I think it's worth noting that your two examples are clearly medical. To go from them it would seem that a mental state is a belief about ourselves (in the Psychology today article) or to others (in the Royal Children's hospital article). I would say "concept", but I thought that might be more ambiguous than "belief"

So we go about thinking about mental states to either help ourselves feel better, or to assess whether others need help in feeling better.

Well it's nonsensical to talk about feeling like God. But for all intents and purposes you were tantamount to being a god, at least. That's what I meant. — Posty McPostface

What's the difference such that being a God is sensical, and feeling like God is nonsensical?

Is that important in some way? Dreams are self generated content, at least to the highest degree possible. — Posty McPostface

I suppose it depends on what one means by God. If we mean something akin to Zeus then maybe not. It just seems like everything depended on their being a world I have no control over -- that the real world is always first anyways, and the dreamworld is secondary to it.

Why not related? You have something tantamount to the power of a deity in a lucid dream. How is that not related? — Posty McPostface

I don't see it like that, I suppose. Just because experience changes doesn't mean I'm the creator of reality. I know it is a dream, after all, and not real. Or, the reality that it has is that of a dreamworld, in the way that my imagination has a kind of reality but it doesn't change the world I live in. Further, the dreamworld is bound to both my desires, which are part of the world, and even the experiences themselves are derivative of having the sort of experience that humans have, of a world where I have no control. I can change the scenery, so to speak, but it is always of the world I actually live in.

Have you ever read this book? It's very clear and lucid. Disagreements are spelled out. Reasons are given for why the author thinks this or that position is better or worse.

Seems convenient. :D

How about time? You have the A and B theories of time. This is metaphysics. I understand both. They are clear and easy to understand. We can meaningfully disagree on them.

Does the question of time also arise prior to metaphysics?

Am I alone in having a viscerally negative reaction to this sort of thinking? — Srap Tasmaner

Probably not :D

On the one hand, I think philosophy, much like science, begins in everyday efforts at reasoning in everyday situations. Do this more reflectively, more systematically, and you're doing something else, despite the origin, because you've changed the context, the goals, all sorts of things — Srap Tasmaner

I'd like to hear more from you on this argument. While I don't think there is a single point at which basic reasoning becomes philosophy, I would be interested in hearing what you believe philosophy to be as opposed to what the philosophy of is such that it seems ridiculous to claim that those engaged in some activity obviously do not have philosophical beliefs.

For me, as I said before, It's something that I'm open to saying I might be over-extending, but it's a belief that I can't unsee either.

I've also thought it ridiculous for philosophers to claim everyone is always taking philosophical positions, or that they're implied. It seems like an attempt at self aggrandizement, like the undergraduate who comes home for Christmas break and lectures his parents on their metaphysical assumptions.

(Are philosophers more prone than other sorts of scholars to worry that what they do is pointless? Do they feel more need than others to assert the importance of what they do?) — Srap Tasmaner

Well, I think there is a difference between doing philosophy and some activity. My thinking is more along the lines that if you have beliefs about whatever it is you are doing then you'll have beliefs which fall squarely within what counts as philosophical. And it seems to me that as people do things they also come to believe things about what they are doing -- so you'll have an engineer who believes that engineering is organized around such and such to such and such ends by such and such means. "Engineering" means something, and it is possible to count what is a part of engineering from what is not engineering or what is good engineering from what is bad engineering. Sometimes these are set up by the discipline itself -- there are collective rules which hold as a kind of grammar between engineers. They are widely agreed upon. And sometimes it's more a matter of taste.


But in either case we're dealing with the nature of the activity or what good it is for or how it should be done which are the sorts of questions that philosophers investigate.

The only way out of that is simply to not have beliefs about these things. But I don't know how you'd come to extirpate beliefs about what you're doing without engaging in some kind of philosophy. To me, at least, coming to believe such-and-such about what I am doing just comes naturally. So at one point, for instance, I had a certain set of beliefs about science, and as I came to do philosophy of science I changed those beliefs. But my starting beliefs were common sorts of answers to questions in the philosophy of science -- that science comes to approximate reality, that it is the best way to truth, that it is characterized by its methodology above all else.

