I agree that it's not necessary to do good all the time, since I don't think that it's necessary for one to have a good life. My point was only about the lack of harms being good regarding people who don't exist, but even here, it would not be practical to claim that one has to constantly do good. Practical limitations and the long-term consequences of an action have to ge kept in mind. In short, even though I theoretically differ from mainstream philosophers, my views, for all practical purposes, lead to intuitive conclusions due to the nature of our current existence. Trying to do an excess of a good thing can create more harm than good, which would be counterproductive. I am doubtful of the efficacy of unmitigated altruism, especially when there are pragmatic concerns as well as a probability of harm from unqualified "obligations".

The value of good might be counter-intuitive, but it's probably still less so than an absolutist opposition to all procreation for the sake of a lesser or nonexistent good.

Edit: Also, I am glad to know you're not an antinatalist or a Schopenhauerian pessimist (it would be important to remember that not all pessimists might support AN). :)

Thanks for sharing this in-depth and enlightening information. I haven't had much time to study these topics for the past few months due to personal commitments and online debates. But the comments here have sparked my curiosity again, and I'll surely look into these intriguing events as soon as I possibly can. A true "gift" indeed.

Btw, if you have any book recommendations, I shall be immensely grateful to receive them. I am not the best at choosing :p

Some people might think that their notions of "burdens" trump all other perspectives and considerations. However, there are many people who find ineffable joys in their lives that they could not have asked for had they not been created. If that point isn't relevant, then neither is the claim that one is "forcing" something onto someone who does not exist. When their are no houses, equivocating by comparing an actual violation of interests to one involving "dropping" things at doors that don't hide a house or a person can seem to be emblematic of confusion or even, dare I say, manipulation (semantical, of course!).

Ignoring all joy, all the harm that could befall existing people due to a total lack of reproduction, and indirectly devaluing meaningful lives by essentially telling them that their creation was a tragic mistake that should not have happened due to the existence of risks is inherently paternalistic and fulfills nothing other than a pessimistic desire to ignore all that is good. One's personal evaluation of "X" (which could be totally legitimate and understandable) doesn't give them the right to suggest that X is supposedly irredeemably bad for all, especially those who aren't here to express their opinions on it (this is as sensible as the claims about "forcing" or "imposing" life) or that a particular component of X is all that we should care about. I think that this is narrow-minded at best and downright dangerous at worst.

It's also increasingly becoming "clear" to me that antinatalism is false. I don't think that nonexistence has any value, so not creating people isn't inherently problematic for me (which is also the reason I do not actively advocate for natalism in a world that already has many issues to deal with). However, if it's ethical to not create a harm, it's also unethical to not create a good. In the case of existing people, this fact would be affected by various factors including the fact that those who exist do not seem to require excessive external interference for gaining happiness as long as they aren't harmed. However, it's quite evident that nonexistent beings are not in a preferable state of affairs. In view of this, if all else is equal, I do think that it would be problematic to not create a benefit if it's good to not create a harm. But since we don't live in such a world, I think it would be quite difficult for our intuitions to align with that logical conclusion. Actions that ultimately lead to more harm than good are not a desideratum.

"Oh, you have a good life in spite of suffering, and you also want to do everything you can do to help others? Well, that's irrelevant because the harms matter more so your procreation was not a gift but an immoral gamble" is not a particularly wise thing to say, in my view. Happiness is also more than mere probability or selective deontological games (defenestrate positive intentions regarding giving a good life but take into account allegedly selfish intentions pertaining to the birth of "mini-mes or more working hands) that care about a nonexistent "imposition" (whilst also attempting to impose an unjustified pessimistic view onto others) but not about an act of true beneficence which cannot be solicited and is one that leads to the genesis of the opportunity for indescribable value for billions of sentient beings in this mysterious universe of ours.

I do think that we need to stop worshipping parents blindly. There's nothing praiseworthy about creating people because you want more working hands. We definitely need to think about these issues in a more careful manner.

I hope people can think about these problems in a careful manner and reach a truly comprehensive conclusion. Having the will to do good and represent the interests of all can be a worthwhile and fulfilling endeavour. ;)

Yeah, I do not think that one should say that potential goods would outweigh the current harms (in the sense that they are the dominant factor in the present moment), since doing so almost seems to imply that most lives right now do not have sufficiently valuable lives and that possess harms that need to be outweighed by future goods. Also, I do not think that one needs to constantly harm someone for happiness (many people gain joy from helping others), even though they might permit some of it even as they try to alleviate it due to the presence of other positives. Obviously, we need to do a lot more, but I think that there are countless individuals who genuinely cherish their existence. In light of this, perhaps it would be better to say that life would be more worth creating in that utopia than it is now. However, I do not think that creating a person is always an all-things-considered harm for a person, so the question of potential utility outweighing the current "harm" would not be relevant.

One cannot "violate" the autonomy of someone who never expressed an interest in an alternative state of affairs that was somehow ignored when they were created. Also, people cannot ask for a good life either. If the absence of happiness is not bad because nobody needs it, then I do not think that the lack of suffering can be considered good either, since nobody benefits from that absence. Many people can find their lives to have a significant amount of value even in the face of harms, and I think that their perspectives also matter. However, it might not be a good idea to mindlessly procreate without addressing problems such as rising wealth disparity. In addition, people should not be pressurised to have children. Ultimately, I do not think that there is a convincing argument for antinatalism. Hopefully, we can create a better world for all through the implementation of ideas such as a liberal right to a graceful exit.

Interesting post. All I would add is that I believe that satisfaction itself can be pleasant. In view of this, we find hunger to be problematic only when our current level of contentment is depleted due to consumption. The same would apply to the desire for water (which comes from a loss of an adequate amount of water in our bodies), the desire to sleep (which comes after we have consumed all our energy doing various things), and the need to have money (which only becomes relevant when one finds their current resources to be insufficient). Therefore, I don't think that one needs harms to cherish pleasant experiences. However, it might be preferable to allow for some harms if they can lead to greater happiness for us. Nevertheless, the minimisation of unnecessary is generally a desideratum for living a fulfilling life. I hope that you and everyone here has a wonderful day/night!

:up:

That's indeed possible. And just as infinite desires could exist, infinite ways to attain fulfillment could also be present. Having the right perspective and problems that aren't as difficult to solve (such as the interminable large-scale wars and the lack of adequate healthcare that was prevalent in the past) could certainly help. I hope that we can work together towards progress for all!

:broken: :heart:

There's definitely much to truly understand, much of which could be counter-intuitive ;)

New goods could create new problems (although this doesn't change the fact that progress is possible, such as the eradication of diseases like smallpox and polio), but they also lead to new solutions. Pessimism matters, but so does optimism (at least for many). It certainly could be problematic to procreate in instances where the harm is likely to be too great, but I think it would be far more problematic to prevent all joy and lives that would be worth it. Still, it's obvious that not all times are appropriate for thoughtlessly creating new people, so caution should be exercised.

