(1) When Israel kills people, it’s unintentional/accidental. In this they have a near perfect record.

(2) When Palestinians (whether Hamas or whomever) kill people, it’s terrorism. — “Mikie

The plausibility of such distinction (not its actual validity, which remains to be investigated) comes from the “principle of distinction”, which Hamas’ asymmetric warfare approach doesn’t allow.

Why? Because even though they’re the oppressed people in this scenario — living for decades in concentration camp conditions under a superpower-backed colonial state — and have killed FAR less people, they do it intentionally. — Mikie

That is consistent with what I just wrote. Hamas prefers an asymmetric warfare approach because it can’t compete with Israel in conventional ways. So Hamas purposefully exploits an asymmetric warfare approach to radicalise both the Israeli and the Palestinian population, which in turn helps Hamas perpetuate its warfare approach.

So how many innocent Palestinian children need to die before Israeli actions count as terrorism/“bad”? — Mikie

Terrorism is a warfare approach. And it is not based on comparing number of casualties or civilian casualties, but on respecting or violating the principle of distinction and the notion of proportionality that goes with it. Of course, reality is arguably much messier and uglier than this, I can concede you that. Yet that doesn’t mean decision makers can or even should try to fix it.

What Israel should do is the right thing, regardless of Hamas demands. — bert1

Well, it depends on what you mean by "do the right thing".
Ordinary citizens should act according to laws, regardless of the reasons why they have those laws. But should political decision makers take decisions, regardless of the political consequences of their decisions?

So what? War is neither a beauty contest nor a fair play contest.

↪neomac

You keep saying this, asymmetrical war is a reality, I’m not saying that it’s a question of morality, fair play here. But rather an imbalance in agency. The only agency Hamas has had since October 8th is the option of releasing the hostages and surrendering themselves. Israel has wide ranging agency and propaganda machinery. Not to mention the thing I said about apartheid. — Punshhh

You mean that since Israel is disproportionately stronger than Hamas and can erase Hamas from Gaza, then Israel must yield to Hamas’ demands? Or that since Israel is disproportionately stronger than Hamas and can erase Hamas from Gaza, then Hamas can’t help but fight Israel to death? Do these conditionals make sense to you?

Also if Hamas had surrendered, the course of this situation might not have been much better than where we are now. Certainly if they had released the hostages, but not surrendered, it may well have been considerably worse than that. — Punshhh

Better in what sense? For whom? If Hamas had surrendered prior to committing the 8/10 massacre, then this would have spared the Gazans the current brutal retaliation. Any time Hamas surrenders in exchange for a cease-fire, then this would spare Gazans further brutal retaliation. If Hamas doesn’t surrender but it returns the hostages in exchange for a cease-fire, then this would still spare Gazans further brutal retaliation. So if the purpose is to spare Gazans Israelis’ brutal retaliation or further brutal retaliation, then not committing the 8/10 massacre, surrendering, returning hostages would be (or have been) all available options to Hamas. Wouldn’t they?

Yes, however this is an asymmetrical situation. Israel is an occupying force with state of the art weaponry. Hamas is a small band of terrorists with basic weaponry. — Punshhh

So what? War is neither a beauty contest nor a fair play contest. War is as shitty as it can get. Precisely because there is an asymmetry of forces it's not advisable for the weaker to poke in the eye of the stronger. If the weaker does it for whatever reason then there are consequences to be payed.

Also the idea that Hamas can spare the population by handing back the hostages and surrendering, or something. Works on the assumption that Israel doesn’t have an ulterior motive, or can be sufficiently trusted. — Punshhh

Sure but the argument can be retorted: the idea that Israel can spare the Palestinian population from the consequences of the conflict and withdraw from Gaza after returning the hostages, works on the assumption that Hamas doesn’t have an ulterior motive or can be sufficiently trusted. What differs is the price to pay, given the asymmetry of forces the Palestinians are the ones to risk the most.

So if Palestinians are doomed to suffer whatever price Netanyahu is willing to inflict on them (at least until Hamas keeps hostages and Netanyahu is in power), who is going to help them? If it is the Great Satan to do it, what would be the benefit for the Great Satan?

And the invading Russians have installed people they allegedly sought to do away with. — jorndoe

:up:

But their Nazi thing is a great (rabble-rousing) rhetorical/propaganda device (like sort of extending The Great Patriotic War), — jorndoe

Yes the Russian forget to mention that before the Great Patriotic war there was:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Molotov%E2%80%93Ribbentrop_Pact
And that during the Great Patriotic war "while millions of Ukrainians fought against the Nazis as part of the Red Army during WWII, approximately 250,000 Ukrainians joined the German forces and participated in the Holocaust and other German atrocities."
https://origins.osu.edu/read/living-ghosts-second-world-war-and-russian-invasion-ukraine?language_content_entity=en
Not to mention, that there was a comparable number of Russian collaborationists of the Nazis:
https://www.feldgrau.com/WW2-German-Wehrmacht-Russian-Volunteers/

One of the basic problems is that there isn't similar case like Ukraine when the West has supported one side in an conflict or had it's own conflicts. Invasion of Iraq was quite dubious, done with false arguments and little understanding of how unstable Iraq was. Yugoslavian civil war was indeed a civil war. And Serbia shows that even if Serbians ousted Milosevic, they weren't at all happy with the US after NATO had bombed their country. Yet the assault on Ukraine 2022 is a clear cut example of one country attacking another with Putin giving even more delusional arguments (neonazis controlling Ukraine and hence a denazification of Ukraine) than the WMD argument for invading Iraq. — ssu

Among other issues, there is one which I find philosophically deep and troublesome: namely, the notion of sovereignty as it is shaped by the Westphalian system (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Westphalian_system)

What we should note is that if Putin would have opted just for Crimea and not tried to instill revolution in all Russian areas (which didn't happen in Kharkiv or Odessa, but only in the Donbass), it might have worked. We could have been fine with that as Europe was already at easy with a "frozen conflict" in Ukraine. Yet February 24th 2022 changed all that. Now it's quite simple. — ssu

That sounds about right. BTW how are the Finns taking the recent Russian threats: https://www.deccanherald.com/world/putin-says-russia-will-deploy-troops-to-finlands-border-now-it-is-in-nato-ria-reports-2935190 ?

The population is expendable in the pursuit of Israel’s objectives. — Punshhh

No less than the Palestinian population is expendable in the pursuit of Hamas’ objectives, right?

I explain for over 2 years how to get the best outcome for Ukraine: diplomacy, using both economic incentives and the potential for continued violence (which even if devastating for Ukraine is still harmful for Russia and, most importantly, there's huge error bars on all sorts of processes and events at the start of the conflict, which must be priced into decision making) as leverage in that diplomacy, prevent tens of thousands if not hundreds of thousands of deaths, mass trauma and injuries, a large part of the entire youth of Ukraine permanently gone, retain as much territory as is viably possible ... and somehow I'm pro-Putin. — boethius

You keep framing things in a way that I find rather questionable.

To me, “the West” refers to a political strategic alliance between numerous democratic countries: there are conflicting agendas between Western countries and within Western countries. And Western governments have also changed over 20 years. Russia is one country, with a despotic regime that has been lasting for more than 20 years. Westerners likely care about not losing their standards of life more than Russians. Westerners can voice their discontent more often, more loudly, more widely than Russians and can be infiltrated by pro-Russian propaganda more than Russia can be infiltrated by pro-Western propaganda. Competing political/economic lobbies (including those financed/guided by foreign powers like Russia) can thrive and weaponise Western people’s discontent against any government. That’s why boosting military build-up, implement coherent/timely foreign policies over a long period of time and getting confrontational with a foreign foes, namely foreign policies that demand sacrifice to the nation are much more easy to enforce for Russia than for the West. In other words, the decision-making process and the political will in Western democracies is structurally more weak and vulnerable to international shocks, than in the authoritarian regimes.
So to the extent there was/is a Western failure to support Ukraine adequately this may have less to do with ethic of Western decision makers than with the structural problems of Western decision making as such. And what makes your argument still pro-Putin is again its hypocritical purpose of morally discrediting the West, even if the lack of resolve and cohesion in the West is not inherently immoral and it stems also from people like you whose prejudicial distrust over Western institutions amplifies lack of resolve and cohesion.

I've posted the same Western reporting on the Nazis in Ukraine I think 4-5 times now. It's the same cycle, someone mentions the Nazis in Ukraine as mere Russian propaganda, I post the evidence based on Western reporting, and then no one wants to talk about it anymore.

Got through these videos and you will see what the concern is. — boethius

I watched your 4 out 5 videos (one is not available) and I couldn’t find what I expressly asked: your evidence to support the claims “they have no hesitation to explicitly say their goal is a war with Russia and to destroy Russia”, “their main goal (to Western journalists on camera) is starting a war with Russia that will destroy said Russia.”, “explicitly explaining to Western journalists that's what they want: a grand purifying war and destruction of Russia”.
So I’m still waiting for your source to support such claims.

Once faced with the evidence, the denialists will then say "well there's not enough Nazis!", but then refuse to answer the question of how many Nazis would be enough. It's a simple question, if I say "this isn't enough water to live on" presumably I have some standard in my head of what is enough water and could inform you that a thimble is not enough water but about 2 litres a day is a normal healthy amount (but may vary quite a bit depending on the conditions). — boethius

I doubt that you watched the videos you linked since one can find there many pertinent answers to what you have been asking to the denialists.
Take video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MUgKTfe-IqA
At minute 9:39 the guy says “if you look at the electoral results of the far-right political parties in Ukraine, they actually only add up add up to 1.65% IN TOTAL, which is less than some INDIVIDUAL far-right parties in other European countries have achieved” and that doesn’t even reach the bar for obtaining any seats.
At minute 15:54, the guy answers to question about the scale of the Azov phenomenon as follows: “In absolute numbers, it’s a TINY TINY TINY of the Ukrainian population. None knows for sure, but I think the last reliable figures were about 2000 active fighters at any one time”, while the wider Azov movement is max 20k people.
At minute 12:32, the guy goes even so far to concede: “If there wasn’t a neo-nazi problem before this war, there might be afterwards”. So Putin’s war would be the reason why there is a neo-nazi problem for Ukraine that wasn’t there before the war.

The Ukrainian neo-nazi problem was such a non-problem that in Ukraine there is a Jewish president, there are Jews fighting in Azov Battalion and fighting against Russia for Ukraine:
https://www.jpost.com/diaspora/article-762000
https://www.peoplesworld.org/article/israeli-government-welcomes-azov-battalion-leader-as-honored-guest/
https://www.timesofisrael.com/senior-zelensky-adviser-40-jewish-heroes-fighting-in-mariupol-steel-plant/
https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/ukraine-conflict/1651655303-russia-claims-israelis-fighting-alongside-azov-militants
https://genevasolutions.news/ukraine-stories/in-ukraine-jews-embrace-their-double-identity

Now, maybe there isn't and has never been enough Nazis in Ukraine that not-invading and destroying said Nazis would be the appeasement.

But, they're clearly there with quite a bit, even if "not enough" power, and it is foolish to dismiss their presence, goals and how they impact events, in both direct and indirect ways. — boethius

If you watched those videos you linked, the neo-nazi problem in Ukraine is never taken to be a problem primarily for Russia! But for the US and Europe given the international far-right network and far right terrorist attacks in the West. And more so for Ukraine itself after the war with Russia, because there is a chance that neo-nazi may fight against any peace agreements with Russia made by the Ukrainian government (as shown when they protested against Zelensky in 2021 https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-right-protesters-zelenskiy/31410694.html).
Notice also that even Prigozhin the leader of the Wagner Group questioned the nazi narrative of Putin: https://www.euronews.com/2023/03/24/wagner-boss-openly-defies-kremlin-ukraine-nazi-narrative

It's also important part of the conflict as it's simply giving Putin and the Kremlin immense propaganda wins. Russians don't squint their eyes and debate exactly what kind of runes we're looking at when they see obvious Nazis talking obvious Nazi shit.

Of course, simply because something is true doesn't mean it won't be used and exaggerated for propaganda purposes, and in this case it is a simple motivator that goes some way to explain why Russian troops didn't just run away from the battle field as they low morale and "didn't know why they're fighting" and other lines repeated by Western media. — boethius

The nazi problem which Russians lament is not a NAZI problem AT ALL. It has nothing to do with Nazi symbolism, antisemitism or white suprematism for the simple reason that the neo-nazi, white suprematists, far-right ideology and militia in Russia is not only bigger in volume wrt Ukraine (https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id-moe/09348.pdf, https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/RAD-135-10.-12.pdf, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1022970.pdf, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/0/e/27072.pdf, https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--2592--SE, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/301232300_The_New_Russian_Nationalism_Imperialism_Ethnicity_and_Authoritarianism_2000-15) but WAY MORE influential abroad (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Managed_nationalism). Indeed, Putin and Russian ideologists (like Dugin) have been actively engaged in exporting and supporting such far right movements abroad (https://www.justsecurity.org/68420/confronting-russias-role-in-transnational-white-supremacist-extremism/).
Not surprisingly Russian neo-nazi militia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neo-Nazism_in_Russia#Groups) are the ones involved in Euromaiden and the conflict in Donbas (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_separatist_forces_in_Ukraine, https://ukraineworld.org/en/articles/infowatch/russian-neo-nazi). I wrote a series of additional notes on this, starting from this post: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/882175
The problem for the Russians is not if Azov battalion is ideologically neo-nazi, but that they are "Russophobe"!

