These aren't even in the same category. One can do philosophy as a hobby, just like literature, art, and science. If something is a hobby that doesn't exclude it from these categories.

So far it seems to me that you're attached to the notion that science must be institutionalized, and institutionalized in one particular way.



Our health and welfare depends on far more than good predictions. But, all the same, the number of practitioners, or the status of a discipline, doesn't specify what philosophy is. The same holds for science. This is why I mentioned philosophy -- philosophy is still philosophy even if it's not the most popular practice in the world.



Insofar that you grant my first premise -- that science is what scientists do -- then I'd say you are in error when you state that science has nothing to do with an interest in nature. My position follows easily enough from this. At that point it's just a matter of reading the history of science -- which surely precedes the enlightenment.

It's noteworthy to say that an interest in nature is not the defining feature of science. Pagans also have an interest in nature, but pagan rites are religious and not scientific.

Even so it is not predictive power alone that makes science what it is.



I'm not so sure. It sounds to me that you would just call the cancer-curing oracle science, if it happened to make good predictions.

And, I don't share your rosy view of science. It's fun and interesting, but I'm not about to give it three cheers.

(part 1) I think we must mean different things by social practice, then. I don't think that because something is a social practice that it depends on what people flock to, per se. The status which scientists enjoy in today's world would depend on this, but not scientific practice itself. Scientific practice is what scientists do, not what people who are not scientists like about science.

I disagree that scientists are only the result of institutionalization. I agree that it being widespread and that it's status in our world relies upon this, but a social practice is not an institution. One can have a social practice without institutionalization. Philosophy, I would say, can also be practiced without institutionalization.

But these things are not wed to institutions as much as they are to social practices. And social practices just require people to act collectively.

I wouldn't speculate on why every scientist does science. I think the motivations are many. Some do it for money. Some do it out of curiosity. Some do it out of a love for knowledge and a desire to understand nature. Some do it because it's fun. But if science is not defined by prediction, which if the previous point is granted then the history of science easily shows that it is not, then the motivations of particular scientists aren't as important as the social practice of science -- which is where we can glean an understanding of what scientists do.

"Why would anyone want to do philosophy!" :D

Have you read much on Lavoisier? Of particular note to this conversation --

Lavoisier was a powerful member of a number of aristocratic councils, and an administrator of the Ferme Générale. The Ferme générale was one of the most hated components of the Ancien Régime because of the profits it took at the expense of the state, the secrecy of the terms of its contracts, and the violence of its armed agents.[7] All of these political and economic activities enabled him to fund his scientific research. At the height of the French Revolution, he was accused by Jean-Paul Marat of selling adulterated tobacco and of other crimes, and was eventually guillotined a year after Marat's death.

Lavoisier funded his own experiments. Mostly out of interest.


Before the enlightenment, too, there were always people interested in nature. As long as we are not attached to the notion that modern scientific institutions are not the defining feature of science, it goes back to ancient philosophy, so I would claim. This is the result of looking at science as a social practice.


Now, one of the advantages of funding scientific research through the state is that it broadens who gets to study and do science. Usually, before the state funded science, Aristocrats and the rich were the only ones who could pursue these ends. Much like philosophy.

But, then, I would say philosophy ought to also be funded. These things are valuable unto themselves. They don't need state interests or popular appeal for that to be the case.

People may flock to whatever it is they're drawn to -- but what people flock do isn't a criteria of science anymore than prediction is. Why would that matter?

Also, "prediction" isn't something which all humans are drawn to for all time. I would say people want their desires satisfied, and that a desire present today is a cure for cancer, but I wouldn't say that this has a bearing on what science is. Again, why would it? What do people's desires have to do with the practice of science?

I agree with you that science is a social practice. In specific I would say that science is the social practice which scientists do -- not the social practice that is popularly understood, but the actual one which scientists perform.

Of course it does. But I didn't mean who did you read, but rather what your reasoning is.

I disagree with your assertion. Prediction is just a part of the social practice of science. Other parts of science include explanation, understanding, and knowing -- not just prediction.

I gather that this is your opinion. But from whence does it derive?

I prefer to use "asses and elbows" to mean a hustle and bustle which is disorganized due to a mixture of incompetence and a lack of resources. Often understood to mean that you have to fight for yourself. i.e., "There is 15 minutes for shower time, there's 50 of you and 5 showers, so it's going to be nothing but asses and elbows"

I concur w. @Bitter Crank --

I mean, uhhhh. . . think very literally. A hole needs ground around it to be a hole.