Not all things that appear to be self-evident (which, by the way, does not include the idea that reproduction is always wrong) are true ;)

It's self-evident that:
A. Innocent sentient beings deserve happiness and deserve to not suffer.

B. To deserve something is not the same as one having an obligation to help an individual. This is not self-evident at all, and neither does this have any reasonable basis.

What appears to be self-evident is the fact that people (who deserve happiness) do not have to be incessantly helped if that isn't required for them to have a sufficiently valuable life, particularly if that support includes great personal cost to oneself. All things are not equal as of now, so it's obvious that our intuitions would differ. But it's certainly "self-evident" to the majority of people that life can be worth it. As I have explained before, nonexistent beings are not in any preferable state of affairs, so this intuition that harms have greater significance becomes irrelevant. And, once again, if suffering is "undeserved", then the joys are definitely deserved. Generally, what we don't deserve leads us to what we do. Those who don't deserve slavery deserve freedom. Considering that happiness is the opposite of joys, it's obvious that innocent sentient beings who don't deserve to suffer deserve to be happy. The term "non-deserving" is a strange and arbitrary one which isn't applicable to reality. The allegedly asymmetrical nature of our intuitions regarding harms/benefits can be explained by conditions relevant to existence (greater harm, interference being unnecessary) that don't completely apply to nonexistence, so the asymmetry, and consequently universal antinatalism, remain flawed.

We may or may not "mind" many things, but that does not necessarily make them intrinsically bad/good (vide supra my earlier comments regarding the purported inherent badness of the state of being dead).

People do mind cessation if it leads to (what we perceive to be) an eternal loss of a valuable life. Also, if a deprivation only matters for one who exists to be deprived, then a prevention/liberation from harm also only matters for one who actually benefits from it, not the void. Benatar's pseudo-asymmetry does not seem logical to me.

A basic understanding can lead to erroneous conclusions ;)

And my hunch is that the widespread rejection of suicide (or dying as a whole, even though it remains an inevitability) points to the fact that the asymmetry is fundamentally flawed (though I have many other reasons as well, such as the fact that absence of the positives being significant if the lack of the harms matters). Vide the farmers in India spending hundreds of days to protest against oppressive laws even in the face of a lack of resources. There are some gains that can be subtle to spot and which are ineffably stronger than material wealth. If a debt is "settled" once a person ceases to exist, the profit of joy is also lost when it happens. And yet if the profits do not matter since the person does not exist, then neither does the absence of debts since their absence would not give them a positive balance and the opportunity to gain something truly valuable.

If pre-existence is a worse state of affairs than existence, it wouldn't make sense to not bring relief to people.

I hope more people can find real fulfillment in their lives and avoid deserts of misery and irrationality. May you and everybody else here have a wonderful day!

Indeed.

"Neutral" state of affairs might be better than bad ones (such as harm), but they are also worse than good ones (such as happiness). In light of this, I do think that if it can be good to prevent harms, it can also be bad to prevent potential joys. And as far as actions are concerned (in some sort of deontological sense), that would probably have more to do with not intentionally creating harm which harms someone's interests. However, since nonexistent beings don't have an interest in the void, I do think that it can be justifiable to create a person under that framework as long as one cares for them and creates them with the right intentions (them having a good life as opposed to being mere working hands). Even if I judge the morality of an action by something other than the consequences, I probably still won't believe in the asymmetry, because my intuition and inquiry into this matter don't tell me that the absence of harm is good even though it doesn't provide an actual benefit but the lack of joys isn't. The reasons for creating a person might change from happiness (or utility) to the general good of an individual or society, but I don't think that I would be convinced by the arguments for universal AN even if I held that framework. Have a nice day!

The asymmetry does not really make sense to me. There is nobody suffering from a deprivation of joy and nobody gaining fulfilment from the prevention of harm. Again, if one is not being deprived of happiness if they do not exist, they are also not being saved and brought to a blissful safe zone that would be better than nonexistence either. The evaluations are clearly comparative, and in that sense, if it can be good to prevent harms that no actual person in the void has a need to prevent (and would consequently benefit from their prevention), then it is also problematic to not create joys, irrespective of whether or not someone exists to ask for them themselves. This is just what I think. Anyhow, I hope that you have a brilliant day!

Dreams are indeed dreams and reality is indeed reality. They could meet, but we could also conflate. The line is blurred when biases (potential, but probable) and projections are involved. Dreams and intuitions covered by haze can be difficult to comprehend. Interpretations abound, yet reasonable probability seems to point away from the absolutes. Nevertheless, I realise that each individual will have their own conclusion. I can only hope that it will serve them well.

I completely concur. Part of the problem is the inability of most people to realise that shallow consumerism and unbridled selfishness can never lead to a good outcome in the long run. Toxic positivity is a facade that cannot hide the problems we need to address.

And neither will I ignore the fact that there is immense suffering in the world that has to be alleviated through monumental effort. What does give me hope is the existence of people who, in spite of having seen innumerable tragedies, still continue to see the light of meaning in seemingly insignificant things, such as the company of a loved one. There is humungous power there, and there are also people who gain happiness by helping others (a win-win of sorts) along with individuals like you who are deeply compassionate and often bring attention to that which needs to be done. We must not forget that there can be joy even amidst suffering, and as far as "guilty pleasures" are concerned, I believe that true joy comes through contentment, love, and beauty-none of which, if seen in a balanced way, can solicit guilt as long as one is also trying to help those around them and make the world a better place. Greater goods are a necessity, so that is a separate matter. I hope things will work out for the best.

I do not think so. I think it is more likely that we have not turned on all the lights. The place could turn bad, sure, but it is not always the case.

It is a desire that exists despite suffering due to the existence of things we may not always pay attention to (but which matter a lot for us), and while it could cause a form of suffering, I do not believe it is a form of suffering in and of itself. It does help the case for natalism because it gives us a reason to think that there is some good that is left that is worth continuing on for numerous people (even if cessation would be painless). The suffering could be avoided (although it is debatable whether that avoidance is exactly "good"), but the prevention of all cherished moments of life would certainly not be desirable. No life-no love for life; no love for life-no joy. I will not be myopic enough to claim that reducing the harms significantly must not be our priority, but I simply think that doing so should not come at the cost of all good.

Anyhow, I hope that you have an awesome day/night!

Sometimes, there's a dream of falling off one's bed that does not materialise in reality. After a while, its persistence loses its persuasion power. But reality obviously remains enigmatic. Terrible void, future bliss, or something else-much to ponder. May you have a good day!

Or eternal bliss :p

But I don't believe in hell (or the sort of theistic heaven people talk about). It's something ... ineffable. Interesting stuff, as always.

