Realism is defined as the assertion of the existence of a reality independently of our thoughts or beliefs about it, so a Realist wouldn't deny that there is a sub-stratum. — RussellA

If Realism is the thesis that there is a sub-stratum then I'd fit anti-realist.

Just not sure what to make of the belief that the tree exists whether it's in a mind or not, given the previous notion of mind-independence. The moon spins. People feel. Perspectives fit within the surface, just as minds do, just as moons do.

I think people would be tempted to call the surface something like "experience", but I would do no such thing. "Experience" used like this is a reification. This notion of reality is that it is irreducible, and absurd -- to call it a substrate is to give it too much meaning, because there's no base.

The Phenomenological Direct Realist believes they directly perceive something existing in a mind-independent world even if they don't know its name. The Semantic Direct Realist believes they directly perceive an apple existing in a mind-independent world.

For the Direct Realist, the terms phenomenology and semantics distinguish important features of their view of reality. — RussellA

It still feels like a set-up to me. Wouldn't the direct realist have to be committed to the notion that our phenomenology is part of the world, just as semantics are? "Mind-independent" is doing a lot of work in distinguishing the direct from the indirect realist.

Let's just say the surface is mind-independent. Minds, whatever that happens to be, are within the surface, but do not define the surface. And, there's no substrate.

So by the set-up I'd be an anti-realist Direct realist :D -- maybe not so bad.

That's true, but I have an innate belief in the law of causation, in that I know that the things I perceive in my mind through my senses have been caused by things existing outside my mind in a mind-independent world.

My belief in the law of causation is not based on reason, but has been been built into the structure of my brain through 3.5 billion years of life's evolution within the world.

I have no choice in not believing in the law of causation as I have in not believing I feel pain or see the colour red. — RussellA

I don't know.

I think "causation" is one of those habits which we learn from those around us who teach us how to use it. It's different from what we feel, i.e. red or pain. We infer causation, and there are many ways of inferring causation. I'd say I am more on the side of Hume in saying that it's a habit of thought, but I wouldn't go so far as to specify it as a necessary connection between events. I think it's a much looser concept than that, as we can see the various notions of cause put forward by philosophers: Aristotle's four-causes, Hume's necessary connection, and Kant's tri-partite division into three distinct categories where the third is a synthesis of the previous two -- these conceptions of cause are not the same. Philosophers, at least in specifying this habit, are able to make distinctions between ways of thinking about causation, which gives me a reason to doubt that it's some innate idea: some of us have been able to pick it apart and then found different things. So it's more likely that we're inventing causation than it's innate, given the evidence of the intelligent and creative.

But even if causation isn't real, the trees deep in the Amazon live on without my mental blessing. Is that mind-independent?

I agree that there is the surface of perception, cognition and language which is real and we have direct access to, and there is a substratum which is also real. The Indirect Realist believes that they can only make inferences about what exists in this substratum, whilst the Direct Realist believes they can directly perceive what exists in this substratum. — RussellA

In the set up I think I understand the distinction between direct and indirect realist. However, I think I'd call myself a realist, rightly, yet deny there even is a sub-stratum. The surface is all there is which we have direct access to, and there's no reason to believe there's a substratum. That's because without access to the substrate there's no way to check our inferences, or a way to check if there is a relationship between the substrate and the surface. We could only check it against the surface. It may match the substrate, but we'd never know due to its indirectness.

Both the Indirect and Direct Realist agree that the substratum is real and exists. They both perceive, cognize and talk about "apples". The Direct Realist believes that apples exist in a mind-independent world, the Indirect Realist doesn't.

I can perceive things that I don't have words for. For example, exotic fruits of Asia. Therefore, it's possible to be able to perceive an apple without knowing that it has been named "apple".

As both the Indirect and Direct Realist agree they perceive change, we cannot use change to determine who is correct. Therefore, just consider the picture at 230 days. As both the Indirect and Direct Realist are able to perceive things they have no name for, remove any reference to the name" apple". The Direct Realist would argue that the object at day 230 exists as it is seen in a mind-independent world, whilst the Indirect Realist would argue that it doesn't. — RussellA

I feel like this notion of mind-independent world gets too much emphasis for a direct realist's way of putting things. It feels like how the indirect realist interprets the direct realist, rather than how the direct realist defends their view.

I wouldn't reduce reality to either phenomenology or semantics (or science). "Surface" is a metaphor without a counter-part in my way of understanding. I might go so far as to say -- it's all surface! No matter how deeply you dig into the earth, or bite into the apple, or build the transcendental conditions of experience it's just another surface. It's because the surface changes that we reach for these stories about in/direct reality: we like stability. We like being able to predict things. But the world is only partially predictable, and even when it is we frequently change our minds later about how we should predict change.

Rather than adding something in-between myself and reality, I'd just say reality is wider than some system of thought. Systems of thought are build to cohere, and reality is far from coherent. That's why it makes sense to say it's independent of ourselves, at least. We like coherency, and the world resists.

It's all good. I'm still behind myself for the same reasons :D -- two weeks behind, at this point, and still at work during class today. Work picked up, eating into study time (or, for me, focused time -- I run out eventually)

Yes! At least my memory of the lectures is he mentions ruling class ideas pretty frequently. Something that's nice about the lectures is that he's doing a lot of the work in making it relevant to people. I know why I find it relevant, but he's doing a great job of connecting it to the class.

Seems to me that in the example provided they're all apples. That's because you're putting the apple to use to argue against a particular position. They are no longer apples the moment we stop calling them apples. Say when the last picture was thrown into the trash and no one called it an apple anymore. (unless we want to, of course -- the apple can be resurrected in words at any time, just as it never needed to be cast into words to be itself)

In order to judge whether "apple" is the right term at a time we have to have access to the apple. And at any time, even if there is a substrate which holds the properties of the apples beneath perception and cognition and language, then all my use of "apple" will only be embedded in the shared world where the apples change, where we have perspectives, and we have no substratum to settle how it is we should use words. We remain at the surface, which we have direct access to. (surely we have direct access to the indirect reality? In which case, couldn't we just call this the real, and the other the unknown?)

