Hopefully this indicates you now understand the point being made in the text, that space and time belong to the subject himself, so that when there isn’t a subject there aren’t those necessary pure intuitions that belong to him, precisely what Kant meant by the disappearance of the one entails the disappearance of the other. — Mww

I just reiterated what was in the text. How could you have missed that, too?
That's what I was saying. This is crazy when you're agreeing with me, but you don't know you're agreeing with me.

What society as a whole needs is to get rid of the post-truth scam artists eroding the status of knowledge. The media literacy of being able to understand who's who and not fall for scammer narratives is key to healing society's relation to knowledge. — Christoffer

Yup. We are in the age of misinformation. When the whole society is focused on number of views or clicks, that's what we get.

Having said the above, one does envy the life of the ancient stoics, to a degree. They were not preoccupied with the social life of the modern era. Instead, they met, drank, had discussions on the events of the senate, were consulted with since everyone in Rome was in one way or another affected by the Greek philosophers. I don't know what more to say, am I moping here? Maybe I should resign myself to feeling inadequate in terms of my coping strategies. — Shawn

There is, indeed, a big difference between the ancient times and today when it comes to the bombardment of our life with social media. So, you try to cope using the means that are fitting for today.
For example, there is no more "vanishing" to a remote, uninhabited island (unless it's a tv show). Even if you isolate yourself, if you have a computer, a phone, or tv, then you're bombarded.
The key is mind over matter. A lot of what you see online are fake. Misinformation. Exaggeration.

Given minor differences in translations, yes, he is, and no, they are not. Mode of perception is not perception, and neither space nor time is ever an appearance, but only that which is in space and time, is. — Mww

Again, misreading.

We have therefore wanted to say that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of appearance; that the things that we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them to be, nor are their relations so con­stituted in themselves as they appear to us; and that if we remove our own subject or even only the subjective constitution of the senses in general, then all the constitution, all relations of objects in space and time, indeed space and time themselves would disappear, and as ap­pearances they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us. — Mww

Space and time are its pure forms, sensation in general its matter. We can cognize only the former a priori, i.e., prior to all actual perception, and they are therefore called pure intuition; the latter, however, is that in our cognition that is responsible for it being called a posteriori cognition, i.e., empirical intuition. The former ad­heres to our sensibility absolutely necessarily, whatever sort of sensations we may have; the latter can be very different for different subjects. Even if we could bring this intuition of ours to the highest degree of distinctness we would not thereby come any closer to the constitution of objects in themselves. — Mww

Please follow their argument to the fullest. It is easy to get lost with two paragraphs almost repeating themselves line by line.

Space and time are its pure forms which we can only cognize a priori. (not in themselves). This is called intuition which adheres to our sensibility absolutely necessarily. The things we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them to be. And if we remove our own subject, then all relations in space and time, indeed space and time themselves would disappear.

There. I rearrange the lines of their argument for easy understanding.

The 'forms of intuition' - namely, space and time - and the world of appearances exist only in relation to the subject's cognitive faculties. If the thinking subject were removed, what we understand as the empirical world would also cease to exist because it is dependent the structures of human cognition. — Wayfarer

Correct. The world wouldn't disappear if we disappeared.
Here we can also bring in Wittgenstein. The the limit of the world would be disabled as well.

It's the same point that Kant was making, about how time has a subjective component, arising from the awareness of duration. — Wayfarer

No, it's the bit where Kant says 'were I to remove the thinking subject, the whole world must vanish'.

I looked up the exact quote:

"Now space and time exist only in the subject as modes of perception. If we remove the subject, they vanish as well, as do all appearances. Nothing can remain that is not, in its own way, an object of experience." (Critique of Pure Reason, A42/B59) — Wayfarer

It's a misreading. Kant is not saying here that space and time vanish as soon as the subject vanishes. Look again. "space and time exist only in the subject as modes of perception. Because to Kant, even space and time are only appearances to us. If space and time are perceived, then they are object of experience only. If we remove the perceiver, then there's no object of experience, is there?

It just now caught my attention that there seems to be a pervasive agreement among thinkers in this forum that the way the world reaches our consciousness, which is different than the way the world actually is, constitutes an automatic error or subjectivity on our part.