Sometimes we wish to close the door in front of us not only because the room in front of us looks bad, but also because leaving the majestic hall one is in would hardly be desirable ;)

I think that happiness does matter a lot, but for all practical purposes, I believe that we should indeed focus on removing extreme harms before chasing minor pleasures.

It's certainly not a good idea to allow for too many existing resources to be wasted away and fall prey to debt. Fortunately, I don't think that the losses have to outweigh the profits. Hopefully, we can continue to mitigate the former. Stopping thoughtless procreation would definitely go a long way in helping this endeavour.

Suicide is about as much evidence as the love people feel for life is evidence for the claim that the absence of happiness is bad even if nobody needs it (since many people want to keep living for as long as possible) but the absence of pain isn't (since many people don't seem to care about the fact that potential harm would also be averted, which might be the reason why many people want to preserve life even in instances of severe harm). In reality, I don't think that suicide gives us any evidence to believe that the absence of pain is bad but the lack of joy isn't. That same person could still think intuitively that the absence of joy would indeed be bad, but since they don't have it in the first place and the bads outweigh the good in their life, so ending one's life doesn't matter. I hope that fewer and fewer people would have to make this choice in a state of total misery. The right to a dignified exit could be useful as far as this is concerned.

I think that @Batricks is right in saying that a possible pre-existence could change the nature of procreation significantly. If it were the case that there were souls floating around in the void who were being tortured horribly and who were desperate to exist in order to find relief, procreation could become a lot more important. However, since there's no evidence that pre-existence is some sort of heaven/hell, I don't think we need to give too much thought to this possibility. In the end, I believe that the prevention of harms should not come at the cost of the prevention of all joy. We've discussed this before so I won't keep repeating myself. Hope you have a great day!

I am more interested in the truth than what seems to be absurd, and I don't think that talking about absurdity is relevant when someone believes that death brings us to a terrible state of affairs and that life shouldn't exist.

As I said before, just because we have a reason to create positive lives doesn't mean we do not have other considerations which do matter when making the decision. The fact that people would have to sacrifice a lot (for now) and aren't comfortable with the idea of constantly creating new lives certainly plays an important role, and so does the fact that such as society is unlikely to benefit for long.

You've also not provided an iota of evidence that we "deserve" to not be harmed but we don't deserve to benefit. Once again, deserving something has nothing to do with whether or not one needs something to happen, especially when there are other elements to consider. You have continued to ignore this point. We are trying to generate a reasonable position that is comprehensive and nuanced enough to account for the diversity of the sentient experience and our epistemic limitations. Your framework miserably fails to do that, I am afraid.

If there is no significant harm, then I do believe that we should increase happiness for others. Perhaps a way of doing that would not be to live in a world where everybody is obliged to help others and instead focus on not harming others (which usually proves to be sufficient for a valuable life). Once again, this hypothetical world where (all else is equal) is not the one we live in, so it doesn't make sense to refer to it and try to claim that my view is absurd. It's a lot more strange to suggest that preventing all potential happiness for the sake of averting harms is acceptable.

My view does account for this so-called asymmetry by mentioning the fact that this intuition is based upon our lived experiences, wherein there usually is a cost involved in doing too much to make others happy. If one is willing to posit a hypothetical which is divorced from our current reality, they should also understand that the nature of our intuitions could vary in such a situation. Personally, my intuitions do not tell me that it's necessary for me to not create a bad life but it isn't problematic to not do so if all else is truly equal. We need to account for our intuitions in a reasonable manner lest we fall prey to delusions.

Well, I completely disagree with you. You have merely asserted that suffering is undeserving but happiness is non-deserving without truly explaining why. Again, one could deserve something without needing it (if they are already content) or one being required to act (if there is too little good for too much harm involved). Deserving something has to do with whether a good should be given to someone, not with one needing that good or the creation of that good being necessary at a particular point of time. If you say that the suffering that is created is "undeserving", you're presupposing that it's something bad that's happening to innocent people who deserved to not suffer. But if that's the case, then I don't see how one could logically deny the fact that innocent people do deserve to be happy (which is what one is indirectly saying when we claim that they don't deserve to suffer). Your intuition is not shared by most people and it cannot serve as a basis for the alleged asymmetry.

If they truly are, then it certainly would be. But this hypothetical world is clearly so disconnected from our reality that many people are probably not going to even understand how different our intuitions would be in such a situation. The truth, however, transcends personal biases.

Simply resupposing that an intuition is rational is not rational. As I said in the other thread, not all intuitions are equally plausible. Believing that thunder is a punishment from the heavens might have seemed intuitive once upon a time, but later discoveries have shifted our understanding and consequently our intuitions. And as far as the rationality of intuitions is concerned, we should try to pay more heed to the universally shared intuition that the preservation of life and joy can be quite good.

You have not provided any justification for your claim that happiness is "non-deserving" other than resorting to alleged "intuitions" regarding the necessity to prevent harm but not increase happiness. However, you do not grasp the fact that deserving something does not entail that one needs a thing. Most people do intuitively believe that innocent sentient beings deserve to be happy and do not deserve to suffer. But a person could deserve good health even though one does not have an obligation to donate their organs to them if they do not have a need for them in the first place. The point is that connecting what we deserve (which is about our status as a moral sentient being) with an obligation to give something (which involves an actual need for something) is a line of spurious reasoning. I have already addressed the supposed asymmetry regarding our intuitions to avoid causing negatives but not creating positives. Firstly, it would be pertinent to mention that not all intuitions are correct, which is presumably what you would have to acknowledge if you want to defend a position that goes against the intuitions of most people (that reproduction is good). Secondly, this intuition can be explained by the fact that people who already exist do not need constant external interference for the sake of living a pretty decent life as long as serious harm is avoided. But this principle of giving precedence to the avoidance of harms as far as existing beings are concerned does not apply to nonexistent beings, since they are not in a satisfied state of affairs that would be maintained merely by the prevention of harms. Furthermore, actively doing good for others all the time can involve great personal cost and perhaps even a wider degree of harm for others. In light of this, it is quite natural that people would want to focus on mitigating harms. Yet this does not diminish the fact that the positives of life do matter for people and the fear of losing them (in the case of trying to create too much joy) and the joy of having them (in the case of not requiring interminable active effort from others) is what seems to play a major role in forming this so-called "asymmetry" that we possess no reason to apply to procreation. The arguments for universal antinatalism remain unjustified.

