Or she didn’t say that because just a moron would have thought that buying time was an admission by Europeans that Minsk agreements were deceivingly meant to arm Ukraine in order to initiate/pursue a war against Russia. — neomac
That's literally what the expression "buying time" means. That's literally what the expression "buying time" means. It doesn't mean "coercive pressure as one component in a diplomatic strategy to establish a lasting ceasefire", which Merkel could have easily expressed that concept in her own words had she wanted to. — boethius
No, it literally doesn’t. The metaphoric locution “buying time” roughly refers to the purpose of delaying the moment of facing some issues, either in the hope those issues will disappear by themselves or in order to better prepare to cope with them. Out of context, the intention to be provocative or to dupe somebody is not inherent to the semantics of that locution AT ALL. So one has to take into account context to determine its contextual meaning. Here you go:
1) Let’s start reviewing the claim in its wider textual context:
ZEIT: Are you asking yourself whether the years of relative calm were also years of failure and whether you were not just a crisis manager but also partly the cause of crises?
Merkel: I wouldn't be a political person if I didn't deal with it. Let's take climate protection, where Germany has done a lot compared to other countries. But with regard to the topic itself, I admit that, measured against what the IPCC's International Climate Report says today, not enough has been done. Or let's look at my policy with regard to Russia and Ukraine. I have come to the conclusion that I made my decisions at the time in a way that I can still understand today. IT WAS AN ATTEMPT TO PREVENT EXACTLY SUCH A WAR. The fact that it didn't work doesn't mean that the attempts were wrong.
ZEIT: But you can find the way you acted in previous circumstances plausible and still consider it wrong today in view of the results.
Merkel: But that requires you to say what exactly the alternatives were at the time. I thought the discussion in 2008 about Ukraine and Georgia joining NATO was wrong. Neither did the countries have the necessary prerequisites for this, nor had the consequences of such a decision been fully considered, both with regard to Russia's actions against Georgia and Ukraine and to NATO and its mutual assistance rules. And the Minsk Agreement in 2014 was an attempt to give Ukraine time. [Editor's note: The Minsk Agreement refers to a series of agreements for the self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Luhansk, which had broken away from Ukraine under Russian influence. The aim was to gain time through a ceasefire in order to later achieve peace between Russia and Ukraine]. It also used this time to become stronger, as we can see today. The Ukraine of 2014/15 is not the Ukraine of today. As we saw in the battle for Debaltseve (a railway town in the Donbass, Donetsk Oblast, ed.) in early 2015, Putin could have easily overrun them. And I very much doubt that the NATO states could have done as much to help Ukraine then as they are doing today.
So in that interview, Merkel ADMITS that Minsk Agreements were an attempt to prevent such a war (as the note of the editor further confirms), however it failed. And even though it failed, it gave time to Ukraine to implement Minsk Agreements, and ALSO to get stronger “as we can see today”. NOWHERE Merkel is talking about Ukrainian victory or about the chances of Ukraine to resolve the conflict in military terms according to its maximalist expectations or cheerleading propaganda.
2) It is very far fetched to claim that Western Europeans, especially Germans or Merkel, were intentionally provoking Russia to a bigger war. For several reasons: (A) given the economic-political ties between Germany and Russia, Germany military unreadiness, and Germany ideological aversion to get dragged into wars and all its consequences (including a refugee crisis). (B) Westerners cornered Ukraine to sign Minsk Agreements which burdened more Ukraine than Russia, since not only Russia was not taken to be a co-belligerant but it was also granted a role of mediator pushing for an interpretation of the Agreements which for Ukrainians amounted to a capitulation to Russia. (C) Even though Minsk Agreements helped Ukraine restore its military forces which in 2014 were poorly equipped, undertrained, and unprepared for a Russian aggression and to partner with NATO (actually, a “decrepit” army:
https://theconversation.com/in-2014-the-decrepit-ukrainian-army-hit-the-refresh-button-eight-years-later-its-paying-off-177881), in a moment where Russia had means and motives to pursue a military escalation after grabbing Crimea without much of a fight, STILL the West and especially Germany didn’t military support Ukraine as Ukraine expected, out of fear to provoke a military escalation from Russia. Indeed, the military aid was very much constrained, slow and far below expectations (since 2014, remember the issue over lethal vs non-lethal weapons up until 2018? Where non-lethal weapons means “defensive and designed to prevent further UAF [Ukrainian armed forces] fatalities and casualties”
https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN07135/SN07135.pdf ), Germany was the most reluctant country to offer military aid to Ukraine also after the war started (
https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2022-04-28/german-arms-deliveries-to-ukraine-spds-controversial-course). And again, Germany opposed NATO membership for Ukraine since 2008. (D) Merkel ADMITS that Minsk Agreements were “an attempt to prevent such a war” in the very same interview where you extrapolated the claim to defend herself most likely against criticisms about her having not done enough to support Ukraine (see the Guardian article you posted, see persisting complaints by Ukrainians about the Western support). That's why Merkel needed to stress it out that however questionable from the Ukrainian perspective still Minsk Agreements achieved something important for Ukraine, that otherwise wouldn't have been possible. And that's what she's trying to take credit for despite the criticisms.