So, yes, I could do science without questioning such beliefs. But I don't know what else I'd call those sorts of beliefs other than philosophical beliefs -- because there certainly isn't a science of science, for instance. And the debate on what is a good answer to various questions about science take on all the tools which philosophers develop.

They don't do it absent some kind of knowledge, mind. But it's not like in answering what the scope of scientific inquiry is means I'm doing either just science or just history.


For other activities I don't see why I'd not have beliefs of the same sort.

I hope this doesn't sound like a personal attack. It's not remotely. Just something I think about now and then. I'm hoping you can make such claims seem more reasonable than they seem to me now.

No worries. I hope I don't come across as having such thin skin that you worry about it too much just by expressing a philosophical belief or asking a question. Hopefully we'll both feel we have a better understanding of one another and ourselves by the end of it all.

Well, in the post I responded to you said there was no way to become versed in the discipline of metaphysics. But with the problem of consciousness, which is metaphysics, there is a way to become versed to a point where at least the disagreements can be understood. So you must hold that not all metaphysics is nonsense, when that seems to be what you were denying in the post I responded to -- you said you thought some questions were meaningful, but you haven't said that some of those that are meaningful are also metaphysical questions.

I'd say that this is inconsistent with your position that the question about consciousness is a meaningful question with an obvious answer. One can become versed in, say, the debate about consciousness. And the problem is clear enough that disagreement can take place. Yet, since this is a question about the nature of reality -- about what exists in reality -- it's also a case of metaphysics. So some philosophical questions either are not nonsense, or it does not count as a philosophical question.

But as to the existence of universals, I can't make any sense of the question. When I exercise my powers as an English speaker, I don't know what's being asked. And since I know of no other criterion by which to make a question framed in English sensible, I conclude that it's nonsense. — Snakes Alive

Just because I cannot make sense of some question that does not then mean that the question is nonsense. There are many technical questions that I cannot make sense of. Or, perhaps I have been knocked across the head a few too many times and I just cannot grasp some questions anymore due to injury.

It could just be the case that I am ignorant. And however many times I may read a book on the topic I may remain ignorant because of an inability on my part. Such has been the case, many a time, with math for me. It's only through the patience of a mentor that I've been able to learn the math I have -- on my own? Forget it. It's not one of my natural talents.

Well, to be honest, I am at a disadvantage in that philosophy of law, specifically, isn't something I'm familiar with. I've been thinking mostly by analogy to the philosophy of science, which I am familiar with. I don't know to what extent those two overlap or could be treated as the same.

Scientists often express a lack of need for the philosophy of science. The problem there is that science involves reasoning, some of which has even changed over time in terms of what is acceptable or not, and it basically amounts to saying that the present philosophy of science as enshrined in the institutions of science are all you need. For a paycheck they are correct. But if one were to wonder something along the lines of "How does science work?" or "To what extent does scientific knowledge elucidate reality?" or "Does science prove that God does not exist?" or any number of questions which people do actually ask and feel they have answers to then you'd at least be pondering things which philosophy ponders, or answering philosophical questions without any philosophy.

Sure it's possible to do. But why settle for beliefs arrived at badly?


I'm not sure to what extent this would apply to the philosophy of law, though.

Good points. I was just using that as an example, but you're right to point out the very human concern with spelling out the nature of some practice, rather than just reaching for truisms that are unhelpfully circular.

I might be inclined to agree with the definition of law if it's no different from the mafia. :D But that's a thread too far astray to say more than that.

I agree with your method, though -- the distinction between something useful and something that appears useful is, itself, worth looking at, exploring, and attempting to define on purely pragmatic grounds.

So, does the fact that you can feel like god, in your dreamworld, and create, fly, or do pretty much anything you want some roundabout proof that the concept of 'God-hood' is actual? — Posty McPostface

I've had lucid dreams and I don't know if I'd say I felt like a God. In a lot of ways my lucid dreams were very much bound up with my desire and the play of my imagination. And, as remarkable as it may sound to be able to change the experience of the world I'm in, I could always tell it was a dream ,and the dream always mirrored things I'd already seen.

Nothing was ex nihilo.

Furthermore I'd say that there is something about dreaming which is deeply personal and semi-spiritual, as has been discussed already. But these are human needs.

The dreamworld, as I've experienced it at least, seems to be so thoroughly human that I don't think it proves the concept of "God-hood" as something which is actual, or even coherent. Not that this is a disproof, either -- I just don't think it's related.

