How can a problem which doesn't exist be exaggerated? How can the Russians cause more military and political repercussions than something which doesn't exist? — Isaac

I didn't talk about existence, but about relevance on a negotiation table as you seemed interested to discuss.

Reminding the reader of the notion of belief you're working from again... — creativesoul

Unfortunately for you, my objections to your ignoratio elenchi fallacy do not depend on my theory as I clearly stated:

Let’s not forget however that this argument must be understood within your specific theoretical framework — neomac

False belief cannot possibly be true. — creativesoul

Which I'm not questioning. Indeed also false statements cannot possibly be true. And that depends on the meaning of truth and false, not on the meaning of belief and proposition or statement, as I already explained.

> What it does mean is that it might represent a good diplomatic lever in any peace negotiations.

It depends on how relevant is the lever. And the claim "There is a Neo-Nazi problem in Ukraine" needs to be proven.

I found a study from July 2016 ("The Far Right in the Conflict between Russia and Ukraine" by Vyacheslav LIKHACHEV), claiming:
From the very beginning, the armed conflict that broke out in the Donbass in the spring of 2014 drew in right-wing radicals, on the Ukrainian as well as on the Russian side. Organised ultra-nationalist groups and individual activists established their own units of volunteers or joined existing ones. The ideology, political traditions and general track record of these right- wing extremists meant that it was both natural and inevitable that they would take an active part in the conflict. Yet the role of right-wing radicals on both sides has on the whole been exaggerated in the media and in public discussion. This article demonstrates that Russia’s use of right-wing radicals on the side of the “separatists” in Donetsk and Lugansk provinces had greater military and political repercussions than the involvement of Ukrainian far-right groups in the “anti-terrorist operation”. The general course of the conflict, meanwhile, caused the importance of far right- groups on both sides to decline.

Not to mention how the Ukrainian Jewish community reacted to the "denazification claims about Ukraine by Putin.

When an author is critiquing something other than what I've wrote, and/or something that quite simply does not follow from what I wrote, it is an irrelevant critique. — creativesoul

A logic reader will understand that you are not logic.

An astute reader will note that the critique above holds good only if we conflate belief and statements. — creativesoul

A logic reader will understand that I'm not conflating anything. And it's precisely b/c I'm not conflating belief and statements that I can prove where your reasoning logically fails.

what the author takes to be an accurate report and/or rendering of what's being critiqued. — creativesoul

A logic reader will understand that you simply failed to understand the purpose of my critique.

emphasis above is mine

Differently from my claims... — creativesoul

A logic reader will understand that your highlighting is pointless. Indeed I'm not misattributing any of my claims to you, since I'm explicitly stating that my 4 claims are different from your 2 claims, except for their logic structure which is the one you reported here [1]. But what my 4 claims show more clearly than your 2 claims, it logically holds also for your 2 claims.

In the first rendering they compared kinds of propositions. In the second, they compared kinds of beliefs. Hence, it is an irrelevant critique, as a result of critiquing something other than what I wrote. — creativesoul

A logic reader will understand that it is relevant to show:

• the genesis of your ignoratio elenchi fallacy as explained here (third point).
• That even if you compare beliefs and propositions you should distinguish qualified and unqualified subjects in your conditionals
• The validity of the “cannot possibly be true/false” requirement (as in “false propositions cannot possibly be true”) depends on the meaning of “true” and “false” (which are contradictory terms), not on the meaning of “belief” or “proposition” per se.

[1]

If all A's can possibly be true or false, and false B's cannot possibly be true, then A's are not equivalent to false B's.
If all A's can possibly be true or false, and true B's cannot possibly be false, then A's are not equivalent to true B's. — creativesoul

About the denazification of Ukraine... let's also hear what the Ukrainian Jews have to say about it:

Ukrainian Jews Angry and Appalled at Putin's 'Denazification' Claim

After the Russian leader evoked the term 'denazification' to explain his invasion of Ukraine, local Jews call him 'totally nuts' and say they have not experienced antisemitism under the current government

(source)

"We believe that talk of 'fascists', a rise in 'followers of Bandera' (a nationalist who collaborated with the Nazis during World War II) and the return of Jewish pogroms is intended to frighten people," said the signatories, who included businessmen and artists as well as the president of the federation of Jewish organisations in Ukraine, Iosif Zisels. "The claim... that there is rising anti-Semitism in Ukraine does not in any way correspond with reality." While Kiev kept a close eye on nationalists in Ukraine, "the same cannot be said of neo-fascists in Russia who are given official encouragement," the petition concluded, calling on Putin to "stop interfering in Ukraine and encouraging pro-Russian separatism".

(source)

The US and its allies, some of them, want a 'diminished' Russia. Are we agreed on this? — FreeEmotion

"'diminished' Russia" is a dubious expression b/c it has to do with the potential ambitions of Russia to reach a superpower status on the global geopolitical stage, but due to the emotional connotations attached to it, it could mean "humiliated Russia" for certain Russian propaganda while for those who fear Russia it could mean "harmless/unthreatening/cooperative/supportive/friendly Russia".

If all propositions can possibly be either true or false, and false belief cannot possibly be true, then propositions are not equivalent to false belief.

If all propositions can possibly be either true or false, and true belief cannot possibly be false, then propositions are not equivalent to true belief. — creativesoul

Both of your claims sound correct as much as the 4 following ones:

• If all propositions can possibly be either true or false, and false propositions cannot possibly be true, then propositions are not equivalent to false propositions.
• If all propositions can possibly be either true or false, and true propositions cannot possibly be false, then propositions are not equivalent to true propositions.
• If all beliefs can possibly be either true or false, and false beliefs cannot possibly be true, then beliefs are not equivalent to false beliefs.
• If all beliefs can possibly be either true or false, and true beliefs cannot possibly be false, then beliefs are not equivalent to true beliefs.

However, differently from your former 2 claims, what these latter 4 claims make more evident is that:

• We should distinguish qualified and unqualified subjects (like “true proposition” or “false proposition” vs “proposition”, or “true belief” or “false belief” vs “belief”) as reported in these claims. If we do not distinguish them appropriately, then the antecedents of the conditional claims will be contradictory: e.g. if “all propositions” means “true propositions and false propositions” then “all propositions can possibly be either true or false” is a contradiction in terms, while if we take "propositions" to generically refer to any proposition prior to (or independently from) any assessment of its truth-value then there is no contradiction.
• The validity of the “cannot possibly be true/false” requirement (as in “false propositions cannot possibly be true”) depends on the meaning of “true” and “false” (which are contradictory terms), not on the meaning of “belief” or “proposition” per se.