The actual Nazis are one thing, the perception of those Nazis by Russians and Putin and so on is another thing, and their discourse about said Nazis is still yet a third thing. Of course, how we know anything about reality is through our and other perception and discourse on those perceptions, in this case we can be confident of some degree of objectively confident view of the Nazis due to the reporting of credibly unbiased reporters that have no stake in the outcome of whether the Nazis are there or aren't there or what they are doing or not doing (a credibility that would be based on yet still more perceptions and discourse on those perceptions). — boethius

Yes, I can collect videos too:

This one's just adorable. — “boethius

As these ones:

Again I don’t see the U.S. having any interests in the Middle East other than the supply of oil from the Arab states and protecting the Western outpost of Israel. They want to maintain the status quo in the area for these reasons. They were happy for Syria to be thrown to the wolves in the fight against Isis and now they are only maintaining a presence in those areas to prevent the rise of Isis in the region over the next period.
As such I don’t see the Middle East as an important arena of geopolitical, or hegemonic tension.
I don’t see any signs of wider conflagration, or broader hegemonic locking of horns, or WW3, resulting from this crisis. Neither the U.S. or China wanted this. — Punshhh

Maybe that depends on where and what you are looking for. As far as I’m concerned, the Middle East, Europe, the Pacific, Africa, South America are contended/contendable spheres of influence for 3 major hegemonic powers: Russia, China and the US. Controlling these areas means controlling their economic/security input and output and whatever transits through them. The Middle-East is important for commodities like oil and gas, and for international routes (commerce of goods, oil/gas supply, internet supply). Besides that region is source and exporter of Islamic Jihadism, that can spill over in other areas of interest (like Africa and Europe). That’s not all: as a hot area the middle east nurtures the international contest in military supply (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/11/fear-of-china-russia-and-iran-is-driving-weapons-sales-report) and as failed governance area criminal business thrives (https://www.arabnews.com/node/1944661). All that sounds particularly worrisome if WMDs are involved (https://thebulletin.org/2023/04/why-a-wmd-free-zone-in-the-middle-east-is-more-needed-than-ever/)
So there are several reasons why the Middle East can very much be subject to hegemonic interest and struggle, and wars in Middle East can get more news attention than the war in Ukraine (not only in the West).
Russia and China as competitors of the US (the former primarily in East Europe, the latter primarily in the Pacific) are interested in getting the US overstretched: inducing the US to divide attention and energies in multiple conflicts like in Ukraine, in Israel, in the Red Sea perfectly serves that purpose. The co-occurrence of such conflicts doesn't look casual at all, given that Iran (a regional hegemonic power strategically allied with China and Russia against the US) can very much be the liaison among the three by supporting Russia against Ukraine, Hamas in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Yemeni Houthi in the Red Sea (https://www.arabnews.com/node/2465036/middle-east, https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/sites/default/files/Iran%27s%20Proxy%20Wars_2.12.24_JC_JMB_JC_JMB_JC.pdf). The geopolitical link between what happens in Israel and the hegemonic conflict between super powers is candidly stated by involved parties:
“We want the Arab communities in the West to be active, and (we want) cooperation with superpowers like China and Russia,” the former Hamas chairman continued. “Russia has benefited from our (attack), because we distracted the U.S. from them and from Ukraine.”
“China saw (our attack) as a dazzling example. The Russians told us that what happened on October 7 would be taught in military academies,” the terrorist leader boasted.
“The Chinese are thinking of carrying out a plan in Taiwan, doing what the Al-Qassam Brigades did on October 7,” Mashal claimed, saying “The Arabs are giving the world a master class.”
https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/israel-at-war/1698588842-oct-7-will-be-taught-in-military-academies-hamas-leader-boasts-of-russian-chinese-support

Russia and China do not need to get more directly/openly involved in the conflict in the middle east: indeed, they may just want to maximise the military/economic/reputational costs for the US to their benefit while minimising the costs for them, and for that it could be enough to abstain from helping to fix the middle east crisis or contribute to keep it alive (e.g. by helping Iran and other forms of triangulations).
https://www.orfonline.org/research/how-hamas-taliban-are-gaining-from-russia-chinas-growing-influence
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/russias-dangerous-new-friends
https://theins.ru/en/society/269789

As long as the West is eroding its power of deterrence against a more assertive Rest, the question remains: how can the West, the US, Israel deter without escalating? And that’s not all, when the tide of historical circumstances will favour the Rest, we should also expect that the Rest will come back at the West (https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-09-20/china-russia-india-and-the-global-south-the-era-of-revenge.html). This explains the race for military build up also in the West (and not only, https://theowp.org/south-korea-to-increase-military-spending-and-to-set-up-a-military-unit-specializing-in-drones/, https://www.vox.com/world/2023/1/15/23555805/japans-military-buildup-us-china-north-korea) and why certain taboos are broken (https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-defense-committee-marie-agnes-strack-zimmermann-european-nuclear-weapons/, https://www.euronews.com/2023/09/01/conscription-is-seeing-a-revival-across-europe-is-that-a-good-thing).

The primary geopolitical game being played currently is by Russia in Ukraine and as far as the West is concerned (geopolitically) that is going nicely in that it is keeping Russia occupied and gradually weakening her. This is also providing the incentive for Europe to re-arm and wean herself of Russian oil and gas. There is however the increased affiliation of Russia with China to consider. However I would expect this to result in a reluctance for war from this coalition once the Ukraine war has played out. This will most likely result in a new Iron curtain dividing Europe from Russia, as I predicted in the Ukraine war thread. Russia will pull back from China when they realise they would be required to sell their soul. — Punshhh

Even if Russia is weakening, that’s maybe true also for the West. Europe in particular is weakening economically (https://apnews.com/article/economic-growth-europe-recession-red-sea-trade-2b28c78474cf9ed2f3d28e85e9458bc9) and politically (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20240223IPR18084/parliament-calls-for-action-against-the-erosion-of-eu-values-in-member-states, https://www.reuters.com/breakingviews/europe-will-struggle-unite-if-ukraine-loses-2024-03-11/) in a period where political cohesion and expenditures must grow to face common security and energetic challenges. And the possibility of a European decline is ominously looming (https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/02/23/the-decline-of-europe-becomes-more-evident/, https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/civil-war-comes-to-the-west/). Even the hegemonic power of the US is strained by national challenges and the pressure from international competitors. Besides, if the US wants Russia to be bogged down in the war in Ukraine, China may want the US to be bogged down in the war in Ukraine, in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in the Red Sea. Notice also that if China manages to establish a strategic alliance with Russia, Iran and Saudi Arabia, amongst the major oil suppliers (with the possibility of widening the strategic alliance of oil/gas exporters over Nigeria, Kuwait, Algeria, etc. maybe through the BRICS), this could be a non-negligible threat for the West (https://unherd.com/2023/07/has-the-west-lost-control-of-oil/, https://www.cointribune.com/en/saudi-arabia-and-china-sign-the-end-of-the-petrodollar/).

As I said before, why would China enter into a ground war, or dabble with proxy wars, when she is already winning the economic war? — Punshhh

A part from the fact that the Chinese economy has run into some serious troubles (https://time.com/6835935/china-debt-housing-bubble/, https://www.vox.com/world-politics/24091759/china-economic-growth-plan-xi-jinping-crisis), if you want a deeper risk analysis for hotter conflicts involving China you can find lots of interesting readings on the internet, like this one:
https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/04/china-war-military-taiwan-us-asia-xi-escalation-crisis/

If the IDF were wicked then the IDF should be targeted; not random, peaceful civilians. Hamas hurts the Palestinian cause of self-determination. — BitconnectCarlos

BTW
The cruel irony of Hamas’s onslaught, which alongside the scale of bloodshed, shocked Israelis with the barbarity of the terror group’s torture and documented sexual abuse, was that many of the civilians Hamas slaughtered and kidnapped were precisely the loudest voices for peace with Palestinians.
https://www.timesofisrael.com/peace-activists-in-a-traumatized-israel-remain-hopeful-for-a-two-state-solution/

Russia deepening ties with global axis of evil, Israel charges at UN
https://www.jpost.com/international/article-789156

You keep repeating that:

“such as nazi groups doing their best in the Donbas to trigger the current larger war, and explicitly explaining to Western journalists that's what they want: a grand purifying war and destruction of Russia ... and then Berlin!”

“Many of the factions supporting these provocative policies vis-a-vis Russia had no qualms of explicitly stating their main goal (to Western journalists on camera) is starting a war with Russia that will destroy said Russia.”

“The Nazi's are definitely there in Ukraine (I am happy to re-post all those Western journalist documenting it) and are definitely a problem (mainly for Ukraine). They are also a genuine security concern for Russia (as they have no hesitation to explicitly say their goal is a war with Russia and to destroy Russia”

Can you link your source?

Yet Pakistan didn’t perform or wasn’t cooperative as required. — neomac

And why is that? Because the state of Pakistan had it's own security agenda, which the Bush administration didn't care a shit about. There were there only for the terrorists ....and either you were with them or against them .And that's why it failed. — ssu

A part from unnecessarily caricaturing Bush’s administration attitude toward Pakistan, your views seem to overlook Pakistan’s agency in dealing with the terrorists. And this risks to attribute to Bush also Pakistan’s strategic mistakes:
https://southasianvoices.org/what-went-wrong-pakistan-strategic-depth-policy/

But how clearly wrongheaded did it look the idea of exploiting that "window of opportunity” within Bush administration, back then? — neomac

So clearly wrongheaded that few people including myself saw the error that was being done. All you needed was read a bit. What was telling then was Scott Ritter, who had been part of the weapons inspection team and wrote a little book about there being no WMD program anymore before the invasion. Of course he faced the wrath of the US later and once those bridges are burnt, the only thing to get income is to be Putin's spokesperson. — ssu

Trump shattered the stupid idea of "The Prez just got bad intel”. — ssu

Even if the link between Saddam and Al-Qaeda, or Iraq possessing WMD or the bad intel were convenient hypes, still your analysis may miss something deeper in Bush’s approach to the region:
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/wmd-just-a-convenient-excuse-for-war-admits-wolfowitz-106754.html
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2003/05/11/no-weapons-no-matter-we-called-saddams-bluff/0be893f3-f877-44d9-84b2-5f580266213e/

“Property” as a legal term presupposes a legal system. Israel doesn’t acknowledge the Palestinian legal system. But it acknowledges to some extent the international legal system, so to that extent, Israel may be compelled to abide by what international law establishes for Palestinians

↪neomac

You can dress it up all you like, it doesn’t change the facts on the ground. The people living on that land were expelled by an occupying force. This is why they hold a grievance and it’s still happening in the West Bank. Indeed it has happened continuously since 1948. — Punshhh

Then it’s not about facts, but what one wants to legally/politically infer from that.
For example, if the numbers of Palestinian and Jewish Nakba are comparable (if not superior on the Jewish side) and the confiscation of properties and assets on both sides are comparable as well then they compensate each others (e.g. in Syria, Jewish property was confiscated and Jewish homes were used to house Palestinian refugees.). In other words there was an exchange of people and properties on both sides. So one can’t reasonably expect the Israelis’ to listen to Arabs’ grievances against them without Arabs’ listening to Israelis’ grievances against them.
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/fd/il20062006_07/il20062006_07en.pdf

the international status over Palestine was the one proposed by the UN resolution 1947 which the Palestinians rejected. So Israel forcefully imposed its rule with the main support of the US at the expense of the Arab/Palestinian aspirations in that region.

So now we see what happened, it’s not difficult, it’s not complicated.
And yes I know about the Jewish Nakba, that was an inevitable consequence. — Punshhh

If you are reasoning in terms of “inevitable consequences” than also the Zionist project can be claimed to be an inevitable consequence of the persecution and abuses Jews suffered in the West and in Middle East.

I can accept that. But if they are both (potentially) racist, and oppressive, then so? What is the significance so great that it merits differentiation in the context of these discussions? That is, besides just that "analytical minds must repel classifications based on overstretched associations of ideas." — ENOAH

If it’s a problem of security concerns more than racism, then Israelis may be more open to solutions that address their security concerns in satisfactory ways (and resentfully closer toward solutions/measures grounded on "racial issue" accusations). I’ll give you an example, if one wants to push for a 2 nation-states, one should try to couple it with things like demilitarisation and neutrality of Palestine and, maybe even a constitutional regime that protects minorities like the jews (and their properties) in the Palestinian State and grants them political representativity (no less than the Arab/Palestinian minority has in Israel).

Is Apartheid objectively more culpable than Colonial Occupation and the imposition of Martial Law against, and for the purposes of subjugating, indigenous people who are all painted with the same brush on the basis of their ethnicity? — ENOAH

As I said, one should be careful with similarities, besides an analytical mind should care about consistency. If one wants to talk about Foreign Martial Law in terms of Apartheid State for Palestinians in Gaza and West Bank, how about the condition of Palestinians in Lebanon?
https://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/20-09-28_lfo_context_protection_brief_2020_final83.pdf

So the US invaded and occupied a country, which not only had a tradition of fighting successfully Great Powers that invaded it, but now there also was a safe haven, a country next to Afghanistan where the Taleban could rest, reorganize and train and coordinate the fighting from.

So yes, George Bush didn't take into account that the Taleban would simply continue the fight from Pakistan. And guess he didn't want to make Pakistan, another former ally of the US, another nuclear capable axis-of-evil state like North Korea. Nope. Once Kabul was free from Taleban, mission accomplished and onward to the next war. — ssu

As far as I know the Bush administration had a hard time to diplomatically/financially solicit Pakistan to fight the terrorist network from their side, but he tried to the point of even calling Pakistan “major non-NATO ally”. Yet Pakistan didn’t perform or wasn’t cooperative as required. Pakistan’s approach was more for appeasing toward the Talibans in order to contrast the Iranian (and the Indian) influence in Afghanistan and contain the terrorist threat on its soil.
It would have seemed smarter for Bush to cooperate with Iran and India to preserve the new Afghan government after overthrowing the Taliban one and/or contain a Taliban comeback. Only then Pakistan may have turned more willing to deal with the network of Taliban terrorists on their side with the support of the US. But I guess that the pro-Israel lobby may have contributed into shaping the course of the “war on terror” surrounding Iran.

And when OBL was killed, did the war end? Of course not! That's what you get when your response to a terrorist attack done by 19 terrorists is to invade a country where the financier of the strike has been living. Getting the terrorists won't end the conflict, because those insurgents opposing you are fighting you as the invader of their country. To me it's quite obvious, but people can live in their bubble and have these delusional ideas that a whole country has to be invaded in order for it not to be a terrorist safe haven. — “ssu

It took 10 years to kill Osama Bin Laden. Maybe the US could have pursued a small military operation Israeli-style to hit main Al-Qaeda leaders, military resources, and training camps but the idea of remaining there could have also been a way to keep the terrorist forces in the region to fight the “invader of their country” and not give them a chance to regroup and organise another attack in the US soil in retaliation. Especially if the other risk the US felt exposed to was not just Islamic terrorism, but Islamic terrorism equipped with WMD weapons (let’s not forget https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2001_anthrax_attacks). Whence the infamous link to Saddam.

