Not at all, given that two people can be presented with the same argument, and one feels forced to accept it (because he thinks it's so irresistibly good), and the other one doesn't (because he thinks it's dumb).

IOW, an argument's strength doesn't somehow exist objectively, independently of persons, as an inherent trait of the argument itself. Rather, strength is ascribed to it by people, and different people will ascribe different strengths to it. — baker

I thought so too but then I read a couple of introductory books on logic.

We can all agree on word definitions, for the sake of communication, without agreeing on anything else. People of all cultures can agree that "good" should be associated with a positive quasi-emotional feeling, even if in some people that feeling is elicited when they hear "marry whomever you love," and in others when they hear "throw homosexuals off rooftops." I wouldn't see any value in lack of agreement that "good" should be associated with a positive quasi-emotional feeling, and thus people talking past each other. — Acyutananda

Aah! You mean to say that "positive feelings" are not a good yardstick for morality. I agree for the reasons that you put forth. Americans may feel good when they see homosexuals marrying each other but an Iranian may experience the exact same "positive" emotions when they see homosexuals taken to the gallows.

Yet, there seems to be something generic about morality in re "positive feelings" - we feel good, barring some exceptions, for the same things - a partner, a family, friends, food, health, helping others, shelter, clothing, amenities, etc. Should we ignore the many instances where "positive feelings" are aligned to our ideas of morality and focus only on the cases where the two don't concur?

I guess I now understand what you're saying, but – perhaps changing the subject – wouldn't you say that in order for the terms "good" and "bad" to be most useful, to be truly normative (using your examples), "good" in Iran would have be associated not only with the Quran, but also with a positive quasi-emotional feeling, and "good" in America would have be associated not only with equality, but also with a positive quasi-emotional feeling? — Acyutananda

We would all converge to a point (a set of ideas) but the cost of that is we'd be losing out on the richness of human thought.

All I'm saying is for moral relativism to be true, the word "morality" in America must mean the same thing as the word "morality" in Iran for instance. Only then can we say morality is relative to culture - the same thing (morality) is culturally determined (in America homosexuality is ok but in Iran it's immoral). If, on the other hand, the word "morality" means different things e.g. in America it might have a meaning associated with equality and in Iran the word maybe associated with the Quran then Americans and Iranians aren't talking about the same thing are they?

That is an intriguing idea. I have a hard time thinking of anything that is worth taking more seriously than life. If we don't take life seriously, can we take anything seriously? Conversely, if we can't take anything more seriously than life, can we take life any less seriously?

So I guess my question is, what do you mean "don't take life seriously?" Should I be considering suicide more (joking)? — FlaccidDoor

I wanted to qualify the statement "don't take life too seriously" but I just left it as it was for effect. My point is those who complain about cognitive dissonance maybe committing the grave mistake of assuming the world is self-consistent. There's no evidence for that I'm afraid and in fact all the evidence seems to point in the opposite direction. I guess a much harsher response to those who want to seek and destroy all inconsistencies in their worldview would be "that's the way it (the world) is. live with it!"

...and how could you decide if that memory was correct? There's nothing to compare it to, except itself. — Banno

I realize that but what's the point? The fact that memory is unreliable and also that there's no memory-independent corroboration available does nothing to disprove that some aspects of consciousness are indescribable. Right? :chin:

There's a name for this psychological condition - cognitive dissonance. The fact that one may feel sorry for an adversary who's made it faer life's purpose to maim or kill you and, at the same time, one lashes out at one's own friend and family bespeaks a deep, underlying contradiction in one's worldview.

That said, this only if one takes it seriously enough but I suggest we cut ourselves some slack and take heed of the advice, "don't take life too seriously."

A variation on Wittgenstein - yes. — Banno

:ok:

I'm questioning what it is that makes S a "distinct sensation". How could one know that the second sensation is a recurrence of S? — Banno

I already told you, it would depend on how good my memory is. Supposing I possess a perfect memory, I would immediately recognize a sensation as one I had experienced before and I would also recall the name S that I had given it.

Do you mean "good and bad refer to the same thing [singular]," which would mean "good and bad refer to good-bad," or do you really mean "thingS," in which case the things would be something apart from good and bad? If you mean the latter, what would be examples of the things? — Acyutananda

What I mean to convey is that it's possible that "good" and "bad" may refer to different concepts in different cultures i.e. morality may not be amenable to generalization across cultures. This is Wittgensteinian in character as you might've figured out by now.

Why bring Wittgenstein in at this juncture?