And this shows where your ignoratio elenchi fallacy (as discussed here, see third point) is coming from:

• Distinguishing qualified and unqualified subjects wrt to their alethic status assessment
• But then swapping them implicitly and misleadingly while comparing propositions and beliefs

And that's why if you want to pertinently compare propositions and belief, then:

• you should NOT compare assessed beliefs (i.e. “false beliefs” or “true beliefs”) with unassessed propositions (i.e. “propositions”), or unassessed beliefs (i.e. “beliefs”) with assessed propositions (i.e. “false propositions” or “true propositions”).
• Instead you should compare assessed beliefs (i.e. “false beliefs” or “true beliefs”) with assessed propositions (i.e. “false propositions” or “true propositions”), or unassessed beliefs (i.e. “beliefs”) with unassessed propositions (i.e. “propositions”).

2 examples of inappropriate quotations:



My sentence was creatively chopped out by a deranged soul.



Taken in its context, my claim was referring to a different example from the one we are handling here, and only in order to clarify some implications of your views, not mine. (But now that you made me think about it, I would not be surprised if also on that occasion you were already committing a similar ignoratio elenchi fallacy ).

> At time t1, the individual believes that that particular clock is a working one. It is not. The individual's belief is false. False belief cannot possibly be true. Therefore, the individual's belief cannot possibly be true. "That clock is working" can be true. It only follows that "that clock is working" cannot possibly be what the individual believes.

You just fetched the same argument from the trash bin, where it should have rested for ever and ever. So I must re-toss it into the trash bin for exactly the same reasons I already explained here. Evidently you fail to understand my objection as well as how valid deductions work. The problem is not in the piece of narrative you reported about the genesis of that belief but in what you feel so ridiculously confident to infer from. This confidence comes from some preposterous assumptions that are neither properly spelt out nor properly argued, and that you simply brainwashed yourself to accept, hoping to do the same with me (or us). And you failed that too. Philosophy, as I understand it, it's the opposite of brainwashing.

> QED

Fremdschämen. That's what I feel, sir.

At time t1, the individual believes that that particular clock is a working one. It is not [0]. The individual's belief is false [1]. False belief cannot possibly be true [2]. Therefore, the individual's belief cannot possibly be true [3]. "That clock is working" can be [4]. It only follows that "that clock is working" cannot possibly be what the individual believes [5]. — creativesoul

This is a very messy argument. But before tossing it into the trash bin (along with all your other catastrophic arguments), let’s clarify a few points.

First point, it seems you are comparing here 2 things:
- The individual's belief that that particular clock is a working one, at time t1
- And the statement “At time t1, that clock is working”
You apparently need this comparison to establish correct belief reports wrt your understanding of the difference between propositional and non-propositional belief. Let’s not forget however that this argument must be understood within your specific theoretical framework, because my theory doesn’t require any truth assessment of a belief for proper belief ascription at all (indeed such a requirement of yours suggests a confusion between logic requirements and epistemological requirements!). In addition to that, I also questioned that you can successfully identify the right belief report without running into some inconsistencies internal to your own theory for reasons that affect also your current argument. Anyway, in this post, let’s put all the latter considerations aside and focus on your last comparative argument as it is.

Second point, if the individual's belief is claimed to be false ex hypothesi, then also the statement “that clock is working” must be claimed to be false ex hypothesi. In addition to that, you made a general claim such as “False belief cannot possibly be true”, but since you did not explain the truth conditions of this claim (my idea is that it’s a contradiction in terms), one can find it as evident as “False statements cannot possibly be true” (which is also a contradiction in terms). Unless you can argue otherwise, if you wish so.

Third point, let’s assume now that we can validly infer [3] from [1] and [2] (even though the structure of your argument - as it is - does not correspond to a logically valid deduction yet, so it’s a non sequitur!):
[1] The individual's belief is false (ex hypothesi)
[2] False beliefs cannot possibly be true (contradiction in terms)
[3] Therefore, the individual's belief cannot possibly be true (conclusion)
Then we can also validly infer [3’] from [1’] and [2’] b/c the above argument and the following one share the same (il)logic structure:
[1’] The statement “that clock is working” is false (ex hypothesi)
[2’] False statements cannot possibly be true (contradiction in terms)
[3’] Therefore, the statement “that clock is working” cannot possibly be true (conclusion)
Therefore either [4] or [3] must be rejected !!! And in either case it only follows that also [5] must be rejected !!!

In other words, you should compare (assessed) false beliefs with (assessed) false statements, not (assessed) false beliefs with (unassessed) statements!!! So your messy argument amounts (among others) to an ignoratio elenchi fallacy.

Twat. — “creativesoul

Try harder, dude! ;)

You are taking it too personally, sir. I had fun primarily in being articulate, clear, focused, logic and versatile while formulating my objections against your view. Instead, you played very poorly at every round (and we had many), so I guess not much fun for you, independently from the scores. At your place, I wouldn't care about the scores you lost as much as about the fun you didn't have.

A gifted shitshow consisting of a gross misattribution of meaning bordering on deliberate obfuscation... — creativesoul

Look, I didn't mean to wreck your self-confidence. You put yourself into a corner, despite my repeated warnings, and started beating yourself with such an embarrassing determination that it's a bit unfair to make me feel guilty for how bad your catastrophic views look to yourself now.

I've much more important matters to be involved in. — creativesoul

Sure, thing! And may Jack be with you!

Here other objections:

The major problem of your definition of “belief” [1], among others, is that - in a case of belief based on ignorance of the relevant facts - it either does not prove that “At t1, Jack believes that broken clock is working” is a more accurate belief report than “At t1, Jack believes that clock is working”, or it proves rather the opposite, i.e. that “At t1, Jack believes that clock is working” is more accurate than “At t1, Jack believes that broken clock is working”.

