Why would I care in the slightest about your assessment of the Cowen article? If I want an economist's critique, I'll ask an economist, not some nobody on an internet chat forum. You're not qualified to say to what extent Cowen's conclusions are reasonable. — Isaac

Why would I care in the slightest about your assessment of my of assessment of the Cowen article? You cited Tyler Cowen to support your claim. You assessed an expert source as good enough to support your claim or question mine, even though you are no expert. Now I'm claiming you are wrong also based on the source you yourself cited.
Your questioning my expertise is unjustified. If you have teeth issues you go to a dentist not to a gynecologist, I suppose. Why is that? Because you are supposedly enough well educated to distinguish a gynecologist from a dentist, even though you can hardly be called an expert on any such matters or even an expert at distinguishing gynecologists from dentists, right? And if you are not enough educated, you can still learn these kinds of assessments from other educated people who are not experts either.
The article main point is focused on policies and the conviction that Marshall Plan’s related keynesian recommendations weren’t effective (liberist, pro-free market policies were!). It’s not focused on the contribution of the private sector to the Italian reconstruction with the money of the Marshall plan at all! But that's what's relevant for my objection to you, and what's should be relevant for you to counter it.
To distinguish the scope of my studies wrt Tyler Cowen’s article, and related main findings one doesn’t need to be an expert. It must be educated enough and read it carefully.

I made a point about post war reconstruction being always an opportunity for profiteering, you said that wasn't true because of the Marshal plan. — Isaac

I didn’t claim anywhere that the Marshall Plan was everywhere a success, my exact words were: “If your claim - more charitably understood - refers only to corporate contributions to reconstruction as such, then one must take into account the Marshall Plan after WW2”.

To maintain that critique you have to show that it is not possible that it's true - ie that no experts think that. — Isaac

If you want to start claiming my position is actually wrong, or untenable, then we have an asymmetric argument. To support my position I only need to show it's plausible. To support yours you need to show mine is actually impossible. — Isaac

These are false alternatives. One could simply argue that his position is more plausible than yours. That’s what I’m doing.

Strange answers to very straightforward questions. — creativesoul

Here is a more straightforward answer: we all learnt to report S’belief at t1 based on what S says at t1. That’s the practice. Now you claim that we should revise this practice because it doesn’t make sense to you for whatever reason and therefore we should attribute S’belief at t1 what S or we know at t2 about S's belief at t1. In conclusion, your belief attribution method is based on knowledge attribution. I find incoherent this conclusion because knowledge presupposes belief, so the workflow must logically start with determining belief first, and then knowledge.

I was hopeful that there was a bridge when you mentioned "perceptual beliefs", but that notion turned out to be rather empty it seems. All belief is existentially dependent upon physiological sensory perception(biological machinery), including those that are arrived at in the 'other' ways you mentioned. Thus, I found that rather unhelpful for adding any clarity. — creativesoul

It depends on what you want to clarify. I wanted to clarify the notion of justification. So to me the notion of justification applies differently based on the genesis of a given belief.

I have the impression that you forgot who I am. I reviewed at length your approach a while ago and I also addressed the kind of questions you are asking now. We practically disagreed on everything.

If we are going to go with what the farmer would say, upon what grounds are we claiming that the best time to do that(to go with what the farmer says) is when the farmer is wrong about their own belief, rather than when they become aware that they had once believed that a piece of cloth was a cow(rather than go with what the farmer would say when they're right about what they saw and what they believed about what they saw)? — creativesoul

Briefly, when belief-attribution is incoherently based on knowledge-attribution, the other inconvenient is that one should update belief attribution every time there is knowledge update. The other inconvenient is that if X and Y disagree on what constitute knowledge but they agreed on what S believes according to the current belief-attribution method, yet they would report S's beliefs differently according to your belief-attribution method, multiplying the beliefs S has and probably failing to even understand each other.

Yet what you've provided is evidence that some people think "it was not just a corporate opportunity to "screw everyone", because to some extent and in some cases it succeeded". I already knew that. — Isaac

Not just some people. Some experts and that's not all. Probably you missed a couple of things about the expert you cite, Tyler Cowen (as much as you did about Mearsheimer). His article “The Marshall Plan: myths and realities” is a critical view of the Marshall Plan from a liberal (if not Neo-liberal) and anti-keynesian point of view and the conclusion is that the right liberal free market policies and not central planning policies recommended by the US were the main factors to boost growth [1]. So the first fun fact is that while you were insinuating my neo-liberal fundamentalism ("Unless you're fresh out of high school or you've been raised in cult of fundamentalist neo-liberals") yet you cited an expert whose views about the Marshall Plan (or in general [2]?) are more in line with neo-liberal views then mine. In other words, he would credit the post-war growth to the properly freed market forces than to the central planning that the Marshall Plan implied!
The other issue is that Tyler Cowen’s article doesn't offer any in depth study of how the Marshall plan worked in the case of Italy[3] (like these studies did: https://books.openedition.org/igpde/14777 [4] , http://www.giorcellimichela.com/uploads/8/3/7/0/83709646/marshall_plan_draft.pdf [5]), especially wrt the role of private corporations which is relevant for my objection to your idea of post-war reconstruction as "corporate opportunity to 'screw everyone'". Besides, in his closing remarks, while praising the role of good free market policies vs keynesian central planning, Tyler Cowen added: “In most cases, this phenomenon was encouraged by European leaders themselves, such as West Germany's Ludwig Erhard and Italy's Luigi Einaudi, rather than by outsiders.” Yet the fun fact is that Luigi Einaudi himself argued in a long interview: “The Marshall Plan is indispensable for the recovery of the Italian economy” [6]


[1]
U.S. advisors urged Italy to undertake a coordinated public investment program and extensive Keynesian aggregate demand management policies. In 1949-1950, American officials finished a study of the Italian economy without mentioning stringent migration controls across municipalities and rent controls, perhaps Italy's two worst pieces of economic legislation. Once again, the recommendations involved Keynesian macroeconomic poilicies

Policy makers and aid proponents should no longer view the Marshall Plan as an unqualified success. At best, its effects on postwar Europe were -mixed, while its impact on the American economy was negative. The basic problem with foreign aid is that economic growth is not a creature of central planning and direction. Growth is the result of individual initiative and enterprise within a sound legal and economic framework. Government can only supply the framework. Anything more will result in the well-known problems of central or socialist planning: the impossibility of rational economic calculation, the creation of perverse incentives, and the stifling of entrepreneurial initiative, among others. Foreign aid programs always will be plagued by such problems.

In most cases, and certainly in the case of the Marshall Plan, the government-to-government character of foreign aid encourages statism and central planning, not free enterprise. The best way to promote free markets in other countries is to allow their businesses to trade with the U.S. without government interference. This freedom of trade includes not only exporting and importing, but also lending, borrowing, and labor emigration and immigration.

