a romantic love in the sense of Romanticism -- full of pathos and self-justifying -- then that sort of love I think Epicureanism is opposed to. But Epicureans did marry and have children, even if The Master did not. So there must be a kind of sexual love that was generally deemed as OK. Even if there be a honeymoon phase that fades away -- that's only natural.

You seem inclined to defend and uphold Epicurus's doctrine. — javra

I'm willing to play the apologist in order to increase understanding.

OK Can you then comment on your own stance as regards romantic love being a general wrong as per Epicurus's convictions?

Sure.

The outline of desire to which @180 Proof wrote needs further specification to address why, though.

There are three kinds of desires: the fulfillable and the unfulfillable, and that which falls in-between. Or another way to put the same categories: the natural and necessary, the unsatisfiable, and the natural and unnecessary desires.

Romantic love in this division falls under "natural and unnecessary"; one may live a content life without it, and one may live a content life with it -- the important part is to live a content life. Similarly so with the marathon runner: If someone is taking on the pains to run marathons out of the pleasure of running a marathon then there's nothing wrong with pursuing a natural, unnecessary pleasure (unnecessary here because one need not run marathons to live a content life). What would be in error, though, would be to run marathons out of a fear of death because no matter what you do you'll die, and then the entire time you're here all you did was spend time pursing that fear.

To put that latter part in terms of the lover: imagine the person who never settles down because every real person doesn't satisfy them from the vantage of "The One" -- when, really, there is no "The One", there's a relationship you can build with someone who wants similar things out of their life.

It's not that we must avoid pains -- it's that we shouldn't be the cause of our own mental anguish; the pains aren't so bad as they stand, and the pleasures are not so alluring that we need to punish ourselves for not obtaining them.

OK, I don't though. For one thing, I don't agree with Epicurus that everyone ought to be an ascetic like he was. — javra

I want to mark a distinction here: @180 Proof's description of the good/bad pleasures is accurate to Epicureanism is what I mean -- as in, descriptively, this is what Epicurus says are the good/bad pleasures in a rough-and-ready way.

With your examples what I'm saying is that the Epicurean ethic can handle them. So with:

For starters, just because most cases of romantic love lead to pains that would not have otherwise occurred does not to me entail that therefore romantic love ought to be shunned by one and all as a form of wisdom.

And your example of the marathon runner, and your example of the altruistic firefighter.

It's not that all marathon runners, firefighters, or lovers are bad. It's the ones who run marathons for glory, heroes that save people for praise, and lovers that possess their object of love that the Epicurean philosophy is aiming at.

So it's not that marathons are bad -- it's the character of the person who is running marathons in order to achieve immortality that's causing themself to be miserable.

Maybe this is all differences of opinion. So be it then.

Oh, of course it does in some way, though we can still offer reasons and such for the opinions and attempt to pursue what's good, or at least enjoy reflecting for awhile.

But my post was in direct relation to how Epicureanism was outlined by 180 Proof. And with that description I yet disagree. — javra

I thought his summation good enough, basically -- in a rough and dirty way, sure that's what the bad pleasures are, and the good pleasure is ataraxia and aponia, like the link he linked says.

I'd disagree with that link in marking a distinction between Epicureanism and Hedonism -- but I understand the distinction he's drawing (I'd just call them two types of hedonism)


Also, your post gave me an in to laying out a bit on Epicureanism -- I had been thinking about what to say yours was just the first comment that finally sparked words.

Going by Epicurus's thoughts as just outlined by you, running marathons would then be bad, this because they result in increased unnecessary pain. As does weightlifting, and a good number of other human activities often deemed to be eudemonia-increasing. The altruism to running into a house on fire and thereby risking grave unnecessary pain (to not even get into the risk of mutilation and death) so as to rescue another's life would then be bad and hence unethical? — javra

That's not quite right.