Consider: a scientist may say that science is nothing more than what scientists do. But other scientists may disagree with that, on philosophical grounds. Because there is experience involved we can hope that there is some kind of knowledge to draw from, though it is quite possible that the scientists are philosophically naive and making some basic errors of judgment because of a lack of familiarity with philosophy.

And my neighbor may say the same thing, but without said experience or knowledge of either philosophy or science, in which case the answer may be right but there's no reason to follow along with their reasoning.

I'd pretty much go along with that. I tend to think that philosophy of [x] is neutered without experience with the [x]. So in philosophy of science you have an intense interest in the history of science. Many philosophers of science have also done science. But to say that the law is nothing more than

. . . what you must deal with, what you must comply with or evade (legally of course). It's the problem you want to resolve, the thing you want to take advantage of, something you'd like to see repealed, in the here and now. — Ciceronianus the White

is the philosophical position I'd say you've marked out. If someone were to define law without some knowledge of the law, be it in practice or in its history, then I'd probably not think their position was well founded. But that wouldn't invalidate their position, but rather their method -- they could have, after all, stumbled upon a good answer. They just don't have good reasons for it.

I think I would just say that your fashion of answering perennial questions in the philosophy of law is itself a particular philosophical disposition. But, on the whole, I don't find distinctions between the philosophy of some practice and the practice to be terribly useful. Rather, it seems to me that in practicing such-and-such we already have some philosophical notions being put into practice -- some of which, I imagine, get challenged in the practice and some of which get affirmed.

Sometimes I wonder if my thoughts go too far on this. But I don't see how you get around having beliefs about the nature of the practice you're doing. Perhaps if these are unexamined then one isn't doing philosophy, but one still has beliefs that fall under what is properly thought of as philosophical.

I see two stories there. In one case we have the SPE demonstrating that people act in accord with circumstance, and then in his rebutall all he says is:

the SPE’s conclusion of the value of understanding how systemic and situational forces can operate
to influence individual behavior in negative or positive directions, often without our
personal awareness. Its message is a cautionary tale of what might happen to any of us if
we are not mindful of these external pressures on our actions.

Concluding with

For whatever
its flaws, I continue to believe that the Stanford Prison Experiment has earned its
deserved place as a valuable contributor to psychology’s understanding of human
behavior and its complex dynamics. Multiple forces shape human behavior; they are
internal and external, genetic and dispositional, historical and contemporary, cultural and personal.

So the setup I get from the articles differs from what he's defending in his rebuttal. The original articles seem to be arguing against a stricter interpretation, but here Zimbardo is not defending such a notion.


Honestly I haven't read the documentation or anything like that. I just remember the experiment being mentioned in passing in intro courses, and that's about it. I'd have to read more to form a strong opinion on what it all means or says. But that's worth noting that Zimbardo, here, doesn't seem to be making as strong of a claim as the original article is attacking (unless I'm just misreading him too)

In my book seeking knowledge is a good in and of itself, irregardless of whether it leads to progress and whether progress itself is good. It is not such good that can override any other consideration, but it is good.. — SophistiCat

I think I view knowledge as a minor good -- so the difference between us is probably one of degree. Because I don't think I disagree with your point about a priori ethics or the temptation to find certainty in simple ethical formulations when our world is not amenable to such treatments, but requires judgement and experience. All of that made sense to me, including the point you make about how gaslighting can be viewed as acceptable in some cases -- how a counter-example can be read going both ways, either for or against counting something as good or for or against counting some principle of action as actually holding in all cases.

In saying that seeking knowledge is a good in and of itself, though, you answered my question. It's because seeking knowledge is good that you consider it in looking at these various cases -- so the Milgram experiment or the SPE form one end of the spectrum and the Asch experiments another, in terms of what is acceptable. I'm willing to say that the Asch experiment seems more innocuous than setting up a prison and encouraging people to act out the roles they imagine they should act out.

But I can't help but see how knowledge is constantly used for good and for ill. That just because we know more about the world that does not then mean we do good with said knowledge. Knowledge amplifies power, which in turn is only exercised in proportion to how good or bad we are, in a collective sense.