[2]
Israel still has some problems with living standards and income inequality, but it is a classic case of neoliberalism — at least in the economic sphere — mostly working out as planned.
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-06-06/israel-s-economy-shows-that-classical-economic-theory-still-works?leadSource=uverify%20wall


[3]
Italy, moreover, seemed to be seeking market solutions for some of its economic problems but was actively hindered by ECA administrators. The Americans in charge of the ECA in Italy continually were expressing concern about the Italian governments's "excessive" attention to balanc-ing budgets and controlling monetary expansion. U.S. advisors urged Italy to undertake a coordinated public investment program and extensive Keynesian aggregate demand management policies. In 1949-1950, American officials finished a study of the Italian economy without mentioning stringent migration controls across municipalities and rent controls, perhaps Italy's two worst pieces of economic legislation. Once again, the recommendations involved Keynesian macroeconomic policies.

[4]

A provisional conclusion on the impact of the Marshall Plan, therefore, must be that :
- it made a significant contribution to the investment effort of the Italian steel industry in the Reconstruction ;
- it allowed Cornigliano to become the leading firm in the market for thin flat products, thereby establishing the newly formed alliance between Fiat and Finsider at the forefront of Italian manufacturing industry ;
- it allowed many small private producers to reequip themselves and thus participate in the rapid growth of electric steel taking place during the Fifties. The Sinigaglia Plan, therefore, attained only partial success in reorganizing the industry, which also meant that the feud between State-owned and private firms dragged on.


[5]

In this paper, we have examined the effect of the Marshall Plan on the Italian postwar economy. The modernization of transportation systems was associated with (i) an increase in agricultural production despite a decrease in the number of agricultural workers, (ii) more widespread adoption of modern agricultural machines, and (iii) an expansion of the industrial and service sectors . These findings indicate that, in addition to influencing Italian institutions, the Marshall Plan had beneficial effects on local economic development. Within each Italian macro-region, the amount of ERP reconstruction grant money had a profound impact on the economic growth of otherwise similar nearby provinces.


[6] https://loccidentale.it/il-piano-marshall-indispensabile-al-risanamento-delleconomia-italiana/

you'll know full well that a wide range of solutions have been proposed which are neither government controlled nor corporate profit engines. — Isaac

Like what? Name a couple of these solutions.

Your claim was that the Marshall plan countered my position. To do that it would have to have been a) constituted of corporate reconstruction contracts, and b) an unquestioned success. It was neither. — Isaac

Well the original idea I was addressing was about post-war reconstruction as "corporate opportunity to screw everyone". To question it, it's enough to prove that the post-war reconstruction supported by the Marshall plan was not just a corporate opportunity to "screw everyone", because to some extent and in some cases it succeeded. Besides I do not understand what is so specific about "corporate reconstruction contracts" that can not be applied to the Marshall Plan, since grants and loans in the end trickled down to the private enterprises involved in the national reconstruction. For example, this article (https://worldcrunch.com/business-finance/-2657196800) talks about "Rebuilding Ukraine" with something like a Marshall Plan. Among the examples of Marshall Plan success that were cited there was this one:
The Italian economic miracle was notable for such features:
• restored monopoly: monopoly companies (Fiat, Edison, Montecatini etc.) had priority in receiving loans and financial aid under the Marshall plan, which led to the capture of foreign markets by Italian monopolies and an increase in industrial production;
• the agrarian reform of 1950-1955: the redemption of land allotments with an area of more than 100 hectares by the state and their further sale to citizens in installments;
• Italian supply of materials for the production of U.S. military equipment during the Korean War (1950–1953).
Result: Italy had fully recovered from the war by the early 1950s, and industrial production tripled between 1953 and 1962. However, in the late 1960s, the monopolization of the economy led to corruption and inequalities in the development of individual regions of Italy.
(where Fiat, Edison, Montecatini are big private corporations)

The Marshall Plan was a US government loan instrument. — Isaac

More grants than loans.

It was not a corporate reconstruction contract, which is what I was referring to with Bayer. — Isaac

You mean it was centrally planned? Yet the private sector was significantly involved, e.g.: Also established were counterpart funds, which used Marshall Plan aid to establish funds in the local currency. According to ECA rules, recipients had to invest 60% of these funds in industry. This was prominent in Germany, where these government-administered funds played a crucial role in lending money to private enterprises which would spend the money rebuilding. These funds played a central role in the reindustrialization of Germany. In 1949–50, for instance, 40% of the investment in the German coal industry was by these funds. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marshall_Plan#Implementation)
Washington’s official commitment to Europe also encouraged American private industry. Some of the big corporations had investments and production facilities in Europe whose expansion and modernization they were now more prepared to consider. Other firms, with a strong dollar in their hands, similarly contemplated attractive participations in European companies that were looking for American technology, new production techniques, work organization, management, and
marketing. (https://www.learneurope.eu/files/8113/7509/5720/Plan_Marshall._Lecciones_aprendidas_s_XXI.pdf)

BTW, and more in general, if both central planning and corporation initiative are always a way to screw people, what's left for you to hope for?

A congressional report on the plan later concluded that

It is, for example, difficult to demonstrate that ERP aid was directly responsible for the increase in production and other quantitative achievements ... assistance was never more than 5% of the GNP of recipient nations and therefore could have little effect. — Isaac

That's reported in the section dedicated to "Critiques of the Marshall Plan" which are all taken into account. But the real conclusion is significantly different:
Accomplishments. While, in some cases, a direct connection can be drawn between American assistance and a positive outcome, for the most part, the Marshall Plan may be viewed best as a stimulus that set off a chain of events leading to a range of accomplishments. At the completion of the Marshall Plan period, European agricultural and industrial production were markedly higher, the balance of trade and related "dollar gap" much improved, and significant steps had been taken toward trade liberalization and economic integration. Historians cite the impact of the Marshall Plan on the political development of some European countries and on U.S.-Europe relations. European Recovery Program assistance is said to have contributed to more positive morale in Europe and to political and economic stability, which helped diminish the strength of domestic communist parties. The U.S. political and economic role in Europe was enhanced and U.S. trade with Europe boosted.

So, even if we shouldn't overestimate the immediate and direct economic impact of the Marshall Plan, there isn't enough to support the idea that the Marshall Plan was just a "corporate opportunity to screw everyone" either.

You could throw in the whole of Europe after WW2. — Olivier5

Indeed, I took just the most notable examples to me.