Something that's difficult to understand with ancient ethics is we have a tendency to want to classify an act as good or bad, but these ancient ethics don't address the goodness and badness of acts in the way modern moral philosophy often does. For Epicurus:

No pleasure is a bad thing in itself, but some pleasures are only obtainable at the cost of excessive troubles. — Diogenes Laertius, Epicurus' Principle doctrines

to respond to your example of training for a marathon. (so it'd depend upon how much anxiety a person is burdened with in training for the marathon -- if they are tranquil and accepting of the pain then no evil is found in training and running a marathon)

For saving someone in a burning building: were you to do it because of anxiety that you would not be perceived as altruistic (even if just by yourself or before God) then that'd be bad, but if you were to do it because you have a natural kinship towards other human beings and no fear of death then ataraxia is still achieved.

That is, just as there aren't good/bad acts for Epicurus in particular there are no heroic acts one must strive towards. None of us are Odysseus and Homer is a storyteller more than a doctor: surely it's good that someone else was spared pain, and surely it's good to care for our fellow man, because this is what it means to live a good life.

But whether a particular act in a circumstance is good or evil -- as if there were some consequentialist calculus that tells us the right action to take as an individual at a given moment -- just isn't what the ethic is driving at, and is more contextual than asking after whether a particular act just is good or bad because of some rule.

Nice exposition of Heidegger's relevance to this text.

And making sense of why Adorno is tying the question to the answer: i.e. one could assert that Heidegger's opening of the question is the work, whereas Adorno wants to put that line of thought to rest in noting that for philosophy the question asked often is already connected to the answer.

This does not mean, however, as in the
constant parroting of Kierkegaard, that the existence of the questioner
would be that truth, which searches in vain for the answer. Rather in
philosophy the authentic question almost always includes in a certain
manner its answer.

Idealism would like to drown out precisely this, to always
produce, to “deduce” its own form and if possible every content...
[But]...There can be no
judging without the understanding any more than understanding
without the judgement. This invalidates the schema, that the solution
would be the judgement, the problem the mere question, based on
understanding

Although I think he wants to target all phenomenologists including Husserl with this, just to make that explicit (not that you said otherwise), and not just Heidegger -- but Sartre, and Bergson, and anyone who might lay claim to "the things themselves" absent ratio: this being a sort of "flip side" to Hegel who claimed everything is "analytic" --- the idea goes from one to the next as any philosopher could judge -- where now by looking to the non-identical we are trying to set aside our desiderata in favor of the things where we cannot do so without some sort of ratio for the things themselves to be mediated by.

EDIT: I finished Being, Subject, Object and see I was following along with the general pattern of thinking -- he notes the difference between these thinkers there while grouping them.

Adorno is very aware of this objection, which is why in the introduction and in the lectures he emphasizes that negative dialectics rigorous, stringent, and so on. — Jamal

This theme is what I think attracted me to pursue reading Adorno, along with your and everyone else's help.

Stringency, rigor, reason -- these are things I care about and only argue against because I care about them.

And Adorno is taking up dialectics, which I've always struggled with, so it helps in my understanding there too.

I'd say that's only because we're all rats in the mindless race. It's just a part of life in the capitalist world.

I'm pretty sure that's what the university is meant to be, though it fails to live up to the ideal.

Personally I think we have a preponderance of bullshit jobs in the sense we could get rid of them without much changes in terms of economic output: Rather, the structure of jobs is there to create a moral caste system of the deserving and the undeserving based upon how much money one has so we continue to make up new occupations to have a chance at survival when we could just limit the economy to the necessities -- which we've already done before in a practical way during the pandemic -- and let people live as they want while distributing out the hours of necessary labor.

But, then, why am I bigot? Or why am I, if you prefer, speaking bigotry? — Bob Ross

I don't believe you're a bigot. I think you're a person of good character: else I wouldn't have engaged.

I'd rather say that sometimes the words we use are used by others in a manner which we wouldn't approve of -- but since we live in a social world we have to find another way to express ourselves.

Make sense? I have faith in you @Bob Ross, but the words you've used are used by others who want more than a philosophical reflection.

The people in here are trying to claim that I am a bigot or at least speaking bigotry by saying that transgenderism is bad and transitioning is immoral; but yet when it is transgender person that says it now it all of the sudden isn't bigotted. — Bob Ross

I'm not following your ending here -- I'd note that there's nothing wrong with being trans or gay for the various reasons I've stated. And I don't think it's who says what with respect to this issue -- i.e. I don't think there is a morally or factually correct stance which states that trans or gay people should not be what they are.

