Re "the spin-off theory": Indeed, the lack of progress in philosophy may be an illusion.
Well, again, it depends on how one defines and what one considers as "progress" ... — Alkis Piskas

Definitely. And I'm saying that philosophy often serves as a kind of creative ground for the creation of new sciences -- it's called philosophy when no one agrees and it sounds absurd (Galileo), and it's called science after someone shows how clever they are (by hook or by crook, but people are often persuaded by accurate predictions or things which satisfy their desires so those are frequently focused upon -- but note it's not the truth of propositions, but rather there persuasiveness that's being put forward here)

I don't think there's really an essence between the disciplines -- rather, more like a continuum that as things become uncontroversial scientists begin to step in and expand while holding some fundamentals constant.

Philosophers, on the whole, don't hold concepts constant or agree upon what philosophy should be doing.

So it's a sociological theory as to why we believe these things are different: they're different because we treat them differently, on the basis of how much agreement there is.

Against that Chalmer's points out:

Only one view (non-skeptical realism about the external world) attracts over 80% support. Three views (a priori knowledge, atheism, scientific realism) attract over 70% support, with significant dissent, and three more views attract over 60% support.

So that would seem to be, relative to his notion of progress (multiplicitous, but still concerned with true beliefs), a counter-argument to the claim.

I'd just say that these questions will change throughout history, except maybe the first one -- but I'd say the first one is a conceit of modern philosophy more than a real issue, so it's not a surprise that people agree on it. It's part of the culture of philosophy. It wouldn't be that interesting to discuss knowledge if we didn't know anything, right? So realism is a natural belief for people interested in philosophy, given that they care about such things. If someone were a skeptic, they likely wouldn't care too much about knowledge and metaphysics.

I'm still making my way through Chalmer's, but I'm pretty sure that my complaint is going to be somewhat dry but focused on measurement. I don't think Chalmer's is going into the problems of measuring things like "convergence to the truth" or "degree of belief" -- much less whose beliefs get to count (if a scientist quits his job and is looking for another, do the beliefs still count? How long? Do graduate students count? What about if one of the respondents changes their beliefs down the line, a common phenomena? How about when a belief is able to be expressed by two different sentences? Does the believer believe both sentences, or only one? Stuff like that)

That is, what appears to Chalmer's to be an empirical proposition in his argument "There has not been large collective convergence on the big questions of philosophy.", while it may be true, and I think it's empirical in principle, in practice we wouldn't know how to determine the empirical truth of the proposition. So it boils down to dueling intuitions on the beliefs of others'.

"Advancing" means making progress, which is the subject of this topic. And the subject of progress in philosophy is discussed quite a lot. One of the many interesting articles is "Why Progress Is Slower In Philosophy Than In Science" ((https://dailynous.com/2017/06/02/progress-slower-philosophy-science/), published in a site about professional philosophy. — Alkis Piskas

My thought is that there is neither progress in science or philosophy, really. "Progress" has some end-goal in mind, or at least a notion of how things ought to improve. And what scientists think of scientific progress isn't exactly the same as what the public at large thinks about scientific progress -- and as for philosophical progress, that simply depends upon the person speaking since there's no means for specifying, exactly, what progress consists in. Or, at least, one can do so -- but it will just be a stipulation.


I was suggesting, though, that the intension of "science" is "that which people tend to agree to" and the intension of "philosophy" is "that which people tend to disagree upon" in many uses -- but that the extension of those terms changes over time depending upon the state of a given science/philosophy. (basically the spin-off theory mentioned in your article. The other article linked there has a paywall, and I done read my free ones this month)

Science is advancing. This is very obvious. But is philosophy? — Alkis Piskas

I think that the perception of philosophical "advance" (whatever that might mean) is being colored by this belief. If advancement is understood to mean "be like the sciences" and philosophy is understood to mean "whatever it is, it's not science" then we shouldn't be surprised that we don't feel like philosophical advancement hasn't happened. That's just how we set up how to use our words.

*shrugs* Ignore it. Just trying to work within certain parameters I don't know. You shot down the example, so I wanted an example, but then it occurred to me that the two ethics should serve as a good enough basis for pointing out -- the open question argument works between Aristotle and Epicurus because both of these are naturalistic ethics that posit different goods.