When is it subjective? If the construction of our eyes is such that the cones carry the photo pigment and communicates with the brain when light waves enter, which causes us to see colors, then how is that subjective?

No kidding. Just the kind of thing that will trip up your average "realist". — Wayfarer

Apologies. I thought you were one.

The point I'm trying to make is that there is a kind of 'dual perspective' at work in understanding this question, which is deep question. There's common sense realism, in which we are just individual subjects in a vast world. But there's also the philosophical understanding of the role of the mind in constructing the world. — Wayfarer

Fair enough. In so far as the use of language influences the way we see the world, then yes, the mind plays a role in constructing the world.

I would take that remark seriously if you demonstrated any grasp of the point I'm making. — Wayfarer

It's a trick question in philosophy. Wittgenstein talking about the world and the subject.

"The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world." — Wayfarer

W stepping outside to talk about the subject. If what's he's saying is correct, then he is incorrect. It is a paradox.

It seems to be more than just lacking high level communicative capabilities. That they are unable to form complex thoughts and reasoning.

What exactly is going on here? What in culture and education fails to form these abilities? — Christoffer

The intelligence of a collective group or population can change. This has been discovered by historians. Reading comprehension, depth in understanding, and ability to construct complex written or spoken narratives can be undermined by technology, among other things.
So, then the question becomes, can a reduced intelligence be the cause of a downfall of a culture? Yes! We've seen over histories that cultures/kingdoms had risen, reached their glorious era, then vanished.

Has the complete subversion of the needs of consumers been accomplished? I'm no Marxist; but, one has to really think about how your needs are being subverted by the calculus of rational self-interest by those who profit the most from making or changing laws the most. Actual individuals don't have the time or resources to make or change laws, special interest groups do, as well as the rich, funding them. — Shawn

Have you studied behavioral economics?
The power of the consumers lies in their decision to spend and where. And that affects what products and services to produce.

True "flourishing" comes from resignation, withdrawal from engagement with others. Social engagement leads to more attachments, and more conflicts, and more frustrations, litigations, manifestations, allegations, contortions,
and complications, in short, drama and disappointments, all of which serve only to entangle the individual further in the suffering. Withdrawal is the first step in peaceful denial-of-will. — schopenhauer1

Those are the monks. There are people who practice this way of living.

Physicalism is reductionist by definition. Why? Because it methodically excludes or reduces what may be deemed anything other than the physical to the physical. Physicalism is 'the view that all phenomena, including complex processes like consciousness, emotions, and social behaviors, can be explained without residue in terms of physical components and laws—typically those of physics and chemistry—without requiring additional principles or explanations'. — Wayfarer

I'm not sure where you got that definition.
I haven't looked up the fitting definition for this purpose. But it certainly isn't what you define as physicalism. Reductionism by design denies other existents except for one thing. Whatever that one thing is. That is not what physicalism suggests. I already mentioned this before -- physicalims doesn't deny gravity and consciousness or the subjective experience. It denies that there is an unexplained gap between the physical and the intangible, subjective experiences.

It is of course true that when it comes to phenomena such as gravity and the composition of massive bodies, then physicalism is a sound assumption (which is the 'methodological' aspect). But the extension of that methodology to the problems of philosophy is what is objectionable about it. — Wayfarer

I see where your objection is -- that physicalism implies that there's only one explanation for both the celestial bodies and our consciousness (which is rightly the domain of philosophy). It doesn't. There are types of matter, just as there are types of existents. What physicalism denies is that there is no explanation at all for the mind or the consciousness.

Actually, I was thinking of mereological nihilism, that there are no true part whole relations, and that arrangements of them are ultimately arbitrary. Thus, the world contains no cats, trees, stars, etc. These only exist in the mind. There are only a few fundemental fields (perhaps unifiable, in which case there is just one thing). This seems to make "saying true things about things" virtually impossible. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Okay, you can hold this view, but it doesn't undermine physicalism. I wrote above to Wayfarer that physicalism can be all inclusive, except for the belief that there is this divide between our consciousness and our body composition.

My guess, which is mostly based on how other "problems in the sciences," have progressed, is that the terms currently applied need to be radically rethought. That's just a guess though. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree with this.

Wow!