Here is why:
- At a first glance, both competing belief ascriptions present Jack as drawing meaningful correlations between the perceptible clock , his wondering what time it is, and whatever other evidence necessary to find out what time it is with that perceptible clock. According to this coarse understanding of your definition of belief, one is allowed to use indifferently “that clock” and “that broken clock” to refer to the clock, as you do when talking indifferently about “a clock” and “a broken clock” [2]. But that means that both belief reports are equally accurate!
- However, according to a narrower understanding of your definition of belief (which we must prefer to be more analytical), then it is true that Jack drew meaningful correlations between that perceptible clock, his wondering what time it is, and whatever other evidence necessary to find out what time it is, but Jack didn’t draw meaningful correlations between that clock and the evidences of its being broken, b/c otherwise we couldn’t claim that he ignored that that perceptible clock was broken! Therefore “At t1, Jack believes that clock is working” is more accurate than “At t1, Jack believes that broken clock is working” for a case of ignorance of the relevant facts, indeed the former is true while the latter is false precisely because the former accurately reports between what relevant evidences Jack was drawing correlations [3], while the latter fails to do that!!!

BTW, this line of reasoning shows another wider problem of your definition of belief. Indeed your definition of “belief” doesn’t allow you to distinguish true from false beliefs: since in both cases the believer draws meaningful correlations between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things.

These two objections help better understand the probable reasons why you can not rely on your definition of belief (as you presented it) to prove your belief ascription claims. Indeed your definition of belief (despite being still very inadequate) is more apt to express the p.o.v. of the believer (or what the believer is aware of believing) then your notion of "unaware" belief based on a (for me, equivocal and unjustified) knowledge requirement [4]. And in fact, to support your belief report accuracy claims you still need a suitable linguistic report of the belief content we are aware to believe (which is captured by your definition of "belief") as input for the manipulative rendering of the belief content we are unaware to believe (that's how you select the proper linguistic form for a given belief content)!!! And this is already enough to show how self-defeating your line of reasoning is wrt to your own assumptions!!!
Unfortunately due to the inadequacies of your notion of belief, you feel pushed to rely on another assumption (the knowledge requirement for belief ascriptions) to discriminate true from false beliefs and identify putative "unaware" beliefs to be reported.

[1]

Belief consists entirely of meaningful correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things by a creature with the biological machinery capable of doing so. — creativesoul

[2]

While words are not propositions, on my view, the content of Jack's belief is not words either. The correlations he draws at the time as a means for believing what the clock says do not include language use. Those words are not being thought by Jack at time t1. Jack is wondering what time it is, so he looks towards a clock to know. That's the way it happens. This is well established habit, to the point of it's being nearly autonomous. That is to say that it is something done without much thought at all about the clock aside from believing what it says. We do not look to a clock and think silently or aloud "I believe that that clock is working". We just don't. That's just not how it works. That is a metacognitive endeavor. Believing a broken clock is not. — creativesoul

[3]
Indeed this also consistent with your claim about not being aware of our own mistaken beliefs

Belief contents express the point of view...
— neomac — creativesoul


This notion of "belief" cannot take account of language less, mistaken, and/or false belief.
A mistaken creature's point of view does not - dare I say, cannot - include the mistake. Hence, when we ask Jack at time t1, what he's doing immediately after looking at the clock, he will not say "I believe that that broken clock is working". Rather, he will say something about finding out what time it is/was.

He is unaware of being mistaken. He is unaware that he believes that a broken clock is working. From's Jack's point of view at time t1, the mistake is unknown.

Inform Jack of what he needs to know and upon recognizing his own mistake, he will readily admit to having made it unbeknownst to him at the time. He will readily admit to having once believed that that broken clock was working. — creativesoul

[4]

Jack was mistaken. It is impossible to knowingly be. Thus, a proper rendering of Jack's belief will come in a linguistic form that is impossible to knowingly believe. — creativesoul

> This notion of "belief" cannot take account of language less, mistaken, and/or false belief [1].
A mistaken creature's point of view does not - dare I say, cannot - include the mistake [2].
[…] He is unaware of being mistaken [3]. He is unaware that he believes that a broken clock is working [4]. From's Jack's point of view at time t1, the mistake is unknown [5].

I agree with claims 2, 3, 5. But totally disagree with claims 1 and 4.

More specifically:

• Claim 4 can neither be equated to nor be implied from 3
• By comparing 3 and 5, it seems that you are equating the notion of “being aware that” and the notion of “knowing that”, or you are presupposing some co-implication between them but it would be better to spell it out appropriately because it is not evident at all: “awareness” is an ambiguous notion per se (e.g. are you familiar with the distinction between transitive and intransitive consciousness? Or the notion of higher-order consciousness? Or the notions of phenomenal and non-phenomenal awareness?). Also the notion of “knowledge” admits different understanding (e.g. internalist vs externalist notion of “knowledge”) and can not be conflated with the notion of “awareness” yet there might be some equations/co-implications between them, depending how these notions are understood. So I would agree on some equation or co-implication between claims 3 and 5, under the condition that we agree on the specific notions of “being aware that” and “knowing that” as applied in this case.
• I’m noticing a potential claim shift though: from “S knowingly believes that p” to “S knows that he believes that p” or “S is aware that he believes that p” as claim 4 and the equation between “being aware that” and “knowing that” (from claim 3 and 5) would suggest. Indeed you never spelled out what “S knowingly believes that p” is supposed to mean until now. If “S knowingly believes that p” means “S is aware that he believes that p” then say it explicitly b/c there are different understandings of "knowledge" and "being aware". However if this is the case, there would be an additional problem: we are shifting focus from someone's belief about a broken clock to someone's belief about their own belief about a broken clock, which looks yet another bad move for you.

So your claims 3,4,5 put together look twice equivocal: in the first place, wrt to the notion of "awareness" (if it is to be assimilated/correlated to the notion of "knowledge"); in the second wrt the content of such awareness (p or the belief that p?).

> Inform Jack of what he needs to know and upon recognizing his own mistake, he will readily admit to having made it unbeknownst to him at the time. He will readily admit to having once believed that that broken clock was working.

I myself can be mistaken and I can figure out what is proper or improper to claim of myself if I were in the situation of Jack. Now, after putting myself in his shoes, even when I recognize that I’m mistaken, I wouldn’t be "ready to admit" to having once believed that broken clock was working. And if I were so disposed it would be only for pragmatic reasons, not for accuracy concerns. So the “unproblematic understanding” argument does not prove to me that your philosophical understanding of Jack’s hypothetical situation is right.

Much, arguably most, of the groundwork has already been offered, here in this very discussion... — creativesoul

Where? can you give me a few links?

It makes no sense at all to me to say that the cat's belief has content that expresses the cat's point of view. — creativesoul

The challenge is: can you justify that claim in a way that is understandable to me (based on assumptions that we both share)?