I generally approve of science, although not being an expert, I cannot really gauge the quality of psychological theories and experiments qua science

I am no such expert. And I don't mean to cast aspersions against the potency of psychology. History is potent as well. And knowing how people act in an era can be used to poor ends just as much as good ones. I'm just skeptical of its scientific veracity on the basis that humans change with knowledge of themselves, whereas chemicals have no knowledge of themselves and continue doing whatever it is they are doing.

Perhaps it's just a matter of complexity. I sometimes think that there is a difference in kind, though, in which case we shouldn't expect the same sort of knowledge. But I suppose I go back and forth on this opinion, too. And I don't claim to have expert knowledge on the matter. It's just my judgment, given what I've learned so far.

Eh, it's not like I wasn't enjoying myself. I wouldn't engage if I wasn't -- so no need to apologize.

The 3rd answer is best because the normal distribution is the most common distribution. — Devans99

You've got it bass-ackwards. Which distribution just depends upon the phenomena under consideration. It's not like all phenomena are linked together, and a distribution is picked because most phenomena follow such-and-such a distribution. That's just goofy. Besides you still haven't spelled out what your graph is measuring, so I don't know if it even matters all that much.

Assuming the survey is correct then 70% of dogs are nice. That's it

The best thing you can say about what you do not know is that you do not know. So if the survey was not done well, if there is a subset of dogs to which the survey does not apply, then the best thing you can say is that you do not know if they are nice or not -- it would be premature of you to say "Well, it is the best guess that half are one way and half are another way"

If you have to make an assumption you're basically admitting the point -- that the number you're assigning is arbitrary. Just because you believe 50/50 is the statistically most likely distribution that does not mean that it is -- thus far all you have for that belief is the assertion of the belief.

But your starting with 50% is entirely arbitrary. You just like the number 50%, so you decided to start there. It seemed like a good number to you.

If the survey is correct, then 70% of dogs are nice. 85% of dogs are not nice just because you tacked on an arbitrary 50% to some unknown quantity. The 30% who are unknown could all be mean. There is literally no reason to assume 50% of the unknown quantity are one of two values. They are simply unknown, and if you were to choose a random dog then, given the evidence that you have, you'd be making a good bet by saying the dog is nice.

Some questions that don’t have evidence baked in:

‘Is there a creator god?’
‘Is the dog nice?’
‘Is the frog fat?’

So questions can be about existence or boolean valued properties only. All of these types of questions are statistically best answered 50% / 50%. — Devans99

I'd say that it depends on the domain under consideration, and so evidence is a part of such things.

"Is the dog nice?" -- the weight given yes or no would depend upon the percentage of nice dogs there are. So, like the ball example, if we just chose some random dog from the set there would be a percentage assignable based upon what so far has been observed.

But if you just mean to restrict questions to boolean values, 0 or 1, then OK.

If mathematical objects are allowed then it could be demonstrated that there are more "No" answers, as well -- 2 + 2 = 4, but it does not equal any other number. The "ball" you'd be picking out is the predicate, some number, and only one such number exists for which the answer to the question "Is 2+2=x?" is yes.

If not, then you'll have to further restrict what you mean by the relevant domain. Because at this point your domain is any question for which there is a yes or no answer, and which there can only be two possible outcomes for the object under consideration.

I do not know what you mean by evidence being built into a question. The primary difference I see is that you're asking about existence, whereas I had questions about properties. But I have evidence that the desk exists. I see it right here. So I don't see how existence is somehow different, or how a creator is somehow different from questions about properties of things. The more questions we ask, the more "no" answers we will have.

So I'll ask again -- what is this graph that you propose? What is on the x-axis, and what is on the y-axis? And what would a normal distribution look like for questions of the sort that can only be answered in two ways?

Thinking a little more deeply about it -- what is the graph you propose?

I would put it like this. The x-axis is the number of yes/no questions asked. So we don't have to worry about infinity, we can look at the tendency. The Y axis is percent of questions whose answer is no. We have the ability to generate all kinds of no questions -- like "Is the desk brown?" Now supposing that the desk is indeed brown, we can say yes. But then we can also ask "Is the desk green? Is the desk gray? Is the desk blue?" and so on, for all the colors that it is not. We can ask "Is the desk three feet tall?" -- and, again, supposing that it is, we can also ask "Is the desk four feet tall? Is the desk two feet tall?" and so on.