Consciousness, like memories, is not a thing. It is a status that happens when our neurons get stimulated repeatedly. Our individual, unique memories, which we fondly call subjective are made possible by synapses. — L'éléphant

On that view, wouldn't flight also not be a thing, since it is just "cells in wings responding to chemical signals." The same for "running," or "life" itself (and so also for each instance of living things?) Yet, since we have already successfully mastered heavier than air flight, we know that the principles of flight were not to be found in studying the organelles of cells in the wings of all flying animals, nor in their DNA, etc. (at least not most easily). Indeed, one can build a flying machine while being largely ignorant of the biology of flying animals so long as one understands the principles of lift, etc. that all those animals physiology takes advantage of. The same seems true of running and swimming, or even language production, and perhaps it is even so for conciousness. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I guess we can a draw a Venn diagram and show that all of the above would be inside the circle of consciousness. It goes without saying that all of that would require consciousness.

In philosophy, depending on what philosopher you subscribe to, a thing is something that has 'wholeness' and perceptibility as its core features. No one, at least that I know of, has defined consciousness as a thing.

But then we are at risk of dissolving all things and having only a single universal process. IMO, the solution here is to realize that things (substances) have relative degrees of unity. — Count Timothy von Icarus

If by dissolving all things and having only a single universal process you mean 'reductionism', there is no risk associated with using the view of physicalism, in my opinion. I understand that there are some members on this forum that detest the word reductionism. I myself do not care about this idea. I don't support it. Physicalism is not a reductive theory. It is a foundational theory that purports to show that the world cannot exist without matter or the physical components.
And I say this, gravity is there because of the forces of masses. Yet, we cannot see or touch gravity.
So, the only thing one is risking by holding the view of the physical is, they let go of the ideas of the magical phenomena, about which an explanation is impossible. Gravity is not magic. Consciousness is not magic. They can be explained and traced back to the origin.

In my reading, it seems that objections to physicalist theories of mind tend to largely center on the appeal to the physical being used to drag along other suppositions, e.g. a sort of reductionism — Count Timothy von Icarus

Vide supra.

So, the point I was trying to make is, there really isn't a gap between the subjective and the material component of our experiences. The million pulses that have to happen in order to retrieve an image of an apple or a tree is not magic. It's just misunderstood, I think. Our consciousness of the world is in the form of a picture or story, but that's not how our brain stored it.

I like this thread because it brings up a lot of philosophical questions, rather than scientific questions -- a common problem when physicalism is the topic.

But then, to avoid hypocrisy, the door should be open to alternative metaphysical commitments that don’t have any direct bearing on the conducting of the scientific method, no? — Baden

I suppose I am advocating for a kind of radical agnosticism as to the ultimate nature of things — Baden

The ultimate nature of things had already been announced way back when the pre-socratics didn't have the scientific method, let alone physics yet. The universe, according to them, is made up of "stuff" (What stuff is, is not important at the moment. We just want to point out that they, too, saw reality as physical). So, the humans' recorded conception of the world predates any scientific method.

But first, I will segue here and talk about the reason why the scientists (I mean scientists, not philosophers) do not have a well-defined explanation of how memories formed in the brain is because they discovered that the human brain is much more complex than previously thought when it comes to determining where exactly the memories are stored. We don't store complete images or stories in the brain. When we try to remember something that happened in the past, it's the network systems that get activated and neurons talk to each other by sending signals in the form of electrical pulses (not to be confused with electricity) and chemicals. These are encoded signals, as they explained, during our experiencing. The formal name for this process is synaptic plasticity.

Going back to the metaphysical view of physicalism, it is necessary that we have to resort to an explanation of how our experiences get stored in the brain. The 'subjective' experiences that we refer to is at the heart of the hard question of philosophy, after all. Because it is here where we assign the place of the consciousness. Consciousness, like memories, is not a thing. It is a status that happens when our neurons get stimulated repeatedly. Our individual, unique memories, which we fondly call subjective are made possible by synapses. The differences in our recollection and our feelings (differences, therefore we say they are subjective) are due to the fact that our brain cells are not pre-mapped so that everyone who eats an apple would have in their brain the same exact set of neurons talking to each other. I could be missing a taste bud for sweets, for example, or tartness. I could be deficient in some vitamins, for example.

