Moliere began a discussion of essences with the example of hammers. This is a strange move from the perspective of an Aristotelian, because hammers have no real essence. A hammer is a derivative being, a human artifact. Hammers should always be studied in relation to humans, because their existence is dependent upon humans. — Leontiskos

The discussion has moved to other considerations, but I have some thoughts here.

Aristotle is conceptually rich, so this is very much a guess in the dark:

Perhaps individual human activity, like hammering, is strange in Aristotle because he offers an ontology that has a kind of cause that accounts for the change of individuals over time such that they're still the same object while undergoing change because of the kind of object they are --- teleology. The hammer doesn't fit very well because it's not a biological entity or a natural kind -- its teleology is directed by an individual, and so its purpose is relative to the ends of not even a species but of an individual of the species. All tools are such that they are always relative to some other being's usage, and so they don't have a teleology at all -- they don't have an activity that their kind strives towards which makes them what they are.

It seems your account must have named objects without real essences alongside what has essences -- and maybe what you say here has something to do with why Heidegger used the example of hammering in putting the question of the meaning of being back on the table for philosophical investigation.

If hammers don't have essences, then what does? And on what basis are we to exclude tools from having being (or, perhaps they have being, but no essence?)?

Isn't counting adding 1 to the previous number? — RogueAI

I think "counting" is almost a primitive. It's such a simple operation or concept that we'd have a hard time defining it rigorously. But I'd put "counting" as more primitive than addition, because addition holds for more domains than counting -- such as fractional numbers that fall in-between the counting numbers.

Without defining the domain counting is strange. You can't count to the square root of 2 on the natural numbers, for instance. Counting will never get you to the real number line. And if we allow division, at least, it's pretty easy to operate on the natural numbers such that we need more numbers than what we count. One might say a difference between quusing and adding is that adding is a part of all arithmetic, and so we have access to division, where quusing is the same as addition up to a certain point but what makes it different are the rules and the domain.

Quaddition is clearly a philosophical toy, but modular arithmetic works similarly in that there is no number beyond a certain point within the mod space. Quaddition just defines, arbitrarily, what happens after you reach the end.

I think I'd respond by saying you're doing counting, which is neither addition nor quaddition. Counting is an entirely different, third rule where you count, rather than add or quus. If you were quussing you'd stop the moment you counted up to 5', the 5 beyond all 57's.

In counting we need symbols to begin to understand just how much we have of something. Hence learning the base-10 system, and having to memorize the order of numbers prior to being able to count to 57 -- we're already using a number system by the time we're counting, and so counting presupposes understanding the domain of numbers with some kind of symbolic system. Counting is tied to the natural numbers, where in quussing we're clearly in a different domain -- but all three rules, counting, adding, and quussing all look the same up to the number 57 because that's where the domains of interest are the same, and the operations are similar and so the outputs are the same within that small domain, and because we're using the same number system to represent the numbers. Not that changing bases would matter, I just mean we have a number system with bases, rather than a number system that consists of "one, two, three, and many" or something like that.

Quusing is clearly derivative of adding, and so it seems a bit silly -- but I'd say there's no fact to the matter between choosing between, say, counting on the natural number line or counting on the rational number line until you get to a point where there is a difference, like the square root of 2 and suddenly you see that you have a new kind of number to deal with. But for all that there is still a difference between these sets, it's just not in the rules of counting, adding, or quusing.

You’d be surprised to hear I don’t believe in law either. — NOS4A2

Metaphysically speaking I am unable to reduce a marriage to anything between two people, especially when it appears there is nothing between them, connecting them, and bonding one to the other. It also appears they are not “in” anything of the sort. I would say each of them relate to one another, or at least I would recognize that one is speaking figuratively when using such language. That isn’t to say one should never use the word “marriage” or “relationship”—abstractions, generalizations, universals are necessary to speak and think about the world—it’s just that one ought not to include them in his ontology, metaphysically speaking. As such he should not apply his politics to them. — NOS4A2

They are not only nominally or proximally bonded, but have a history together. — NOS4A2

I think you've changed your position a little, then. You're allowing some aggregates to have real relations, and claiming that there are some times when a person claims there to be a real relation when there is not a real relation. Here the case of the family is a real relation because they have a history together rather than merely being named as together, like an abstract relationship.

At one end of a possible spectrum I'd say there are pure abstractions -- the set of all people such that they are in the set named "424", which may have real applications when discussing the tenants of a building but is a bit accidental about who the members of that set are.