So an exponential distribution even makes sense in the case of yes/no questions -- there are surely more "no" answers than "yes" answers. And the more questions we ask, because we can also ask different questions that are about the same object, and there are more no's for any given object, the more no questions there are.

But we have omitted no evidence at all yet so we don’t know what the distribution is but we can still pick the statistically most likely distribution which is normal. — Devans99

I'm not sure how your first statement links to your second one. And picking a distribution you can do -- but it's pretty arbitrary. What's to stop me from saying that the statistically most likely distribution is exponential? Especially given that you've said we know nothing about the external world?

Why not?

- We will be more correct in a statistical sense if we pick the midpoint of normal distribution - 50% — Devans99

That is only the case for phenomena which follow a normal distribution, though. To pick the normal distribution is an arbitrary assumption. There are plenty of pheneomena for which this assumption doesn't hold -- non-normal distributions. And in the case of Yes/No questions, without a method of counting, we simply do not know what kind of distribution holds.

- You can. A little bit of common sense and statistics tells us, on average, the answer to yes/no questions (for which nothing else is known) is 50% yes, 50% no. — Devans99

I'd say that common sense, in this case, is misleading. How many yes/no questions are there? I don't think there is any reasonable way to count. Language is often characterized as a system of expression which uses finite resources to express infinite possible sentences. That's because we simply do not know how many sentences there may possibly be -- it basically looks like infinite to us. So there is no way of knowing if 50% of yes/no questions are yes or no. We simply lack the ability to count. Just because there are two answers that does not mean that both answers are weighted the same. Take a look at the colored ball set-ups for probability. If we have 5 red balls and 20 blue balls in the same bag, then the probability of drawing a red ball is 20 percent. There are only two possible outcomes, but the outcomes have different probabilities because of how many of each there are.

In the case of God there really is only a probability of either 0 or 1, because existence does not admit of degrees. At least not without some fairly strange notions about reality that are clearly not going to be shared by everyone.

I might modify this a bit though and say there is no non-arbitrary way to assign a probability. Clearly you can just pick a number.

Proposition 1 - There was a creator god

Assume 50% probability true to start with — Devans99

Why?

If I know nothing about the proposition, then I cannot assign a probability value to it.

Big Bang is evidence for creator at 60% probability so combining probabilities:

Again, why? Where is this 60% number coming from? Why not 30%? Or 0%? Or 100%? Or 75%?

Fine tuning is evidence for the creator 75% probability so:

Annnndd... same question.

Prime mover is evidence for the creator 25% probability so:

Yup.

To double check, I’ve done the inverse proposition below:

The thing is, you're just pulling numbers from your intuitive feeling for them. There is no reason to accept your probabilities. For some proposition 1 has a 0% probability of being true, and for some it has a 100% probability of being true. And, in the end, you have to have some kind of knowledge of the world to reliably assign a probability -- so in the case of a evenly weighted coin we know that we will get heads 50% of the time, over the course of infinitely many coin-flips, because we know things about the coin. Same goes for card games or pulling different colored balls out of bags.

But we know nothing about God, so we cannot assign a probability to his existence or not aside from our intuitive feelings on the matter, which diverge wildly because of extra-probabilistic reasons.

Is a researcher conducting a psychological experiment on other people acting ethically? That was the actual question behind this side discussion. And after all is said the answer does not become any more obvious than it was at the beginning of the discussion. If I feel that a psychological experiment is ethically acceptable, then pointing out that this experiment involves manipulation and deception won't change my mind. Without even appealing to counter-examples, like I did before, I could just turn the argument around and say that, since clearly this experiment is ethically acceptable, then some manipulation and deception can be ethically acceptable. — SophistiCat

I think at that point we'd have to ask -- what makes it ethically acceptable?

Deception and manipulation are ethically accept in certain circumstances. The ax murderer is deterred from murder because of our manipulation, and that is more than acceptable but even good. I'd say that putting on your best face at work is a more everyday example of manipulation that is acceptable, because work is tied to survival. Protecting yourself and your loved ones from those who want to exploit them would be another ethically acceptable justification for manipulation, at least if our deceptions are directed at the people intending harm.

I don't know if I buy that science is a justification. Science doesn't lead to progress. It leads to knowledge. And knowledge is value-neutral -- it can be used for good or ill.