Well, moral relativism, to my knowledge, claims that moral values vary with culture with all of them being as equally right. However, for that to be true, the notion of morality has to be universal in scope i.e. every culture must mean the same thing when they use the words, "morality", "good", and "bad". If not then moral relativism doesn't make sense for then different cultures would be talking about different things when they use these words.

:up: :ok:

For sure. The meaning of a name need not be given by a description.

SO you have a sensation, and name it "S". Later, you have a sensation and say to yourself "Ah, that's S again..."

How do you know this second event is a recurrence of S? — Banno

That all depends on how good my memory is, right? I don't see the relevance though unless you're trying to go Wittgenstein on me. Private language?

You have a point. A simplification would probably be to say that one is constructive, the other destructive, but it falls short as a separating line. But couple this with "activity," there will be a seemingly apparent difference. The visionary of a Leandro Leviste or an Elon Musk can very apparently be seen especially when juxtaposed with the "sleeping, dreaming man" It's that act of valuing, the striving for a "better world" that differentiates one from the other. — Nagel

I find the combination escapism and art to be packed with potential. The escapist is weary of the world - just too many things wrong with it - and the artist, naturally sensitive to aesthetics, imagines, creates and presents faer impression of how beautiful we can make the world.

Does it? Why?

Next time you have the sensation, can you say "ah, that's 'S'"? — Banno

I maybe off track here but naming is not the same as describing. Certain aspects of consciousness though nameable can't be described. So, I may be able to remember the name "S" which I gave to a sensation when I experience it but describing it is an entirely different story, no?

So something like “You ought to be compassionate” is justified by something like “I value compassion?” If so, the issue is that you’re extending, or projecting, your values on to me. What is the justification for that? Why should I, or you for that matter, choose to value compassion? In order for values to be able to justify oughts, they must be justified first, or else they are baseless. Any appeal to some internal state seems incapable of justifying anything. — Pinprick

We can always depend on the fact that we're all human and though there are individual differences, there's something generic about being human - this is evidenced by the fact that despite cultural variations in our sense of right and wrong, within cultures there's, taking into account your concerns, a "miraculous" convergence of moral thought. In short, no individual projects faer idea of morality on another or the entire group, rather everyone arrives at the same moral ideals together.

This is where we’re disagreeing. Oughts are much more than expressions of our desires in my view. Besides this, to say you want things to be different than they are, is to say that because things are a certain way we ought to do X. So it still seems to be derived from what is. “The current state of affairs is unsatisfactory, therefore we should do X.” The only thing you seem to be doing is adding an additional premise, while trying to eliminate the first. “The current state of affairs is unsatisfactory. I desire to change the current state of affairs. Therefore I (we?) should do X.” — Pinprick

My approach to the is/ought problem is simple. When moral theorists state what is and then subsequently make claims about what ought to be they're, contrary to what Hume thought, not inferring the the latter from the former in a vacuum. Rather, what ought to be follows from a background system of values against which what is is set. Granted that the system of values is arbitrary but the point is the necessary inferential link between what is and what ought to be has been firmly established.

It's something like sorting things out on your desk. There's the what is - the state of the items on your desk. Then, based on a system of values (where each item must go), you decide where each item on your desk ought to be.

So let's take "this distinct sensation from my finger tips" and call it "S".

You might now say: "I have sensation S".

What is it that has been left out?

Nothing is left out, since "S" is the name of that sensation, so it includes everything about it...

As if names were somehow short descriptions. — Banno

When encountering "S" I don't actually experience the sensation "S" refers to and therein lies the rub. No?

That is the point at issue! If numbers are real, but not corporeal, then it's a defeater for philosophical materialism - there are reals that are not material. — Wayfarer

This might help the case for some version of idealism (non-materialism).

They (numbers) don't exist in the same way that flowers or pens or chairs exist but are real nonetheless. — Wayfarer

This maybe the stumbling block for idealism (non-materialism).

Even if we were to all agree that immaterial numbers exist, we still have to contend with the fact that numbers aren't like "...flowers or pens or chairs..." We're not out of the woods yet.

1. If irrational numbers don't "exist" I shouldn't be able to create a number that doesn't have a repetend [a repeating finite set of digits]

2. I can create a number that lacks a repetend e.g. 1.01001000100001...

Ergo,

3. Irrational numbers "exist" (I just gave you an example)[1, 2 Modus Tollens]

Art as escapism. Well, it's quite undeniable that given the right conditions - a certain personality type, the right kind of art, and so on - a person can construct a world out of art which then becomes faer made-up sanctuary - a place to retreat to, if only in daydreams, from the indifference bordering on frank hostility of reality.