True. :D

But having occupied public space before, and having no real qualms with firearms, it's not the tactic that bothers me. Just the end-goal. It does pretty much strike me as a rich man's quest to have more control over their land. Not sure if the couple should really spend more time in jail -- I'm not a big fan of jail or mandatory sentences -- but I also don't know my ass from a hole in the ground about the case, and it strikes me that the demand isn't commensurate with that story really.

Yeah.

Ok, that makes sense. That's why I was confused I suppose. I didn't expect Quine to propose that irrational numbers can be "discovered" in some discrete, terminal sense. That's not what they do, and they're just as real as any other number too.

I mean the very notion of 'conceptual scheme' is not ontologically neutral. And while it could be wedded to any old ontology I don't think that's singular to the notion of 'conceptual scheme' -- since we can also wed any old ontology to physicalism or whatever it is. Ontology is like that. It applies everywhere.

A lot of this thinking comes from my reading Davidson's paper 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual scheme' -- my opinion has morphed over time, but it's still a good paper.

While I have a higher opinion of academia than yourself -- and given that I enjoy art for the sake of art, etc, that may be of no surprise -- I found this post very engaging and good. I'm sympathetic to a lot of it.

I tried to formulate a more thorough response over time but this is about all I could come up with.

There's an interesting argument that was just made in the Atlantic which I share some sympathies with, too. And, yeah, I could care less that they occupied a park with weapons. That part doesn't bother me. The part that bothers me is that if black people had done it, they'd be dead.

Uhm, I mean, it's a little weird quoting myself, but that's exactly what I said to BitterCrank:

I don't believe the complaint is that SWAT should greet the white people, but that it'd be nice to be treated equitably -- and this is just another example in a long list of examples to highlight racial disparity in the United States.

So, equality in this case wouldn't be an equality of the lowest common denominator. Rather, all people deserve to be treated as if they are human, with the needs and rights that entails. — Moliere

I didn't just allude to Ferguson, I said it in my first post. Along with Tamir Rice. I said these because of how close they are in time. There are always differences in events. There's also much more to the story than you're presenting, and I don't particularly want to take up that side of the jostle.

The one piece of context, in spite of your harping, that you seem to be either ignorant of or ignoring is the history of blacks in the United States. Recent history, even. A more salient comparison would be the MOVE bombings in 1985.

Do you really believe that this Oregon conflict will end with an air strike?

I don't believe the complaint is that SWAT should greet the white people, but that it'd be nice to be treated equitably -- and this is just another example in a long list of examples to highlight racial disparity in the United States.

So, equality in this case wouldn't be an equality of the lowest common denominator. Rather, all people deserve to be treated as if they are human, with the needs and rights that entails.

YNF :D -- that's a good one.

Also something I saw was that the group claimed 150 militiamen, while other sources claimed seeing 15. If my experience serves it's probably in between. I very much doubt the 15 figure. People were probably asleep or not in the immediate vicinity. But if the last episode of Wild Bundy's Adventures is anything to gauge by the YNF isn't known for maintaining any real sort of cohesiveness or discipline outside of their hatred of all things "government" (they devolved into infighting between groups as soon as the thread had subsided), which from my own experience means that logistics aren't the strong suit of the group.



And, yes, the racial aspect of this event is palpable in the face of the recent events of Tamir Rice, as well as the difference in treatment at Ferguson.

Then according to that formulation, I'm not referring to ontological beliefs, but to beliefs about ontology, which there is no indication that either of these people had, or that beliefs about ontology had any effect on their work. That's what I'm saying. One needn't have any particularly well thought out stance on the matter to have a motivation to make scientific discoveries, and I can't imagine a single reason why adopting a (to once again misappropriate Kant) deontological position should in any way effect those motivations. — Reformed Nihilist

That's true. But on the latter I think that you're equivocating. Because at the beginning of this paragraph you're talking about beliefs about ontology -- so beliefs about the study of what exists. But then when you say adopting a de-ontological position should not effect motivations to make scientific discoveries -- which seems, to my ears at least, denote beliefs about what is, rather than beliefs about the study of what is.

Or not?

I'm just saying how I hear it here. I'd like clarification.