But along comes an organizer knocking on the doors of the old 424, and eventually the group of people decide to form a tenant union. Now they have a history together, in your terms -- they've voluntarily joined together into a group and have real relations. (and so are now at the other end of the spectrum from abstract to concrete)

From what I can see you're objecting to, say, the nation as a real relation because it's not individually voluntarily agreed upon. So the law, because it's not individually voluntarily agreed upon, is not a real relation, but an abstraction of some other real.

Whereas I'd say that the law is real, but it's an odd duck. (which is why social ontology is interesting -- it's full of odd ducks that are hard to deal with)

But you raise some good questions in regards to political subjects (the people, the nation, the workers, the race, society). What sort of bond or relationship can we infer between the aggregate parts of these sets? Are these bonds actual? Or are they assumed and imposed? If they are not there, is it the goal of the politician to create them? — NOS4A2

It seems to me that you're willing to accept some social bonds as real, and some as not-real -- a realist account. It's the criteria of real-ness that you're using which is at odds with... well, everyone who has posted so far :D

At least if I'm right about the criteria of a real relationship being having a history together, which in turn seems rely upon individual voluntary agreement. A basic individualistic libertarian norm. The problem with it being -- well, what about all the relationships which may be abstractions but still influence our life? Why bother calling them not-real while we still have to account for them, seeing as we don't live in the individualistic libertarian world? Are they illegitimate reals, in which case the problem isn't metaphysics, but ethics or politics?

I'm looking at Chapter 11 again this morning, and having taken a break for the nitty-gritty I wanted to see if I could understand the derivation of infinitely iterating functions to get a better grip on time and oscillations in the book. I'm having trouble, on page 81, of understanding the third step where J2 is called.

Anyone else work out this demonstration yet?

Heh. I suppose I'd say that it's only us chickens that have to step up, and that's the real problem. We're the leaders we have been waiting for -- we're just not as good as we want our leaders to be, so we feel inadequate to the task.

But all the other leaders from before that we honor were in similar shoes at one point.



That's because duty sucks. ;)

If a couple is married and owns a house, does the nominalist say "no one owns the house" because ownership is jointly owned by two members of the set?

I don't think so. I think the nominalist would say something like the couple is arranged marriage-wise, that it reduces to a relationship between them -- but the relationship is still real for all that, it's just not the set that's real. They both own the house would be the answer, just not in virtue of being a real set.

But you also say

In applying this subject to objects and entities outside another’s conceptual space, one would be hard-pressed to find and/or point to anything of the kind, and it would be difficult to discern what it is in the world he is actually talking about. — NOS4A2

So it would be more apt to say that if a couple is married and owns a house, and they talk to nominalist aliens about what they own then it wouldn't make sense to the aliens until they spell out that the couple is in a relationship arranged marriage-wise.

I agree that classical logic doesn't deal with time very well. That's part of what allowed Kant to distinguish between Logic As Such, and Transcendental Logic. As well as providing a conceptual entry into Hegel's philosophy.

To evaluate the difficulty of logic, on the whole, dealing with time I'd have to do more homework on logic. Just looking over this: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-temporal/ -- but it could be that GSB's logic would fit in here, and so "difficulty" is what's being dealt with in Laws of Form. In that case there'd be choices to make on which logic, and I'm not sure how I'd make a choice. (More homework necessary on my part, basically) ((EDIT: Though I should note that it's necessary on my part specifically because of what I'm interested in. I don't think because I'm wanting to bridge these things that means much about GSB's book -- it's more a me thing))

Here's another related piece, fairly short and understandable.
http://homepages.math.uic.edu/~kauffman/TimeParadox.pdf — unenlightened

Another good read. It hits a lot of points of interest for me -- the liar's paradox is one of those I keep going back to, and I found the dual-functions which iterate back and forth in a time series really interesting, and it's interesting how Kauffman links all of these things back to GSB.

I found this summary fairly interesting: https://www.projectenportfolio.nl/images/1/16/Robertson-Laws_of_Form.pdf — Count Timothy von Icarus

That helped me -- it's nice to have an interpretation that's been worked through by someone else. I didn't realize that GSB's algebra is formally equivalent to Boolean logic (although now that I'm saying that I'm beginning to ask myself, just what *is* formal equivalency? I've sort of just taken that assertion at face value from people more knowledgeable than I). Also I didn't pick up the similarity between self-reference and re-entry.

Side note: It's interesting that Brown was working on network issues. I've seen some articles on information theoretic/categorical models of quantum mechanics that attempt to explain physics as a network. This in turn, allows us to recreate standard QM in a different language, but also explains entanglement in a more intuitive network-based model (or so the author claimed, I did not find anything intuitive about the paper lol). I do find the idea of modeling reality as networks or possibility trees interesting though. But again, it's easier to conceptualize the network as a fundamental thing, rather then that the network simply is a model of process and relation, which seems to be the true basic entity! — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yup, I find that part of what's fascinating in the book. Since the logic was developed in tandem with a practice I'm interested to know it from that practical angle more.