Most of the time I think the indirect realist inserts more than is needed into an ontology. We might as well be anti-realists at that point -- the real is outside of perception, and all we have is perception. But the indirect realist wants to assert, all we have is perception, and there's something real out there underneath it all as an inference, as I understand it in this thread, starting from naive realism -- that what we see is what's the case, modified to our perception.

But if so I think it has to be established by some other means than by looking at change, difference in opinion, or difference in perception because these are realist things -- the realist would just note that things do, in fact, change, or do, in fact, look different at different times, which is why we select different words at different times. What's needed isn't change, but the substratum. Given all the changes we perceive, all the perspectives we have, and that we know true sentences -- how is it we know that the sentence "Reality is experienced indirectly" is true? The direct realist won't deny change or anything we experience or the mechanisms of perception, because these are all part of the world as we experience it.

Only the little story about the Real being beneath the real-- that's what's being doubted.

Finished up p 515 today. I can see why the 21MAR23 lecture was a bit big picture now -- this section is a detailed counter pre-history for the rise of capital meant to counter the myth perpetuated by economists that Capitalism is pre-history. So we get a story which spans from the slavery of the ancient world to Marx's day, largely focusing on German Feudal history but at a very big picture view.

For myself I think that I'm not satisfied with Marx's history :D. It's surely better than what he's countering. It's at least attempting to make Capital into something which arises out of the movements of history, something which isn't eternal but rather came about -- as opposed to not even the end of history, but re-interpreting old relations in capitalist terms. However, it follows along with his notion of stages too much for me. I tend to believe that Marx defines capitalism well, but I'm uncertain about the rest. And I tend to emphasize the abstract portions of Marx's theory rather than the elements where he distinguishes between proto forms of capitalism and the vestiges of feudalism. The jumps from feudal Europe in its vestigial forms of capital to capital look good to me -- though I want details for a true history rather than Marx's counter sketch -- it's the comparisons to the ancient world and slavery that always seem sort of hand wavey to me. It feels too anachronistic to call "slavery" a mode of production, especially as it lives on under capital.

Seems myopic. Philosophy is huge.

And if Marx is correct, then philosophy isn't written in journals alone (which means Bunge is certainly a poor judge of Marxism, at least)

In Bunge's view do philosophers show up to the philosophy factory and make 100 proto-ideas that can then be assembled into the Brand New Idea to Sell? The philosopher as the maker of sayings, like a Hallmark card writer? :D

Looking at his list of things for reconstructing philosophy it looks like he just wants people to write different things. And most importantly, to write with these virtues in mind: "Authenticity, clarity, criticism, depth, enlightenment, interest, materialism, nobility, openness, realism, systemism, and topicality."

Which is just to say: More philosophers should be like me. The oldest philosophical prejudice of all :D

Fair.

I'll accept the decision either way, of course. I don't want the responsibility.

Only mentioning thoughts.

That's what I was looking for and saw nothing, but I'm lazy.

I'll just say I would be fine with un-banning the member for now? Unless?

Yeh I was bummed upon reading that one.

We had a really good conversation on something I hardly ever get to really think about here.

Heh. I think I'm more uncertain, but I have no disagreement that a lot of the difficulty has to do with horrors.

The easy cases are the principles we say we hold to. "Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness" is my war-tribes creed, and they are willing to kill in the name of these values. (even as we take on more and more fascistic cultural elements, what the creed says and how it functions are at odds. They basically contradict one another)

It's always a contrast with action that causes my uncertainty in principles, so for myself it is not easy to make in-principle distinctions. I am tempted by the good, but since I have no knowledge of the good, I have no truth of the good. And I don't even have a guess as to how someone could possibly have such a knowledge. Hence, being committed to honesty, I announce my nihilism.

@unenlightened maybe we'll see one another the more I share, but maybe not. Still, in the spirit of sharing thoughts on the subject --

I have a hard time believing that anything is noble. Hence I am at least an anti-realist towards these virtues. Rather, people feel the sublime in contemplating noble actions -- but the reality of noble actions is far from beautiful, sublime, or good: for the most part Honors and nobility are the rewards of war. Moral goodness and war frequently go hand-in-hand, at least of this variety of moral goodness.

As much as I respect Nietzsche as a philosopher a lot of my beliefs can be read contra his entire project. Him and Aristotle are the usual suspects I have in mind when I think "Who is it I just basically disagree with on everything when I finally piece it all together into something coherent?" -- both hierarchical thinkers, both believers in masters and slaves, and both entirely bloodless in their lives while building an architecture of thought that supports empire, in Aristotle's case, and domination, in Nietzsche's case -- with a side dose of "self overcoming" to help those of us still invested in our slave moralities to accept Nietzsche's morality of domination.

But I would put the myth like this -- Noble goods are divine goods, and that they are out of reach for human beings. The most good a human being can do is to live a peaceful life among friends and family pursuing the simple pleasures of life. The noble goods inspire us, but they aren't meant for us to reach for them -- when we do we often commit to terrible things in the name of this greater good. They are better for myths and stories to reflect upon rather than emulate.

And yet that's far from some kind of morally realistic account. It's very much bound to an intepretation of our nature and the results I observe when people believe in a certain way, in addition to the kind of life I want to live. I want to live a peaceful life of simple pleasures, and I do so -- and I would do so were The Form of the Good to tell me to do otherwise.

And yet I will not do it.

The inversion would be -- I can only pretend that killing is bad, given my reliance upon those who are willing to kill to preserve our societies. My actions betray the feeling. The paladins of our world would say something like this, some with resentment that there are those who don't fight, because they view themselves as a necessary part of the social world which is simultaneously shamingthem for doing their duty, and some without resentment because they feel pride and honor for the good they've done. The reason they kill is to preserve freedom -- a noble good. They sacrifice their morality for the community.

Sorry, a third thought that might help us:

I read Nietzsche as the philosopher that cared so much about value that he was willing to sacrifice the good to save valuation itself.

