But surely morality is primarily about others, not oneself?

If i have reason to do something due to it serving some of my ends, then we describe that reason as an instrumental or practical reason, not a moral reason.

But if I have reason to do something due to it serving some other person's ends, or due to it bringing about a just state of affairs, or ameliorating an unjust state of affairs, or if I have a reason to do something because it will bring about something of intrinsic moral value, then we describe those reasons as 'moral' reasons.

But surely morality is primarily about others, not oneself? — Bartricks

I agree.

And, after you mistreat someone, you will still live with yourself -- knowing what you did.

But what work is the word 'existential' doing?

Moral obligations are had by persons. So, one needs to be a person in order to have any.

And a defining feature of moral obligations seems to be that they concern acts we have reason to perform for the sake of others, or for the sake of the promotion of something of moral value or the prevention or amelioration of something of moral disvalue.

But there's no 'ethic' here, inasmuch as it is left open exactly what we are morally obliged to do. The point is just that when the ground of the reason for action is some consideration that is not to do with one's self - not to do with promoting one's own interests - it can qualify as a moral reason.

But what work is the word 'existential' doing? — Bartricks

Just a category term, nothing more. Sartre, Camus, Heidegger, Levinas.

(EDIT: persons I still puzzle through. I'm no expert on any of them, and "existential" should be understood in a general category of philosophy sense. but this seemed like a synthesis/summation that might look good, or at least generate discussion ;) )

That's less egocentric than other renditions. In Sartre's terms values make demands on us, yet we must choose which of those demands we will meet. So we live with the results of those choices. Hence, commitment then becomes the basis for authenticity.

I agree. That's probably what I'm going for. I acknowledge that the extreme needs to be known though.

Perhaps replacing "authenticity" with "living with yourself"?

I agree. Every choice is either 'mostly helpful' or 'mostly harmful' or 'mostly indifferent' to oneself (e.g. Sartre) and/or another (e.g. Levinas). There is no escape from choosing and no escape from the consequences of making choices. That's existentialism in a nutshell for me – an ethic without mores (e.g. de Beauvoir).

Perhaps replacing "authenticity" with "living with yourself"? — Moliere

Yes, I'll go with that.

For Sartre, Marxism. But I think virtue ethics will suffice; a virtue being how we want to be, and hence authenticity remains "living with yourself".

In Sartre's terms values make demands on us, yet we must choose which of those demands we will meet. So we live with the results of those choices. Hence, commitment then becomes the basis for authenticity. — Banno

Fair. "Living with yourself..." includes Sartre and Trump. Both of them lived with the decisions. And regardless of the facts, philosophically speaking we can see them both as paragons of how they wanted to be.

An existential interpretation of virtue -- hrm thinking the thoughts now

There is no escape from choosing and no escape from the consequences of making choices. That's existentialism in a nutshell for me — 180 Proof

This inability to escape -- I agree that that's the theme! But I wonder why is "escape" the metaphor? (edit: not that you have to answer or anything... just an errant thought)

We're prisoners – "lifers" – of existence (à la gnosticism). No one here gets out alive. :death: :flower:

Is this a discussion on (the pricking of) conscience?

What is conscience but the realization that one has done wrong even when one has gotten away with it? The context, sensu amplo, is the perfect murder and the experiences of the murderer, morally and judicially speaking. Is an immoral act a cross to bear, a millstone around the neck, a sword of Damocles vis-à-vis an active, unforgiving, conscience?

Then I don't see what this thread is about.

You will always have to live with yourself. — Moliere

Find out what it means to die - not physically, that's inevitable - but to die to everything that is known, to die to your family, to your attachments, to all the things that you have accumulated, the known, the known pleasures, the known fears. Die to that every minute and you will see what it means to die so that the mind is made fresh, young, and therefore innocent, so that there is incarnation not in a next life, but the next day. — Krishnamurti

Truly, truly, I say to you, unless a grain of wheat falls into the earth and dies, it remains alone; but if it dies, it bears much fruit. — John 12: 24

I protest, brothers, by my pride in you, which I have in Christ Jesus our Lord, I die every day! — 1 Corinthians 15: 31

The existentialist is resigned to the prison of self, and seeks to make himself as comfortable as possible within the image he has of himself - that is the ethical life. Whereas the religious is determined to escape to that state of being wherein one can: ...