Hence: "It looks like a tautological claim. On a charitable reading" — neomac
What? — Isaac

You wrote: "War -> reconstruction requirements -> corporate opportunity to screw everyone"
Now if your claim - non-charitably understood - refers only to corporate contributions to reconstruction that, as you would say, "screwed everyone", then claiming "I can't think of a single example from history where that's gone well for the inhabitants" is practically a tautology: there is no corporation that didn't "screw everyone" in a set of corporations that were selected precisely because their contribution "screwed everyone", obviously.
If your claim - more charitably understood - refers only to corporate contributions to reconstruction as such, then one must take into account the Marshall Plan after WW2. Not surprisingly, Chomsky commented (in "The Umbrella of U.S. Power"): “the generosity was largely bestowed by American taxpayers upon the corporate sector, which was duly appreciative, recognizing years later that the Marshall Plan “set the stage for large amounts of private U.S. direct investment in Europe,” establishing the basis for the modern Transnational Corporations, which “prospered and expanded on overseas orders,... fueled initially by the dollars of the Marshall Plan” and protected from “negative “developments” by “the umbrella of American power.” (The former citation comes from the U.S. Commerce Department in 1984, the latter from a "Business Week" article, in 1975).

Hence: "It looks like a tautological claim. On a charitable reading"

It's a pattern repeated over and over - War -> reconstruction requirements -> corporate opportunity to screw everyone.

I can't think of a single example from history where that's gone well for the inhabitants. Can you? — Isaac

It looks like a tautological claim. On a charitable reading, the example would be: Germany, Italy, Japan after WW2.
If further "reconstruction" doesn't necessarily presuppose war, then I'd include also ex-Warsaw Pact states and Soviet-Union Republics that joined the West (i.e. through NATO and/or EU) after collapse of Soviet Union.

It is precisely because correlation implies1 causation that it's important to keep in mind that correlation does not imply2 causation. It's not banal, as Bartricks has claimed. — Jamal

I'd agree (except that "implies2" != "entails" see below)

By the way, and roughly speaking, I think implication in logic is something that happens within statements (if then), whereas entailment happens within arguments, that is, between sets of statements and a conclusion. — Jamal

I agree on that too, but I would elaborate further as follows. The notion of "entailment" has broadly to do with semantics, while "implication" in formal logic is just a certain type of truth-functional operator (namely expressing a certain combination of truth conditions as in the "material conditional"). So when we deduce a conclusion from some premises (like in propositional logic by using logical connectors like "if/then", "and", "not", "or", etc.), one can claim the conclusion is "entailed" by the premises, when the truth-functional meaning of the logical connectors (independently from the actual/full meaning of the terms they combine) ensures the truth of the conclusion. In conclusion, while the "entailment" expresses a semantic link between terms, "implication" doesn't express any such link.

I'm entailing that you are a troll.

"Implication" as in "material conditional" corresponds to a certain type of truth-functional relation between the antecedent and the consequent:


Accordingly "Correlation Does Not Imply Causation" simply means that one can have "correlation" (A="E1 is correlated to E2" is true ) but not "causation" (B="E1 is causing E2" or "E2 is causing E1" are false). Here some examples: https://wikimili.com/en/Correlation_does_not_imply_causation#Examples_of_illogically_inferring_causation_from_correlation

↪neomac
I used to think like you, but then I looked it up in a dictionary which clearly suggested two senses of justification. — Ludwig V

Yet you claimed: "But there's an issue about how far philosophy needs to cater for ordinary use of words".

If something is 95% likely to happen, most people would consider themselves justified in predicting that it will happen, and most people will agree. — Ludwig V

So are you suggesting that the farmer calculated that the likelihood of that cow-looking thingy on the field was 95% and therefore he was partially justified in believing that there was a cow on the field? I think that’s a bit of a stretch. I could find plausible that the farmer claimed “I’m 95% sure that’s a cow” but not “There is 95% chance that’s a cow”. In other words “95%” is more likely and hyperbolically a degree of confidence not a computation of probability in the case of the farmer.

The standard format for establishing who committed a crime is means, motive, opportunity. Suppose I establish means and motive beyond doubt and establish that there is no evidence against opportunity. Not quite conclusive, but enough to justify belief - or so many people would say. — Ludwig V

That’s a good example. Would you claim that the judges know that the crime was committed based on that partial justification? Or, else, would you claim that the judges know that the crime was probably committed based on that full justification?
It seems to me that once you introduce probabilistic beliefs there is no need to talk about partial justification, the justification can still be full and conclusive (unless for you "conclusive" = "non-probabilistic" while for me "conclusive" = "sound"), the point is that premises and conclusions are probabilistic.
One way to verify this is again through deduction:
P1: if X had means and motive to commit crime Y, then it’s highly probable X committed crime Y
P2: X had means and motive to commit crime Y
C: it’s highly probable X committed crime Y
This deduction expresses knowledge not if it’s valid but if it’s sound. Contrast that to the case where the situation was exactly the same, except for the fact that the judge reasons like this:
P1: if by flipping a coin I get heads, then it’s highly probable X committed crime Y
P2: by flipping a coin I get heads
C: it’s highly probable X committed crime Y
The deduction could be valid but certainly not sound. Therefore it wouldn’t express knowledge.

My impression is that the reason why one could consider "partial" a probabilistic deduction wrt a non-probabilistic deduction doesn't depend on the lack of soundness of the deduction but on the cognitive limits that the probabilistic reasoning shows wrt a non-probabilistic reasoning in a certain domain. However since both reasoning can be sound, they both can express full justification and full knowledge.

I have no idea what you're talking about. — Isaac

Agreed. You have no idea about what you yourself are talking about, go figure!

What has the pragmatic acknowledgement that Russia had legitimate security concerns (if you poke them, they'll bite), got to do with the ethics of supporting a war affecting millions according only to the objectives of those with a particular passport? — Isaac

Precisely, that’s why you are living in your fantasies. You must properly connect ethics with pragmatics if you want to rationally commensurate what should be achieved (in terms of desirable ends) with what can be achieved under given geopolitical circumstances.

We ought not have provoked Russia - knowing what would happen and we ought not continue to finance a war which risks the starvation of millions. — Isaac

Here 3 problems:

• Unjustified conceptual framework shift: what do you mean by “Russia” here? Did you ask ~143M Russians? Are you treating Russia as a homogenous entity? There is no Russia, just a bunch of people with Russian passports. And since their government is not democratic and there are no other ways to measure support, we have no way to know what Russia wants. So stop talking about Russia being provoked.
• Missing geopolitical conceptual framework: your pragmatic acknowledging that Russia had legitimate security concerns is not based on the conceptual framework that gives sense to the expression “legitimacy security concerns” with all its implications but outside of it (namely it's based on its ethic implications). It’s like acknowledging the value of a chess move by a player based on the next move of his opponent independently from what the endgame is or worse as a function of how the result is welcomed by the father of one of the players or worst without understanding that chess is a competitive game.
• Unjustified knowledge claims: talking about “knowledge” is incompatible with the notion of taking decisions under uncertainty as in politics people do (and you were taking into account), and that’s not just due to the extraordinary complexity of the problem, but also due to the players’ intentional opacity about specific strategies: geopolitical agents for security concerns are never fully transparent to their competitors or even allies (e.g. just think of the notion “strategic ambiguity”). And that's why our guesses better be educated by geopolitics and history.

if you believe that "lots of global events cause that level of damage - from local warlords, oppressive police, environmental pollution, poverty" why are you specifically concerned about the Ukrainian crisis? — neomac

It's the title of the thread. — Isaac

Sure why not? Since you just happened to find a study that highlights the effects of the Ukrainian crisis instead of the effects of "local warlords, oppressive police, environmental pollution, poverty”, you thought it was worth quoting it to me because of the title of the thread, despite the fact I was the one who first linked a survey titled “Global impact of the war in Ukraine: Billions of people face the greatest cost-of-living crisis in a generation” while you were the one claiming that the Ukrainian crisis doesn’t deserve such highlight compared to"local warlords, oppressive police, environmental pollution, poverty", right?

