> The part in parentheses was "even if sometimes only figuratively", Ie not necessarily referring to an actual flag. The flag represents control by the government of that country. Control over some aspect of Ukraine's government (either by having them sign a binding agreement, or by installing a friendly 'puppet' governor in some region) would reduce their risk from foreign influence.
Now it’s clearer. I disagree with this claim “The flag represents control by the government of that country” even when this can be a plausible conversational implicature. National flags as Ukrainian and Russian flags (
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_flag) are symbols of a nation not of their governments. Governments can change and yet the flag and the nation that the flag represents can remain the same. I’m not saying this to be pedantic, but for its motivational implications as well as strategic and moral. People who are fighting against a puppet governments of some foreign power (as Yanukovych was to the Ukrainians) in defence of their national identity and independence are not fighting against their flag, but for their flag as expression of their national identity and independence. And I find this kind of fight morally defensible.
> Well then your agreement is nonsensical. I don't know what more to say. Either fighting over national identity is wrong or it isn't. It doesn't become wrong or right based on the interpretation of some specific historical event. If your agreement that "fighting over a flag is always wrong" is dependant on how the Ukraine war is interpreted, then how did you decide before Russia invaded Ukraine?
First of all, my agreement was conditional and you should have reported as such, as I explicitly asked. If you found my conditional agreement nonsensical or confusing, you could have protested or asked for clarifications, instead of misinterpreting it the way you see fit and move on. Secondly, I formulated my conditional agreement to address an ambiguous theoretical assumption of yours that could be interpreted in different ways. Indeed, to avoid confusions about my position I also immediately explained what I meant in that post, and reiterated in the following posts. If fighting a war over a flag literally amounts to fighting over a piece of coloured fabric as an ornament of a building, then I find it preposterous and 100% immoral. If it’s understood in a metaphorical sense (which is the opposite of talking about “the insignificance of flags”), then we should clarify the metaphor and if you take the national flag to represent a government (yet this too could be morally defensible, for example if the alternative is between a democratic and mafia government), then I disagree with that reading too for the reasons I explained previously. Finally, each of us is presenting and tentatively defending a certain understanding of this war based on moral and strategic assumptions and their implications, so it’s on us to clarify how to understand our metaphors as well as our examples wrt to the issue at hand.
Concerning your alternative “Either fighting over national identity is wrong or it isn’t” is that fighting over national identity is morally defensible (even through war) because people can morally value things more than their own lives, like national identity and independence and unlike a piece of colored piece of fabric on top of a building or a puppet government.
> So you'd have to forward some argument to that effect. It's no good just saying 'for me' at the beginning and expecting that to act as an excuse not to supply any reasoning at all.
I have no such expectations. My expectations are instead that you ask for clarifications, if interested, as I did when I needed clarifications from you. Notice also that I had to reiterate my request for clarifications to you (for example wrt your alleged third strategy or your understanding of “fighting over a flag”).
>Why do you see it as a matter of Ukrainian national security vs Russian oppressive expansionism. Why not, for example, a matter of American expansionism vs Russian expansionism? To quote from the article @StreetlightX posted earlier…
Indeed the war between Russia and Ukraine can be seen in both ways, namely as “American expansionism vs Russian expansionism” and as “Ukrainian national security vs Russian oppressive expansionism”, the reason why I privilege the second depends on genealogical and moral considerations. The clash between American and Russian expansionism in Ukraine is shaped as it is because it is nested in a more ancient clash between Ukrainians and Russians (
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukrainian_nationalism), which echoes in the chaos of narratives about the Ukrainian national identity among Putin and Ukrainian authorities, academics and society at large (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_the_Historical_Unity_of_Russians_and_Ukrainians#Reactions, https://uacrisis.org/en/55302-ukraine-identity,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukraine%E2%80%93NATO_relations#Popular_opinion_in_Ukraine). Indeed the clash of empires doesn’t really become meaningful to people (at least ordinary people) until it resonates within their moral landscape and personal experiences: knowing that in this war USA and Russia are fighting a proxy war in a piece of land called Ukraine for human and material resources, doesn’t tell me enough to decide whom I have to side with in this war. Knowing who is the oppressor and who is the oppressed, knowing that the oppressed is fighting for something I would value too at his place, knowing that this fight is a conventional war with its toll on civilians and their homes, etc. all this is more relevant for me to decide if one should support America or Russia or neither.
>Diplomats are not the arbiters of whether a negotiation has worked. If a process stops the war, everyone can see that it has worked, we don't rely on diplomats to tell us this.
You didn’t get my point. Negotiation is a practice based on complex and institutionalised speech acts like making offers and requests, give assurances, cut deals between participants. As all speech acts , they are governed by conversational maxims, one of which is sincerity. So if all diplomats would always lie to each other during the negotiation, all negotiations would fail and the practice wouldn’t even exist. Surely diplomats my occasionally lie, and lie to the public is much easier than lying to other diplomats, yet all get’s compromised when parties start from such a position of mistrust as in this case.