To be fair, what sometimes passes for philosophy rightly gives philosophy a bad name, and I can't fault anyone who only has a passing knowledge of philosophy to believe it is all sophistry, mental masturbation and an attempt to get easy credits. — Reformed Nihilist

Yeah, but what passes for science, in that same vein, is also really bad science. But we don't judge the discipline of science based off of what is bad. Why would it be fair to judge the discipline of philosophy on what is bad?

I think it's more hubris than anything. Philosophers give more credence to science than scientists (tend to) give credence to philosophers -- especially in the physical sciences. This is sad, because it's usually an unfounded assumption . . . which, if they were stricter empiricists, would be overturned.


EDIT

I'm not sure what this could possibly mean except the category error I stated.

QM is science. It isn't philosophy. How could philosophy possibly sort out which interpretation of a scientific theory is the best scientific interpretation? The only possible way to sort that out is more hypotheses and more empirical testing. — Landru Guide Us

Unless I am greatly mistaken, QM interpretations are absolutely not science. If they were, they would be falsifiable. — Reformed Nihilist

I think this is the source of much of my disagreement. It's our philosophy of science, not on the topic itself. Because this exchange:

But anyway, quantum mechanics, as far as I can tell, is one of those areas of science that is filled with very smart scientists making very stupid metaphysical assumptions. — darthbarracuda

That is what I was saying, in a nutshell. — Reformed Nihilist

I wholeheartedly agree with.




That may take the thread a bit too far astray. But the long and short of it is this -- "falsifiability" is an outdated and (I would say, and most phil-o-sci today would agree) wrong theory proposed by Popper to differentiate science from metaphysics. It's interesting, but it's far too simplistic.

Wow! I'm glad to have returned to this essay. It meant a lot more to me this time through than I had remembered. Also, I was more able to pick out why Quine was saying what he was saying -- and note how, though the essay is interesting unto itself, it's somewhat dated (just by virtue of it being published originally in 1948, and more philosophy having been done -- not a fault of Quine's by any means)

Some excerpts with a quick commentary below to get conversation started:

One's ontology is basic to the conceptual scheme by which he interprets all experiences, even the most commonplace ones. Judged within some particular conceptual scheme -- and how else is judgment possible? -- an ontological statement goes without saying ,standing in need of no separate justification at all. Ontological statements follow immediately from all manner of casual statements of commonplace fact, just as -- from the point of view, anyway, of McX's conceptual scheme -- 'There is an attribute' follows from 'There are red houses, red roses, red sunsets'.

* I found this interesting. This is the first paragraph Quine uses the term "conceptual scheme". It's interesting to me because it seems that Quine seems to give more priority, later in the essay, to phenomenolist accounts of ontology than others. He doesn't want to commit to phenomenalism, since he says we should, quote unquote, wait and see and explore and experiment -- but I'd say that this essay favors phenomenalism. This is interesting because here we might see why -- because of his basis of judgment on conceptual schemes.

But I'm not so sure that is as innocent an introduction as Quine might believe. (meaning, "conceptual scheme" is not ontologically neutral, but pregnant)

Names are, in fact, altogether immaterial to the ontological issues, for I have shown, in connection with 'Pegasus' and 'pegasize', that names can be converted to descriptions, and Russell has sown that descriptions can be eliminated.

* Hence the importance of a proper account of names. (supposing that one were to want to save the arguments which Quine begins by attacking)

a theory is committed to those and only those entities to which the bound variables of the theory must be capable of referring in order that the affirmations made in the theory be true

This is the nugget around which all the rest of the essay turns -- trying to give a criterion of ontological commitment so that ontology can be discussed, understood, and disputed with thereby committing oneself to an entities existence.

Physical objects are postulated entities which round out and simplify our account of the flux of experience, just as the introduction of irrational numbers simplifies laws of arithmetic

???

What does this analogy mean? I didn't follow this part of the essay at all until he got to the part about how objects are a myth view of physics and physics is a myth from the point of view of phenomenalism.

Just some more bumblings that are going around in my head:

Physicists are not guiltless in this matter, either. By way of example: After Heisenberg had published his theory, along with Bohr, he had the audacity to go the philosopher's conferences and tell them things like "My theory proves that Kant was wrong". I mean that he said this in no uncertain terms. Clearly there's an interesting relationship to be had between QM and Kantian philosophy, but this wasn't what he said. He more or less claimed to have knowledge of "the thing in itself" without really understanding the philosophy behind said term.