No it isn't, don't be naive. It's produced by conflicting national interests, not Steven Segal. — Isaac

Are you crazy?! I - not you - am the one claiming that the core issue is about the Western countries national interest in conflict with the national interest of an authoritarian regimes like Russia, China and Iran. You are the one trying to sell us the idea that 8 million dead children in Yemen ought to be the core issue of this conflict as if it made geopolitical sense!
And talking explicitly in terms of hegemonic power clash is Putin too, not his friend Steven Seagal: https://intellinews.com/putin-calls-for-a-new-world-order-in-his-annual-valdai-speech-260759/

This presupposes that there is more than one kind of belief. — creativesoul

The expression "perceptual belief", as I use it, it's simply pointing to the genesis of that belief. If a belief is processed out of perceptual evidences, it's perceptual, if it's processed out of other propositions through reasoning it can be deductive or inductive belief, if it's processed out of a communicative channel it's a transmitted belief, etc.
This is at least part of my background assumptions while thinking about justification.

If I see a cloth and I think it is a cow, is that not based on induction? I've seen cows before and that looks like a cow so I conclude that it is a cow. — Janus

Then there seems to be a terminological issue here. I intend inductive reasoning as a form of reasoning where from a set of particular propositions we conclude some general proposition: e.g. From crow one is black, crow two is black, crow three is black, ..., crow n is black, I conclude that all crows (in a set of crows larger than n) are black. As you see we are talking about propositions and we are moving from particular to general.
In Gettier's examples: 1. We do not talk about particular propositions as the basis for some other belief, but of perceptual evidence as the basis for perceptual beliefs 2. The perceptual belief is particular not a generalization.
So to me the information processing that goes from perceptual evidence to a particular perceptual belief is not inductive reasoning.

Most knowledge claims it seems, apart from purely logical or mathematical results, are based on observation and inductive reasoning, so I am not sure where you see deduction fitting in the picture. — Janus

Logical and mathematical knowledge are based on deductions (see theoremes). And one could question that inductive reasoning based on observation can be called knowledge at all (Hume deemed inductive inference are unjustified). In any case Gettier’s examples do not seem to relate to deductions nor induction. They concern particular perceptual beliefs.
But I was suggesting to consider “deduction” as a study case for better clarifying the notion of “justification” because if “justified” is a normative term (as I understand it) and not just a descriptive term, then justification must refer to some information processing based on some cognitive standard (e.g. deduction rules in case of justification based on deduction, observational/measuring standards in case of perceptual justification, communicative standards in case of third-party feedback justification etc.). And if deduction is a form of justification, then we can easily see how our acceptance of knowledge=JTB or its rejection can be rendered in terms of valid/sound deductions. In other cases of knowledge, it’s less clear, how to distinguish valid from sound information processing.

I suggested that one would only be justified in believing that one had seen a sheep rather than a cloth if one got close enough to be absolutely sure — Janus

adoption of some arbitrary standard of what should be thought to constitute evidence and hence justification for empirical claims. — Janus

Here you are confirming that justification is a normative concept not a descriptive one, since we should use some standard to assess justification, then you are suggesting what observational protocols could be provided in order to ensure justification for perceptual beliefs (e.g. one has to go close enough to be justified). I would add that perception is not the only way we form beliefs, but there is also deduction and third-party feedback. So what is left to clarify is if there is a way to distinguish valid/sound justification in case of perceptual beliefs and socially transmitted beliefs as much as we distinguish valid/sound deduction.

More nationalist bullshit. — Isaac

"Legitimate security concerns" is not fashionable anymore?

https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1116152

The Ukraine crisis risks tipping up to 1.7 billion people — over one-fifth of humanity — into poverty, destitution and hunger.

“In Yemen 8 million children are already on the brink of famine. Families are exhausted. They’ve faced horror after horror through seven years of war. We fear they will not be able to endure another shock, especially to the main ingredient keeping their children alive.
— Isaac

But if you believe that "lots of global events cause that level of damage - from local warlords, oppressive police, environmental pollution, poverty" why are you specifically concerned about the Ukrainian crisis?

8 million children. Did anyone ask them whether they want the war to continue so that Ukraine doesn't lose any territory? No. — Isaac

And did anyone ask them whether they want the war to continue so that Russia will appease its legitimate security concerns? Neither.
Not to mention that this war is not matter of Ukrainian losing territory to Russia or Russian national security concerns. It’s matter of power struggles and world order between authoritarian vs democratic regimes: in particular, it’s about Putin wanting his threats against the Western-led world order to be taken as damn seriously as his threats against NATO enlargement, if not more. What do you say? Should we take him damn seriously?

Disgusting. — “Isaac

And how is your disgust helping the 8 million children so far?

all justification is conclusive would result in two senses of "justification" — Ludwig V

I don't understand what you are saying here. What are the two senses? By "conclusive" are you referring for example to sound deductions as opposed to valid deductions?
I’m still wondering what “partial justification” means. How can probability make the justification partial?

The latter tells us a lot more about support for particular strategies in the areas where is actually matters, as opposed to an almost meaningless generic support among people who are no more affected by the issue than any other. — Isaac

It matters to them because their lives and living is more exposed to the war than in other areas. But it matters to the rest of Ukraine too because they might lose their territory, men and resources to fight a foreign power. Besides those areas are more pro-Russian so it's easier to find Ukrainians there who would more likely want Zelensky to make concessions to Russia, than the other way around, and if Putin is right in claiming that pro-Russian separatists called him in their defense against the Ukrainian government, then they are now paying also for the gamble pro-Russian separatists there have taken, as much as Ukrainians are paying for provoking the Russian bear with a stick in the eye, right?

All surveys apply only to the sample. Whether the stratification is specified or not. Your study, for example, was limited to Ukrainians outside of donbas, over 18, with access to a mobile phone and internet connection, and with sufficient free time and willingness to take part. That biases the results against the very people the survey I cited aimed to capture. — Isaac

Sure, and anybody must take into account the limits of sampling to reason more clearly. But there is a difference in a survey that is designed to address the popularity of Zelensky in Ukraine and another designed to address the popularity of a strategy in 3 cities in south-east Ukraine.
And again, this is not the only indicator. That's one that adds up with many others, including also formally democratic indicators. And any popular support indicator in its individuality (including formally democratic indicators) may be misleading and miss something of non-negligible political value in determining popular support for or against a government.