> I'm only claiming that it might. I only need to demonstrate that it is possible in order to substantiate that claim. Those who argue that Ukraine shouldn't negotiate because Putin lies, have the much harder task of demonstrating that such a process never works, otherwise it'd still be advisable to try.
I see no need for such a demonstration to support the idea that is not worth negotiating with Putin, were this the case. If successful negotiations are generically possible and we may have case studies of successful Russian or Ukrainian negotiations, yet negotiations may also fail also due to deep mistrust: indeed, what credible assurance could possible give Putin to not attack Ukraine again if Ukraine gives up about NATO given that Russia has already broken past agreements (
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Budapest_Memorandum_on_Security_Assurances) ? The same goes for Putin, if Putin thinks that the Ukrainian diplomats are too influenced by the US who want this war to continue, then Putin would have no reason to go for a negotiation unless for taking time to better supply his war machine?
And, interestingly, they both could be right while the negotiation will stall.
> That matter is undeniably secondary to actually partaking in negotiations. The parties involved must actually be negotiating in order for it to even be a question.
At this point partaking is not the problem, because there have been many negotiation sessions between Russians and Ukrainians, but they got stalled.
> ...that you find some arguments persuasive is irrelevant to this claim. Your claim is that arguments of America's culpability are not supported by an objective analysis of the facts. I asked how you justify that claim when so many experts, after having made an objective analysis of the facts, reach a different conclusion.
> I don't see what difference this makes if those decisions all tended in much the same direction.
The experts you are referring to (like Kennan, Kissinger and Mearsheimer) converge enough in the analysis of the genesis of the current crisis and claim how wrong the West effort to expand east-ward at the expenses of Russian strategic interests was. I can get how insightful they were on the assumption that the end of the Soviet Union didn’t mean the end of the cold war mentality, especially in the Russian political/military elites from that generation (as Putin is). Yet their claims and advise do not necessarily converge with your views in some relevant aspects. E.g. Kissinger advises “It is incompatible with the rules of the existing world order for Russia to annex Crimea. […]. To that end,
Russia would recognize Ukraine’s sovereignty over Crimea” (
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-ukraine-crisis-start-at-the-end/2014/03/05/46dad868-a496-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9_story.html). While Mearsheimer concludes that: “The result is that the United States and its allies
unknowingly provoked a major crisis over Ukraine.” (
https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Why-the-Ukraine-Crisis-Is.pdf).
Anyway, as far as “great powers” politics goes, I can get that there are many good reasons to consider antagonising Russia a “strategic blunder” for the US: Russia is not a strategic threat to the US as much as China since Russia is a declining power anyways, normalising relations with Russia could have helped turn Russia into an ally against China, getting NATO involved in a war useless to the US will ruin whatever is left of NATO’s reputation if Ukraine is lost to Russia. So too much at stake for little reward on a lower priority strategic front for the US. On the other side, one big concern for the US is to preserve their long-term influence over Europe against the ambitions of Russia and China, or against Germany becoming more assertive (https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/ICS-USEU_UNCLASS_508.pdf,
https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/could-europe-fear-germany-again) and for the EU (especially for the easter European countries) the concern is to preserve NATO’s protection against any military threat especially from Russia. So the US can not overlook the national interests of its partners and allies in Europe, as much as in Middle East as much as in Indo-Pacific. Even more so, given the technological and economic power concentrated in the EU. Additionally this war is a tragic but maybe necessary wake up call for Europeans against the existential threats coming from authoritarian geopolitical powers and the risks of relying only on the US military support.
And we could go on by wondering what a “strategic blunder” was for Putin to start a war in Ukraine, etc. And it wouldn’t be over yet, because we should also strategically analyze the possible outcomes of this war, etc. and how the rest of the world could react to each of them.
While all this is certainly precious feedback from experts and governmental advisors, yet government foreign policies and foreign policy trajectories over decades are the result of such an overwhelming informational and motivational selective pressure on decision makers (or generations of decision makers) and executive branches by all kinds of teams of experts, lobbies and world events that no strategic analyst could fully rationalize within their theoretical framework, I’m afraid.
But the major problem is the unresolved logic tension between strategic view and moral view. If you want to talk about morality and moral responsibility you need moral principles and agency (capacity of making and executing free informed decisions). Now from great power politics, however morality is relative (“national identity is just a flag”) or instrumental and agency is always reduced to “causal” reaction to perceived existential threats or opportunities (which sounds as an oxymoron wrt so-called realist view in geopolitics), so preventive moves to increase deterrence, reciprocal threats and ping-pong blame game are structurally embedded in this view. Indeed the competition between Russia and NATO didn’t begin with NATO enlargement’s provocation simply because it never really ended with the Cold War (https://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/96-98/cottey.pdf,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1995/09/21/yeltsin-vs-clinton/442ba04d-23c7-4d8b-9732-2dda43e1544b/).
