The original question you are supposed to be addressing is whether or not moral judgements are propositional, true, and objective; and not whether or not people treat moral judgments as if they are propositional based off of their desires. — Bob Ross

I'd say the position I'm forging here believes that moral judgments are propositional, true, and subjective.

"One ought X" means "I feel commitment to Y" (be it due to disgust or love, it doesn't matter, it only matters that there's an attachment).

So "One ought X" can be true or false on the basis of whether or not the speaker feels commitment to Y because that's all that "One ought X" means -- it may look like it's talking about these objective oughts, and due to being in the form of a statement it's true or false, but the statement is actually about feelings of commitment, and it also acts as a sort of imperative: Not only I feel, but because "One ought..." I also feel others should too.

The feeling isn't a proposition, but neither are red cups propositions -- red cups make "The cup is red" true, and likewise, under this rendition, feelings make "One ought X" true, so it fulfills the requirements of being propositional and true, just not being objective -- hence Subjectivism.

I am not following, I guess. Are you saying that moral judgments are propositional, but that they are made true by desires? E.g., "one ought not X" is true or false relative to whether or not "I desire one ought not X"? — Bob Ross

Yes.

If so, then that is plagued by the same issue: a desire about a proposition cannot make it true; and that's why emotivists reject that moral judgments are propositional---they have to.

I don't think the desire is about the proposition, though. In the abstract it's just a desire -- but the object of desire is not the proposition, but rather what the proposition is about. What justifies "One ought X" is that the speaker is sincerely committed to what the proposition is about -- it's the emotional commitment that makes it true, under this rendition.

So what say you?

What you described, is that a belief about a proposition can make that proposition true or false. — Bob Ross

The proposition is "One ought X"

The feeling is not a proposition, and since all beliefs are propositional, the proposition is not being justified by a belief -- the justification is non-cognitive, but the belief, that one ought X, is cognitive.

I think valence of value is confounded by many factors, such as, whether one 'likes' or 'dislikes' something to be valued. Otherwise, it may also depend on the inherentness of a quality or attribute to the ascription of value. Hope that doesn't sound too vague — Shawn

Nope! That helps. To summarize what I'm understanding:

Valence of value is known by liking or disliking or perception of intrinsic value or willing some value

Yes, well I don't have all the answers to your question; but, I can attempt to say that the study of value would lead a person to believe that what they value is in fact a good "thing."
On the contrary I'm hesitant to say that there's a direct correspondence between X and Y. So, what do you think about the association between X and whether it is intrinsically related to Y, as I'm getting hung up on intrinsic goods which have a strict relationship, and instrumental or extrinsic goods with a weaker relationship... — Shawn

I want to reformulate with the above now. I was confused and so wrote some confusing things.

Yet, I find it hard to believe that without knowledge of valence of value, how would anyone know how to appreciate or cherish the good? — Shawn

What if the good is different from knowing value?

That seems to be Petrarch's point.

The good layperson without that knowledge still cherishes good even without that understanding because they just are good -- it's a different sort of knowing from axiological knowing, even in the monastic sense.

If you take a glance at how transient happiness is, then the very notion of what one values would serve as a compass in the fleeting moments of cherishing and loving the good.

I think it does, but the question is -- do these values, or commitments, equate to a knowledge? Or are they just convictions?

I don't know that you deviated from cognitivism. You spoke of "a cognitive expression of feeling," which is a bit opaque but still prima facie cognitive. — Leontiskos

True, but I could see how I slipped from cognitivism at the beginning into emotivism at the end when going back and re-reading, so it was muddled and confusing. I think I'm being clear now.

My point was that whether we are talking about subjectivism (cognitivism) or emotivism (non-cognitivism), they both seem to fail for the same reason. — Leontiskos

I don't think they are truth-makers either. I just don't see how feelings confer moral obligations. I think the burden of proof is on the person who claims that their mere feelings establish moral obligations of some kind. — Leontiskos

Are you just playing devil's advocate, or do you actually believe that feelings can make moral propositions true? I mean, I don't usually say, "I wonder if I have an obligation to do such-and-such? Let me check in with Moliere's feelings to know for sure..." :razz: — Leontiskos

I'm playing with the idea, yeah, but I also genuinely doubt that the position must be internally inconsistent -- usually there's a way to accommodate criticism.

I think people take up duties out of emotional commitments to something or someone, and if they cease to have that emotional tie then the duty loses its appeal and what was a commitment becomes an ideal.

So, in a practical sense at least, our feelings are very important when it comes to moral propositions and maintaining duty.

I think the problem is that those who attempt to reduce moral deliberation to some set of self consistent propositions forget that what is at issue is not an abstracted analysis of the truth of moral propositions, but how our lives and those of others are benefited and harmed by what we say and do and think. — Fooloso4

How our lives and those of others are benefited and harmed by what we say and do and think is certainly more important to my mind than these exercises in categorization.

But we don't need to be too serious all the time, and there's something fun in the exercise, I think

According to Wikipedia ethical subjectivism is cognitive-propositional, and I have found this to be the case among self-professed subjectivists. I don't think you are disputing this even though your thesis draws near to emotivism, but here is the problem I see with subjectivism and emotivism:

Moral propositions are (meant to be) binding upon oneself and others
Subjectivist and emotivist propositions are in no way binding upon oneself and others
Therefore, subjectivist and emotivist propositions are not moral propositions

(I.e. Subjectivism and emotivism are therefore not moral theories, because they fail to achieve normativity.)

"I feel like murdering is abhorrent" (subjectivism) and "Boo murder!" (emotivism) are in no way binding on others, and they are arguably not even binding on oneself. Feelings do not seem to be adequate to justify moral propositions. Going back to the OP, I would say that it is not only beliefs that are inadequate to justify moral propositions, but that feelings are also inadequate. — Leontiskos

Thanks for the correction. So a subjectivist must be cognitivist. I didn't understand that.

EDIT: Oh, regarding the end -- what makes feelings inadequate? And what if they aren't justifiers so much as truth-makers?