The case of Iran is obvious when it comes to Iraq. It's telling that the Saudis told exactly what would happen if Bush senior would continue the attack from Kuwait to Baghdad. But younger Bush had to go in, because there was the "window of opportunity”. — ssu

This looks as another big mistake in the hindsight, and Bush didn’t listen to the Saudis nor to Putin ok. But how clearly wrongheaded did it look the idea of exploiting that "window of opportunity” within Bush administration, back then? The war on terror was likely exploitable to more ambitious hegemonic goals in the region beyond simple retaliation. Yet wrong intelligence, unilateralism, widening goals and overlooked regional political equilibria backfired.

Like "War on Terror". What is this war against a method? What actually does it mean? Going after every terrorist group anywhere or what? — ssu

how many different wars you think they can handle? Fighting in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, the Sahel, Philippines. — ssu

What do you think will happen when an administration starts a "Global War on Terrorism"? What kind of myriad involvement you will have everywhere when you try something like that? — ssu

I don't think there's any trace of the Taleban being involved with the September 11th attacks oir that they had been informed about them. And what was the "diplomacy" between the US and Taleban in turning OBL to US authorities? As I've stated, it wasn't enough just to get OBL and Al Qaeda leaders to be put into trial. Nope, Americans wanted revenge, punishment! — ssu

While I understand that there is greater chance to solve problems by military means if military objectives are enough clear and circumscribed, and circumstances are favourable (military capabilities are enough, national and international consensus is wide, all other diplomatic attempts failed, etc.), I doubt that this is how human affairs and politics are reasonably expected to work. In other words, you keep reasoning as if, in a conflict, the political task was to define military objectives in such a way to maximise military success, as if politics has to adapt to military needs. But I find more plausible to take war as a way to pursue political goals with other means. So it’s political goals that guide (and misguide too!) military effort. Besides I’m reluctant to view the American failure in the middle-east just as a military outburst driven by punitive compulsion. The same goes with the Israeli reaction to the massacre of October 7th, and Hamas reaction to prior Israeli oppressive measures. These reactions are not just actions emotionally driven by will to retaliate, but also pro-active steps toward longer term goals and calculated wrt expectations about other main interested players’ moves. So even war on terror (i.e. against Islamic Jihadism) in the middle east was a political strategic move not just a compulsive reaction, as much as NATO expansion in Europe and inclusive economic globalization (especially addressing potential competitors like Russia and China). All of them were long-term strategies testing the US hegemonic capacity of shaping the world order through hard and soft power, even if it ultimately wasn’t planned and dosed well. Democratization (and economic growth) seemed the best way to go to normalise relations, preserve peace and quell historical grievances (as it happened for Germany and Japan) so the US, after the Cold War, in the unipolar phase, had the time window to think big and take greater risks.
Even terrorist attacks of Islamic jihadism, including the 9/11 attack, aren’t just isolated punitive operations against some past grievance, but steps toward more ambitious ideological goals (https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL32759.html). Islamism and Islamic Jihad can very much aspire to ideologically replace the Soviet Union in representing the grievance of the Rest against the West since the end of the Cold War. And it can very much be seen as a globally sharable foe (so another aspect of the globalization) given the problem of the muslim minorities in Europe, Russia’s conflict with the Chechen, India’s tensions with the muslims of Kashmir, China’s persecution of the Uyghurs, Israel’s conflict with Hamas (backed by Iran), Egypt’s struggle with Muslim Brotherhood. While the asymmetric warfare, the fluid/decentralized organisation, the vocation to martyrdom, and the prospect of obtaining WMD made Islamist Jihad look a particularly tricky challenge to anybody, including to the US (and Israel). So escalating a state-to-organization confrontation to a state-to-state confrontation and bring the confrontation into the Islamist homeland (i.e. targeting states that finance or, otherwise, support Islamic terrorist organizations) was instrumental to hitting deeper into Islamist jihadism.
So even if the US committed big mistakes, I question the way you are trivialising them. What we see in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, or in the war on terror can NOT be reduced to an “emotional reaction”, an act of revenge, of just punishment, a retaliation for a provocation. These events are best understood as power struggles. And people/leaders/political administrations/states are not necessarily peace maximisers so political choices do not need to be assessed exclusively in terms of peace maximising objectives.

On the other side, Saddam was a maverick and had more enemies than friends in the region while the influence of his biggest supporter (the Soviet Union) was already gone. So he was an easy enemy. — neomac

LOL! So you think that Osama bin Laden and his little cabal called Al Qaeda weren't mavericks? :lol: — ssu

Maybe I wasn’t clear enough, but my point wasn’t about being or not a maverick, but about being one or many (as I clarified later “The ‘war on terror’ wasn’t against a single enemy”). Indeed, Islamist terrorism looks as a fluid network of cross-national guerrilla fighters’ groups (with replaceable leaders).

Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated. (The whole speech here) — ssu

Bush’s speech still “tastes” differently wrt what I said earlier.

But I’m not sure to what extant the US could have done otherwise in light of what was known back then and given its hegemonic ambitions. — neomac

What I find is tragic is that when too many people die, legal procedures how we treat terrorists or other homicidal criminals goes out of the window. Hence, I think it's an impossibility that 9/11 would have been treated as a police matter and the perpetrators would have been dealt as criminals and not to have a war in Afghanistan. Some other nation without a Superpower military could have been forced to do that. But now it was an impossibility. Not only would Bush have looked as timid and incapable of "carrying the big stick", he would have been seen as cold. If it would have been Al Gore as the president, likely the war in Iraq wouldn't have happened, but Afghanistan would have. And the real history is well known. To please the crowd wanting revenge and punishment, the Bush administration gave us the Global War on Terror. Something which still is fought around the World by the third US president after Bush. — ssu

As I said elsewhere “long-term strategies can still be worked out of ‘emotional responses': indeed, it’s the emotional element that can ensure a united/greater home support for strategic efforts around the world.” In other words, to me the issue is not the emotional element behind a foreign policy but how it fits into a wider political strategy. Even if Al Gore would have stopped at Afghanistan, it remains to be seen if and how this choice could have served wider political strategic goals.

It's something that Biden warned the Netanyahu government not to do. But Bibi surely didn't care and is repeating exactly something similar. — ssu

The similarity may overshadow very different stakes: for Israel it’s a matter of nation-state building, for Bush it was more matter of hegemonic struggle.

Notice that 20% of the Israeli citizens are Arabs/Palestinians and they do not suffer from the political, economic, legal, and social discrimination — neomac

Notice that we are talking about the Occupied Territories. — ssu

An Apartheid state is a state with a racially based law system in peacetime, not a foreign military occupation imposing martial law to indigenous people.

So a question back to you, why then a one-state is impossible? The answer is that Zionism isn't meant for the non-Jews, so the State of Israel has a problem here. — ssu

As much as the Palestinian nation-state promoted by Hamas. One state solution is impossible for both Zionists and Hamas, because they both pursue a nation-state over the same land. So they are reciprocally incompatible. Under this assumption, you have no more reason to complain about Zionism than about Hamas. Yet you seem to put a greater moral burden on Zionism, I guess that’s because you are compelled by the comparison of military capabilities and losses which favour Israel, or because you believe that Palestinians have a more right to the their nation state over Palestine than Israel. So it would be clearer if you spelt it out instead of leaving it implicit.

What also I can concede is that the ethnocentric nature of the Zionist project is incompatible with Western secular pluralism, and this factor can very much facilitate structural discrimination even if it doesn’t straightforwardly lead to an Apartheid state. — neomac

I agree, this incompatibility here is the real problem. Hence all the talk of a two state solution.

And we have just a slight disagreement on just what makes a state to be an Apartheid state. You won't call it that, others here like me will call it so. — ssu

Since you insist, then let me insist: no it’s not “a slight disagreement”. Qualifying Israel as an apartheid state is analytically wrong to my understanding. It’s like equating ethno-centric Nation-state, State with structural discrimination, foreign military occupation, Apartheid state due to certain similarities. Even Republican conservatism and nazism are similar wrt left-right political spectrum, yet one can’t reasonably call Republican conservatism “nazism” unless one wants to achieve a rhetoric effect more than analytic goals. Even Stalinism and Nazism are similar within the spectrum democracy, liberalism, pluralism vs dictatorship, authoritarianism, totalitarianism, yet one can’t reasonably call Stalinism “nazism” unless one wants to achieve a rhetoric effect more than analytic goals. Analytical minds must repel classifications based on overstretched associations of ideas.
Out of curiosity, can you list other current Apartheid states, beside Israel, according to YOUR understanding of what an Apartheid state is?

What I’m saying is there was an injustice to the people on the ground when the Nakba occurred, because as far as they were concerned it was their property, their real estate when it happened. — Punshhh

“Property” as a legal term presupposes a legal system. Israel doesn’t acknowledge the Palestinian legal system. But it acknowledges to some extent the international legal system, so to that extent, Israel may be compelled to abide by what international law establishes for Palestinians. Yet it likely won’t do it if this compromises its national security. So until Israelis’ national security concerns are addressed in a way that sufficiently satisfies Israel, then a solution can be only FORCED onto Israel. Who is going to do this? How? I doubt that the US (or any other major actors in the region) finds convenient to force a violent solution on Israel for various reasons. So only diplomatic, economic, legal pressure remain but diplomatic, economic, legal pressure may still be ineffective if too mild (why should they be mild? Again out of convenience?) or even counterproductive if they could harden Israeli’s resolve.
Since you care so much about Nakba and refugees’ property rights, do you know there is a Jewish Nakba too?
https://www.thetower.org/article/there-was-a-jewish-nakba-and-it-was-even-bigger-than-the-palestinian-one/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jewish_exodus_from_the_Muslim_world

So why exactly should we acknowledge rights to land to people (Arabs and/or Jews) prior to the end of the British Mandate?

I saying that their right to the land they are living on is due to their living on and owning the land on which they lived. — Punshhh

If you are still talking about the Nakba, see my previous comment. If you are talking, as we should, about the Palestinian State, Nakba and the legal case of the expelled Palestinians during the Nakba doesn’t suffice to deal with the demand for a Palestinian nation-state. Zionists bought lands from local owners, befriended powerful allies, obtained the league of nation acknowledgement and, after the British Mandate ended, the international status over Palestine was the one proposed by the UN resolution 1947 which the Palestinians rejected. So Israel forcefully imposed its rule with the main support of the US at the expense of the Arab/Palestinian aspirations in that region.

So your only position then is limited to a concern for any broader geopolitical considerations and possible developments — Punshhh

.

Right. I’m not a political activist and using this philosophy forum to spin some political propaganda, no matter how legitimate, instead of philosophically investigating one’s own understanding of the political crisis in the Middle East is a wasted opportunity, even worth of being ridiculed.

P.s. I’m not going to go back over pages and pages of responses to answer questions. My responses will be consistent as my position on these issues has been considered at length and doesn’t change as a result of interactions with others. That’s not to say I won’t accept a revision when new information is provided and errors identified. — Punshhh

You do as you wish. I do as I wish.

It sounds as if you are making an objection to me — neomac

Sorry if I was rude or impolite, didn't mean to. — ssu

You are neither rude nor impolite to me. And I’m fine even with rude and impolite objections as long as they are on topic and sufficiently argued. In any case, I have a thick skin.

Just to emphasis that in order to have peace after war, it's not so simple as politicians say it is. Simple easy sounding solutions (just destroy them) end up in quagmires.

For example: Just to "go to" Afghanistan and destroy Al Qaeda and the supporting Taleban was what George Bush had in mind. He didn't want to have anything to do with "nation building". Did he take into account Iran or especially Pakistan, the backer of Taleban? Nope. So the US got it's longest war, which it even more humiliatingly lost than the Vietnam war. And Pakistanis can celebrate (as they did) outsmarting the Americans. — ssu

I’m not sure what you are referring to. Pakistan and Iran didn’t have the same interest in Afghanistan. Bush reserved a more privileged treatment to Pakistan than to Iran, during the war on terror (maybe this was a mistake, since the Iranian were willing to cooperate in fighting the Talibans more than the Pakistani were). So I do not understand why you are claiming that Bush didn’t take into account especially Pakistan nor in what sense he could have taken into account both Iran and Pakistan. The ethnic/religious composition of Afghanistan doesn’t look it very amenable to nation building.

That was the plan. And simple naive plans backfire. Usually because they are stupid plans. — ssu

As long as presidential speeches are meant to market national and foreign policies the president promotes, one has to assess them more in rhetoric terms and as function of their effect on the audience, more than on their accuracy or explanatory power. But even in that speech Bush is talking also about international support, patience for sacrifice and the long time that the war may require (it took almost 10 years to kill Bin Laden). He is also talking about the broader prospect of a war on terror (which may have been nothing more than a threatening posture) and making pay the price of the terrorist attacks to state sponsors (which is not only based on military action, but also diplomacy, intelligence, legal prosecution). The confidence in a victory didn’t seem farfetched given the military power of the US and Bush’s focus on objectives such as the destruction of military capabilities and terrorists training camps in Afghanistan, or making it more difficult for terrorists to use Afghanistan as a base for terrorist operations, or bringing terrorists to justice. He insisted also on friendly dispositions toward Afghans and Muslims, and humanitarian aid to the civilian population.
I don’t think one can see much of a plan doomed to fail from that speech alone. At most one can get an impression of confidence in the international support and in the victory of justice that my look excessive or hypocritical in the hindsight.
Anyways speaking of “war on terror” in such wide terms, unilateralism, widening the conflict and lack of flexibility may have plausibly contributed to misdirect efforts and to compromise successes.

Just compare to his father who a) got an OK both from the UN and from Soviet Union and China for the use of force, b) arranged an overwhelming alliance, c) listened to his allies and didn't overreach and continue to Baghdad, d) had an cease-fire — ssu

I find your comparison misleading. A declining Soviet Union led by a complacent Gorbachev said OK at the UN resolution but he also tried to play the middle man to avoid the war since Saddam used to be a strategic ally. China abstained from voting (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_678) as well as from opposing the American led intervention against Iraq. Indeed, China might have been willing to cooperate with the US in weakening the Soviet Union with its system of alliance. Besides China was prone to focus on national economic build-up and modernisation pushed by Deng Xiaoping’s reforms more than to engage in international military endeavours over international borders. Even more so, if such abstention was instrumental to preserving a soft but not compromising cooperation with the US over Taiwan. On the other side, Saddam was a maverick and had more enemies than friends in the region while the influence of his biggest supporter (the Soviet Union) was already gone. So he was an easy enemy. The Gulf war was also an easy cause because it was a relatively narrow conflict between two Arab countries, one bullying the other, over internationally acknowledged borders with no major or incumbent geopolitical stakes for the US. And it was restorative objective because the instability was brought by Saddam’s aggression which was countered without any need to overthrow Saddam. Actually this war greatly contributed to support the idea of the US world police.
The “war on terror” wasn’t against a single enemy, nor an easy cause (Islamic terrorism inflicted a humiliating attack against the US which would be welcomed by anti-American feelings in the region), nor a restorative objective (the region was destabilized by overthrowing regimes and this offered enough leeway to other geopolitical actors’ initiative at the expense of the US). But I’m not sure to what extant the US could have done otherwise in light of what was known back then and given its hegemonic ambitions.