I'd say I'm more attached to the good than I am to moral realism, and tend towards nihilism contra Nietzsche. I'm not willing to kill to save valuation. (EDIT: flipped the vowels to match the german phonetic rules)

I feel the need to note: I wouldn't call myself beyond good and evil. I basically think most people who have thought about the problem enough to be able to defend their nihilism can't make that claim just as a performative contradiction

They are only false if you misinterpret them to be statements of fact. — unenlightened

Isn't that what moral realism does? Moral anti-realism wishes to divest moral statements of fact-hood. There is no truth here -- just what's important. It's not the truth that will set you free, because there is no truth to the matter. There's nothing to deliberate or discover or argue. There are one's convictions and that's about it. Decision, in a backwards way, is what sets one free. It's the lack of deliberation, the lack of uncertainty, that frees one. Hence the temptation to call it a fact, to secure ones moral status even more.

You ought to do good, but you will not.

The moral conflict arises from identification, which is separation. I want versus we want, and then we want, versus they want.

It's only a moral conflict if there be a truth to the matter, though. If there be no truth, it's just a set of desires. And they need not even be in competition, unless that's what we want.

What moral realism is not is either that the good works or is rewarded. So societies can 'thrive', just as individuals can 'thrive', by identifying self -interest as the individual against the rest, or the tribe against the enemy. In the latter case, the selfish individual is subsumed into a selfish society. A religious sect typically makes this identification, and strengthens it with supernatural threats and promises, and pretends it is not all a mafia.

Being moral will not save you. It was always an empty promise, because if it would save you, it would be mere expediency, and even arseholes would find it expedient to be good. But it is the only end to the internal conflict, to end the identification. Than one is, ahem, beyond good and evil. In the meantime, it is a commonplace that God favours the big battalions, and therefore being good is costly and painful. — unenlightened

Right! So it makes sense to call it false. There's nothing there. There's no fact to the matter. There's no goodness. It's just you on your own making choices that feel right, just like everyone else.

I'm not following how this goes against error theory. Or, at least, there are some thoughts I have.

All moral statements are false.

However, trust and honesty are frequently built on false beliefs. In fact, for a lot of communities belief in false things is how a group checks to see if someone is trustworthy -- if you believe the gods are watching, you might think twice about crossing the rules of the tribe even when the people aren't watching. Christian communities are often obsessed with what people believe, and belief maintenance. Going to church is part of belief maintenance is part of community building is part of trust and honesty. Once a month, in the Morman church -- at least when I was a little one, who knows now -- there is what is called a "Faith and Testimony Meeting" where people who feel the spirit will get up and declare to the church their faith and testimony in the church due to the teachings and beliefs which are being maintained.

In fact, if moral statements were true, then I'd expect the sort of behavior as above, but I'd expect it across a much smaller groupings of beliefs. Instead what we have are a very wide margin of possible false beliefs that, insofar as a group lands on some strategy for child-care and belief-reproduction (belief maintenance within the family, missionary work) it's good enough to survive and thrive in the cultural jungle.

The scenario is different from the snake oil salesman, who knows he's selling snake-oil, and the false prophet, like Joseph Smith -- it's the people they are talking to who believe in false things, and form community from that. There's plenty of faith, honesty, and trust. Just not much truth.

The categorical imperative that I long considered as true was "Thou shalt not kill" -- but reality woke me up from that one. Clearly the societies which are very efficient at assigning the best people to killing are the ones which thrive. At which point -- what is moral realism anymore?

I think (?) we are forced to speak in varying intensities of metaphor, within or upon a continuum of metaphor. — green flag

I'm not certain anymore. I had thought that, but now I'm not sure. But even if so, it's still worth noting the divergence here between cellular signaling and ant-signs, yes?

It's hard to pin-point when we're no longer really talking about language, but rather using the metaphor of language to talk about something else. With cellular signaling I suspect that this is what's happened, but I admitted to not being well read on the subject of biosemiotics too which seems to go down that rabbit-hole -- so it's just a worry of mine. I tend to worry about overly complicated ontologies, especially when they start going into things we don't normally have day-to-day experience with like cellular machines, proton pumps, antibodies and so on. And then the a/sexual division which makes me doubt that we are similarly motivated enough to really be able to even begin to make metaphors of understanding, where at least with the ant I can see an organism performing a role within a community. It's close enough to count while still possibly being wrong, but in figuring out it being wrong that might point to possible differentiations between large and small writing.

At least, so the guess goes.

At the moment I'd say we don't need consciousness for a sign system. — green flag

Agreed. Consciousness is a related issue, but a side issue.

But I see the value in looking at ants, because the interplay between individual and tribe is still visible.

Cool :) That's what I want. And ant-psychology is so very different from ours too, so we can't go down the psychologistic rabbit-hole in defining the sign -- which I think is another reason it's a good thing (no reason to explain one uncertain thing with another uncertain thing like the mind)

What would reading their poetry be ? — green flag

Exactly! It's an example of something that is not-translatable, but in total. Unlike, say, English to Spanish poetry, which is very difficult but we are able to make translations because we are able to learn both languages. And we are able to interpret the ant in our languages, but we are not able to translate because the notion of ant-poetry (or ant-language) is so foreign and alien we can't even imagine what it might be like. It's entirely out of our knowledge of meaning. (EDIT: Though, quick note upon re-reading -- I hate to rely upon the imagination as an argumentive tool. It's very easy to point out that one could just not be imaginative enough)

Deep question. Do ants have consciousness ? But I don't even know what 'consciousness' means exactly. Humans use it in criminal trials and on operating tables. We implicitly (most of us) judge that the dead are not conscious, for we put them in holes or ovens, just as surgeons cut out the wisdom teeth of anesthetized patients.

It's a great question to me :) -- but hopefully the above can put the question of consciousness aside as another confusing question rather than an avenue for understanding the confusing question of the sign.

I like the continuity you are emphasizing. Biosemiosis (such as very low level cellular signaling) also interests me, but I haven't got around to studying it closely. — green flag

Me neither.

The ant example is something I take more seriously as an example of a sign than cellular signaling. At that point I'm not sure if we're speaking in metaphor or not anymore, where at least with the ant example I'm certain I'm willing to claim that has enough similarity to count as a sign -- looking at meaning as something that isn't unique to humans, at least, when thinking of writing in the large sense.