That said, these mind-worlds serve a very useful purpose - as beacons that reveal a "better world" as opposed to the world as it is, "unsatisfactory" to put it mildly. In other words, it's quite a difficult task to tell apart an escapist from a visionary.

Math ain't my cup of tea and I'm dangerously close to, as Neil deGrasse Tyson puts it, "...the perimeter of my ignorance...". I suppose I should know when to quit. G' day!

Self-imposed isolation is what you're getting at I suppose. This may come off as weird but I like to look at it from a causal perspective. Every single person is causally potent, some to a greater extent than others.

One can, as we all know, cause good things to happen or bad things to happen. Keeping to yourself, "voluntary loneliness", removes you from the causal web and while that's a good move since you can't cause trouble, it's in a way selfish because you can't do good as well. By the way, "selfish" is an inapproporiate word as far as self-imposed isolation is concerned because there's nothing to gain from it. If you really want to find a flaw in it, I suppose you should be focusing on the implicit indifference.

The Tao is...

e pluribus unum

/eɪ ˌplʊərɪbʊs ˈjuːnʊm/

noun

out of many, one (the motto of the US).

They exist as abstractions, mathematical concepts. — emancipate

Yet real numbers and "imaginary" numbers aren't exactly like each other. I can easily express any real number with the numerals, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and a decimal point but not an "imaginary" number. This difference, how does it impact the OP's concerns?

You seem to have missed the point but it's entirely my fault. What I meant was real numbers - as a category - has real-world instantiations i.e. there's at least one real number that's actually, let's just say, measurable with a straight edge. Not so for "imaginary" numbers.

Go find out, Fool. Interesting stuff. — 180 Proof

Sound advice. :up:

Their biases long observed in experiments. Daniel Kahneman (Thinking, Fast and Slow) got the Nobel in 2011 for his work with the late Amos Tversky on the prevalence of cognitive biases and how they adversely impact decision-making & judgment. — 180 Proof

Good job Daniel, my good man. The first step to a solution is recognizing that there's a problem.

More importantly, are the findings (of the experiments) generalizable? Or given that the fortune seems to be rather fickle about whom she favors or dislikes, should we carry out invididualized experiments? Could the trade-off between statistical generalizations and individual uniqueness be misleading?

I don't think this is right. Imaginary numbers exist as mathematical entities used by mathematicians. In exactly the same way, the real numbers exist for mathematicians: they exist because they are used.
The term imaginary number is considered to be a misnomer by many mathematians. — emancipate

@Wayfarer Corrigendum.

By the way, if imaginary numbers exist, what is the square root of -1? I know the square root of 4 is 2, a number; I know the square root of 2 is 1.414..., another number.

All real numbers are (probably?) instantiated in the universe. Take for example pi, wherever you see something circular/spherical, it's there as the ratio between circumference and diameter.

Where is a real-world instantiation of the square root of -1? Electronics? Semiconductors?

The paradox, people of a given country will cheat, torture, rape, and kill each other but will, with the slightest of provocations, rally under their national flag. And when the reason for that goes away, it's back to business as usual - cheat, torture, rape, and kill each other.

In short:

Officially, in philosophy, it's about the power of the argument.

Out in the real world, it's about the argument from power. In the real world, the argument from power is always the most powerful one, "criticial thinking" be damned.

But philosophers are aware of that, are they not?
So why do they still advocate for criticial thinking? — baker

A loaded gun's muzzle pushed against the temple can be very convincing, so convincing in fact that the owner of the temple may be convinced of faer own nonexistence [pace Descartes].

Likewise, a sound argument has the same power of persuasion that a loaded gun's muzzle pushed against the temple has. One is always, without exception, forced to accept the conclusion of a sound argument.

It seems that either way - whether you're in the presence of a philosopher presenting a good argument or whether you're under duress to believe something - we're being forced on pain of injury, death, or looking like a fool.