So you could get it wrong and still be justified. That makes Gettier cases possible. — Ludwig V

But what does “justified” mean here? If “justified” is a normative term and not just a descriptive term, then justification must refer to some cognitive processing assessment wrt some cognitive normative standard (e.g. deduction laws in case of justification based on deduction, observational/measuring standards in case of perceptual justification, communicative standards in case of third-party feedback justification etc.)

(Actually, the doctor is almost certainly in the same situation, that the tests and evidence will only give their answer on the balance of probability.) — Ludwig V

I was thinking about probability too in reference to partial justification. But then I spotted 2 issues: 1. as far as I know, Gettier’s examples do not talk about beliefs in probabilistic terms (“S believes that P” and not “S believes that probably P”) 2. Probability either is conceptualised as a scalar value to be quantified (then what is supposed to be the probability that the farmer saw a cow while watching something that looks like a cow to consider his belief that there is a cow partially justified? I don’t think anybody is computing probabilities to support justification assessments in ordinary contexts), or it simply expresses a personal degree of confidence, but the inconvenience of taking into account degree of confidence in assessing partially justified beliefs is that anybody could be claimed to be partially justified in believing literally anything to be the case (including contradictions!) on condition that she be not sure about it. That's too much of a concession to me.

That's why I think that talking about partial justification makes more sense in ordinary contexts as a way to acknowledge some limits in our cognitive competence.

Zelensky is committed to a policy which this poll indicates does not have great popular support. — Isaac

Only within the sample of Ukrainians that the survey was specified to be representative of: namely "residents and displaced persons in three Ukrainian cities close to the southeast battlefields this summer" (so in an area were pro-Russians are more likely to be found)

So? — Isaac

So popular support can be measured through indicators others than the ones provided by formal democratic institutions. Indeed the poll you provided is again an indicator to take into account, that however doesn't invalidate the claim that Zelensky has great support from Ukrainians.

I didn't ask if you had a problem with it. — Isaac

I didn't talk about me I talked about democratic institutions as such. And I gave you historical examples to prove the point.
No sensible person would consider Italy a failed democracy because it doesn't admit a mafia party or a fascist party or a North Korean party within its party system. On the contrary, we may consider Italy democratic precisely because it doesn't include such parties. And if you do not understand this, you are a danger to democracy.

I'm explaining the consequences. — Isaac

You are explaining nothing. You are just iterating on your piece of propaganda not meant to well-inform anybody.

You've yet to demonstrate that — Isaac

Why on earth would I?! Your intellectual clumsiness is just so fun to watch, dude, why would I give you another chance to get things straight? You have no fucking clue even what you are asking when you say "You've yet to demonstrate that". Priceless.

Propaganda is OK. Autocracy is OK. Banning free press is OK. Conscription is OK. Denying human rights is OK. — Isaac

Are you talking to me? I never made such claims.

I wouldn't so easily have been able to find a poll to the contrary. — Isaac

But you didn't. The poll doesn't survey the popularity of Zelensky among Ukrainians: Ordinary Ukrainians on the front lines are divided on a ceasefire and negotiations.
Besides also in peacetime, in democracy, you have people voting against what turns out to be the winning party or refusing to go to vote, that has no bearing on the fact that that party has democratically won.

In addition, the lack of opposition parties and opposition press means that any support thus measured is unlikely to be well-informed and so even less useful as an indicator of genuine support. — Isaac

Where opposition = "Russian collaborationist". Zero problem with that in democracy. Besides the "Russian collaborationist" can just run propaganda and misinformation as Russians do on national TV, so there is no guarantee that having such opposition people would be more well-informed.

You, however, do need some qualification if you want to claim a view or interpretation is wrong, more than merely disagreeing. — Isaac

It's enough to have read Mearsheimer's to realise how clumsy it's your attempt to making a point in favor of your views by citing him. You are incapable of understanding my own claims (I suspect you do not even understand your own claims), so it's no surprise that you do not understand what "legitimate security concerns" means in Mearsheimer's "offensive realism" theory. Or you do but you are playing dumb. In any case I'm not handholding you through fairly simple concepts, you need a minimum level of comprehension.

Let’s distinguish two intellectual tasks: the first one is to assess whether JTB is an acceptable definition for the notion of “knowledge”. I think that deductive reasoning offers a study case to clarify the alternatives wrt the notion of “justification”: if “justification” amounts to “sound deduction” then knowledge=JTB is still plausible (this view is in line with the NFL assumption). If “justification” amounts to “valid deduction” then knowledge=JTB is not plausible (this view is not in line with the NFL assumption).
The second task is to assess knowledge/justification claims, namely beliefs about one’s knowledge/justification. This task must be handled in accordance with the definition we have given for “knowledge” or “justification”: so e.g. knowledge claims express knowledge if they are JTB, if we have established that knowledge=JTB.
There is something else however that might interfere with our understanding of both tasks: the trivial acknowledgement that any claims, including knowledge/justification claims (which discriminate between what is knowledge/justification and what not) are fallible may induce us to question the nature or the very possibility of knowledge/justification as such. Here is the problem of skepticism which we can address, but currently I find it off topic for this thread.

I'm not trying to falsify it. I'm not claiming Zelensky doesn't have popular support. I'm claiming we don't know for sure in any specific strategy. You're the one claiming we do know. — Isaac

My knowledge claim amounts to questioning your claim that we do not have “proper measure” to assess legitimacy through popular support. As I said there are formal and informal ways to express popular support for a government. Informal support exists in democracy and outside of it, and it can be measured through various indicators. In political theory (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legitimacy_(political)#Forms_of_legitimate_government) there is no analytic or explanatory reason to restrain “legitimacy” and its measuring to what one can formally get from normally functioning democratic institutions. If you do it, it’s for propagandistic reasons, not to well-inform.

Twelfth time now...

I wasn't wondering why it was the case. I was pointing out one of the consequences of it being the case. — Isaac — Isaac

Thirteenth time the charm...

I wasn't wondering why it was the case. I was pointing out one of the consequences of it being the case. — Isaac — Isaac

That when we say that some decision about Ukraine is rightly "up to the Ukrainians" we currently have no legitimate method of asking them, we are talking about a (currently) autocratic government without opposition. As such we are mistaken if we legitimise Ukrainian strategic decisions on the grounds of a Ukrainian right to self-determination.
Zelensky's apparent recent decision to refuse negotiations until there's regime change in Russia, for example, is not a legitimate decision of the Ukrainian people. — Isaac

Since you keep playing dumb, here is what you get wrong on the consequences. The consequence is not that Ukrainians ended up having an “autocratic government”, the form of government didn’t change: in wartime democratic regimes do not function as in peacetime, that’s all. The consequence is not that Zelensky’s strategic decisions are illegitimate, but that they are legitimately taken by a democratically elected president to act as a representative of Ukrainian people in peacetime and wartime accordingly. The consequence is not that Ukrainian people didn’t decide as in peacetime, but that they (as people from any other democracy on the planet) do not get to decide about national security in wartime as much as they do not get to decide about fiscal policies in peacetime. Besides the consequence which you see so problematic is not even that Ukrainian people are not deciding, but that the government didn’t have a coalition to Russian collaborationist parties, but since this too is perfectly compatible with democracy, there is no reason to see this consequence as problematic from a democratic point of view.
Better now?