But the first distinction is made by the first cell, and then the first re-entry of the first distinction into itself by the first language speakers, and then...

The Observer is the observed.
— Krishnamurti

Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world.
— The Grateful Dead

I would not say that the world is composed of eyes, but it has eyes, and we are those eyes. — unenlightened

There's a flag I want to put on "first cell", but it feels too off topic.

Granting the first cell making a distinction, which I can agree with, it's interesting how the story can be used for a single developing organism -- a story from birth until here we are talking -- as well as the development of organisms. "then the first re-entry of the first distinction into itself by the first language speakers" helped click some of GSB to his wider, philosophical sense that I haven't been grasping (and, truthfully, I'm still feeling around about).

"The world has eyes" is a nice phrase. It feels mystical in that way that tries to make a reflective statement -- where we talk of the world, which is usually not ourselves, but then it fits us within the world as we see our own eyes in our minds-eye -- that is, through language (or at least with a great deal of assistance from language)

When you finish with your next post: What do you make of 's linked summary?

especially Americans are hung-up on the mob influence on the unions in the past. — Benkei

I think there's been a concerted effort to undermine unions.

There's a lot of images of unions, like the mob (but so, so many others), which are popular because they make a splash and feed into people's preconceptions. There are even law firms dedicated to busting union drives. There's also been a long-term concerted effort to defund unions through what are called "right to work" laws such that people who benefit from a given contract can opt in or out of whether they'll pay union dues, which -- due to human nature -- most people prefer free things to not-free things and it takes about one generation before a union is unable to hire enough staffers to appropriately service the contract and it becomes something of a limping organization that, with appropriate activism, can be strong -- but everyone at this point is used to the more bureaucratic form of labor unions and they really do just want a fee-for-service model (without paying for the fee-for-service model).

And with fewer numbers comes less influence within the political realm, which in turn means that politicians are more likely to ignore the demands of labor even while unions contribute to the democratic political party. It's a feedback loop.

Which is why I say the capitalists have become better at divide and conquer -- that's basically what's happened over the course of the last half of the 20th century as a concerted political effort to undermine the democratic base in favor of capital.

OK So rather than a Cartesian subject: "One is always in one's world" has a phenomenological sound to it. The world is composed of distinctions, in this case, some of which include me (inside) and the rest of which doesn't (outside), but which are still together as one world: the world composed of distinctions. The book is gesturing towards a flow of distinctions upon distinctions with the first distinction holding for all distinctions thereafter.

Not quite clear to me, esp. the last statement, but it's OK. — Alkis Piskas

You make it sound like a simple phsychological game. I'm afraid there's much more to it than just that. One does not risk his job, his income and the support of his family because he gets angry.
(Except if he's a total idiot, of course.) — Alkis Piskas

There are always more details, and often times they're important to a particular circumstance. I presented a simplification which was meant to highlight how emotion, rather than duty, would be the reason a person decides one way or another. The simplification fits with the scenario of a strike.

The "more" would be the lead-up to the strike, what other tactics had been tried, the sorts of demands the workers are making, how long the contract has been in place, what relationships there are between union members, union leadership, and management, what the wider circumstances are in which the conflict is taking place....

In short, the sorts of things that a historical account would take care of better than a hypothetical.

Consistency, authenticity, candor, good intentions, competence, dedication to achieving clear goals that align with your own. The ability to listen. I think it is easy to recognize when someone is showing you the way to what you want, or what you think your nation needs. — ToothyMaw

These all sound good to me. I'd even be able to point to some examples of people that fit.

I'm not sure anyone would disagree with this list. They'd disagree on who fits, though. And I bet we'd be more inclined to put dead figures on the list, too. It's easier to honor the dead than the living.

I suppose I'd just point out that we have quite a few leaders. But I don't recognize your list in many of them. And so this is the cause of doubt: it seems that we already have leaders who believe themselves to be all of these good qualities, but we're lamenting that they don't possess them.

But is it just because certain people haven't seen that it's their duty to lead and influence people towards good ends? We have lots of people attempting to lead and influence, it's just not the right people? Is all that's stopping them is that they don't realize what their duty is?

I should begin by saying that it has been some years since I have worked extensively with Aristotle's primary texts, so a strict Aristotelian may quibble with me on this point or that. Still, I think I will give an accurate account. — Leontiskos

You're in a better position than me. Years ago I read a substantial amount of Aristotle in English, but that's about it.