And since Israel never has had the attempt to make both Jews and Non-Jews there all Israelis, then this is what you get.

If you want peace and have in your country other people then you, then you try to make them part of your country (like Romans decided later that everybody living there would be Romans). Or be even smarter, create a new identity like the English did: Everybody, including them, would be BRITISH. Even that wasn't enough for the Irish, because they had a long memory of how the English had behaved in their country. But it has been a success story in Scotland and Whales. — ssu

You are thinking as if people and states reason in terms of maximising peace and are willing to sacrifice anything else for peace. But that’s a rather questionable assumption: people can fight because they refuse slavery, or inequality, or intruders, or for blood revenge, or for predation, for defence, for helping somebody under threat, etc. People can fight also to preserve their religious or ethnic social identities, the customs, habits, language, historical memories they have inherited from past generation and want to transmit to future generations. This mindset can drive Israelis as much as Palestinians. Israelis apparently do not want peace if that means sacrificing Israel as a nation-state. And even Palestinians do not want peace if that means sacrificing Palestine as a nation-state. In other words, you have to convince them, the people and their the leaders, that nation-state is not something worth sacrificing their life for. And good luck with that.
Until then Israel can’t simply annex Gaza and West Bank and give Israeli citizenship to all Palestinians, even if the international community allowed it (and I doubt it). Indeed, given all the historical grievances and the comparable demographic size, there is no guarantee that the conflict would NOT reproduce in form of a civil war. It’s a deadlock.
So if one finds Israeli’s security concerns credible given its nation-state ambitions, then only solutions that address such Israeli’s security concerns better than just keep using brute force or ethnic cleansing have a chance to be appealing to Israel. For example, I deeply doubt that one state or two state solutions can address Israeli’s security concerns better than a confederated state (which is still compatible with Palestinian nation-state ambitions) or three state solution (which is NOT compatible with Palestinian nation-state ambitions).

Now, does Israel try this? No. It's a homeland for the Jews and others just can fuck off. And that's why in the end it is an Apartheid system, because it has at it's core that similary hostility towards the others, similar to what the white Afrikaaners had in their system for blacks. — ssu

You are comparing Israel to an Apartheid system as others compare Israel to Nazi Germany always in light of perceived striking similarities. But watering down the meaning of the words, based on associations of ideas, to achieve rhetoric effects is more good for propaganda than for analysis. Notice that 20% of the Israeli citizens are Arabs/Palestinians and they do not suffer from the political, economic, legal, and social discrimination that “Blacks” suffered in South Africa during the Apartheid, nor from the segregation and/or military regime Israel has imposed in West Bank and Gaza. As far as I’ve understood, the Israeli military rule until 1966 made look Israel dramatically closer to an apartheid state than after the military rule was lifted.
What also I can concede is that the ethnocentric nature of the Zionist project is incompatible with Western secular pluralism, and this factor can very much facilitate structural discrimination even if it doesn’t straightforwardly lead to an Apartheid state.
Indeed we shouldn’t overstate its gravity nor underestimate its force for 3 reasons:
1. The ethnocentric nature of Zionism was common to European nation-state formation, nationalist ideologies, European colonialism (which also lead to ethnic cleansing and/or oppression). It took centuries and 2 world wars to overcome this mindset in favour of more pluralistic views. In other words, pluralism seems a very hard won lesson. So maybe also Israelis and Palestinians have to learn it the hard way.
2. Structural discrimination is still very common also in Western pluralist countries (like the US, the UK, France, Germany etc.) and actually in the rest of the world (have you compared how certain minorities are treated in other countries, like Arab/Muslim countries or China or India or Russia?).
3. Security concerns (not racial concerns) are still dominant in Israel and when a country is at war with terrorism or another country, democratic backsliding is expected (“Terrorism and Democratic Recession” https://www.jstor.org/stable/26455914).

And where did I make such extraordinary claims exactly? Can you quote me verbatim?

↪neomac

I didn’t say you had made such a claim, I wasn’t talking about you, I was talking about claims. But you do appear to be positioning yourself there in relation to my claim. Unless, you are in some kind of neutral position. As far as I’m concerned to even consider that this Israeli administration we are discussing could be a workable solution, unless it is imposed with brute force is entirely fool hardy, or naive. It’s not going to happen.

While from your neutral position you are happy to use analysis to deconstruct what I was saying. — Punshhh

I do not have a neutral position. I’m partial, interested and pro-Israel, to put it bluntly. But that doesn’t mean unconditional support for the Zionist cause. In other words, my position is that, given my understanding of the status of the geopolitical game in that area, I think there are STILL strong reasons to see Israel as a valuable strategic ally of the West (I qualify myself as a Westerner) and act accordingly even in the current circumstances. So even if the West doesn’t align with Israel on how Israel is handling the current crisis, it has to deal with Israel in a way that it doesn’t estrange Israel either. I do not have strong opinions on that and I do not think I know better than Western or Israeli political decision makers. So mine are just general concerns from a Westerner perspective based on a general understanding of the situation given certain geopolitical and historical assumptions.
Since I’m not a political activist and we are in a philosophy forum, I prefer to focus on my and my interlocutors’ limited understanding of the situation beyond personal interested perspectives. This means the analytic exercise I’m engaging in and challenge others to do as well is to investigate, make explicit and review the assumptions and the arguments which could support one’s political beliefs. To give you an example: I do not care if one believes and claims that Israel is “ an Apartheid state”, but I care more to understand how one came to conclude that Israel is “ an Apartheid state” and assess how such argument is compelling on geopolitical and historical grounds.

You mean that the burden of proof is all on me and you have to do nothing other than making claims? You didn’t even offer a clarification of what you mean by “Apartheid state”.

But I’m realising that you are not committing to a position on these questions. You’re just shooting down what people say. I ask for a counter argument and none is provided. You comment on some issue, but thats not making claims. — Punshhh

What is the counter argument that you asked and I didn’t provide, exactly?
I’m still waiting a compelling response to the 3 questions I asked to you.
1. If you check the demographic of Palestine in recorded history, the first known people to occupy those regions in majority were Jews, not Arabs/Muslims.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_history_of_Palestine_(region)
Before the end of the 12th century Arabs/Muslims turned to be the majority.
So those lands have been over time occupied by different people and demographic distribution changed over time. But the original people occupying the land of Palestine (and which never completely left Palestine) were NOT Arabs/Muslims but Jews (and notice that the West Bank = Judea+Samaria is the heart of the historical Jewish land). And the main reason why many of the Jews fled from those lands is due to oppression by foreign powers (first the the Roman/Byzantine empire then by that Muslim empire + Arab/Muslim COLONIZATION of lands originally occupied by Jews). So why exactly should we acknowledge historical “occupation” starting from the time the Arabs/Muslims turned to be the majority after oppressive colonisation of lands originally occupied by Jews?
2. Correlating land and population is not enough to establish rights over the land, because such rights are established by rulers. And in ancient history up until the end of the British Mandate the rulers and owners of the land were the leaders of kingdoms and empires not Jewish/Arab people. So why exactly should we acknowledge rights to land to people (Arabs and/or Jews) prior to the end of the British Mandate?
3. Correlating land, population and land rights, is not enough to establish national identity. Indeed, Palestinian nationalism supporting a Palestinian nation-state developed in the last century and in response to Zionism. So why exactly should we acknowledge rights to the land to a nation whose identity is rooted very much in this fight for land ownership with another nation whose identity precedes such conflict?

looking at your discussion with SSU about what apartheid is I’ll give it a miss for now. — Punshhh

What a surprise.

I’m not criticising your approach or what you’re saying, it just feels a bit to much like a philosophy tutorial, where your only input is to mark my homework. — Punshhh

I have nothing against you, personally. But I’m here to entertain myself, not you. And I use the same approach with everybody.

The notion that an Israeli administration that would be introduced in Gaza would be an improvement on what was there before October 7th. Or that it would even come close to something acceptable to the Palestinian population is an extraordinary position

“Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence”. — Punshhh

And where did I make such extraordinary claims exactly? Can you quote me verbatim?

You mean that the burden of proof is all on me and you have to do nothing other than making claims? You didn’t even offer a clarification of what you mean by “Apartheid state”.


Perhaps we should try and agree what a state is first, or a human. — Punshhh

Sure, if you suspect a disagreement between us over the notion of “state” or “human”. The point is that YOU feel compelled to call Israel an “Apartheid state” and want me to agree with you since you suspect a disagreement (and rightly so).

P.S. For some reason, I do not get notifications from you, even if you reference my nickname.

Not sure what your point is: — neomac

You might set your objective to that you fight a war to an unconditional surrender, but that doesn't mean that it happens automatically. Meaning that the defeated enemy can choose to surrender to you, hear your demands isn't something that automatically happens. Or simply doesn't appear to your surrender meeting. Hopefully you get it. — ssu

It sounds as if you are making an objection to me, yet I didn’t claim nowhere that unconditional surrender should happen automatically. Indeed you can not quote me saying it. So what’s the point of bringing that up? Even fighting for one state or two states solution “doesn't mean that it happens automatically”. So what?

So the “Apartheid condition” you are talking about, is very much motivated by concerns over Palestinian terroristic attacks like those of Hamas. — neomac

Wrong. The Apartheid system started immediately after the 1967 occupation of the West Bank and Gaza when the military occupation started. Far earlier than the first Intifada. See here. — ssu

You can call it “apartheid system” but I’m not compelled to accept your classification until we agree on the notion of “apartheid system” and its application on this case. Your link simply reports the following: The existence of a dual system of laws for Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank has been used as evidence by those who claim that Israel practices apartheid in the region.. As far as I’m concerned, I’m not sure if “dual system of laws for Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank” is enough evidence to legally support the accusation of “crime of apartheid” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crime_of_apartheid) or call Israel as an “apartheid state”, so I will let legal experts and competent tribunals on such matter to decide. However I’ll question it for historical reasons I’ll clarify below.

That Palestinians living in the occupied territories are under military law and aren't citizens of Israel while Israelis living in the West Bank are (and are under Israeli law), is the obvious sign of an Apartheid system.

And of course, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza cannot vote in Israeli elections as they aren't Israeli citizens. As there isn't an one state solution. Usually people living in a country are under the same laws and are considered citizens of the country. Not so in occupied territories that Israel holds.

That's one thing of the Apartheid system, — ssu

Does the fact that you notice “one thing of the Apartheid system” or as “the obvious sign of an Apartheid system” suffice to call Israel an “Apartheid System”? Because that is what you seem to claim.
As far as I’m concerned, the dual system in the West Bank occupied territories consists in the fact that Palestinians were/are under Israeli military law and not under Israeli civil laws, because Palestinians are not Israelis, and military laws in the West Bank (which still leave room for Palestinian local civil laws) are enforced by the military force which controls that territory, even if it is a foreign one. That situation is not uncommon, at least during wartime.
Does this dual legal system suffice to classify Israel as an “Apartheid system” as such or an “Apartheid system” in the West Bank region, and even more so if it protracts after wartime period? I find it disputable at least on historical grounds. The “Apartheid system” I have in mind is the one implemented in South Africa. South Africa Apartheid System wasn’t a military occupation over disputed land, the imposed legal system (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apartheid_legislation) by a white minority over a black majority in the whole country was explicitly racially based, economically exploitative/discriminatory, legally abusive (e.g. by allowing corporal punishments to blacks who violated the law), beside being politically authoritarian and segregational. And all these traits are relevant to me (as to the sources I rely on) to assess if a system can be called Apartheid System.
So I can get and do not need to discount that Palestinians in the West Bank feel oppressed by authoritarian and segregational measures (like walls and blockades) of the Israeli military rule, in addition to the abuses they accuse the Israelis to commit. And I can get if, to many, that is already enough to trigger humanitarian concerns, accusations of committing a war crime, support for the Palestinian cause, or remarks about striking analogies with the South African Apartheid System.
But I still find misleading to call Israel and apartheid system to the extant such classification suggests inferences and beliefs which would hold for the paradigmatic case of the South Africa apartheid system, but arguably not for Israel.

which started well before there was any Hamas formed. — ssu

I was talking about barriers and barricades as a form of segregation comparable to Apartheid segregational measures. Of such measures I was saying they were a response to Palestinian terroristic attacks, not specifically to Hamas’ attacks alone. But I welcome your objection to the extant it challenges people, you included, to clarify their understanding of the notion “Apartheid system” as I tried to do previously.

In Israel:

Jewish settlers in the West Bank are Israeli citizens and enjoy the same rights and liberties as other Jewish Israelis. They also enjoy relative impunity for violence against Palestinians. Most of the West Bank’s Palestinian residents fall under the administrative jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority (PA), which operates under an expired presidential mandate and has no functioning legislature.


In Apartheid South Africa:

In the Apartheid system The Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970 made every Black South African, irrespective of actual residence, a citizen of one of the Bantustans, which were organized on the basis of ethnic and linguistic groupings defined by white ethnographers. Blacks were stripped of their South African citizenship and thereby excluded from the South African body politic.


Hopefully you do see the similarities and just why people can refer quite aptly the situation to Apartheid. — ssu

As I argued, I can see the similarities but I question that such similarities suffice to “refer quite aptly the situation to Apartheid”. I’m sure even Hitler and some random Jew burned in a concentration camp might have had lots of interesting similarities too, yet such similarities might not be enough to call both of them nazi.

But why do you believe that if Hamas surrenders, the people of Palestine will be plunged into an even more oppressive situation? What evidence do you have? What reasons?