It's interesting how people can so flawlessly point out the alleged problems with other worldviews but fail to apply the same level of rudimentary critical thinking when it comes to their own belief. Antinatalism remains indefensible, but the arguments that you use to suggest that we should not trust our intuitions regarding the goodness of life (which are self-evident to many people, even if it isn't for you or some others) could also be used against your other claims regarding the inherent badness of death (after all, we do have a strong survival instinct which could help in the propagation of the species, which would be "desirable" in a metaphorical sense for evolution) or the creation of happiness not being necessary, neither of which are anywhere close to being as self-evident as 1+1 = 2. Something being "selected for" doesn't have to make it true or false, but it's certainly good to investigate our intuitions in a thorough manner to ensure that we don't hold flawed views regarding a nonexistent hellish void that we are condemned to post existence ;)

I was using good in terms of something being moral and something which we have a reason to do. And no, the good isn't "non-deserving", since ethical people do deserve happiness, in my view. I also have my doubts about the existence of "non-deserving" things, since I believe that saying one doesn't deserve something means they do deserve something better. Otherwise, there isn't much point in talking about what people deserve in the first place. And if suffering is undeserved sans any actual moral deed by a person, then the happiness is deserved.

Receiving an undeserved benefit could still be good for a person (in the sense that it would give them joy), but it obviously won't be moral, so I agree with that.

I think that all goods do give us reason to help others, but the point is that those reasons don't have the same power and can be countered by other reasons, such as the issues the creation of that relatively minor good could cause for you. Since most people don't need constant interference for joy other than a lack of harm, it wouldn't make sense to make others try to benefit people at a higher cost for themselves, since this is likely to lead to more harm than good. However, nonexistent beings are not in any preferable/undesirable state of affairs, which is why we have to view that situation differently.

If you could give my $1000 dollars at a nonexistent cost to yourself (no loss for you, no concerns about trust) and if making this an obligation wouldn't cause more harm for others, I believe that one would indeed have a duty of beneficence. However, as things stand, it simply doesn't make sense to try to cause a small benefit that isn't indispensable for a sufficiently valuable life but could cause more harm for the person trying to give the benefit. However, since nonexistent beings are not in a preferable state, the potential joys matter as much as the potential suffering.

I have said multiple times that just because we have a reason to help someone, it doesn't mean that we have to do it. As I have said before, existing people don't require a flurry of benefits for them to be adequately happy as long as they aren't harmed, which is why it can certainly make sense to focus more on reducing harms for existing beings instead of trying to bring about benefits that would eventually cause more harm for you or society as a whole. However, nonexistent beings are not in a fulfilled situation, which is why we don't have a reason to treat the harms and benefits in an asymmetrical manner.

Just because we believe something, it doesn't mean it's true. If this were the case, then I suppose one could summarily dismiss antinatalism on the basis that most people do believe that having children is good and so is the preservation of the positive aspects of life. As for the "obligation to procreate", I believe that we do have a reason to create positive lives just as we have reasons to not do so. This doesn't mean that it's always possible, and it could be the case that implementing such a view could lead to more harm than good, which would be counterproductive. The idea that no positive lives should be created is as much of a "repugnant conclusion" for many as is the idea that we do need to create too many people (which isn't necessarily required). Intuitions are bound to differ. Still, it's great to see people like you who do want to alleviate suffering and care about others. I hope more people could become compassionate like you.

Since my view does not entail that we must keep benefitting others at great cost to oneself, it is indeed self-evident. On the other hand, a position that suggests that it's acceptable to prevent all deeply meaningful experiences for the sake of averting harms is neither intuitive nor self-evident. We definitely don't have good reasons for accepting such as position ;)

You're missing the point. It is still good to benefit me. It's merely that superficial benefits that entail a high cost for you are not necessary, since that benefit isn't required for me to live a valuable life.

I could still deserve happiness, but this doesn't mean that I need it or you have to give it to me. Again, deserving things is about our innocence.

Again, preventing harms might be more important for those who already exist because most people do not require external interference for being adequately happy as long as they aren't harmed. This doesn't mean that one does not have a reason to benefit others, but this reason can be affected by our own personal limitations and the fact that the good isn't that pertinent for a sufficiently valuable life. But this doesn't apply to those who don't exist.

It's not asymmetrical, since both the joys and the harms do matter. It's only the case that there isn't a need to constantly try to benefit others when they do have fairly decent lives since they would probably not lose much happiness from the lack of intervention as long as there isn't severe harm. However, this framework would not apply when there is no fulfilled state of affairs in the first place.

Again, we do deserve happiness (because that has more to do with moral and immoral actions) just as much as we don't deserve suffering. But this doesn't mean that one would always need that happiness or there wouldn't be other factors to consider (such as the harm you could incur in trying to benefit me).

If it can be good to prevent harm, I do think that it can be bad to not create valuable lives. However, this has to be seen in the larger context of practical limitations and the impact of any universalisation of any idea.

Not exactly, since I don't need incessant interference from others (especially if it comes at a great cost for themselves) to be happy as long as they don't harm me. Rights are not exactly the same as what we deserve. Rights involve things we need others to do.
Here's the definition of "deserve" according to the Cambridge dictionary:

"to have earned or to be given something because of the way you have behaved or the qualities you have"

This means that deserving things has to do with our actions (which is why if one can say that we don't deserve to be happy because we haven't done anything moral before existing, we could also say that we don't deserve to not suffer since we haven't done anything to be "worthy" of that) and not with whether or not I would suffer from an absence of something. I could still deserve to receive a gift even if I am already happy as long as I don't commit an evil deed. Now, whether it's obligatory for you to give me a gift is a different matter, and this depends upon the degree of sacrifice involved for you, the long-term consequences of actions that could be universalised, as well as the amount of happiness that would be lost if I don't get the money. However, nonexistent beings aren't in a satisfied state of affairs, which is why we do not need to treat the benefits and harms in an asymmetrical manner.

If you say that people don't deserve to suffer (undeserved harm), then you are presuming their innocence. I would argue that innocent people deserve to be happy, just as they don't deserve to suffer. However, the way we create happiness has to be seen under a broader context that includes our own well-being and limitations as well as the outcome of any action (such as incessantly forcing others to increase happiness).

It isn't question begging. I am only pointing out that there isn't a sufficient reason to treat the harms and benefits differently. The point was that the reasons provided for treating harms and benefits differently as far as procreation is concerned are arbitrary.

We could be deserving of things without it being necessary for you to provide it to me if I don't have an extreme need for that thing in order to be happy. As for the benefit, I don't think that one needs to constantly benefit others when they don't need external help to such a great degree. However, this is because of the linked nature of harms and benefits. If one would suffer terribly if they don't get the money due to the absence of the joy of getting it, then it would definitely be important to give the money. However, since the lack of money is not likely to cause terrible harm to my ability to be happy, it doesn't make sense for you to sacrifice precious resources for trying to help me. But it's evident that nonexistent beings aren't in a state of affairs they prefer/don't prefer, which is why we would have to take future goods/harms into account.

I don't think that your claim is intuitive at all. One could claim that 2+2 is 4 but 1×4 is 8. But this would not make this true.

It's indeed self-evident that the harms are undeserved.