What you just described is moral non-cognitivism (e.g., emotivism); and NOT moral subjectivism. You have abandoned moral subjectivism for a different position; which, prima facie, is fine but does not contend with my OP. — Bob Ross

Got it.

Then consider this rendition that's not quite emotivism, but is an attempt at reformulating the thesis to avoid your contradiction.

The cognitive aspect is the truth of moral propositions.

Truth isn't a truth-maker, though. In the same way that states of affairs make statements true (but the state of affairs isn't truth) so goes it that the sentiments make moral propositions true.

The moral proposition is still true, but truth is not an emotion, and so it's perfectly fine to claim that emotions are the truth-makers of moral propositions.

"α" is an inconsistent position for a moral subjectivist to hold (and this is the main point of the OP): a proposition cannot be made true or false relative to a belief, and this is why they have to rewrite it as "I believe <...>" as they can't evaluate coherently "<...>" relative to a belief.

For a moral subjectivist to be consistent, they will have to deny that "<...>" is a moral proposition and hold, instead, that "I believe <...>" is the moral proposition. At this point, "β", they have defeated their own position: they were supposed to demonstrating that "<...>" is true relative to a belief and NOT "I believe <...>".

Being that "I believe one ought not torture babies" is "one ought not torture babies"

Those can't be equal: they are obviously not the same proposition. A person who holds this, does not understand what propositions are. "1 + 1 = 2" != "I believe 1 + 1 = 2".

"I believe one ought not torture babies" is a moral proposition

Yes, if they do this, then, like I stated above, they have defeated they own position: they were supposed to be arguing that "one ought not torture babies" is a moral proposition and NOT "I believe <...>". — Bob Ross

The internally inconsistent part, is that, in a nutshell, a moral subjectivist claims that moral propositions in the traditional sense (e.g., "one ought not torture babies for fun") can be true or false relative to a belief about it; and results in an inconsistent view, for the vast majority of moral subjectivists, of the nature of a belief and a proposition. The inconsistency is exemplified easily in the way that moral subjectivists readily convert moral propositions into propositions about beliefs while incoherently maintaining that the original moral proposition has been preserved. — Bob Ross

Under moral subjectivism, the following is true:

1. A belief is a (cognitive) stance taken on the trueness or falseness of a proposition; and
2. Beliefs make moral propositions true or false.

These two statements are inconsistent with each other, and here’s a quick syllogistic demonstration of why:

P1: A stance taken on the trueness or falseness of something, is independent of the trueness or falseness of that something.
P2: A belief is a (cognitive) stance taken on the trueness or falseness of a proposition.
C1: Therefore, a belief about a proposition cannot make that proposition true or false.

P3: Beliefs make moral propositions true or false.
P4: C1 and P3 being true are logically contradictory.
C2: Therefore, moral subjectivism is internally inconsistent.

In short, if a belief is a (cognitive) disposition towards whether or not a proposition is true or false; then it plainly follows that beliefs do not make propositions true or false. Thusly, moral propositions cannot be true or false relative to cognitive dispositions. — Bob Ross

Well, the whole idea behind moral subjectivism being internally inconsistent is that they take (1) beliefs (which are stances) to make propositions true or false, while conceding, in their own rewriting of the propositions, that (2) propositions cannot be made true or false by beliefs; which is self-evident when they rewrite "one ought not torture babies" as "I believe one ought not torture babies".

I don't think that begs the question, but I see why you would think that. — Bob Ross

OK, I have a better idea of what you're saying now -- it's not begging the question, but this is your explicit interpretation of Moral Subjectivism, and you are drawing out implications of these two beliefs which Moral Subjectivists hold to show how they are contradictory.

I think the easier rejoinder might be to let go of one or the other belief, if they agree with the argument, but redefine Moral Subjectivism in a palatable way -- for instance, a Moral Subjectivist will often say that it's not beliefs about the Moral Proposition which make it true, but our sentiments which make it true -- there's not a cognitive justification so much as a cognitive expression of feeling. What makes "One ought not murder the innocent" true is that when a person says

(1) "One ought not murder the innocent",

that statements means

(2) "I feel like murdering the innocent is abhorrent"

where the cognitivist is being confused by the shape of the sentence being in subject-predicate form, the non-cognitivist will insist that these sentences, though they look like statements about oughts, they are statements about feelings, and so the feelings -- the subjectivism -- are what make morals true.

Yet, I find it hard to believe that without knowledge of valence of value, how would anyone know how to appreciate or cherish the good?. — Shawn

Would this relationship hold generally: if and only if a person does not have knowledge of valence of X, then it's hard to explain how they have an appreciation of or cherishing of the Y.

Where, in your example, the variables are set to
X=value
Y=the good

?

If you take a glance at how transient happiness is, then the very notion of what one values would serve as a compass in the fleeting moments of cherishing and loving the good

I agree with your sentiment here. I think what I'm hung up on is whether or not the compass in times of suffering -- what one values -- is a knowledge, and also I'm uncertain what "valence" might mean in relation to value which is why I tried to break out the sentence from the topic at hand to understand your assertion; is there another example for X and Y in the above which would fit within the sentence, or another way to put the sentence with another example?

Or, really, I'm asking after what all these terms mean in relation to one another, or if there's a simpler way to state the belief you find hard to see as false.

So, I take this as a analogy that was provided of the nutritionist. — Shawn

I think Petrarch's different here in that the nutritionist example differentiates goodness from knowledge of goodness, but the layperson ought visit the expert in order to better their chances of becoming good -- that is, there is a knowledge that may not be necessary, and is certainly different from the activity, but it enables that activity.

Petrarch, as I'm understanding the letter -- I'm not expert on him by any means -- prioritizes this activity to the point that even though he clearly loves letters(knowledge), he would trade this knowledge without hesitation for being good. There's a different priority there which, if one could be good without knowledge then it seems one could cherish and appreciate that goodness even though they have no knowledge of the valence of the good.

I wanted it all in context, but I should highlight the portion that's most relevant to the topic and why I started looking it up in the first place:

However, at the same time they claim that I am altogether illiterate,that I am a plain uneducated fellow. This is just the opposite of what men of letters have stated when judging me, I do not care with how much truth. I do not make much of what these,friends deprive me of, if only what they concede me were true.