An essence is what something is in virtue of itself, and the definition describes the essence. It will also be useful to note that for Aristotle the standard beings are substances: things which exist of themselves and which possess their own mode of being and acting. So hammering would be an act of a substance, in particular an act of a human substance. — Leontiskos

A hammer is an artifact, not a substance, but be that as it may, we still need to understand what a hammer is before we use it. For Aristotle definition is not restricted to a means by which one shares knowledge. To understand what something is is to have its definition, and to have partial knowledge about what something is is to have a nominal or partial definition.

So when you approach a hammer for the purpose of manipulation you have already formed a partial definition of it. It is a physical object (which can be manipulated physically). It is graspable by the hand. It possesses a kind of leverage. It has a hard head which can be used to hit things without incurring damage. All of this is part of the definition, and is already implicit in one who manipulates a hammer. For Aristotle it wouldn't make much sense to say that you manipulate a hammer without some understanding of what it is. — Leontiskos

Is it possible to act without knowing?

That seems to be the only condition you'd accept human activity as non-essential, given that any amount of knowledge results in having at least a partial definition or some approximation of an essence.

I believe these two are incompatible with each other as to the direction and recipient of the effect (fear and anger).
Fear works against the employees. Anger --as I can assume from how you put it-- works against the company. So I can't see how you can select between the two ... — Alkis Piskas

"working against the company" is a bit of a stretch, I'd say. "the company" is primarily comprised of employees, after all. But the union is for the employees, so it doesn't make sense to say "against the company" from that standpoint. (against management, now...)

Anger works against fear that management uses in its negotiations. Once you're at the point of a strike that's pretty much the emotional spark which will drive a person to select one side or the other -- or the professionals will stand back and wish people could just get along without acknowledging that there are simply differences in desire due to social position.

For a lot of professionals or independent contractors they have a hard time understanding this stuff because they're simply treated differently than workers who are viewed as replaceable or as not really worth being paid enough to live or just enough to live. They've had roughly fair dealings with employers and opportunities they can move onto if something goes south at their current place of employment. The social position of the workers just isn't something that clicks for a lot of people until they have felt it.

The other thing that's missing from the scenario is the build-up to the strike. By the time you get to a strike you've already exhausted pretty much every other option. What a union really does is negotiate -- striking is just a tactic in that process of negotiation, and it's basically the last resort.

But most negotiations are not conducted on such strong lines that warrant a strike. But by the time you get to a strike... I mean, avoid it at all costs, but my answer remains the same because I prefer to have power in a negotiation rather than not.

My conclusion is that we have to cooperate, because others would see us as "selfish", "traitor", "a black sheep", etc. — javi2541997

Heh. That's an interesting conclusion, at least for myself, because I would push against it while maintaining that we have to cooperate. pointed out how the owners of firms are already incorporated, and the workers are only kinda-sorta incorporated.

If I were the King of Rules, or some such nonsense, I'd say that every firm must be a closed shop.

Or: we have to cooperate because we're human beings.

It is not the same crossing the picket line just because you are afraid of being sacked than having other kind of duties. — javi2541997

I think your first example is a bit of a fiction. It's not the same, but anyone in that situation isn't crossing the picket line because they're afraid of being sacked. I'll bring it back to my opening response: it's because their anger dried out and they've come back to their fear. The scabs believe the boss will win, which sometimes the boss does win, and so they go back over to the boss's side.

But sometimes the workers win too.

(EDIT: And either way, I'm still maintaining that duty can't justify choosing the path of the scab. It's not a duty. It's a selfish action, which we all do all the time. It's merely not dutiful)

I have empathy, but they're still scabs. I understand why they're doing it, but the choice they're making is still "My family is more important than your family".

I don't think we, as philosophers, should give the scabs anything more than the truth. The truth is they are choosing themselves over the other families to the point that they are willing to sacrifice the other families who are benefiting workers for their own family.

That, even if you don't call them such, is a scab. And once the strike is over the scab will get picked off by the boss, eventually, because they already did what the boss wanted, and the new recruits won't remember all the conflict from before.

It's your claim to duty that I'm challenging. I empathize with people lesser because I'm lesser. But I don't claim that I'm good for that reason.

I accept the argument about Socrates and the Singleton Socrates. And I understand the paper to basically be directed towards essentialists (so it's not for me), but rather arguing that this is a better concept of essence than the modal concept, while accepting and explicating their connection.

But I'm not seeing the conclusion very well.

So what is an appropriate specification of the meaning? The only satisfactory answer
appears to be that the specification should make clear what the meaning (essentially) is; it should
provide us, that is to say, with some account of the meaning's essence.

I think I'd just say: I got some unsatisfactory answers to your question.

Carrying over my response here, though I'm fine with moving it back to "Belief" as well.