Has nothing to do with failing to read the next few lines... — creativesoul

Meaning? "Thus" expresses the idea that you are logically inferring your claim "a proper rendering of Jack's belief ..." from "Jack was mistaken" and "It is impossible to knowingly be", aren't you? If so then your argument [1] (as it is) is deductively invalid (in particular, it's a perfect example of non sequitur) and inconclusive (because you didn't conclude with the claim that you were asked to prove). In other words, there is literally nothing else to logically understand in there. Unless you are claiming that the "next few lines" weren't supposed to be an argument to logically support your claim that "At t1, Jack believes that broken clock is working". But then what else? Can you spell it out?
For now your argument looks nothing more than a wishful thought.

[1]

Jack was mistaken. It is impossible to knowingly be. Thus, a proper rendering of Jack's belief will come in a linguistic form that is impossible to knowingly believe. — creativesoul

> Maybe I am right if you do not.

Of course, your claims may be correct even if you didn't demonstrate to me any good argument to support them. What I meant it's just that you didn't demonstrate to me you are right. To do that one has to provide a valid and conclusive argument from some assumptions. I didn't accept any of the assumptions specific to your view (your definition of "belief" and your knowledge requirement) nor I saw any valid and conclusive argument that from those assumptions concludes that "At t1, Jack believes that broken clock is working" is a more accurate report than "At t1, Jack believes that clock is working" wrt to the example of Jack you gave us (which is a case of ignorance of the relevant facts)

> A true belief cannot be false. A false belief cannot be true . It is impossible to knowingly be mistaken. It is impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood.

I totally agree with the part in bold, for semantic reasons: true and false are contradictory terms.

Concerning the part not in bold, I'm not sure how you understand it. If it simply means that any of the 2 following claims is necessarily false or contradictory:

• The claim "S knows that p and 'p' is false"
• The claim "S knows that p and p does not occur"

Then yes, I totally agree, and that again for semantic reasons: the notion of "knowledge" presupposes that "p" is true or that p occurs, but "true" and "false" are contradictory terms as much as "occur" and "does not occur", so those 2 claims are contradictory or necessarily false.
If the part not in bold means something else (as it seems from your later posts) or the same but for different reasons, then you have to spell it out to me, coz I can't justifiably agree to something I do not even understand.

the non-propositional content you attribute to Jack is... ..."Jack believes that broken clock is working" — neomac


No, it is not.

You are conflating the content of my report with the content of Jack's belief. — creativesoul

This objection is maybe based on my poor phrasing. I re-edited my text to better express what I wanted to say.

Jack was mistaken. It is impossible to knowingly be. Thus, a proper rendering of Jack's belief will come in a linguistic form that is impossible to knowingly believe. — creativesoul

This is a perfect example of begging the question argument — neomac

:worry: — creativesoul

I misunderstood your argument because this is how you presented it:
Jack believes that broken clock is working.
The above report is in proper linguistic form. It is accurate. It is true. It is impossible to knowingly believe that a broken clock is working. That's all that was meant by "proper linguistic form".Jack was mistaken. It is impossible to knowingly be. Thus, a proper rendering of Jack's belief will come in a linguistic form that is impossible to knowingly believe
So from the way you presented it, it wasn't clear where the argument was supposed to start.
But if I misunderstood you, then I'll take back my objection that this specific argument was begging the question. One objection less against this specific argument.

Yet I have another objection. Now that you made clear that your argument is only this:
Jack was mistaken. It is impossible to knowingly be. Thus, a proper rendering of Jack's belief will come in a linguistic form that is impossible to knowingly believe.

Then your argument (as it is) is a perfect example of non sequitur, logically speaking. I'll formalise it for you:
premise 1: Jack was mistaken (p)
premise 2: It is impossible to knowingly be mistaken (q)
conclusion: a proper rendering of Jack's belief will come in a linguistic form that is impossible to knowingly believe (c)

p
q
-------
c

This is not a valid logic deduction!!! And it's not only fallacious, but it is still far from being conclusive because the conclusion is not that "Jack believes that broken clock is working" is an accurate report of Jack's mistaken belief, as I asked you to prove. So you simply provided a fallacious argument to prove a general claim about how Jack's mistaken belief should be rendered.
In other words, you have yet to provide a deductive argument in a valid form (if that's what you are trying to do), which ends with the right conclusion. And once you did, then we still have to see if it is sound.

@creativesoul

Let's not forget that you made the following claim:

We can set all the other stuff aside for now and focus upon what counts as belief.

Then, we will see how much sense it makes to ascribe belief to another, because we will have some standard of belief for comparing our ascriptions/attribution to. — creativesoul

So I would expect you to prove that "Jack believes that broken clock is working" is an accurate report of Jack's mistaken belief based on your definition of "belief" [1]. Instead you are trying to support that claim based on a knowledge requirement [2].
Now either your knowledge requirement is based on your definition of belief, but you didn't provide any (valid) argument that deduces this requirement from your definition of belief.
Or your knowledge requirement is not based on your definition of belief, then your claim that "what counts as belief" would set a standard for comparing belief ascriptions is unjustified.


[1]

Belief consists entirely of meaningful correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things by a creature with the biological machinery capable of doing so. — creativesoul

[2]

Jack was mistaken. It is impossible to knowingly be. Thus, a proper rendering of Jack's belief will come in a linguistic form that is impossible to knowingly believe. — creativesoul

It is impossible to knowingly believe that a broken clock is working, because if we know it is broken, we also know it is not working, and thus we cannot believe that it is. That has nothing to do with the sentence being a contradiction and everything to do with knowing that broken clocks do not work. — creativesoul

Which is all it takes to show how convention has been in error... — creativesoul

Well if we accept all your premises (and I haven't accepted any so far) maybe you are right, yet it doesn't prove that your report is accurate. I pointed that out b/c this is a problem internal to your theory, not b/c it's enough to prove that our common belief ascription practices are wrong (indeed I think the opposite).

> That question makes no sense on my view.

Then we need your theory of meaning and truth for you to establish when sentences are true, false , or necessary false. Or do you mean that sentences are true, false or necessary false as a brute fact? And, BTW, shouldn't the belief content you attribute to Jack in your report "At t1, Jack believes that broken clock is working" match the belief content as you describe it in your claim below in order to be accurate?

You are conflating the content of my report with the content of Jack's belief.