3) In light of contextual considerations, it is very far fetched to claim that Western Europeans, especially Germans, were deceptive, because making Ukraine stronger to the point of being in condition to withstand a major Russian escalation WAS NOT EXCLUDED BY THE MINSK AGREEMENTS (
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minsk_agreements#Text_of_the_protocol), and no she didn’t need to express herself otherwise to make that point clearer to those who ignored the actual content of the Minsk Agreements and the criticisms she was trying to defend herself from (like those coming from Ukrainians and Westerners invoking greater support to Ukraine). So Russian expectations about the “provocative” reconstruction of the Ukrainian army were not grounded on what was explicitly agreed upon. Besides, as you can read here in this report: “The Minsk Agreements: Not Legally Binding but a Political Commitment” (
https://www.kas.de/documents/252038/4520172/The+Grand+Stalemate+of+the+Minsk+Agreements), so it was mostly left on Ukraine and Russia’s initiative to comply with such agreements. So no, Merkel did NOT admit any intention to be provocative or to dupe the Russians.
4) Whatever residual reason to pin “bad faith” on Western intentions (also independently from Merkel's declarations in that interview) in favor of Russian expectations can overwhelmingly be retorted against Russia because: first, conjecture for conjecture, it’s very hard to believe that a paranoiac despot, ex-KGB agent expert on disinformatia and historical revisionism, with a network of both Western (especially in Germany, given their economic and political ties) and Ukrainian covert agents could possibly be duped by Western intentions about the Minsk agreements. Putin was most likely aware in what predicament Western Europeans and Ukraine were, also considering the power relations between the US and Europe, and how he could exploit their hesitancy and “buying time” in his favour more easily than they could in their or in Ukraine’s favour. Indeed, their hesitation/reluctance could have been taken as a political pretext for escalation, as well as a convenient window of opportunity to push covert operations on the ground (including Russification of the region), AS HE ACTUALLY DID. Secondly, given the occupation of Crimea by Russian militia and the Russian arming/leading to support Ukrainian separatists’ armed conflict with Kiev, Russia was most likely violating previous agreements like the Budapest Memorandum, NATO-Russian foundation act and the United Nations Charter (among others). Third, while Russia was more accountable to comply with Minsk Agreements than Ukraine because (A) Russia was the unprovoked aggressor (differently from Israel wrt Hamas) and Ukraine the victim, (B) had greater military means than Ukraine, and (C) had vested interest to protract the conflict and compromise the Ukrainian territorial integrity and sovereignty (to compromise Ukraine’s chances of Westernisation), not only Russia didn’t do its part to preserve a cease-fire but it was arguably Ukraine the one that did more to comply with Minsk agreements (
https://cepa.org/article/dont-let-russia-fool-you-about-the-minsk-agreements/). But if that’s the case then one doesn’t owe good faith to others for dealing with problems that those others created and protracted in bad faith .
Merkel would have known this faction in Ukraine that actually wants a bigger war with Russia existed and at the time she made her comments it seemed this factions view was validated. — boethius
It’s a convenient caricature to present Ukraine’s views as ”this faction in Ukraine that actually wants a bigger war with Russia”, what the Ukrainian leadership aimed to is to preserve territorial integrity and political sovereignty. One can question the methods in light of their chances too succeed. The point is that Ukrainians were/are fighting against Russian oppression, as much as Palestinians fight against Israeli oppression. The main difference is that the former was UNPROVOKED, since Ukraine didn’t attack Russia proper, as Hamas attacked Israel proper. And ultimately it’s inherently a national matter what Ukrainians are ready to do to defend their own territorial and political sovereignty.