But it's also self-evident that the benefits are deserved. This is because we assume the innocence of people. We believe that innocent human beings deserve to not suffer, and they deserve to be happy. Your argument hasn't truly addressed that.

If you punch me, it would certainly be wrong (I think), since I don't believe that I deserve to be punched (I hope). However, this also implies that I deserve to be healthy (which is good for me). Deserving things seems to be about our innocence, not on the intensity of our needs to prevent being punched vs gaining money. For instance, even if someone is perfectly happy, it wouldn't be the case that they don't deserve more happiness unless they committed an immoral deed.

On the basis of consistency. Benefits and harms are interrelated. Since existing beings don't require incessant intervention in order to live sufficiently valuable lives, I do think that preventing extreme harms is more important. However, nonexistent beings aren't in a fulfilled state of affairs, which is why it becomes important to treat harms/benefits as far as they are concerned.

I don't think that there is any ambiguity. In my view, when we say that we don't deserve something, we necessarily mean that we deserve something else. This can be seen when we talk about people not deserving to be in prison, which is precisely because we believe that they deserve to be free. Therefore, it's the term "non-deserving" which is ambiguous and somewhat peculiar.

That's been the crux of the issue for a while now.

The claim that seems to imply that we do not deserve happiness because we haven't done anything moral, but we somehow deserve the prevention of suffering even though we haven't done anything good to justify that either.

I am aware of that. I was referring to the suicide point. Good or bad may not be experiential (I disagree with that but I grant that for the sake of the discussion). However, as I said before, I don't believe that one can say that absent harms that benefit nobody are good, but the lack of all joy is not a worse state of affairs.

Regarding the "asymmetry", it doesn't make sense to suggest that people who haven't done any good/bad don't "deserve" to suffer (which is why it would be good to prevent harm, which in turn would imply that they "deserve" to not suffer), but they somehow don't deserve to be happy (since they haven't done anything that justifies not creating that good). We do have a positive reason to create good (though that might be mitigated by other factors) just as we might have reasons to not create harm. Your argument implies that one needs to have done something good in order to deserve happiness, but if that's the case, then one could also say that they need to have done something worthwhile in order to deserve the prevention of harm (and the people who would have valuable lives need to have done something harmful if they apparently deserve to not experience potential joy). And if we cannot refer to nonexistence and only have existing people to work with, then we could also consider the fact that we do try to alleviate suffering for those who exist, which (rightly) suggests that we believe that everybody deserves to not suffer and be happy as long as they haven't harmed anybody. But if one needs to have done something moral to deserve happiness, then one could apply the same criteria to the prevention of harm and claim that we don't need to prevent suffering for people who just began to exist since they never did something that made them "deserve" the prevention of suffering. In other words, the bar of good as a necessity for joy but not for the prevention of harms seems arbitrary. I would also say that when we usually talk about what someone does not deserve, we also talk about what they do. So, if I say that someone does not deserve to be in prison, then I am also implying that they deserve to be free. Applying this framework to your argument would lead us to the absurd conclusion that people who begin to exist deserve to not experience joy (since they don't deserve to experience them).

In short, if the creation of suffering that nobody deserved to experience is bad (which would imply that "they" deserved to not suffer even though they did not exist prior to their birth), then the formation of joys that we did not deserve to not experience can be good. If one needs to have done some good in order to justify the bestowal of joy onto them, then the only consistent view would be that one needs to have done a good if they don't deserve to suffer. I think that you are equivocating. By saying that suffering is undeserving, you are essentially implying that there is a reason to prevent harms for someone who has not done anything moral. In other words, people always "deserve" to not suffer. However, one could just as easily point out the fact nonexistent beings have not done something immoral either, which is why they don't deserve to not experience potential joy. I don't see any valid reason to accept the claim that doing something good is required for one who never existed to deserve happiness (which is a bizarre criteria, since we don't have a reason to assume that people who were created by us and haven't done any harm and weren't capable of doing a good before existing don't deserve to be happy), but it isn't necessary for them to have done something moral in order for them to deserve the elimination of suffering. Whenever we say that something was undeserving, we also mean that something else was preferable, such as freedom instead of imprisonment. Therefore, if you believe that the harms were undeserving, your position also entails that nonexistent beings "deserve" to not suffer. And this is where the unjustified double standards in your asymmetry become clear, for if it is important to have done a good for one to deserve joy, then I don't see why the same criteria should not apply in order for us to become undeserving of suffering. As always, focus does remain important. Have a wonderful day!

It was Agent who said that suicide somehow supports the asymmetry. But it isn't clear to me that a desire to die somehow implies that the absence of pain is actually bad. It could be the case that one would find relief from a slightly less painful death rather than living a life devoid of any value. However, this doesn't give us any reason to think that nonexistence itself is intrinsically better for the person. If one wants to take potential suffering that would be prevented into account, they also need to take potential joys into account. The failure to do so could lead to irrational conclusions. Once again, not all our intuitions might be correct (just as the antinatalist might claim, erroneously in my view, that the intuition that life is worth it is correct). The only thing that has been demonstrated ("vide supra") is that merely asserting that the lack of pain is good but the absence of happiness isn't bad on the basis of a selective glance at our intuitions is not logical. The absence of happiness leads to pain and the lack of pain can lead to satisfaction, so I don't think that one is fundamentally important than the other.

I already said I don't agree with it. I don't think I ignored your argument.

It's true that only the existent can experience goods and bads. They might also prevent potential benefits/harms.

Your claims about harms/benefits and who "deserves them are problematic, in my view. If it's bad for people to experience harms they did not "deserve" to experience, I don't see why it wouldn't be good for innocent potential people to experience joys they never deserved to not experience. Once again, there's no real asymmetry here, so universal antinatalism cannot be justifiable.

And I don't think that the fact that there's nobody "missing out" on pleasure is relevant. There's nobody in the void who's desperate to avoid existence and would somehow feel fulfilled by their lack of creation. In short, they won't be "saved" from suffering since they would never exist in the first place to gain from that better state of affairs. However, if it's supposedly good for a harm to not exist even though it doesn't provide a tangible benefit to a person, I think that the only logically consistent view would be to suggest that the lack of happiness is bad irrespective of whether or not someone can ask for it themselves. I believe that the so-called asymmetry involves arbitrary double standards which are not reasonable.

Lol! Or perhaps the realisation that if a state of affairs devoid of harms does not need an experiencer to be deemed good, I don't think that one has good reasons to claim that someone needs to exist for the lack of value to be problematic. Arbitrary double standards don't constitute a valid "asymmetry'.

As for pregnancy, I do think that we really need to take procreation far more seriously and ensure that we don't engage in mindless reproduction that could create mostly bad lives and exacerbate harms.

Which is why we don't have to accept Benatar's asymmetry in the first place, since it doesn't make sense to claim that the lack of harms is supposedly "good" but the absence of joy isn't. Nobody needs the happiness before they exist, but neither do they need the void. And yeah, people who exist can certainly be a source of value for others, but it would still be preferable to avoid lives that are bound to be mostly negative.