The content of Jack's belief are correlations drawn by Jack between directly and indirectly perceptible things. That would include the broken clock and his wondering what time it was, amongst other things less relevant. — creativesoul

Here another objection for you: you claim that “At time t1, Jack believed that broken clock was working” [1] is accurate based on the idea that the proper rendering of a false belief should be put into a proper form that it will be impossible to knowingly believe [2] .
Then here are some belief reports put into a form that it will be impossible to knowingly believe:
1. At time t1, Jack believes that broken clock is working
2. At time t1, Jack believes that clock is working and that clock is broken
3. At time t1, Jack believes that is not the case that clock is either broken or working
4. At time t1, Jack believes “that broken clock is working” is true [3]
3. At time t1, Jack believes that broken clock is not a broken clock
5. At time t1, Jack believes that broken clock is not a clock
6. At time t1, Jack believes that clock is not a clock
7. At time t1, Jack believes that clock that CreativeSoul knowingly believes to be broken, is working
8. At time t1, Jack believes that he knows that broken clock is working
9. At time t1, Jack believes that he knowingly believes that clock is working and that clock is not working
10. At time t1, Jack believes that broken clock is working and 23765.3456 * 23.456 = 557439.9463936
11. At time t1, Jack believes that broken clock is working and planet Earth is flat and all elephants fly
12. At time t1, Jack believes that working clock is broken
13. At time t1, Jack believes that clock is working and a butterfly is not a butterfly
14. At time t1, Jack believes that 0 / 3 = 5
Since all 14 reports satisfy your requirement of being in a form impossible to knowingly believe, are they all equally accurate report of Jack’s mistaken belief?
And if only 1 is the accurate report of Jack’s mistaken belief (or you exclude any of them as accurate), then your requirement is at best necessary but not sufficient to determine the proper belief report of Jack's mistaken belief.
And you have to specify what the missing requirement is b/c otherwise you didn't prove yet At time t1, Jack believed that broken clock was working” from your own explicit assumptions!!!.

[1]

At time t1, Jack believed that clock was working.
At time t1, Jack believed that broken clock was working.
You're claiming the first is more accurate. I'm claiming the second is. — creativesoul

[2]

a proper rendering of Jack's belief will come in a linguistic form that is impossible to knowingly believe. — creativesoul

[3]

Jack cannot knowingly believe "that broken clock is working" is true — creativesoul

> Jack cannot knowingly believe "that broken clock is working" is true, because it is a contradiction in terms, necessarily false, etc. That's all about language use. Jack's belief is not.

Why are you changing the example again?
You should write: Jack cannot knowingly believe that broken clock is working
And not: Jack cannot knowingly believe “that broken clock is working” is true

> It is impossible to knowingly believe that a broken clock is working, because if we know it is broken, we also know it is not working, and thus we cannot believe that it is. That has nothing to do with the sentence being a contradiction and everything to do with knowing that broken clocks do not work.

Why are you changing the example again?
You should write: It is impossible to knowingly believe that broken clock is working
And not: It is impossible to knowingly believe that a broken clock is working.


> There is no need for further explanation. I've more than adequately explained several times over in a variety of ways.

That’s because probably you do not understand what I’m asking you to explain. Even though you should have understood because I gave you examples of the kind of answer I was expecting. Anyways, what you are doing is just joggling with truth claims such as:

• Jack believes that broken clock is working (accurate belief report with appropriate non-propositional linguistic form)
• Jack believes “that broken clock is working” is false (accurate belief report with appropriate propositional linguistic form)
• “that broken clock is working” is false (accurate non-belief report with appropriate propositional linguistic form)
• It is impossible to knowingly believe that a broken clock is working (accurate knowledge report with appropriate non-propositional linguistic form)

And you evidently take this joggling explanatory, because you take as your philosophical task to simply make such claims, contrast their usage so that others do not conflate them, and enforce their usage on your interlocutors without further questions to make you happy. But that has more to do with brainwashing than philosophy to me. And it shows that you are not open to challenges (while challenging others’ views), so why should others be open to your challenges?!
When I ask you for an explanation, I’m asking you about what grounds the truth of all these truth claims of yours. What grounds the truth of all these claims must depend on relevant facts or logic/analytic rules that govern our representations. And if you want to compare the validity of your claims against other claims you should ground your arguments on relevant facts and inferential/logic/analytic rules that govern our representations that must be shared to make our views commensurable. That is why it's utterly pointless to constantly remind us your list of truth claims to prove anything at all. And that's why I keep you telling to not change examples and to provide the truth conditions for your claims in a way that is understandable to us without using your truth claims (which would beg the question) [1]

Now since you insist to distinguish between sentences and belief reports with appropriate non-propositional linguistic form, and you still avoid to answer the very specific question I already asked you 8th times in a row (by changing examples and shifting attention from one truth claim to the other), instead of asking you the same question for the 9th time in a row, I'll ask you:

• what grounds the truth of the claim “the sentence ‘that broken clock is working’ is a contradiction in terms”? My answer is because that sentence ‘that broken clock is working’ represents an object (i.e. that clock) with contradictory properties, namely the properties attributed to the object at the same time by that sentence are terms (i.e. “broken” and “is working”) that by definition are taken to be one the negation of the other. Do you agree? If not, what else grounds the truth of the claim “the sentence ‘that broken clock is working’ is a contradiction in terms”?
• what grounds the truth of the claim “It is impossible to knowingly believe that broken clock is working”? My answer is because the non-propositional linguistic form ‘that broken clock is working’ represents an object (i.e. that clock) with contradictory properties, namely the properties attributed to the object at the same time by that non-propositional linguistic form are terms (i.e. “broken” and “is working”) that by definition are taken to be one the negation of the other. Do you agree? If not, what else grounds the truth of the claim “It is impossible to knowingly believe that broken clock is working”?
• What grounds the truth of the claim that “if we know it is broken, we also know it is not working”? My answer is because “is broken” is a term that by definition is the negation of “is working”, so they are supposed to refer to the same property respectively as absent and as present, whence the validity of the inference between "we know it is broken" and "we also know it is not working". Do you agree? If not, what else grounds the truth of the claim that “if we know it is broken, we also know it is not working”?