Most gladly should I divide between me and these brothers of mine the inheritance of Mother Nature and heavenly Grace, so that they would all be men of letters and I a good man. I should wish to know nothing of letters or just so much as would be expedient for the daily praise of God.

His friends criticize him for merely being a good man who does not care for truth. The bits on envy, so I read the letter at least, are very much Petrarch's interpretation of his friends. When I think about what his friends are saying it sounds like his friends are bragging.

But the point with respect to studying axiology I was thinking of is in Petrarch's insistence that being lettered and educated isn't as important as being a good man. Something to note here is how literacy wasn't widespread at the time since this predates the Gutenberg press, and also that Petrarch is clearly a man of letters in this time as demonstrated by his writing. So he's not insulting education or its value, but insisting that it's not the same as being a good man, and that this is more important than being lettered.

Okiedoke.

In that case I agree with:

My criticism is that P1 begs the question. — Lionino

What is of the highest good can only be defined by how you or a group of people value it, no? — Shawn

I suppose the study of value, or axiology, would lead one to appreciate what to value as good. That's why, I am led to believe that axiology must be one of the highest goods, to a philosopher or even a layman. — Shawn

Upon further thought, what I mean by axiology not being exclusive to the philosopher, is meant in not all philosophers being the disciples of Plato that would be well versed in the study of value and goodness of the objects endowed with value. — Shawn

This morning I went chasing a quote and dug up this:
On His Own Ignorance And That of Many Others II, Petrarch

The quote I had in mind was "It is better to want the good than to know the truth", which you can see this English translation doesn't translate it as that, probably going for something less catchy but more accurate :D. But it's relevant, and I thought it'd be cool to bring something textual to think through these questions -- and it's fairly short because it's a letter so it's not a big ask, perfect for TPF. (EDIT: After all, if axiology is the highest good, then we ought to be doing some studying)

This is a letter Petrarch wrote which deals with these themes of knowledge and value -- which seems to relate in that your thesis is that the study of ethics is the highest good, and also because he's clearly more on the medical-type philosophy side.

I'm going to paste the part of the letter which skips the parts that were necessary at the time: the whipping of the self before getting to the point, and the praise of God for loving this insignificant worm after the point just so we can talk about the point and not get lost in the genre. It was the beginning of the Rennaissance so writing conventions differed from ours, plus it is just a letter which has a nice story for thought in it.

Tell me what you think of it whenever you have the time, if you'd like.
*****

As had come to be their custom, there called on me these four friends whose names you need not be told, since you know them all. Moreover, an inviolable law of friendship forbids mentioning the names of friends when you are speaking against them, even if they do not behave like friends in a particular case. They came in pairs, as equality of character or some chance bound them together. Occasionally all four of them came, and came with astonishingly winning manners, with a gay expression on their faces, and started an agreeable conversation. I have no doubt they came with good and pious intentions. However, through some cracks an unfortunate grudge had crept into hearts that deserve a better guest. It is incredible, though it is true--if only it were not too true! The man whom they wish not only good health and happiness, whom they not only love but respect, honor by their visit and venerate, to whom they try with greatest effort to be not only kind but obedient and generous--this very same person is the object of their envy. So full of patent and hidden frailties is human nature.

What is it that they envy me? I do not know, I must admit, and I am amazed when I try to find out. Certainly it is not wealth, for every single one of them surpasses me as much in wealth as "the British whale is bigger than the dolphin," as that man has said. Moreover, they wish me even greater wealth. They know that what I have is moderate, not my own property but to be shared with others. It is not magnificent but very modest without haughtiness and pomp. They know that it really does not deserve any envy. They will not envy me my friends.

The greater part of them death has taken from me, and I have the habit of sharing them willingly, just like everything else with other friends. They cannot envy me the shapeliness of my body. If there was ever such a thing, it has vanished entirely in the course of the years that vanquish all. By God's overflowing and preserving grace it is still quite satisfactory for my present age, but it has certainly long since ceased to be enviable. And if it were still as it was once, could I forget or could I then have forgotten the poetic sentence I drank in as a small boy; "Shapeliness is a frail possession," or the words of Solomon in the book in which he teaches the young: "Gracefulness is deceitful and beauty is vain." How should they then envy me what I do not have, what I held in contempt while I had it, and what I would despise now to the utmost were it given back to me, having learned and experienced how unstable it is? They cannot even envy me learning and eloquence! Learning, they declare, I have absolutely none. Eloquence, if I has is any, they despise according to the modern philosophic fashion. They reject it as unworthy of a man of letters. Thus only "infantile inability to speak" and perplexed stammering, "wisdom" trying hard to keep one eye open and "yawning drowsily," as Cicero calls it, is held in good repute nowadays. They do not call to mind "Plato, the most eloquent of all men," and--let me omit the others--"Aristotle sweet and mild," but whom they made trite. From Aristotle's ways they swerve, taking eloquence to be an obstacle and a disgrace to philosophy, while he considered it a mighty adornment and tried to combine it with philosophy, "prevailed upon," it is asserted, "by the fame of the Orator Isocrates."

Not even virtue can they envy me, though it is beyond doubt the best and most enviable of all things. To them it seems worthless--I believe because it is not inflated and puffed up with arrogance. I should wish to possess it, and, indeed, they grant it to me unanimously and willingly. Small things they have denied me, and this very greatest possession they lavish upon me as a small gift. They call me a good man, even the best of men. If only I were not bad, not the worst in God's judgment! However, at the same time they claim that I am altogether illiterate,that I am a plain uneducated fellow. This is just the opposite of what men of letters have stated when judging me, I do not care with how much truth. I do not make much of what these,friends deprive me of, if only what they concede me were true.

Most gladly should I divide between me and these brothers of mine the inheritance of Mother Nature and heavenly Grace, so that they would all be men of letters and I a good man. I should wish to know nothing of letters or just so much as would be expedient for the daily praise of God. But, alas, I fear I shall be disappointed in this my humble desire just as they will be in their arrogant opinion. At any rate, they assert that I have a good character and am very faithful in my friendship, and in this last assertion they are not mistaken, unless I am.