I originally thought that because they are an obvious example of a highly social species, even moreso than ourselves, and it seems to me that this is a good guess to begin in looking for some kind of bridge between the two kinds of writing. And now I'm thinking any sexual species must have language at some level in order to coordinate copulation, but it may also be very metaphorical at that point -- it's a little hard to see what we have in common with sharks, for instance. There clearly is more than just this point, but it's an important point to consider in looking at cellular signalling, because they are asexual. Making it even stranger for us to relate to -- which means it may be their "language" is is so foreign that it'd be foolish to understand it on the architecture of understanding our own language.

Some thoughts on translation:

Even though ants are writing meaningfully to one another in a way which we can translate into our language that doesn't mean that we are suddenly speaking ant, or that they can speak English. If there be a poetry of ants we'd have to be an ant to read it. But we know we have poetry, at least. So there's something to claiming these four tokens as a sign (English sentences, braille, sign-language, ant pheromones) -- but that sort of meaning is larger than and doesn't include translation, per se, where "translation" is an act whereby a writer who knows two languages is able to re-express meaning in a similar manner in both of them. (the first three obviously count as translatable, where the fourth is questionable). But just because this writing is "larger" that doesn't mean "better" -- just more encompassing. We, as humans, will clearly prefer the first three examples of signs over ant-signs, and if there be a way to understand language on a scientific basis then it'd make sense to prod why it is our species is able to write in the small sense.

Relating our abilities to the creatures around us seems to me to be the route I'm most interested in. It just gets very confusing very easily.

The apparent medium-independence is also fascinating. It's easy for us now anyway to switch between reading and listening. Then of course we speak and hear so many metaphors meant for eyes (visual memory, I guess.)

Right! That's what makes it hard to specify some set of conditions for a sign. Along with everything else we've said so far.

I think we are basically on the same page. Meaning is between and within us. — green flag

Yup! Seems pretty close. Though it's worth noting that what we are close in is confusion :D

My mind changes a lot. But I think that's a good thing. And I frequently find myself in between positions.

I have certain loves: Epicurus, Kant, Marx, Feyerabend, Camus, Levinas

But thems are just loves. And we aren't our lovers, much less the people we hold in admiration.

I'm pretty creative so I mostly like to explore different notions on the boards -- usually others' because it's easier to comment than to make an OP, but sometimes I get the gumption to start a discussion.

Welcome to the boards. Do you have a "lay of the land" you'd share about yourself?

Cool. This might be the one thing that allows me to draw a distinction between myself and those who believe in Propositions, for instance (which fits the loose notion of Platonism) -- the words mean, but we are still their creators. And they are up for interpretation, so emphasis on the we: what I intend is not per se what I say. Intent could be important for my listener, but need not be. And it's this interplay between writer and interpreter where meaning originates, I think. (and the sharing of interpretations is itself a new writing which must be interpreted, and so on as long as we desire, which is a lot higher than one might suppose for the philosophically inclined ;) )

So, yes, a very large number. But still finite.

(EDIT: Also, I thought it a mistake but then I kind of liked the distinction between writer-listener -- it's perfect for disrupting the notion that a sign must be either visual or aural, and the pheromone example demonstrates how it could even be chemical (and need not include homosapeins -- most social species, I imagine, have language, whatever it is))

You can think of an infinite number of tokens in a certain sense by adding context to each traditionally conceived token. You might never use 'token' twice in the same context. We can also imagine sentences as tokens for a countable infinity. And so on. But you make a good point about the reuse of words. There's a paper out there about the use and efficiency of ambiguity. Our short words tend to be ambiguous. We've learned to lean on the practical context to cheapen the cost of babble. — green flag

Are there an infinite number of sentences?

I think there's a very large number of sentences, and language is infinitely iterable -- but it's used within a finite amount of time, so there will only be so many finite sentences produced, for instance, if our theory of tokens is that sentences are tokens.

But one thing I'd push against here is that language must use sentences. The stop light is a good example of tokens of meaning without English sentences (though surely, if we normally use English, we interpret with English and explain what the lights mean in English -- green means go, red means stop, yellow means slow down)

So part of the difficulty in asking after the sign is even choosing what a token is. Is braille sententially structured? What is its relation to sign-language, and what is sign-languages relationship to ant pheromones which mean "follow this trail" when interpreted into English?

Sure. We are practically successful. There are billions of us. I imagine philosophy as wanting a tighter and tighter grip and yet a larger and more articulated view of the world. To solidify and sharpen what we mean manifests something like a will to power and beauty. Why does a cat groom itself ? — green flag

I think a certain kind of philosophy likes to pursue a grasping of the world. For me, I pretty much find pleasure in the activity itself. And I see so many potential avenues for philosophical development that it's really fascinating. Sometimes there is comfort in having an articulated viewpoint, and sometimes there is comfort in recognizing that articulated viewpoint as something more like a model to share with others and less like a grasping of reality.

So, in short, I do it for fun and sociality.

I believe language means also, I just don't know exactly what it means to say so. — green flag

Yup! :D

So I'm a semantic finitist rather than a semantic nihilist, right ?

Sounds good to me :).

For myself, I don't feel coherent enough to have a classification yet. It's just one of those questions which lingers in the back of my mind, one which I don't even know how to formulate clearly, even though here we are talking about meaning.

It is a system of metaphor that structures our everyday conceptual system, including most abstract concepts, and that lies behind much of everyday language. — green flag

Not sure what "It" means here.

As Derrida noted, metaphor is itself a metaphor. What the hell does it mean to call something a metaphor ? If metaphysics is metaphorical, then metaphor is playing a metaphysical role in the structure as center or basis. I call this the blurry go round. It's a merry hurrying through the fog. — green flag

I prefer to attempt to put the question of meaning aside from metaphysics, first. I think it makes much more sense to say we don't know metaphysics as we know science (points in favor of the structuralists -- comparison helps clarify meaning). But regardless of all that, surely we must be able to use language?

I think I'm persuaded by the pragmatics of language. Meaning and use are not the same. But I think the method of looking at use clarifies meaning. Something I think about is that even though language on the whole has a possibly infinite number of meanings, any one token of meaning can't have any more than some finite number of meanings. "token" as in token/type.

Is taking meaning as basic a kind of platonism ? Are meanings 'basically' forms ? — green flag

Heh. That's the question! I don't believe in forms, and yet I believe words mean. It sounds like platonism of some kind, but I don't think that's really believable either.