[1]

Jack believes that broken clock is working.
The above report is in proper linguistic form. It is accurate. It is true. It is impossible to knowingly believe that a broken clock is working. That's all that was meant by "proper linguistic form". Jack was mistaken. It is impossible to knowingly be. Thus, a proper rendering of Jack's belief will come in a linguistic form that is impossible to knowingly believe. — creativesoul

This is a perfect example of begging the question argument (twice fallacious b/c besides begging the question, it’s also deductively badly formed, as it is!). You take as premises that “Jack believes that broken clock is working” is an accurate report and that that report is in proper linguistic form b/c it is impossible to knowingly believe that a broken clock is working, to conclude that Jack’s belief’s report is accurate b/c it is in a linguistic form that it is impossible to knowingly believe.
The problem is that the claim that “Jack believes that broken clock is working” is an accurate report of Jack's belief, is precisely what needs to be proven, so you can not use it AT ALL as a premise of a probative argument. Indeed what needs to be proven must figure in the conclusion not in the set of premises !!!

I'm not talking about the sentence "That broken clock is working", I'm talking about the proper linguistic form that you claim to be impossible to knowingly believe when put into the belief report "Jack believes that broken clock is working". Isn't this proper linguistic form representing an object ("the clock") with contradictory properties ("broken" and "is working")? Because if it is not the case, then you should explain why it is impossible to knowingly believe it when using this proper linguistic form in your belief report.

> I'll answer whatever questions you like, so long as they follow from what I'm arguing or are just plain ole simple questions about basic facts that seem to cause an issue for my position if and when my position is held in light of those facts. I've no problem at all bearing the burden of my claims. Questions based upon non sequiturs are another matter altogether.

What I always asked you to argue from the start is to prove the following claim of yours:

At time t1, Jack believed that clock was working.
At time t1, Jack believed that broken clock was working.
You're claiming the first is more accurate. I'm claiming the second is.
Prior to continuing... Do you agree with that much? — creativesoul

So I’m following your arguments as long as they focus on what I’ve asked you to argue: to provide support for precisely that claim, and nothing else. And you should expect that kind of questions, because you are challenging our common belief ascription practices. So if you do not make your challenges worth following, I will simply dismiss them.
Besides you have a default tendency of framing other people’s claims by assuming correct your assumptions, which again would simply make pointless any philosophical debate because you are begging the question. And, not surprisingly, this complaint of yours proves it once more: since I removed the part that triggers your framing attitude (like the expression "belief content"), then you accuse me of "non sequiturs" (even when I'm simply quoting your claims and asking questions about them) because you can not trap me in your frames to easily accuse me of conflating things.
So my questions are either conflating things (when you can frame me) or arbitrary (because you can not frame me), therefore you are right. This is not how I understand philosophical debates, this is just your way to preventively censor any potential objections against your philosophical assumptions. Trying to retrain your interlocutors to conform their claims to your theoretical language, to validate your own claims is not philosophy, but - at best - brainwashing.

> What is it that you believe can be gleaned here by virtue of this procedure of yours? What does that question have to do anything we've discussed? Explain to me the relevance of the question. If it is relevant, I'll be glad to answer it. Teach me something new. I'm always game for that.

The relevance is that this is a claim of yours that I find questionable (indeed absurd), so until you provide arguments to support it, I’ll take to be unproven your claim that your belief report is more accurate. The reason why I find it questionable is because you are reporting of Jack that he believes something, which is contradictory because “broken” and “is working” represent contradictory properties of “the clock” (let's see if you can frame this). Indeed it must be so because this is the proper linguistic form which you claim it is impossible to knowingly believe.

Thus, when Jack's false belief is put into proper linguistic form, it will be impossible to knowingly believe. — creativesoul

Jack can not knowingly believe that broken clock is working because “that broken clock is working” is a linguistic form of a contradiction.

> At time t1, Jack believed that a broken clock was working. Jack's belief consisted of all the meaningful correlations he drew while wondering what time it was and then looking at a broken clock to find an answer to his question. The content of the correlations Jack drew at that time are the content of Jack's belief at that time. So, I simplified the answer for ease of understanding. The non propositional content included Jack's wondering what time it was, and a broken clock. That satisfies the criterion perfectly.

I have objections against this claim too, and I have objections also against the claim that “It is impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood” but let’s do a piece at a time and do not mix everything since you can not clearly follow my objections.


So once more (8th time): is “that broken clock is working” in your report “Jack believes that broken clock is working” a contradiction? Or, if you prefer, does “that broken clock is working” in your report “Jack believes that broken clock is working” have the linguistic form of a contradiction? If not, why not?

You are conflating the content of my report with the content of Jack's belief. — creativesoul

I might conflate whatever you see me conflating if you continue to frame my questions. But I will return to such a claim of yours later because I suspect you are committing yet another big mistake.

Anyway you wrote this:

At time t1, Jack believed that clock was working.
At time t1, Jack believed that broken clock was working.
You're claiming the first is more accurate. I'm claiming the second is.

Prior to continuing... Do you agree with that much? — neomac

I'm asking you (7th time): in the belief report that you claim more accurate, namely "At time t1, Jack believes that broken clock was working.", I see 3 items: broken, clock, was working. Explain what each of them stands for. Start from was working.
It's always the same question, but I removed the part that triggers your framing (i.e. "belief content").

P.S.
Too often the questions of mine you think you are answering, are not my questions but the questions that you misunderstand as a consequence of framing my position.

Could you elaborate? — creativesoul

try again (6th time):

spell out what each single item of these 3 items (|broken|, |clock|, |is working|) that are part of the belief content you attribute to Jack in your non-propositional belief ascription rendering "Jack believes that broken clock is working", is. You can start from |is working| — neomac

That's at least the fourth time I've said that and answered your question. It's fishy that you act as if I've avoided it. — creativesoul

Then quote yourself when you explain what "is working" stands for. Because this is what I asked. And if you not find it, that's because you did not answer my question.
So try again (5th time):

spell out what each single item of these 3 items (|broken|, |clock|, |is working|) that are part of the belief content you attribute to Jack in your non-propositional belief ascription rendering "Jack believes that broken clock is working", is. You can start from |is working| — neomac

↪neomac
Yes, and the Mona Lisa has quite a nice frame. — Bartricks

Not to mention that there is lots to learn from the history of Mona Lisa frames too:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mona_Lisa#Frame
https://artjourneyparis.com/blog/mona-lisa-story-behind-fame.html

So you're saying that those words in quotes are the content of Jack's belief at time t1? — creativesoul

No. In the example "Jack believes that clock is working", the belief content is the fitness condition expressed by the completive clause, so it's the state-of-affairs (i.e. the object "clock" and its property "is working") in the real world that would make that belief content cognitively accurate or, to simplify, true. There might be something else misleading in talking like this though.


> Logical notation? The form of belief attribution? "The logic”???

By “logic” here, I’m generically referring to the rules of our common belief ascription practices.