Linking it back to Post-modern philosophy and ethics, Aristotle would serve a modernist, and Epicurus would serve as post-modernist because of their relationship to truth and knowledge. For Epicurus, while he certainly didn't deny truth, the value of truth is relative to what it can be used for -- or, to what extent it can be used to cure the soul of anxiety.

Or, sans an example... it should be enough to say, here are two naturalisms: Aristotle and Epicurus. So it makes sense to ask: Which naturalism is good? If there is a choice in the matter, then the facts are important to our judgment, of course: but the question still makes sense in light of the judgment between naturalisms which posit different goods. Clearly both were motivated by the facts, but what counts as good wasn't the same.

Sure, no problem.

So, who counts?

Aristotle and Alexander the Great?

Anyone alive today?

If that were so, then It'd almost make the point for me -- that there are two naturalisms here, and even with natural ethical facts, the ethical choice remains. Almost, because @180 Proof doesn't see Bezos as Aristotelian, so we can drop him. I have to wait to hear more about what sort of examples would even count, given the suspicion for philosopher's inventions.

I mean, in terms of actual access to psychological states of the elite, then I'd have to say I'm pretty dry on that. You agree that the elite are what Aristotle considers good, though, yes? Just of the political variety?

Oh, that's not your fault. I have more than a few threads I'm thinking through :D


Let's take Jeff Bezos. The man seems to be doing well for himself. I doubt he feels anxiety. He very likely has more good days than bad. While he doesn't follow the model of Epicurean bliss, I doubt that he needs to. He's probably feeling quite dandy.

But his life requires others to suffer, at least in our way of looking at the world: there's no free lunch, and the rich get rich on the backs of the poor.

So he's an example of a man living in equanimity, who doesn't worry -- but because the social system is set up in a way where others must labor for him.

That's hardly fair.

But by a bio-ethics, Bezos is basically a good person. Specifically, Aristotle's bio-ethics would say he's not just a good person, but the pinnacle of ethics -- and that being good is reserved to those like Bezos who are among the elite. (or, at least, he serves as an example -- due to the nature of ethics, of course we could posit someone else or interpret Aristotle differently, but I'm trying to use a real person due to the concern you brought up about philosopher inventions)

Moore's open question argument still punches because I can ask -- while Jeff Bezos is living a good life, is he good?

Just that the question works is all that matters, from the meta-ethical point. But I can understand that such things are rarified in relation to how one lives their life.

So, from my perspective -- and not because it is true -- I say Jeff Bezos shouldn't be allowed to exist in the first place, that his life is a bad life because it's not fair, even though he's living a naturally happy life (I doubt tranquility is his M.O., which is where the Epicurean would criticize him -- but the Peripatetic could very well say, yes, Bezos is the pinnacle of human goodness, and we are justified in so saying due to our biological nature)

Let's take the tetrapharmakos:

The Gods do not care about your life (so do not try and appease them with your actions)
There is no afterlife (so live the life you have, and not for a life hereafter)
What is good is easy to get (all you need are the basics to be happy)
What is painful is easy to endure (so you need not worry about the diseases you might experience later)

A simple enough set of beliefs meant to target what Epicurus saw as sources of anxiety in people's lives.

But one that only makes sense if you want to be happy, first and foremost. You have to care about living a tranquil and happy life in order for it to matter at all.

And it may sound strange, but not everyone seems to care about that. The choice remains, and people frequently choose unhappiness over happiness. I think Epicurus points out some of the ways in which we can hedge that choice off -- and, if we're dedicated Epicureans, the cure is more important than what some other person wants or wills.

But surely you see how people make choices other than an Epicurean life. Seems to me the diversity of choices, of ethics, makes the question make sense: you can say this will bring you happiness, but is that happiness good?

Sometimes, yes. Actually, almost always yes, given my perspective.

But one can be lulled by sweets and feel good while living badly, I think. What else to make of a person who owns people and lives blissfully, for instance?

I think it shows itself to be relevant, but I'm fine with dropping it for now.

Explain how is the following not an instance of moral realism (i.e. ethical naturalism)
What you find [harmful], do not do to anyone.
— Hillel the Elder — 180 Proof

I'm fine with this counting as moral realism and ethical naturalism. My charge is that moral realism nor ethical naturalism are ultimately helpful in making decisions -- Moore's open question argument still works, even dropping fact/value.