Metaphysical words aren't meaningless, but their status is strange. They float over an abyss, one might say. How is their meaning to be grounded ? If it all ? — green flag

Is "grounded" the right relationship to seek? And if so, what even is grounding?

I usually just take meaning as basic. Being a competent speaker of a language means knowing meanings, and we seem able to use English. It's us that knows what words mean. In fact, sometimes we're even something like the gods of meaning, creating words ex nihilo -- a strike against the structuralists.

The critique of phonocentrism also detaches (elusively pure) "meaning" from the voice. If what is poured in the ear is mostly signs evoking images, we like to drink our hieroglyphs with the mouths on the side of our face. — green flag

Derrida is in the back of my mind. In particular there's a difference between the meaning of the sign, or writing in the small sense, and meaning, or writing in the large sense. Writing can be taken as primary to speech, where speech is phono-centric writing.

At which point -- how do we know what the sign is? Isn't it that which is always-already meaningful?

And if everything is text, writing in the large sense, that too is meaningful. Meaning overflows our signs. Writing is a chasing after, a drawing a trace within a meaningful world using the pen we all have, our body -- in whatever capacity.

Which goes further to highlight how difficult it is to come up with a general notion of the sign. Even those without writing in the small sense manage to communicate meaning in the large sense. What could a sign possibly be, given how widespread meaning is in this set up?

I should have done bookend last week. I think I'll be able to catch up this week. But, I haven't even caught up with last week's reading yet much less this week's, so I'm going to hold on posting notes as I listen until I catch up on readings. (the lectures are saved, after all, so I'll take advantage of that.)

The next bookend, though, ending on page 584:

… Apart from the circumstance that the preparation of a larger quantity admits of a more effective division of labour and the employment of superior machinery, there is in this matter that sort of latitude, arising from a quantity of labour and capital lying unemployed, and ready to furnish additional commodities at the same rate. Thus does it happen that a considerable increase of demand often takes place without raising prices.’(73.)>

:D

I like that one. The whole album is great.

A couple of songs about death that have been ringing about my mind:




EDIT: Changed the video for Leonard Cohen to the album cover. I just posted the video thinking it would have the song but upon watching saw it was more than that.

Epicurus and the tetrapharmakos is what came to mind first for me. Glad to see someone else mention that line of thought.

-- I'd say what you feel about death is the healthy place to be, insofar that it is a genuine feeling. My feelings on death fluctuate. I certainly fear it in the sense of avoiding death -- even fireworks make me jump!

So when I say to myself "Death is nothing to us" I mean to remind myself that my fears are temporal. It's natural to fear death, and it is good to remember that this fear isn't a real thing you can defeat. For some of us that part is not so easy to accept.

Well, I can try! I don't think meaning is an easy subject to discuss. Some difficulties:

It has a self-referential quality -- what we say is an example of the phenomenon being explored, and so in the act we can make new examples that break old rules, even the rules that we may supply ourselves.

Presuming rules even matter in the matter of meaning, which seems doubtful but it's a place to begin.

And this is true even if we don't find counter-examples in a given discussion -- given that language has an infinite number of possible iterations, one might even predict that every theory of meaning has a counter-example, and the successful theories of meaning are theories for which we haven't found the counter-examples yet ;).

And in the midst of deliberation, we could claim that a given sentence is "meaningless", so it doesn't count against a theory of meaning. (it's easy to find ways to "save" a pet theory of meaning)

Then there's the possibility of undermining ourselves in the same manner that we might be suspicious of:

If one ends up convinced that signs get their meaning from their relationships with other signs, then one ends up suspicious about terms like 'consciousness' and 'being' and 'qualia.' It's not a simple matter of denial. It's rather a sense that people don't know what they are talking about, and (often enough) they don't know that they don't know what they are talking about. — green flag

If it's possible for others to not know that they do not know, how can I know that I do know? Especially when meaning seemed so simple and easy this whole time, almost as if it were given, and now it seems impossible to determine?


Which says a lot about my doubts and difficulties. Maybe that'll be enough to the task of feeling like we understand one another :) -- though it certainly didn't help in answering the question of meaning.

Personally I'd like to know if anyone else has been struck with a strong sense of just how foggy sense tends to be. — green flag

Present.

:)

All I know is that they mean with guesses at what they mean -- I certainly don't know how they mean, and at times doubt that they mean but immediately recant as the expression makes sense in the moment of the saying.

Correct me if I am wrong, but it seems as though you are noting that philosophical positions tend to be complex and hard to nail down precise distinctions between views, which I agree with; but, why would this entail that we can’t achieve one—or shouldn’t strive for it? I don’t think that we are barred from making “concrete” distinctions in philosophy, but I would grant it is exceptionally difficult to achieve such due to the nature of the study. — Bob Ross

Oh I think it's OK to strive for impossible goals. Else philosophy would surely disappear! :D

Just noting that as we move from different communities that we sort of have to start rolling the rock from the bottom of the hill again. (EDIT: And sometimes even within the same community!)

I agree, but I still think we should strive for it. However, I am starting to view general distinctions in philosophy as not mutually exclusive and exhaustive options (to your point). — Bob Ross

Cool. :)

It seems as though we have a lot in common with our views; and that you’re response to my “blurring of the distinction” is that that is what the distinction is (i.e., blurry) by its own nature; but I still think we ought to strive to make clear distinctions (even generally). — Bob Ross

Yup! I think we understand one another now!

It is impossible to maintain both direct realism and our scientific understanding of the mechanics of perception and the world. — Michael

Given that I can see a world, that's so much the worse for our scientific understandings ;)

But, even more, surely we can be realists who are not scientific realists? That is, we may not infer that our scientific understandings are reality.

It sounds like you are noting that words are always up for redefinition: that, at every level, we could “cut it up” differently—am I correct?

If so, then it seems to me that this is true of all words, is it not? — Bob Ross

Yes. Though I'm hopeful that the point is non-trivial to what you are asking. I pretty much hold this belief with respect to any discussions about determining what is real, so there is a general place I'm coming from in thinking here, though I'm trying to tailor it to the specific topic at hand.