This, incidentally, is the reason why they count me among their friends. They are not prevailed upon to do so by my efforts in studying the honorable arts or the hope ever to hear and learn truth from me. Thus it comes plainly to what Augustine tells of his Ambrose, saying, "I began to love him, not as a teacher of truth, but as a man who was kind to me"; or what Cicero feels about Epicurus: Cicero approves of his character in many passages, while he everywhere condemns his intellect and rejects his doctrine.

Since all this is the case, it may be doubtful what they envy me, though there is no doubt that they do envy me something. They do not well conceal it and do not curb their tongues, which are urged by an inward impulse. In men otherwise neither unbalanced nor foolish this is nothing but a clear sign of undisciplined passion. Provided that they are envious of me as they obviously are, and that there is no other object of their envy--the latent virus is expanding by itself at any rate. For there is one thing, one empty thing, that they envy me, however trifling it may be: my name and what fame I have already won within my lifetime--greater fame perhaps than would be due to my merits or in conformity with the common habit which but very rarely celebrates living men. It is upon this fame that they have fixed their envious eyes. If only I could have done without it both now and often before! I remember that it has done me harm more often than good, winning me quite a few friends but also countless enemies. It has happened to me as to those who go into battle in a conspicuous helmet though with but little strength: they gain nothing from the dazzling brightness of this chimera except to be struck by more adversaries. Such pesti- lence was once but too familiar to me during my more flourishing years; never was there one so troublesome as that which has now blazed up. I am now an anvil too soft for young men's wars and for assuming such burdens, and this pestilence revives unexpectedly from a quarter from which I do not deserve it and did not suspect it either, at a moment when it should have been long since overcome by my moral conduct or consumed by the course of time. But I will go on: They think they are great men, and they are certainly rich, all of them, which is the only mortal greatness nowadays. They feel, although many people deceive themselves in this respect, that they have not won a name and cannot hope ever to win one if their foreboding is right. Among such sorrows they languish anxiously; and so great is the power of evil that they stick out their tongues and sharpen their teeth like mad dogs even against friends and wound those whom they love. Is this not a strange kind of blindness, a strange kind of fury? In just this manner the frantic mother of Pentheus tears her son to pieces and the raving Hercules his infant children. They love me and all that is mine, with the single exception of my name--which I do not refuse to change. Let them call me Thersites or Choerilus, or whatever name they prefer, provided I thus obtain that this honest love suffers not the slightest restriction.They are all the more ablaze and aglow with a blind fire, since they are all such fervent scholars, working indefatigably all night long.

However, the first of them has no learning at all--I tell you only what you know--the second knows a little; the third not much; the fourth--I must admit--not a little but in such confused and undisciplined order and, as Cicero says, "with so much frivolity and vain boasting that it would perhaps be better to know nothing." For letters are instruments of insanity for many, of arrogance for almost everyone, if they do not meet with a good and well-trained mind. Therefore, he has much to tell about wild animals, about bird and fishes: how many hairs there are in the lion's mane; how many feathers in the hawk's tail; with how many arms the cuttlefish clasps a shipwrecked man; that elephants couple from behind and are pregnant for two years; that this docile and vigorous animal, the nearest to man by its intelligence, lives until the end of the second or third century of its life; that the phoenix is consumed by aromatic fire and revives after it has been burned; that the sea urchin stops a ship,however fast she is driving along, while it is unable to do anything once it is dragged out of the waves; how the hunter fools the tiger with a mirror; how the Arimasp attacks the griffin with his sword; how whales turn over on their backs and thus deceive the sailors; that the newborn of the bear has as yet no shape; that the mule rarely gives birth, the viper only once and then to its own disaster; that moles are blind and bees deaf; that alone among all living beings the crocodile moves its upper jaw.

All this is for the greater part wrong, as has become manifest in many similar cases when animals were brought into our part of the world. The facts have certainly not been investigated by those who are quoted as authorities for them; they have been all the more promptly believed or boldly invented, since the animals live so far from us. And even if they were true, they would not contribute anything whatsoever to the blessed life. What is the use--I beseech you--of knowing the nature of quadrupeds,fowls, fishes, and serpents and not knowing or even neglecting man's nature, the purpose for which we are born, and whence and whereto we travel?

These and like matters I have often discussed with these "scribes" who are most learned, not in the Law of Moses and the Christian Law, but, as they flatter themselves, in the Aristotelian law. I did so more frankly than they were accustomed to hear and perhaps with less caution: talking with friends, I did not think of any harm that might derive from it. At first they were astonished, then they became angry, and, as they felt that my words were directed against their sect and the laws of their father, they set up a council among themselves to condemn for the crime of ignorance--not me whom they undoubtedly love-- out my fame which they hate. If only they had called others to this court! Then there would perhaps have been opposition to the sentence they intended to pronounce. However, to keep the verdict harmonious and unanimous, only these four convened. They discussed many different matters concerning the absent and undefended defendant--not because they disagreed in their opinions, for they all felt the same way and intended to say the same thing, but they were arguing with each other and against their own sentence after the manner of expert judges. Thus they wanted to render a decision with more color by sifting and squeezing the truth through the narrow sieve of contradictions.

As the first point, they said that public renown supported me, but replied that it deserved little faith. So far they did not lie since the vulgar mass very rarely sees the truth. Then they said that friendship with the greatest and most learned men, which has adorned my life--as I shall boast before the Lord--stood against their verdict. For I have enjoyed close friendship with many kings, especially with King Robert of Sicily, who honored me in my younger years with frequent and clear testimonials of my knowledge and genius. They replied--and here I will not say their iniquity but their vanity evidently made them lie--that the king himself enjoyed great fame in literary matters but had no knowledge of them; and the others, however learned they were, did not show a sufficiently perspicacious judgment concerning me, whether love of me or carelessness was the cause.