In the Republic, Socrates attacks not only the abusers of power and wealth, i.e., tyrants, but also poets. — Jamal

In those days, poets existed [made their living] through the patronage of the rich. They penned praises for their patrons.

The question is why this is accompanied by a subjective experience of it, — Patterner

Define subjective experience.

to note that all of the investors in FTX got their funds back, which was announced in May this year. Which, I think, tends to throw the very long sentence that SBF received into some question. Lewis doesn’t say it outright, but he seems to suggest it. He says in conclusion ‘I think the truth is closer to “young person with an intellectually defensible but socially unacceptable moral code makes a huge mistake in trying to live by it” than “criminal on the loose in the financial system.” — Wayfarer

Wow! Okay. I'm gonna say it outright that you are mistaken and -- Jesus Christ!

The damage to the financial industry is much more than getting their money back. Are you really saying "No harm done"?

But it isn't explained through physicalism alone. — Patterner

It does explain that the processes such as the consciousness are made possible by the physical bodies that we possess.

Here is the folly of the civilized humans:
It is us that labeled the consciousness as non-physical before we have an argument for it. Let us admit this much. So how is it that we have arrived at this conclusion without first explaining its relation to the bodies. In fact what's happening here is that we already have a notion of what is non-physical before we have a reasoning for it. And the way we win this claim is by saying "no", "no", "no" to the theory of physicalism. And we feel smug about doing this because the theory of physicalism, according to us, did not even provide an adequate account of the non-physical.
Why would they? We invented the non-physical notion. And yet our senses do not deny that there are physical bodies that we perceive -- with the help of the light, the air, the atmosphere, darkness, and particle invisible to our eyes, the mass, the texture, we come to know what a tree is, a table, a chair, another human being, animals, starts and the sky. Everything we do involves matter.

Physicalism can even explain mental functions, like how we perceive different wavelengths of electromagnetic radiation, differentiate between different wavelengths, and move to avoid things that will harm the body. — Patterner

I am guessing this is a typo. Last time I checked, you are opposed to this.

No, because the fact of one's own being is neither a physical fact, nor can it be denied (cogito ergo sum). — Wayfarer

A claim without support.

And here, 'supervenes' is able to be defined in just such a way as to paper over any current or even newly-discovered inadequacies in physicalism. — Wayfarer

Another claim without support.

Well, speaking of Aristotle, he distinguishes artifacts (i.e. machines) from organisms on the basis that the latter are self-organising and their parts all work together to maintain the whole. Whereas machines are manufactured, their principle is external to them, and each part performs only the role designated by manufacturer. — Wayfarer

I don't know what to make of this. Did you read his 4 causes?

Just to be clear, I am not saying that Aristotle came up with physicalism. All I am saying is, if you read his 4 causes, the material cause is there. If you are searching for a sympathetic philosopher to the notion of physicalsim, it is Aristotle.

No, I'm opposed to physicalism because I think it's an illusion, something like a very influential popular myth. Because we're bedazzled by science and technology (and hey I'm no different in that respect) we see the world in those terms, but matter has no ultimate, mind-independent reality. Tangential to the original post, but there it is. — Wayfarer

All I see here is a "no". But you didn't provide a convincing argument for why you are opposed to it.

I gotcha. I misinterpreted your post that I initially responded to. — Patterner

No problem. :up:

Ah, materialist philosophy of mind. I’ll try out some objections. First, you’re up against ‘the hard problem’ - there’s never been a plausible account of how the first-person nature of lived experience arises from the processes described by objective science. Experience has a qualitative dimension which never appears in the equations of physics by design, due to the ‘Cartesian division’ at the origin of modern science, the separation of primary (measurable) and secondary (subjective) attributes. — Wayfarer

I could interpret what you say here in two ways: One. In other words, you are supporting physicalism. If there's never been an account of how the first-person nature of lived experience arises from the objective source, then wouldn't that tell you that maybe it's because it can be sufficiently explained through physicalism alone?
Two. We just accept that there are two categories of existence -- the physical and the non-physical without further argumentation.