Propaganda works also through artists, pop stars, and other kinds of VIPs — neomac
So? Are you suggesting propaganda induced opinions are well-informed ones? — Isaac

The objective of propaganda is not to ensure that citizens are well-informed (according to what standard? How well-informed vs persuaded by propaganda are democratic citizens in peacetime really?), but that doesn’t necessarily imply misinformation, nor that propaganda is an illegitimate or ineffective way to earn political support, just because it doesn’t inform well enough. Unless you have in mind one single form of legitimacy for ideological reasons.

I questioned your and other Pollyannas' full grasp of Mearsheimers&co views wrt the subject "legitimate security concerns". — neomac
Yes, the question was - with what qualification? On what ground is your 'grasp' the 'full' one? Do you have any citations from experts to back up your interpretation. — Isaac

With the same qualification you pick Mearshaimer&co’s claims to support your views.
“On what grounds”?! “Citations from experts” (as if I didn’t do it already)?! “Interpretation”?! Have you ever fucking read Mearsheimer really?! Do you know his theory called “offensive realism”?! Did you read anything about geopolitical theories and in particular realist theory at all?! It’s like asking me grounds, citations, interpretation about aritmetics. Not to mention that you yourself couldn't cite any Mearsheimer's or Putin appeasement claims from geopolitical realists assessing this war in terms of Ukrainian casualties (even less in comparison to Yemeni casualties), or greedy military industries/banks&co wanting to suck blood from the rest of the world.
No, dude, I am not here to recover your ignorance on such basics. On the contrary, I’m satisfied at denouncing it and mocking it as it deserves.

democracy gains it's legitimacy from a well-informed, free electorate. we have a right to know what our government's are up to, a right to hold them account and a right to have institutions in place to do those tasks on our behalf. — Isaac

Sure, but again in wartime democracies do not work with electoral consultations of a well-informed, free electorate to take decisions of national security. Are you crazy?

Good for him. why would I judge the justification on the basis of his desirable outcomes? — Isaac

You wrote: 'justification', in this context is that for which some reason (or reasons) can be given that refer usually to either desirable consequences
Now the legitimately elected president of Ukraine has the reasons I explained referring to the desirable outcome that I pointed out. What else do you need?

It doesn't. It means up to the people who have citizenship of Ukraine. The meaning could not be simpler. — Isaac

It's not you who decides the meaning of the words. Political representatives are called representatives precisely because they are elected by the Ukrainians to take political decisions that best satisfy their preferences. So the Ukrainian government represents Ukrainians in international politics.

No it doesn't...

https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/2022/11/03/ukraine-risks-being-locked-into-endless-war-in-bid-for-perfect-peace/

Ordinary Ukrainians on the front lines are divided on a ceasefire and negotiations. My Ukrainian colleague Karina Korostelina and I surveyed the attitudes of both residents and displaced persons in three Ukrainian cities close to the southeast battlefields this summer. Almost half agreed it was imperative to seek a ceasefire to stop Russians killing Ukraine’s young men. Slightly more supported negotiations with Russia on a complete ceasefire, with a quarter totally against and a fifth declaring themselves neutral. Respondents were torn when considering whether saving lives or territorial unity were more important to them. Those most touched by the war, namely the internally displaced, were more likely to prioritise saving lives. Other research reveals that those farthest from the battlefields have the most hawkish attitudes — Isaac

Dude, your article starts with "Talking peace is not popular in Ukraine right now. "
But ok I noted down what the results of a survey on 3 cities on the front line is.
Yet it doesn't falsify the claim that Zelensky has still great support in Ukraine.

I didn't mention anything about needing referenda. I'm talking about a lack of fully free opposition. — Isaac

And I addressed that too. Banning parties collaborating with the enemies is perfectly compatible with any democracy at war.

there are other forms of legitimacy that can be measured — neomac
Yes, but a survey of pop stars is not one of them. — Isaac

Yes it is, for the reasons I explained. It's part of the informal support among other indicators I listed. Indeed, the president Zelensky was a popular actor before becoming the president, did you know that? Do you think it was just a coincidence? That his popularity didn't play any role in his elections?
In Italy the M5S is founded by a very popular comedian, Giuseppe Grillo, do you think that this is a mere coincidence?
Are you familiar with the concept of "influencer"? Propaganda works also through artists, pop stars, and other kinds of VIPs, do I really have to explain it to you?

there are some basics that you and other Pollyannas here do not seem to fully grasp when you so cheerfully cite Mearhsheimers&co — neomac

And your qualifications are...? — Isaac

Did you just stop reading where you stopped the quotation or are you just playing dumb as usual? I didn't question Mearsheimers&co qualifications, I questioned your and other Pollyannas' full grasp of Mearsheimers&co views wrt the subject "legitimate security concerns".

↪neomac
It will probably come as no surprise that Isaac is playing fast and loose with the truth in saying that Ukraine banned opposition parties — SophistiCat

No surprise, of course. But his sophisms are worse than just failing to get facts right.

Ah, so you'd agree that since we know there's majority Russian speaking minorities in the occupied territories, we can safely conclude they do indeed want to separate from Ukraine — boethius

Of course. Or at least I find it plausible.

even if we reject the legitimacy of the democratic tools in play? — boethius

I'm not rejecting anything. I'm just saying that in wartime democratic institutions do not work as in peacetime. But that doesn't mean that during wartime political representatives are not legitimate representatives in a democratic sense!

Certainly if Ukraine's right to self determination is just cause, so too is Crimea and Donbas and the other regions? — boethius

Right to self-determination can be handled through international law. Otherwise in the messy way it is handled now. (I didn't use the expression "just cause" on purpose because it requires further elaboration).

As long as there's "legitimacy through popular support" (or at least it's possible to just say so) then Russia is simply coming to the aid of people — boethius

Sure so Putin would claim.

completely justified in their right of self determination — boethius

For me a discussion of rights makes sense wrt a legal system, in this case international law and related international recognition. Beyond that self-determination is matter of national interest against other national interest.

Russia has legitimate security concerns about NATO setting up shop on the other side of its 1,000-mile-plus border with Ukraine. — Isaac

A part from the fact that with Sweden and Finland joining NATO the NATO border to Russia would be twice as much (and Putin practically said it's not a big deal)


But there are some basics that you and other Pollyannas here do not seem to fully grasp when you so cheerfully cite Mearhsheimers&co who see NATO enlargement as a mistake and want to push Ukrainians to surrender as much as Putin can feel satisfied.