It wouldn't be the first time on this forum, or for myself. :)

I'll give a direct response instead.

I don't know what you mean. What "fact/value distinction"? There aren't any value-free facts for a naturalist (of my persuasion). For instance, suffering (e.g. harm, deprivation, bereavement, etc) is a functionally disvalued fact, no? — 180 Proof

It is.

“Can we actually 'know' the universe? My God, it's hard enough finding your way around in Chinatown. The point, however, is: Is there anything out there? And why? And must they be so noisy? Finally, there can be no doubt that the one characteristic of 'reality' is that it lacks essence. That is not to say it has no essence, but merely lacks it. (The reality I speak of here is the same one Hobbes described, but a little smaller.)” — Joshs

What is this from? I want to know more! :D

I don't know what you mean. What "fact/value distinction"? There aren't any value-free facts for a naturalist (of my persuasion). — 180 Proof

This is what I mean -- dithering the distinction between fact and value means there aren't value-free facts. Where Hume states the logic between the copula and "ought" creates a non sequiter, the ethical naturalist will say it creates a condition of satisfaction, or something like that -- a natural, ethical fact.

For instance, suffering (e.g. harm, deprivation, bereavement, etc) is a functionally disvalued fact, no?

Yes, I agree.

As for Hillel's maxim: "what you find hateful" – whatever is harmful to your kind – "do not do to anyone" – your kind. It's not a "command", it's a normative observation. — 180 Proof

I just mean the form of the sentence -- it's in the form of an imperative, rather than in the form of a statement.

"If you and yours functionally avoid harm, then you ought to avoid harm"

So the first part of this conditional is a statement, and the second part is also a statement that switches out "is" for "ought" - what Hume calls into question. One response to Hume is to point out that this is exactly how one would "derive" an ought from an is within our logic, and point out that a conditional is in the form of a statement -- that is, it's functionally truth-apt, regardless of how we might feel about "ought" being spooky.

And, as you note, there is certainly regularity in nature -- a regularity that, as long as we're not obsessed with universality, is still pretty dang regular: human beings, on the whole, seem to want remarkably similar things when we consider the formal possibility within existential ethics, whereby master can smash the old table of values and posit new ones in their place.

***

It sounds funny to our ears which have been trained on Christian ethics, but I'd say one thing in favor of Epicurus' ethics is that it's actually hard to be happy. It takes effort. We have an irrational aspect to ourselves which allows us to attack our natural desires, or create desires which run away with themselves.

As scientists these divergences are as important as the convergences: there's nothing ethical or good about any one path except insofar that a path helps that person become happier.

But if that's the case, then we're back at the problem Hume pointed out: just because there are many humans who are happy by being married, with children -- not all humans want to be married, with children. It may be the case that Man, as posited by modernity, is the master of his destiny, but should he be?


Basically Moore's open question argument still punches, for me, in spite of all the attempts at making a natural ethics.

I mean, obviously I have a particular interpretation of Kant, but in that interpretation at least -- our experiencing something does not make it real. Kant briefly mentions how it's necessary for reason to believe things are permanent in spite of our experience being the only means by which we know them. Like, it literally makes no sense to say our mind makes the world, so we believe it does not. and with that belief making sense, we may eventually come to the conclusion that -- oh goodness. Given Hume's criticism of causality, maybe our cognitive apparatus has a say after all.

The question is: is talking about the location of the Moon "in space" when no one is watching as silly talking about the smell of Mars when no one is around to sniff it.

These all occuring within space-and-time, they are a part of the form of intuition -- part of the given. Anything empirical -- thereby subject to the categories -- is real, ala Kant.

But if reality were nothing like what we experience, no kind of observation would be telling us anything that we could justifiably base any theory on. For example the idea of evolution is based on the fossil record; and observation of plants and animals and their similarities and differences, and also on studying DNA profiles but according to his theory all that could tell us nothing about how species evolved, and indeed the very idea of species evolving and sharing traits and DNA would be groundless.How do you think he could address this problem? — Janus

This is a good question to me because Kant's biology is explicitly anti-Darwinian, while his physics are pro-Newtonian. (he's actually skeptical of chemistry, too, which made me laugh given my job)

I have no idea how he'd resolve these problems, in fact, but from a charitable perspective I'd imagine he'd try to integrate new scientific discoveries. After all, his attack on Hume is based on what he takes to be undeniable: Science says shit about causation, and what it says is true. Hume makes a good argument against that belief. So how to counter the argument while preserving the science?