And what are the best arguments against the existence of qualia? — noname

Qualia seems to refer to that ineffable, unwordable, aspect of consciousness. To say that it's not real would mean that everything about consciousness is expressible in words and let's, for the moment, ignore the issue of how well such descriptions will be. Let's conduct a little experiment with me as the subject. I'm, as of this moment, typing these words from my keyboard and I get this distinct sensation from my finger tips - it has a certain quality to it - but as I try to put into words this "distinct sensation" I can't seem to do it. Similarly, I'm reading these words as I type it onto my computer screen - I can see the words clearly and know, to some extent, what these words mean and as I try to convey the conscious experience of reading and knowing these words, I still feel language is not up to the task - there's a certain part of the experience of consciousness that I can't seem to express in words. This, to sum it up, is qualia. Ask Daniel Dennett to describe his consciousness as best as he can and then ask him, "is that all?" or "anything else?" The answer should be "no" and "yes" respectively. In other words, there's something about consciousness that defies description and this ain't so because of linguistic issues; au contraire, something about consciousness is indescribable and that's qualia.

Yes, true, although black holes, in particular, were theoretically posited as a direct consequence of Einstein's laws, weren't they? And again I'm not claiming that science is all-knowing even in principle. Look carefully at the OP again. The topic I'm interested in is: are numbers real? And if so, in what sense are they real?

The view that numbers are real, independently of any mental activity on a human's part, is what is generally known as mathematical platonism. The point is, this is unpopular in today's academy; there are many very influential mathematicians, who are far greater experts than I could ever hope to be, who are intent on showing that it's mistaken. But according to this article Benecareff's influential argument against platonism was made 'on the grounds that an adequate account of truth in mathematics implies the existence of abstract mathematical objects, but that such objects are epistemologically inaccessible because they are causally inert and beyond the reach of sense perception.' In other words, this argument denies that we can have the innate grasp of mathematical truths that Frege asserts in the paper mentioned above. That's the 'meta-argument' I'm trying to get my head around. — Wayfarer

Well, what exactly does "real" in "numbers are real" mean? I'm no mathematician but I can say with some degree of confidence that numbers are, at the end of they day, abstractions - they are, in the most basic sense, patterns in sets: The number 1 is the pattern in the sets {0}, {a}, {red}, {fox} and the number 3 is the pattern in the sets {good, 3, pee}, {%, fee, bravery}, {love, dog, +} and so on. The question then is, are abstractions real? Finding an answer to this question is the first order of business, no? So, what do you think? Are abstractions real?

A good starting point is to realize that all it takes is a mind sensitive to patterns, with a pattern-recognition module so to speak, to see that there is a pattern in the world as we know it that humans have named numbers. Any system capable of detecting patterns will, sooner or later, hit upon the idea of number from its observations of the world. Doesn't that indicate that though it takes a mind or a pattern-detecting system to conceive of numbers, the pattern has to exist outside of the mind, in the world "out there" as opposed to "inside our minds"? How can the mind perceive of something that doesn't itself exist in some sense of that word? Beats me.

Have you also looked into Imaginary Numbers? The square root of -1, according to mathematicians, doesn't exist and that means, the aptly named, real numbers exist. How exactly are mathematicians using the words "exist" when making statements about the reals compared to imaginary numbers?

Oh and I forgot to mention, thanks, as always.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Optimism_bias (scroll down to the section on 'pessimistic bias') — 180 Proof

Pessimism bias is an effect in which people exaggerate the likelihood that negative things will happen to them — Wikipedia

I think a well-designed study should settle the issue once and for all.

That aside, the notion pessimism bias works only if we know that things aren't as bad as the pessimist believes. Whence this knowledge? It presupposes, along with the idea optimism bias, that both are flawed views of the world. How do the people who coined these terms know that?

What really boggles the mind is that two mutually contradictory points of view (pessimism & optimism) are to be found in the same environment (this world). Something smells fishy, no?

I wish someone would make the effort of gathering information that could be used to prove pessimism or optimism, neither, even both, I have no stake in it. Such a project would involve making a list of plans people make for whathaveyou and calculating the success/failure ratio of these plans. If the ratio is 1 then neither optimism nor pessimism is justifiable, if the ratio is greater than 1 then Go! Optimists! and if the ratio is less than 1, pessimists are right on the money. We could do this at the level of an individual too. Why don't you try it on yourself and check whether you should be a pessimist or an optimist or something else? Since there's a practical and sound statistical method for settling the matter, arguing about it without taking that into account is a complete waste of time unless one's intentions are of an exploratory character.

The device you're communicating with depends on the unreasonable effectiveness of maths. Interesting article, but the sense in which I'm arguing for Wigner's view, is certainly not that maths or the mathematical sciences are in any sense omniscient in principle or practice. Very well aware of that. — Wayfarer

I didn't mean to say you didn't know this stuff but what I want to bring up is there are certain areas in physics where math, as they claim, "breaks down" e.g. black holes, the Big Bang singularity, to name a few. I wonder if this means anything? Does it shake scientists' faith in math as a complete, self-contained, tool for studying the world at large?