• Security concerns are legitimate reason to do war, invade countries, disrupt energy and food supply on word scale, threat to escalate to nuke (if they can) no matter what costs on people and corporations and other countries! This is true for Russia as for all countries: China, Iran and Nord Korea included! The US and the EU countries included! Ukraine included!
• Security concerns are national security concerns, so nationalism is in some form still there as a fully motivational force!
• American isolationists think that it’s not in the US national security interest to fight this war in Ukraine against Russia. And this could be a fucking serious problem for European national security concerns !

It’s these assumptions that one should keep in mind when citing these people. They do not calculate the endgame of this war in terms of saving Ukrainian lives nor in terms of selling less/more something (shale gas, weapons, hamburgers) to let some big corporations sniff more cocaine, fuck Filippino trans, in a golden villa, and making jokes about the billions of poor Yemeni kids that explode under American bombs AT ALL.

That which is 'right', in this context, is that which derives from rights in some way (either natural rights, or concepts of justice), as in the expression "I have a right to know why you said that", it's not claiming anything about the law. I have a right to keep my property, but it may not be justified to have excess. — Isaac

And what are exactly the natural rights or concepts of justice or rights-not-claiming-anything-about-law that Zelensky has violated in not having a coalition with Russian collaborationist parties?

That which has 'justification', in this context is that for which some reason (or reasons) can be given that refer usually to either desirable consequences or virtues which are causally related to the act in question. "blowing up that bridge was justified because it prevented greater harm in the future “ — Isaac

For Zelensky, the desirable consequence of not having a coalition with Russian collaborationist parties, is that the response to Russian invasion is going to be more resolute, military decisions are not going to be ratted on and therefore chances to regain control over occupied territories are greater.

That when we say that some decision about Ukraine is rightly "up to the Ukrainians" we currently have no legitimate method of asking them, we are talking about a (currently) autocratic government without opposition. As such we are mistaken if we legitimise Ukrainian strategic decisions on the grounds of a Ukrainian right to self-determination. — Isaac

“Up to the Ukrainians” means up to the governmental representatives of Ukraine that were democratically voted to act as such in peacetime and wartime? “Autocratic government without opposition” (where “opposition” = “Russian collaborationist parties") which in wartime is perfectly legitimate and perfectly compatible with democracy (Italian democratic governments are not supposed to make political coalitions with anti-state mafia representatives, you know). No we aren’t if the current Ukrainian government is fighting for national sovereignty and security against foreign invasions. One could claim that Ukrainians do not give a shit about Ukrainian self-determination. But Zelensky’s government has great support from Ukrainians, even despite the censorship that he rationally applied over press and opposition, even the losses they have suffered sofar. So what on earth are you talking about?

Zelensky's apparent recent decision to refuse negotiations until there's regime change in Russia, for example, is not a legitimate decision of the Ukrainian people. — Isaac

Political representatives do not delegate decisions to the people they represent, otherwise what the hell is their job supposed to be, people could literally decide everything by referendum. But it doesn’t work that way in normal times (there are no referendums on fiscal matters), go figure during wartime. I don’t know wars of national self-determination based on referenda, usually they are led by strong leaders with great popular support.

It means that, for the time being, dissent in Ukraine regarding the government's course of action is not being properly recorded or represented, which is extremely relevant to the kinds of arguments Paine and @Olivier5 were making about legitimacy derived from popular support. Currently, we have no proper measure of that. — Isaac

So my comments on legitimacy through popular support and how to measure it when democratic tools are not available was pertinent. And your constraining “legitimacy” to “democratic” legitimization is twice misleading: there are other forms of legitimacy (informal support) that can be measured, and Zelensky was democratically (formally) legitimized to be the chief leader of Ukraine in peacetime and wartime.

Playing the devil's advocate: what if the Americans want to slowly push Putin go tactical nuclear to turn his escalate to de-escalate strategy against him?

There might be 4 possible promising consequences in doing this:
- Heavy conventional retaliation: like destroying the Russian strategic infrastructures (e.g. Black Sea fleet), no fly zone in Ukraine, bombing Russian army in occupied (but not-annexed) territories.
- Possibly turn the Rest of the World and of Europe definitely against Russia.
- Possibly turn the trend of American domestic divisions (at least wrt Russia) in line with the current anti-Putin stance more favorable with the Biden at the next elections.
- And therefore also possibly turn Russian support for Putin (especially inside his own entourage) against Putin.

valid deduction is often expected to conserve justification and to conserve knowledge, just as it conserves truth. — Srap Tasmaner

This is the case only if the premises are known to be true by X or justifiably believed to be true. My point is how to better understand justification wrt deduction as a study case.

The awkward bit in the Gettier cases is the possibility of partial justification. — Ludwig V

What does partial justification of a belief mean ? In case of a deduction (which I'm talking about to clarify the notion of justification, not to equate the 2 concepts), it could be when we believe premises to be true (and they are true!) but we do not know them to be true:
P1: If doctor X diagnoses a cancer, then there is a cancer
P2: doctor X diagnoses a cancer
C: there is a cancer
One could believe P1 to be true (P1 being the case) and yet not know it to be true.
But in this case again, the term justification wouldn't apply to just valid deductions, they would still need to be sound deductions.

"right and justification" as your quote specifies. — Isaac

What do you mean by "right" and "justification" as distinguished from "lawful"?

A tenth time then...

I wasn't wondering why it was the case. I was pointing out one of the consequences of it being the case. — Isaac — Isaac

And? What's your point in highlighting the consequences? What lesson is there to learn in there?

On what grounds then? I argue someone doesn't have a legitimate mandate, you argue that they do because you use a different meaning of 'legitimate'. That's neither a critique nor a line of questioning. It's just a declaration. — Isaac

We have been through this already. Terminological issues can be settled through stipulation whenever terminology diverges from some standard usage or triggers misunderstanding. What is substantial however is conceptual consistency and explanatory power behind the given terminology.

Some people think that there is no knowledge in Gettier cases, but that there is justified true belief. Hence they conclude that the JTB definition is inadequate. Others, like me, think that the JTB is correct, (subject to some caveats). They think that if there is no knowledge, there cannot be justified true belief. The question comes down to whether the main character's belief is justified or not; the stories create situations in which it isn't possible to give a straight answer. Or that's my view. — Ludwig V

I think one way to see this issue more clearly is by considering the distinction between valid and sound deductions. A conclusion could be validly inferred from some premises and be true, yet the deduction could be unsound because at least one of the premises is false. Example:
[P1] All cats are plants
[P2] All plants are mammals
[C] All cats are mammals
Now let’s ask: if C is true, X believes that C and X is justified in believing that C by that deduction, then does X know that C? Well if a valid deduction is enough to be deductively justified, then we do not have a case of knowledge (i.e. knowledge can not equate to JTB). But if only sound deductions can qualify as deductive justification, then we do not have a case of justification (i.e. knowledge can still equate to JTB).