And then there is the question of whether or not said science does lead to knowledge. Here it seems that these stories at least challenge that, though under the auspices of accepting psychology as a scientific discipline. It's one of those things where if you're a scientist you'll say that we are perfecting knowledge and we can expect errors along the way, and if you are not you'll take it as evidence that the enterprise cannot deliver on its promise.

Maybe it's better to put that aside though and just ask -- what fruits are born from said research? Do the circumstances we find our practitioners of science in justify manipulation, in a similar way to other cases of manipulation that we find ethically acceptable?

Would you say that your response here is fundamentally an appeal to the irrational to justify being rational? I don’t mean that in any derogatory way. I like how you put it. But it appears to be that for something to be ‘appealing’,as you put it, is a response to the emotional experience of something feeling appealing. This isn’t something that is itself reasoned. But rather it comes across as intuitive. — Mr Phil O'Sophy

I don't think that feelings are irrational, tout court. If your life is in danger it makes sense that you
fear. If your loved one is in the hospital it makes sense that you worry. If you achieve something you care about then it makes sense that you feel accomplished.

So, no, I don't think that this is irrational. It's just consistent -- these are a couple of reasons why we provide reasons. And I'd say that my response describes how rationality works, too. One, it is nice to hear why someone believes as they do -- else I'll just stick to the beliefs I happen to have, since there is no moving from one belief to another by some means which allows different persons to consider them. And two, we move our beliefs because some justification is persuasive -- which itself only makes sense to me in terms of aesthetics.

Because it is appealing -- both in the sense that it allows us to make appeals, and also in the sense that it is aesthetically satisfying.

Deceptive and manipulative behavior isn't always a sin, and when it is, it isn't necessarily a big deal - that's my point. We do it all the time, even unconsciously, and often for good reasons: when we try to look our best, when we try to be persuasive, when we are being tactful, when we try to make someone feel good (or bad), when we avoid giving "too much information." And then there are different degrees and modes of candidness that are appropriate to different relationships: with your spouse, with your child, with a friend, with a colleague, with a shop clerk, with a police officer, etc. Someone who is absolutely candid with everyone at all times would be rightly considered a sociopath. — SophistiCat

Would you say that we engage in authentic relationships with people all the time, too?

It seems that way to me.

Authenticity is not deceptive or manipulative, I agree there. But I'm uncertain about some of your examples. Acting tactfully or trying to make someone feel good or bad are quite possibly authentic expressions or actions. It's a matter of whether or not you are tactful or want to make someone feel good or bad.

Persuasion might be done authentically, even. It just depends on whether you believe what you are saying -- so telling someone what persuaded you isn't deceitful, while thinking up anything to change someone's belief to match what you want it to be regardless of whether you find it persuasive isn't.

Looking your best, I agree, is not part of an authentic relationship. We treat those we love worse than those we are strangers to because we don't have to put on a show for them.



How big of a deal it is... well, I sort of feel that a life with less deception is a happier life. So I don't know if I'd cast these things as sins, though they certainly can be in some cases. It's more that by engaging others in a strictly deceptive manner you cut yourself off -- you are only hurting yourself, because you can no longer trust people and be with them. To dovetail a bit of what @unenlightened is saying above, they become objects which, likewise, are manipulating you too, which destroys all hopes of any kind of relationship with people.


EDIT:

(I know someone who says that he despises movies and theater, because he values truth and honesty. I think he is a douche.) — SophistiCat

I wanted to hone in on this a bit but wasn't sure how to at first.

There is a difference between authenticity, and valueing truth and honesty and following through in some respect because of that value. Active valuation of this sort ties into one's identity, a lot of the time. But being authentic is anything but an identity -- at least of the sort we are attached to, express in words and decide actions from. Authenticity is tied to feeling.

Now, I don't know this someone. Perhaps he is an authentic douche. :D But there is a difference between simple candidness, the active valuation of truth/honesty, and an authentic relationship -- one seems to be caught up in pure self-expression, whereas the other includes someone else and is felt prior to any expression.



How does any of that relate to the OP? Well, it's a bit tangential. I just felt it was important to say, and hoped that maybe it related after the fact. Maybe with a bit more work it will.