Love and do what you want. If you stop talking, you will stop talking with love; if you shout, you will shout with love; if you correct, you will correct with love. — Augustine

Then I don't see what this thread is about. — Bartricks

Sometimes I just have thoughts come to me, and in this case that's all the thread was about -- here attempting a summation of sorts that captures many diverse thoughts into a few.

Perhaps a good frame would be to ask "What are the limits of an existential ethic?" ? That'd be a question that gets at what I was thinking through.

But there's no 'ethic' here, inasmuch as it is left open exactly what we are morally obliged to do. The point is just that when the ground of the reason for action is some consideration that is not to do with one's self - not to do with promoting one's own interests - it can qualify as a moral reason. — Bartricks

This is fascinating in relation to:

For Sartre, Marxism. But I think virtue ethics will suffice; a virtue being how we want to be, and hence authenticity remains "living with yourself". — Banno

We can call ourselves moral by committing to something other than ourselves. That fits perfectly with the frame proposed here -- insofar that a person is committed to anything outside the self, then they are acting morally. So existential ethics don't prevent one from committing to Family, God, and Country. If that's who you are then you are acting in good faith, and the meta-ethical consideration is satisfied.

I think the charge is that existentialism is too permissive -- while one could be dedicated to Marxism, one could also be dedicated to building a cult of personality, and insofar that you are authentically a sociopath you can continue to live with yourself, or live authentically. So, at best, existential ethics can offer some persons a way to question what they are doing and whether or not it's something they ought to be doing or if they should do something else, it doesn't give a guide beyond that.


I wonder -- is there some way to state the existential demand which addresses this concern? Or is individualism and and selfishness enough of a charge to deflate the project?

Is this a discussion on (the pricking of) conscience? What is conscience but the realization that one has done wrong even when one has gotten away with it? The context, sensu amplo, is the perfect murder and the experiences of the murderer, morally and judicially speaking. Is an immoral act a cross to bear, a millstone around the neck, a sword of Damocles vis-à-vis an active, unforgiving, conscience? — Agent Smith

I think it could be, in that "the pricking of conscience" is a common way people make ethical decisions -- you mentioning murder makes me think of Raskolnikov, who was clearly overly bothered by the existential situation and took it to an extreme -- I wonder if the fear holds up? If there is no God, is everything permitted? Did Raskolnikov actually demonstrate our freedom to murder, or did he demonstrate the opposite? It's not like he lived a happy life.

I think this thought of the image is something which existentialists attempt to stop. Isn't conforming to an image of yourself a good description of inauthenticity? You aren't being, you're cognizing who you are and acting from that. Sartre's description of the waiter seems to fit that description. Rather, it seems the existentialist wants us to be who we are rather than conform to an image of who I am, in accord with a role with such-and-such responsibilities and privileges.


At its broadest I think that existential ethics are possibly consistent with a religious life -- a life of death-and-rebirth, in a sense, gets along with how wide the existential condition is. I think that this point of contrast is good because I think that the existential religionists reinterpret their religions in light of existentialism (perhaps this is a way of filling out the existential ethic?) And I like your contrast between the death of the self with life-affirming (self-affirming?) themes in existentialism. There's something to that.

Perhaps the religious life sees an end-point -- to act out of universal love, as opposed to from the self. An atheist existentialist would say that such a condition of universal love does not exist due to moral rules or religious teaching. These too are images. Or, at least, if we are the saints that the religious talk about, we have no need for moral codes or injunctions from religious leaders, and no amount of social pressure will turn us into what we aren't. It's not the code doing the work, it's the person being who they are! We apes are partially saintlike, at times -- though not all of us.

***

Or, being who they aren't? funny thing here -- if who we are is what we do, then whatever we do we are who we are, but there is the theme of authenticity -- we can be ourselves authentically or inauthentically. For Heidegger he seemed to contrast authenticity with everydayness or being busy. Interestingly to the charges made here, if we include Levinas, then I'd say he actually manages to escape the charge of selfishness or individuality, given that we only come to know ourselves as ethical beings within the face-to-face relationship of the Other.