Then what does justify an ought? — Pinprick

The justification of oughts can be found in the system of values one chooses. It's no secret that this is exactly where moral theorists are facing problems as no moral theory is either sufficient or necessary, something that probably is the holy grail of ethics.

What's to be noted however is that an ought isn't inferred from an is as Hume seemed to have believed and if that's the case, Hume's objection is null and void. Oughts do nothing but express our desire for things to be different, that's all there is to it. The bottom line is no argument is being made and if so no fallacy can be committed.

Aren’t they inadequate because they aren’t capable of bridging the gap? It’s funny, because I always felt like it was the moral theories that ignored/overlooked/dismissed the is/ought gap. — Pinprick

I maybe mistaken of course but Hume's issue is with how an ought can't be inferred from an is and justifiably so if there were no reasons/explanations on how normative statements that depend on a value system can be derived from prescriptive statements that don't. I'll try another approach. What is an ought really? Doesn't it express a desire/wish/hope that things could be, well, different but different from what exactly? Well, different from what is of course. It appears from what I've just said that the is-ought relationship is not in any sense a logical deduction and therefore Hume's objection is N/A. The ought isn't deduced from an is, rather an ought is desired from an is.

Of course, no disputing that — Wayfarer

The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences' — Wayfarer

Well, for what it's worth, turbulence

The onset of turbulence can be predicted by the dimensionless Reynolds number, the ratio of kinetic energy to viscous damping in a fluid flow. However, turbulence has long resisted detailed physical analysis, and the interactions within turbulence create a very complex phenomenon. Richard Feynman has described turbulence as the most important unsolved problem in classical physics. — Wikipedia

Math, not as effective as Eugene Wigner thought, eh?

The Unreasonable Ineffectiveness Of Math

Aren’t our feelings/emotional states also “is’s?” Aren’t they facts about the world like any other? — Pinprick

Sorry for replying twice to your concerns regarding the is/ought problem but it seems necessary to evaluate the matter further.

It appears that Hume's worry centers on the connection or lack thereof between facts and values. Indeed, the objection is a valid one for there definitely is a difference between statements about what is and statements about what ought to be. Statements of the former kind are value-independent i.e. can be made in the absence of any values but statements of the latter kind are value-dependent i.e. can be made only within a framework of values. Necessarily then that one can't be used to infer the other without explaining/arguing how the two are logically connected. What strikes me as odd is that moral theories are precisely the systems of values that bridge the is/ought gap and Hume, for some reason, seems to have ignored/overlooked/dismissed that as inadequate.

Aren’t our feelings/emotional states also “is’s?” Aren’t they facts about the world like any other? — Pinprick

Is/ought problem

Hume's is is a bit nuanced in my humble opinion. It doesn't include our impressions/feelings of/about the facts of nature and only refers to the facts of nature minus our impressions/feelings with respect to them. The is/ought problem arises out of the absence of an inferential link betwixt descriptive statements (is) and normative claims (ought) but our feelings/impressions about/of deeds/actions provide the missing link, bridges this gap.

It looks like the great Hume goofed up since there's no is/ought gap at all. Consider the arguments below.

Argument 1.
Premise (is): Murder occurs quite often
Conclusion (ought): We ought not murder

Argument 2.
Not a Premise, just a statement of fact (is): Murder occurs quie often
Premise: Murder makes us sad
Conclusion: We ought not murder

Hume thought that is/ought arguments are like argument 1 where the reason for an ought is an is. That's incorrect, is/ought arguments are actually argument 2 in form and the is statement is simply there as a description of how the world, well, is. The actual premise, like "Murder makes us sad", is, in the above example, a declaration of our objection to the is, to wit, "murder occurs quite often".

In short, an ought/ought not is never obtained/inferred/deduced from an is but from our feelings/impressions towards/of an is. I'm surprised Hume failed to notice this.

Well, I consider the absence/lack of a definitive, clear idea about humanity in the sense how we should conduct ourselves? a sign of complexity rather than incompetence. There are so many perspectives on the human family, each valid in its own way, that sorting the wheat from the chaff is an uphill task. I suggest/recommend patience on our part, adopt a laissez-faire attitude, perhaps even pray if you're the religious type, hope for a lucky break, and do what doctors sometime do, to wit, wait and watch. A part of me wants to kick myself for such naive optimism but I don't quite care.