↪neomac

Simply because the situation has worsened (the means and practice of the Israeli government and the IDF.)
This is self evident for these reasons;
The stand off between Israel and the leaders of Palestine has worsened and deepened over a long time, as each new conflict occurs. It only ever gets worse, not better.
There is clear evidence of Israeli leaders becoming militant, radicalised. This will only make the situation worse and make it more difficult for Israeli’s to trust Palestinians.
Their insensitivity to the plight as evidenced by their actions re’ Gaza and concerns of Palestinian people, suggests that they will remain insensitive in any subsequent Israeli controlled state. — Punshhh

What is your argument here? The Jewish psyche? You should suggest Israelis your therapist, I guess.

You proposed a confederated solution. My point was that such a confederated solution would amount to another form of apartheid by a different name. — Punshhh

Dude, really? Is that the most you can do?

Yes you said that so many times. And the first time was already one time too much.

I will stop when you agree with me about that. Or demonstrate that it is not the case. — Punshhh

You mean that the burden of proof is all on me and you have to do nothing other than making claims? You didn’t even offer a clarification of what you mean by “Apartheid state”.

They weren’t born into a traumatised oppressed population as Palestinians are. If Hamas, surrenders now. The people of Palestine will be plunged into an even more oppressive situation. — Punshhh

Agreed with the first point. It must be taken into account for the possibility of reaching durable peace. But why do you believe that if Hamas surrenders, the people of Palestine will be plunged into an even more oppressive situation? What evidence do you have? What reasons?
If one looks at the history of blockades and barriers of Gaza and West Bank one sees that they were consequence of the terroristic attacks (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza%E2%80%93Israel_barrier, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israeli_West_Bank_barrier). The blockade imposed on the movement of goods and people in and out of the Gaza Strip followed Hamas's takeover in 2007. So the “Apartheid condition” you are talking about, is very much motivated by concerns over Palestinian terroristic attacks like those of Hamas. So the segregation the Palestinians are experiencing is arguably the consequence of Hamas fight and the more Hamas fights the worse it gets for Palestinians as we see with the current devastation because Netanyahu is compelled to demilitarised the entire Gaza and police Gaza like in the West Bank.

This West Bank regime is the perniciously oppressive apartheid state I referred to. — Punshhh

Yes you said that so many times. And the first time was already one time too much.

I don’t see a solution here, a confederate state would be the same in all but name. — Punshhh

What is your argument here? The Jewish psyche? You should suggest Israelis your therapist, I guess.

Does what you are saying imply that horrors of the war (like the ones we see in Gaza) or demand for unconditional surrender constitute a strong argument against durable peace in the region? Because history shows also that one can demand and obtain UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER (https://www.britannica.com/topic/Potsdam-Declaration) and have prospects of a durable peace after enough devastation (including civilians, kids, cities) and even after heavy bombings and nukes. — neomac

If you ask for unconditional surrender and assume to get an unconditional surrender, then there has to be someone that SURRENDERS! — ssu

Not sure what your point is:
- Do you mean that Israel aims at exterminating Palestinians? Israel has the means to exterminate the Palestinians in Israel in Nazi style. Yet they didn’t do it up until now, nor their official rhetoric or the Zionist ideology supports that, nor Netanyahu’s current war against Hamas proves that this is the objective.
- Do you mean that Palestinians will not surrender and will keep fighting as martyrs of their cause? Well then they have to fight in increasingly worse conditions against a more powerful and more hostile force, and hope the rest of the world will keep supporting their fight, if not save them.

Hence history has shown, that you don't automatically get an unconditional surrender. Iraq and Afghanistan are perfect examples of this. And if you think that the only way is then to take the Mongol Horde attitude to the strategy "make a desert and call it peace" of killing literally everybody, then go away only to come two weeks later to check that you really have killed off everyone, you still haven't create real peace for yourself: the Mongol Empire collapsed quite quickly to smaller parts. And isn't remembered so fondly afterwards. — ssu

As far as I’m concerned, I neither stated nor believe nor implied nor suggested that unconditional surrender is automatic or necessary or sufficient or necessary&sufficient for durable peace. I just argued that unconditional surrender can come even after brutal and wide devastation.
Besides there are other factors that can likely weigh in for a durable peace which I mentioned already, like: the reaction of the international environment (e.g. if major Hamas sponsors stop their support) and how oppressive is perceived the foreign dominant power to be (e.g. Israel could help restore economy, freedoms and political rights in the occupied territories).

Arafat failed the test badly and set a precedent which obviously biased Israelis toward Palestinian terrorist organizations. — neomac


And the Palestinian/Arab side can actually say the same things of Israel, which didn't accept the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002 which was endorsed by the Arab League and immediately embraced by Jasser Arafat and later by Mahmoud Abbas. Polls have find that the Palestinians (then) were favourable towards it.

Yet The Israelis simply rejected it as a "non-starter". — ssu

The proposal which came from the non-Palestinian & Saudis-led Arabs (if Palestinians are a nation they shouldn’t be confused with other nations, right?) was rejected as it was, but many Israeli representatives praised and welcomed the initiative. Indeed, Shimon Peres even offered a counter-proposals to deal with remaining issues (https://www.haaretz.com/2007-05-20/ty-article/peres-israel-to-present-counter-proposal-to-arab-peace-plan/0000017f-f5ce-d47e-a37f-fdfe08050000)
And in any case, beside the thorny problem of the refugees, the Palestinian militants like Hamas (which was the incumbent replacement for Arafat) STILL rejected the proposal, refused to acknowledge Israel, and refused to give up on military fighting Israel. Israel needs security guarantees and no alternative compensation can replace that.

So why is it only the fault of the Arab side? — ssu

.

I was talking about the Palestinians and not the Arabs. And I didn’t talk in terms of “fault” for several reasons which I tried to clarify on different occasions. To summarise my point, blame is assessed wrt a certain way of framing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The problem is that there are many of such framing views, mainly the Palestinian, the Israeli, the international community, ALL OF WHICH can be incompatible and easy to question or discredit. So for these reasons I refrain myself from assessing blame based on any such frames. Yet these different ways of framing the conflict nurture power struggles, and to that extant they all are relevant to one’s understanding of the situation. I challenge others to engage with such an understanding: it’s intellectually more honest and enlightening than chairing moral tribunals over the internet.
Besides you still refrain from talking about strategic failures by the Palestinians and the Arabs (e.g. the expulsion and persecution of Jews in the middle east for the Arab-Palestinian-Israeli conflict made hundreds of thousands of Jews flock into Israel, the so called "Jewish Nakba”, as if the Jews didn’t have enough historical grievances against the Arabs even prior to the birth of Israel), only the West and Israel commit strategic failures.

To me it's obvious. There's no real will for a negotiated peace or a two-state solution. The whole arena has been hijacked by religious extremists who have succeeded to burn every bridge towards peace. And those that accuse only one side about this aren't seeing the reality. — ssu

I certainly do not need to discount the possibility that “there's no real will for a negotiated peace or a two-state solution”. What I’d question is your penchant for reducing controversial policies from Israel and the US as a matter of religious fanatics. Where this the case this would be EVEN MORE worrisome for Gaza which is manifestly and pervasively led by a Islamist regime (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamism_in_the_Gaza_Strip) sponsored by a Islamist regional power which apparently you keep overlooking in your analysis. (BTW do you know any secular or non-secular Palestinian terrorist organisation programmatically fighting for a two state solution?)
Indeed, secular and nationalist views like those of the Zionist founding fathers were pretty clear about the violent and exclusive nature of the Zionist project which doesn’t support any Palestinian state over the territory the Zionist claimed for Israel. And secular Palestinian nationalism like the one from Arafat until Oslo was also pretty violent in nature and rhetoric. After Oslo, Arafat putative “conversion” came too late, Hamas was growing in power and pulling support from Iran.
Besides Hamas does’t seem to make any difference between secular and non-secular Israelis.
And Netanyahu too is compelled to agree with Hamas on this (https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israels-netanyahu-says-he-will-pave-way-conscript-ultra-orthodox-2024-02-29/)

Japanese proved to be capable of that (and Hamas?) but evidently there were enough decision makers who rejected this logic (starting with the Emperor himself). — neomac

I think who ought to be congratulated are here the Americans in the way they handled both Germany and Japan after WW2. — ssu

Yet nothing was CERTAIN OR EVEN ANTICIPATED before Germany and Japan surrendered after utter devastation. So utter devastation is not necessarily an obstacle to durable peace.

But the order only succeeded when other nations went along with it, not by use of force and threat (as the Soviet Union did), but by cooperation. Places where the US has used old imperial ways aren't so happy with the Americans. — ssu

We can’t simply assume that what once was feasible and convenient under certain circumstances is still feasible and convenient in other circumstances. In the middle east the US experienced the competition of Islamism and other competing hegemonic ambitions so the middle east was very much contested. It seems to me a caricature to take the American policies and the struggle for hegemony in the middle east as the result of sheer dumbness/evilness without considering the pressure coming from the inside (various lobbies) and the outside (authoritarian competitors or uncooperative/sluggish allies).

Somehow that idea of peaceful coexistence and cooperation seems for many naive and wrong. — ssu

As far as I’m concerned, what seems to me naive and wrong is not the idea of peaceful coexistence and cooperation, but the conflation between desirable and feasible. Human affairs are complicated, opaque and unstable under stress, so consequences can be unpredictable and very costly. Security concerns are rooted in this basic acknowledgement and coping with such predicament has its logic forged by historical experience, not by peace&love common sense. There is no amount of moral outrage over “dumbness” or “evilness” that can recover this predicament once for all. EITHER dumb and evil are the powerful majority so the minority can be screwed just because it’s the powerless minority, OR dumb and evil are the powerful minority which can screw the life of all others because the majority is powerless. SO once again POWER is what is needed to make dumb and evil people harmless. And peace&love common sense rhetoric doesn’t look that powerful in human history, so far. That is to say, the Great Satan is not the cause but the product of power struggles to cope with security concerns which start at the grassroots of humanity, always and everywhere, which then are amplified by evolving technological and demographic processes.

Winning a war is one thing, what to do then is another. Winning the peace is the fact that is missing here. — ssu

Nicely put.

Perhaps you don't get my point: there has to be a peace that will prevail in the future. If the other side loses, then it loses and it is open to hear your terms. Yet if your terms are simply "drop dead" or there are no terms, then there is no reason to subject, but simply go on, plan how you can defeat the enemy occupier. Hence a war has been quite futile, if the peace will be broken in the future. — ssu

Does what you are saying imply that horrors of the war (like the ones we see in Gaza) or demand for unconditional surrender constitute a strong argument against durable peace in the region? Because history shows also that one can demand and obtain UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER (https://www.britannica.com/topic/Potsdam-Declaration) and have prospects of a durable peace after enough devastation (including civilians, kids, cities) and even after heavy bombings and nukes.

And what's the solution you have in mind? A final solution like Mr Hitler had in mind for the Jews? There's seven million Palestinians, so 'doing away' with seven million will get you into Guinness World of Records and topple Mr Hitler's previous Holocaust. That is neither possible or sustainable and quite deplorable. — ssu

I’m a nobody and it would be totally irrelevant if the solution I had in mind is exterminating all Palestinians in Israel with nukes and concentration camps. I’d rather focus on what Israeli and Palestinian first decision makers could (or could more likely) do along with the decision makers of the International community community.
For example, my understanding is that Netanyahu is going to destroy Hamas (and other militant groups’) military capacity and identified combatants in Gaza as thoroughly as possible and impose a West Bank regime in Gaza. Maybe complemented with some agreements with Egypt to accept and keep refugees in Sinai as long as needed. But there is more than this that Israel likely has in mind to weaken foreign players which fuel the Palestinian resistance.
Concerning the wider prospect of solving the conflict by satisfying nation-state demands, I keep hearing people talking about one state or two states solution, instead of a confederated solution which has been proposed jointly by representatives of both sides, and sounds to me addressing the security concerns of both sides more equitably.

How about Germany? — neomac

Actually with Germany this becomes even more clear when you think of the two Post German states! Which one experienced a revolt against it's occupier as early as the 1950's? Which had to build the Berlin wall to keep it's citizens from fleeing to the other Germany? And which Germany basically collapsed as a house of cards and end up in the dustbin of history after the unification of the two states? And finally, which Germany is still an ally of the US and is totally happy that the US has bases in it's territory? — ssu

To me the case of Germany suggests that the problem for a durable peace is not necessarily the amount of devastation, civilian deaths, unconditional surrender, and loss of territorial integrity. But how oppressive the victorious foreign power is perceived to be in peace settlements, AFTER the war is ACKNOWLEDGED as lost. And limited retaliation for terroristic attacks which allows easy recovery won’t be enough to get that, so the next step could likely be to escalate to a full out war against Hamas, followed by a West Bank style occupation which is what we are seeing unfolding.
Anyways, to my understanding, one critical step on both sides is switching attitude from “just peace” to “secure peace”. And acknowledging that this is a UNEQUAL burden for Palestinians than for Israelis since the Palestinians are likely the ones which have much more to lose in terms of security (after having likely lost a “just peace” i.e. for persecution of war crimes, reparation, borders back to pre-1967, etc.) if hostility persists. That implies that Palestinians should focus less on territorial sovereignty and integrity (so being more flexible and complacent to current Israelis’ territorial demands), and more on how safely they will live and restore their economy.