The science always mattered to Kant, though. I mean, the dude tried to invent terms to turn metaphysics into a science -- but then argued against it. But it was at least an interest of his.

It's fairly speculative to think what Kant might think of our modern scientific world, ultimately. Especially given the diversity of opinions on Kant's thoughts on teleological judgment and how that sort of offers a way for reasonable individuals to still be, well... spiritual. Or whatever.

Well... I mean, ethical naturalism already dithers the fact/value distinction. Right? That's why MacIntyre went back to Aristotle to demonstrate that ethics can be done without the distinction... at least, I'll admit here, this is purely memory.

Casebeer is the person I sort of use as the best modern representative of ethical naturalism, but I'll admit that's probably outdated at this point. He had a real sense for what mattered though -- he used Quine's attack on synthetic/analytic as a means for undermining Moore's naturalistic fallacy/open-question argument and establishing that factual matters... well, matter.

With the Hillel quote, it's a boring explanation -- since the quote is in the form of a demand, it does not fit the criteria for a fact. But you could reformulate the sentence to say something like:

"What any person finds harmful, if that person does the harmful thing, then they are bad" or something like that.

It relativizes morality to the individual, but it's at least in the form of a fact.

But that relativity... well... for many it doesn't matter: for us, for example, I think we're mostly interested in this stuff because we'd like to be happy, and happy with others too.

That relativity is seen as a threat is worth mentioning.

********


More in the spirit of what I wrote on modern/post-modern, the natural facts about our desires aren't really bad things. After all, I immediately went to desire as a frame for talking with one another. I am pretty close to epicurus in my way of looking at the world, in terms of ethics. However, post-modern ethics only ask you realize that your desire is yours -- there is no good, even of a natural kind, there is simply you and me and everyone who has these feelings to navigate. And, on top of that, there is no me per se -- there is, but I'm connected to others. So the others I'm connected to matter, in spite of our phenomenal disconnection.

Eh, I'm not either. If I opposed non-expert thinking then I'd always have to remain silent.

In general I think historical thinking is better for-us, insofar that we understand it to be something a little less potent than scientific thinking in terms of its rigor, but it cares very much about truth. Even moreso than scientific thinking, in my opinion -- it cares about the specific truth of the situation more than even the logical rules. Contradiction? Bring it on! We saw what we saw.

But it's also a sort of more humble knowledge that can't be proclaimed.

And there: it seems you and I agree that the state doesn't really do anything. We do. And that's where value comes from.

Heh. Well, OK. But now you have many reasons -- not a reason. You're moving from science to history -- a move I'm fully in favor of. But it's not usually what economists like because their assertions no longer apply, given that they mostly only apply ceteris paribus

In spite of the opinions of economists, I don't think it's an accident that the United States inherited the earth and squandered it, and then China has come on the rise because it has an industrial base.

In that case, you're contradicting your point here:

The state has no real mechanism to earn wealth of its own so it must take it from those who are productive. — NOS4A2

And you're left with the question -- why is this or that state more wealthy than another?

Yup. That's exactly what Marx says -- people aren't given the number of tickets that are actually equal to the amount of value they produced. So the nation -- through capital -- benefits.

Well...

I mean.

That's the labor theory of value. Badda-bing.

Yeah, I agree -- especially in our world, with our particular history, primitive accumulation explains why capital rose where it did first: capital requires a seed, and feudal/mercantile/colonial organizations provided that seed in our world.

Tickets are worth things because people work—I’m not so sure what that means. As far as I know currency is usually valued according to what, if any, commodity backs it, or on the faith in the issuer of it, in many cases governments and their central banks. — NOS4A2

I agree with this. Currency has worth because governments establish social worlds where said currency counts -- you either pay the man for the bread, or it's theft, and the state has a thing to say about theft.

So we are at least operating at the same scope, here -- which is important, because I think that's frequently missed. Normally people begin to talk about supply/demand and firms and such -- things that happen within a market established by states.

Now, why do states back such things? What's going on between states? Which state is richer? And how did it become richer?