This attitude can be further exemplified by a popular quote attributed to Richard Feynman: "Philosophy of science is as useful to scientists as ornithology is to birds"

I would link such hubris to the industrialization of warfare and the impact this had upon the world, as well as the destruction of intellectual centers in Europe through the second world war and the appropriation of said intellect by an industrial power. After the atomic bomb, after the general theory of relativity, and after the various philosopher's critique's of metaphysics in the early 20th century -- what could philosophy possibly offer over what science had clearly demonstrated?

Well, given how marvelously bad many a scientist is at philosophy (See: Roger Penrose, Hawkings, and Sam Harris), I think that question is more easy to respond to these days. :D But that would explain some of the hesitancy on the part of philosophers, I think. (though perhaps there are authors I'm unaware of who are trying to bridge this gap between philosophy and physics -- which I think, given the problem of QM interpretation alone, shows there could be something fruitful there)

Again, the only question I really have, is why isn't there a Daniel Dennett for QM? Isn't that what philosophers are supposed to do? — Reformed Nihilist

I think this is more cultural than anything. Physicists are given a wider berth of respect than psychologists are. So, when a physicist says such and such, philosophers tend to listen to that statement more than when a psychologist says such and such. Philosophers feel more comfortable in the realm of psychology than they do in the realm of physics.

That's my point. Neither spoke specifically about ontology vs. epistemology to my knowledge. Anything else would be psychologizing. Just as you can't extrapolate that I have a theistic view if I say "bless you" when someone sneezes, you can't extrapolate if someone has an ontological bias because they say something is or isn't or exists. In both cases, it's just people correctly practicing a language tradition. — Reformed Nihilist

I wouldn't call a belief a bias -- but I would say that beliefs about what is are ontological beliefs. So one does not need to explicitly state that such and such is an ontological belief, or such and such is an epistemological belief -- it's a matter of interpretation.

Which unto itself wouldn't necessarily indicate psychologizing since there's many ways to interpret a text.

Whatever they're about. Epistemological stances about QM are about QM. Epistemological stances about rocks are about rocks. Either you take me for a naive idealist, which I most assuredly am not, or I don't understand your question.

Again, I'm not an idealist. It is very simple. Some explanations have the same predictive power as others. Adding unneeded ontological commitments to explanations lack parsimony. The more parsimonious the explanation, the more preferable. Ontological commitments are at best, a philosophical distraction. — Reformed Nihilist

I don't know if you're an idealist or what. Since you said you thought that a distraction I thought I wouldn't bring that up.

However, I am skeptical of any sort of epistemology sans ontology -- as I'm also skeptical of the inverse of that. I don't think it quite possible to have a strictly epistemic belief without ontological commitments.

Well, I think you're making a leap to imagine that we can say anything about the philosophical leanings of Einstein or Darwin in terms of an ontological vs. epistemological debate (maybe Einstein said something that could reasonably be interpreted to be about the subject, but I'd bet dimes to donuts that Darwin didn't even come close). — Reformed Nihilist

Is Origin of the Species about the state of knowledge, or is it about how species come to be?

I take Darwin to be a thorough naturalist, at least later in his life. His writings reflect this as at least being a fair interpretation -- which would be an ontological position, no?

I would say that we can ascertain a person's philosophical views in the same manner we ascertain a philosophers views -- by reading what they wrote and interpreting it. This is obviously not free of error and fallabalistic, but that's different from saying we can't do it at all.

It doesn't matter though. Just as most people think about the everyday physics of the world in terms of Newtonian principles, and no engineer would use quantum mechanics to design a bridge, when we speak normally, we take ontological stances rather than epistemological ones.

I don't think that Newtonian principles are everyday by any stretch of the imagination. If they were then they would have been found much sooner.

I think that Aristotle's physics actually gets close to a reasonable phenomenology of the everyday natural world, but I'd also hedge that and say I doubt that his is a universal phenomenology but is more culturally embedded.

Also, on the latter -- what are epistemological stances about, to your mind?