I'm not sure what it would mean to know something without knowing the essence, and I am not sure what people have in mind when they talk about knowing something without an essence. — Leontiskos

My understanding of Aristotle's notion of essence is that it is a given something's definition.

The first thing that comes to mind is know-how. I know-how to hammer, regardless of what the hammer is pointed at (or even what the hammer is -- animal, vegetable, mineral, or familiar tool). I don't need to know the essence of a thing in order to manipulate it. And a lot of knowledge is at this level of manipulation rather than at a definitional level. The definitions come later when you're trying to put knowledge into some sort of form which can be shared to assist in spreading the knowledge.

At that point definitions are important. They're a wonderful tool for teaching someone differences that were picked up through practice, but would be much more slowly learned without the definitions.

But because definitions are developed from practice I'd say that definitions are not necessary. (What is the essence of "thingy" in "Hand me that thingy over there"?) And if it's not necessary we can conclude definitions are not essential to knowing-how.

I still don't see how that is a lie. They aren't brainwashed; they are convinced that there is a good cause and that they should take it up. I would say manipulation is not always via unsavory means, although it has that connotation. — ToothyMaw

That's at least pretty close to https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noble_lie ? Or not?

It's not brainwashing. It's myth making.

However, go ahead and say what you want about it. I kind of want to know what you were going to say. — ToothyMaw

My first thought is that if duty is real for some and not real for others then there are some people who are not attuned to duty. So who are the dutiful, such that we know they are attuned to duty, and who are those who are not attuned to duty? Or is it not a kind of knowledge at all?

One should lead by example, demonstrating that a cause is worthy even without such an appeal. — ToothyMaw

Seems like it would apply to Donald Trump and to Joe Biden, for instance. At least we can see that there are people who follow either leader, and so believe those leaders to be demonstrating their cause to be worthy. But you're blaming the leaders -- so it's not them.

In fact I think it's no one, if I'm reading you correctly.

So how am I to know this duty when I see it?

. If one is genuinely trying to instill a sense of duty for a good, substantial reason, then no. — ToothyMaw

I think that's pretty much what a noble lie amounts to: it's technically a lie, but it's for a good, substantial reason of drawing the people towards what's good. Since your account asks leaders to instill goodness in others through manipulation it seemed to fit.

A cynical exploitation would not be a noble lie, but just a lie.

These concepts can be real to one person and not another and it doesn't diminish the importance of duty to those who are attuned to it. — ToothyMaw

I'm going to try and do a little philosophy with this sentence, if you don't mind.

Something that's confusing to me here is "concepts can be real" -- not the relativism, but just that sentence alone. My guess is you're saying duty is not a noble lie because duty is real, in some sense. So duty is real for some people, and not real for others. Is that correct?

I'm calling out the leaders, not the people. And yes, I do maintain that duty is the most powerful motivator, as it can override just about any other consideration if the human is manipulated correctly. Remember the Third Wave experiment? In that instance it was used to harm, but such manipulations can be used for good. Many, if not most, of us have grown complacent, and good leaders with the peoples' best interests at heart need to intervene - before a nasty, fascistic one does. — ToothyMaw

Nowhere do I say that duty is what one "ought" to do, but rather is a subjective motivator that can be manipulated by good leaders to good ends - which is what I'm actually advocating for here. — ToothyMaw

So duty is a kind of noble lie, then?

There are so many inspiring stories in the history of labor. Thanks for sharing, I didn't know that one.

Yeees... only... Well, let's say both the political and economic landscape of the future are as yet unmapped. But I think that speculation belongs elsewhere. — Vera Mont

Heh, yes.

Well, it is interesting to see that mafia trade unions share the same industry/commerce: trucks and transportation. To understand how poisonous can a trade union be, we have to look at Jimmy Hoffa's story. Hoffa became involved with organized crime from the early years of his Teamsters work, a connection that continued until his disappearance in 1975. He was convicted of jury tampering, attempted bribery, conspiracy, and mail and wire fraud in 1964 in two separate trials. He was imprisoned in 1967 and sentenced to 13 years. In mid-1971. — javi2541997

The one I was thinking of was learned of in passing, and I rather like my legs.

It takes a lot of bravery to organize on a shop floor, or youthful anger (as others have already pointed out). It takes even more bravery to try to organize the honest way if the mafia is involved. Some organizers have done that, but not me. But because some organizers have done that this is how I know they still exist (and that the answer is always organizing).

But it's a rare case. I mentioned it as an obvious example of when unions can go bad. I don't think anyone should just blindly believe that because there's a union it's a good thing. It could be a bad union. There are examples of that.

The thing is: you can either leave your job, or organize. Sometimes the fight is too much for some people, and I understand that. Human beings are frail and weak. Duty is something that's a bit out of reach for most of us, though it can be inspiring.