Just having a war and winning the battles doesn't give you peace, especially if you don't think about what to do after a military victory. If you have only naive or delusional ideas that the people will thank you after you have bombed them or then just want retribution, the likelihood that peace will continue is doubtful. Didn't the Americans find out that after invading Iraq? Mission accomplished, as you remember
! Well, there the US is still stuck, have basically given the place to Iran with the Iraqi government asking the Americans to leave. — ssu

You are talking as if ending war is a matter of common sense. But how far can we go with common sense really? If all that is required is that ENOUGH PEOPLE are common sensical about how to reach a durable peace and this durable peace is not reached after decades, we could conclude that there aren’t enough people that follow common sense, couldn’t we? But if that’s the case what’s the point of appealing to common sense? If enough people are not guided by common sense and can screw things up to other ones which do follow common sense, then common sense is not the solution, maybe it’s even part of the problem since it passively lets it spread.
Let’s put aside this naive appeal to common sense, and acknowledge that individuals aren’t or can’t be fully micro-managed to reform their society effectively. And that individuals hardly tolerate putting continuous efforts in changing habits or expectations when the end results depend on wide collective to put equal effort, while trust is compromised, supervision is not reliable, defection is even encouraged and compliance is discouraged if not under existential threat. To be more concrete, as long as Gaza is mainly RUN politically, economically, financially, militarily, religiously, socially by Hamas (infiltrating even UNRWA) and Hamas is devoted to destroy Israel, there is no chance that Palestinians will get rid of Hamas. Hamas runs a pervasive mafia state in Gaza and, as such, it has Palestinians in its grip. Even if there are Palestinians who would go as far as to blame Hamas for all it’s happening to Palestinians, yet they can’t help but serving Hamas one way or the other. And Hamas, in turn, can greatly serve its foreign sponsors, mainly Iran and until it does, Iran will support Hamas. That’s why the situation is so messed up.

the problem is that ALSO peace depends on narratives and it remains unreachable if it is grounded in incompatible narratives about peace conditions. — neomac

Exactly. And that means you really have to take into consideration what the losing side WILL ACCEPT! True peace is what both sides can accept. But if you don't care shit about the enemy you have beaten or think of them as human animals who are incapable of handling themselves and are totally irresponsible, then you reap what you sow when the enemy comes back after a decade or two. Or continues simply continues the war with the limited resources it has. — ssu

The accusation “you don't care shit” by people without skin in the game at people who put their skin in the game doesn’t sound that compelling.
Besides stats do not seem to support optimism about chances of “true peace”: In the period 1946-2005, 63 interstate wars have been recorded globally. Only about one fifth (21%) of them had a decisive outcome in which one party ended up as the victor and the other as the loser (i.e., total victory/defeat). Almost one third (30%) of these wars ended in a ceasefire, while only one sixth (16%) were concluded with a peace agreement. The remaining cases had an outcome without clear victory/defeat nor any type of peace settlement. Worryingly, of the negotiated peace agreements between 1975 and 2018 almost four out of ten (37%) broke down following a reignition of the war between the same parties. Moreover, more than three quarters (76%) of the peace agreements that broke down did so within two years, 12% lasted for two to five years, and another 12% lasted for more than five years but eventually broke down. Wars that end in a tie as opposed to a decisive victory, where both sides share an acrimonious history, and where one side’s existence is threatened, are significantly more likely to be repeated
https://hcss.nl/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/How-Wars-End-HCSS-2022.pdf
So one may easily try to solicit others to work harder on conditions amenable to “true peace”, but can’t assume “true peace” to be likely to succeed by those who put their skin in it.

Military build-up is an outcome of an agenda, it's not an agenda itself. NATO expansion was only one small reason, another was simply that there's only the narrative of Russia as an (threatened) empire. Russia simply cannot see itself as a nation state, because it isn't one made for just Russians. — ssu

That’s what I’m saying as well. Russia chose to invest its income from the American-led globalization in military build-up to support its power projection in the world and at the expense of the West. But the further implication is that the Pax Americana hasn’t just about screwing countries in the middle east but also about benefiting other countries (e.g. European countries, Russia, China), some of which now feel encouraged and have chosen to challenge the US.

Secular zionism wasn’t ideologically more prone to support a Palestinian state than Israel today — neomac

I might have to disagree here, even if you make your point well. Religious zionism is far more intolerant at making compromises. At least the founding fathers assumed that in the future they ought to make peace with the Palestinians/Arabs. — ssu

I conceded as much: “it would have been easier to deal with secular zionism at the end of the British Mandate, then with non-secular zionism today, given the greater pragmatism of the former and a shorter list of historical grievances against Palestinians back then”. What else do you want me to concede, exactly? What kind of compromise do you have in mind? What examples?
In the link I provided to you there is no argument to support a Palestinian state. Israel in the secular Zionist founding fathers’ own understanding is a colonial (and VIOLENT) but justified enterprise against indigenous people which must be dispossessed of lands they are expected to claim to be theirs and where the Jews would establish a nation state ethnically dominated by Jews. So, back then, “making compromise” didn’t mean being prone to acknowledge a Palestinian state over the lands they wanted to be theirs (namely,
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/map-of-palestine-as-claimed-by-world-zionist-organization-1919) and which included Gaza and West Bank.

In truth, the PLO/FATAH and the PA would have said again and again the pre-1967 borders would be enough for them. Even Hamas would have hinted at this (for example Benkei referred to this at the start of this thread). And there have been the Arab peace proposals, so you can look them up.

It's just one of the myths that the Arab/Palestinian side hasn't made any efforts at a negotiated peace themselves. — ssu

I was talking about Palestinians. The Oslo agreements (which was mainly setting interim conditions for future negotiations AND IT DIDN’T COMMIT ISRAEL TO STOP SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK) were made by political leaders with different status: an actual prime minister vs a leader of a (until then terrorist) Palestinian organization whose doubtful/controversial credibility in the Israelis’ eyes was under test from 1993 until the Camp David summit. Arafat failed the test badly and set a precedent which obviously biased Israelis toward Palestinian terrorist organizations.
Hamas is even less credible than Arafat, because in addition to the biasing effect of Arafat’s precedent, it has an Islamist penchant (so more troublesome, e.g. for arrangements over the status of Jerusalem), an even deeper link to Iran and it never recognized Israel.
So at words Palestinian representatives came up with proposals which ultimately weren’t enough credible because compromised by the irrepressible confrontational dispositions and rhetoric within the Palestinian front.

A bit off the topic, but this also is something not so obvious, was it the atomic bombs or was it actually the Russian attack on Japan? Or both? — ssu

OK I watched the video and read a few more things about the subject. Apparently he is not the first one to make the argument that the Japanese surrendered because of the Soviet incumbent involvement against Japan more than because of the nukes. I definitely welcome a richer understanding of the Japanese predicament and the reasons which may have motivated the Japanese to accept surrender. Also because, as I mentioned elsewhere, one must take into account the distribution of the decision process by decision makers. And during WW2 there was some power struggle between Japanese military and the Emperor.
Anyways, from the Emperor’s speech, we can’t discount the possibility that, under the predicament in which the Japanese were, the nukes were a strong reason to prompt surrender, at least for HIM : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hirohito_surrender_broadcast
After all, the magnitude and immediacy of devastation one single nuclear bomb could bring about against military and civil targets must have been really impressive to experience. And understandably so given how this impression still informs the logic of deterrence. Besides the Americans were threatening to launch a third nuke, likely in Tokyo, and annihilate the Imperial residence as well as the Emperor (bunkers aside) which the Japs, including the hardliners, were very much sensitive about. So it’s still plausible that while killing the Emperor would have made him a martyr and prompted resistance, threatening to kill him along with his imperial residence may have deterred some hardliners from pursing the war. Of course, within a logic of martyrdom no amount of suffering and devastation could curb resistance to the last man but then not even the Soviet involvement would have been a strong reason. Japanese proved to be capable of that (and Hamas?) but evidently there were enough decision makers who rejected this logic (starting with the Emperor himself).

I do not believe in God. Only in Goddesses.

But here comes the part I have tried to explain: The US had then a plan that made peace to prevail. The US didn't annex Japan or Japan wasn't cut into pieces by the allies (even if the Soviets took the Kuril islands, which has causes problems). The US left the Japanese emperor alive. The US did many things that the Japanese could accept, even if the surrendered. — ssu

Dude, you forgot the 2 nukes. Nuking countries apparently is a good method to obtain peace, sure. First, nuke, than show mercy (you can always nuke again). This reminds me a line from Hamlet: “I must be cruel to be kind”. Anyways, if nuking is a good strategy for prompting surrender and permanent peace, then that's also an option for Israel to consider, right?

And this is my point: the war had a Klausewitzian goal. After the surrender the peace worked. Imagine how well it would have worked if Japan would have been cut into to with Stalin holding one part? North and South Korea give an answer to that. — ssu

How about Germany?

Yet there's no similar goal other than to "get the terrorists" when the US invaded Afghanistan. What was the plan then for Afghanistan? Nothing, George Bush had no intention of country-building at first. How did the plan take into account Pakistan? In no way. And hence Pakistan could burn the candle from both ends and in the end got it's Taleban back into power with the US retreating in humiliation.

My point is actually very well explained by Yuval Noah Harari in the following interview from some days ago: if you don't have the time to check it out all, please go to minute 09:00 where after the question Harari explains well what in the war is lacking: an Klausewitzian goal for the war. He takes the example of the invasion of Iraq, which simply played into the hands of Iran. Again something that wasn't clearly thought over, but concocted by the neocons. — ssu

I don’t know if you read my last post in its entirety but I do not need to question the poor planning you are talking about and which is referring to specific policies, military or otherwise. Even less I question the claim that Iran benefited in Iraq, it very well fits into what I already said about Iran. However when I talk about strategy I’m referring to long-term geopolitical goals (not to what’s the best method to get as close as possible to a durable peace benefiting everybody). One my also question that Islamic jihadism was a strategic priority for the US wrt to challenges coming from the globalization. Said that, even if talking about poor (disastrous?) implementation is understandable, still I find more likely that it was for other reasons than the fact that Bush couldn’t distinguish between Sunni and Shia.

Furthermore it's exactly on the point what Harari says about the battle for the soul of the Israeli nation between patriotism and Jewish supremacy. Harari explains very well the difference between patriotism and the feelings of national supremacy. As Harari also notes, Netanyahu hasn't said what the long term plan is. That Klausewitzian goal is missing: a peace to end this war. — ssu

I can agree with Harari to some extant: war is a choice, narratives push people to war, justice depends on the narrative, militarisation gets countries in a vicious race to re-arming and eats budget that could go to health care or education or anything else that could benefit the community.
Still he seems failing to connect the dots of what he himself is saying:
- If narratives push people to war and we should NOT focus on justice because this is based on incompatible narratives, the problem is that ALSO peace depends on narratives and it remains unreachable if it is grounded in incompatible narratives about peace conditions. People often do not want just “peace” but a “just peace”. And even if people are willing to accept a perceived “unjust peace", at least they want assurances for a “secure peace”, which again is shaped by narratives. Anyways, if both Palestinians and Israelis would find acceptable a path toward a “secure peace” (more than a “just peace”) maybe their best chance is to give up on the idea of one or two states, and work on a confederative solution (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Land_for_All_(organization)), assumed that the international circumstances will be sufficiently favourable to it as long as needed, of course.
- What’s the point of reminding us that the money thrown into military build-up is depriving us from education and healthcare, while at the same time conceding that people are pushed to re-arm when neighbours re-arm anyways?
BTW that’s a point I stressed many times also in the thread about the war in Ukraine: the Great Satan was the one which supported decades of globalization and globalization is what economically FUELED the military build-up of Russia and China under the Pax Americana. It’s the military build-up and the consequent power projection of Russia that enabled and encouraged the Ukrainian invasion WAY MORE than the trigger of NATO expansion. That’s also the part that people criticising the West conveniently forget. Indeed the US reduced its military presence in Europe, and its nuclear arsenal, and helped Russia get back its nuclear arsenal from Ukraine. And offered an opportunity to converge with Russia and China in the fight against Islamic jihadism, and possibly to democratization. So with all the wealth Russians and Chinese accumulated they could invest to grow standard of life (education and health care) and freedoms for their people. In other words, they HAD A CHOICE but then they chose to reinforce their authoritarian regime, and to purse power competition fuelled by historical grievances!
- Also the difference between true patriotism and jewish supremacy is arguably misleading. National narratives and religious narratives can lead to war, Europe knows it very well. And secular zionism wasn’t ideologically more prone to support a Palestinian state than Israel today (https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/quot-the-iron-wall-quot). What however I find more plausible is that it would have been easier to deal with secular zionism at the end of the British Mandate, then with non-secular zionism today, given the greater pragmatism of the former and a shorter list of historical grievances against Palestinians back then. On the other side what was the Palestinian endgame? Always very confrontational toward a Israeli state, and expectedly so. We talk about the American failures in the middle-east, how about starting to talk about the Arab and Palestinian failures in the middle east too?
- Last but not least, if all that it takes to end this war and get a permanent peace is just to change ideas and we shouldn’t care about justice just about peace, here is the simplest solution that would grant Palestinians both peace in Palestine AND their nation state AS FAST AS POSSIBLE without Israelis' complaints: CONVERT TO JUDAISM! (And this idea is not even lacking of historical precedents offered by the Jews themselves).

the discussion is expanding and I don’t have enough free time to address long posts right now. — Punshhh

And that's the most compelling argument you could offer, so far.

“Hamas terrorists can surrender completely!”

Yeah, and Likud (deadlier and better funded terrorists) can all resign from office immediately. Sounds equally probable. — Mikie

If it is sounds equally probable that Likud (deadlier and better funded terrorists) continues exterminating Palestinians while Hamas/Palestinians continue not surrendering, then political pressure can be exercised on both sides with equal chance of succeeding or failing. The point is why political pressure should be exercised on the one that is deadlier and better funded more than the other one that has way more too lose in terms of life, means of subsistence and freedoms. Do you have an idea?

When Japan tried to wipe off and sink whole Pacific fleet of the US, invaded the Phillipines (then a colony of the US) and Guam and Aleutian Islands of Alaska are something totally different on scale to a terrorist strike perpetrated by a non-state actor as tiny as Al Qaeda was. So it's a bit strange to say that Roosevelt responded with oversized force. There's no doubt that the US was attacked with the objective of taking it's territory (the Phillipines). The stupidity of this action from the Japanese is really a good question.

Secondly, the atomic bomb was thought as a large bomb and note that more people were killed in the fire bombings of Japanese cities. Only with the Cold War it gained it's reputation. The idea of strategic bombing wasn't purely American, Giulio Douhet had proposed it first in the 1920's and obviously the other countries believed in the concept that taking the battle to the whole enemy country made sense. — ssu

I didn’t mean to suggest that the Japanese attack and the Islamist attack were on the same scale, just that the American nukes more than aiming at destroying military capabilities, strategic infrastructures or decapitating/disrupting the Japanese chain of command, were aimed at demolishing morale in the civilian population and force total surrender. And this solution was welcomed by most Americans back then (and despite the fact that the number of American civilian casualties in the Japanese attack is far lower): In the initial days following the Japanese surrender, the United States public overwhelmingly supported the use of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. A Gallup poll taken in August 1945 found that 85 percent of Americans supported the bombings, 10 percent were opposed to them, and 5 percent had no opinion. (https://ahf.nuclearmuseum.org/ahf/history/debate-over-bomb/). However that choice still remains controversial today and, in any case, it just set the first step of the following path to the future democratisation and economic development of Japan which wasn’t CLEAR back then, nor necessarily doomed to be successful, since the nuclear bombing and humiliation might have reason for collective resentment for generations.