I don't think that there is any sound argument for universal antinatalism. If it is bad to create negative lives, I believe that it can also be good to create positive ones, irrespective of whether or not one can ask for such a life themselves (however, we do need to take practical limitations and long-term impact of any action into account). And if the absence of pain is good even though it does not benefit an actual person, I don't see any reason to think that the lack of happiness isn't problematic even if there's no conscious harm. In the end, I agree that Benatar's asymmetry makes little sense, but that applies to universal antinatalism as a whole, as I showed in that other thread ;)

"Where there is value, there needs to be a valuer."
In which case one cannot claim that the absence of pain that helps nobody in the void is good but the lack of happiness isn't because someone isn't crying out for the joys.

Regarding suicide and the "truth" of asymmetry, I think that people can believe many false things and many right things for the wrong reasons. If the fact that most people believe life is good and the joys are worth creating even if nobody needs them does not justify the idea that life can be worth it, then I don't think that the notion that the absence of pain is good but the lack of joy isn't bad can be logically defended, even though this might be an intuition we have (along with a whole bunch ofnotjer the intuitions that include the goodness of reproduction and life itself). The reality is that:
1. Cessation could be rational if one considers the fact that it would prevent more harm than good.

2. Alternatively, it could reduce one's pain, a relief which would certainly be desirable if no other way can be found.

Benatar's asymmetry is false and the biggest argument for that is life itself ;)

Chickens might be wiser since they don't hold seem to hold strange views regarding the intrinsic badness of death.

A view that ignores the larger picture and doesn't even bother to check whether or not it's what it appears to be can never be nuanced.

Projection is a real problem. Nevertheless, I apologise if I failed to grasp what you wrote and consequently misinterpreted it.

Putting on the blindfold when the lights are turned on will generally impair one's ability to see. That doesn't affect the ineluctable truth. However, it's fine that you missed the fact that I addressed them thoroughly.

A "claim" can also be used to refer to any argument/position/conclusion/opinion. Your conclusion is a part of an argument which claims that something is true. It's not an indisputable fact to me, so I will continue to refer to it as a claim. But as I've demonstrated (I think), your conclusion remains indefensible.

Have a nice day!

No, the point was that it's not necessary that the "mediocre" lives are mostly bad. They could certainly be, but they could also be good (overall).

Why did you put "becasue" in quotes? Was that a prophecy that you were going to write it in paragraph 15 of your reply?

The pain could certainly be harmful. Other than that, I don't think that unsubstantiated claims about the badness of death can be accepted.

You have once again failed to understand that if life does have more value, it would not make sense to end it, especially if the process could be painful. It's certainly quite relevant.

Moderately miserable lives can also be good. I don't think that the harm is the only relevant factor in consideration. Just as there could be harms in such a life, there could also be pleasant moments which would make the person's life worth living. That judgement would probably have to be made by the person themselves. If we have adequate reason to believe that the life would still contain more good than bad, it can be justifiable to create them. However, it's true that we should refrain from creating them if the risk of significantly high.

No, you're the one who keeps misssing the point. Uninvestigated intuitions don't give us a basis to believe something is inherently bad. As I have mentioned ad nauseam, just because the life has many harms one cannot ignore the fact that it could also have many goods. If it didn't, it would probably be worse than a mediocre life. A person could have a bad life but still find living to be preferable to a painful death (which could be rational) or they could also consider the harms to be not strong enough to devalue the goods they experienced. They could also believe that nonexistence brings them to some special sort of hell, but while they might "think" that this gives them a reason to avoid death, it would be an unjustified reason that would be akin to fearing thunder as some evil force that sends us to hell.

I've already said before that I don't agree with you the deprivation account. You're the one seems unwilling to go beyond your rigid framework.

Throughout this discussion, I have repeatedly tried to excavate the foundations of our intuitions by searching for the reasons we have them. You have, mistakenly so in my view, ignored that by callously accusing me of focusing on "psychology". Howbeit, you have missed the fact that it can be important to focus on the reasons because:

A. We can see whether or not the intuition is rational by searching for the elements that gave rise to it. For instance, imagine that you are afraid for the life of a loved one. This intuition would surely deserve more attention if this was because you thought that she was in a risky part of the neighborhood than if it arose because you saw a character being harmed in a horror movie. How do we determine whether or not the intuition is rational? We do so by looking at the evidence at hand and whether or not our reasons for having that intuition are reasonable. A loved one being defenseless in a risky area is, but a fear that arises from watching a horror movie does not seem to be so.

B. We can also see if the absence of the reasons behind the intuition would cause it to reduce/not exist. Now, I had talked about three major reasons (aside from a pure instinct to survive and propagate that all organisms seem to have):

1. External influence that we take in blindly.

2. A desire to cherish the good that exists in one's life.

3. The desideratum to avoid extreme pain.

I think that we have more than decent reason to believe that the lack of the above factors can certainly help diminish/remove the intuition that death is bad. Regarding (1), I think my own perspective has changed quite a bit depending on the environment around me and the amount of knowledge I possessed. When I was younger, I did not really fear death. But when everyone around me kept talking about how bad death is, I internalised that view and started to view death as something terrible. However, when I actually started reading about this issue and the nature of reality itself, my dear (in terms of nonexistence itself being bad) reduced significantly, and due to this, I also don't have such a great desire to avoid death.

As for (2), I think that this is fairly obvious. As one starts to lose value in their life, they increasingly begin to see death as a valid option. This is a good example of how the replacement of joy with pain can gradually make a person to wish to cease to exist: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/24/podcasts/the-daily/marieke-vervoort-euthanasia-belgium.html

I hope that people can have the right to a graceful exit, even though I also wish that we can create a world where nobody would have to take that option amidst intense harm.

And finally, (3) ties into the second point because people clearly do wish to avoid pain. However, when they have the ability to die in a relatively painless way (such as those who chose voluntary euthanasia), people can prefer cessation or at least stop fearing death too much. I've personally experienced this as well as seen this with other people. Since we now know that the lack of these reasons can diminish the intuition, I believe we now have an abundance of valid justifications for thinking that the intuition that death itself is bad (as opposed to pain/loss being bad) is not reliable. The intuition that we need to avoid death can certainly be rational, but this would be for vastly different reasons and it would also entail that we should not infer that the void itself is a realm of agony.

I also explained that there's a difference between any value that life would have for us/any moral value that life would have and the joys that life itself would experience. The immoral person could still have a life that would be mostly good for themselves, even if they harmed others. I thought that the topic was the badness of death for the person, and if that is the case, then the same reasons I mentioned before apply here. Obviously, it wouldn't help us if the killer continued to live. However, the question was whether death was a harm for them, not for us. As I've mentioned before, the only plausible view could be that it robs them of a good life or the process itself would involve immense pain. Except for this, I don't think that meaningless about the inherent badness of death that are premised upon intuitions that we haven't really looked into can be considered logical. Blithely ignoring the reality won't affect it.