Practical illustration. You arrive home to discover your house and everything in it has burned down. If there was an instrument that could capture your precise neuronal and physiological state at that instant, it might capture data from which a suitably-trained user might be able to infer a state of acute emotional distress, and which would be an objectively accurate account. But on the basis of that data no matter how detailed, there would no way to determine how it feels and what it means to you. Saying that this is ‘neuronal’ or ‘physical’ might be objectively accurate but it would also be meaningless in the absence of the first-person perspective - namely, yours - which you bring to it. — Wayfarer

I see where I need to make what I said clearer (or at least, my idea of physicalism).

It is not a matter of objectively perceiving what one feels -- in your example, turmoil and distress. Physicalism is not in the business of determining the objectivity (or the lack thereof) of experience. I think we make a mistake when we take physicalism as an epistemic theory, rather than an ontological theory. If it could demonstrate (and I think it does pretty well) that all things supervenes on the physical structure, then it has done its job.

What I think is difficult for us to reconcile with accepting the truth of physicalism is that we, by default, feel defeated by the notion of the "mechanical". But if you follow Aristotle's 4 causes, it theorizes that we're not just machines in motion, but could be affected by changes in our environment, the efficient cause. So, we are necessarily in the trajectory of change. However, there's the final cause, which is described as the point of our existence (the end or purpose). Here you could argue that the final cause is a subjective notion -- but if you actually incorporate all the 4 causes into the formation of an entity, you'd find that the trajectory of our existence necessarily leads to us being the way we are. (We need to drop this expression "in motion", like particles are in motion. Rather, we have to think in terms of imprinting, or molding, or even influencing).

He does a lot of long-form interviews, podcasts, rallies, so one can get a fairly good judge at competence. Weasels can bring up one or two lines that they find nuts, and sometimes rightfully so, but when compared to the millions of other things he says their portrayal turns out to be false. Kamala does zero interviews. — NOS4A2

:up: I'll check them out.

↪kindred
:roll: — 180 Proof

I laughed at this.


My dude, are you not seeing the point?

If intelligence is distinct from the physical how can the non-physical affect the physical to give rise to life or other intelligent processes that occur in matter ? — kindred

You could wipe out your awareness/consciousness by eliminating the sodium in your diet. Is this clear?

But I haven't heard of a physicalist account of the bridge. I hear of different physical structures and events added to the mix, but not of how the physical has the subjective experience of itself, rather than just taking place "in the dark." I thought maybe you had heard of a theory that had leptons in a central role. — Patterner

lol. You haven't heard of the physicalist account of the bridge because they don't say there is one! That's my point. Physicalism denies that there is the physical, then there's the other that's non-physical. Everything supervenes on the physical.

Is it not an attribute or property of a physical thing ? How can intelligence be a tangible thing that can be touched? How would you support your assertion if that’s the case ? — kindred

It's because you have the ordinary observation of reality. So, to you, if you can't see the atoms, atoms don't exist. Only tables and chairs exist.

Intelligence supervenes on the physical. That's the metaphysical assertion that I am claiming. Without the physical reality, there would be no morality, no subjective experience, no concepts of anything.

Since intelligence is a non-physical thing — kindred

In my view, intelligence is a physical thing.

What is your account of the bridge from the physical to the phenomenal? — Patterner

I don't have one. I mentioned earlier that I favor physicalism.

Here's a suggestion for Kamala's detractors: rather than falsely pin her to an ideology that suggests she actually believes in something, point out the fact that she has no solid policies at all, that e.g. her website is a bunch of gobbledeygook, a Rorshach blot of cliches designed so that any vague bullshit can be read into it. She is horribly and fatally scared of committing herself to anything other than being Not Trump and her ultimate faith is in the stupidity of the opposition in not realizing and exploiting that, but rather focusing on easily rebutted insults that harm their sources more than her. She was laughing at the debate and she'll laugh her way right into the presidency if the dummies on the other side keep going the way their going. — Baden

I actually watched their debate. My purpose was to find out if Trump was really crazy as the media portray. I did not find him crazy. What I found is someone who is willing to ask the hard questions. I didn't expect either one to have a complete vision of a government given the 90 minute format of the debate. That would be ridiculous. But, my god, Harris was scared to say anything with conviction. She loved teasing Trump. And she failed to answer the first question thrown at her by the moderators. Nothing in the way of conviction about reality. I would say it is cowardice.