It would be to cumbersome to say "according to the most current accepted understandings of gender, and to the best of my knowledge, I am a male", I can just skip all the things we take for granted and express it in an ontological way and say "I am a man". I assume that Darwin, et al speak, and largely think the same way as most people do, and ascribe to a not particularly well considered, but generally useful form of pragmatic ontology. The problem is, the same way that QM doesn't lend itself to building bridges, it also doesn't lend itself to being coherently spoken about using traditional ontological terms. So in a nutshell, I don't think that there's an inherent need for an ontological stance to have the same project as someone who says they want to know how thing "really are", you are just speaking more concisely if you say you are trying to find the most useful way to model our observations.

To my mind one is committed to an ontology the moment they state how things are. There is something confusing in the question "How are things, really?" I'd agree. In specific, "are" seems to already denote existence -- which is a reasonable interpretation of "reality", clearly related to "really".

To speak of observations is to have something which is also observed -- there may be an interplay between the two, by all means, but that doesn't eliminate the observed. And, at a minimum, it seems that the world is at least populated by observations -- a bit abstruse, but a possibility -- which would mean that we're still committed to some kind of existence in speaking in this manner.

I don't think I'm proposing a strict line. I'm just pointing out the apparent lack of any philosophical voice making positive propositions in this area of QM interpretation, and saying that I'm a little troubled by it. — Reformed Nihilist

Gotcha.

I know that Chalmer's in A Conscious Mind points out that work still needs to be done in this region. I wouldn't be surprised if there were some philosophers working on it, but it's been maybe 5 years since I've really read up on anything more on QM.

I can't imagine the possibility of even one, so I think you mean something different from me. Could you give me a "for instance", so I can see where we are diverging? — Reformed Nihilist

Einstein's work is the perfect example. It was built on thought experiments in addition to scientific arguments -- it drove at the nature of reality.

QM, for that matter, was also interested in the nature of reality -- in the physics of the atom and how it really behaved. It was not interested or motivated by a desire to have a set of useful tools for predicting observations.

The speed theory of heat vs. phlogiston was motivated by questions about the nature of reality.

Natural selection is similar.

They were interested in reality -- at the very least, if they believed otherwise, in the reality of nature if not the fundamental constituents of reality -- and not in merely developing statements which could predict observations.

Yeah, as far as the science is concerned that sounds like SUAC to me.

As far as philosophy is concerned then that's different. I don't think that the reality of an observed and an observer collapses the scientific project into one of useful predictions. I think that it's a mistaken philosophy of science to try and draw a barrier between science and philosophy -- at least a hard one. There are clear examples where one is neither, but there's also a middle ground between the disciplines.

It would be interesting if philosophers were to write more about the ontology of QM, I must admit. But then, if I understand you correctly, that would cross the line that you're proposing -- since ontology should have no part in science.

My problem with that is mostly historical. Ontological questions have driven science for a long time. So it seems to me that if we are so strictly opposed to ontology, then much of what we consider scientific breakthroughs would have been denied before they got started. And, in fact, they often were -- and it was the successors who decided what counted, rather than the inventors and their critics.

I would note quickly hereafter that just because ontology can be a part of science, that doesn't mean that ontology should only be scientific. I disagree with the latter vehemently, but I wouldn't want to draw a clear line between the two either because it doesn't seem to fit with how science has been practiced so far.

Oh OK, my bad. Yes, I would say the CI is making an ontological claim. So if you're saying otherwise then I misunderstood you.

To me it sounds like you're describing what has been playfully termed "Shut up and calculate" :)

EDIT: But then, that always struck me as an attempt to avoid ontological commitments. It pairs well with your philosophy of science -- i.e. one which is instrumental (as I read you) -- but I wouldn't say that it's a necessary phil-o-sci for SUAC.

Is it philosophy or is it science?

I think that this problem straddles the line in a similar manner to consciousness. That's probably why people put the two together so frequently, even if they have nothing (so it seems to me) to do with one another. There are experiments, even, which attempt to push one interpretation or another -- but as any cursory examination of phil. o science shows, experiments are not neutral to interpretive assumptions, either.

And then some of the most lasting contributions to science were motivated by philosophical thinking.

I think it's safe to say that there is a space between science and philosophy that counts as both, and it's not always clear which category we should use -- but, it doesn't matter, either. There need not be a hard line between science and philosophy.


Which Interpretation?

Yours sounds a lot like the Copenhagen Interpretation to me. Most other interpretations try to explain away the stochastic nature of reality, but the Copenhagen Interpretation embraces that aspect regardless of which emphasis you choose (i.e., Bohr vs. Heisenberg).