Whether or not the killer has a good life in prison would depend on their attitude. A friend of mine who had been to a prison that some people there were fairly happy and clearly wanted to keep living. Obviously, they would have preferred if they were not imprisoned. But many things exist in degrees, and it's not necessary that a person would immediately desire nonexistence if they are in prison. As per the deprivation account, if the person would still have lived a life that had more moments of happiness than harm, it would be bad for them to die. If it would contain more harm, it would not be bad for them to cease to exist (other than a few goods that would be lost, but then that could be outweighed by the prevented harm). Alternatively, it could still be reasonable for them to keep living a fairly average life over dying in a painful way. What wouldn't make sense would be an aversion to death on the basis of a baseless argument for the void being some sort of hell. Thankfully, most people don't seem to have this unreliable intuition.

I've only mentioned it because you don't fully understand it, but I've also explained that I don't agree with it. However, as always, you continue to turn the other way when things don't suit you. One could do better, my friend. Once again, you are missing the point by forgetting the face that a moderately bad life could be worsened by a painful death, in which case it could be better for a person to keep living. Furthermore, if the life is moderately bad, it could also be moderately good, which would give them a reason to not choose nonexistence. Death could still be reasonable if the harms would always outweigh the good, but just because it is doesn't mean that everybody would be able to overcome their emotions, the deeply ingrained views regarding death, and their (very rational) fear of pain to take the final step, especially if their life also gives them a decent amount of reasons to keep living.

I disagree with the deprivation account for different reasons. However, your arguments against it fail to defeat the deprivation account, since you've only claimed that death would be a harm for a moderately valuable life whilst failing to consider the limits of intuitions and restricted understanding that afflicts many people. In your case:

If P, then Q.
P
Therefore, Q.

If death prevents greater suffering than good, then it is preferable (according to the deprivation account). It could be that ending one's life would be a slight harm as well if it prevents some positives. However, non-existence would still be better overall. But I don't think that most lives are mostly negative.

The upshot is that the deprivation account still stands as far as your criticisms are concerned.

I agree that the pain is bad and it would probably be the real reason why the harms are bad. If only some people could realise that there is also pain involved in death, which might be the real reason behind why we want to avoid death (and which would be rational) instead of some unjustifiable claims about the inherent badness of death (which we have no evidence to believe that it plunges us to hell). But you also don't understand what exactly would be lost. Sure, it would be bad that the person couldn't watch the movie. However, the bigger loss would be the fact that they would be robbed of their health. I don't think that you understand the things you are criticising, my friend.

Your criticisms of the deprivation account are often incoherent and often don't even realise what would be lost (health instead of a movie). As things stand, I am afraid that you have merely initiated a pointless cycle to talk about your cherished beliefs that you never truly wanted to be changed in light of new evidence.

You didn't, and neither did you prove the intrinsic badness of death. I think that even a goldfish is capable of paying attention for a while, which is much better than ignoring everything.

I've argued that while we have certain intuitions regarding the harm of death (which could include the idea that it brings us to hell), not all of those intuitions appear to be reasonable in light of a critical analysis of the world around us. The annihilation of our being (loss of good) and the pain incurred by us during the dying process can give us good reasons to avoid cessation, but it's apparent to me that they don't give us a reason to think that the joyous moments of life that consist of ineffable love and beauty don't matter.

Wishful thinking/total lack of thinking at all might be an apt description of your replies. I wouldn't want to degrade chickens here, so I won't comment on them. You have failed to justify that death does not lead to the cessation of our being other than point to intuitions while ignoring the fact that not all intuitions are reasonable. Your intuition might tell you that driving your car for the first time will necessarily kill you, but you logically disregard that instinct once you consider the evidence at hand, such as the fact that there's no evidence that people are always dying when driving for the first time, and your fear probably has to do with a movie you saw a while ago. But since we know that movies don't always match with reality, we have good reason to think that our intuition is unreliable. Now, you could claim that people do in fact die and are secretly replaced by invisible clones, but the question is—which view is more reasonable? And just as one would probably consider the clone explanation to be unlikely, one could also see that the lack of any evidence for hell post existence combined with other reasons for our intuitions (fear of loss and pain)
give us solid reasons to reject the idea that nonexistence leads to hell.

You're free to believe otherwise, but it would be pertinent to remember that this would probably be a position held despite of true reason, not because of it. The" truth", probably, is that there is no good reason to think that death takes us to a worse place. As for heaven, I think one could definitely say that the fact that so many people believe in heaven gives us a "reason" to believe that it's a serious possibility (since that's apparently all that's required for one to think death is a special form of hell). One could bolster this intuition by mentioning the fact that some people have a strong desire to die (and reach heaven) that's not acted upon only due to the possibility of extreme agony while dying. So, it's so good that only extreme pain can make us want to delay it. As for other people, there could be other reasons for the lack of their desire to immediately go to "heaven" such as the fact that they believe that living a specific sort of life is required for going there. Additionally, one could just as plausibly say that our strong desire to exist and reproduce give us a "reason" to think that nonexistence is always bad (before and after existence) and it's only life that can provide us relief, even if it contains harms. The point is that these intuitions are no less reasonable than the ones you rely on. If you could look beyond your lazy dogmatism, you could realise that mere intuitions give us very few rational reasons to believe in the existence of something we have no evidence for. This becomes even more important when those intuitions can have other intuitions driving them (such as dying being too painful and death leading to a loss of happiness), which gives us a reason to believe that the intuition is pointing to something other than the inherent badness of death (along with the fact that not all parts of the intuition give us equally good reasons to trust them). You have certainly taken this matter out of the realm of reason, my friend, but it has also given us excellent reasons to doubt your position. You've managed to convince me even more that many of our attitudes towards death are based on vacuous claims and uninvestigated intuitions that are not defended in a very rational manner. Since there is a "possibility" that there are souls in the void suffering horribly before they exist (which is supported by our intuition that living is good/preferable even in the face of harm), we could also say that we have a reason to think that life brings us to the only "better" place possible.

Now, since there is a possibility that there are souls floating around in the void desperate to exist and avoid the pain of inexistence (which we apparently have a reason to believe sans any actual evidence merely due to intuitions), it would be reckless beyond comprehension to even think about supporting a view that leads to the cessation of all life and condemns billions of souls to an eternity in agony. Not saving innocent souls from that terrible state of affairs for as long as we can is patently immoral. A view that rejects this clearly deserves opprobrium.