General philosophical categories are frequently like this. They are not like the general category of "cars" because there are concretes to refer to. Here the elements of the set are philosophical positions, which themselves usually operate more like webs than isolated propositions. And as you hold certain parts of a view as true -- the metaphor of nailing them down within a conversation -- usually you can find various ways of interpreting a position as part of one camp or another due to the web-like structure of philosophical positions and how you can interpret them in various ways.

I thought the point was that they are only ever general theories? Are you saying there’s no way to make a distinction (even generally) at all? — Bob Ross

The reverse! We can make distinctions, but upon doing so we are no longer talking generally, but rather are creating a set of understandings that we can think through together.

But after making those distinctions, say you were to go to another group of people who are enthusiastic about philosophy, they won't hold in some general sense. New terms will have to be forged in that group.

But the general notions of realism or nihilism will still be there -- people will generally know what you mean by those terms, that one holds morals to be real in some sense and the other holds morals to not be real in some sense, that it's basically a metaphysical question (as opposed to an ethical question), and usually if someone has read something they'll have a general idea about which positions tend to fall under which category.

But at that stage everything is blurry -- we haven't really agreed upon terms yet. We could very easily talk past one another in thinking that these terms have set definitions! Something in a school setting that's easier to do is give these words some kind of permenance on the basis of the reptition of classes or a shared understanding of certain works. But when trying our hand at it here -- well, it seems apparent to me at least that these general categories don't have fixed meanings, that they frequently -- when we include multiple beliefs and positions within them -- have conflicts within themselves that can be exploited for philosophical purposes.

But upon doing so we usually start holding terms steady. And that's when it seems that we're no longer dealing with some general philosophical categories which have distinct meanings but rather a loose grouping of positions which we can then explore together upon coming to a mutual understanding.

Exactly, I think that objective moral judgements are only possible as non-cognitive, whereas cognitive moral judgments are always subjective. It is, indeed, a very unusual realism (or maybe anti-realism: I don’t know (: ). — Bob Ross

Hah! Well, if you don't know, then I certainly don't! :D -- And with what I've said so far I'd expect any particular philosophical position to be difficult to categorize within the general frames.

I didn’t quite follow this part: what does it mean to “reverse the initial determination”? I am failing to comprehend what a reversal would be. — Bob Ross

From "real" to "not-real" -- the reversal is with respect to the judgment of a position as realist or nihilist.

I am a bit confused, as moral cognitivism and non-cognitivism are not indicators, in themselves, of whether a person is a moral realist or anti-realist: moral subjectivists, like nihilists (error theorists), also hold that moral judgments are propositional. If someone tells me they think moral judgments are cognitive, I do not thereby infer that they are a moral realist.

Is your point, perhaps, that error theory is an example of a moral anti-realist view that, somewhere along the history of the moral realist vs. anti-realist debate, broke the distinction; whereof they had to refurbish it to accommodate for it? — Bob Ross

Yes! A rephrase, though -- I don't think I could make the claim in history, because while I'm familiar with the terms I'm not familiar with the contemporary history. However, conceptually, that's what I'm saying. It may be that this was more an idiosyncratic example of a theory which forced me to rethink the categories, but I think I've managed to communicate myself by golly. :)

I am starting to understand more: thank you! It seems as though you are formulating two mutually exclusive options (which are different than the moral realism vs. anti-realism distinction, for nihilism is an example of the latter): “realism” or “nihilism”; where the former is the position that there are objective moral judgments and the latter is that there isn’t. Furthermore, this “realism-nihilism” distinction is fundamentally ambiguous (and only for general distinction purposes). If one derives an unambiguous distinction, then they are, according to your view, not making a metaethical distinction because that can only be general (which is ambiguous). Am I understanding you correctly?

If so, then it seems as though you are claiming one is barred from achieving a clear distinction in metaethics; however, I am uncertain as to why that would be true. Why, fundamentally, can we not achieve a clear distinction between objective and non-objective morals? I understand that I too am blurring the distinction; but I mean it more in the sense that the current distinction is blurred and not that I cannot fundamentally achieve a clear distinction in metaethics.

Likewise, I didn’t entirely follow the entailment from the fundamental, blurry nature of distinctions in metaethics (e.g., the “realism-nihilism” distinction) to there is always going to be a blurry line between metaethics and normative ethics: can you explain that further? I am understanding you to be claiming that the meta-normative ethic distinction is, likewise, blurry (and fundamentally always going to be that way): assuming I am understanding correctly, why? — Bob Ross

It sounds like to me that you are almost saying we could get a clear distinction going (if we only clarified our terminology in a precise manner); so I might have misunderstood your first paragraph. — Bob Ross

I'd formulate realism-nihilism as more of a gradient, I think, where the most extreme form of the gradient is exclusion/inclusion rules without any exceptions, in which case it would then be two mutually exclusive options. And to make it even more confusing, I'd note that even the rules for establishing the gradient are up for negotiation.

Also, I was using "nihilism" more loosely to be synonymous with anti-realism, and just thought it sounded better than repeating realism vs anti-realism -- purely aesthetic choice there, but I should have stuck with your terms to keep the conversation more manageable.

Given that I don't believe there to be a general theory of moral realism or anti-realism my support for my initial claim is only due to repetition of the above procedure: For any given norm it can be given either a realist or anti-realist interpretation, and often the same norm can be given either interpretation just by changing the rules of inclusion/exclusion for the categories "moral realism" or "moral anti-realism".

We have cognitivism vs non-cognitivism, for instance, where the former is often interpreted as a form of realism, and the latter is often interpreted as a form of anti-realism. But then error theory is a response to the sense-making argument for cognitivism (that moral statements are meaningful, and used, so how could they be different from the other statements, like plumbing or building buildings, which are meaningful and used?): it provides an interpretation of all moral sentences, in the T/F sense, assigning "False" as the value for all moral statements. This is then secured by noting how the artificial process described here mirrors common ways of thinking, like how we think about astrology -- the words all make sense, but most of us who like rationality tend to think they aren't about real things. They are false statements that make sense.

And here you're providing the realist interpretation of non-cognitivism in your OP :D -- at least if I'm understanding you correctly.