Nowhere Merkel is talking about Ukrainian victory in that comment. That's your rhetoric manipulation. — neomac
She says "buying time" ... buying time for what? To become "stronger as we see today".
The far bigger war with Russia is at that time underway. By "strong" she is obviously implying "able to win on the battlefield”. — boethius
That may sound plausible in the hindsight, but when Putin invaded Ukraine in 2022, neither the West nor the US administrations were expecting Ukrainians to be able to resist as they did. When building up the Afghan security forces in 20 years, the US spent tens of billions more than they spent to rebuild the Ukrainian army since 2014 to 2022. When they were directly war fighting the Talibans in Afghanistan, the US spent hundreds of billions more than they spent in war fighting the Russians in Ukraine (
https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2021-04-30qr-section2-funding.pdf). And yet when the Americans left Afghanistan, these Afghan military forces were unable to prevent the Taliban from taking control of the country in a matter of months after the US withdrawal.
So, without a deeper understanding of the situation (including Ukrainian motivations), it was not implausible that the Ukrainians could have collapsed in the same way vis-à-vis such a foe as the Russian army. Even less implausible given the political/military/intelligence/economic/demographic ties between Russia and Ukraine since the Soviet era. All the more if one were to believe Russian propaganda: Ukraine’s regime was the result of a Western coup, Russians and Ukrainians are one people, Ukrainians are just misled to self-destruction by a biiiiiig (or “tiny tiny tiny”? Which one sounds better? You tell me!) fraction of genocidal Nazis, Kiev will capitulate in matter of days or weeks, etc. This understandably elicited greater optimism and boosted moral because expectations about Ukrainian performance in an armed conflict with Russia were already pretty low (no matter how Western propaganda artificially amplified this sentiment).
Besides, roughly one month prior to Merkel’s interview, Gen. Mark Milley notoriously warned Ukraine and the West that
despite Ukraine’s heroic success in driving the Russians from Kharkiv and Kherson, it would be “very difficult” to evict Russia’s army from the entire country by force. There might be an opening for political solutions, however: “You want to negotiate from a position of strength, Russia right now is on its back”. (
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eoxCo1mXzEE&t=6s).
So, NOTHING in admitting that the Ukrainian military forces became stronger, logically implies or “obviously” suggests that their strength was enough to resolve the Ukrainian territorial disputes with Russia via military means in a way that satisfied Ukraine. BTW this is a persisting issue of Western support to Ukraine, at least, from the Ukrainian perspective.
Otherwise her comments would make absolutely no sense: Minsk was to buy time for Ukraine to be strong ... but alas obviously not strong enough and therefore to ultimately be severely damaged by Russia and forced to sign unfavourable peace terms?! — boethius
Nobody knew back in 2014 what Putin would do in 2022 for certain. We should talk in terms of risks of escalation. The Ukrainian were confident that to mitigate such risks they needed to work on military deterrence with the help of the West. But Western collective support to build such deterrence couldn’t possibly have been granted, or even fully planned back then by individual Western politicians, other than in a form of a generic political commitment, and most certainly not with the same confidence Putin can establish/plan Russia’s foreign policies. The decision process in Western democracies is way more complicated than in authoritarian regimes both internally to individual countries, and externally among allied countries. And Russia can interfere with Western and Ukrainian decision making through infowar more easily than the other way around. So Western commitments to Ukraine could end up being more problematic and conditional in the backstage than on the stage when the West must show unity for propaganda reasons. This is consistent with the persistent disagreements between Ukrainians and Western allies on how to deter Russia.