I suspect the reason such sentiments creeped into spiritual texts is that we are the authors of our own spiritual texts and we're as imperfect as they come: Sometimes a bigot got to pen a spiritual passage.

"Transitioning" only became a thing in the past few decades — Outlander

Supposing that's true: So what?

Can't you see the lunacy in assuming a life-changing and often permanent and irreversible procedure that hasn't had the time for any actual lifelong studies to be done is the "first, best, and only option"? — Outlander

Can't you see that the life-changing decision is truly life-changing one way or the other? That to not-transition is as life-changing as to-transition?

Yes, people have to make decisions for themselves and live with that.

No, others who have feelings elsewise about those decisions don't have much of a say in what they do, and ought not to.

Would you consider that transgender person a bigot then even though they were pro transitioning as a necessary evil? — Bob Ross

A bigot? No. They're clearly in a place of conflict. I'd only want them to feel it's OK to transition while they don't think it is.

Also, come to think of it, that transgender person I mentioned to ProtagoranSocratist agreed with me that transgenderism is caused by gender dysphoria, that it is bad, and they even went so far as to say it is immoral to transition; — Bob Ross

This is exactly the sort of thing I want to combat: it's not immoral to transition. This is a false belief passed down from an ancient world where bigoted beliefs could easily be passed on.

To consider it immoral is to hate onself if they want to transition. That's a bad ethic.

Your explanation of ‘tendencies’ seems to deploy realist semantics to convey your point; and it is tripping me up.

If humans do not share a nature, then we cannot say that there is such-and-such a way a human will tend to behave because there is no such thing in reality as a human—no? — Bob Ross

Sure we can.

Because you were saying it is eudaimonic: that’s an Aristotelian term that refers to happiness as a biproduct of realizing one’s nature; and you description of Epicurean thought seemed to imply the same thing. I think I just need to understand how you are analyzing what a nature is and then I can circle back to this. — Bob Ross

I think that's not quite right :D

I'd rather say that your response here is exactly where we're missing one another.

Epicurus follows along with Aristotle's assumptions, which is why I choose him as a foil to Aristotelian philosophy.

I think Epicurus has a point about human nature that's much more limited than what he thought, though still applicable in all cases where someone wants to live a tranquil life.

I'd say that this is still eudaimonic because once one accepts they want tranquility all the other components of character-development towards one's nature come into play.

In a sense I'd say that there is more than one nature a human can pursue, even if they contradict one another in terms of what all humans can be. (I'm still persuaded by the existentialists)

Are you saying you deny that the heart functions in a way to pump blood? I don’t understand how one could hold that: can you elaborate more? — Bob Ross

I deny that there's a teleology to an organ: once the heart stops pumping this is as natural as any other function our body undergoes. We have the capacity to pump blood with our heart, and due to natural selection we're endowed with that power, but there is no truth to our teleology -- one day all of humanity will be extinct in the same way that the heart stops pumping. There is no purpose which secures these capacities.

But that's the question, isn't it? Can excluding certain debates ever be done in a philosophical manner? — Leontiskos

I'm not sure. That's what I'm attempting at the moment, though.

There's a sense in which, sure, if I follow along with the thoughts of my own heritage, I understand the lines of thought which note differences between various sexual acts, feelings, and so forth.

I think they're all mistaken, though. Were I still religious I'd consider them abominations which desecrate the texts -- human beings being what they are, fallen, of course they'd write scripture which supports bigotry against sexual minorities.

As it is I'm of the opinion that it's the religions which need to come to terms with the world we are in, if they be peaceful. If not then I suppose we get to be on different sides of a divide in spite of both wanting peace.

I think this qualifies as classical.

should try hard to entertain the possibility that some people who hold to traditional sexual ethics really are acting in good faith, and are not bigots. — Leontiskos

This has been my approach all along.

I am also strongly stating that these sorts of questions aren't really up for debate here -- but am hoping to do so in a philosophical manner. Insofar that a sexual ethic thinks that homosexuals or transexuals are immoral that is something not really worthy of debate as much as persuading someone who is reflective that they are in error.

Wonder away: But I'll insist that you're wrong factually and ethically.