The procedure above is similar to the one I started with Kant's notion of Freedom grounding ethics. In general what I'd aim to do for any proposed rule for classifying an ethical position as moral realism vs moral anti-realism is provide an interpretation which reverses the initial determination. The stronger reversals do not add auxiliary hypotheses (which I think Error theory accomplishes), but I hope we can agree that a reversal can be accomplished through auxiliary hypotheses without that being controversial.

Hopefully this is clarifying rather than adding more confusion. I appreciate your patience!

What exactly do you mean here? I don’t think I completely followed. — Bob Ross

I'll do my best to explain myself.

Given any norm, be it consequential, deontic, virtue-theoretic, or somewhere in between, I claim that one can classify that norm as realistic or nihilistic based upon one's theory of realism or nihilism. The inclusion-rules for realism-nihilism can be modified without ever changing the normative-level theory. I believe it's a different question from the normative one, entirely, so as we change the rules for realism-nihilism we can include and disclude the normative-level theories -- which at least leads me to believe that there will never be a clean map between the normative and the meta-ethical. It will always be blurry, until we start nailing some terms down. And then it will be specific, and it won't be a general theory of realism/nihilism.

am not invoking Kant (although the term does originate with him) but, rather, “objective moral judgments”. As far as I understand, one does not need to hold there is this Kantian notion (or rationalist notion) of free will (in the sense of autonomy vs. heteronomy) to be a moral realist. So an anti-realist (or, as a matter of fact, anyone) can validly state that my implict-moral judgments are not voluntary in the Kantian sense, and so Kant would probably disagree that they are moral judgments; but I don’t agree with Kant either. — Bob Ross

Cool, cool. I'm shooting in the dark a bit. I don't mind being corrected, so correct away :)

Interesting, I think fixated-upon norms would be anti-realist because I don’t think any of them are objective. I don’t think the thesis for moral realism entails that one has to have a basis of choice over it, but I could be wrong. — Bob Ross

Yup, no worries. I agree. If anything my position is emphasizing how much room we have for our theorizing, and how that's what makes it difficult. I chose Kant because it looked like it fit and it's a rich vocabulary, but I know we don't have to use his words. Hell, I don't agree with him either !

Error theory is not a moral realist position: it is an anti-realist one. They hold that:

1. Moral statements are propositional (i.e., cognitive).
2. They are all objectively false.

I guess I should clarify that by the realist position I do not mean that they just hold a position grounded in objectivity but, rather, that there are true objective moral judgments—sorry if that was ambiguous in my post. — Bob Ross

I agree here. Sorry for the confusion. I was specifically riffing off of @Banno's definition to point out how there can be ambiguity in any set up of realism-nihilism, which is mostly what I'm pointing to I think: we're going to have to pin down some words and terms before being able to answer.

I see anti-realism (regardless of whether it be error theoretic, subjectivist, non-cognitivist, or some other sub-camp underneath anti-realism) as the claim that there are no objective norms, which I think is half-incorrect (as there are implicit-categorical norms, but no fixated-upon-categorical norms); but, likewise, moral realism tends to be that there are objective norms, and this is taken to mean both fixated and implicit types--which I disagree with. So, I am, more and more, starting to give up on the distinction itself — Bob Ross

First I'd say that distinction is a general one -- so no need to hold to it.

But also, no need to hold to "objective norms" or "there are/not categorical imperatives" as setting out the meaning of anti-realism.

Generally I believe meta-ethics tends to not map onto normative ethics -- usually you can find a way to defend a realist or anti-realist version of a norm, depending upon how you set out realism or nihilism.

But onto your distinction:

I find that an “objective norm” (or “categorical norm”) is a norm (i.e., an obligation) which is necessarily issued by a being’s faculty of normitivity; and it is implicit and involuntary. In other words, such a norm (which is objective) is because one exists with a nature that fundamentally has such and not an obligation that they decided to fixate upon. Thusly, I find the need to distinguish implicit-moral judgments and fixated-upon-moral judgments: the former being objective, and the latter non-objective. — Bob Ross

The anti-realist could say something along the lines that these implicit and involuntary norms don't sound like categorical imperatives, because you couldn't choose them. Deontology, in its Kantian form (which I'm guessing that's appropriate given "categorical imperative") at its base, is an ethics of freedom -- so remove freedom, and it's no longer a moral choice (though it could be a legal choice, say if we brainwashed a criminal into becoming good, they would be following the legality of the moral law but not the morality)

So it'd be better to classify that kind of instinct as non-cognitivist -- an emotional attachment which has no reason. Hence, anti-realism.

Then, of fixated-upon norms, it kind of goes in reverse -- it's the very basis of choice which allows these to be moral! Hence, moral realism.

Moral realism is the idea that moral statements have a truth value - they are true or they are false. — Banno

Error theory being a noteworthy example to highlight for blending those two sentences: they have a truth value, and they are false.

Mostly using your post as an opportunity to highlight how realism-nihilism don't have clean maps, and can be set out in various ways.

I tend to favor moral anti-realism, but mostly out of laziness. I agree that nature-based arguments -- or virtue-theoretic devices, which is how I'm interpreting you -- blur the distinction between moral anti/realism. I think that's one of its virtues, actually: rather than asking if there are these immutable rules which are true for all moral agents, virtue-theoretic devices focus on attempting to build the kind of character which has a tendency to make wise decisions. So it intentionally doesn't take up the question of moral anti/realism at all, and tends to blend elements of both without much attention to the question of moral anti/realism.

Almost like it's irrelevant. . .

21MAR23 lecture notes.

Haven't read the section yet, but still taking notes to share and listen for nuggets to think about while I do the reading.

"The recognition of capital is one of the themes of this section"

Marx is trying to name capital, give it a definition, and make it recognizable. From the previous capital is a process, not a thing.

Marx wants to name capital and the capitalist. So it's an exciting session but it's also a very complicated one because of the various ways Marx is trying to set up to understand the concept of capital.

"The true nature of capital emerges only at the end of the second cycle" -- that is at that point surplus-value has been used to create more surplus-value.... back in the chapter on money Marx talks about how we are ruled by abstractions, where no one is responsible.

The spiral form comes about when capital posits its presuppositions -- it presupposes labor and posits more labor through surplus value extraction.