They then made another objection against themselves, saying that the last three Roman popes had vied with each other in inviting me--in vain, it is true--to a high rank in their intimate household; and that Urban himself, who is now at the head was wont to speak well of me and had already bestowed on me a most affable letter. Besides, it is known far and wide and doubted by no one that the present Roman emperor--for there has been no other legitimate emperor at this time--counts me among his dear familiars and has been wont to call me to him with the weight of daily requests and repeated messages and letters. In all this they feel that some people find some proof that I must have a certain value. However, they resolve this objection too, maintaining that the popes went astray together with the others, following the general opinion about me, or were induced to do so by my good moral behavior and not by my knowledge; and that the emperor was prevailed upon by my studies of the past and my historical works, for in this field they do not deny me some knowledge.

Furthermore, they said, another objection against them was my eloquence. This I do not acknowledge altogether, by God not. They pretend that it is a rather effective means of persuasion. It might be the task of a rhetor or an orator to speak oppositely in order to persuade for a purpose, but many people without knowledge had succeeded in persuading by mere phrases. Thus they attribute to luck what is a matter of art and bring forth the widespread proverb: "Much eloquence, little wisdom." They do not take into account Cato's definition of the oratory which contradicts their false charge. Finally, it was said that the style of my writing is in opposition to their statement. They did not dare to blame my style, not even to praise it too reservedly, and confessed that it is rather elegant and well chosen but without any learning. I do not understand how this can be, and I trust they did not understand it either. If they regain control of themselves and think over again what they have said, they will be ashamed of their silly ineptitude. For if the first statement were true--which I for my part would neither assert nor make myself believe--I have no doubt that the second is wrong. How could the style of a person who knows nothing at all be excellent, since theirs amounts to nothing, though there is nothing they do not know? Do we so far suspect everything to be fortuitous that we leave no room for reason? What else do you want? Or what do you believe? I think you expect to hear the verdict of the judges. Well, they examined each point. Then, fixing their eyes on I know not what god-- for there is no god who wants iniquity, no god of envy or ignorance, which I might call the twofold cloud-shrouding truth--they pronounced this short final sentence: I am a good man without learning. Even if they have never spoken the truth and never shall speak it, may they have spoken it at least this once!

Yes, and the further question asks whether the highest good is the highest good or the study of value (axiology). — Leontiskos

Right!

If "studying the highest good" is going into a monastic life in order to improve oneself and happens to include reading texts then I think I can understand the motivation for the assertion.

But not if it's just straight up reading text books. That's what I was confused by, and am still thinking over.

Even supposing that we have to enter into the study of value to determine the highest good, does it then follow that the study of value is the highest good? It seems to me like saying that the study of nutrition is the most nutritious thing.

Yeah, I agree. One can, by analogy, go to a nutritionist and follow their advice to be nutritious.

I would say that one must study good (or value) in an abstract way, but that this abstraction or reification is not itself the highest good. It seems that it simply cannot be the highest good by the very fact that it is a means to an end. — Leontiskos

I don't know how much study is important at all to the good at a personal level, but I recognize its importance as a discipline. I think that's getting me hung up a bit -- are we meaning the study of value is the highest good for the academic type philosophy, or the medical type philosophy?

The study of nutritious certainly helps us be nutritious, but eating the right foods and not the wrong ones is what makes one healthy.

Yes, I shortened the thesis too much. So, I think the study of value is of the highest good to the philosopher. — Shawn

M'kay.

I can at least think about it now. I was just confused as to what you were saying.

Sweet.

OK, so rephrasing the thesis with justification:

"The study of value is the highest good, because we have to be able to value what is good in comparison with other goods to be able to appreciate it as a "good" "

So I'm wondering if the first meaning of "value" is the same as the second? Is the study of value becoming able to value what is good?

Because I had been reading the thesis as "Axiology is the highest good, because..." which I think of as category of philosophy in which questions like "What is the highest good?" are asked, but usually people get by with goods just fine without studying axiology. (which isn't to say I don't find axiology important, but people are able to value good without study, so the thesis seemed confusing to me)

doesn't the situation that you are framing require us to have a way of qualifying what is good by appreciating it? Hence, the presupposition, to me, seems like we have to be able to value what is good in comparison with other goods to be able to appreciate it as a "good." — Shawn

That's the start of a reason, I think. I'm reading you as saying "Because we have to be able to value what is good in comparison with other goods to be able to appreciate it as a "good" " -- am I reading you right?

What is of highest good can only be defined by how you or a group of people value it, no? — Shawn

Not "What is of highest good?" -- I'm asking what would it count to be a "highest good" at all? Or, perhaps easier: Why axiology and not something else?

The thesis statement of this thread is that axiology (the study of value) is the highest good. — Shawn

That's the thesis, but where's the reason for it?

What's a highest good?

If I were to say "Happiness is the highest good, because it leads to all the others", then how might you say the philosophical study of values is higher than that?

Fair enough! However, I do not mean truth-aptness by truthity: I to the assessment of the truth of the thing or lack thereof and not its capacity for truth---it is the 'lack thereof' that disbars me from simply saying 'truth' instead of 'truthity'. I went ahead and changed the OP to use 'trueness or falseness' instead of 'truthity'. — Bob Ross

Then I don't think I understand after all.

What does "The assessment of the truth of the thing or lack thereof" mean? That it has been judged or justified, or that it can be judged or justified?

Episode 21.

Interesting parallels between McLuhan and Hegel. I've heard a lot of Novak's quotes, but I cannot remember from where (did I read McLuhan and forget that I read him, or is he just that influential?).

I agree with him in describing our society as a tribal one.

Interesting theory about how electronic communication enabled eroding national ties by making that space "shorter" or "instantaneous", so that one's identity and community can more easily become more important and different from your nation.

His continuation of the Hegelian analysis of McLuhan's tetrad reminds me of Marx in that the technology enables a new social order.

That’s fair. I could have sworn it was a technical term for it but, upon re-searching, I do not find it anywhere. All I mean by it, is the trueness or falseness of something (and not necessarily that it is true). — Bob Ross

I understood better what you meant when you explained it -- I'd have called the concept https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803105953845", which is a term I've come across in the literature that means a sentence is able to be true or false (Unlike sentences like "How are you today?")

I didn't want to interrupt the flow of things for something so minor, but since it came up I thought I'd offer a possible word to use.