You don't "buy time" to suffer the same consequences later, perhaps even worse, you "buy time" to prepare a more favorable outcome. Using a negotiation to "buy time" would be understood by anyone in diplomatic, legal, and/or political circles as the goal is to buy time to prepare for an escalation of the conflict and not buy time in order to implement the spirt of the agreement (which makes no sense: you do not "buy time" in signing an agreement with the intention of fulfilling the agreement, just not now but maybe later?! It's not how anyone speaks with even a cursory experience with this kind of discourse). — boethius
I argued that Minsk Agreement served both purposes: reach and preserve a cease-fire while at the same time making Ukrainian more military ready in case of Russian escalation. They are not inherently incompatible, and both purposes took time (also the implementation of Minsk agreements, since it had to go through the internal Ukrainian political process and was obstructed by Russia). What I deny is that Merkel admitted in that interview to act provocatively toward Russia or to dupe Russia. This is a caricature of what she said, based on pro-Russian biased assumptions.
Had Merkel actually thought Ukraine negotiated Minsk with the intention to avoid a bigger war and was therefore implementing Minsk with the goal of avoiding a bigger war, but that, alas, supplying arms to Ukraine as part of that diplomatic strategy didn't work but fortunately Ukraine is now better able to deal with Russian bad faith vis-a-vis Minsk, she would have said something along those lines — boethius
Indeed, she said “something” along those lines. That’s what I’m arguing.
To take two important domains: in the ABM and INF situation, the West could offer in a negotiation to assuage Russian concerns of nuclear first strike, even in mutual beneficial ways that aim to create a new non-proliferation treaty architecture that is favourable also to the US (vis-a-vis not only Russia but also other nuclear or would-be-nuclear powers); and in the economic sphere obviously the West could approve Nord Stream II that Russia spent some 10 billion dollars building. In direct bilateral negotiations Ukraine cannot offer either of these things as leverage, only in negotiations that involve (at the least) the US and Germany could ABM, INF and Nord Stream II be on the table. — boethius
Russia may very well have agreed to favourable terms for Ukraine in not only the Donbas but even Crimea could have changed status (some sort of strange quasi status is had been floated at the time), if Nord Stream II was approved and also some nuclear deescalation (or then at least avoiding further nuclear escalation) which presumably the West should also want. Obviously plenty of other issues such as NATO and so on. — boethius
Here is a question for you: since Europe wouldn’t need a defense system against an anti-Western authoritarian regime as Russia is, then another way to get rid of NATO/Western defense system against Russia would and have been for Russia to turn into a pro-Western democratic regime, respectful of other pro-Western countries’ sovereignty? Russia could be like France and the UK a sovereign and nuclear power within the West strategic alliance. Russia could use its resources to improve material and political standards of life in Russia for the good of the Russians, enjoy a peaceful life as ex-imperial nations with other Western nations (like France, Germany, Spain, Japan) and still expand its sphere of influence in a cooperative way with the West (e.g. in Africa and Middle East). So what’s wrong with these scenarios from Russian perspective?
While you think about it, here my objections to your claims:
1) Let me notice that the US made its efforts to act cooperatively with Russia after 2008 see the Obama administration’s “Russian reset” which, among others, comprised Obama’s decision to turn down Bush’s plans to station an anti-ballistic missile systems in Poland and the Czech Republic (
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6720153.stm). And
Vladimir Putin said the decision was "correct and brave". (
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_reset). And there was even a dedicated channel to address whatever Russia’s security concerns about NATO after the collapse of the Soviet Union, as established by the 1997 Founding Act (
https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm). Besides there were margins for security cooperation in other areas of the globe, e.g. in fighting terrorism and stabilising the Middle East (especially, under Bush’s administration). Yet things deteriorated during the following years on different issues because NEITHER party could help but interfering in whatever the other party saw as its sphere of influence (it’s again Obama the one who approved the plans for the defense systems installed in Romania and Poland). Russia’s concerns in foreign policies are the same ones the US has, and such concerns have little to do with specific/circumscribed territorial and economic claims. They have to do with hegemonic competition at large, starting with those areas of the globe which both Russia and the US see as their proxy spheres of influence like in Europe and in Middle East. Security maximizers are prone to stretch and clash whenever they see an opportunity for weakening their competitors. What makes the difference is their resources to pressure competitors and attract clients. In other words, when states compete for hegemony there is no inherent reason to take opportunities for cooperation as a railroad toward greater stability. Indeed, weaker competitors could grow bolder and empowered through cooperation (as it is the case of Russia, China and Iran) and turn more aggressive, especially if they have historical humiliations to redeem.