I don't think you have to resort to hermitude. (is that a word?) to avoid playing games. It's just a matter of having an authentic relationship with someone. Not that this is possible for everyone, but surely we do have authentic relationships with people too.

I have to admit that I feel skeptical about psychological science. I tend to think of humanity as primarily historical in character, without defining features which transcend our historical epoch. So it is possible to say that this group of people in this time period have these tendencies, but it is not possible to say that humanity, as a whole, shares such and such features. To do so is just to generalize from a particular historical moment to some kind of human nature. Interesting features can be revealed, but the experimental setup is just another instance of history.

Hrm! That's the first I've heard of this. I certainly had gone over the experiment in our intro psych class. Thanks for sharing.

Well, I'll admit that I am inclined to say that individuals are given. I have a general suspicion of there being an explanation, a why, the stapler is this stapler and not that stapler (or table, or building, or sky).

Or, if there be an explanation, I suppose what I'm generally suspicious of is that we know that we have this explanation, rather than that explanation, as the best explanation. There is a point at which explanation ceases to have justification.

Also, I'm more inclined to say "given" in the sense that we agree to such-and-such. I'm not super-committed to a notion of a discursive mind being somehow defined by an other-worldly mind which thinks things into existence, ala full blown Kantianism. It just seems that individuals are agreed upon or not, and we can try to show what we mean by an individual, but we cannot explain them in the same way that we can explain, say, the origin of species.

Gotcha.

I know that it sounds outlandish -- but I think that there is something worthwhile in acting in developing practical reason.

There is something important learned in thinking through a character or role -- you have to develop motivations which may not be your own, you have to think from the perspective of a total other while being able to relate to that other just enough to make it come to life, and you have to do more than just think through said relation -- you have to embody this other person, and in a sense -- if only temporarily and within the confines of an art -- become them. By playing tragic roles, comedic roles, and things in-between (even two dimensional roles, at times) you get a feel for the human being in practice without the total effects on your actual life.

While there is more to consider in play acting than just these considerations (such as making an entertaining play, or standing in a way that you can be seen), there is something about others that comes to light in taking on them as if they were yourself, and not just in fantasy but in a way that it is at least believable in a play acting setting.

I also don't want to overemphasize the art in terms of practical reason. We can get lost in fantasy. But such is also the case even when dealing with real problems in our life. I think acting just helps in being able to step outside yourself, just a little bit, and even come to understand yourself a little better as you make comparisons, distinctions, and relations to something that is not ourself.

Must teleology be bound to pre-destination? Or do you just mean teleology in the sense of cause-and-effect?

I think I would put it that disinterest can apply to art as it does to reason.

While I think that Kant is closer to Hume than traditional readings tend to render him, I will say that he doesn't allow for many motivations inside of his account of practical reason. He also is primarily interested in practical reason in its moral sense, and I don't think that's quite right. Insofar as we are deliberating about action then I'd say that practical reason is being applied or appealed to. But a lot of our actions are not strictly moral, especially in a deontological sense. Plus it seems to me that we can be motivated by more than respect even within moral deliberation, and especially in ethical deliberation.

Disinterest, as I see it, would apply in cases where advice is being given by some trusted person. So a priest, a counselor, a friend, a mentor, or something along those lines.

But then we can also use reason to our own benefit. While there is something good to be said about not being caught up by certain passions, we are passionate beings. And reasoning about our own well-being is anything but disinterested, even in the specific Kantian sense.

I definitely feel like picking through a problem has a similar feel to struggling with some work of art. There is a kind of leap in coming to a novel solution, one that involves the imagination at work -- and also in working out the implications of said leap.

I think trying to frame it in terms of how is better just because I agree that it is very hard to be clear on what is involved. But I think it's a little easier to say how -- like the elements and principles of visual art. They don't really specify what art is, they're just general guidelines for how to think about art in order to make art. And true mastery of an art often involves the intentional breaking of those guidelines. But that only comes with thousands of hours of practice.

So maybe the conditions I listed are a bit too clinical -- as seen from the outside, based upon examples of practical reasoning, rather than ways of thinking through a practical problem.

Well, sure. I think there are advantages here too. But you're asking something more personal. Something I would want to know more about you in the flesh before I said anything. There is something to knowing one another together roughly in the same area that changes everything.