Production -- Circulation: two moments that are separate and need to be separated, but then they merge. (after at least two cycles, so that surplus-value can be produced by means of surplus-value)

The circulation process as a whole incorporates the moment of production and now we are looking at a totality, or a unity.

There's a large section here about different modes of production through history. (this'll be interesting to me!)

The relationship to nature differed prior to capital. You cannot have a capitalist system that does not separate culture from nature, and which does not treat nature as a resource for exploitation. Whereas other economies people tend to see themselves as part of nature.

The whole conceptual apparatus of capital is to dominate nature, you figure out its rules and that permits us to rule -- these conceptual forms evolve from the economic engine requiring nature to become a resource.

This suggests there's something going on with the metabolic relations of nature -- capital works on the metabolic relations of nature. . . these transitions that have occurred deal with the understandings, ideas, and practices towards the metabolic relations of nature. If we treat everything from nature as a free gift then we can use them until they are gone. And we have this idea that it's not a good thing to do, but it would require a change in the mode of production, given this relationship between economies and nature. And capital cannot do this because it's committed to endless growth.

Conceptual apparatus for talking of transitions: barriers that exist, and dissolution. Capitalist mode of production dependend upon the dissolution of peasant forms, dissolution of institutional structures and modes of thinking of a peasant based society -- similar to the dissolution of the barriers to exchange.

Large discussion about disagreements between Stalin and Mao and interpreting China as a peasant society so Mao is leading a peasant rebellion and that's bad according to Stalin. "Oriental mode of production" came up but eh.

"Thus the old view, in which the human being appears as the aim of production, regardless of his limited national, religious, political character, seems to be very lofty when contrasted to the modern world, where production appears as the aim of mankind and wealth as the aim of production. In fact, however, when the limited bourgeois form is stripped away, what is wealth other than the universality of individual needs, capacities, pleasures, productive forces etc.,created through universal exchange? The full development of human mastery over the forces of nature, those of so-called nature as well as of humanity's own nature? The absolute working-out of his creative potentialities, with no presupposition other than the previous historic development, which makes this totality of development, i.e. the development of all human powers as such the end in itself, not as measured on a predetermined yardstick? Where he does not reproduce himself in one specificity, but produces his totality? Strives not to remain something he has become, but is in the absolute movement of becoming? In bourgeois economics -- and in the epoch of production to which it corresponds -- this complete working-out of the human content appears as a complete emptying-out, this universal objectification as total alienation, and the tearing-down of all limited, one-sided aims as sacrifice of the human end-in-itself to an entirely external end. This is why the childish world of antiquity appears on one side as loftier. On the other side, it really is loftier in all matters where closed shapes, forms and given limits are sought for. It is satisfaction from a limited standpoint; while the modern gives no satisfaction; or, where it appears satisfied with itself, it is vulgar" -- p. 488. Harvey went too fast for me to type it out so I grabbed my copy to type it out because when he was reading it it hit a lot of points.

We're at a halfway point, in a sense, so we'll be looking at what capital posits, now that we've covered what capital presupposes.

And onto Q&A. Work being what it is I'm gonna skip out here, and post notes.

Not really, the way I'm telling it. Which is that 'disenchanted' is the identification of the 'gritty realist' who stalks the boards explaining to us primitives how our beliefs keep us detached from reality. Instead of examining their own beliefs – 'Life has no meaning' as a meaningful fact. It is a step off the path, rather than a step on it, like Bunyan's Slough of Despond. — unenlightened

I've filled in some details and gone too far in my description then. And come to think of it it was foolish of me to outline a path to enlightenment when I'm not enlightened, even in sketch form. There is this seeming that dis-enchantment is enlightenment. And that could go some way to explain the prevalence of our gritty realists meaningfully declaring that there is no meaning -- it feels like enlightenment.

I wonder why? What is this feeling of enlightenment? And surely it can go in reverse, too, though perhaps they aren't the exact same spell, then -- but they both end in belief. It's that belief which is important, and seen as important. Which is what you said, but I'm just tuning into it now. (I'm afraid I wanted to put too fancy a conceptual bow on top in my first reply)

The move you describe -- when one tells another that their belief detach them from reality. That's at least a philosophical move. And at times it could function as a spell, because no one has authority over reality itself, and yet that way of talking is claiming authority on the real -- at least enough authority to be able to tell you that your beliefs detach you from reality (thereby knowing enough about how beliefs work, how you work, how reality works, and the relationships between all those three all through some internet posts -- seems quite the stretch, when you put it in rational terms, that anyone could possibly know that much. But disenchantment is more my bag after all :) )

But everything one reads about a real enlightenment suggests that there is no path. One requires a disciplined intention to strip oneself of unnecessary baggage, but the step out of oneself is a single step, not a journey; a step that one cannot take oneself, but that is given by grace, or comes as a sudden insight, unexpectedly when the ground has been prepared.

In a soldier's stance, I aimed my hand
At the mongrel dogs who teach
Fearing not I'd become my enemy
In the instant that I preach
My existence led by confusion boats
Mutiny from stern to bow

[Refrain]
Ah, but I was so much older then
I'm younger than that now
— Bob Dylan

The attainment of youth, you see, is the real cure. One dies every day and thus remains Forever Young. — unenlightened

Nice :).

Can libertarian free will (the idea that it's possible to have done something else in the past) exist in any universe whatsoever? My gut answer is no because it seems illogical to justify its existence. How can an exactly identical situation have multiple possible outcomes? If you try to explain what would make an agent choose one action over another, you seem to be reinforcing the idea that actions have a cause. — Cidat

In one set up of libertarian free will actions have a cause but that cause is not necessity. It's freedom. It's an entirely different causal structure which does not follow the form "if A then necessarily B", or however one wants to bring necessity into the linguistic structure. The reason these things don't conflict is because causal structures which follow the necessary form are inventions by us rather than ontological realities: just because we've found some things which always follow a rule, and those things compose us, that doesn't mean we follow those rules. That's the fallacy of composition. So while we can be composed of things which sometimes follow necessary rules, we ourselves don't have to follow those rules: we follow a different causality, the causality of freedom, in which an agent causes things rather than a prior state of affairs.