2) Russia’s security concerns about the defense systems installed in Romania and Poland, here is what Stoltenberg said in 2016 :
Nor does the system represent any threat to Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent. Geography and physics both make it impossible for the NATO system to shoot down Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles. The interceptors are too few in number, and either too far south or too close to Russia to do so.
We have made this clear to the Russian authorities time and again. Yet Russia has declined all NATO proposals for cooperation on missile defence, including the establishment of joint centres and a regime to ensure missile defence transparency. Moscow unilaterally terminated dialogue with NATO on this issue in 2013. Source:
https://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/opinions_130662.htm?selectedLocale=en
In other words, Russia cornered itself into a position of no dialogue with NATO about security in Europe. The point is that the US can do the same with Russia, and obviously for very compelling reasons: the security system in Europe concerns all European countries not just Ukraine nor primarily Ukraine. So if Russia is perceived as a threat by other Europeans countries, the US can’t just sacrifice European security for Ukrainian security. And if any unilateral defensive move/request from Westerners can be claimed to be hostile/provocative if it can’t be vetoed at convenience by Russia, the West can do the same.
3) One thing I do not understand in your argument is the following: if Russia fears these defence systems, how annexing south-east Ukraine will prevent that if the rest of Ukraine can still join NATO? And even if Russia turned the whole of Ukraine into a neutral/demilitarized/puppet state, still those defence systems could be deployed in the Baltic States and in Finland. How can Russia prevent that without invading/attacking those countries? Besides Russia likely deployed nuclear weapon systems bordering NATO countries (
https://www.kyivpost.com/post/36982), so why Russia’s deterrence should be prioritised over Western deterrence?
Now, it was presented by Western officials and media at the time that the reason to rebuke any Russian invitations to negotiate all the issues in play, a "new European security architecture" was that this was essentially as a favor to Ukraine in that the West wouldn't go "behind Ukraine's back" and negotiate things with the Russians. — boethius
I say all this not only because it is apropos but also Merkel would have known the purpose of US policy was to be provocative and not to try to reach a resolution with Russia. — boethius
Unless, Merkel would have known that the purpose of Russia’s was to be provocative and not to try to reach a resolution with the US, as it became blatant before the Russian invasion started:
The Russian leadership is demanding legally binding security guarantees from the US and NATO in two draft treaties. Key demands are, firstly, a commitment to refrain from undertaking any further Eastern enlargements of NATO, particularly with regard to Ukraine or other states within the region such as Georgia. This would entail withdrawing the prospect of membership offered at NATO’s Bucharest summit in 2008. Secondly, the Alliance should guarantee that it will not deploy any weaponry or military forces on the border with Russia. Thirdly, NATO should end its military cooperation with post-Soviet states and scale back its military forces to the 1997 level. This would mean no longer deploying military forces and weaponry in NATO countries that were not members of the Alliance in 1997. Moscow is therefore also demanding that NATO withdraw its multinational battlegroups from Poland and the Baltic states. Fourthly, the US should pull its nuclear weapons out of Europe and, fifthly, cease meddling in Russia’s internal affairs. Here, the Kremlin is referring to support for the so-called Colour Revolutions as part of a US democracy-building agenda.
Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has also made it clear that Moscow takes a critical view of any NATO accession by Finland and Sweden. The Russian leadership is thus extending its reach beyond the traditional post-Soviet sphere of influence and, by seeking to reduce NATO’s role in Europe, is striving for a dominant position in European security policy. Russia is no longer merely demanding a right of veto in all matters pertaining to European security, as called for in former President Dmitry Medvedev’s 2008 proposal for a treaty on a new European security architecture. Instead, THE AIM IS TO DRASTICALLY CURTAIL THE US’s ROLE IN EUROPE, to establish security guarantees for Moscow and to consolidate spheres of influence in Europe on a legally binding basis. Initial talks between the US and Russia on 10 January 2022 showed that such guarantees are unrealistic.
Source:
https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/future-european-security-what-does-russia-want
BTW, anti-Americanism is also the reason why many, also in the West, and in this thread too (likely including you), take a pro-Russian stance. Even if Russia is evil, still it’s the US the Great Satan.