And geopolitical agents are theoretical abstractions that may hide very different situations for real political agents. Putin’s dictatorial power extends over the last two decades so he could take all his time to prepare for this war and take effective decisions consistent with his goals, meanwhile in the US there have been five different administrations (including a philo-Putinist Trump) in loose coordination with an even greater number of changing and politically divided EU leaders and governments, decided also thanks to a growth of anti-globalist populism that Putin contributed to feed with his money and troll armies. So not exactly the same situation for responsibility ascriptions.
> The west is delivering weapons to the oppressed. Whether that's 'helping' them depends entirely on your analysis of their options.
Sure, then again the West tries to help the oppressed by delivering weapons instead of trying to help the oppressor.
> So? How many people have the 'stick' immiserated. That's the metric we're interested in, not the method.
We who? I’m interested in the method too though. You are interested in metrics? No idea of the number of victims on both sides. Do you? Nor have I an idea about the weight you would assign to each causal factor of your multi-causal analysis. Do you? Out of curiosity, can you give me a rough idea about what your math to calculate the Ukrainian misery based on your multi-causal analysis would look like ? Can you list, say, 3 causal factors and tell me the weight you would assign to each of them and why?
> 4. Ukraine seems more open to share our views on standard of life and freedoms than Russia. — neomac
What am I supposed to do with that? What evidence to you have?
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2022/03/04/are-ukrainian-values-closer-to-russia-or-to-europe/
> 1. This gives Russia no more than is de facto the case already, so it doesn't give an inch on Russian expansionism, it just admits that we've failed to contain it peacefully as we should have. Russia already run Crimea, Donbas already has independent parliaments and make independent decisions, NATO have already pretty much ruled out membership for Ukraine, as have Ukraine.
A perfect summary of Putin’s negotiation tactics, well done. Yet this tactic didn’t sound that convincing so far and BTW also the US had a de facto puppet government in Afghanistan for 20 years. So no, you didn’t offer any third strategy equally opposing the West and Putin, you just repeated Putin’s demands and related blackmails without considering Ukrainian demands at all.
> 2. I care very little about Russian expansionism when compared to the lives of thousands of innocent Ukrainians.
Therefore you do not care to offer an opposing strategy against Russian terroristic expansionism, (worse than any Islamist terrorism has been so far to the West).
> If you want to throw them in front of the tanks to prevent it, that's on you, but I'm not going to support that.
> Now explain how it's morally acceptable for us to throw Ukrainian civilians in front of Russian tanks to help us achieve these goals.
Who is us? I didn’t throw anybody under tanks. And the antecedent of that conditional is false. Nothing to explain here.
> What 'moral reasons'?
Putin is a murderous and criminal oppressor of innocent Ukrainian civilians. This claim is intelligible without any multi-causal talks and arguments ab auctoritate. So Western leaders have moral reasons to contrast Putin offensive expansionism the best they can, as long as they can.
> We're talking about the US and Russia here, not Isis. The US 'method' is causing more deaths in Yemen right now than are being caused in Ukraine by the Russian 'method'. And Yemen isn't even the US's only theatre of war as Ukraine is Russia's.
Sure, but your preposterous claim about the immorality of fighting over a flag or national identity was general. And so I offered you another counter-example to make my case even more clear.
If you want to talk about the US and Yemen open another thread. Concerning “methods”, I simply claimed they have moral implications and therefore I take them into account: a stick and carrot strategy (a mix of incentives and deterrence) may be morally more defensible than a full blown-war as in this case.
> Care to expand on these clandestine 'personal preferences’?
Well it was a minor point of a general consideration, but let’s say as a mere hypothetical example that Putin paid you with his precious rubles to support his propaganda in this forum against the meddling of the West in Ukraine. Prior to the war, I would have considered it just something I dislike, now I would consider it immoral.
> That just goes back to your disagreement that Russia had any reason at all to see NATO's actions as a threat (ie arguing that NATO weren't even shaking the table at all). The problem is, an overwhelming quantity of foreign policy and strategic experts disagree with you and you've not provided a single reason why anyone would take your view over theirs.
Indeed, I offered reasons mainly to question your 2 moral claims:
Recklessly endangering millions of people by knowingly provoking a ruthless tyrant without any meaningful protection for those he might attack is immoral (as an accusation against the West).
Fighting a war over a flag is without doubt immoral.
And in this post I could complement my arguments with a few more comments about the experts you were alluding to. I didn’t do it earlier simply because I didn’t know whom you were talking about.