In short, long-term strategies can still be worked out of “empathic responses”: indeed, it’s the empathic element that can ensure a united/greater home support for strategic efforts around the world. — neomac

Yes. Assuming they make sense. Did the reason why the US had it's longest war in Afghanistan make sense? The reason given was that "If the US doesn't occupy Afghanistan, it might possibly become a terrorist safe haven." It was repeated over and over again, but in my view it's even far more crazier than the "Domino Theory" in South-East Asia. — ssu

I’m not sure that this was the plan all along. As anticipated, strategies need to be adapted on the evolving circumstances and so they can fail in the execution phase, as I acknowledged already. But I’ll remind you that at the beginning of the war on terror, there was a wide consensus over it also from countries like Russia, India and China.

2. “War on terror” doesn’t seem to me an example of unclear strategy, even if it ultimately failed. — neomac

How about "War on Blitzkrieg”? — ssu

That’s a cheap criticism. In politics, catchy names and slogans aren’t meant to be explicative but to solicit/nudge popular support.“War on terror” gives the sense of urgency and recalls the 9/11 Jihadist terroristic attacks without explicitly referring to Islam: indeed, an alternative could have been “War on Islamic Jihadism”, if not “Crusade against Islam” (somehow inspired by Huntington’s “Clash of civilizations”). I’m sure they were more clear but not as convenient for propaganda, and not only for “political correctness” concerns (I’ll come back to this at the end).

And then just a reminder about the "War on Terror" thinking, I assume you have seen it, but if not, it is one of the classic interview from general Wesley Clark, which btw. he absolutely hated to be reminded about during the Obama administration

That above isn't a clear strategy. It's the strategy of "We can do now everything we have wanted to do". That is unclear and will lead ultimately to failure, which it did. And actually also why there is indeed a lot to be critical about US policy. — ssu

Or this clip: here is the former secretary of Defense saying on why invading Iraq would be a stupid idea and would end up in a quagmire, which he the later promoted and then pushed through and indeed ended up as a quagmire. — ssu

It is said that prior to invading Iraq, George Bush didn't know the difference between a Sunni or a Shia. — ssu

I’m not sure what one can infer from such anecdotes. I certainly do not:
- expect American Presidents to be smarter than the teams of advisors they rely on, especially for foreign policies and strategic analysis.
- discount the tensions that can often emerge between military advisors and political decision makers. Or between more hawkish and more dovish views among political advisors over long-term strategies. We are seeing this at play also in the Ukrainian war.

But let's think for a while what would the Americans would have thought if Bush had acted just by negotiating the handing over of OBL from the Emirate of Afghanistan (the Taleban), then had FBI and NYPD among other police departments working on the terrorist strikes. Not only would it looked like a weak response, but in fact extremely cold. That's the whole problem here. It's a version of Naomi Klein's "shock doctrine": if you a strike leaves your country in shock, you can do anything you want. — ssu

My understanding is that the wider strategic goal was to counter islamism in the Middle-East always in a hegemonic perspective, not just as a mere punishment of the actual culprits of the 9/11 attack. Bush presented it as a war on terror (“Bush warned Americans that "this crusade, this war on terrorism, is going to take awhile.” https://www.csmonitor.com/2001/0919/p12s2-woeu.html) with the most ambitious aim of exporting democracy in the middle-east and in the interest of the international community (whence the initial consensus from major international actors). Eventually, failed objectives (installing functional democracies and uprooting jihadism) and material/reputational costs of a never-ending war for the US appeared outweighing any actual gains (like eliminating jihadist leaders of al-Qaida, Talibans and Isis) by far. That’s why the whole enterprise looked so ill-conceived. I guess that the degree of overconfident unilateralism plus foreign and sub-national interests ended up hijacking and wasting efforts: foreign interests as Russians and Turks which fought the terrorists that they didn’t like (like Kurds and Isis) and sub-national interests as in the pro-Israel lobby (among others) which pushed for a fight against pro-Palestinian jihadism. Indeed, if one looks at the gains, the American strategy (after 9/11 attack) looks more similar to Israeli fight against Hamas than the other way around, and not by accident, I guess. Killing Saddam Hussain, Bin laden, Al-Qaeda were all supporters of the Palestinian cause. Most importantly Syria and Iran were and they still are potential targets in that logic. So surrounding Iran by installing a pro-American regime in Afghanistan and giving some leeway to ISIS as an anti-Iranian and anti-Syrian jihadism (more than pro-Palestinian jihadism) in the middle-east might have been instrumental to the Israeli cause. And this in turn triggered the reaction of Iran which allied with Russia in the fight against ISIS (while possibly helping Al-Qaida), and messed up with the American objectives in Afghanistan by officially supporting the Americans against the Taliban terrorists but covertly supporting them too against the Americans, or by supporting a pro-Iranian “democracy” in Iraq.
That’s why I’m talking about failed implementation of geopolitical objectives of strategic importance. Ideally it was one international game to be played against Islamic jihadism. But then it ended up being many regional double/triple-games being played by major international players.
Anyways, I think we are talking past each others, since when talking about strategy I have in mind wider geopolitical objectives that guide specific foreign policies, not about specific foreign policies.

I realize you don't speak for Israel, but if that's the price to pay to save the children, while I personally might be willing to pay it, is that not a brutal ransom to exact? Palestinians, in your own words, must surrender totally and unconditionally to Israel to save the children?

As I've said before, all judgement aside, there are functional ways to approach this tragedy and there are dysfunctional ways. Hamas can be the monsters that they appear to be, and still, that doesn't mean the ransom you offered would be helpful, let alone justified.

Don't you think? — ENOAH

To get a better understanding of my views, maybe those questions are not the best starting point. Certainly, I do not speak for Israel in the sense that I have no interest to push their propaganda in this forum. Yet my understanding of the geopolitical stakes in the Middle-East support enough my belief that the Israeli cause can serve Western interest in the region more than the Palestinian cause. Said that, my posts mainly focus on my and other people's understanding of the conflict, more than marketing one policy or another to solve the conflict.
Those questions are meant to "stress-test" pro-Palestinian views, in the first place. But also to remind people that there are options and choices, also on the Palestinian side, to cope with their predicament now, as they used to have before ending up in such predicament. "Surrendering" and "fleeing from Palestine" are/were options. Only a certain way of framing the issue compels Palestinians and their supporters to exclude such options. And they are not necessarily the same. These ways of framing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict constitute their most basic understanding of that conflict, so I find philosophically interesting to make them explicit and question them.

The US didn't go invading countries. When it got to wars (South Korea, South Vietnam), there was actually a country that had been attacked. And obviously it was then as uncertain as now, but this thinking that what would your actions make others respond was thought. This lead after the Cold War ended the US to form a coalition with multiple Arab states, even Syria, to oust Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait and get the green light from the UK and from the Soviet Union.

And that then simply went to their head and diplomacy was forgotten.

Hence after 9/11 the "empathetic response" of 19 terrorists attacking the US, hence we have to invade a landlocked country on another continent because the financier of the 19 terrorists there, didn't have any kind of thinking of this kind behind it. — ssu

I’d question your points on 2 grounds:
1. When the US got attacked by the Japs in WW2, the US nuked the Japs twice, as soon as nukes were ready. Is this an "emotional response” or a first necessary step of a “clear strategic” path for Japs to democracy, peace and prosperity for Japan in the next half century which American politicians/diplomats conceived? I couldn’t find compelling evidence of the latter. Of course, the US has less of an “emotional response” when conflicts do not concern them directly but other countries. In short, long-term strategies can still be worked out of “emotional responses”: indeed, it’s the emotional element that can ensure a united/greater home support for strategic efforts around the world.
2. “War on terror” doesn’t seem to me an example of unclear strategy, even if it ultimately failed. Indeed, in a unipolar period the US got (over?)confident in finding unilateral solutions: like pulling jihadists to fight their wars in their homelands and overturn regimes which weren’t complacent to the US. This mixed with the idea of exporting democracy (like it happened in Europe and in the Pacific) while spinning the propaganda of a Western world (also with the possible support of Russians and Chinese) against Islamist Jihadism wasn’t that unclear to me.
Yet, long-term strategies can fail in many ways during execution because strategies are not infallible recipes. Maybe one can think better strategies or better ways to implement them in the hindsight, yet politicians do not have the chance to test different long-term solutions before picking the best one. They are compelled to follow a certain path under lots of national and international pressure, and despite all the unknowns.

Same thing has now happened with Israel, because so many civilians were killed on October 7th. Anticipation of what could or would neighboring Arab countries (plus Iran or Turkey) doesn't matter. What the long term solution here and how does Israel get there doesn't matter. Destroy Hamas! Let's see what to do after that. — ssu

I disagree for the reasons provided before and in the previous post. The “emotional response” refers to home support for Netanyahu's retaliation against Hamas in Gaza but this also serves the strategic path of making a Palestinian state solution impossible, in line with the Zionist project and consistently pursued by Netanyahu in his political carrier. Hamas aggression has given to Netanyahu the green light to at least turn Gaza into something like the West Bank.
And there are also national and international circumstances that can compel Netanyahu to pursue on this war path: postpone the bitter end of his controversial political carrier (at risk of jail and universal condemnation), the American hegemony challenged from inside and outside which could make their support weaker and more unreliable in a world that is getting more dangerous. What, I guess, remains an imperative within this strategy (even beyond Netanyahu) is also to contain Iran by pulling Saudis, Russians, Americans at convenience, preferably in its neighborhood. That part is predictably lesser clear though.

There are still people alive who were uprooted in the Nakba, many and their descendants still live in refugee camps. — Punshhh

Sure, they are not the only ones to live in refugee camps. And it is reported that they aren’t even listed in the five largest refugee camps in the World:
https://www.unrefugees.org/news/inside-the-worlds-five-largest-refugee-camps/

Living in refugee camps must be an awful predicament. Even having a cancer must be awful. So what?

Anyway, I think you’re splitting hairs a bit here — Punshhh

.

As I said, I’m interested in conceptual analysis, so if I can’t split hairs here, in a philosophy forum, where else can I? Besides I find it a worthy exercise as long as it helps better understand things.

I’m not sure what you mean by “moral case”, if you want to argue for a moral right to land, go ahead, I’m all ears. I limited myself to question a LEGAL right of Palestinians/Israelis over such disputed lands prior to the end of the British mandate.

I don’t think one can separate the moral case, or cause, from the legal case. — Punshhh

Well, I just did. A legal system requires at least codified rules (like the Nazis laws against the Jews or the Apartheid laws in South Africa or laws to regulate traffic) and a central authority to enforce them (like with concentration camps where Jewish adults and kids can be exterminated, or places to stone to death adulterous women according to sharia laws). Some laws can be morally motivated by humanitarian concerns to some extent, but not all of them. Still they are laws.
You do not seem able to provide a compelling argument for why it wouldn’t possible to separate moral case from a legal case. Making claims is cheap, providing compelling reasons to support them is tougher, but sometimes rewarding too.

I doubt that a Palestinian would seek to separate them. — Punshhh

Palestinians want their land to be theirs not because they are human, but because they are Palestinians and refuse to be removed from lands they have been occupying for generations by foreign powers. So Palestinians are fighting to gain sovereignty over a certain territory and demand to the international community to acknowledge their nation-state status. This doesn’t need to be framed in human rights terms, not even for the international law:
As a principle of international law the right of self-determination recognized in the 1960s concerns the colonial context of territories right to independence or another outcome of decolonization. The principle does not state how the decision is to be made, nor what the outcome should be, whether it be independence, federation, protection, some form of autonomy or full assimilation. The internationally recognized right of self-determination does not include a right to an independent state for every ethnic group within a former colonial territory.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-determination

Without wanting to sound Woke, I would think there is a human rights issue here as well. There is an overwhelming case for grievance with the Palestinians. Something which many Israeli’s seem blind to. — Punshhh

Sure, I get why anybody who reasons in terms of human rights can see a human rights issue in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict when civilians and kids get killed/bombed and deprived of the means of subsistence. I’m simply arguing that what one can see as human rights issue is not necessarily what Palestinians or Israelis see happening. Indeed, even Palestinians can be very much blind to an overwhelming case for grievance with the Israelis. And neither party seems compelled to frame their grievance in human rights terms as you understand them. You may WISH to have Israelis/Palestinians persuaded about your human rights framework and deal with their Nation-state demands accordingly, or you may WISH to have human rights framework imposed over Israelis/Palestinians and deal with their Nation-state demands accordingly. Either are things you may certainly WISH. That doesn’t mean that your wishes correspond to what Israelis/Palestinians wish for themselves nor that your wishes can be satisfied now or ever.

Merely in the sense that it is an on/off lever, with little more control than that — Punshhh

.

No idea what point you are trying to make with this vague statement, nor if it is an objection to anything I said about your views or mine.

My humanitarian standards in this discussion may appear to be one sided. So is the level of aggression in the conflict and the regard to person and property. — Punshhh

Meaning? If the amount of killed Jewish civilians and kids, and deprivation in terms of means of subsistence as a result of foreign aggression was equally high on both sides, would this be less of a humanitarian issue to you?
As far as I’m concerned, IDENTITARIAN views are expected to be one sided precisely because they are identitarian. Instead UNIVERSAL human rights views are expected NOT to be one sided precisely because they are universal. So, there is no conceptual issue with one sided level of aggression in the conflict and the regard to person and property if Israel reasons in identitarian terms. While there is a conceptual issue if one applies UNIVERSAL human rights views only on Israel but not on Hamas.

you are hammering a nail with a geopolitical hammer. — Punshhh

And for a compelling reason, since the geopolitical approach is very much about understanding how history and geography shape the security concerns of people around the world from their perspective, and means to deal with them. This approach is more enlightening and intellectually honest than just applying one’s preconceived notions on human conflicts concerning others, especially if others are the main ones to suffer the severe consequences of such conflicts.