Only if those nouns are a value of a variable. ;)

That's a good refinement. I agree with you. But even then -- how do you determine the realm of possibility?

Even in a vague way? Obviously you can't determine the future precisely. But this is a common rhetorical move -- that such and such belief is not "realistic" when compared to human nature. That determination is oft taken for granted. How does one determine the bounds of possibility, in your opinion?

I suppose I'd take this up a level in abstraction, first, and ask -- what does realism have to do with political ideals?

It's not that we shouldn't temper our desires by how the world is, but rather, it is possible to do so in a very brute way so that we never reach for anything more. In a supremely simplistic manner "realistic" could just mean "What exists now", which would clearly demotivate any political position no matter how easy or hard it may seem to pursue.

So, to rephrase my first question -- what is the relationship between realism and political ideals, and what do we mean when we say "realistic" in a political context?

Merry Christmas to y'all! Above is my favorite Christmas song. It's not exactly a happy song, but I always have a soft spot for sad songs -- especially one's sung by half-drunk sounding irreverant celtic punk bands.

Fixed. I added them.

I didn't realize there was a thread for this. I'm just reposting what I posted in the December poll as a resource.

Peter Singer -- The Solution to World Poverty
http://www.unc.edu/courses/2009spring/plcy/240/001/The_Solution_to_World_Poverty1.pdf

John Hospers -- What Libertarianism Is
http://www-personal.umich.edu/~lormand/phil/teach/pp/B%20%20%20NO%20PUB/B2%20%20%20Right-Libertarianism/Hospers%20-%20What%20Libertarianism%20Is.pdf

Kai Nielson -- A Moral Case for Socialism
http://businessethics.qwriting.qc.cuny.edu/files/2012/01/Nielsen.pdf

James Sterba -- Liberty Requires Equality
https://philosophynow.org/issues/110/Liberty_Requires_Equality

Garrett Hardin -- Lifeboat Ethics
http://web.ntpu.edu.tw/~language/course/research/lifeboat.pdf

Judith Jarvis Thomson -- A Defense of Abortion
http://myweb.facstaff.wwu.edu/nmarkos/Zola/Thomson.Abortion.pdf

Don Marquis -- Why Abortion is Immoral
http://faculty.polytechnic.org/gfeldmeth/45.marquis.pdf

Peter Singer -- All Animals are Equal
http://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/phil1200,Spr07/singer.pdf

Paul Taylor -- The Ethics of Respect for Nature
http://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd/phil3140/Taylor.pdf

True, not all leftists would be like this. However, I disagree that these are fundamental values and intrinsic rights. Who are they to claim so? As far as I'm concerned, the only rights a man has by birth are the same rights a tiger has - which are not many. It is society which grants man any other rights that he has, and man owes it to his community for having them. Thus it is man's duty to support his community which has provided for him while he couldn't provide for himself - and it is also his duty to remember that if it wasn't for his community he'd be in no better or worse state than a tiger is. — Agustino

Oh my. I agree with the beginning, but I must admit a severe disagreement with your conclusion. Yes, rights are only granted by society, but -- this only means we can get more, not that we have to respect society. And, really, why shouldn't we ask for more? If we don't, then we have an over-class of folks who take advantage of those who are below them -- and I don't blame them, of course, because that's only human nature -- but we don't have equality until people in the underclass actually come together and fight.

I hope not, given that he's a very consistent progressive -- but, I will note, would not get along in radical circles even in the U.S., which are rather conservative themselves when you consider the world picture. [sorry, mate: don't mean to hate. but. . . it's rather true. especially considering your views on weapons, where most radical leftists are fine with weapon ownership, whether it violates laws or no] @Landru Guide Us [edited so landru sees us all and stuff]

In light of Christmas, I share my still-favorite x-mas song, as unhappy as it might be. Ahhh what can I say -- I try to be happy, but if you ask me, these are the things that make me happy.

I am sorry to hear it, and I hope the best for his loves and family in a trying time. He will be missed. [though I personally never really interacted much with him, I did know him just by being in this circle of folk]

There's a part of me that agrees, and a part of me that wonders.

The part of me that wonders is asking: How do you feel about the works of Camus, or Sartre?

I just want to hear from you, more than anything. I don't have a critique or anything, nor do I know if I will have one after you respond. I would just like to know what you think at this point, if you don't mind responding.

Heh. I think your poll might be a bit too reflective of your answers, Bitter ;).