I think it could be, in that "the pricking of conscience" is a common way people make ethical decisions -- you mentioning murder makes me think of Raskolnikov, who was clearly overly bothered by the existential situation and took it to an extreme -- I wonder if the fear holds up? If there is no God, is everything permitted? Did Raskolnikov actually demonstrate our freedom to murder, or did he demonstrate the opposite? It's not like he lived a happy life — Moliere

I thought I was off-topic. Anyway, if you'd like to pursue the general idea contained in my previous post, here's an amusing short story:

The Twelve Fools

Once there lived twelve fools in a village. One day they started on a journey in search of job to a distant town. On their way they came across a river. There was no bridge or boat so they had to swam and crossed the river. After landing on the bank of the river they counted themselves, but each of them did not count himself. So they counted only eleven instead of twelve. They thought one of their companions was missing so they began to cry. Meantime a traveller came near by and asked about their problem. They told him about the matter and he agreed to produce the lost man. The traveller told them to stand in a line, started to count and gave each of them a blow and counted twelve. After that the fools were very happy, thanked him for finding out their lost companion and went their way in search of jobs.

I didn't do it. No one saw me do it. You can't prove anything. — Bart Simpson

:snicker:

Rather, it seems the existentialist wants us to be who we are rather than conform to an image of who I am, in accord with a role with such-and-such responsibilities and privileges. — Moliere

Yeah, I specified self-image rather than social image, but point taken.

Or, being who they aren't? funny thing here -- if who we are is what we do, then whatever we do we are who we are, but there is the theme of authenticity -- we can be ourselves authentically or inauthentically. For Heidegger he seemed to contrast authenticity with everydayness or being busy. — Moliere

I think it is a contradiction, how could one be what one already was: viz, the authentic coward and greedy arsehole, or whatever. Let alone attain to it as the philosopher's stricture on moral probity. But it is not to be wondered at that what one ought to be and do is in contradiction to what one is and does.

if we include Levinas, then I'd say he actually manages to escape the charge of selfishness or individuality, given that we only come to know ourselves as ethical beings within the face-to-face relationship of the Other. — Moliere

This makes more sense to me too. I would talk of dependency on the M(other) as in "Be good for Mummy", and from this the ethical being arises as the internalised conflict, because what is good for Mummy is not necessarily good for me, but must become good for me, if I know what's good for me.

So the question is, whether there is an authentic-self in the resolution of the ethical conflict, and I think Paul and Jesus and Krishnamurti are saying "mu". Found this piece of paranoia in my inbox today:

You should never be here too much; be so far away that they can’t find you, they can’t get at you to shape, to mold. Be so far away, like the mountains, like the unpolluted air; be so far away that you have no parents, no relations, no family, no country; be so far away that you don’t know even where you are. Don’t let them find you; don’t come into contact with them too closely. Keep far away where even you can’t find yourself; keep a distance which can never be crossed over; keep a passage open always through which no one can come. Don’t shut the door for there is no door, only an open, endless passage; if you shut any door, they will be very close to you, then you are lost. Keep far away where their breath can’t reach you and their breath travels very far and very deeply; don’t get contaminated by them, by their word, by their gesture, by their great knowledge; they have great knowledge but be far away from them where even you cannot find yourself.

For they are waiting for you, at every corner, in every house to shape you, to mold you, to tear you to pieces and then put you together in their own image. Their gods, the little ones and the big ones, are the images of themselves, carved by their own mind or by their own hands. They are waiting for you, the churchman and the Communist, the believer and the non-believer, for they are both the same; they think they are different but they are not for they both brainwash you, till you are of them, till you repeat their words, till you worship their saints, the ancient and the recent; they have armies for their gods and for their countries and they are experts in killing. Keep far away but they are waiting for you, the educator and the businessman; one trains you for the others to conform to the demands of their society, which is a deadly thing;* they will make you into a scientist, into an engineer, into an expert of almost anything from cooking to architecture to philosophy. — Krishnamurti's Notebook

Yet also "You only exist in relationship".