So, what are your thoughts about education that even someone in poverty can afford by simply going through an online course or possibly in the future looking into AI providing some quality courses by some venture capitalist or entrepreneur via the internet? — Shawn

As boring as my original advice. ;)

I know nothing about AI venture capitalist future learning in libraries, but I know that you can't really put a price on knowledge and that going to school has benefits.

I figure if someone is motivated enough to teach themselves through the internet then they're not the person that needed all these motivations in place, like employment or grades, to learn something.

And really it just depends on too much to give any general answer besides "Go to school, it's good for your mind!"

One way to look at education is as a democratic institution because it offers equality of opportunity -- rather than being stuck with the profession your parents have there's a system in place that, for better or worse, attempts to level the playing field.

I think that in our economies that post-secondary education ought to be considered something offered for everyone -- we live in pretty advanced economies, and the more people who are knowledgeable the better we'll be able to figure out the problems that face us.

But that's not as fun as making money, so the democratic role in the US is restricted to secondary education, with some government programs in place to assist in attending post-secondary (and a somewhat attempted ameliorations for excessive debt, though not everyone agrees with even what's been done)

So the point to go is pretty much up to you: If you have a way to make money that's stable which does not require an education then there's no financial reason to go, though you may want to for personal reasons -- but, that's a pretty pricey ticket for personal reasons if you don't have the money up front.

I think it's a good bet, though, if you finish it. Also, while the above points out the democratic and financial reason for education, for me I'd say it's because you gain knowledge, it widens your perspective, you learn better ways to think, and these are valuable unto themselves as well as to society if you are willing and able so that's why I went and don't regret it (though I did have an eye on a career when I did go, too).

I don't think in a fundamental way, no, because they are both senses-- just in terms of what using the sense of sight as a metaphor for all senses suggests: when we think about sense-organs with respect to sight, generalizing from sight to all sense-organs, then the metaphor of a picture suggests that everything we see is a representation just like the picture is a representation.

They are both senses, and the metaphors change when we go to another sense -- but surely we should treat all the senses in the same logical manner. That's the point of bringing them up together: with senses other than sight I'm not sure what is representative. If I'm eating then I'm tasting what I'm eating, and incorporating it into me -- the world-becomes-me.

If taste were judgmental then we could set up a code of flavors in a meal which would inform you of a mathematical problem.

Now, I have no doubt that, given enough knowledge, we could reliably induce synesthesia such that this would be possible to read a book by eating it encoded into a complex series of flavors.

But right now I'd say the sentences like "This tastes sour" are the representations of the sour things.

I have not said that cats perceive trees as trees, but they perceive trees as some kind of affordance or other (although I am not saying they could conceive of it linguistically as an affordance or as anything else) — Janus

That's what I was thinking with the term, too -- objects with affordances make sense of a cat's or a bat's experience being different, but still about the same objects all while their experiences are probably different because human language can bring out features that I've missed upon a first listen.

Music, in particularly, is like this with me. Upon reading about a composer often I'll be able to hear and separate out more of the orchestra because of the words I've been given to organize that experience -- language enhances listening rather than cuts off the listener from the object.

Very interesting; can you elaborate? Especially the first bit. — Apustimelogist

My thought is that representationalism is tempting because we often think in terms of vision, but our bodily sensations are sense-organs too: yet we'd be more apt to say we're connected to our toe -- that consciousness extends beyond the head -- than we'd be to say we're connected to the truck across the parking lot, which I admit is where things sound weird.

With sight it's easy to interpret as if the pictures we make -- like the ones we hang on walls -- are just smaller versions of sight and so everything we see is a representation of some kind of underlying world. This is especially so because of the separation of self/world pretty much implicitly assumed in modern philosophy.

But when I stub my toe, I can't think what the analogue to "picture" would be such that my pain is a representation of something rather than just what it is. The closest thing I can think of is phantom pains -- but that doesn't seem like a representation, either, but a memory so intense that even losing the body part doesn't separate the pains remembered.

Rather than a bundle of representations, I'd say I'm a bundle of meat that's been socialized enough to have a thought or two to share. (these thoughts, these judgments, I can see as representations -- they are about something. But it seems funny to say my pain is about my toe rather than the pain being a part of the toe being a toe -- sensitive to environmental damage)

But most indirect realists do think that these explanations are directly evidencing indirect realisms. — Apustimelogist

Right.

My take is that there isn't really evidence for indirect realism as much as indirect realism is an interpretation of what we know -- so I'm providing an alternate interpretation to weaken the justification for indirect realism. Or at least that's the strategy.

No, I'm not implying it in a fundamental metaphysical sense. But some have pointed out that my actual view on mind-body metaphysics is not so dissimilar from a kind of neutral monism (maybe a very minimalist one) so maybe you would still think it the case of my view anyway. Though I don't think I see my view that way. — Apustimelogist

I'll take your view of your view over my view of it any day :) -- if I view your view differently then I'd say I'm incorrect about your view.

I think a neutral monism could go either way regarding in/direct realism -- it'd depend upon whether our perceptions are representations or presentations, I think. But cool, I can take up the notion that this isn't an issue of fundamental metaphysics.

I'm not sure to be honest. I think it depends on the angle you take. As you say below, it can be quite vague all this talk I think. I don't think indirect realists necessarily have to bring strong metaphysics into it beyond the talk of realism about representations, similar to the way you can talk about whether scientific theories (are real)*. The science I think provides quite a good description of how perceptions would be indirect so not much work is needed to be done there. Naive direct realism I'm not so sure. — Apustimelogist

Mkay, fair.

But the experiences still extend into the outside world beyond the head? — Apustimelogist

It seems so to me, yes.

I can understand the motivation for representation when it comes to sight, but I don't understand what a representation of my toe would be when I'm stubbing it or not.

Minimally I have a hard time thinking of the perception of my body as a representation: I can go as far as to say it's a bundle, and there is no "I", but I don't think my body is a bundle of representations.

Well I only use it in a weak sense as opposed to a fundamental, tangible ontology. — Apustimelogist

Cool.