As it is I can't answer the second question. But it's probably better to type out a response anyways.

I do believe I have real political efficacy. I don't think that changes with the state one is in. I think that it can be harder or easier to be politically effective in certain circumstances, but I don't think one is ever actually politically ineffective.

Now, feeling politically ineffective is one thing, and quite a common phenomena. Understandably so, even. But I wouldn't argue that this feeling, even based on experience as it is, is the truth.

Political agency can be exercised in any situation. I don't think it is quite personal, but it can always be exercised even if you are an army of one. In order to be effective, though, you have to come together with others in some fashion -- which is why I'd hesitate to call political agency "personal".

However, I would say I am also construing "political" in a broad sense. Naturally if you follow all the rules lain out then our agency will be more or less effective depending on those rules. But politics doesn't actually have any rules attached. And in order for the under-class to gain a foothold it is more often the case that the under-class must break the rules [there is a reason, given the system they live in, they are the under-class, after all].

What counts as "the rules" varies considerably. In some countries you can't protest. But in some countries you can -- and as long as you do so in the "polite" manner [in accord with the rules], you won't have much effect. You'll be allowed your free speech so that you can express yourself, and then you'll go back home.

But political movement sees these rights not in moral terms, but as tools. We utilize the rights to position ourselves to act politically, not as the political actions themselves. So you might organize a street demonstration in order to amass enough people together that you can shut down a business, or set up a picket large enough that scabs can't get through. The political act is had at the vagaries where rights are no longer protected, not when they are protected. The protected action is just a means to reach that line of scrimmage where you are an inconvenience to your negotiating partner or enemy.

It is in this sense, I'd say, that one always has political agency.

@darthbarracuda -- It might be helpful to realize that there are more ways of conceiving of pleasure than along a spectrum or number line or something akin to a subjective experience that can fade or grow more powerful.

By all means this is how people today tend to think of pleasure -- as a subjective experience that can be maximized or minimized -- but there's more to pleasure than this. For instance, Epicurean pleasure is had in the fulfillment of natural and necessary desires. It's not along a spectrum, and I would argue that it's not specifically a subjective experience as the British Empiricists imagine it, but that pleasure, in this formulation, has an objective quality to it [hence, why the master could teach others the ways of pleasure, rather than everyone going about individually needing to see "what they happen to like"]

Another sort of pleasure is the pleasure in fulfilling some task -- playing the piano masterfully is a usual example here. There is a pleasure derived by doing, but it is not quantifiable -- we are just fulfilling a desire [something we lack], or reproducing desire [and so it becomes more pleasurable over time]. It's something experienced in the act, and it is experienced because we find fulfillment in doing things well [or, to take an Aristotelian stab, because we are fulfilling our human nature in excellence]



I actually think a good deal of confusion arises because we lack the cultural resources to discuss the complexity of pleasure. In common it's thought of subjective, and along an axis. But there's so much more to pleasure and desire. But I suppose I'm getting off track with that comment. It's just something that's been flitting around in my brain-box for awhile.

The various Islamic caliphates of the past were not anything near the utopias they imagine them to be. Islamists would also be surprised and appalled at certain facts about these regimes. Take Akbar the Great of the Mughal Empire, for example. He had Hindu wives and maintained cordial relations with the West. — Thorongil

Akbar the Great comes much later in the history of Islam, though. ISIL, to my understanding, is referring back to the 600-700's. Hence, an anachronism, but not mythic.

They may have false beliefs and hopes based off of falsity, and they are clearly not historically literate because anyone who takes a historical viewpoint would, well, avoid anachronisms.

But that's still different from the wholesale mythic Fascisms which have no basis in reality. They weren't even false.

The two amount to the same thing, since we can be fairly certain that an apocalypse won't happen as described in Islamic eschatology. — Thorongil

In terms of effects, perhaps -- well, not even then, because the fascists were better at fighting wars and playing politics -- but as far as ideology goes I would say that the falsity of this belief differs from the point I'm making. Namely, that their beliefs about the state marks the two political movements as significantly different.


It may just be a matter of opinion, as you point out in your previous post that you're justifying the use of the portmanteau as good enough, but I suppose I see the conflation is unhelpful and inaccurate. While neither is a desirable society to live in I don't see the motives behind fascism as the same as the motives behind militant Islam, nor do I see the ideological aspects as the same.