Curiously, physics itself is largely mathematical in nature. The standard model of particle physics is understood in purely mathematical terms. But mathematics itself is not physical, but conceptual. How would you account for that? — Wayfarer

Conceptualization is still part of our mental activity. And mental activity is neuronal. And we know that's physical. But I think you mean to say, there is no 'picture' of mathematical concepts, but just concepts. So how did we come up with mathematical concepts.

I believe you are exhibiting what empirical mathematicians have complained about in the past and present -- that just because it is mathematics, it must be only theoretical, and any insinuation that we didn't arrive at this higher mathematical thinking without clinging to the tangibility of objects, or the empirical nature of reality, is blasphemous. That is the world of the purists. Either they fail to understand what physicalism is, or they, too, are searching for that bridge.

Then how did matter become intelligent unless intelligence was there to begin with. — kindred

I think what you're really asking is how did consciousness or mind develop from the brain. This is the hard problem of philosophy. And this forum is teeming with threads like this -- really good ones, too.
The subjective experience is a hot button because 'no' philosophical accounts have given us the bridge from the physical to the phenomenal. The critics of consciousness and subjective experience had raised an unconscionable objection against the theories of perception that sort of 'skip' the step on when this -- this consciousness -- develops from physical bodies.
I don't have my own suspicion as to the strength of their argument because, to me, consciousness is physical. As in atomic. As in leptons. The fluidity of our own experience is physical.

Then that must mean intelligence precedes life in that it’s the potential for inanimate matter to become matter. Where did this intelligence come from ? My argument is that it’s been there all along and preceded life. — kindred

Matter precedes intelligence.

The question I have is…has intelligence always been around before this world was created prior to the Big Bang or was it simply an emergent phenomenon thereafter ?

In my opinion intelligence must have been pre-existing and manifested (or re-manifested) itself in life and nature and through us human beings.

As to how life emerged from non-life through abiogenesis which has not been observed scientifically remains a mystery which gives credence to a pervading intelligence prior to the existence of this universe. — kindred

I disagree. Intelligence did develop in complex organisms and it is cumulative -- so there must be the 'infrastructure' of brain and body. And this infrastructure must continue to change/progress in ways that could accommodate higher innovations.

It is not unreasonable to imagine that the universe is populated only by one-celled amoeba and nothing else.

It sounds like your view is that the intelligence must be there first before we could be the intelligent life forms. But it is more reasonable to think that matter must be there first -- the brain, the body, the senses for neural connections to occur.

The dog has no issues in yet going to touch with its nose the door with the more circular figure. This until the two doors – more properly the circular ellipse and the elliptical circle – become indistinguishable by it. At this culminating point, the heretofore friendly dog goes insane as described.

Granting that this experiment did in fact take place, why would the dog go mad – — javra

Did the experiment reveal their findings? If that was a true experiment, the researchers would have some insights as to why the dog went insane.

We humans can judge a dog’s reaction as a rational response or not, but I see no evidence that a dog is using reason prior to any response or after the fact, or during a “communication.” — Fire Ologist

OK. So it turns out that you will accept that a dog's reaction is a rational response, but deny that the dog is rational because they don't "use reason". I take it that you mean that the dog doesn't say out loud "This is the situation, so I should do that." But humans often act without verbalizing their reasons out loud. Does that mean they aren't rational either? — Ludwig V

Once again, I think you misunderstood. I don't read Fire's comment as saying the dog's reaction is rational. This is the pitfall of propositional logic. Humans can judge (view) the dog's reaction as rational, not that it is rational. Fire's comment went on to explain that he does not see any evidence that the dog is using reason.

In other words, when one misunderstands it. — 180 Proof

I didn't say you should implicate yourself.
.

At least some animals learn from each other (likely by means of mimicry) and even pass on (some of) what they have learnt to succeeding generations. (Don't lionesses and wolves teach their cubs to hunt?) That is simply an extension of the ability to adapt one's behaviour in a changing environment. — Ludwig V

I think on this thread, we keep missing the point when we say ..."but animals also do this or that.."
Like us, animals can and do learn from each other.

Anyways, what are other people's most uninteresting philosopher/philosophy and why? — schopenhauer1

Nietzche's Übermensch.

It is uninteresting once you know it is about existentialism and the will to power.

:100: I think that was broadly characteristic of many of the Axial Age philosophies both East and West. — Wayfarer

Yes, true. It's the mind.