I just don't think you can frame scabbing, in particular, as a dutiful action. It really is as selfish as I described: you're picking your own family over the families of your coworkers. A lot of people have sympathy for that position, but think on the categorical imperative: if everyone scabs then there's no strike to scab and everyone is back at work. I understand that duty need not follow the CI, but it's a pretty well worked out example of a philosophical theory of duty at least. So I have my doubts.

I think it's time to ditch all the old forms. — Vera Mont

:D

A saying after my heart. But I've mellowed out. Union structures work to give some semblance of power to working people. The old forms stick around because they still work better than nothing, and also because the old form of capital is still around. It hasn't changed that much, except to grow larger and become better at divide and conquer.

But I'm afraid I have to say one should think in terms of bosses and workers, when looking at political economy. Or at least the bourgeoisie, if not the lieutenants of capital. As a socialist surely you agree here? Automation can give us good things if used well, but to be used well the workers need to have a say in political economy?

Right, I understand. I just mean -- look at the 1800's. The hours were longer, automation caused there to be a labor reserve army, and there were fewer laws in place.

I don't think the working class has disappeared, though it's not a topic for USian political parties. Like you say, it's all middle-class based talking points.

But it's not like the house of commons during Marx's time was the most progressive force, either. It took organizing then, and it took organizing during the 1900's to maintain those victories which brought about a kind of golden age of labor, and that's what it would take today. And really it'll depend upon the workers. Not my little opinions on the matter.

It might have to get worse before people want to make it better, though. Most workers are not fighters. They just want the best for them and their family, and fear is an effective motivator.

I know something about the history of trade union movements and labour parties. The present is pretty dim, especially in the US, but other countries, too, where a succession of governments have been systematically kneecapping unions.

But what of their future? Given the state of automation and collar-bleaching... I wonder. Teachers, librarians, nurses, yes. Who else is, or can be organized into, a progressive political force? — Vera Mont

I'm out of the game, and I broke my crystal ball awhile ago, but my sympathy for the future of labor has always been the service sector. But as long as there's a money-flow within a firm and a group of people who depend upon a wage from the firm then there's lies the possibility to unionize: call centers, food chains, delivery drivers, uber/lyft drivers, amazon, wal-mart, target, alphabet workers, public sector workers, migrant farmers, transit workers, baristas, catering companies, hotels, non-profits...

When people talk about the dimness of labor I note how the golden age of labor was something of a fluke, and it only came about due to fights under arguably worse circumstances (sometimes the same, in the most extreme cases -- migrant farmers come to mind here particularly). What worked then is what would work now, if people decided to stop living in their little family-bubble.

And that's why I think the scenario, as posited, is basically reactionary: it's the scabs prayer.

I've been in unions at various points in their life-cycle, including an attempt to form a brand new one. That was defeated, and two years later, the same workers opted to join one of big, powerful unions, in which they would be an insignificant cog. Not a great outcome, but a rational choice that resulted in better pay for my ex-colleagues. By then, I was working elsewhere as a member of one of the big, powerful unions - which served us very well, as it happens, and deserved our support. — Vera Mont

I started as an organizer on my own shop floor and then eventually became a staffer for a different union in another life. But not so much union activity now that I'm doing the sciences -- scientists, among other professionals, have a hard time seeing themselves as "workers". The images of the factory are still strong, even though there's no need for a factory to have a union that works -- all you need is solidarity. Also I've had my fill of fighting. Being an organizer is a stressful, thankless job where everyone blames you for everything and most of what you do is run around putting out fires for less than the members you service make ;).

There are definitely flaws in unions which are worth noting and learning from. They're human organizations. And from a Marxist perspective it's generally viewed that unions can't be strong enough to compete with capital, so there are even political reasons to criticize unions from the left.

I guess I just don't see the scenario as presenting the flaws and how to learn from them as much as giving us a very common image that the boss uses: the image of the poor, benighted worker who has two bosses, the union boss and the company boss, and he's just trying to feed his family.

The OP example was questionable, so I questioned it. Is that not why we're here? — Vera Mont

It is. But I thought @Banno had a good point. There's a very rich history, and I thought the scenario was kind of highlighting the worst aspects of a union without really getting at how people have actually overcome (or failed to) these sorts of things. So I suppose I'm just questioning the question. The annoying philosophy thing.

As presented in the example, the call to strike seems irrational. — Vera Mont

That's because it's meant to ;).

At least so I'm maintaining, while maintaining that it's not possible to make the argument from duties to scab.

But it is just an example, a hypothetical.

The example I used the strike was for equal pay for women. They didn't win in the first strike, but they got some victories, and then some odd 15 years later the original demand was met with a longer strike.