Well I'm not sure since it seems you were perhaps using affordance in different sense, ha. But possibly yes, I definitely think I have preferred starting points in my reasonings that are probably not the same as yours. — Apustimelogist

Probably :)

Of course, that's why it's interesting to converse in the first place, so nothing wrong with that.

Well... there is a normal, but I agree it's not normal...

In an attempt to bring it back: that notion of normal, so it seems to me, is more of an indirect realist belief to reconcile how representations can be right or wrong, even when it comes to perception. (for me, "representations" is definitely a turn-off)

hell yeah.

It's nice to see someone with your struggles succeed.

It makes me feel like I can do it too.

yes. The person on NPR obviously is receiving help. I also receive help others don't need. These conditions can inflict a lot of pain, and as a person who medicates I'm pretty much on board with that line of thinking: do stuff to make the terrible not as terrible cuz why not?

But I also thought that the notion that the person with that disability was valuable even with it was nice to hear, and not just as a hallmark card -- but as a genuine thing. People with disabilities often have unique perspectives, and so they are worthwhile even in the economic sense (which is all we care about)

That's for sure. I could even say that one of the most nuanced philosophical thinkers of the 20th century (Heidegger) seemed to find the Nazi narrative acceptable. But that might be gauche. — Tom Storm

Yeh, but Derrida and Levinas baptized his thoughts, if not his soul. ;)

I don't think I'd be a Marxist if I thought we are stuck with our own worldview.

It's not like I started thinking these thoughts from birth, right?

This morning I heard on NPR a person who has schizophrenia who started a podcast, or something like that, to interview people at his campus about what it would feel like if they knew a person with schizoaffective disorder was on campus.

It was NPR so it was a feel good story -- he knew what he was getting into, and had a positive spin on what people said with a hope for more acceptance.

I say this by way of suggesting, at least, that it's not a malfunction so much.

One of the parts of the radio programme that touched me, with my own shit, is where the people he knew learned how to prefer him as he was, and would not want him to be otherwise.

Yes.

Right. For me this almost implies some form of idealism where the object of my toe is just the experience of my toe, without anything more. I think I would also be open though toward some kind of notion of direct awareness of information or something like that which I
think is similar to this comment here you made: — Apustimelogist

I think "information" counts as kind of idealism, if you're positing it as a kind of fundamental substance that everything is composed of.

I'm attempting to articulate a material view of direct realism, however -- along with no foundations I'd say there is no one or two substances which everything is composed of. The task then becomes: how to articulate a direct realism that is material, and yet does not rely upon a notion of substance?

For my part I'm more in favor of the naive view of the world, though I think it's hard to formulate into a proper philosophical thesis.

But to clarify I wasn't trying to necessarily imply anything about the universe being just experiences. I don't believe sufficiently clear notions of fundamental metaphysics are accessible so I don't bother with that. — Apustimelogist

Isn't that pretty much what the topic of indirect or naive realism is about? Fundamental metaphysics?

We can make the notions clear in our conversation at least, I'd say, and I'd even hazard to say that this entire conversation is a bothering about insufficiently clear notions.

But to clarify I wasn't trying to necessarily imply anything about the universe being just experiences. I don't believe sufficiently clear notions of fundamental metaphysics are accessible so I don't bother with that.

I was just saying that I am having what I call experiences and they flow and any time I recognize errors, that is just encompassed in types of experiential flow. And yes, what I would call the self is enacted in the flow too just like you said.

It might not be apt to call it direct realism though because I wouldn't say it conflicted with the idea of mediational processes and a chain of causes originating outside of what is experienced. It is more appropriately, and perhaps trivially, a direct awareness of what is going on in my head which I think is then not the same as the kind of direct realism described on wikipedia or something. It would be quite weakened and I would even push back against the notion of there being a fact of the matter about the sense that these experiences are about objective objects out in the world in the same kind of way I push back against scientific realism. As an analogy, I would say what we perceive is closer to a notion of an instrumentalist science where we construct theories that predict data, as opposed to theories being objectively real. — Apustimelogist

But what does it mean for a color itself to be an affordance? — Apustimelogist

I'm uncertain of the best way to put it, but at the very least what it means is that though direct realists directly perceive objects in the world that does not then entail that what they see is a fixed property, or that there are not other properties which a given perception is not perceiving.

It's mostly the notion of permanent objects and their essences that I'd try to avoid -- things are in constant flux.

Tbh I think the affordance/J.J.Gibson-kind of direct perception is closer to my "direct awareness of information" than it is to more literal direct realism. — Apustimelogist

I had to look up J.J. Gibson. I was using the term more locally, in our conversation -- a term of art meant to contrast with "properties", is what I was thinking.

The objects are there, I just don't think they are what the naive view might believe. Perhaps this is a way of differentiating the naive from the direct realist: I think the naive realist is seeing something real, that literal objects are a part of their experience, but that does not then mean that every judgment about that real thing which a naive realist makes is going to be true or comprehensive.

But judgment is judgment of what is directly perceived (and, of course, judgment influences perception -- but that's not the same thing as saying perceptions are judgments, or rather, must be judgments). (in a sense I'd say that every judgment has a dual-awareness -- the judgment ,and what the judgment is about)

But I suspect maybe that interpretation may be particular to me.

While I've come to discount the notion of an information ontology, you're far from alone in thinking like that.

What can I say? I'm a disagreeable sort. ;)

The idea of affordances definitely was a significant input, among others, to what led me to the idea that our experiences are fundamentally just about "what happens next?" and enacting that... which I see as pretty much just a more general view of affordances. So affordances is an important concept to me but I have gone away from the idea that the kind of qualities I directly experience are literally affordances. If sensory information arises from patterns on sensory boundaries like the retina, then the connection to affordances must come in afterwards.

Heh. Well, I've clarified, but also -- it could just be a case of dueling intuitions here. You'd prefer to start with the information, I'd prefer to start with the objects.

But how do we really differentiate which is the better way to talk?

For me, I don't think it makes sense to say the dress can be two colors without loosening realism and directness, arguably both. But again, I don't think that contradicts my "direct awareness of information" thing imo.