The reality is that we have no evidence to think that nonexistence leads to hell. If anything, your inability to truly understand the nature of reality and our intuitions inexorably leads one to the conclusion that universal antinatalism remains a flawed position to hold. But if we are going to trust our intuitions blindly, then the possibility of an eternally painful void containing souls being tortured makes natalism a no-brainer. The true predicament might be that a few people don't understand the seriousness of the matter.

Those might be possibilities, but they aren't the only ones out there. If nonexistence leads to an eternity of happiness for innumerable souls, I don't think that it's a good idea to not create a person. Furthermore, going by our intuition that life is preferable to nonexistence, I think it can certainly be "reasonable " (if you think that our intuition that death is bad is totally reliable without any investigation/context) to think that the void contains innocent souls being harmed in ways you and I cannot even imagine. Not saving them just because one personally doesn't see value in life is too cruel a game for any ethical person to play. You can continue fearing a hell that we have no evidence for if that's what you have chosen to do. I think that you deserve better, my friend. But be that as it may, I don't think that your opinion justifies condemning souls to an eternity of pain. Or, more realistically, it does not give us a valid reason to prevent all potential joys.

Until we know beyond reasonable doubt that the void does not have souls (which we cannot see or know except for "inferring" that on the basis our intuition that life is better than nonexistence even in pain) who are desperate to exist and avoid the agony of nihility, it is immoral to advocate for universal antinatalism. More modestly, I think that it would be irrational to believe that death is inherently bad unless we have a good reason to think that we should not try to see whether or not our intuitions are always reliable about things it doesn't know much about (and we know that thunder is not a magic spell cast from hell) and when that intuition might actually be pointing to other things than the one we think it is at a superficial glance. Considering that (in my opinion) you failed to demonstrate the falsity of the idea that the intuition might be the result of societal influence (in which case it as as arbitrary and unjustified as the idea that racism is good merely because one's culture believes it to be so) and that it could be linked with other intuitions (life being good, the process of dying involving too much pain) that give us a reason to think that it's actually pointing at something else, I believe that we can safely say that your position is not reasonable and universal antinatalism remains immoral and deeply problematic. Pessimistic prognostications about the void cannot be accepted without sufficient justification.

Thanks for your detailed replies. I appreciate your willingness to share your thoughts in such depth, and though I disagree with you, I am truly grateful to you for sharing your insights. You clearly care about the reduction of harms, which is something that we definitely need to focus on. I hope that we can live in a better world someday (and prove more definitively that death doesn't necessarily lead to eternal hell and that life does indeed have profound value!). Hope you have a fantastic day/night!

No, they're not.

Many "mediocre" lives can also have value, but I agree that a life which a person won't cherish (for the most part) should not be created. However, you're once again missing the point that people could still prefer their average lives over a painful death or the cessation of their entire being due to a fear of death that's often encouraged by the culture around us. Whether or not that's true is another matter (especially if there is no possibility of joy left and the pain is extreme).

I haven't claimed that all lives are worth creating due to their "intrinsic value". There certainly are harms that also exist, but a "moderately bad" life could also be partially good (and a life where the person is frequently thinking about ending everything might be worse than "moderate"). However, unless the positives would outweigh the negatives for that person, I think it would be better to not create them. I do think that we need to take procreation a lot more seriously.

There are also many meaningful lives being lived that continue to see unfathomable potency in life which is what fuels their desire to continue living even in the face of suffering. I think it would be narrow-minded to reduce their choice to simply an intuition to avoid death, since there is more to their lives than just that.

People could indeed suffer due to a lack of a meaningful relationship, so it's not a trivial matter. However, I won't be emphasising that here.

If the aversion to death is evidence that it leads to something terrible, I think that the fact that people do wish to continue living despite the existence of harms does demonstrate that life has more value than some people realise ;)

As far as the death penalty is concerned, I don't think that there is much confusion here. Since the convict could still have a decent life, the loss of their life/the pain they would feel would certainly be a harm for them. I feel that the latter is more relevant, but the larger point is that both of these points make more sense than some unjustifiable idea regarding the intrinsic badness of death.

The murderer may not be a good person, but that has no bearing on whether or not he enjoys his life. If he does live a mostly happy life, then one can plausibly say that the loss of his life would not be something he would find palatable, especially if it entails harm that would be felt consciously.

Those are two different things. The fact that the beauty of her face was lost is indeed a harm. However, there is also pain and a deprivation of happiness, which would probably be the primary concern here. Fortunately, we don't have sufficient evidence to believe that nonexistence (as opposed to the process of dying) leads to a terrible state of affairs.

I do not necessarily agree with the deprivation account (since I don't think that the void can be either good or bad). However, your criticism of it appears to be merely presupposing that death is a harm without justifying that idea other than resorting to intuitions that may not align with what we know to be in our rational interest due to the existence of strong emotions and a close association of death with physical harm (which has generally been the case throughout history, though it's fortunately beginning to change in recent years, I believe). The deprivation account won't say that death is inherently good or bad, but it would say that the loss of a mostly good life is instrumentally bad by virtue of the good it deprives you of, just as the cessation of a mostly bad life (that would most likely be bad in the future as well) can be instrumentally good (instead of a lesser evil) by virtue of the harm it prevents. Again, simply assuming that death itself is harm because of mostly unexamined intuitions that conflate different pertinent elements (pain and nonexistence) appears to be an irredeemable flaw in the argument.

I don't think that any of your arguments give us reason to think that death is an intrinsically bad state. All of your examples have, in my view, better explanations that also take the limits of our intuitions into account. In short, any potential badness of death (aside from the pain of dying) comes from misconceptions regarding the void, a desire to prevent possible pain (which seems to be more rational), and a loss of the possibility of goods one could experience. Again, we've discussed this before, so I would rather avoid incessant repetition. I hope that you have an excellent day!

:up:

Or perhaps life has so much value that it takes a significant amount of suffering before one decides that they no longer want to live.

Even if there is pain involved in death, I don't think we have sufficient reason to believe that the harm outweighs all the good one can also experience throughout their life. It could, but not necessarily.
Interesting stuff.

Many of us certainly are grateful to be there.

We cannot ask to be at the restaurant either. Thankfully, our friends were kind enough to bring us there :p

When most people enjoy the majority of the course, I don't think that a precise choice is necessary.

That terrible soup at the end might not always be extremely bad. It could be mediocre, but we would find it terrible because many of the other dishes we had were so good. Furthermore, not everybody believes that a bad soup (whose degree of badness can differ for different individuals) at the end of hundreds of absolutely delectable meals (and a few bad ones) makes the alternative of never having a meal preferable. Lastly, it might be reasonable to say that the final soup tastes bad and could probably cause an upset stomach. What wouldn't be reasonable (I think) would be to think that it would set one's tongue on fire for eternity. Anyway, this has been discussed for long, so I shall stop here. Hopefully, more people can judge the menu in its entirety instead of emphasising a single dish. Have a wonderful day!