I doubt that many among us have the background knowledge of the political situation in the wider region to do more than broad brush predictions and generalisations. — Punshhh

So what? Anybody can still try to understand things better than he/she used to, also by discussing with other people as it happens in this forum. And by “understanding things better”, I do not necessarily mean to know more about a subject. To get a sense of one’s own understanding limits about a subject is already a valuable achievement.

Besides I’m not playing any geopolitical chess. I’m just an anonymous nobody participating to a philosophy forum for personal intellectual entertainment. Others are free to ignore me, if not interested or bothered by what I write.

12000 children killed, and counting. Probably an underestimate. — Mikie

So you agree with me that Hamas and Palestinians could surrender totally and unconditionally to Israel in exchange for peace?
How many children are YOU willing to sacrifice in support for Hamas' or the Palestinian cause?
Would you yourself sacrifice your own children and all the people you love to support a fight against a despicable foreign regime which has the means to wipe your country out if you do not surrender totally and unconditionally?

And when someone will counter and argue saying that destroying Hamas is a clear strategy, well, so was fighting Al-Qaeda and the War On Terror a 'clear strategy' to many at the time. Just go to Afghanistan and destroy Al-Qaeda and the Taliban! What could have been more clear? — ssu

I’m not sure how clear strategies can be even conceived in a period of international uncertainties and power balance shifts. In the absence of a clearer strategy, maybe one can simply try to gain time and prepare for the worse.

So it’s a tutorial now is it? — Punshhh

That’s how I enjoy engaging in discussions in this philosophy forum.
Others can ignore me, if not interested or bothered.

Unless you are going to explain why the Nakba and subsequent Apartheid state is not the primary cause of the current conflict? So why should I answer that question? — Punshhh

First, soliciting me now to provide an explanation to you before you feel compelled to answer my questions sounds pretty unfair since I was the one to solicit you first.
Second, the questions you didn’t answer were very much meant to undermine the idea of “a primary cause” of the current conflict. Besides, as anticipated, I find also causal language at risk of conceptual confusion.

To answer your question, as far as I’m concerned, “Nakba” is a historical trauma at the core of Palestinian nationalism, as much as “the Holocaust” is at the core of Zionism. Both parties can push narratives grounded on such events to boost identitarian social cohesion and guide/justify political action. So both narratives can explain to some extant the actual choices of both communities. But they are only part of the picture of the political tensions we see in the middle east and, even, within of each community. In other words, there is NO PRIMARY CAUSE OF THE CONFLICT, but reasons for political choices of palestinians/israelis’ decision makers, and related popular support to engage in a conflict, and for other players to get involved in such conflict. The meaning of such conflict doesn’t depend exclusively on a single reason of one player, but on all pertinent reasons of all players plus all circumstances that enable players’ actions and struggles.

Also are you arguing now that the people living on the land who were displaced during the Nakba should have, or had, no moral case for grievance now? — Punshhh

I’m not sure what you mean by “moral case”, if you want to argue for a moral right to land, go ahead, I’m all ears. I limited myself to question a LEGAL right of Palestinians/Israelis over such disputed lands prior to the end of the British mandate. As far as I’m concerned, Palestinians may have reasons for grievance which I can empathise with and which may be worth to struggle for. The same I would say about the Israelis. How good are such reasons, though? That’s open for debate and if things can’t be fixed diplomatically between Palestinians and Israelis, then both Palestinians and Israelis may resort to violence to work it out. I may not like it or even want it to be over for whatever reason but that’s not necessarily a more legitimate reason than theirs to fight their war as brutally as they deem necessary.

Another counterfactual. Why are you sure? Jews fled from their land ALSO because of the Arab/Muslism colonization and oppression. Arab/Muslism still today massacre civilians belonging to other Christian and Arab/Muslim communities.

It’s a comment on the inhumanity of the British imperialists. — Punshhh

I’m more interested to understand the reasons of the war in the middle east for main involved players. Since you didn’t offer compelling reasons to expect British imperial rulers to be enough more humane than the Ottoman, the Muslim, the Byzantine, the Roman empires wrt your humanitarian standards, the fact that the British imperialists were inhumane toward the Palestinians sounds as arbitrary in terms of explanatory power as claiming that the British imperialists didn’t act in muslim manners toward the Palestinians.
More in general, I find the task of judging actions and responsibilities based on a priori universal humanitarian principles more myopic than enlightening, and more intellectually dishonest than emotionally sincere.

My point was and is that the geopolitical players are playing a game of geopolitical chess alongside the conflict in Israel and Palestine. They are not playing a game of chess in amongst the conflict. — “Punshhh

Not sure what point you are trying to make with these different prepositions. My point is that in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict there are other players (not bystanders) indirectly involved, which both Israelis and Palestinians very much have to take into account for their strategic decisions. So the aggression of October 7th can NOT be best understood as an emotional reaction by Hamas for something that Israel previously did INDEPENDENTLY FROM reliance on foreign sponsors’ support or considering international repercussions. So the game that is being played alongside the conflict influences very much the game that is played in amongst the conflict.

There are backers of the two sides as you say, but they merely turn on, or off, the tap of arms/money supply, or turn the dial of urging restraint, or allowing unrestrained activity. — “Punshhh

Why “merely” ? “ Tap of arms/money supply” (along with planning and preparation) are enabler so “necessary conditions” of the aggression of October 7th to be the way it is. Besides, as I argued, it is rather implausible that Hamas doesn’t strategise by taking into account foreign sponsors’ reaction (if not even advise or instruction) and international repercussions. Or that international repercussions and incentives do not shape Israel’s security concerns in general and military response to this massacre in particular. So, as I concluded, the massacre of October 7th can’t be best understood in isolation from the wider geopolitical context: indeed, it’s in the geopolitical context that one can find many relevant reasons and conditions for this massacre to happen the way it did.
“Merely” in your quote sounds appropriate only if one wants to look at the massacre of October 7th MERELY as a function of Hamas’s perception of Israeli abuses in the past two years while abstracting from other factors. Why would one want to do that?

Even if you wish to claim that Hamas was ONLY or MAINLY motivated to punish ILLEGITIMATE provocations by Israel in the past two years, independently from other geopolitical considerations, and that’s enough for you to blame Israel for the massacre of October 7th, sill I find such claim problematic:
First, it clouds one’s understanding of the conflict as it is dealt with by people who put their skin in it (and without such an understanding we can hardly claim to know if or how this conflict can be fixed). Indeed, what is the standard for legitimacy here? Hamas’s standards or your humanitarian standards? If it’s Hamas who is reacting to Israeli perceived abuses, then it’s Hamas’s standards not your humanitarian standards that would explain its reaction.
Second, Hamas’s motivations for October 7th can NOT be reduced to a retaliation after 2 years of perceived abuses. For two reasons: 1. Hamas’s moves are MAINLY IDEOLOGICALLY DRIVEN, they want to put the entire Palestine under Islamic rule (secular nationalism may survive in Palestinians and support Hamas, yet Hamas doesn't seem unequivocally bound to the nation-state cause of the Palestinians), so the massacre of October 7th is not a mere punitive reaction to two years of perceived abuses or the apartheid condition of the Palestinians, but a step instrumental to the restoration of the Islamic rule in Palestine (in an interview related to such massacre, Ghazi Hamad, a member of Hamas’s political bureau, said about Israel “Israel is a country that has no place on our land” “We must remove that country because it constitutes a security, military and political catastrophe to the Arab and Islamic nations” https://www.timesofisrael.com/hamas-official-says-group-aims-to-repeat-oct-7-onslaught-many-times-to-destroy-israel/#:~:text=A%20senior%20member%20of%20Hamas,future%20until%20Israel%20is%20exterminated). 2. Hamas’s moves look very much STRATEGICALLY CALCULATED, namely they are shaped by expectations over other relevant players' reactions (Khalil al-Hayya, a senior member of Hamas, said the action was necessary to "change the entire equation and not just have a clash... We succeeded in putting the Palestinian issue back on the table, and now no one in the region is experiencing calm.” https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/08/world/middleeast/hamas-israel-gaza-war.html) as well as by the need to maximise political effects, so not just to punish Israel (e.g. the liberation of Palestinian prisoners and combatants through exchange of captives, inducing a brutal reaction from Israel so to stir outrage in the Arab world, hinder the normalisation between Israelis and Saudis, or alienate international community sensitive to humanitarian concerns or to anti-Colonialist/anti-Western narratives, etc.).
Third, if you frame Hamas’s actions as a reaction to prior Israelis’ actions, one can also frame Israelis’ actions as a reaction to prior Hamas/Palestinians’ actions. For example, it is reported that the attack of October the 7th (named “Operation al-Aqsa Flood”) was a response to the police storming to Al Aqsa mosque during Ramadan
(https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/26/who-are-qassam-armed-resistance-in-gaza, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-secretive-hamas-commander-masterminded-attack-israel-2023-10-10/). The problem is that the Israeli police REACTED to a barricade by Palestinians to prevent Jews from accessing the Jewish Temple Mount during Jewish Passover, being the Temple Mount and al-Aqsa Mosque located in the same compound (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_Al-Aqsa_clashes#Incident). Notice that the Temple Mount is the holiest and most archaic place of Judaism (King Solomon is claimed to have built there the First Temple something like 1500 years before the colonisation and islamisation of the area by the Arabs ), while Al-Aqsa Mosque is only the third holiest place for Islam. Yet Muslims are more free to access and prey in that compound than Jews and Christians despite the Israeli police presiding over the compound for its security.
Fourth, your humanitarian standards seem also unfairly applied: why should Israel comply to your humanitarian standards, while Hamas shouldn’t? Is it because Israel looks much stronger so it has to apply greater restraint than Hamas? Would you think that independently from whatever the consequences are?

Nor that Palestinians, if given self determination would follow suit. — ENOAH

And yet
Islamism in the Gaza Strip
Islamism in the Gaza Strip involves efforts to promote and impose Islamic laws and traditions in the Gaza Strip. The influence of Islamic groups in the Gaza Strip has grown since the 1980s. Following Hamas' victory in the 2006 Palestinian elections and a conflict with supporters of the rival Fatah party, Hamas took complete control of the Gaza Strip,[1][2][3] and declared the "end of secularism and heresy in the Gaza Strip".[4] For the first time since the Sudanese coup of 1989 that brought Omar al-Bashir to power, a Muslim Brotherhood group rules a significant geographic territory.[5] Gaza human-rights groups accuse Hamas of restricting many freedoms.[2]

Ismael Haniyeh officially denied[when?] accusations that Hamas intended to establish an Islamic emirate.[5] However, Jonathan Schanzer wrote that in two years following the 2007 coup, the Gaza Strip had exhibited the characteristics of Talibanization,[5] a process whereby the Hamas government had imposed strict rules on women, discouraged activities commonly associated with Western culture, oppressed non-Muslim minorities, imposed sharia law, and deployed religious police to enforce these laws.[5]

According to a Human Rights Watch researcher, the Hamas-controlled government of Gaza stepped up its efforts to "Islamize" Gaza in 2010, efforts that included the "repression" of civil society and "severe violations of personal freedom".[6] Israeli journalist Khaled Abu Toameh wrote in 2009 that "Hamas is gradually turning the Gaza Strip into a Taliban-style Islamic entity".[7] According to Mkhaimar Abusada, a political-science professor at Gaza's Al-Azhar University, "Ruling by itself, Hamas can stamp its ideas on everyone (...) Islamizing society has always been part of Hamas strategy."[8]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamism_in_the_Gaza_Strip

Millions of Evangelical votes? Do you have any compelling evidence that millions of Evangelicals would vote for Biden, if only Biden let Netanyahu do whatever he wants in Gaza? — neomac

Naturally most of the vote for Trump, of course, but notice that the Israeli lobby is so powerful in both parties. And isn't Bibi just waiting for Trump to arrive?

And it's going to be even worse when Israel attacks Lebanon. — ssu

I never discounted the pro-Israeli lobby. The point however is that the opposition to the pro-Israeli lobby (roughly, Evangelicals + Jewish lobby) is growing in potential votes and donations [1], and it could grow even further if Israel attacks Lebanon. So the power of, at least, the pro-democratic Jewish lobby over Biden, may not suffice to motivate Biden to support Israel unconditionally. On the other side, Iranian proxies in the middle-east and Russia in Ukraine keep challenging the US so the US needs to contain them without overstretching. That's why I think Biden's attitude toward Israel in its current predicament may very much be conditional on his understanding of how Israel can serve the American strategic interests in the middle east, before and after the elections.


[1]
Progressive Democrats break fundraising records in election fight against pro-Israel PACs
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/progressive-democrats-break-fundraising-records-in-election-fight-against-pro-israel-pacs

Why Many Blacks Turn on Biden Over Palestine - International Viewpoint
https://internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article8392

Half of US adults say Israel has gone too far in war in Gaza, AP-NORC poll shows
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/jan/24/americans-believe-israel-committing-genocide-poll

Until there's a "problem" with their psyche and it's suggested such a thing is inherent to such a group, which is what was being discussed. — Benkei

Dude, I see you can't answer very simple questions. But since you enjoy embarrassing yourself, I'll absolutely enjoy giving you another chance.
The meaning of "psyche" doesn't imply any reference to "race", but magically "psyche of group" does, why? "Psyche" is inherent to one individual human being as it is inherent to groups of individuals equipped with psyche. And if individual human beings can have psychological problems because of biographical traumas, there is no reason why we should not also talk about psychological traumas of groups like the Jewish community who has suffered historical traumas [1]. We can talk about problems of collective psychological traumas without having any racist intention explicit or implicit, and we can have psychological traumas because we have a psyche, a psyche with problems, individually or collectively.
Your dumb argument depends on your convenient claim "it's suggested" that apparently doesn't require evidence to support it other than what looks to you (you didn't ask Punsh what she meant, did you?), and on your catastrophic confusion between "inherent to a group of individuals" and "inherent to the race of a group of individuals", or "psyche of a group" and "psyche of a racial group".

Everybody can consider themselves warned without resorting to dumb questions trying to figure out what is and isn't permitted here. — Benkei

At your place I would suppress that embarrassing post of yours, Holy Benkei, and say sorry for pointlessly threatening us. It's for your own credibility as a wise moderator, you know.

[1]
https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/2023-12-10/ty-article-opinion/.premium/how-the-nakba-has-eclipsed-the-holocaust-in-u-s-media-since-october-7/0000018c-5328-db23-ad9f-7bf8c3be0000
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9893309/
https://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2010/09/holocaust-survivors