I am in a relationship of conflict or negation or otherness with what I ought to be, and that creates the limit of self that identifies it. Therefore, when I am what I ought to be - authentically - there is no more division and I am the world in relation to itself.

Fair. "Living with yourself..." includes Sartre and Trump. Both of them lived with the decisions. And regardless of the facts, philosophically speaking we can see them both as paragons of how they wanted to be. — Moliere

For me this raises a notable question. When is someone actually living with the decisions they make? I know in practical terms, and from a panoptic overview, it appears that all people live with the decisions they make. But at another important level, they can only live with decisions if they are able to identify their own agency.

Does someone like Trump even have capacity to understand where he ends and the wider world begins? What is it to say that Trump lives with 'his choices' other than to say the real world is involved and/or reacts to him. Not everyone is able to see that they are even making choices and they may struggle to identify what their role is in how the world seems to treat them. For me this complicates the matter of choice and authenticity somewhat. Or maybe it means I need to reconsider what authenticity means.

you *should* consider that you'll always be with yourself. — Moliere

This idea makes me think of personal integrity. Do you also see the connection?

Yes, I see that connection. In a way you could say that personal integrity comes before all other considerations -- including others, as has been pointed out here.

...insofar that you are authentically a sociopath you can continue to live with yourself, or live authentically. — Moliere

Yes, and here Sartre's misanthropy comes into play. Since hell is other people one might not take into account the needs of one's tormenters. So

We can call ourselves moral by committing to something other than ourselves. — Moliere

is insufficient. being moral must include not just recognition of the existence of competing needs but a commitment to satisfying the needs of the other as well as oneself. Hence Trump must be a solipsist, ultimately lonely.

Does someone like Trump even have capacity to understand where he ends and the wider world begins? — Tom Storm

See my reply to Molie, immediately above. Trump is alone.

:up:

@Moliere, - that's also the flaw in the various "will to power" philosophies, and why Schopenhauer and Nietzsche were also alone - failed humans, unable to step outside their self-inflicted solipsism.

in a way you could say that personal integrity comes before all other considerations -- including others, as has been pointed out here. — Moliere

Yes, I could say that. But I wouldn't call it a "consideration", which refers to something to take into account, i.e. a thought a fact or any element that one uses to make a decision about something. I see integrity as an ethical state and practice in which a person shows consistent and uncompromising adherence to (his) ethical standards. This is what "integral" means: whole. We also have the term "integer" in Math, which means a whole number, not a fraction.

A very dear and important to me term and concept!

BTW, the word "personal" in connection to intergrity is redundant, although it is widely and commonly used. Esp. in an ethical context, it always refers to a person. Yet, I have been using it myself for years! It sticks with you. But I would never say, e.g. "A man with personal integrity", but rather "a man of/with integrity". Note that in Greek, we normally use simply "intergrity" in all cases. The word is preseved from Ancient Greek to our day, with only a slightly different ending in demotic Greek, since the last quarter of the 20th c.

personal integrity. — Alkis Piskas

:up: The good man enjoys sound sleep but the bad man doesn't. It boils down to that, oui monsieur/mademoiselle?

Unfortunately, it seems this is more fiction than fact - to be found only/mostly in novels/plays/movies that aren't, as they say, based on a true story. I'd love to be proven wrong about this though.

But surely morality is primarily about others, not oneself? — Bartricks

I guess it doesn't matter if I act morally, it only matters if others act morally. I like that, it gives me license to be a complete bastard :smile:

I'd love to be proven wrong about this though. — Agent Smith

I would think, on face value, that a person who holds true to his principles is much more deserving of respect, and much more likely to have self-respect, than a person who conveniently betrays his principles on occassion.

I don't know how you got that from what I said. My point was that it is one of the marks of a moral norm that it is grounded in the interests of others. If I have a reason to do x for your sake - so, the ground of the reason is your sake not mine - then it seems to qualify as a moral reason. More to it than that, no doubt. But it seems to be one of the hallmarks