I think that maybe this is the sort of stuff that might differentiate naive from direct realists -- naive realists won't have a reason or address the indirect realist's objections, but direct realists attempt to do so with philosophy rather than bald assertion.

Eh, not other dimensions, no. Just the mind interacting with itself -- something the mind is trained to ignore to pay attention to the important things. (EDIT: Or, even more abstractly, it's really just a local, ontic interpretation of experience, which we have been taught to treat in a certain manner in an industrial society with a division of labor, etc.)

I am not sure I see a profound difference tbh. Disruption of normal functioning is what the indirect realist sees as disruption of normal representations. — Apustimelogist

Right -- but indirect realism has problems. These are explanations for phenomena used to support indirect realism which don't resort to the position of indirect realism to make the case for naive realism more plausible.

I don't think that undermines the point, though. Hallucinations show that the mind can create experience. Once you notice that, reality will always be taken with a grain of salt. — frank

Hallucinations show that we experience the world differently from one another -- but that doesn't mean it's the mind creating experience, I'd say.

In the case of starvation, for instance, sometimes people's experiences have been interpreted as religious visions of a truth beyond the everyday -- what is colloquially called "hallucination" can be interpreted as another layer of reality which our normal functioning has been trained to ignore (and which is why the disruption of normal functioning turns the mind on itself -- which is what I'd say hallucinations are.)

And sometimes people do see features which are not actually there from some other person's perspective, like hallucinations. Someone on an LSD trip might see motion in the carpet where another person sees none at all. (Though I guess you might say motion and non-motion are both there?) — Apustimelogist

I think hallucinations are a different case than illusions in that I wouldn't reconcile them the same way. Illusions can be covered pretty well by the duck-rabbit, but hallucinations like one experiences on hallucinogens or when they don't have enough sugar to make the brain function as it normally does don't work that way.


For hallucinations I simply note that in every case we can find some physiological reason why they are hallucinating -- usually it's a physical, chemical reaction that's taking place which disrupts our normal functioning. I like to point out starvation as a means for visions because it demonstrates that we don't need a "foreign" substance to our bodies, but even if our bodies don't get what we need then our minds don't behave like we normally expect -- that is, total hallucinations, if we do not analyze them using Cartesian assumptions, are evidence that our mind is a part of the world because the world influences it, rather than the other way about. (Still thinking over the other stuff, but I had a ready-made response for the example of total hallucinations, or dreaming too if we want to go through that :D )

Yes, when you put them side-by-side but I am still not sure what the latter really means in terms of being aquainted with the world. — Apustimelogist

Let's go with 's link and pick out a definition, such as:

We said above that what distinguishes the classical, Russellian notion of acquaintance is, minimally, that (i) it is a non-intentional form of awareness: acquaintance with something does not consist in forming any judgment or thought about it, or applying any concepts to it; and (ii) it is real relation requiring the existence of its relata; one cannot be acquainted with some thing, property or fact that does not exist.

So I'd claim that I am aware of my toe, and that awareness is not intentional, which I take "intentional" to mean the philosophical use:

In philosophy, intentionality is the power of minds and mental states to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs — first sentence of the SEP article on intentionality

Something that's probably confusing in the mix is that I'd be inclined to endorse this version:

...There are consistent ways to accept acquaintance theory without accepting classical foundationalism. some might agree that we do have some knowledge by acquaintance and appeal to such knowledge in the dualism debate in the philosophy of mind

I wouldn't pick up foundationalism, but in a debate between naive and indirect realism I'd be inclined to accept that there is non-inferential awareness, at least. The bit on "intentionality" I'm a little less certain about -- it seems to me that awareness can be about something without being inferential or judgmental, so there's a kind of intention I'd accept while still using some of the specifications of the SEP's article on acquaintance.

To me, there are basically just sequences of experiences and we can be erroneous about what experiences will happen next, or what experiences accompany each other. That is all. And recognizing errors itself involves some sequence of experiences. — Apustimelogist

If it's all just experience then wouldn't that be a kind of direct realism? There wouldn't even be a self as much as a local bundle of experiences which gets in the habit of calling itself "I", erroneously.

What if two people see the same object in two different ways due to an illusion, yet they are both directly aquainted with that object? — Apustimelogist

I think objects have affordances more than distinct properties.

So the black/gold/blue/white dress: The dress is all four colors, and which you see depends upon the context. It's our logic of "color" which is amiss, because we believe that an object cannot be both black and gold in the same place at the same time, but given the intersubjective nature of color I'd revise our logic on color -- it seems that objects can be both at once, given the dress -- and we're inclined to call the affordance we don't perceive an illusion.

And if one rejects this? — AmadeusD

Then I'd set aside whether we are conscious or figure out some other way to work consciousness into an account of direct, or naive, realism.

Especially since perception doesn't need to be described in phenomenological terms to understand it in a functional manner -- we can sidestep the question entirely and just focus on perception and whether or not perception is an intermediary between ourself and the world, and why.

I don't think this is true, personally. Consciousness does not extend at all.. It couldn't, on any account of it i've heard.

Even from the head, or is consciousness limited to the going-ons of the brain?

That some pretend that consciousness is something even capable of 'literally' touching the world is probably one of the more embarrassing aspects of human theorizing.

I'm not sure why.

I think it's interesting stuff.

That consciousness literally extends outside of the head and touches the world is kind of why the problem of consciousness is a big deal for some. Granting that it does, and granting what we know about perception it doesn't make sense -- but then some say it does make sense, it just doesn't get along with the science and that's the whole problem.

But I'd say that the distinction between naive and indirect realism operates at a higher level of abstraction than the problem of consciousness -- we could be consciousness-realists or anti-realists, and fall either way with respect to naive or indirect realism regarding perception and objects, just framing it in different ways when it's brought up (it's different, but understandable why the problem comes up regarding perception)

For my part I think reductios work because if the indirect realist position turns out to be absurd, or at least results in undesirable conclusions, then it seems that the indirect realist has some explaining to do -- if the naive realist position accommodates these absurdities and can explain the original problems that the indirect realist brings up, then it'd be better to believe in naive realism.