. It doesn't obviate the consequences of not having one. It would be preposterous to expect me to fly by jet to my next conference. The preposterousness doesn't have any impact on the consequence that I may be late as a result. — Isaac

So what? In your example the goal is to be at the conference on time (and you failed it). While Zelenesky’s goal is not to have a coalition with Russian collaborationist parties (and he succeeded it). The point is that that’s a rational goal, because when national sovereignty/security is in severe danger there must be enough convergence and commitment on matter of national sovereignty/security for a coalition between otherwise opposing parties to efficaciously deal with such an emergency.

Even a tyrant coming to power on a wave of popular support is illegitimate if they do not have means of being held to account. — Isaac

If that’s how you understand legitimacy, you better clarify it because: In political science, legitimacy is the right and acceptance of an authority, usually a governing law or a regime. Whereas authority denotes a specific position in an established government, the term legitimacy denotes a system of government—wherein government denotes "sphere of influence". An authority viewed as legitimate often has the right and justification to exercise power. Political legitimacy is considered a basic condition for governing, without which a government will suffer legislative deadlock(s) and collapse. In political systems where this is not the case, unpopular regimes survive because they are considered legitimate by a small, influential elite (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legitimacy_(political)). And all that doesn’t necessarily require democratic ways of holding political leaders to account.
BTW is Putin a legitimate leader according to your way of understanding political legitimacy?

It's a basic tenet of democracy. — Isaac

So what? It’s rational to act in accordance to democratic rules under the assumption that there are sufficiently robust democratic institutions. While a central government which is still struggling for its sovereignty and territorial control, can’t operate under such assumption. Obviously.

Yes, that's true. I've been discussing the legitimacy of that mandate. — Isaac

Without clarifying what you mean by “legitimacy”. And if you do not clarify your own terms, then I feel encouraged to apply my understanding of them.

Besides we have a different notion of political legitimacy. — neomac

Then stop responding to my posts as if I shared your notions. — Isaac

I don’t see why: that’s how I can discover where our notions diverge, for example. And if we aren’t sharing same notions, I can still question your notions.

Do Ukrainians deserve to be protected against Russian aggression, answer: yes. At any cost? No. — Benkei

That's your way of framing what is at stake, not mine. The geopolitical implications of this war go beyond the fate of the Ukrainians themselves. And its irrational to ignore them.

Roosevelt was elected in 1944. The UK ensured consensus by using a coalition of parties. Neither banned opposition. And that's the point here. A government's mandate requires a robust opposition to hold them to account, otherwise the mandate is meaningless because the public cannot be expected to simply find out how things stand of their own accord. — Isaac

I disagree with the examples and the main claims.
None of the above countries were invaded. Coalition parties in the UK and in the US made sense simply because they didn’t include any party collaborationist with hostile foreign powers. And even if one sees the Ukrainian war in terms of civil war (as often the war in Ukraine has been described), it’s preposterous to expect a coalition between opposing parties that see one another as the enemies: it’s like expecting the Federal government to form a coalition with confederates during the Civil War, or the coalition that fought against the fascists in Italy build the new state by including the fascist party.
In democracy, government's mandate would require a robust opposition to hold them to account as long as there is enough convergence on matters of national sovereignty/security. This point is particularly critical when the Ukrainian central government (unlike the US and the UK in WW2) is still in the process of state building against legacies from the Soviet era, interfering social-political-economic-criminal ties with Russia and therefore wide mistrust in democratic institutions and political parties.

"well if the people didn't support it, they'd demonstrate, so it's got a mandate” — Isaac

He got the mandate when he was elected as president for peacetime and wartime. Period. And if the capacity of parties to guarantee representativity can be problematic in Western countries with more robust democratic institutions (e.g. when the voter turnout is particularly low and parties do not collect enough votes), go figure in countries which still have weak democratic institutions. That’s one more reason to value the informal support for political leaders. Since there is large support for Zelensky it’s preposterous to question his legitimacy just because he didn’t build a coalition with Russian collaborationist parties.

Constitutions do not determine the legitimacy of mandates. If Putin wrote a constitution in which it was guaranteed that he was ruler for life, would you argue his mandate was legitimate? — Isaac

Zelensky didn’t change constitution as you suggest. And even Western democratic constitutions generally give extraordinary powers to the president in wartime. Besides we have a different notion of political legitimacy. I'm talking about political legitimacy in terms of actual formal and informal support. Formal support (through binding institutions: e.g. constitutions and laws) doesn’t need to be grounded on “democratic” institutions as Westerners understand them. Yet Westerners might be more interested in tracking informal support where formal support is not as representative as in full-fledged or functional democracies.
Your notion of “legitimacy” is more in the domain of what ought to be within the limits of your wild imagination, I guess.

A society which has banned opposition parties and press is one in which the government are not properly being held to account, and as such that government does not have a legitimate mandate. It's that simple (my edit.). — Isaac

Not simple, simplistic.

Are you net even the least bit suspicious about the messages you're regurgitating. — Isaac

Not as much as I am suspicious about your intellectual skills and honesty. I’m responsible for what I write not for what you understand.

We have these almost consecutive arguments - on the one hand this a just war because it is fighting for the ideal of democracy and Western freedoms over the Russian tyranny, then without even pausing for breath, you're now arguing that democracy's not all that important after all and governments can run off a few opinion polls and some celebrity support without that causing any major issues. It's really quite a talent. — Isaac

If you see a contradiction, you have to blame your poor logic acumen and your attitude to caricature your opponents’ claims to make a point.That’s not talent though. Just embarrassing intellectual misery.

In a country where opposition media reporting has been banned. — Isaac

The country is as at war, so democracy can not function as normal: e.g. do you have any examples of countries invaded by a foreign power that run democratic presidential elections while at war? I don't.
Yet, if/when possible, we can still assess consensus/support for the government through other indicators.

I don't know how familiar you are with the general consensus on what constitutes a legitimate mandate, but it's rarely done by lack of pop star opposition. — Isaac

Can you quote me where I claimed otherwise? VIPs, artists, and pop stars can be influencers with followers and amplifiers of the people's voice so it's important for politics and politicians to have them on their side, supporting their propaganda. For example, for 43 years the people of Iran have been denied representation at the United Nations, recently, the pop star Nazanin Boniadi changed that. And that's of great importance for the Iranians who oppose the regime. So it's unreasonable to dismiss the "soft power" of such prominent people (Zelensky was a popular actor before becoming president, are you familiar with that?), especially after showing - as you did, even in your last post - so much concern for the impact of propaganda. In any case, that's just one indicator that adds up with others I listed, of course.

The point was about legitimate mandates. — Isaac

Zelensky is the president so he has the legitimate mandate to be the president also during wartime according to the Ukrainian constitution (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_Ukraine#Duties_and_powers). What's so hard to understand, dude?