> How can anyone establish what counts as acceptable and/or unacceptable attribution of belief to another if there is no standard regarding what counts as belief?

Of course there is a standard, but it’s implicit in our belief ascription practices. What is hard it is to spell it out. Also grammar rules are implicit in our language practices, but it’s a non-trivial task to abstract them. So there are cognitive rules that are implicit in our common belief ascription practices to identify beliefs, and my theoretical effort is to abstract those cognitive rules from our common belief ascription practices. But rule abstraction presupposes rule application. Yet again there might be something else misleading in talking like this though.

> What exactly would we be attributing to another when ascribing some belief to them, if we did not already have an idea of what beliefs are?

Right, this idea however is implicit in our common belief ascription practices. Indeed one learns the usage of the word “belief” from those competent speakers that utter belief ascriptions in the given circumstances.


Look, I won't answer any more your questions if you do not answer my previous post. Coz it's the 4th time in a row that I'm asking the same question (that I already asked other times) but you avoid to answer it, which is fishy. So:

spell out what each single item of these 3 items (|broken|, |clock|, |is working|) that are part of the belief content you attribute to Jack in your non-propositional belief ascription rendering, is. You can start from |is working| — neomac

To give the full non-propositional content is impossible. — creativesoul

Impossible? We are discussing here if "that clock is working" is more or less accurate than "that broken clock is working". The full account I'm asking is about this and only this belief content attribution in this and only this example, not the belief of everybody in the universe present past and future.
So again:spell out what each single item of these 3 items (|broken|, |clock|, |is working|) is, because you are using these three items to determine the non propositional content of Jack's belief in your non-propositional belief ascription rendering. You can start from |is working| , since you keep saying that Jack's non-propositional content is about a broken clock but you never mention "is working". Yet the non-propositional content you attribute to Jack is not rendered as in "Jack believes that broken clock" but as in "Jack believes that broken clock is working" and if the broken clock is the real world object than what "is working" in the real world? Nothing? A property? So spell out what each single item of these 3 items (|broken|, |clock|, |is working|) that are part of the belief content you attribute to Jack in your non-propositional belief ascription rendering "Jack believes that broken clock is working", is. You can start from |is working|
BTW even for the claim "While it is impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood" you have yet again to explain exactly why it is impossible to knowingly believe "that broken clock is working".

Presumably when you visit the sistine chapel you stare at the floor. — Bartricks

Presumably because also the floors are worth watching.
https://www.google.com/search?q=sistine+chapel+floor&tbm=isch&ved=2ahUKEwjKyamp8ZP2AhUEkFwKHcmZC64Q2-cCegQIABAA&oq=sistine+chapel+floor&gs_lcp=CgNpbWcQAzIFCAAQgAQyBQgAEIAEMgYIABAFEB4yBAgAEBgyBAgAEBg6BAgAEEM6BggAEAoQGDoGCAAQCBAeUIYKWPQ0YI09aAVwAHgAgAE-iAG7CpIBAjI3mAEAoAEBqgELZ3dzLXdpei1pbWewAQDAAQE&sclient=img&ei=CiQVYsqcA4Sg8gLJs67wCg&client=firefox-b-d

What is the content of Jack's belief at time t1? — creativesoul

I answered that already. Belief contents express the point of view (the intrinsic fitness conditions) of Jack's believing attitudes which best explain his behavior in the given circumstances at t1. In the case of false beliefs due to ignorance and not irrationality "that clock is working" is better than "that broken clock is working" because that clock is working can be either true or false, while "that broken clock is working" is contradictory so always false i.e. it can not adequately express a case of ignorance.

It seems you do not fully appreciate the different theoretical tasks of your approach wrt mine. My theory of belief is based on what I take to be some pre-philosophical linguistic facts (common belief ascription practices). These belief ascription practices are not based at all on my theory of belief. These belief ascription practices are not based at all on a full blown theory of propositional content (like frege's or russell's). And my theory of belief is not based at all on a full blown theory of belief as propositional attitude (like frege's or russell's). Indeed my theory of belief and a theory of belief as propositional attitude may compete to explain the very same linguistic facts. That is why:
- my primary task is not to develop a theory of belief, but to understand as much as I can the logic of our common belief attribution practices.
- I don't care about your distinction between propositional and non-propositional content as such, as much as I care about how your view and the usage of this distinction may compete against our common belief ascription practices.
- I don't care to specify further my theory of belief, because understanding and defending the logic of our common belief ascription practices it's more important to me than my theory of belief. That is also why you shouldn't care about my full-blown theory of belief coz I don't have one yet. And to critisize your view it's enough for me to counter your misconception about the logic of our common belief ascription practices as I understand them, or to question the internal coherence of your assumptions and claims.

Your situation is different: you are developing a theory of belief and belief ascription in competition with a specific theory of belief as propositional content (whose source is still unknown to me) and our common linguistic practices. So your primary task is to provide the details of your theory of belief and then judge our common practices accordingly.
That is why the primary explanatory task for you is to exactly and completely explain the difference between propositional and non-propositional belief content as you understand it in the relevant example which are always the same two (never ever change them):
At time t1, Jack believed that clock was working.
At time t1, Jack believed that broken clock was working.

That is why I asked you to give me the full non-propositional content which Jack is not aware of believing (and can not knowingly believe true) when you claim of him "Jack believes that broken clock is working". There are 3 items in this non-propositional content: "brocken" "clock" and "is working". What are these entities? What is the meaningful correlation that is drawn between them? And who is drawing this meaningful correlation between these 3 parts "broken", "clock" and "is working"? I take it to mean the real-world referents of the words you are using in your non-quoted belief ascription report. Is that right?
"clock" is the real object existing in the world outside of our mind
"broken" is the property this real object in the world truly has
"is working" is the property that this real object does not have.
Is that it? If not, spell out what these 3 items are, because you are using these three items to determine the non propositional content of Jack's belief. You keep saying that Jack's non-propositional content is about a broken clock but you never mention "is working". Yet the non-propositional content is not "Jack believes that broken clock" but "Jack believes that broken clock is working" and if the broken clock is the real world object than what "is working" in the real world? Nothing?
There is no progress if you keep just repeating your distinction between propositional and non-propositional content (without offering an analysis of it) and then projecting it on to me as if I were committed to it, to make me play the role of one who confuses the 2. That's framing and question begging accusations.

