A variation on Wittgenstein - yes. — Banno
I'm questioning what it is that makes S a "distinct sensation". How could one know that the second sensation is a recurrence of S? — Banno
You’re right that for Merleau-Ponty what counts in perception is differences and relationships between colors , but he would also argue that colors , and all other perceptions, only emerge as as expressions of the body’s actions in the world. — Joshs
...and how could you decide if that memory was correct? There's nothing to compare it to, except itself. — Banno
I'm a bit surprised to see you agree here, Joshs.
Given that it makes no nevermind, why not just say that there isn't a how-the-colour-red-looks-to-Luke? — Banno
You can't convey the subjective character of "how it looks/feels to me" in language (such that others can know, e.g., how red looks to you), so there's no point in trying. Does this make the concept of qualia useless? It apparently finds its use in philosophical discussions. — Luke
some aspects of consciousness are indescribable. — TheMadFool
I still feel language is not up to the task... — TheMadFool
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