This is why I wanted to know if there is a possibility for a worker to disengage from this structure. When I read papers and news related to this issue, I figured out that a "scab" is badly seen among workers and most of them end up disowned. Yet, I was curious to understand the purposes of a scab and then some delicate situations like my OP could exist. Even, the trade unions can act aggressively towards the workers and threaten them. Acting like a gang, as you explained. — javi2541997

When I said "mafia laundering" I wasn't making a metaphor. I mean there exist legal entities in the United States which are registered as unions but are operated by the actual mafia as a money laundering operation. They don't really service their contracts very well, and they don't even bother to fight for a better one. They'll just re-up the contract for as long as they can so they can keep the structure, and for the most part the contracts are hardly enforced anyways.

The funny thing here is that the solution is still the same. It's not disengagement, but engagement: you organize. Else you just let the mafia run the show. Same goes for if you disagree with leadership: you organize.

Participation is what keeps a democratic organization alive. A worker can disengage with the structure, sure, but I think you'd have a hard time making the case that it's a duty to do so unless a worker's duty is only to themself and their family. (which others have basically said so far -- so if you take that extra step then you can even be secure in yourself and know you've done your duty)

Now insofar that democratic structures are gang-like then a union can act like a gang. But this is more of a reaction to having to deal with social structures and a desire to be independent than it is engaging with the reality of trade unionism: The next job, contra @ssu, will have similar structures in place. The cowboys of the world, as I call them, are entirely selfish as I set it out: they're there for themselves and their family, and that's that.

But the union movement benefits them even if they decide to hamper it. That's why it'd be hard to make the case that it's a duty -- if you're a worker then you're already indebted to a long history of struggle. There are the cowboys who want to be individuals, but by that they're making the choice I said: they're choosing their own family over the families of others.

And that's true even if human nature is basically bad, and so unions, too, are of course corruptable. But that's not what they are, and that's kind of the vibe that your scenario presents: it would be naive to believe that every union is a shining beacon of goodness, or something along those lines. I don't even think "goodness" enters the picture -- it's about power, simple as. But it's similarly foolish to judge unions on the basis of the single scariest thing that a worker might have to do. That's not even most of what a union does. Most unions try to avoid strikes.

That's an assumption not always borne out by results. The strikers are not necessarily represented by the union leadership; they may be incorrect in their assessment of the situation; this particular worker may be aware that the strike is futile.
If he makes his decision on nothing more than loyalty to the union, it's just another case of blind obedience, not a moral or ethical one. — Vera Mont

When does scabbing not hurt strikers?

"The strike is futile" is fear, as I said. So that worker is picking on the basis of their fear, because they believe the boss will win so they're hedging their bets and helping the boss break the strike. It's not "nothing but loyalty", but an awareness of how the world works -- if you help the boss break the strike then you're putting your family ahead of the other families that are also risking themselves. That's the choice being made.

The real choice... eh, we're not in a union drive here so it's a bit idle to talk about "the real choice", unless we're going to use historical examples.

Either way I don't think you can make the case that scabbing is following a duty, which is what the original scenario is speaking in terms of, unless the only duty you have is to yourself and your family. (which, in truth, is where a lot of people reside in terms of willfully chosen duties -- duty to union, outside of union families, is often seen as a naive position. But it's not. It's the only reason workers have what they have today, and it's the reason why they're losing more of it too)

I mean, there is always one specific person who, for whatever reason, is in a worse position than the rest. — javi2541997

Yup.

But here's where history can serve as a better guide to understanding the problems and decisions a worker faces. Union drives have succeeded and failed, unions have been successful in one generation and fade away with future generations, or experience resurgences. That's the ebb and flow of historical reality. (One might be tempted to call it dialectical ;) )

For instance, unions cross the anglosphere -- they are organized all across the world, across different ethnicities and language-groups. Some of the most inspiring stories of strikes come from overcoming differences in language, culture, and expectations. Unions thrived prior to women becoming more prominent within the workforce as well, to speak to another point you brought up.

And sometimes trade unions aren't even as effective as a political lobby. Sometimes they're a money laundering operation for the mafia, and the contracts they service won't protect anything, nor are they actually run on democratic principles.

All these possibilities are explored in the history of labor.

I'd echo @Banno's sentiments here. A particular worker is in a particular time and place. The scenario is already abstract from the outset: it's a deontological problem of choice. For particulars we should look to history.

But there's no choice in the abstract. If you're a worker then, like it or not, scabbing will hurt strikers. Even if the worker really wants to scab that will occur, and that's not really defensible on ethical, deontic grounds. It falls pretty easily to the first formulation of the categorical imperative because not everyone can scab -- if they did then there'd be no strike and they'd all be back at work.