Broken clocks and wondering what time it is, — creativesoul

I asked you to give me the full non-propositional content which Jack is not aware of believe and can not knowingly believe true when you claim of him "Jack believes that brocken clock is working". It's always the same example. In such content there is "broken clock" but there is no "wondering what time it is".
There are 3 items in this non-propositional "brocken" "clock" and "is working". What are these entities? What is the meaningful correlation that is drawn by them? And who is drawing this meaningful correlation between these 3 parts "broken", "clock" and "is working"? I take it to mean the real-world referents of the word you are using in your non-quoted belief ascription report. Is that right?
"clock" is the real object existing in the world
"broken" is the property this real object in the world truly has
"is working" is the property that this real object does not have.
If not, spell out what these 3 items are, because you are using these three items to determine the non propositional content of Jack's belief.

> try harder

What for?

> Why are you crossing out 'Reason' and replacing it with 'reason'? It's 'Reason' not 'reason'. The source of normative reasons is traditionally called 'Reason' with a capital 'R' (because 'reason' is ambiguous).

Your typo, remember? Anyway, I fixed it.

> is sufficient to place the burden of proof on you

I already proved my point. Suck it up and move on.

> Why can't they be imperatives of multiple minds? Because a group of minds is not itself a mind and it is only minds that can issue imperatives. If there were multiple minds, then in virtue of what would their imperatives be the imperatives of Reason? Furthermore, it is a principle of Reason that one should not posit more entities than is needed to get the job done: one mind is sufficient. So, positing several would be a) incoherent and b) ontologically extravagant (there's a big word for you - you can blow that at people in the future). Note as well, that even if one can coherently posit several minds (and one can't) - and it is not ontologically extravagant to do so (and it is) - you would not have refuted divine command theory, for all you will have done is multiply the number of gods!

Well at least nobody can say you don’t know how to glorify your intellectual failures.
Here some charitable thoughts for you:

• I didn’t claim that a group of minds is a (one) mind but since you suggested it, it’s not even clear why a group of minds can’t issue imperatives collectively like legal/judicial systems as institutional collective bodies or think about the concept of "General Will" by Rousseau or the "Collective Unconscious" by Jung.
• “If there were multiple minds, then in virtue of what would their imperatives be the imperatives of Reason?” whatever that is supposed to mean, should I care? All I can say is that there might be different ways in which “Reason” and “imperatives of Reason” can be understood. So it’s on you to clarify their meaning and support related premises with adequate evidences. I’m not saying you are capable of this or willing to do this (I doubt both), I’m just saying it should be your task, not mine.
• “a principle of Reason that one should not posit more entities than is needed to get the job done” what is the “job” to be done here? The Holy Trinity admits three Persons with the same devine nature. So the number of ontological entities to posit depends on the explanatory role they have to play. In Kant, the practical reason that issues categorical imperatives belongs to a plurality of human beings, so the fact that moral imperatives are universal and categorical is in not per se in conflict with the idea there can be multiple minds equipped of practical reason capable of issuing moral imperatives. And I'm not holding Kant's position or defending its consistency, I'm just using it to prove that your claims can be pertinently questioned.
• "a) incoherent and b) ontologically extravagant" go back to square one
• "ontologically extravagant (there's a big word for you - you can blow that at people in the future)" you aren't that useless after all, thanks! I will return you the favor asap!
• “you would not have refuted divine command theory, for all you will have done is multiply the number of gods!”. If this was my intention (which is a wrong assumption), I still couldn't refute a theory before understanding well enough what it claims and it implies: in your 8 premises there are notions to clarify (what do you mean by Reason, imperatives, moral imperatives, source of moral imperatives, mind, etc.?) which make unclear meaning and truth conditions. Those 8 premises (as they are) are not evidently true for the reasons I already explained. Do you claim otherwise?! Because if you do, then this would just be the third most stupid claim one can find in this thread (which wouldn’t be a coincidence since you made also the first two).

> Only 4 premises can be questioned for all of the others follow logically from them. But you can't see that, can you? Here: $<<<=X///

Indeed, by randomly typing on a keyboard, you immediately look much smarter! So keep practicing!

> If Reason is a mind then that mind would be omnipotent because she'd get to determine what is and isn't possible. And she'd be omniscient because she'd get to determine what is and isn't known. And she'd be omnibenevolent because she'd fully approve of how she is. That's why.

Such unsolicited apodictic claims show how much you are into these old smelly scholastic farts. And that’s a second good reason why it’s pointless to argue with you about your DTC theory (especially if your preposterous terminology has not been adequately clarified). Scholastic junkies are just "ontologically extravagant entities" ;) which a principle of Reason requires me to simply get rid of (or laugh at, if in the right mood).

> Now, do you have an actual argument to make that calls into question the truth of any of the four premises of my argument?

No Fartrrricks. With you it’s not matter of truth. It’s just matter of very poor philosophical taste and lots of intellectual dishonesty. It would be stupid not to see it.

I am attributing to him an attitude towards the broken clock such that he believes it to be a reliable source of information regarding what time it was. — creativesoul

Notice that this claim is a de re belief ascription analogous to "Jack believes of that broken clock that is working" (which I was talking about a while ago) where the expression "the broken clock" is outside the completive clause of the predicate "to believe", and within the semantic scope of the one who makes the belief ascription. You are using it to disambiguate your own claim against the putative misunderstanding of others. In using it, you are proving that this form is more understandable than your own rendering. But even if you used it just as a temporary concession, what is more critical, is that this rendering allows you to keep unclear what constitutes non-propositional belief contents. Which is what you should still explain to support your claims.

It seems that my objectors/detractors do not understand that the content of Jack's belief is not propositional. He is not drawing correlations that include the words "a broken clock is working". It is only if he were doing so, it is only if I said he were doing so, that I would be guilty as charged regarding attributing a contradictory belief to Jack. — creativesoul

You have to prove that part in bold of your claim. What is exactly the non-propositional belief content that Jack is not aware to hold, namely "that broken clock is working" (without quotes)? Can you spell it out right away? Between what kind of things is Jack drawing correlations when you are attributing to him the non-propositional and unquoted content "that broken clock is working"? I see 3 items in there ("broken", "clock" and "is working"), what do they stand for as parts of a non-propositional content? Not words (b/c otherwise they would be propositions), then what else?

At time t1, Jack believed that clock was working.

At time t1, Jack believed that broken clock was working.

You're claiming the first is more accurate. I'm claiming the second is.

Prior to continuing... Do you agree with that much? — creativesoul

Yes I do.