Things worth explaining.

And one such explanation puts the genesis of the wealth of nations with an organized work force which exchanges its labor for tickets to exchange for goods or services.

Eh. This looks like a perspective which thinks these tickets (what else is a dollar?) are worth something.

If you follow back the reality of our world, however, I think you'll see -- tickets are worth things because people work.

We live in a world where that's not acknowledged. So I understand the confusion.

But it's a world only upheld by The State.

These are great questions. I haven't read the thread, but I am a recovering Kant-thusiast. So take my answers for what you will....

Can Kant’s noumenal world to be understood to potentially have any kind of physical form (waves, for instance) which we cannot apprehend directly? Or is the use of the word ‘physical’ here entirely superfluous? — Tom Storm

I would say that Kant's noumenal world cannot have any kind of physical form, on pain of contradiction.

On that, though, I think Kant thinks action is the bridge between phenomenal reality and noumenal.

But what his actual philosophy says -- no. It's not possible.

Following Kant, we obviously construct the phenomenal world we know out of the noumenal world in some way - presumably from the sensations which present themselves to our consciousness. Is there any simple way of describing how this is might be understood to actually work?

If we follow Kant I don't think this is obvious -- I think it's an easy inference which makes sense of his writings, but it's not obvious. And I say it's not obvious because you're tripping across a conceptual bump Kant kind of didn't address, or at least tried to address and didn't satisfy.

If we are consistent with Kant's words, then we have no role in constructing a world out of the noumena. We construct phenomena.

In the phenomenal world we are always operating from some kind of sense making schema. We make sense of the world we apprehend and choices based on this - which may have impact upon our very survival (don’t jump off that cliff, don't smoke, etc). Could dying then be taken as an example of receiving direct feedback from the noumenal world?

Here I'd say yes, funnily enough. Mostly because Kant puts immortality (the soul) as one of the Ideas which are permanently sought after by Reason. A way of expressing Kant's thoughts on the soul are -- well, you won't know until you die. And then -- you'll either really really know in the same way you know you have a hand. Or won't exist at all. (basically saying the question is worthless to explore, on a scientific level of knowledge)

Finally managed to bring it back around. Not sure if it's acceptable, but -- there it is. Some thoughts on post-modern philosophy and morality.

Honestly, this post is still relevant to the thread's topic...

Ethics, at its core, is how we interact with others.

There we are in agreement. And I may be tripping over words here so excuse me if that's the case: I feel that post-modernism has no normative ethic. And I think that's a *feature*, rather than a bug.

Post-modern philosophy questions truth, in my analysis -- so I think we agree there.

And I think I agree that truth is important for the left. Especially now -- truth, coherence, communication... these things are becoming more than threats. I often find myself feeling alienated, even in day to day life.

I suppose, given all that, I wonder -- what's the use of moral realism? I am uncertain that a statement of my convictions is really any different from a statement of fact... but only because both are words spoken to some end.

"Moral realism" is another philosopher's dream. A dream people who are not philosophers use to feel good about living in bad situations.

So, to bring it back to post-modern ethics (at least as I have outlined it thus far) -- whilst we lose truth, we gain responsibility. We are the ones who are responsible for the world we live in, fascism and all.

What post-modern philosophy does is refuse its readers the excuses we come across, in bad faith. It demands the reader accept their role.

Here we agree.

So far the court's ruling on Citizens United v. FEC has turned what was once hyperbole into fact: we now live in an oligarchy, since propaganda is efficacious and money buys propaganda.

Put it in his obituary that he cared -- more than most.

Oh shit, I was right!

Well... if that's where we're at, I'm sad. But then no amount of charity will matter.

So... an answer for an answer.

Do you believe me in saying I was not trying to attack you?

Nope. Not a one worth sharing.

I have ideas about what people know on this forum, though.

Well, I wouldn't say it like that -- rather, I'd say I made a personal attack, but I was trying to build bridges.

But I take your word for it.

Do you believe me in saying I was not trying to attack you?

For me, I just know Fooloso4 has read the PI. Like... that's a pretty basic document around these forums. Most of us have.

But I see I don't have that relationship to say such things.

Sorry.

Heh. You're welcome.

I was trying to build bridges... but I failed here. Maybe another time.