One of the things missing from the abstract problem is that unions are democratic organizations. So there's already social responsibility in the mix which isn't represented by the problem.

It would be much better to look at historical cases, the miners and Thatcher, perhaps. — Banno

I agree here. Historical cases demonstrate how people have overcome various problems, or failed at overcoming various problems. What they lack in conceptual clarity they gain in fidelity to the vagaries of political action.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ford_sewing_machinists_strike_of_1968 is a good example because it also has a movie you can watch which I found satisfying. I like that it depicts strikes as scary things, because they are scary. You don't know the outcome of your actions, and you have the real possibility of losing.

But progress has only come from normal people being willing to do scary things.

But keep in mind that the worker of the example has problems in his family: the wife is already unemployed, one kid is sick and the other goes to college. Maybe the rest of the workers are covered up thanks to the incomes of their respective families... — javi2541997

Families are rarely in a state of perpetual comfort. There's always something to take care of. This is the common mantra of the scab: "I understand what you're doing, but I have to take care of my family" -- which is fear. The scab believes the boss is going to win, so the scab chooses the boss's side. This is to the detriment of the strikers, whose families are similarly unstable, have needs, and so forth. It's not a neutral act of duty, it's a person actively sabotaging the efforts of strikers in the name of their family: Family over Union.

A common act of social grace is to say something along the lines of "The spouse wouldn't allow it" or "My kid is at home sick", and I understand them to be bowing out of whatever it is we're doing. But they're usually speaking for themself, and sometimes the kid is at school and the parent just needs some time to themself and the only excuse people accept is some duty or other.

But when you're talking union the "my family" excuse is out the door -- buddy, we all have families. That's what we're doing this for.

Workers do face difficult decisions in supporting a union drive, becoming active in the union, and in striking, especially when the employer is hostile. The risks are not a pretense. Strikes do not always succeed, and a failed strike can leave the union members broke and out in the cold. — BC

I agree.

That's why I thought that duty doesn't leave a choice.

You may have a family. But do you think that the other strikers don't? They're already risking exactly what the OP sets up. Some cave to fear, or selfishness, and think of their own family in the moment. It's particularly difficult because a person has these connections, and that's a struggle.

But philosophically speaking the duty is clear: the strikers are risking their families already. You should do the same. Don't blame your fellow workers who are just asking for fairness to be able to take care of their families, blame the boss for not doing what's right!

Which should point out the importance of looking at, even if I'm wrong, fear and anger.

With that being said: I really like the last chapter because it's close to what I was writing out, once upon a time, when attempting to invent a purely spacial logic (that didn't work out, and so I threw it away as nonsense). Also I enjoyed working through a calculus that isn't the same as all the others, though there are parts I'm still uncertain about. And I enjoyed GSB's fusion of poetry with math, which is something I have a soft spot for. (EDIT: Might be a bit of a surprise given my approach so far -- but I wanted to treat the book as a logic in addition to its poetic value, and thought maybe that was the part I could contribute to for understanding the text)

Good recommendation @unenlightened, and thanks for the prodding and motivation. I would not have finished the book without your help.

Empathy. You see what happened to someone, you understand that you could have been the one, and so you leave something nice because that's what you'd like to be done if it were you.

Typing out the ending, because it's probably the most interesting philosophical part:

An observer, since he distinguishes the space he occupies, is also a mark.

In the experiments above, imagine the circles to be forms and their circumferences to be the distinctions shaping the spaces of these forms.

In this conception a distinction drawn in any space is a mark distinguishing the space. Equally and conversely, any mark in a space draws a distinction.

We see now that the first distinction, the mark, and the observer are not only interchangeable, but, in the form, identical

While I've admitted ignorance to certain parts of GSB's demonstration, I'm not sure about the conclusion here. Not that it's wrong, only that I'm uncertain that it's earned.

Observers and such haven't really shown up until this point. He's asking us to interpret ourselves as an "m" outside of a circle where the circle is the forms around us. But this would be the simple subject, if it can be reduced to an "m"? Or no? It's not clear, because "observer" shows up at the very end.

All the same I think I like "a distinction drawn in any space is a mark distinguishing the space" -- to mark a space one must mark. Even "the unmarked state" has been used so far as equal to variables, and so works, in a sense, as a marked space would (in a different way from the way space pervades expressions)

But I'd say that GSB sees something I don't, at the end. And I suspect it's because he's an idealist. He can see that the first distinction makes the observer interchangeable with the mark because he believes that, at base, this is all mind-stuff and the forms we see are mentally constructed? Or something along those lines.

But all I see is a mark, and a man who wants to be that mark.